ROOP CHAND versus STATE OF PUNJAB
Supreme Court of India | Decided 10 October 1962 | [1963] SUPP. 1 S.C.R. 539 | 1962 INSC 286
Key facts
- Decided
- 10 October 1962
- Bench
- S.K. DAS*, J.L. KAPUR*, A.K. SARKAR*, M. HIDAYATULLAH, RAGHUBAR DAYAL
- Bench size
- 5
- Case number
- WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) No. 77/1957
- Disposal
- Appeal(s) allowed
- Citation
- [1963] SUPP. 1 S.C.R. 539
- Neutral citation
- 1962 INSC 286
Text of the judgment
1 S.C.R.
SUPREM.li: COURT REPORTS
539
of the Constitution nor does it infringe the equal protection clause of the Constitution; we also hold that
the Notification dated April 19, 1955 did not vioiatl'
Art. 14 of the Constitution. We are further of the
view that the constitution of the Committees and the
Advisory Board did not contravene the statutory provisions in that behalf prescribed by the Legislature.
1!02
·\f/s. BhikusiJ
Jilm111.t Kah:.ib'iV4
v
Stm~amntr A~tJ{&
Taluk• Bitii Xcm:or
U11U11
Sh<h, J.
The appeal therefore fails and is dismissed with
costs.
Appwl dismissed.
ROOP CHAND
v.
STATE OF PUNJAB
(S. K. DAS,
J. L. KAPUR, A. K. SARKAR,
M. HIDAY.A.TULLAR and R.AGHUBAR DAYAL, JJ.)
Consolidation of Holdings-Appeal to State GovcrnmentPwtr.to hear appeal delegatd to o.fficer-Dtcision of such ojficu-Rwi1ion of decision by State Government-Ltgality of-Funwmtntal right.-lf infringed by illegal ortier of State GovunrnrntEut Punjab Holdings (Comolidation and Prevention of Fragmtnta,tion) Act, J,948 (Punj. 50 of 1948), ss, 21 (4), 41 (/), i2Conatitution of India, Art. 32.
Under the E. P. Holdings (Consolidation and Prevention
of Fragmentation) Act, 1948, a scheme for consolidation of
holdings was framed for the petitioner's village and a repartition
of the lands was proposed. The petitioner objected to the
repartition and contended that under the scheme he was entitlet1
to retain his plots Nos. 635 and 636 and to get some more land
adjacent to them in exchange for other lands belonging to him
This contention was rejected by the Consolidation Officer
The petitioner filed an appeal before the Settlement Office<
1962
540 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963] SUPP.
1962
Roop Chand
v.
Statt of Punjab
but the appeal also failed. Against this the petitioner filed an
appeal before the State Government under s. 21 (4) of the Act,
which was heard by Shri Brar, Assistant Director, Consolidation,
to whom the power to hear such appeals had been delegated
uuder s. 41 (I). Shri Brar allowed the appeal and the petitioner
became entitled to retain plots Nos. 635 and 636. Respondent
No. 2 to whom these plots had been given on repartition moved
the State Government under s. 42 to revise the order made by
Shri Brar, and the State Government set aside the order of
Shri Brar and restored that of the Consolidation Officer. The
petitioner filed a writ petition in the Supreme Court challenging
the order of the State Government contending that under s. 42
it could not interfere with an order made by itself or by an
officer exercising powers of the Government delegated to him
under s. 41 (1).
,.
Held (per Das, Sarkar and Dayal,JJ.) thats. 42 did not
empower the State Government to interfere with an order
passed by an officer to whom the power to hear appeals filed
under s, 21 (4) had been delegated by it under s. 41 (1). The
words "any order passed .... by an officer under this Act, in
s. 42 did not include an order passed by an officer in exercise of
·powers delegated to him by the Government under s. 41 (1).
Section 21 (4) gives the power to the Government to hear
appeals, and an order made in the exercise of that power,
whether by the Government itself or by its delegate, would be
an order of the Government. Section 42 was applicable to an
order made by a subordinate officer exercising independent
powers under the Act.
Lo:kha Singh v. Director, CoMolidation
Punjab, A. I. R. (1959) Punj. 157, disapproved.
of HoUinga,
The impugned order infringed the fundamental rights of
the petitioner and be was entitled to a writ or direction from
the Supteme Court. If the order was allowed to stand the
petitioner would be deprived of plots Nos. 635 and 636 which
were hi> property.
Per Kapur and Hidayatullah,JJ.-The State Government
had jurisdiction to revise the order made by Shri Brar. Under
s. 42 the Government had over-all control at all stages of the
Cunsoli<lation proceedings. An officer to whom powers were
delegated under s. 41, though exercising the powers of the
Government was still an officer of the State Government and
his order was subject to the power of revision under s. 42. The
order made by Shri Brar under s. 21 (4) was an order of repartition and was liable to be revised under s. 42.
1 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
Lakha Singh v. Director, Oowiolidation
Punjab, A. I. R. (1959) Punj. 157, approved.
541
of Holdings,
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Writ Petition No. 77
of 1957.
1n2
Rorp Chand
v.
Stsll of Punja6
Petition under Art. 32 of the Constitution of
India for the enforcement of Fundamental Rights.
Pritam Singh Safeer, for the petitioner.
S. M. Sikri, Advocate-General for the Stare of
Punjab, N. S. Bindra and P. D. Menon, for the
respondent No. 1.
N. S. Bindm and Ckvind Saran Singh, for
respondent No. 2.
1962. October 10. The Judgment of Das,
Sarkar and Dayal, JJ., was delivered by Sarkar,].
The judgment of Kapur and Hidayatullah, .JJ. was
delivered by Kapur, .J.
SARKAR, ].-This petition under Art. 32 of the
Constitution asks for a writ quashing an order
purported to have been made under s. 42 of the East
Punjab Holdings (Consolidation and Prevention of
Fragmentation) Act, 1948. It is said that the order
was entirely without jurisdiction and if allowed to
stand, it would deprive the petitioner of certain lands
and so wrongfully affect his fundamental rights under
Part III of the Constitution.
The question raised by this petition depends
on a comtruction of certain provisions of the Act
which we shall later quote. A general idea of some
of the purposes and provisions of the Act will however
be useful for deciding that question and may be given
now.
Shortly put, one of the objects of the Act
appears to be to pool together the entire lands held
S.rkllr, J,
542 SUPREME COURT :REPORTS [1963] SUPP.
1962
RHP Chand
v.
)la!e ~J Punjab
by different persons in a village and redistribute the
same among them on a more utilitarian basis in
accordance with a scheme framed for the purpose.
The final result that the Act achieves is that instead
of his original holding a person is given some other
holding. Section 14 gives the State Government the
.power to declare bv notification its intention to frame
a scheme for the consolidation of holdings in any
area and thereupon to appoint a Consolidation
Officer who is to prepare the scheme. Section 19
provides for the publication of the draft scheme
prepared by the Consolidation Officer and for objections thereto being made by the persons likely to be
affected. It also. provides that the Consolidation
Officer will submit the scheme with the objections
and his suggestions with regard to them to the
Settlement Officer and for republication of. the
scheme with such amendments as may have been
made. Section 20 empowers the State Government
to appoint Settlement Officers (Consolidation), in this
judgment referred to as Settlement Officers. It
further provides that if no objections are received to
the draft scheme when first published or to the
amended scheme when republished, the Settlement
Officer shall confirm the scheme and if any objections are received, he may after considering the
objections, confirm the scheme with or without
modification. It lastly provides that upon confirmation the scheme shall be published again. Sub-section
(I) of s. 21 provides that the Consolidation Officer
~hall carry out a re-partition in accordance with the
scheme as confirmed under s. 20. Sub-section (2)
provides that any person aggrieved by the repartition
may file an objection before the Consolidation Officer.
Sub-section (3) gives to the person aggrieved by the
order of the Consolidation Officer made under subsec. (2), a right to file an appeal before the Settlement
Officer. Sub-section (4) provides that "any person
aggrieved by the order of the Settlement Officer
(Consolidation) under sub-section (3) may within
;
1 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
543
sixty days of that order appeal to the State Govern·
ment." Section 22 requires the Consolidation Officer
to prepare a new record of rights giving effect to the
repartition as finally sanctioned under s. 21.
A scheme under the Act had been framed for
village Palrikalan where the petitioner held some
lands. The petitioner had no objection to the scheme
as such but he had taken objection to the repartition
made under it by the Consolidation Officer on the
ground that the repartition was not in accordance
with the scheme. The petitioner contended that
under the scheme he was entitled to retain plots
Nos. 635 and 636 which originally belonged· to him
and to get some more land adjacent to them in
exchange for other lands held by him in the village
while under the repartition made by the Consolidation Officer he was being deprived of those plots and
wa~ being given lands elsewhere. With the merits of
this and the rival contention we are not concerned in
this petition.
The petitioner's contention was rejected by the
Consolidation Officer and he filed an appeal under
s. 21(3) before the Settlement Officer but that appeal
also failed. The petitioner thereafter went up in
appeal under s. 21(4) against the order of the Settlement Officer.
Now, s. 21 (4) provided for an appeal to the
State Government but the petitioner's appeal was
heard by Shri Brar, Assistant Director, Consolidation
of Holdings, Amhala to whom the Government's
powers and functions concerning the appeal had been
delegated under s. 41(1) which is in these terms:
S. 41(1) : "The State Government may for the
administration of this Act, appoint such persons
as it thinks fit, and may by notification delegate
any of its powers or functions under this Ac.t to
1962
Roop Chand
v.
Stall of Punja!
S«rkar, J.
544 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963] SUPP.
-
~Cbnd
Y,
Stttl of i'unj•b
Sari4r, J.
any of its officers either by name or designation."
Shri Brar allowed the petitioner's appeal. A!
a result of his decision the petitioner became entitled
to retain plots Nos. 635 and 636 which he originally
owned and Hari Singh, respondent No. 2, to this
petition who had on the repartition been given by
the Consolidation Officer, those plots along with some
more adjacent lands, was to be deprived of them.
Hari Singh being dissatisfied with the order of Shri
Brar moved the Government under s. 42 of the Act
and the impugned order was thereupon made. That
order set aside the order of Shd Brar and restored
that of the Consolidation Officer. As a result of this
order, therefore, the petitioner was to be deprived of
plots Nos. 635 and 636.
It is now necessary to set out s. 42 on the interpretation of which this petition depends. That section
was amended by Act 27 of 1960 with retrospective effect and it is the amended section that lias
to be considered by us. The amended section is in
these terms :
S. 42. "The State Government may at any
time for the purpose of satisfying itself as to
the legality or propriety of any order passed"
scheme prepared or confirmed or repartition
made by any officer under this Act call for and
examine the records of any case pending before
or disposed of by such officer and may pass such
order in reference thereto as it thinks fit."
The petitioner's contention is that an order whid1
can be interfered with under s. 42 is an order pwed
under the Act by any officer in his own right and not
an order made by the Government itself or by an
officer exercising powers of the Government upon
drlegation under s. 41 (1).
1 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
545
The question really is as to the meaning of the
words "any order passed ...... by any officer under
this Act" in s. 42. Do these words include an order
passed by an officer in exercise of powers delegated to
him by the Government under s. 41 (1) ? We do not
think, they do.
Now, there cannot be much doubt that s. 42
makes a distinction between the Government and an
officer, because under it the Government is given
power to interfere with an order passed by an officer
and, therefore, it does not authorise the Government
to interfere with an order made by itself. As we
understood the learned Advocate-General of Punjab,
who appeared for the respondent State of Punjab, he
conceded that position. He said that the Government
could no doubt have itself heard an appeal preferred
under s. 21 (4) instead of getting it heard by an officer
to whom it delegated its power, and if it did so, then
it could not under s. 42 interfere with the order which
it itself passed in the appeal. We think that this
is the correct position, and we wish to make it clear
that we are not basing ourselves on the concession
made by the learned Advocate-General. We frel no
doubt that an order passed by an officer of the
Government cannot be an order passed by the Government itself.
The question then arises, when the Government
delegates its power, for example, to entertain and
decide an appeal under s. 21 (4) to an officer and the
officer pursuant to such delegation hears the appeal
and makes an order, is the order an order of the
officer or of the Government ? We think it must be
the order of the Government. The order is made
under a statutory power. It is the statute which
creates that power. The power can, therefore, be
exercised only in terms of the statute and not otherwise. In this case the power is created by s. 21 (4).
That section gives the power to the Government. It
1962
Roop Ch•nd
v.
Stale of Puf!ljai
Sarkar, J.
546 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963] SUPP.
19i2
Ro•P Chand
v.
Statt of Puniab
Sarkar, J,
would follow that an crder made in exercise of that
power will be the order of the Government for no one
else has the right under the statute to exercise the
power. No doubt the Act enables the Government
to delegate its power but such a power when delegated
remain:. the power of the Government, for the Government can only delegate the power given to it by the
statute and cannot create an independent power in
the officer. When the delegate exercises the power,
he does so for the Government. It is of interest to
observe here that Wills, ]., said in Huth v. Clarke (')
that "the word delegate means little more than an
agent". An agent of course exercises no powers of
his own but only the powers of his principal. Therefore, an order passed by an officer on delegation to
him under s. 41 (1) of the power of the Government
under s. 21 (4), is for the purposes of the Act an order
of the Government. If it were not so and it were to
be held that the order had been made by the officer
himself and was not an order of the Governmentand of course it had to be one or the other-then we
would have an order made by a person on whom the
Act did not confer any power to make it. That
would be an impossible situation. There can be no
order except as authorised by the Act. What is true
of s. 21 (4) would be true of all other provisions in
the Act conferring powers on the Government which
can be delegated to an officer under s. 41 (1). If we
are wrong in the view that we have taken, then in
the case of an order made by an officer as delegate of
the Government's power under s. 21 (4) we would
have an appeal entertained to and decided by one
who had no power himself under the Act to do. either.
Plainly, none of these things could be done.
Again, if an order passed by an officer to
whom a power had been delegated by the Government under s. 41(1) was an order passed by the officer
then an order made by an officer to whom power
under s. 42 had been delegated would be an order
(I) L. R., (1890) 25 Q. B. D. !191.
I S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
547
by an officer within the. meaning of s. 42. That
order would then be liable to be interfered with by
the Government under s. 42 and if such interference
is again not by the Government itself but by another
officer as its delegate, then in that way the process of
interference might be repeated for ever. Obviously
an interpretation leading to such a result cannot be
correct. It is of some interest to point out here that
in the present case the order under s. 42, that is, the
impugned order had not been made by the Government itself but by the Director, Consolidation of Holdings, to whom the Government's power under that
section had been delegated.
It was however said by the learned Advocate·
General that this absurd result would not follow because power under s. 42 can be exercised only once in
respect of the same order. We will assume that power
can be exercised in respect of the same order only
once. But even so it seems to us that if the order by
a delegate officer is an order within s. (2, then the
power under that section can be exercised repeatedly.
This will appear clearly if we take an illustration.
Suppose delegate officer A makes an order under
s. 21 (4). This order can be interfered with by the
Government under s. 42. Now suppose the Government delegates its power under s. 42 to officer B and
officer B then makes an order under s. 42 as delegate
of Government. That would be an order m;1de by a
delegate officer and capable of being interfered with
under s. 42. This exercise of power would be in respect of an order of officer B and therefore not in respect of the same order in respect of which power
under s. 42 had been once exercised, namely, the
order by officer A. Now assume this time delegate
officer C exercises Government's power under s. 42.
Again the order made by him would be interfered
with under s. 42. Repeated exercise of power would
be in respect of successive orders and never in respect
of the same order. In this way finality in the matter
1'12
R11/Ch ..t
v.
Stcu of l'unjab
Sirkar, J.
548 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963] SUPP.
1'62
R.,p Chand
v.
St•ll of PV11jah
Sttrkar, J.
can never be reached. We must reject an interpretation which prevents finality being reached. On the
interpretation that .we have suggested the matter
would be finally decided; the power under s. 42 cannot be exercised more than once in respect of the
same matter.
We think there are other reasons leading to the
view that the order contemplated by s. 42 is an order
made by an officer in his own right. The words
"The State Government may ...... call for and examine the record of any case pending before or dispo·
sed of by such officer" in the section clearly indicate
that the records are not in the possession of the
Government but are in the possession of somebody
else in his own right and therefore it is that the
Government is given power to "call for" those records. It would not be necessary to give the Government expressly the power to call for records if the
records were with the Government's delel{ate, for such
delegate would be even without such express power,
within the control of the Government. The records
with the delegate would really be records in the
possession of the Government. Furthermore, the
expression "call for" the records is one familiar to
courts of law. It occurs in s. 115 of the Code of
Civil Procedure where a superior court which therefore, is a different court, is given the power to call for
the records of a subordinate court. It may reasonably be presumed that by using the familiar words
"call for" the records, the legislature indicated that
the officer whose order was to be interfered
with under s. 42 was an officer exercising independent powers and therefore a subordinate officer
and not an officer exercising powers delegated by the
Government.
L.
We do not think that Lakka Singh v. Direcfm,
ConaolidatU>n of HoMings, Punjab(') to which we were
referred was correctly decided. There Falshaw, J.,
(I) A.I.Jl, ,1159) Paill• 157.
•
•
I
1 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
54'9
with whom Dua, J., agreed, approved of an earlier
decision by Bishan Narain, J., where the latter said
that "under s. 40 (I) the Government can delegate its
powers or functions only to one of its officers. It, therefore, follows that the Government's delegate under
s. 20 (4) is an Officer and as he is appointed under
this Act and has to perform duties relating to administration of this Act, he must be held to be an Officer under this Act." Falshaw,J., as also Bishan Narain,
J., were dealing with the Pepsu Holdings (Consolidation and Prevention of Fragmentation) Act. This
Act however contained the same provisions as the Act
now before us though the sections were numbered
differently. Apparently, the learned Judges were of
the view that the words "under this Act" ins. 41 of
tke Act before them which corrt"sponds to s. 42 of our
Act, referred to the word "Officer" and not to the
word "order". But we do not think that that view
solves the problem. The question is not whether the
officer is one under the Act. which perhaps means
mentioned in or appointed under the Act, but whether the order is by him in his own right as such
officer? We may point out that the Act does not
expressly say that an officer to whom Government
may delegate its power under s. 40 (1) has to be an
officer "under the Act". Falshaw, J., thought that
the words "any order passed by any officer under
this Act" in s. 41 of the Act before him should be
read as "any order passed under any provision of the
Act by any officer having power to pass any order
under the Act''. If they are so read, we think they
would mean that the officer had power und('r the
Act to pass the order in his own right and not as
delegate of the Government.
The learned Advocate-General said that when
power is delegated to an officer under s. 40(1), he
does not cease to be an officer and therefore an
order passed by him is an order passed by an officer
within s. 42. It seems to us that this is not at all
1962
550 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963] SUPP.
1'92
RM JC/uJnd
v.
Stole of Puajab
determinative. lf the officer does not cease to be an
officer because Government had delegated power to
him, neither does he cease to be a delegate of the
Government because he is an officer. The real
question is different. It is whether the order made
by the officer was made as a delegate of the Government or in his own right.
Then it was pointed out that the order in this
case was the order of an officer and not of the
Government at all, for if it had been the order of the
Government it would have been made in the name
of the Governor as required by the rules of the
executive business framed under Art. 166 of the
Constitution. But it seems to us that the form in
which the order wa:i made is immaterial. The order
was not in fact made by the Government but by
somebody else in exercise of the power which lay
vested in the Government alone. We are not aware
that such an order has to be in the name of the
Governor. The question is, in whose right has an
order to be made so that it may be interfered with
under s. 42 ? It is of no help in answering that
question to consider the form in which the order
was made.
The learned Advocate-General then said that
the words "under the Act" in the section referred
to the word "order" only and not to the word
"officer" and therefore the order contemplated by i~
may be one made by an officer to whom power was
delegated by the Government for that would be an
order contemplated by the Act and therefore an
order "under the Act". We think that this is a
pointless contention. When the Act permits an order
to be made, it must at the same time indicate, as the
present Act does, who is to make the order.
Obviously, a man in the street cannot make an order
under the Act. Therefore the question that has arisen
in the present case: cannot be . answered simply by
r~
I S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
551
saying that the words "under the Act" refer to the
word "order" alone. It cannot be that an order
under the Act can be made by any officer whatsoever.
If the contention of the learned Advocate-General
was right, then even an order made by the Government itself under s. 21(4) would be liable to interference under s. 42, but as already stated he concedes
that this cannot be done. Quite clearly s. 42 does
pot contemplate all orders whatsoever made under
the Act.
The learned Advocate-General further said that
when the legislature amended s. 42 by Act 27 of
1960 it had before i( the decision in Lakha Singh's
case (') and as it did not expressly provide
to the contrary, it must be deemed to have
approved of the interpretation put upon the section
similar to s. 42 by that case. He referred us to a
passage in Ramnandan Prasad Narayan Singh v.
Mahanth Kapildeo Ram (2 ) in support of this
contention. In that case a somewhat obscure text
in a Bihar Statute had been interpreted by the High
Court of Patna consistently from the beginning, that
is, from a time soon after its enactment, in a certain
way and this Court held in view of the obscurity in
the text and the inaction of the legislature over a
number of years that it could be legitimately inferred
that the High Court had correctly interpreted the
intention of the legislature. Without being unders~ood as saying that such an inference must always
be made, we would like to point out that the present
is i\ll entirely different case. Here there is no
unanimity of opinion as regards the interpretation of
the statute concerned. At least one Judge namely
Grover, J., was unable to accept the view that was
adopted in Lakha Singh's case (1). That learned
Judge said, "The use of the expression "officer" by
necessary implication means that the officer should
have exercised power as such and not by virtue of
the delegation made by the State Government!' : see
(I) A.I.R. (1959) l'wlj. 157.
(2) (11161) a.a.R. 138, Ht,
1962
Roop Clo ..i
v.
Stott •f P,.,joi
s.,,.,,,, J.
552 SUPREME COURT RE.PORTS [1963] SUPP.
1962
RM; Oh«na
v.
Stai. •J Punjc/J
Sarksr, J.
La~hr.! Singh's case. (1) p. 159. With this view we
entirely agree. Furthermore, the present petition
was pending in this Court when the Act was amended
and the legislature might have thought that it was
unnecessary to amend the statute to indicate that the
view in Lakha Bingh's case(1) was. wrong forthis Court
would correct that error.
It was lastly said that it may so happen that an
order under s. 21( 4) might give rise to a chain of
reactions which can only be coped with by an order
made under s. 42. The precise contention is not
very. clear to us. This contention appears to have
been accepted by Bishan Narain, J., in the judgment
on which Lakhr.! Singh's case(') is based where he said,
"The changes in allotments in consolidation proceed·
ings otten produce a claim (sic) of reactions and affect
a number of persons and the rights of parties cannot
always be satisfactorily adjusted in an appeal under
s. 20(4). In such cases s. 41 is the only provision
which can be utilised to achieve this object." Section
41 referred to by the learned Judge corresponds as we
have earlier said to s. 42 of our Act. Suppose the
position is that in view of the chain reactions started
the order made under s. 21(4) was better recalled.
Now suppose the order under s. 21(4) is made by the
Government itself, then admittedly nothing can be
done about it under s. 42 to give effect to any chain
reactions. There is no reason to think that if that
order happens to be made by an officer to whom
Government's powers under s. 21(4) are delegated
that should make any difference. The harm, if any
in each case would be the same, and there is no reason
why the legislature should have provided for a remedy
in one case and not in .the other. It might however
be reasonably thought that when an appeal is being
heard under s. 21(4) either by the Government or by
an officer, the authority concerned will before making
the order in the appeal consider the chain reactions
that the order might cause and then decide not to
flt A.LR. 119) l'lm,I. 117,
1 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
553
make the order at all or to make the order and give
effect to the chain reactions by interfering under s. 42
with other orders. Even on the interpretation that
we suggest all necessary chain reactions might be
given effect to. This reasoning does not assist the
respondents at all.
We therefore think that the order impugned in
this case which was made on July 21, 1956 under
s. 42 was entirely without jurisdiction and must be
treated as a nullity. No effect can be given to it and
the petitioner is entitled to an order quashing it.
Then it is said that even so, no writ can be
issued quashing the order as it cannot be said to
affect the petitioner's right to property. The contention in short is that the order affects no fundamental
right and therefore no petition under Art. 32 is maintainable. This objection to the petition is also without
foundation. From what we have earlier said about
the provisions of the Act it would appear that the object of the scheme is to give to a person affected by it
right in the lands allotted to him under the repartition made pursuant to the scheme in the place of his
right in lands which were pooled and which he previously held. Now under ss. 23, 24 and 25 taken
together, the original right to lands come to an end
and a right to the substituted lands spring up uPon
possession being delivered of the new allotments as
mentioned in these sections. It is not necessary to
refer to the provisions of these sections in detail for
this, it is agreed, is the substance of them. It may be
that possession has not yet been delivered in terms
of the Act and, therefore, in a manner of speaking,
the petitioner's original right to land has not yet come
to an end nor has his new right come into existence.
But it is obvious that if the impugned order is allowed
to stand, then it is the intention of the respondent
State and the respondent Hari Singh to carry it into
effect. If the impugned order stands, Hari Singh
1962
Roop Chand
v.
Stale of Pun}ab
SarAar, J.
554 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963] SUPP.
1962
Roop Chand
v.
Sta!1 oj Punjab
s~·kar,
J.
would be entitled to ask for delivery of possession of
the lands given to him under that order and the respondent State would be bound to give him such
possession. The petitioner would have no means of
opposing yossession being ;o given. l~1:nediately upon
s~ch dehv~ry of possession t~1e petitioner's origmal
nght to his lands would disappear. Therefore it
seems to us that the inevitable result of the order is to
affect the petitioner's right to property illegally. It
may be that just now the right has not been affected
and there is only a threat that it will be affected.
But we think that the threat is sufficiently serious and
the petitioner is not bound to wait till his right has
actually been affected more particularly as it is not
disputed that it would inevitably be affected.
In the result we would allow the petition and
issue a writ quashing the order purported to be made
by the Director, Consolidation of Holdings, Punjab
on July 21, 1956, · under s. 42 of the Act. The peti·
tioner will be entitled to the costs of this petition .
Kapur, J.
.KAPUR, J.-The decision of this case depends
upon the construction of two provisions of the East
Punjab Holdings (Consolidation and Prevention of
Fragmentation) Act, 1948, (Punj. 50of 1948), hereinafter termed "the Act"; those provisions are ss. 21(4)
and 42. The former section confers on the State
Government appellate powers and the latter the
power to call for "proceedings" for the purpose of
satisfying itself as to the legality and propriety of any
order passed under the Act by any officer acting under
the Act. The respective submissions of the parties
before us are these: according to the petitioner once
the power of appeal in regard to an order of the
Settlement Officer is exercised under s. 21(4) by the
State Government or its delegate to whom power is
delegated under s. 41 the State Government cannot
exercise the power of control contained in s. 42 of
calling for the record and correcting the errors of its
1 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
555
officers. According to the respondents' submission
the two powers of appeal and control are separate
and distinct powers and if they are delegated to two
different officers as they were in the present case then
the exercise of one power (under s. 21 (4)) does not
exhaust the Government's power or that of its delegate under s. 42 of the Act. In order to resolve the
controversy it is necessary to refer to some of the pro·
visions and the objects of the Act.
As the long title of the Act shows the underlying object of the Act is the consolidation of holdings
and prevention of fragmentation and thus to improve
agriculture in the State. By a series of partitions
since the founding of the various villages in the State
the holdings had become fragmented and uneconomic
for the purpose of efficient cultivation. The Act
provides the remedy for this by means of consolidation of holdings. In order to effectuate that object,
the Act has created a machinery which provides for
putting all the holdings in a village in hotch·potch
evaluating each holding and then repartitioning in
accordance with that evaluation with a provision for
compensation to equalise the values.
Chapter III deals with consolidation of holdings.
Under that Chapter first the State Government declares its intention to make a scheme for consolidation of
holdings and then a scheme is prepared by the Consolidation Officer after obtaining the advice of the landowners of the state. Under s. 15 the scheme has to provide for compensation. After the scheme is prepared it
can be objected to by any landowner and is liable to be
amended by the Consolidation Officer and the Settlement Officer who is a higher official. The scheme
as finally drafted has to be confirmed by the Settle·
ment Officer. After the scheme is prepared and con·
firmed and published, the land is put in hotch-potch
and repartitioned in accordance with the scheme of
consolidation and with the advice of the landowners.
1962
Roop Chand
v.
Stafr of Punjab
/tapur, J.
556 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963] SUPP.
1962
Roop Chand
v.
Stal4 oj Punjab
Kapur, J,
Here comes the hierarchy of officers who are
empowere~ to look into the grievances of any aggrieved person m regard to repartition and that is provided
in s. 21 of the Act. An objection can be lodged in
the first instance by any person aggrieved by the
repartition before the Consolidation Officer and any
person aggrieved by the order of the Consolidation
Officer can appeal to the Settlement Officer
(Consolidation) and if any person is aggrieved by his
order he can take the appeal within the time specified
to the State Government and there the machinery for
appeals stops and subject to that appellate order the
order of the Settlement Officer is final.
After repartition has been finally sanctioned
under the provisions of the Act and has been effected
a new record of rights has to be prepared and then if
all the land·owners agree to enter into possession in
accordance with the scheme of repartition the possession is given to the land owners and if they do not
agree to enter into possession then possession is to be
taken by the landowners at the commencement of
the agricultural year following the date of the publica·
tion of the final scheme and they have to be put into
physical possession of the holdings and would be
entitled to the standing crop on payment of such
compensation as may be determined. Under s. 24
as soon as possession is taken in accordance with the
provisions of the Act the scheme shall be deemed to
have come into force. Provision is then made in
regard to encumberances of the landowners and
tenants. Provision is also made for apportionment
of compensation.
Now we shall deal with Chapter V which is
headed "General". For the administration of the
Acts. 41 empowers the State Government to appoint
such p<'rsons as it thinks fit and it may by notification
delegate any of its powers under the Act to any of
its officers either by name or designation. Section 42
l S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
557
confers power on the State Government to call for
the proceedings i. e. any order passed, scheme prepared or confirmed or repartition made under the Act
by any officer acting under 'the Act to satisfy itself as
to the legality and propriety of orders passed by its
officers and to pass such orders as it thinks fit. Section
43 provides that except as provided in the Act no
appeal or revision shall lie from any order passed
under the Act and under s. 44 no civil suit is entertainable in respect of any matter which the State
Government or any other officer is empowered to
determine, decide or dfrpose of under the Act and
under s. 45 no sui l is maintainable in respect of the
exercise of any power or discretion conferred by the
Act or against any public servant or person duly
appointed or authorised under the Act in respect of
anything done in good faith or purporting to be done
under the Act and s. 4tl is the rule making power.
This, in short, is the scheme of the Act.
It is to be noticed that the Act provides under
s. 42 an over-all control of the State Government at
all stages of consolidation proceedings. It is the
State Government which has to specify the estate for
the purposes of the Act and it has the power to determine and revise at any time the standard areas under
s. 5 of the Act. The scheme for consolidation of
holdings has Lo )le finally sanctioned by the State
Government or by its delegate and after the scheme
is sanctioned repartition is to take place so as to allot
lands to the people in accordance with the value of
their original holdings with such compensation as mav
be necessary and if any person is dissatisfied with the
repartition he can appeal first to the Consolidation
Officer, then to the Settlement Officer and thereafter
to the State Government but the appeals are not
confined to the person aggrieved by the repartition
scheme; any person who may be aggrieved by the
order of Consolidation Officer may, under s. 2l(:l) of
the Act appeal to the Settlement Officer under s. 2113)
1962
Roop C/umd
v.
State of Punjab
Kapur, J.
558 SUPREME COURT REPORTS[l963] SUPP.
1962
!loo; C/iand
v.
St.11 ef Punjab
Kcpur, J.
and any person who is aggrieved by that order, who
may not necessarily be the person who started the
proceedings , before the Consolidation .Officer can
appeal to the State Government. Section 21 reads
as follows:
"S. 21 (1) The Consolidation Officer shall after
obtaining the advice of the landownets of the estate or estates concerned, carry out r«?Partition in
accordance with the sclieme of consolidation confinned under section
20, and the boundaries of the holdings as demarcated shall be shown
on the shajra which shall be publish·
ed in the prescribed manner in the
estate or estates concerned.
(2) Any person aggrieved by the repartition may file a written obiection
within fifteen days of the publication
before the Consolidation Officer who
shall after hearing the objector pass
such orders as he considers proper
confinning or modifying the scheme.
(3) Any person aggrieved by the order
of the Consolidation Officer under
sub-section (2) may within one
month of that order file an appeal
before the Settlement Officer (Con·
solidation) who shall after hearing
the appellant pm such order as he
considers proper."
The effect of thiq section is to give a right to every
person who is aggrieved by any order i>aaed either at
the time of the repartition or by the order of the
1.:onsolidation Officer or by the order of the Settlement
Officer to object amt get relief, The reuoo for this
1 S;C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
559
is that the order passed by the Consolidation Officer
in favour of a person who applies under s. 21(2) may
start a chain reaction which may affect the rights of
others, like any other ordinary partition proceedings
may do, and therefore any person aggrieved has been
given the right to take objection under the various
provisions of s. 21. When the appellate power of the
State Government is exercised by an officer to whom
powers are delegated under s. 41 which provides :-
S. 41 (1) "The State Government may for the
administration of this Act, appoint
such persons as it thinks fit, and may
hy notification delegate any of its
powers or functions under this Act
to any of its officers either by name
or designation.
( 2) A Co11solidation Officer or a Settlement Officer (Consolidation) may,
with the sanction of the State
Government, delegate any of its
powers or functions under this Act
to any person in the service of the
State Government."
The officer though exercising such powers as the State
Government itself possesses is still an officer of the
State Government and has all the protection which
is given by s. 45 of the Act and his order is final as
provided in s. 43. Any order passed by him as an
appellate authority is an order in regard to repartition which has to be taken into consideration for the
purposes of bringing the scheme into effect under
s. 24 of the Act. Thus he docs not cease to be an
officer of the State Government even though in disposing of appeals he is exercising delegated powers.
Section 42 of the Act provides :
"S. 42 The State Government may at any time
for the purpose of satisfying itself as to
1962
Roop Chand
v.
Stall of Punjat
Kapur, J,
560 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963]SUPP.
1962
Roop Chand
v.
State oj Punjab
Kapur, J.
the legality of propriety of any order
passed, scheme prepared or confirmed or
repartition made by any officer under
this Act call for and examine the record
of any case pending before or disposed
of by such officer and may pass such
order in reference thereto as it thinks fit.
Provided that no order, scheme or repartition shall be varied or reversed without
giving the parties interested notice to
appear and opportunity to be heard
except in cases where the State Government is satisfied that the proceedings have
been vitiated by unlawful consideration.''
Now this power of the State Government is distinct
from the powers. 21(4) and is in the nature of revision. This gives an overall control to the State
Government to see that the orders passed by its
officers are legal and are proper because one illegal
or improper order may start a chain of reactions
which may disturb the whole scheme of consolidation
and prevent its coming into effect. One order passed
at any stage under s. 21 of the Act bv which a landowner gets more dian his share or is given a different
area to that which is provided in the repartition
scheme may lead to the undoing of the whole scheme
and may set at naught the whole scheme
of consolidation. It is for that purpose that the
State Government has been given the power under
s. 42 which is further clear from the fact that under
the proviso to s. 42 the Government is expressly given
the power to set aside proceedings ex parte in regard
to which it is satisfied that there has been an element
of unlawful consideration. This would apply equally
to an order under s. 21(4) by a delegate as to any
other order improperly obtained.
The Government has necessarily to act through
as consolidation has to take place in
it~ officers and
l S.C.R.
SUPREME GOUR T REPORTS
501
several villages, where the rights of a large number of
landowners are affected, it cannot always appoint as a
final appellate authority, persons who correspond to a
Financial Commissioner under the Land Revenue Act
of the Punjab; and as the orders of such officers become
immune from challenge in courts and can in certain
cases affect the whole scheme the State Government
has been give.n th~ power of overall control over all
actions of its officers and at all stages. In the present
case the officer who exercised the appellate power was
Mr. Avtar Singh Brar, Assistant Director, Consolidation of Holdings, Ambala. Naturally the Government had to appoint an officer of a higher status to
see that no improper or illegal order was passed and
for that purpose its powers under s. 42 were delegated
to the Director of Consolidation of Holrlings.
The language of s. 42 shows that an overall
control is given to the State Government over all
consolidation proceedings and at all stages. In that
section arc mentioned firstly any order passed by an
officer, secondly a scheme prepared or confirmed,
thirdly a partition made by any officer under the Act.
They are all equally subject to the power of the State
Government under s. 42. The order under s. 21 (~)
by a delegate is an order of repartition and would
even apart from the fact that it is an order of an
officer be subject to the revisional powers of the State
Government under s. 42. Therefore the statute must
be taken to have authorised the State Government to
reconsider the scheme confirmed by ;ts delegate. If
in that case the power is exercisable by the State
Gcwernmcnt there does not seem to be anv reason
why that power is not exercisable when its· delegate
passes an order under s. 21 (4) and thus makes an
order in regard to repartition. So read the extent of
the power of the State Government under s. 42
extends equallv to any order passed by its officers
whether of confirmation of a scheme or of repartition
and whether the power is exercised by the officer
1962
Roup Chand
,, .
State of Punja~
562 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963] SUPP.
1962
Roop Chond
v.
Stole of Punjab
J(apur, r.
making the order acting under authority expressly
given to him under the Act or it is delegated to him
by the State Government under s. 41 of the Act. If
this power were not to be inferred from s. 42 then no
kind of illegality or impropriety would be liable to
correction. This argument receives further support
from the power given to the State Government where
it is satisfied that proceedings have been vitiated by
unlawful consideration. If this power was not there
then any order howsoever obtained would remain
immune from all control of higher officials and would
lead to a great deal of inconvenience if not injustice.
The view of the Punjab High Court in Lakha
Singh v. Director, Consolidation of Holdings,
Punjab(') which was a case under a similar provision of
the Pepsu State in our opinion is a correct interpre·
tation of s. 41 of the Pepsu Act corresponding to s. 42
of the Act. In that case it was held that the
appellate powers are concerned with the grievances of
the appellant and those who are arrayed as parties rn
the appeal but s. 42 gives an overriding power to the
Government to consider any order of its officers under
the Act and to make such orders as would subserve
the objects and purposes of consolidation proceedings.
The change in allotment, as a result of an appeal,
may produce a chain of reactions and affect the rights
of a number of persons which cannot be satisfactorily
adjusted in appeal but under its general powers the
Government may make such orders as would prevent
the right of all or a large number of landowners from
being affected. Without such a power, as we have
said above, the whole scheme of consolidation may
fail because there would be no remedy in a ci vii court
and finality being given to the appellate order would
produce an impasse which must necessarili'. defeat the
object of the Act and the process of consohdat1on.
In this virw of thr m;:itter, in our opinion, this
(I),\. J. R. (1959) Punj. 15?.
l S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
563
petition is without force and is dismissed with costs.
BY CoFRT :-In view of
the majority opinion
the \Vrit Petition is allowed with costs.
1962
Roop Chand
v.
State of Punjab
Kapur, J.
STATE OFKERALA
v.
SHRI M. APPUKUTTY
(]. L. KAPUR and J.C. SHAH, JJ.)
Sale8 Tax-Escaped turno11er-[.'8ue of notice by lkputy
Oommissioner-Jurisdiction_:_Rules, if ultra vires-Madras
General Sale8 Tax Act, 19.19 (Madras lX of 1939), ss. 9 (1), 9(2).
12 (2), 19 (1), 19 (2) (!)-:Madras General SaleR Tax Rules,
rr. 17 (1), 17A (JA), 17 (3A).
The Deputy Commercial Tax Officer imposed sales tax
under the Madras General Sales Tax Act, 1939, on the respon·
dent for the assessment year and the appeal taken against the
assessment order was dismissed. Thereafter the Deputy
Commissioner of Commercial Taxes issued a notice proposing
to determine the escaped turnover for the period of asse<.sment
and in pursuance of this notice he determined the revised turnover. On the dismissal of the appeal filed by the respondent
before the Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal he filed a revMon
petition before the High Court. The High Court allowed the
revision petition on the ground that the notice by the Deputy
Commi.,ioner of Commercial Taxes was issued without jurisdiction.
The State appealed to the Supreme Court with special
leave. The main questions in the appeal were whether the
notice was issued without jurisdiction and whether the rules
under which the notice was issued were ultra vires the Act.
Held, that the power of the Deputy Commissioner to assess
escaped turnover under r. 17 (3A) framed under s. 19 of the
Act docs not arise out of the revisional jurisdiction exercised
under s. 12 (2) of the Act. The Deputy Commissioner fa therefore not bound to restrict himself to the examination of the
1962
Octab1r, 11.
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