ANANT PRASAD LAKSHMINIVAS GENERIWAL versus STTE OF ANDHRA PRADESH AND OTHERS
Supreme Court of India | Decided 2 November 1962 | [1963] SUPP. 1 S.C.R. 844 | 1962 INSC 308
Key facts
- Decided
- 2 November 1962
- Bench
- BHUVNESHWAR PRASAD SINHA*, P.B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, K.N. WANCHOO, K.C. DAS GUPTA, J.C. SHAH
- Bench size
- 5
- Case number
- CIVIL APPEAL No. 140/1962
- Disposal
- Dismissed
- Citation
- [1963] SUPP. 1 S.C.R. 844
- Neutral citation
- 1962 INSC 308
Text of the judgment
844 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963] SUPP.
1962
T ravancCJre Ruibtr
of agri.cultural income from tea plantations and from
rubber plantations is therefore based on good reasons.
r/ Tt11 C6. Ltd.
v
::i·t~te of J(~!nla
Raghubar Dt1yal, /.
Vve hold that the provisions of Explanation 2
are not discriminatory against agricultural income
from rubber plantations.
W c therefore see no forcr in these petitions and,
accordingly, tlismiss the>n with costs, one set.
Petition8 dinm:ssed.
191;2
.Novtmlcr, 2.
/\NAN f PRASAD LAKSHMINIV AS
GENERIWAL
1),
ST ATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH AND OTHERS
(With connected Petition)
(B. P. SINHA, C. ]., P. B. GA.!ENJJRAGAJ>KAn,
K. N. '"' ANCH(JO, K. c. D.\S GUPTA
and]. C. SHAH, .JJ.)
Religiow; Public Trust-Regisl<at:on-Notice on tra8tee~
F'ailure of trustee to app~a.r-Orfkr of remfJval, 1f ultra v1resConstitutional t'alidity of cnactu1,fnt-Trust in one ,') taiel)roperty in unother-l'enue of regi8frat/on-H11de1«1hol liJndowmr.nts Regulation, 1.940, ss. 3, 9.
1
'fhe appellant, who was also the petitioner in the \Vrit
petition, clairned to be the sole hereditary trustee and mut\valli
of the ancient temple of Shri Sitararn Maharaj i:1 Hyderabad.
For the n1aintenance of that temple certain village:; in 13e-rar
had beed granted by the N1zam. The appellant's father had
g-Ot the temple registered as a public trust nnder s. 7(1) uf the
Madhya Pradesh Public Trusts Act, 1951, in June, J9:i:i.
i s.c.:R.
SUPREME COURT RE.1-'0:Rts
845
On December 31, 1957, the appellant was served with a notice
by the Director of Endowments, Hyderabad, to have the temple
registered under the Hyderabad Endowments Regulations,
1940. He objected that the temple having already been
registered under the Madhya Pradesh Act, was not liable to be
Registered under the Regulations and the State of Andhra
Pradesh had no jurisdiction over the endowment and its property. He moved the High Court under Art. 226 challenging
the notice on various grounds. The High Court rejected the
petition, and upheld the validity of the notice. He appealed.
After the High Court had dismissed the writ petition, the
Director of Endowments passed two orders directing that the
supervision of the temple be taken over under r. 179 of the
Endowment Rules and that the management of the temple do
vest in the Director of Endowments, Hyderabad. The
appellant then filed the writ petition in this Court against
these two orders challenging the validity of the Regulations
and the various rules framed thereunder as being repugnant
to Arts. 14 and 19 of the Constitution. His further contention
was that the orders could not be made even under the
Regulations.
Held, that the trust being situate in tlyderabad, the
Hyderabad f,ndowment Regulations applied not only to the
temple situated at .Hyderabad but also to its property situated
outside the State of Andhra Pradesh, that the trust had already
been registered under the Madhya Pradesh Public Trusts Act
could make no difference. Sections 2 (4) and 3 of this Act
clearly showed that a public trust contemplated by it must be
situated in the State of Madhya Pradesh.
State of Bihar v.
S.C.R. 601, applied.
Smt. Gharusi/,a Dasi, [1959] Supp. 2
State of Bihar v. Bhab<Jpritananda Ojlta, [1959] Supp. 2
S.C.R. 624, referred to.
It was not correct to say that because of the application
of the Charitable Endowments Act, 1890, and the Charitable
and Religious Trusts Act, 1920, to Hyderabad, then a Part B
State the Hyderabad Endowment Regulationi, 1940, must be
deem~d to have been repealed by operation of s.6 of the Part B
States (Laws) Act, 1951. The former defil\ilely excluded
public religious trusts such as the present one and the latter,
bys. 3, was confined to a very limited purpose.
Nor could the difference in tl>e two laws y•lating to public
religious arid charitable trusts ! •vailing in lie two parts of
1962
Anant Pras•d
Lakshminivt'lr
Gtneriwal
v.
Stal1 of Andhra
Pr«iesh
846 SUPREME COURT REPORTS[1963] SUPP
1962
Anant Prasad
Lakthminiua~·
Generiwal
v.
Slate of Andhra
Pradesh
the Andhra State, one formerly part of the A State of Madras
and the other of the B State Hyderabad, be said to be discriminatory. J)ifference such as this occ-1sioned as it wa5 by historical reasons could be no ground
for striking down the
la\vs
u11der Art. 14 of the Constitution.
Hhaiyalal Shu/;la v. State of Jfai.l!tya i'rcule.>h, [1%2]
Supp. 2 S.C.R. 297, applied.
State of Rajasthan v. Rao Mmwlutr 8inghji,
!\.C.R. 996, held inapplicable.
f!Y54J
The provisions contained in ss.3 to 11 of the Hyderabad
Regulations, excepting those of s. 4(b) which had no application, provided for the rcgir;tration of cndow1nents and were
conceived in public intere'lt and \Vere as such clearly reason-
able restrictions within the meaning- of Art. 19 (5) of the
Constitution and did not, therefore, contravene Art. I Y (I) (f) of
the Constitution. The validity of these provisions and the rules
fran1ed thereunder, except r.25 \vhich ha" uo relevance to the
subject matter of the appeal and such rules a5 arc consequential
thereon, must therefore be upheld valid.
Further, the two orders, \vhich harl the effect of rc1nuving
the applicant fron1 tr11steeship must be h:~ld to Gr. ultra vires.
Neither che Regulations nor the Rule::. pcrn1ittcd the re1noval
of a trustee for failure to appear in an-;'>ver to a notice for
registration of an endowment, nor coul.d the orders be justified
under rr. 67 and 68 since there was no enq11iry, they were not
mac.le by the Govcr111neut and the re111oval was for a reason
not perrnissibJe thereunder. 'fhc t\Vo orders must, therefore,
be set aside.
CrvIL APPELLATE Jutu8vH;'l'loN: Civil Appeal
No.140/62.
Appeal by special leave from the judgment
and order dated March 18, 1960, of the Andhra
Pradesh High Court in Writ Petition No. 358 of 1958.
WITH
Petition No. 86 of 1960.
Petition under Art. 32 of the Constitution of
India for enforcement of Fundamental Rights.
1 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
847
N. C. Chatterjee, AUadi Kuppuswami, 'l'.
Rama Chandra Rao and Ganpat Rai, for the appellant in C. A. No. 140 of 62 and the Petition No. 86
of 1960.
P. Ramachandra Heddy, D. V. Snstry, 'l'. V.R.
'I'atachari and P. D. Menon, for the respondents
1 to 2.
1962
Anant PrasrJd
Lnkshminivris
Generiwal
v.
State of Andhra
Prad•sh
1962. Novembr.r 2. The Judgment of the Court
was delivered by
WANCHOO, J.-Thc
appeal is by special leave
from the order of the Andhra Pradesh High Court.
The appellant has also filed a writ petition and as
the two matters are connected, they will be dealt with
together.
The appellant is Anant Prasad Lakshminivas
Generiwa I. He is also the petitioner in the writ
petition and will hereafter be referred to as the appellant. The main respondents, who are also opposite
parties in the writ petition, are the State of Andhra
Pradesh and the Director of Endowments, Hyderabad.
They will be referred to hereinafter as the respondents.
The appellant claims to be the sole hereditary trustee
and Mutwalli of the temple of Shri Sitaram Maharaj
Sansthan and the subsidiary deity Shri Varadarajaswami, situate at Sitaram Bagh, in Hyderabad. In
the eauier part of the nineteenth century, an ancestor
of the appellant migrated to Hyderabad and carried
on business there. He obviously prospered and in or
about 1833 he built a temple at a cost of two lakhs
of rupees and installed in it the idols of Shri Rama
and other ancillary or subsidiary deities and consecrated the temple for public benefit and worship. In
1841, one Maharaja Chandulal, a minister to the then
Nizam, granted a jagir consisting of the villages of
Akolee and Bordee in Berar for the upkeep and
maintenance of the temple. Later, however, these
Wanchoo, J.
848
1962
.Ananl Pro.tad
Lakshminivas
Gentriwal
v.
Stale of Andlua
Prorksh
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [!Do3] SUPP·
villages were resumed by the Nizam and two other
villages were granted ins(cad to the temple. It appears
that these two other villages were also resumed, and
the village of Bulgaon was granted to the temple in
1850. It also appears that though village Akolee was
resumed, the resumption order was not carried out
and that village continued in the possession of the
temple, so that since 1850 the temple has been in
possession of the two villages for its upkeep and maintenance. In 1853, Berar was transferred to the
British Government of India by the Nizam and these
two villages therefore came under the administration
of the Government of India. In 1859, some doubts
arose about the title of the temple to the villages and
there were enquiries under the Berar Inam Rules.
Eventually, it was decided that the title of the temple
was goqd and the villages had been assigned with. the
rest of Berar to the Government of India for administration and that they had been granted in jagir for a
religious object and their devolution was governed by
Rule IV of the Berar lnam Rule>. Thereafter inam
certificates were issued with rcopcct to these two
villages in the name of Ramlal, sun of Hargopal, who
was described as the Manager of the j agirdar, Shri
Sitaramj i Maharaj of Akolec and Bulgaon. The
purpose of the jagir was mentioned as "for charitable
expenses of the temple of Shri Sitaram Maharaj
situated in the Sitaram Bagh, at Hyderabad". In
the twentieth century there was considerable litigation
between the members of the family of the foundo'
as to the right of management of the temple. Eventually, it was decided in 1932 that Lakshrninivas
Generiwal, father of the appellant, was to be the
manager of the jagirdar, and this decision was finally
confirmed in J 93:l by the Governor of the Central
Provinces. The Governml'nt of Hyderabad was trying all along to find out how the iv come of this j agir
was being spent. But it was decided that it was the
Government of the Central Provinces alone which had
the right to call for aocounts 0f tbe villages and was
1 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
84!!
responsible to see that the conditions of the grant were
fulfilled, and in 1941 this position seems to have been
accepted by the Government of Hyderabad.
After the Constitution came into force from
January 26, 1950, the State of Madhya Pradesh took
the place of the old Central Provinces and
Berar. The State of Madhya Pradesh enacted a law
known as the Madhya Pradesh Abolition of Proprietary Rights (Estates, Mahals, Alienated Lands)
Act, No. 1 of 1951. In consequence of this. law,
the two villages were taken over by the State .and
statutory compensation was awarded. In addition,
an annual cash grant of Rs. 8,470/- was sanctioned
by the State for the upkeep of the temple. Besides
this grant, there was a large area of home farm land
in the two villages, which was in the possession of
the trustee for the benefit of the trust, and it is said
that an income of Rs. 1,30,000/- was being realised
by the trustee from this home farm land. It further
appears that there are hereditary pujaris and
mahants of the temple, and these persons had been
complaining to various authorities in Hyderabad that
Lakshminivas Generiwal was misappropriating temple funds on a large scale and neglecting his duties
as a trustee and otherwise committing breaches of
trust. In 1951, three of the hereditary pujaris filed
a complain\ before the Government of Hyderabad
alleging various acts of mismanagement on the part
of !h.e trustee. This was inquired into by the Home
M1mster of the State of Hyderabad and he directed
that the temple should be managed by the a committee of five persons and this was said to have been
done with the consent of Lakshminivas Generiwal.
Later, however, Lakshminivas contended that he
had never consented to the appointment of ~e
c~mmittee, which would curtail his rights as hereditary trustee. Thereupon, the Home Minister
directed the Director of Endowments to make a
thorough inquiry into the matter. In the meantime,
19~2
Anant Pr4So.d
La~shminioas
Gmniwal
v.
Stau of Aodhra
PratluA
Wanehoo, J.
850 SUPREME COtJRT REPORTS [ 1!ili:JJ sUPl'.
1!162
Arw11t Prasad
l a~·~hminivas
G'cncriwal
v.
State of Andhr1J
Prade!h
Wanc/100, J.
one of the hereditary puj aris filed a petH10n
under s. 3 of the Charitable and Religious Trusts
Act (No. 14 of 1920) alleging various acts of
mismanagement and paying for an order directing
rendition of accounts, before the City Civil Court,
Hyderabad. In March, l 95G, the court directed
rendition of accounts and appointed an auditor to
scrutinise them. The auditor went into the accounts
and made a report showing several gross irregularities therein. In the meantime
Lakshminivas
Generiwal applied for the registration of the temple under the provisions of the Madhya Pradesh
Public Trusts Act (No. :io of 1951) aml in June,
J !J55, the Rq~istrar of Public Trusts directed the
rrgistration of Shri Sitaram Maharaj Sansthan
Sitaram Bagh, Hyderabaci, as a public trust under
s. 7 (1) of the Madhya ·Pradesh Act No. 30 of
1951.
Hyderabad State also had a law for the purpose of providing for the proper administration of
religious and public charities and for the due
application of the income for the purpose of the
trust. This law was known as the Hyderabad
Endowments Regulations (hereinafter referred to as
the Regulations) and it came into force in 1940.
Section 2 thereof gives the definition of "endowment" as including "every transfer of property which
any person may have made for religious purposes or
for purposes of charity or public utility". lt also
provides for a "Book of Endowment" in which "all
the estates or properties endowed" would be entered.
Section 2 also defines a "tnistee" as meaning a person
appointed by the maker of the endowment for
purposes of management of the property and fulfilment of the objects thereof. Sections 3 to 11 provide
for the compilation of the Book of Endowment; s.12
for the management of the endowed property; s. 13
for the duties of the trustee; s. 14 for possession over
endowed property ; s. 15 for expenditure from the
1 s.c.R.
SUPREME COtJRT REPORTS
851
income of endowed property ; s. 16 for framing of
rules ; s. 17 for appeals an<l s. 18 for revision. It
may be added that a large body of ruks as many as
478 in number have been framed under the rulemaking power conferred by the Act ; and the
Director of Endowments Hyderabad is given the
power to enforce the Regulations and the Rules.
In exercise of his power under the Regulations and
the Rules, the Director of Endowment~ issued notice
to Lakshminivas Gencriwal on September 12, 1957,
to show cause within a fortnight from the date of the
receipt of the notice, why he should not be removed
from the office of trustee of the temple and why the
unauthorised trusteeship of the appellant should not
be terminated, and six charges were kvdled in this
notice. Lakshminivas Generiwal replied to this
notice on September 17, 1957, and pointed out that
he was no longer the trustee and that his son, the
appellant, had been appointed the trustee under the
Madhya Pradesh Act, No. 30 of 1951 by order
of the Deputy Commissioner Amravati in November
195u. He also denied the various charges levelled
against him. On this reply, a notice was issued on
December 31, 1957, to the appellant to the effect
that the temple had to be registered under the Regulations, and he was also warned that if he failed to
take steps to get the endowment registered, the
property would be taken over under the supervision
of the Government an<l no more objection would be
heard from him. The appellant objected to this
notice on February 1, 1958, and his main contention
was that as the trust had been registered under the
Madhya Pradesh Act No. 30 of 1951, the endow·
ment was not liable to be registered under the
Regulations and the Rules framed thereunder, and
the State of Andhra Pradesh had no jurisdiction
over the endowment and its property.
Soon after, the appellant filed a writ petition in
the Andhra Pradesh High Court on February 3, 1958,
1962
Ananl Prasad
Lakshminiuos
Generiwal
.
State o j Andhra
Pradesh
IVanehoa, J.
852 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963] SUPP.
1962
A11ant PraJad
IAkshminWas
Genetiwal
v.
State of Andhra
Pradesh
WanchooJ J.
challenging the notice dated December 31, 1957, and
the following contentions were raised on his behalf:(1) That by reason of the registration of the
trust under s. 7(1) of the M:adhya Pradesh Act
No. 30 of 1951, including the temple, the operation of the Regulations was excluded, as the registration under the Madhya Pradesh Act had become
final ;
(2) That in any event, in applying the Regulations to the trust in question, the courts should bear
in mind the principle of comity of nations and refuse
to interfere with the jurisdiction lawfully exercised
by another State, namely, the State of Madhya
Pradesh (now Bombay after the States Reorganisation
Act, 1956);
(3) That the Hyderabad Government had
acquiesced in the control of the trust by the authorities in Berar and it was not open to it to repudiate
that jurisdiction and claim to exercise the powers
under the Regulations ;
(4) That the Regulations were invalid inasmuch as they infringed the fundamental rights of
the appellant under Arts. 14 and 19 of the Constitution.
The High Court repelled these contentions and
by its order dated March 18, 1960, rejected the writ
petition, thus upholding the validity of the notice
dated December 31, 1957. The appeal is from this
order of the High Court by special leave.
After the High Court dismissed the writ petition, the Director of Endowments passed two orders.
The first is dated June 13, J.960, and it says that as
the trustee had not cared to appear before him, even
though the judgment of the High Court had been
l S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
853
given about three months before, the Dirr~tor con·
sider~d in the interests of the institution, that the
supervision should be taken over under r. I iH of the
Endowment Rules. The serrmd order was passed on
June 14, 1960, and it stated that the temple with its
buildings etc. situate at Hyderabad, had been taken
under the supervision of the Government of Andhra
Pradesh and the ma11agemcnt of the temple would
vest in the Director of Endowments, Hyderabad, from
the date of 1he order, namely, Jtme 14, l!J60. The
writ petition in this Court is directed against these two
orders, and by it the appellant challenge~ the validity
of the Regulations and thf" va1 ious rules frnmrd there·
under on the ground th;1t they are repugnant to
Arts. l 4 and 19 of the Constitution. In addition, it
has been contended on behalf of the appellant that
these order~ arc not justified even under the Regula·
tions.
The State of Andhra Pradesh has opposed th~
petition, and it submits that the Director of Endow·
ments waited till June 13, 1960, after the dismissal of
the writ petition in the High Court, for the appellant
to appear in compliance with the notice dated Decem·
her 31, ]!)[ii, so that the endowment might be
registered under the Regulations. As. however, the
appellant did not appear in reply to the notice, and
in view of the previous conduct of the trustees of this
temple and the several complaints received against
them and the cvaii1m of the trustees even to disclose
what the properties of the temple were, immediate
action had to be t~ken under the Regulations and the
Rules framed thereunder. Therefore, with a view to
secure and pre~crve the trust property, immediate
action was taken so that the property might not be
secreted. It has also been cnntended that the Regulatiom and the Rules framed thereunder gave power to
the State to take posscssio:i of the endowment and
that the two orders were issued under the powers
conferred under s. 4(b) ands. 12 of the Regulations.
1962
A.n•rll ProsaJ
IAkJ/unir. iua.t
GtntrUvil
v.
Stalt of .4ndhr.
p,ad1sh
854 SUPRE:ME COURT REPORTS [1963} SUPP.
1962
.fnanl PratrJd
LaJ;s luninivas
Gmeriwal
••
State of Andhro
Pradesh
It is also submitted that the Regulations and the Rule5
framed thereunder are not ultra vires in view of Articles 14 and 19 of the Constitution.
Learned counsel for the appellant has submitted
the following points for our consideration :-
Wanchoo, J.
(1) By reason of the registration of this trust,
including the temple, under s. 7 of the
Madhya Pradesh Act No. 30 of 1951,
the operation of the Regulations is excluded;
(2) The Regulations and the
Rules framed
thereunder are no longer in force as they
must be deemed to have been repealed
by the Part B States (Laws) Act, No. III
of 1951;
(:l) The Regulations and the Rules framed
thereunder are repugnant to Art. 14;
(4) The Regulations and the Rules framed
thereunder are repugnant to Art. 19;
(5) In any case, the orders passed on June 13
and 14, 1960, cannot be supported under
the RP,gulations.
It will be seen that the appeal is concerned only with
the notice dated December 31, 1957, while the writ
petition attacks the two orders passed on June 13 and
14, 1960. Though the attack on the notice as well
as on the two orders is to a large extent common, we
shall first <lea! with the attack on the notice dated
December 31, 1957, which is contained in the first
four points raised ·on behalf of the appellant before
us. The fifth point concerns only the two orders of
June, 1960, and will be dealt with later.
Re. (l).
The contention of the appellant in this connection is that as the trust has been registered under the
I
'
1 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
855
Madhya Pradesh Act 30 of 1951, the Regulations
cannot now be applied to it, and in any case the Regulations cannot affect property of the temple situate
out5ide the State of Andhra Prade5h. We arc of
opinion that there is no force in this contention. It
is true that the two villages (namely, Bulgaon and
Akolee) are not situate within the State of Andhra
Pradesh; but it is not in dispute that the temple is
situate within the State of Andhra Pradesh, and some
property of the temple in the shape of shops etc.,
besides the temple building itself, is situate in the
State of Andhra Pradesh. Besides, it is common
ground that offerings made by pilgrims to the temple
also constitute a part of its income, and that is received in Hyderabad. As such, we cannot see how the
Regulations and the Rules framed thereunder would
not apply to this temple, which is admittedly situate
in an area to which the Regulations apply. A similar
question came to be considered by this Court in The
State of Bihar v. Smt. Charu.~ila Dasi('). In that
case the templr was situate in Deoghar in the State
of B1.har, though the major part of income yielding
property endowed to the temple was situate in
Calcutta. The que•tion that arose for decision in that
case was whether the Bihar law would apply to the
temple and its properties. Section 3 of the Bihar Act
made that Act applicable to all public religious and
charitable ins.titutions within the meaning of the
definition clause in s. 2 (I) of the Bihar Act, and tl1e
definition clause provided that the Act would apply
to all religious trusts, whether created before or after
the commencement of the Bihar Act, any part of the
property of which was situate in the State of Bihar.
It was held that"where the trust is situate in Bihar the State has
legislative power over it and also over its trustees or their servants and agents who must be in
Bihar to administer. the trust, and as the object
(1) [1959] Supp. 2 S.C.R. 601.
1962
An<J:.t Prasad
Lalohminiuas
Ge'ffniw.11
v.
Stale t1f Andhra
Prildesh
TYnnchoo, J.
856 SUPRE.ME COURT REPORTS [1963] SUPP.
1!162
Ar.ant Prafad
LakJhminivas
Gtneriwal
v.
State of Andhra
Pradesh
H'•nchoo, J.
of the Act is to provide for the better administration of Hindu Religious Trusts in the State
of Bihar and for the protection of properties
appertaining thereto, in re,pect of the property
belonging to the trust outside the State the aim
is sought lo be achieved by exercising control
over the trustees in personain, and there is really
no question of the Act having extra-territorial
operation.''
It was further held that"the circumstance that the temples where the
deities were installed are situate in Bihar and
that the hospital and charitable dispensary are
to be cstablishect in Rihar for the benefit of the
Hin<lu public in Bihar, gives enough territorial
connection to enable the legislature of Bihar to
make a law with respect to such trust.
This d~ci~ion in our opinion makes it abundantly
clear that, where the trust is situate in a particular
State, the law of that state, will apply to the trust,
even though any part of the trust property, whether
large or small, is situate outside the state where the
trust i~ situate.
We mav also refer to the State of Bihru v.
Bhabapritana~.da Ojha('), where a qu~tion was
raised with respect to the application of the' same
Bihar Act to a tru3t situate in Bihar, but in the case
of which a scheme had been framed by thd District
Judge of Burdwan and confirmed by the Calcutta
High Court, at a time when the State of Bihar was
part of Bengal before the partition of 191 L In
that case, it was urged that the Bihar Act did not
applv to the temple by reason of the fact that the
temple and its properties were administered under a
s..:heme made by the court of the District Judge
Burdwan and approved by the Calcutt.a High Co~rt
(I) [1959] Supp. 2 S.C.R. 6~f.
l S.C.K.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
857
both of which were situate outside the territorial
limits of Bihar, nn the ground that the Bihar Act
would otherwise by some of its provisions seek to
interfere with 1he jurisdiction of courts which were
outside Bihar and thereby get extra-territorial operat ion. It was held iu that case that it was competent
to the Bihar legislature to legislate in respect of
religious trusts situate in Bihar though some of the
properties belonging to the trust might be outside
Bihar. And it was further held that s. 92 of the
Code of Civil Procedure would no longer apply in
view of s. 4 (5) of the Bihar Act and consequently
there was no question of extra-territorial operation,
of the Bihar Act.
In the present ca~e, the temple is situate in
Hyderabad in the State of Andhra Pradesh. There
is some property of the temple there, though the
major part of the income yielding endowed property
is situate outside in the State of Madhya Pradesh.
In view therefore of the decision in Srnt. Charusiln.
Dasi's case(1) the Regulations will apply to this trust
as the trust is situate in the State of Andhra Pradesh
and the fact that some of the endowed properties
are not in Andhra Pradesh would make no difference.
Further the fact that the trust has been regi>tcred
under the Madhva Pradesh Act XXX of l!l51 cannot
exclude the ope;al iou of the Regul~tions in the case
of this trust, for the trust is undoubtedlv situate
within the area where the Regulations are in force.
A "public trust" has been defined in s.2 (4) of the
Madhya Pradesh Act as meaning "an express or
constructive trust for a public, religious or charitable
purpose and includes a temple, a math, a mosque, a
church, a wakf or any other religious or charitable
endowment and a society formed for a religious or
charitable purpose". Section 3 of the said Act
provides that "the Deputy Commissioner shall be
the ~egistrar of pu.bli~ tr.usts in respect of every
pubhc trust the µrinc1pal office or the principal
11> p959J Sqpp. 2.a.o.a. sot.
1962
Anant Prasad
lakslimi'lfJ·vas
Gtntriwal
v.
State of Andhr.1
P1adesh
SiiS
1962
Ananl Prasarl
LakshminiuaJ
Gtntriwal
v.
State of Andhr•
J radesh
l'Vanchoo, J.
SUPREJvlE COURT REPORTS [1963] SUPP.
place of business of which as declared in the appli·
cation made under sub·s. (3) of s. 4 is situate in his
district", and he shall maintain a register of public
trusts. Section 4 provides for the registration of public
trusts. It is obvious that public trust as defined in
s. 2 (4) of the Madhya Pradesh Act XXX of l!llil
must be a public trust situate in the State of
Madhya Pradesh. Even though s. 2 (4) does not
say so in terms, the definition must be confined to
public trusts situate in Madhya Pradesh for the
Madhya Pradesh legislature could not. ancl obviously
did not intend to, legislate with respect to public
trusts situate outside Madhya Pradesh. Therefore,
s. 2 (4) must be interpreted to apply onlv to public
trusts situate in Madhya Pradesh. This conclusion
is supported by s. 3, which clearly shows that the
Registrar would have jurisdiction in respect of a
public trust within his district. As to where a public
trust is situate has to be determined in accordance
with the decision of this Court in 8mt. ('hnrusilrt.
Dasi's case ('), and on that view the public trust in
this case must be situate in Andhra Pradesh and not
in Madhya Pradesh where only some of the endowed trust properties are. In the circumstances the
registration of the trust under the Madhya Pradesh
Act cannot be a bar against the enforcement of the
relevant provisions of the Hyderabad Regulations
because even if it may be necessary for the purpose
of management of the property in Madhya Pradesh
to register this trust also in Madhya Pradesh, that
would not exclude the jurisdiction of the State of
Andhra Pradesh to legislate with respect to this trust
which is undoubtedly situate in Arnlhra Pradesh,
though some property of the trust is in Madhya
Pradesh. vVe therefore agree with the High Court
that the trust in this case being situate in Andhra
Pradesh, the Regulations will apply to it.
Re. (2).
The contention in this regard is that the Part B
(I) [1939] Supp. 2 s.c.R. 601.
1 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
85!l
States (Laws) Act, l!l51, applied certain Central Arts
to the Part B State of Hyderabad, as it then was,
from April 1, l\J51, and s. 6 of this Act lays down
that "if immediately before the appointed day, ihere
is in force in any Part B State any Jaw corn~sponding
to any of the Acts or OrdinaDces now extended to
that State, that law shall, save as otherwise expressly
provided in this Act stand repealed." A large
number of Central Acts, were applied to the Part B
States, and reliance on behalf of the appellant is
placed on two Acts in this connection to show that
the Regulations have been repeal~d in consequence
of the extension of those Acts, to the then Part B
State of Hyderabad. These two Acts are, (i) The
Charitable Endowments Act, No. VI of 1890, and
(ii) The Charitable. and Religious Trusts Act, No.
XIV of l!l20. It is urged that because of the application of these two Acts to the then Part B State of
Hyderabad, the Regulation must he deemed to have
been repealed in view of s. 6 of this Act. W c are of
opinion that there is no force in this contention. Ac.t
No. VI of 1890 definitely excludes religious public
trusts from it. The Regulations deal with two kinds
of trusts, namely, public religious trusts and trusts
for purposes of charity and public utility. In the
present case we are concerned with a public religious
trust, which is specifically cxcluckrl from the purview
of Act VI 0f l8!Jll. Therefore, whatever mav be the
effect of Act VI uf l 8\Jtl, on that part of th~· Regulations which deals with public trusts other than
religious trusts (on which wc express no opinion, for
we are here concerned with only reli.gi011s trusts),
there is no doubt that the Regnlations insofar as they
apply to religious trusts, cannot be held to have been
repealed by the application of Act No. VI r,f 18\lO,
to the then Part B State of Hyderabad, for the
Regulations when they deal with religious trusts,
would not be a law corresponding to Act No. VI of
1890.
.. .
1962
An.gnt Pra:Jad
Lakshminivas
Gen~riwo!
v,
State (If Andhru
Pradeth
H'anchoo, ],
860 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963] SUPP.
1961
A,,..I 1'r1Jad
/Aktlurtiniruu
G11niw•I
v.
Slot• of Alldhta
"'"'"h
w"""""' J.
As to Act XIV of 1920, it certainly applies to
religious trusts as well as other trusts of a charitable
nature created for public purposes, but a perusal of
s. 3 of this Act would show that it is ~onfined to a
very limited purpose and that purpose is to give
power to any person having an interest in any express
or constructive trust created or existing for a public
purpo~e of a charitable or religious nature to apply
to the Court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction any substantial part of the subject -matter of
the trust is situate to obtain an order directing the
trustee to furnish the petitioner through the court
with particulars as to the nature and objects of the
trust, and of the value, condition, management and
application of the subject-matter of the trust, and of
the income belonging thereto and also directing that
the accounts of the trust shall bP. examined and
audited. This is all that Act XIV of 1920 is concerned with. The rest of the provisions of the Act
are ancillary to the main provision contained in s. 3.
The Regulations on the other hand are a mur.h wider
enactment and provide, as we have already indicated,
for the compilation of a book of endowment, for the
management of the endowed property, for the duties
of trust('es, for possession over endowed property, and
for the control of expenses from the income of the
property. None of these matters is cr,mprised in Act
XIV of 1920. Therefore, the application of Act
XIV of I 920 to the then Part B State of Hyderabad
cannot be said to have repealed the Regulations by
virtue of s. G of the Part B States (Lr,ws) Act, 1951.
Re. (3).
The contention under this head is that there
are two laws in force in two parts of the State of
Andhra Pradesh with respect to religious"endowments,
and these two Jaws are different in many matters, and
therefore there is discrimination, which is hit by
Art. 14. The State of Andhra Pradesh. as it camr.
i S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
861
into existence after the States Re-organisation Act,
1956, consists of two areas one of which came to that
State from the former Part A State of Madras in
1953 and the other from the former Part B State of
Hyderabad in 1956. These two areas naturally had
different laws. We are told that steps are being
taken to assimilate the laws in the two parts of the
State and bring them under one common pattern.
But that naturally takes time and complete assimila·
tion of all laws has not yet taken place. We are further told that the question of having one law for
public trusts of religious or charitable nature, is under
the active consideration of the State Gevernment.
In these circumstances it would not be right to strike
down all laws prevailing in the two parts of the
State, because of certain difference in them arising
out of historical reasons because the two areas in the
State were formerly in two different States, namely,
the former Part A State of Madras and the former
Part B State of Hyderabad. Our attention in this
connection has been drawn to the State of Rajasthan
v. Rao Manohar Singhji('). In that case a law relating to management of jagir estates which applied
to only a part of Rajasthan was struck down on the
ground that there was nothing corresponding to that
law in other parts of Rajasthan, and the basis of the
decision was that "there was no real and substantial
distinction why the J agirdars of a particular area
should continue to be treated with inequality a5
compared with the J agirdars in another area of
Rajasthar•. " As against this, the respondents rely
on Bhaiyal.al Shukl.a v. State of :Madhya Pradesh(').
In that case, the sales-tax laws in different parts of
the·new State of Madhya Pradesh, which came into
existence after the States Reorganisation Act, I fJ56,
were different in some respects, because they were
enacted by different legislatures. Under s. 119 of
the States Reorganisation Act, all laws in force arc
to continue till r\!pealed or altered by the appropriate legislature. It was therefore held that different
(I) [195*.) S.C.R. 996.
(2) [1962] Supp. 2 s.c.R. 257,
1962
Anat Pr•s•J
Lakshmiriiv1s
G1n1riwal
••
St•le of AndhH
Pradesh
W11U"hoo, J.
862 SUPREME COURT REPORtS [1963) SUPP.
1962
An•nl Prasad
l.11kshmi11 iv as
Gtneriw.it
v.
Slalt nf Andhrn
Pradesh
11"ont:hr10, J.
though parallel laws in different parts of Madhya
Pradesh could be sustained on the ground that the
differentiation arose from historical reasons, and a
geographical classification based on historical reasons
could be upheld as being not contrary to the equal
protection clause in Art. 14. vV c think the ratio of
IJ!U!'l:yr1lal 8hitklit'8 wse(') applies in the present case
and not the ratio of Rao Jla'!Whar Singhji's case(').
In the latter case, the Jagirdars of a particular area
became singled out after the creation of the State of
Rajasthan and management of their properties was
taken away from them while the jagirdars of the rest
of Rajasthan retained the management of their properties. It was in those circumstances when there
was a pre-existing law in one part of Rajasthan to
which there was nothing corresponding in the rest of
Raj ast han that this Court held that the patent discrimination arising in that case was violative of Art.
14. In Bhaiyalal Shukla's nase(') both parts had the
same kind of law relating to sales-tax, though there
were some differences in their provisions. It was in
these circumstances that parallel, though somewhat
different, laws in two parts of the same State were
upheld on the ground of "geographical classification
based on historical reasons." The present case is
similar to Bhaiyalal Shulda' s case('), for in both parts
of Andhra Pradesh there are laws with respect to
public trusts of religious nature, though tlirre may be
some differences in detail in their· provisions. Therefor", the attack on the basis of vfolation of Art. 14
must be repelled in the present case on the authority
of Bhaiyaml Shulcfo's case(').
Re. (ef).
This brings us to the question whether the
Regulations arc violative of Art: rn(l)(f) of the Constitution. We do no~propose m the present case to
examine the numerous Rules that have' been framed
under the Regulations and shall confine ourselves to
(2) (J95fj S.C.R,996.
(I) [1962] Supp. 2 s.a.R. 257,
l S.C.R.
SUPRE:ME COURT REPORTS
86:l
the ·vires of that part of the Regulations which is concerned with registration of endowments, and some of
the Rules in that behalf as the appeal is onlv concerned with registration. We have been told tbat some
of the rules have been the target of attack in the
former High Court of Hyderabad, and some ()I them
have been struck down by that High Coun (sec
Narayan Pershad v. State of llydembwl (')). The
sections with respect to registration are s. :~ to s. I I.
Section 3 lays down that a book of endowments will
be prepared containing all the endowments which are
in force on the date of the Regulations or which will
be brought into force in future. Section ±(a) lays
down that it will be the duty of every trustee or
endower of an endowment to inform in writing with
regard to an endowment the Director of Endowments
concerned with respect to movable and immovable
property of the endowment, and if there is a deed of
endowment, submit the same or a certified copy thereof. Section 4(b) lays <lown that if anv trustee
neglects to discharge his duties referred to in ·s. -i (a),
he can be deprived of the benefit or consideration of
the endowment wholly or partly which he possesses
under the endowment. Section 5 lays down that anv
person may inform the Director of Endowments with
regard to an endowment which has not been entered
in the book of endowments. Section ll gives power
to the Director of Eudowments to give notice for the
registration of endowed property, howsoever he comes
to know of it. Section 7 provides that if no objection
is made within the time fixed in the notice, the
endowed property shall be registered in case the
endowment is found tu be legal. Sections 8 an<l D
provide for procedure for rh:cision of objections where
objections are filed. Section !ti provides that every
person whose objections have been disallowed can file
a suit for declaration in the civil conrt within one
year of the dismissal of l1is objection' whereby his
rights might be decided and entries in the book ol
endowments will then be govcrue<l by the decision of
(!) A-LR. [1955] Hy. 82.
962
Ana11' Prasad
f,,,.kshmi11iva:,
Gerieriwal
v.
Slate of A.ntiluu
PraUsh
~Va11choo, J.
864
1962
Anant Prasad
la{sbminiDos
GfltlriwaJ
'"
Stai. of A•dhra
Protllsh
Wane/Jot, J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963j St11>P.
the civil court. Section 10 further provides that no
person who has not filed objections can file a civil
suit. Section ·ll provides for a presumption t4at
entries made in the book of endowments are correct
unless otherwise he!d by the civil court.
It will be seen therefore that provisions as to the
compilation of book of endowments contained in ss. 3
to 11 (except s. 4 ( b)) provide for registration of
endowed property and for carrying out the objects
of the Act, namely, that the intention of endower may
be carried out and the duties of the trustee may be
discharged conveniently and efficiently for the benefit
of humanity. These Regulations arc clearly reasona·
ble restrictions in the interests of the general public
within the meaning of Art. 19(5) of the Constitution
and are conceived with the purpose of havi;ig correct
information as to the endowments existing in the State
so that their management may be carried out effici·
ently and for the benefit of humanity according to the
terms of the endowments. These provisions therefore
(except s. 4 (b )) as to the registration of endowments
are not in any way 'Ultra vires the fundamental right
enshrined in Art. 19 (l)(f). As to s. 4(b), we do not
think it necessary to express any opinion in this case.
Section 4(b) i1 a kind of penalty on the trustee for
neglecting to carry out the provisions of s. 4(a), and
lays down that the trustee can be deprived of the
benefit arising to him under the endowment. In the
present case it is not the c0ntention of the appellant
that there is any benefit arising to him under the
endowment and therefore s, 4. (b) would have no
application.
In this connection we may aho refer to r. 25,
which lays down that "if any trustee does not derive
any benefit or return from the endowment in accor·
dance with r. :l4, then in the event of non-discharg!"
of duties he may be suspended from the post of trustee
for a suitable period and the management will be
l S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
865
carried on during this period by Government." This
rule is being attacked as going beyond the rule-making power conferred on the Government. We do not
think it necessary in the present case to decide the
·vires of this rule, as the impugned action is not under
this rule. We should not however be taken to have
upheld the vires of this rule when we uphold the
validity of the provisions relating to registration in the
Regulations and the Rules. We therefore uphold the
validity of the provisions relating to registration of
endowments (except s. 4(b) on which we express no
opinion) and the Rules framed thereunder (except
r. 25 and rules consequential thereon which we express
no opinion) to carry out these provisions under
which notice was given to the appellant on
December 31, 1957. In view of our conclusions on
these four points, the appeal must fail.
Re. 5.
This brings us to the consideration of the vire&
of the orders dated June 13 and 14, 1960. The attack
on these two orders is two-fold. In the first place, it
is urged that if these orders fall within the powers
conferred by the Regulations and the Rules made
thereunder, they should be struck down, as the Regulations and the Rules framed thereunder by which
the trustee is deprived of his right of management are
ultra vires Art. 19(1)(f). In the second place it is
urged that these orders which purport to have been
passed under r. 179 are bad as r. 179 itself goes beyond the powers conferred on the rule-making authority under the Regulations and in any case are contrary to the Rules. We do not think it necessary in
the present case to consider whether the Regulations
and the Rules framed thereunder with respect to
removing a trustee from the management of the trust
are unconstitutional. We shall confine ourselves to
the second part of the argument in this behalf and
consider whether the Regulations give power for the
1962
Anant Pra,aJ·
Lakshminiuas
Generiwal
v.
State ef A•dhra
Praiesh
866 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963] SUPP.
1962
dnant I'raud
!.alc.1hminiv"s
GtMriwal
v•
.)!ale of Andhra
Pradesh
removal of the trustee under any circumstances and if
so whether the removal in this case has taken place as
provided under the Regulations and the Rules framed
thereunder. It cannot be doubted that the two orders
taken together amount to removal of the appellant
from trusteeship.
Wanehoo, J,
The only provision.which deals with the manage·
ment of endowed property is to be found in s. 12,
which is as follows :"With regard to the management of the endowed property, the trustee will be generally competent to exercise the powers which have been
conferred on him by the endower. But if any
trustee is not found to be competent, then the
Minister for Endowments may frame rules and
regulations for the realisation of the objects
of the endowment and for the better management of the same by which the trustee will be
duly bound or he may appoint a Superintendent
under the rules."
Analysis of this section shows that it con sis ts of
three parts. Under the first part, the trustee is competent to exercise the powers which have been conferred on him by the endowcr, thereby recognising
the right of the trustee to manage the trust property
according to the terms of the endowment. The
second part lays down that "if any trustee is not
found to be competent, then the Minister for Endowments may frame rules and regulations for the realisation of the objects of the endowment and for the
better management of the same by which the trustee
will be duly bound." Here again the management
clearly remains with the tmstec and he is only
subjected to control by means of rules and regulations
framed for the better management of the particular
trust under the orders of the Minister for Endowments. Then comes the third part of the section
which gives power in the alternative to tthe Minister
1 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
867
for Endowments in case of incompetence of the trustee
to appoint a Superintendent under the Rules. A
Superintend~nt is defined in s. 2 as meaning a person
appointed by Government for purposes of management. Thus the last part of s. 12 gives power to
Government to appoint a Superintendent for purposes of management. This necessarily implies that
on the appointment of a Superintendent to manage
the endowed property under s. 12, the trustee is deprived of the management of the property, and in
effect is removed from trusteeship. This interpretation
of the last part of s. 12 is supported by rules found
under Chaps. XLIII, XLIV and XLV. Chapter XLIII
deals with "Superintendence by Government", Chap.
XLIV with "direct superintendence of Government"
and Chap. XLV "with munthazim (manager)." It
may be added that in the definition in s. 2, the word
"munthazim" has been translated as "Superintendent" while in Chap. XLV that word has been
translated as "manager". It is obvious that the
Superintendent and the manager are the same thing.
Rule 177 provides that if the Government takes over
the endowed buildings under its superintendence, it
shall have power to arrange for direct superintendence, or appoint any munthazim (Superintendent) or
manage through any committee. Chapter XLlV
then provides for direct superintendence by Government. Rule 182 in that Chapter shows that where
direct superintendence is taken by Government the
power of _spending the . recurring amounts as per the
b~dget will be vested m the trustee in accordance
with the powers possessed by him under these Rules
and there is n? removal. of the. trustee. It is only
when a Supermtendent is appomted under Chapter
x~v that he has all the powers of a trustee mentioned m Chap. XXXI (see r. 187). The two orders of
June la and 14, HHiO, read together cll'arlv show that
eve? though they p11rpurl lo IJc passed 11n~lcr r. 17!J
which
re\~rs to_, "d~rect superinte11dcnce b;
Government , the Governmeu t has gone further than
1962
Anant Prosad
Lalcshmi,,foas
Generiwal
••
Stalt of Anrlhra
Pradt!.h
fVanchoo, J.
s6s SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963] SUPP.
1962
Ananl Prasad
l•lcshminivi.s
Generiwal
v.
State uf Andhta
Praduh
lfanchoa, J.
provided in the rule when it decided to take over· the
management of the temple and vest the same in the
Director of Endowments from June 1.J-, l!l60, with
the result that the appellant has been deprived of the
management and in effect removed from trusteeship.
We presume that consequent on this a Superintendent
would be appointed. The last part of s. 12 which
provides for the appointment of a Superintendent
under the rules in effect provides also for the deprivation of the trustee of his right of management and
thus results in his removal. Now r. (i7 deals with the
rem ova 1 of trustee and has laid down :;ix conditions
which would justify the removal of a trustee. The
last of these conditions lays down that if any trustee is
not fit for trusteeship due to some reason other than
those contained in the first five conditions he would
be removed from the post of trustee. But this removal
can only take place if the matter is inquired into by
a competent officer. Thus r. 67 mntemplates that
no trustee shall be removed from t•· .steeship unless an
inquiry is held by a competent ofh.:er. This obviously
means that the trustee will be given an opportunity to
show cause whv he should not be removed from trusteeship and it is only after a proper inquiry that a trustee
can be removed from trusteeship. This provision is in
consonance with the language of s. 12, where the
words used are "if a trustee is not found to be competent". The use of the word "found" clearly shows
tliat the legislature intended that action under the
second and third part of the section would only be
taken after a proper inquiry. Further, r. 68 provides
that the power of removal of a trustee will l:le vested
in the Minister for Endowments. Thus after an
inquiry has been made by a competent officer, it is
only the Minister for Endowments, which in the
present set-up means the Government, which can
remove the trustee. We have already pointed out
that we do not think it necessary in the present case
to consider the question whether these provisions as to
the removal of the trustee by Government can be
1 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
86!.l
upheld as constitutional. But assuming that these
provisions are constitutional, the question that arises
is
whether
the
two
orders
passed
on
June 13 and 14, 1960, which must be read together
and in effect amount to removal of the appellant
from trusteeship can be justified under the Kegulations and the Rules. Clearly these two orders have
been passed hy the Member, Board of Revenue while
r. 68 contemplates that the trustee would be removed
only by the Minister for Endowments, which in the
present set-up, can only mean the Government.
Further, r. 67 provides that a trustee cannot be
removed from t-n1steeship unless an inquiry has been
made by a competent officer. That means that notice
has to be issued to the trustee to show cause why he
should not be removed for reasons shown therein and
it is only after an inquiry has been made and one of
the six conditions provided in r. 67 is established that
the trustee can be removed. In the present case no
notice was ever issued to the appellant to show cause
why he should not be removed from the trusteeship. It
is true that in the notice dated December :n. 1957, it
was stated that in case the appellant failed to respond
to the notice (which was with respect to registration
oft.he endowed property) the case would be completed
takmg the property under the Government's supervision and no more objection would be heard thereafter.
The consequenrn of non-appearance to such a notice
i~ to _be found in s. 7 which provides that if no objection 1s filed the endowment would be n·gistered and
in s. lO(b) which deprives a person wl;o does not
appear to object in response to the notice of any right
to file a suit as provided in s. IO(a). But there is
nothing in r. 67 which gives power to the Government
~o remove a trustee simply ?ecause he fails to appear
m reply to a not1c~ askmg htm to register the endowed
property. The six conditions mentioned in r. 67
a;e : (i) insanit)'., (ii) co_i;i_tractio? _of a contageous
disease ?fa ce:tam type, (m) r.onv1ct10n by a criminal
c:ourt, (1v) gomg out of Hyderabad Stat"' without
1962
Anonl Prowl
lab lmtillil!llS
Gmmwal
.
Stat. of A•dhr•
Pradesh
Wanclioo, J.
870 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963] SUPP.
1962
Ananl Prasad
Lakshminiuas
Gtn4Tiwal
v.
State ()f Andhra
p,.,1desh
Wnnchoo, J.
intimation for more than a month, (v) forsaking the
religion with which the endowment is concerned, and
(vi} unfitness for trusteeship due to some other reason.
There is no provision therefore for removal of a
trustee, merely because he has not appeared in answer
to a notice under s. 6 of the Regulations for registra,
tion of the endowment. The orders therefore that
were passed on June 13 and 14, 1960, which must be
read together, cannot be justified under rr. 67 and 68,
for the reasons that (i) no inquiry was held, (ii) the
orders were not passed by the Minister of Endow·
ments, i. e. the Government, and (iii) the removal in
this case i~ for a reason which is not permissible therein. All that the Director of Endowments was
entitled to do on the basis of the notice dated Decem·
ber 31, 1957, was to proceed to register the endow·
ment, even if the appellant failed to appear in reply
to that notice after making such inquiries as he
thought proper and take such further action as may
be justified by the other provisions of the Regulations.
But on the basis of that notice it was not open to him
to pass the orders which he did on June 13 and 14,
1960, which amounted to removal of the appellant
from trusteeship and taking over of the management
of the trust by the Government. These orders must
therefore be set aside as ultra vires the Regulations
and the Rules, assuming in the present case that the
Regulations and the Rules providing for the removal
of the trustee, are constitutional.
We therefore dismiss the appeal with costs. The
writ petition is allowed with costs and orders dated
June 13 and 14, 1960, are hereby set aside.
Appeal dismissed.
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