M.R. BALAJI AND OTHERS versus STATE OF MYSORE
Supreme Court of India | Decided 28 September 1962 | [1963] SUPP. 1 S.C.R. 439 | 1962 INSC 279
Key facts
- Decided
- 28 September 1962
- Bench
- BHUVNESHWAR PRASAD SINHA*, P.B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, K.N. WANCHOO, K.C. DAS GUPTA, J.C. SHAH
- Bench size
- 5
- Case number
- WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) No. 90/1962
- Disposal
- Appeal(s) allowed
- Citation
- [1963] SUPP. 1 S.C.R. 439
- Neutral citation
- 1962 INSC 279
Text of the judgment
1~§,Q,R.. . SUl,lll:&ME, ,COURT.~ '.'J?ORtS
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which can be tried in courts. If the State contends
(h,aJ the :responden.ts have lost their citizenship ;M
India under s. 9 (2) of the Citizenship · Act, it is . open.,
to the appellant to move the Central Government to
consider and determine the matter.. and if the decision of the Central Government goes against the res-•
p6ndents, it -may be competent to the appellant td
tak~ app_ropriate a,cti?n against tpe respondents,. So,
far as . the appellants case agamst the respondents
under Art. 7 is concerned, the High Court was right
in 'holding that the· respondents were not foreigners
Within the ·meaning of c.l: 7' of the Order and call.flcit;
thetefore, be prosecuted .under s. 14 of the .Act. '.(be
'
appeal accordingly fails and is dismissed.. . • '
1962
.~tate ~/Madhya
Priilleih
i<··~,~-.:~v.~·-, . ·, i_
Pe_er Xtfohd.
-,~_;;_p._.:·:.:·-
Gajendragadkar, J.
Appeal dismissed:
.
M.· R. BALAJI .AND OTHERS .
1962
v.
·September, 28.
;,
STATE. OF MYSORE
.•
(B. P. SniIIA, c. ]., P. B. GAJE~DRAGADKAR,~
K, N. WANCHOO, K. C. DAS GUPTA and
]. C. SHAH, JJ.)
. , ,. . . Admission into O~lleges~Reservation of seats for ·socially
1<114:. educationally . bachurard c/,asses gnd Sohedukd Castes· and
·Schedukd. Tribes~Scope of~Directive Principles-Supr.ern•
(Jourt not to fix pe<~tage-Oonstit'!'tion of India, Arts. 15. (4),
)6.(4),29>(2),46,340. '.·' .
' · • . ·. .
· · ·· On July 26, 1958, the State of Mysore . fasued an order
tl:!at ·all the· communities excepting the Brahm in community;
fell within the definition of educationally and socially backward
!'la.ss(!S _aI\d Scheduled Castes _and Schedul_ed Tribes _'and 75% of
,~~J~ in ,~du~atio_nal_-institutio1:1-~· -~er~ J..:~~eryed for t\1.em . . ,_;~irpjJ11r
9(ders}"eservmg seats, V{ere ..1_s':ued . on. May 14, 1,959 ,JU!~ ,4~,
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44o SUPREME COURTREPORtS [1963) StJPP.
1i6Z
M. R. Blll1ji
v.
State of MJ""
1959,June 9, 1960 andJuly IO, 1961. The percentage of scats
reserved varied in various orders, but all of them were set aside
when challenged.
On July 31, 1962, the State of Mysore passed another
order which superseded all previous orders made by the State
under Art. 15 (4) for reservation of seats. Under that order,
the backward classes were divided into two categories, backward
classes and more backward classes. The order reserved 68%
of the seats in the engineering and medical colleges and other
te~nical institutions for the educationally and socially backward
classes and Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, and left
only 32 per cent seats for the merit pool. The order was
challenged by 23 petitioners by a writ petition w1der Art. 32.
The petitioners contended that but for the reservations made by
the impugned order, they would have been entitled to admission
in the respective colleges for which they had applied. They
contended that the classification made under the order was
irrational and the reservation of 68% seats made by the order
was•· fraud on Art. 15 (4) of the Constitution.
Held, that the impugned order was a fraud on the constitutional power conferred on the State by Art. 15 (4) and the
'ame be quashed. The impugned order categorises the backward
classes on the sole basis of caste which is not permitted by
Art. 15 (4). The reservation of 68% seats is inconsistent with
the concept of the special provision authorised by Art. 15 (4).
However, this Court would not attempt to Jay down definitely
and in an inflexible manner as to what should be the proper
percentage for reservation.
Reservation should and must be adopted to advance the
prospects of weaker sections of society, but while doing so, care
should be taken not to exclude admission to higher educational
centres of deserving and qualified candidates of other com·
munities. Reservations under Arts. 15 (4) and 16 f4) ltt"St be
within reasonable limits. The interests of weaker ~Hoos of
society, which are a first caarge on the States and the dentrc,
have to be adjusted with the interests of thr. community as a
whole. Speaking generally and in a broad way, 11 special
provislon should be less than 50%. The actual percentage must
depend upon the relevant prevailing circumstances in each case.
The object of Art. 15 (4) ls to advance the intereits of the
society as a whole by looking after the interests of tHc weaker
clements in 1ociety. If a provision under Art. 15 (4) ignores
the intereotl of society, that is clearly outside the acope of
i. S.C.1t SUPRJU& COUilT R!PORtS
44,i
Art. 15 (4). It is extremely unreasonable to assume that in
f!llacting'Art. 15 (4), Parliament intended to provide that where
the advancement of :the backward. classes or the Scheduled
Castes and Tribes were concerned, the fundamental righ!S of
the. citizens constituting, the, rest of the society were to .. be
completely and absolutely ignored. Considerations of national
interest and the interests of the community and the sC1ciety as a
whole have already to be kept in mind.
.
·Article 15 was amended and Art. 15 (4) was added.in
view of: the judgment of this Court in the Stat• of. Ma.dras v.
Smt. Onampakam Dorairajan and The Stak of Madr1JA v. 0 .. R.
Srinivasan[1951] S. C.R .. 525. Article 15 (4) is a proviso or
an exception to Arts. 15 (1) arid 29 (2). Ifan order is justifiec!
bythe provisions of·Art. 15 (4),.its validity cannot be.questioned on·the,ground that it violates.Art. 15 (~)or Art. 29 (2).
It is true that the Constitution contemplates the appointment.•of a commission whose · report and recolnmendations can
be of assistance to.the authorities conce~ned for taking adequate
mps.fot the· advancement of backward classes, but . this does not
mean that the appointment of the commission and the subse·
quent steps that would follow it ar~ a coµditiori precedent to
any action being taken under Art. 15 (4). The specia.1 provisions
contemplated uµder Art. 15 (4) can be made by the Union or
the States by· an executive order. · It cannot be said that the
PreSident alone:.can make speCial provision for the advancement
of the· backward classes.
Article 15 · (4) aiithorises the State to make special provision for the advancement of socially and educationally backward· classes· of· citizens as distinguished from· the Scheduled
Castes-and Scheduled Tribes. · Some backward cl"'8ses may, by
presidential order, be included in Scheiluled Castes and '.Tribes;
and i!IJ that .sense the backward da8'es for whose improvement
ptovi•ion.is made itt Att. 15 (4) are comparable to Scheduled
·
Ca•tes and Scheduled Tribe8.
The backwardne~s under Art. 15 (4) must be social and
educational.. It is not· either. social or educatiorull, but it is
both- social and 'educational. Though caste in relatfon to
Hindus inay be a relevant factor to consider in. determining the If
"SoCial backwardness of groups, or classes of ~itizeris, it. cannot
be rilade the sole dr dominant test. There are CC\"tain seGtions
Of Indian society such as Christians,Jains, Muslirris, etc., Who
do not J;eHeve in caste system, and the test of caste ii~• not
a'PJ?lY t<Y them, MoteOvcr, social backWardness IS iii .tht
ultunate analyii:s the result of poverty to a very lar&e stent.
191SZ
442 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [lg63] SUPP.
1962
.\f, R. Ba!aji
v.
StaU of M,ysore
The classes of citizens who are deplorably poor automatically
become socially backward. Moreover, the occupation of citizens
and the place of their habitation also result in social backwardness. The problem of determining who are socially
backward classes, h undoubtedly very complex, but the classification of socially backward citizens on the basis of their castes
alone is not permissible under Art. 15 (4).
In determining the educational backwardness of a class of
citizens, the literacy test supplied by the Census Report> is not
adequate. It is doubtful if the test of the average of the
student population in the last three high school classes is
appropriate in deter.mining educational backwardness. Jn. a.ny
case, the State is not justified in including in the list of backward classe~ castes or communities whose average of Student
population per thousand is slightly above or very near or just
below the State average. The legitimate view to take is that
the classes of citizens whose average is well or substantially
below the State average can be treated as educationally backward. It is not for this Court to lay down any hard and fast
rule in this matter. It is the duty of the State to decide the
matter in a manner which is consistent with the requirements
of Art. 15 (4).
The division of backward classes into two categories of
backward classes and more backward classes is not warranted by
Art. 15 (4). Art. 15 (4) authorises special provision being made
for the really backward classes but by introducing two categories,
what is intended is to devise measures for all classes of citizens
who are less advanced as compared to the most advanced
classes in the State. That is not the scope of Art. 15 (4).
The object of making a special provision for the advancement of castes or com,munities is to carry out the Directive
Principle enshrined in Art, 46. Unless the educational and
economic interests of the weaker sections of the people arc
promoted quickly and liberally, the ideal of establishing social
and economic equality cannot be attained. Article 15 (4)
authorises the State to take adequate steps to achieve the object.
While making adequate reservation under Art. l 6 (4),
care should be taken not to provide for unreasonable, excessive
or extravagant reservation because that would by eliminating
general cor:ipetition in a large field and by cre~ting widesprea.d
dissatisfacuon am.ong the employees, materially affect their
efficiency. Like the special provision improperly made under
An. 15 (4), reservation made under Arl. 16 (4) beyond the
permissible and legitimate limits is a fraud on !he Constitution.
1 S.C.R.
SUPREm COURT REPORTS
443
RartMkrilihna Singh Ram Singh v. State of Mysore, A. I. R.
1960 Mysore 338, S. A. Partha v. The State of Mysore, A. I. R.
1961 Mysore 220, The State of Madras v. Shrimathi Ohampakam
Dorairajan, [1951] S. C.R. 525 and General Manager, Southern
Rsilway v. Rangachari, [1962] 2 S. C. R. 586, referred to
ORIGINAL
JURISDICTION :
Nos. 90 to 112 of 1962.
Writ
IH:
M. R. Bll.j
v.
St•t1 •f Mp1rr
Petitions
Petition under Art. 32 of the Constitution of
India for the enforcement of Fundamental Rights.
S. K. Venkataranga Iyengar and R. Gopalakri&hna,n, for the petitioners.
G. Ethirajulu Naidu, Advocate General of the
State of Mysore, B. R. L. Iyengar, D. M. Chandrasekhar and P. D. Menon, for the Respondent No. 1.
R. Gopakt,krishna,n, for the Interveners.
1962. September 28.
Court was delivered by
The Judgment of the
GAJENDRAGADKAR, ].-Since 1958 the State of
Mysore has been endeavouring to make a special
provision for the advancement of the socially and
educationally backward classes of citizens in the State
of Mysore under Article 15 (4) of the Constitution,
and every time when an order is passed in that behalf,
its validity has been challenged by writ proceedings.
Four previous orders passed in that behalf were
challenged by writ proceedings taken against the
State under Art. 226 in the High Court of Mysore.
The present petitions filed by the respective petitioners
under Art. 32 dispute the validity of the last order
pai!lied by the State of Mysore on the July 31, 1962,
under Art. 15 (4).
Out of the twenty-three petitioners, six had
applied for admission to the Pre-professional Class
in Medicine in the Medical Colleges affiliated either
G•faoi1t11Uk••, J
to the Mysore University or to the Kamatak Univer··
sity;
and seventeen had applied· for admission to the·
M. R. Balaji
..
First' Year of' the 5 Year integrated COUl~e leading
S14tt of M_.,sort
to the Degree of B. E. in the University Qf M>"sore.
CUjidrlp.Jkar, J.
According to the petitioners, but for the· reservation
made by the impugned order, they' woukl;have beel'J
entitled to the admission in the respective "colleges for
which they had. applied. 'As a re5ult ·qfthtl'escr·
vation ''inade' oy the said order/ stttdcnts whb &ave
secureq less percentage of marks have been ·admitted,
but notthe petitioners. That, in brief, is the- peti'.
tioners' grievance and they urge that the imp'U#li:~
order which has denied them the facility ofadmiMiCll'l
.in the respective colleges is void under Artsr 15 .(l)
and 29 (2) and sho.uld hot be enforced ~inst them.
. Accordingly, the petitioners pray that
writ .of
mandamus ar1.d/or• 1any suitable wr.it or directian
should be issued against respondent ·No. I, the State
of ' Mysbre·· · '(hereinafter · ca1led the State), and
the two Selection Committees which· have ·beat
impleaded as respondents 2 & 3. The petitioner$'
case is' that •the· Impugned order which ·has• been
passed under Art• 15 (4) is not valid because the·~
ad6ptea· by the order in specifying and erj:umerating
tlie socially and' educationally ·backwat;d--;classcs:.of
citizens . in the State is unintelligible :and irratio4ill,
and· the dassificathm made on the said basis''is in-e6tt··
sistent with and outSide the provisions of ,Art, 15.(4.}.
Ifis also urged by thern thatthe extent of:ttescrvatiorl
prescribed' by the · said order is so unreasonable;and
eXtravagant that the order, in law, is net justified:by
Art~ Ill (4) atid, in substance, is a fraud 01rthe'•po'We?
conferred by the said' Article on the·State.
•·
v.~
a
.•
These allegations are denied by the State tttd
it is urged on its behalf that the. classification m'llde is
both -rational and intelligible and the - rservation
p.resc:rib~ by the order Ml fully justified.by Art;;l5 (')· The contention that tke order iS a coldara:ble ftei'eise·
. I S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
W>
of the State's power and amounts to a fraud 01> the
Constitution is disputed.
1~
...
M.11. lt.Uji
Sm11 •f MJ""
As we have just indicated, the impugned order
was preceded by four other orders and so, it is neces- G1jm,rq<lli., ,J.
sary to refer to the said orders in their sequence to
understand the background of the dispute between
the parties. On the 26th July, 1958, the State issued
an order that all the communities, excepting the
Brahmin community, fell within the definition of
educationally and socially Backward Classes and
Scheduled Castes and Tribes, and provided for the
said communities and tribes reservation of 75% of
seats in edprational institutions. For the Scheduled
Castes and the Scheduled Tribes, the percentage of
reservation was 15% and 3% respectively. This
percentage for the Scheduled Castes & Tribes has
bei-n "1aintained in a11 the subseauent orders. The
order is;ucd by the State on the 26th July, .1958, w~
challenged before the Mysore High Court and it
appears that the State conceded before the High
Court that there was a drafting error in the Govern'' ,
ment Order and so, it did not press its case that the
said order was valid. In the result, the writ petitions
filed to challenge the validity of the order succeeded
and the impugned order was quashed.
·
In 1959, two separate orders were passed by the
State on the 14th May and 22nd July respectively.
By the first order, all communities, excepting
Brahmins, Baniyas and Kayasts among the Hindus
and Muslims, Christians and J ains, were classified as
socially and educationally Backward Classes. It
appears that 65 % of the seats were reserved for these
socially and educationally Backward Classes and
Scheduled Castes and Tribes. These orders were
challenged before the Mysore High Court in the case
of Ramakrishna Singh Ram Singh v. Stat,e oJ
Mysore (').
The High Court upheld the pleas
raised by the petitioners and quashed the impugned
(I) A.I.R. 1960 MylOl'e 338,
'
446 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963) SUPP.
1'62
M. /I. Balaji
v.
SW• ef Myso"
orders. In the result, ·the High Court directeci
that the applications made by the petitioners for
admission to the respective colleges should be considered without reference to the said orders, but subject
to the reservation for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled
Tribes made therein.
The State then appointed a Committee called
the Mysore Backward Classes Committee with Dr. R.
Nagan Gowda as its Chairman, to investigate the
problem and advise the Government as to the criteria
which should be adopted in determining the educationally and socially Backward Classes, and the special
provisions which should be made for their advancement. The Committee made an interim report, and
in the light of the said report, the State passed an
order on the 9th June, 1960 regulating admissions for
that year into the professional and technical colleges.
Broadly stated, the effect of this order was that 60%
of the seats were left open for what may be conveniently described as the 'merit pool' available to
candidates according to their merits. 40% were reserved for the 'reservation pool', 22 % o:!' which were
reserved for the Backward Classes, 15% for the Scheduled Castes and 3% for the Scheduled Tribes.
This order wa• also challenged before the Mysore
High Court in S. A. Partha v. The St;ate of
Mysore('). It appears that, on the whole, the
High Court did not feel satisfied that the scheme of
the special provision made by the impugned order was
invalid, but it thought that the allotment of seats
under the provisions ot the said order in favour of
the other Backward Classes in excess of 22 % reserved
for them otherwise than by open competition amounted to an unreasonable restraint on the fundamental
right of other citizens and, therefore, was invalid.
Having reached this decision, the High Court indicated the manner in which the reservation in favour
of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes and
other Backward Classes should be worked out so as to
(I) A.I.II.. 19111 Myoore 220;
1 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
447
avoid a successful challenge under Arts. 15 (1) and
29 (2).
I
Thereafter, the Nagan Gowda Committee made
its report in 1961 and in the light of I he said report
and the recommendations made therein, the State
proceeded to make an order under Art. 15 (4) on
July 10, 1961. This Order begins with the observation that the Nagan Gowda Committee has come
to the conclusion that in the present circumstances,
the only practicable method of classifying the Backward Classes in the State is ori the basis of castes and
communities, and it has specified the crit<:ria which
should be adopted for determining the educational
and social backwardness of the communities. The
two criteria specified in the report arc then set out.
The order then expresses the State's concurrence
with the proposal made bv the Committee that the
Backward Classes should be sub-divided into two categories-Backward and the More Backward, and it
adopts the test laid down by the report in that behalf.
This approach, according to the order, is re~listic and
practicable. On the qnestion as to the communities
which shonld be treated as backward, the State made
some variations in the recommendations made by the
Committee. It held that Lingayats, and Bhunts who
formed part of Vokkaligas, should be treated as backward. In that connection, the State noticed the fact
that the recommendation of the Committee in respect
of the said two communities was not unanimous, and
it observed that a large percentage of Lingayat population lives in rural areas and most of them are engaged in agriculture and manual labour and suffer from
all the conseqnenccs of illiteracy and poverty. In
regard to the Bhunts, the State thought that they
could not be distinguished from the rest of the Vokkaligas. The order then adds th 1t Satanis, Nayars and
Zoreastrians whme averag-~ according to the ~duca
tional lest prescribed by the Committee was i per
thousand of population (whereas that of Lingayats i'o
1952
Af. R. Ba.aj
v.
State of Myvor1,,
Gajeridragadkm , J
448 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963] SUPP.
J962
M. R. 8'/aji
.v.
-Sate of Mys~1
.;aj,.,,.,,,,,,.,, /,
7. 1) need not be treated as backward. The order
then examines the question as to the percentage which
should be reserved, and it rejects the Committee's
recommendation of reservation of 68% all-told on. the
ground that such a large percentage of reservation
would not be in the larger interests of the State. That
is why, :tccording to the order, 48 %was fixed as the
total reservation in favour of the Backward Classes,
the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes together;
that means, 30% was reserved for the Backward
Classes. Annexure I to this order gives a list of 81
Classes and 135 More Backward Classes.
On July 31, Hl62, the State passed the
impugned order which supersedes all previous orders
made by the State under Art. 15(4) for reservation. of
the seats in favour of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes as well as the Backward Classes. Under
this order, the Backward Classes are_ divided into two
categories (1) Backward Classes and (2) More Backward Classes. The effect of this order is that it has
fixed 50% as the quota for the reservation of seats for
Other Backward Classes; 28% out of this is reserved
for Backward Classes so-called and 22% for More
Backward Classes. The reservation of 15% and 3%
for the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes respectively continues to be the same. The result of this
order is that 68% of the seats available for admission
to the Engineering and Medical Colleges and to other
techniciil institutions specified in the order passed on
July 10, 1961 is reserved, and only 32% is available to the merit pool. In other words, the percentage of reservation to the extent of 68%, which,
according to the order of July 10, 1961, would have
been against the larger interests of the State, haf!; by
the impugned order, been accepted. The petitioners
contend that the classification made by this order is
irrational and the reservation of 68% made by it is a
fraud on Article 15 (4),
I
1 $.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS.
~49
1962
The problem raised for our decision by the
present petitions involves the consideration of socioM. R. Balaji
logical, social and economic factors, and so, before State ofv. MyJo"
dealing with the contentions raised by the parties
before us, it is necessary to set out briefly the material Gajmdragadkar J
which has been adduced before us. On January 29,
1953, the President appointed the Backward
Classes Commission by virtue of the power conferred
on him under Art. 340 (1) of the Constitution. This
March 30,
Commission made its report on
1955. The Commission was required "to investigate
the conditions of socially and educationally backward
classes within the territory of India and the difficulties under which they labour, and to make recommendations as to the steps that should be taken by the
Union or any State to remove such difficulties and to
improve their condition." [Art. 340 (l)]. According to
the Commission, the relevant factors to consider in
classifying Backward Classes would be their traditional
occupation or profession; the percentage of literacy or
the general educational advancement made by them;
the estimated population of the community, and the
distribution of the various communities throughout
the State or their concentration in certain areas. The
Commission also thought that the social position which
a community occupies in the caste hierarchy would
also have to be considered, as well as its representation
in Government service or in the industrial sphere.
(p. 47). According to the Commission, the causes of
educational backwardness amongst the educationallv
and socially backward communities were:·
1
1. Traditional apathy for education on account
of social and environmental conditions or
occupational handicaps.
2.
Poverty and lack of educational il)stitutions
in rural areas.
3.
Living in inaccessible areas.
450 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963] SUPP.
1962
4.
Lack of adequate educational aids, such as
free studentships, scholar~hips and monetary
grant;;.
5.
Lack of residential hostel facilities.
6.
Unemployment among the educated which
acts as a damper on the desire of the members to educate their children; and
iW". R. Balaji
v
Sir.le of Mys01e
Gaju1dragadlcar, J.
7. Defective educational system which does
not train students for appropriate occupations and professions. (p. 107).
The Committee realised that, in substance, the problem of the Backward Classes is really the problem of
Rural India (p. 55). It appears that having considered several criteria which may be relevant in determining which classes are backward, the Committee
ultimately decided to treat the status of caste as an
important factor in that behalf, and it is on that basis
that it proceeded to make a list of Backward Communities which were specified in Volume II of the
Report.
Dealing with the problem of university education,
the Committee observed that the present rush of
students to the Universities should be prevented in the
larger interests of the country and that could be done
only by training students in various occupations and
professions at the secondary stage itself. But the
Committee noticed that so long as University Degree
qualification continues 10 be a pre-requisite to Government service, it was not easy to prevent the rush at
the doors of the Universities, and so, the Committee
proceeded to recommend that in all Science, Engineering, Medicine, Agriculture, Veterinary and other
technical institutions, a reservation of 70% of the
seats should be made for 1 qualified students of
Backward Classes till such time as accommodation
can be provided for all students eligible for admission.
(pp. 119 & 125).
t
i S.C.R.
SUPRE.l\IIE COURT REPORTS
451
That, in brief, is the nature of the meterial
available from the Commission's Report.
,1
It is, however, significant that the Chairman
of the Commission who signed the Reporl, confrsteL
to a feeling of grave dissatisfaction with the approach
adopted in the Report in determining the question
as to which communities could be regarded as backward under Art. 15(4). "My eyes were however
opened," says the Chairman in his covering letter to
the President, "to the dangers of suggesting remedies
on caste basis when I discovered that it is going to
have a most unhealthy effect on the Muslim and
Christian sections of the nation," and he added that
the said consciousness gave him a rude shock and
drove him to the conclusion that the remedies
suggested by the Commission were worse than the evil
it was out to combat. According to the Chairman,
"if we eschew the principle of caste, it would be
possible to help the extremely poor and deserving
from all communities. Care, however, being taken to
give preference to those who come from the traditionally neglected social classes." Even though the
0hairman thus expressed his distress in very strong
language over the basis adopted by the Commission,
he ultimately agreed to the proposal of the Commission
for the reservation of seats for Backward Classes to
the extent· of 70 per cent.
The Report made by the Backward Classc;
C0mmissiop along with the Chairman's covering
letter was considered by the Central Government in
due course. The Centrr' Government apparently
did not feel satisfied abouc the approach adopted by
the Commission in determining as to who should be
treated as Backward Classes under Article Li(-i ).
The Memorandum issued by the Government of
India on the Report of the Commission points out
that it cannot be denied that the caste svstem
is the greatest hindrance in the way of our pr..igress
towards an egalitarian society, and the recognition of
1962
M. R. Ba.'a1
v.
Stat1 of MJJori:
1•
.Gajmdra1adlc11r, .I
452 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963]SUPP.
1962
.\£. R. Baiaji
v.
State o} 1\fy~ore
a ien /rflgadka1, j.
the specified castes as backward may serve to maintain and even perpetuate the existing distinctions on
the basis of castes. Besides, the IT.emorandum goes
on to add that some of the tests applied by the
Commission were more or less of an individual
character, and even if they were accepted, they would
encompass a large majority uf the country's population.
If the entire community, says, the memorandum,
barring a few exceptions, has thus tu be regarded as
backward, the really needy would be swamped by
the multitude and hardly receive any special attention
or adequate assistance, nor would such dispensation folfil the conditions laid down in Art. 3JO of the Constitution. The memorandum, therefore, emphasised that
action on a systematic and elaborate basis can be
proceeded with only after the necessary positive tests
and criteria have been laid down for determining
which classes or sections are really entitled to get special
relief and assistance. To that end, further investigation was obviously indicated. Even so, instructions
were issued by the Central Government to the State
Governments . requesting them to render every
possible assistance and to give all reasonable facilities
to the people who come within the category of Backward Classes in accordance with their existing lists
and also to such others who in their opinion deserve
to be considered as socially and educationally backward in the existing circumstances.
On April 24, 1962, the Central Governmrnt wrote to the Secretary of Education Department
of the Government of Mysore on the subject of reservation of seats under Arucle l •3( 4). In this communication it was observed that tlte Central Government
had considered the said question and was of opinion
that a uniform policy should be followed all over the
country at least in non-Govermncnl institutions. It
was then added that the All-India Council for Technical Education had rec@mmendcd that the reservation
for Scheduled Castes and Schrdukd Tribes and other
:....," _:\,
r~i
. :'•,'.
1 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
453
backward communities may be up to 25% with marginal adjustments not exceeding 10% in exceptional
cases. The Central Government, therefore, suggested
that in all non-Government institutions in the State,
the reservations under Art. 15 (4) should not in any
case exceed 35%.
In this connection, it would be interesting to
refer to the report made by the Commissioner for
Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes in 1959. In
this Report, the Commissioner refers to the pilot survey
made by the Dy. Registrar General of India at the
request of the Government of India. This survey was
made with the help of material collected at the time
of 1951 Census with a view to find out whether occupations could be adopted as suitable basis for determining social and educational backwardness. A preliminary analysis of the data collected indicated that it
would be possible to draw up a list of socially and
educationally backward occupations on the basis of:(a) any non-agricultural occupat10ns in any
State in India in which 50% or more of the
persons belong to the .Scheduled Castes or the
Scheduled Tribes; or
(b) any non-agricultural occupations in which
literacy percentage of the persons depending
thereon is less than .50°/1 of the general literacy
in the State.
In his Report, the Corr.missioner has adversely commented on the classification made by the State in the
impugned order.
It now remains t0 consider the report made by
the Nagan Gowda Committee appointed by the Stale.
This Report proceeds on the basis that higher social
status has generally been accorded on the basis of
caste for centuries; and so, it takes the view that the
\9w social position of any community is, therefore1
196Z
M. R. Balaji
. v.
State of Mysore
Gajendr.1gadkar, j.
454 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963] SUPP.
1962
M. R. Balaji
v.
~·'ale n.f Mysore
Gajendragadkar, J.
mainly due to the caste system. According to the
Report, there are ample reasons to conclude that
social backwardness is based mainly on racial, tribal,
caste and denominational differences, even though
economic backwardness might have contributed to
social backwardness. It would thus be clear that the
Committee approached its problem of enumerating
and classifying the socially and educationally backward communities on the basis that the social backwardness depends substantially on the caste to which
the community belongs, though it recognised that
economic condition may be a contributory factor. The
classification made by the Committee and the enumeration of the backward communities which it adopted
shows that the Committee virtually equated the classes
with the castes. According to the Committee, the
entire Lingayat community was socially forward; and
that all sections of Vokkaligas, excluding Bhunts, were
socially backward. With regard to the Muslims, the
majority of the Committee agreed that the Muslim
community as a whole should be classified as socially
backward. The Committee further decided that
amongst the backward communities two divisions
should be made (i) the Backward and (ii) the More
Backward. In making this distinction, the Committee
applied one test. It enquired: "Was the standard of
education in the community in question less than 50%
of the State average? If it was, the community should
be regarded as more backward; if it was not, the
community should be regarded as backward." As to
the extent of reservation in educational institutions,
the Committee's recommendation was that 28% should
be reserved for backward and 22% for more backward. In other words, 50% should be reserved for
the whole group of backward communities besides
15% and 3% which had already been reserved for
the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes respectively. That is how according to the Committee, 68°/r,
was carved out by reservation for the betterment of
the Backward Classes and the Scheduled Castes anc:)
1 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
455
Tribes. It is on the basis of these recommendations
that the Government proceeded to make its impugned
order.
Article 15( 4) provides that nothing in this
Article or in clause (2) of Article 29 shall prevent the
State from making any special provision for the
advancement of any socially and educationally backward Classes of citizens or for the Scheduled Castes
and the Scheduled Tribes. This Article was added
by the Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951. The
object of this amendment was to bring Articles 15 and
29 in line with Art. 16(4 ). It will be recalled that in the
case of The State of 1lfadras v. Srimathi Champakam
Domirajan(') the validity of the Government order
issued by the Madras Government fixing certain
proportions in which students seeking for admissions
to the Engineering and Medical Colleges in the State
should be admitted, was challenged. The said
Government Order was on the face of it a communal
order fixing the admissions in the Stated. proportion
by reference to the communities of the candidates.
This order was struck down by the Madras High
Court and the decision of the Madras High Court
was confirmed by' this Co.urt in appeal, on the ground
that the fundamental r 1ghts guaranteed by Articles
15(1) and 29(2) were not controlled by aQ.y exception,
and that since there was no provision under Art. 15
corresponding to Art. 16(4), the impugned order
could not be sustained. It was directly as a result
of this decision that Art. 15 was amended and
Art. 15(4) was added. Thus, there is no doubt that
Art. J5(4) has to be read as a proviso or an exception
to Articles 15(1) and 29(2). In other words, if the
impugned order is justified by the provisions of
Art. 15(4), its validity cannot be impeached on the
ground that it violates Art. 15(1) or Art. 29(2). The
fundamel'l:tal rights guaranteed by the said two provisions do not affect the validity of the special provision
which it is permissible to make under Art. 15(4).
(I) (1951] S.C.R. 525.
1962
M. R. B•l•ji
v.
Slate of AfyJort
Gajendrag•dkar, J.
456 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963] SUPP.
1962
M. R. Balaji
v.
State of Mysore
Gajentfragodkar 1 J.
This position is not and cannot be in dispute. The
petitioners contend that the impugned order is invalid
because it is not justified by Art. 15(4).
The first argument which has been urged by
Mr. Iyyangar on behalf of the petitioners is that it
is not competent to the State to make an order under
Art. 15(4) unless a Commission has been appointed
under Art. 340 (1) and a copy of the report of the
said Commission is laid before the House of Parlia·
ment under Art. 340(3). The argument is that
Art. 340 provides for the appointment of a Commi·
ssion to investigate the conditions of Backward Classes.
The Commission so appointed is required to make a
report recommending what steps should be taken to
improve the conditions of the Backward Classes
[Art. 340(2)]. When the Report is received by the
President, the President is required to cause a copy of
the Report together with the memorandum explaining
the action taken thereon to be laid before each House
of Parliament [Art. 340(3)]. It is the President who
is to take action on the Report and then lay it before
the Home of Parliament and it is only the President
who can, therefore, make special provision for the
advancement of the Backward Classes. That is the
effect of reading Articles 340 and 15(4) together. In
our opinion, this contention is mis-conceived. It is
true that the Constitution contemplated the appointment of a Commission whose report and recommenda·
tions, it was thought, would be of assistance to the
authorities concerned to take adequate steps for the
advancement of Backward Classes; but it would be
erroneous to assume that the appointment of the
Commission and the subsequent steps that were to
follow it constituted a condition precedent to any
action being taken under Art. 15(4). Besides, it
would be noticed that Art. 340(1) provides that
recommendations had to be made by the Commission
as to the steps that should be taken by the union or
any State, inter alia, to improve the condition of the
1 S.C.R.
SUPREME GOUR T REPORTS
457
Backward Classes ; and that means that the recommendations were to be made which would be
implemented in their discretion by the Union and the
State Government and not bv the President. Thus
Art. 340(1) ·itself shows that' it is the Union or the
State that has to take action in pursuance of the
recommendations made, and so, the ar.~ument that
the President alone has to act in this matter cannot
be accepted.
Then it is urged that even if special provision
cari be made by the State under Art. 15( 4), the said
provision must be made not by an executive order
but by legislation. This argument is equally misconceived. Under Art. 12, the State includes the
Government and the Legislature of each of the States,
and so, it would be unreasonable to suggest that the
State must necessarily mean the Legislature and not
the Government. Besides, where the Constitution
intended that a certain action should be taken by
legislation and not by executive action, it has adopted
suitable phraseology in that behalf. Article 16(3)
and (5) are illustrations in point. Both the said subclauses of Art. .16, in terms, refer to the making of
the law by the Parliament in respect of the matters
covered by them. Similarly, Articles 341 (2) and
342 (2) expressly refer to a law being made by Parliament as therein contemplated. Therefore, when
Art. 15( 4) contemplates that the State can make the
special provision in question, it is clear that the said
provision can be made by an executive order.
Art. 15(4) authorises the State to make a special
provision for the advancement of any socially and
educationally backward classes of citizens, as distinguished from the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled
Tribes. No doubt, special provision can be made for
both categories of citizens, but in specifying the categories, the first category is distinguished from the
second. Sub-clauses (24). and (25) of Art. 366 define
Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes respectively,
1,62
Jf. R, Bala} i
v.
Sta:t ~f Afysore
Gajer1Jra.t:adkar, J.
458 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963] SUPP.
1962
~ut there is no clause defining socially and .educat1onally
. . backward classes of citizens, and so in deterv.
mmmg
the question as to whether a particular proviSt•te of Mysore
sion has been validly made under Art. 15 (4) or not,
G'l.jentlra:atikar, J. the first question which falls to be determined is
whether the State has validly determined who should
be included in those Backward Classes. It seems fairly
clear that the backward classes of citizens for whom
special provision is authorised to be made are, by
Art. 15( 4) itself, treated as being similar to the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. Scheduled Castes
and Scheduled Tribes which have been defined were
known to be backward and the Constitution-makers felt
no doubt that special provision had to be made for their
advancement. It was realised that in the Indian
society there were other classes of citizens
who were equally, or may be somewhat less,
backward than the Scheduled Ca~tes and Tribes
thought that some special proand it was
vision ought to be made even for them. Article 341
provides for the issue of public notification specifying
the castes, races or tribes which shall, for the purposes
of this Constitution, be deemed to be Scheduled Castes
either in the State or the Union territory as the case
may be. Similarly, Art. 342 makes a provision for
the issue of public notification in respect of Scheduled
Tribes. Under Article 338 (3), it is provided that
references to the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled
Tribes shall be construed as including references to
such other Backward Classes as the President may, on
receipt of the report of a Commission appointed under
Art. 340(1), by order, specify and also to the AngloIndian communitv. It would thus be seen that this
provision contemplates that some Backward Classes
may by the Presidential order be included in Scheduled Castes and Tribes. That helps to bring out the
point that the Backward Classes for whose improvement special provision is contemplated by Art. 15 (4)
are in the matter of their backwardness comparable
to Scheduled Castes aud S:iheduled Tribes
M. R. B1tlaji
}
l S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
459
In considering the scope and extent of the
expression "backward classes" under Art. 15( 4). it is
necessary to remember that the concept of backwardness is not intended to be relative in the sense that
any classes who are backward in relation to the most
advanced classes of the society should be included in
it. If such relative tests were to be applied by
reason of the most advanced classes, there would he
several layers or strata of backward classes and each
one of them may claim to be included under
Art. 15(4). This position is not disputed before us by
the learned Advocate-General for the State. The
backwardness under Art. 15( 4) must be social and
educational. It is not either social or educational,
but it is both social and educational; and that takes
us to the question as to how social and educational
backwardness has to be determined.
Let us take the question of social backwardness
first. By what test should it be decided whether a
particular class is socially backward or not ? The
group of citizens to whom Article 15(4) applies are
described as 'classes of citizens', not as castes of
citizens. A class, according to the dictionary meaning.
shows division of society according to status, rank or
caste. In the Hindu social structure, caste unfortunately plays an important part in determining
the status of the citizen. Though according to
sociologists and Vedic scholars, the caste system may
have originally begun on occupational or functional
basis, in course of time, it became rigid and inflexible.
The history of the growth of caste system shows that
its original functional and occupational basis was
later over-burdened with considerations of purity
based on ritual concepts, and that led to its ramifications which introduced infiexibilitv and rigidity. This
artificial growth inevitably tended to create a feeling of superiority and inferiority ar.rl to foster mi.n-ow
caste loyalties. Therefore, in d:aling with the
question as to whether an;- class of citizens is soddly
.
'
1962
M. R. Bafoji
v.
State of Mysore
Gajendrtttadkar, J.
460 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963] SUPP.
M. R. Ba/aji
v.
State of MJsore
G•fendrazadkar, J.
backward or not, it may not he irrelevant to consider
the caste of the said group of citizens. In this connection, it is, however, necessary to bear in mind that
the spedal provision is contemplated for classes of
citizens and not for individual citizens as such, and
so, though the caste of the group of citizens may be
relevant, its importance should not be exaggerated.
If the classification of backward classes of citizens was
based solely on the caste of the citizen, it may not
always be logical and may perhaps contain the vice
of perpetuating the caste themselves.
Besides, if the caste of the group of citizens was
made the sole basis for determining the social backwardness of the said group, that test would inevitably
break down in relation to many sections of Indian
society which do not recognise castes in the conventional sense known 10 Hindu society. How is one
going to decide whether Muslims, Christians or J ains,
or even Lingayats are socially backward or not ? The
test of castes would be inapplicable to those groups,
but that would hardly justify the exclusion ·of these
groups in toto from the operation of Art. 15(4). It
is not unlikely that in some States some Muslims or
Christians or .J aim forming groups may be socially
backward. That is why we think that though castes
in relation to Hindus mav be a relevant factor to
consider in determining the social backwardness of
groups or classes of citizens, it cannot be made the
sole or the dominant test in that behalf. Social
backwardness is on the ultimate analysis the result of
poverty, to a very large extent. The classes of citizens
who are deplorably poor automatically become
socially backward. They do not enjoy a status in
society and have, therefore, to be content to take a
backward seat. It is true that social backwardness
which results from poverty is likely to be aggravated
by considerations of caste to which the poor citizens
may belong, but that only shows the relev;mce of
1 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
461
b&th caste and poverty in dete1mining the backwardHtis nf citizens.
The occupations of citizens may also contribute
to make classes of citizens socially backward. There
are some occupations which are treated as inferior
according to conventional beliefs and classes of citizens
who follow these occupations are apt to become
socially backward. The place of habitation also
plays not a minor part in determining the backwardness of a community of persons. In a sense, the problem
of social bacl.wardness is the problem of Rural India
and in that behalf, classes of citizens occupying a
socially backward position in rural area fall within
the purview of Art. 15(4). The problem of determining who are socially backward classes is undoubtedly
very complex. Sociological, social and economic
considerations come into play in solving the problem
and evolving proper criteria for determining which
classes are socially backward is obviously a very
difficult task; it will need an elaborate investigation
and collection of data and examining the said data
in a rational and scientific way. That is the function
of the State which purports to act under Art. 15(4).
All that this Court is called upon to do in dealin~ with
the present petitions is to decide whether the tests
applied by the impugned ord"r are valid under
Art. 15( 4). If it appears that the test applied by
the order in that behalf is improper and invalid, then
the classification of socially backward classes based
on that test will have to be held to be inconsistent
with the requirements of Art. 15(4).
What then is the test applied by the State in
passing the impugned order? We have already seen
that the Nagan Gowda Committee appointed by the
State was inclined to treat the caste as almost the
sole basis in determining the question about the social
backwardness of any community. The Committee
has no doubt incidentally referred to the general
1962
M. R. Bsia}i
v.
Stat1 of Afysor
Gajendrazatlkar, J.
462 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963] SUPP.
U. R. B•l•ji
v.
-tall of Myso1e
iendragadkar1 J.
economic condition of the community as a contributory
factor; but the maqper in which it has enumerated
the backward and more backward classes leaves no
room for doubt that the predominant, if not the sole,
test that weighed in their minds was the test of caste.
When we consider the impugned order itself, the
position becomes absolutely clear. The impugned
order has adopted the earlier order of July 10, 1961,
with some changes as to the quantum of reservation, and so, it is necessary to examine the
earlier order in order to see what test was applied by
the State in classifying the backward Classes. In its
preamble, the order of July 10, 1961, clearly and
unambiguously states that the Committee had come
lo the conclusion that in the present circumstances,
the only practicable metbod of classifying the Backward Classes in the State is on the basis of castes and
communities and the State Government accepts this
test. In other words, on the order as it stands there
can be no room for doubt that the classification of
backward and more backward classes was made by
the State Government only on the basis of their castes
which basis was regarded as a practicable method.
It is true that in support of the inclusion of the
Lingayats amongst the Backward Classes the order
refers to some other factors, but neither the Report of
the Nagan Gowda Committee, nor the orders passed
by the State Government on July 10, 1961, and
July 31, 1962, afford any indication as to how
any test other than that of the caste was applied in
deciding the question. The learned Advocate-General
has contended that the statement in the preamble of
the order of July IO, 1961 should not be literally
construed and he has argued that the words used in
the rdevant portion are inartistic and he has suggested
that the order is not based on the sole basis of castes.
We are not impressed by this argument. We have
considered both the orders in the light of the Report
and the recommendations made by the Nagan Gowda
Committee and we are satisfied that the classification
I S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
463
of the socially backward classes of citizens made by
the State proceeds on the only consideration of their
castes without regard to the other factors which are
undoubtedly relevant. If that be so, the social backwardness of the communities to whom the impugned
order applies has been determined in a manner which
is not permissible under Art. 15(4) and that itself
would introduce an infirmity which is fatal to the
validity of the said classification.
The next question to consider is in regard to
the educational backwardness of the classes of citizens.
The Nagan Gowda Report and the impugned order
proceed to deal with this question on the basis of the
average of student population in the last three High
School classes of all High Schools in the State in relation to a thousand citizens of that community. On the
figures supplied to the Committee which admittedly
are approximate and not fully accurate, the Committee came to the conclusion that the State average of
student population in the last three High School classes
of all High Schools in the State was 6·9 per thousand. The Committee decided that all Castes whose
average was less than the State average of 6.9 per
thousand should be regarded as backward communities, and it further held that if the average of any
community was less than 50% of the State average,
it should be regarded as constituting the more backward classes. It may be conceded that in determining the educational backwardoess of a class of citizens
the literacy test supplied by the Census Reports ma~
not be adequate; but it is doubtful if the test of the
average of student pepulation in the last three High
School classes is appropriate in determining the educational backwardness. Having regard to the fact
that the test is intended to determine who are educationally backward classes, it may not be necessary or
proper to put the test as high as has been done bv
the Committee. · But even assuming that the trs't
applied is rational and permissible under Art. 16(4),
1962
M. R. &loji
v.
State of Mysor1
Gajendratadk•, J.
464
1962
.it. R. Bala.ii
'"
State of JI ysort
'JaJtndragadkar, J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963) SUPP.
the question still remains as to whether it would be
legitimate to treat castes or communities which are
just below the State average as educationally backward classes. If the State average is 6.9 per thousand, a community which satisfies the said test or is
just below the said test cannot be regarded as backward. It is only communities which are well below
the State average that can properly be regarded as
educationally backward classes of citizens. Classes of
citizens whose average of student population works
below 50'/"o of the State average are obviously educationally backward classes of citizens. Therefore, in
our opinion, the State was not justified in including
in the list of Backward Classes, castes or communities
whose average of student population per thousand was
slightly above, or very near, or just below the State
average.
It wilJ be recalled that the Nagan Gowda Committee had recommended that the Lingayats should
not be treated as Backward Classes. The State has
decided otherwise, and in doing so, the State has
taken the view that the figures arrived at by the
Committee should be corrected to the nearest integer
as, in the nature of things, says the order of July 10,
Hl60, it is not possible to attain absolute mathematical precision in making such assessments. That is
how the State average was raised from 6.9 to 7 per
thousand. Evrn after increasing the State average to
7, the position with regard to Lingayat community
was that its average of student population was 7.1
per thousand according to the Committee's calculations and according to the decision of the State 7, and
yet the Lingayats as a community have been held to
be an educationally backward class of citizens under
the State order. This result has been achieved by
adding, I to the State average and deducting ,l from
the Lingayats' average. The Ganiga~ whose average
of student. population is 7 per thousand are likewise
included in the list of Backward Classes. If the State
1 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
465
average is 6.9 or 7, it would, we think, be manifestly
erroneous to regard those communities as educa·
tionally backward whose student population ratio
works at the same level as the State average.
In regard to the Muslims, the majority view in
the Committee was that the Muslim community as a
whole should be treated as socially backward. This
conclusion is stated merely as a conclusion and no
data or reasons are cited in support of it. The average
of student population in respect of this community
works at 5 per thousand and that, in our opinion, is
not so below the State average that the community
could be treated as educationally backward in the
State of M ysure. Therefore, we are n&t satisfied that
the State was justified in taking the view that communities or castes whose average of student population was the same as, or just below, the State average,
should. be treated as educationally backward classes
of citizens. If the test has to be applied by a reference to the State average of student population, the
legitimate view to take would be that the classes of
citizens whose average is well or substantiallv below
the State average can be treated as educationally
backward. On this point again, we do not propqse
to lay down any hard and fast rule; it is for the State
to consider the matter and decide it in a manner which
is consistent with the requirements of Art. 15 (4).
In this connection. it is necessary to add that
the sub·dassification made by the order between
Backward Cl;mt> .ancl More Backward Classes does
not appear to be justified under Art. 15(-1). Art. 15( 4)
authorises sp.:cial provision being made for the really
backward classes. In introducing two categories of
Backward Classes, what the impugned order, in
substance, pllrporls to do is to devise measures for the
benefit of all the classes of citizens who are less
advanced, com pared to the most advanced classes in
the State, and that, in our opinion; is not the scope
00
M.R.B~
"·
Slot. of Myw•
-
466 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963] SUPP.
1962
M. R. Ba/aji
v.
St•lt of Mysare
Ga.fendragadkar, J.
of Art. 15(4). The result of the method adopted by
the impugned order is that nearly 90% of the population of the State is treated as backward, and that
illustrates how the order in fact divides the population of the State into most advanced and the rest,
and puts the latter into two categories of Backward
and More Backward. The classification of the two
categories, therefore, is not warranted by Art. 15(4).
That takes us to the question about the extent
of the special provision which it would be competent
to the State to make under Art. l5(4). Article 15(4)
authorises the State to make any special provision for
the advancement of the Backward Classes of citizens
or for the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes.
The learned Advocate-General contends that this
Article must be read in the light of Art. 46, and he
argues that Art. 15(4) has deliberately and wisely
placed no limitation on the State in respect of the
extent of special provision that it should make.
Art. 46 which contains a directive principle, provides
that the State shall promote with special care the
educational and economic interests of the weaker
.sections of the people, and in particular., of the
Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes. and shall
protect them from social injustice and all forms of
exploitation. There can be no doubt that the object
of making. a special provision for the advancement
of the castes or communities, there specified, is to
carry out the dirP,ctive principle enshrined in Art. 46.
It is obvious that unless the educational and economic
interests of the weaker sections of the people are promoted quickly and liberally, the ideal of establishin'
social and economic equality will not be attained, and
so, there can be no doubt that Art. 15(-i) authorises
the State to take adequate steps to achieve the object
which it has in view. No one can dispute the proposition that political freedom and even fundamental
rights can have very little meaning or significance for
the Backward Classes and the Scheduled Castes and
1 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
467
Scheduled Tribes unless the backwardness and
inequality from which they suffer are immediately
redressed. The l~arned Advocate-General, however,
suggests that the absence of any limitation on the
State's power to make an adequate special provision
indicates that if the problem of backward classes of
citizens and Scheduled Caste and Tribes in any given
State is of such a magnitude that it }'equires the
reservation of all seats in higher educational institutions, it would be open to the State to take that
course. His argument is that the only test which can
be applied is whether or not having regard to the
problem which the State is called upon to meet, the
provision made is reasonably adequate or not. Thus
presented, the argument is, no doubt, prima facie
attractive, and so, it must be carefully examined.
When Art. 15( 4) refers to the special provision
for the advancement of certain classes or scheduled
castes or scheduled tribes, it must not be ignored that
the provision which is authorised to be made is a
special provision ; it is not a provision which is
exclusive in character, so that in looking after the
advancement of those classes, the State would be
justified in ignoring altogether the advancement of
the rest of the society. It is because the interests of
the society at large would be served by promoting
the advancement of the weaker elements in the
society that Art. 15( 4) authorises special provision to
be made. But if a provision which is in the nature
of an exception completely excludes the rest of the
society, that clearly is outside the ~cope of Art. 15(4).
It would be extremely unreasonable to assume that
in enacting Art. 15(4) the Parliament intended to
provide that where the advancement of the Backward
Classes or the Scheduled Castes and Tribes was
concerned, the fundamental rights of the citizens
constituting the rest of the society were to be completely and absolutely ignored,
19i2
...
M. R. lJ•l•}i
St1l1
•f Mysart
GajendragUkar, J,
468 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963] SUPP.
1962
M. R. B•laji
v.
State •f Mysort
ia}tn~ratadkar, J.
In this connection, it is necessary to remember
that the reservation made by the impugned order is
in regard to admission in the seats 'of higher education
in the State. It is well-known that as a result of the
awakening caused by political freedom, all classes of
citizens are showing a growing desire to give their
children higher university education and so, the
Universities are called upon to face the challenge of
this growing demand. While it is necessary that the
demand for higher education which is thus increasing
from year to year must be adequately met and properly
channelised, we cannot overlook the fact that in
meeting that demand standards of higher education
in Universities must not be lowered. The large
demand for education may be met by starting larger
number of educational institutions vocational school,
and polytechnics. But it would be against the national
interest to exclude from the portals of our Universities
qualified and competent students on the ground that
all the seats in the Universities are reserv~d for weaker
elements in society. As has been observed by the
University Education Commission, "he indeed must
be blind who does not see that mighty as are the
political changes, far deeper are the fundamental
questions which will be decided by what happens in
the universities" (p. 32). Therefore, in considering
the question about the propriety of the reservation
made by the impugned order, we cannot lose sight of
the fact that the reservation is made in respect of
higher university education. The demand for technicians, scientists, doctors, economists, engineers and
experts for the further economic advancement of the
country is so great that it would cause grave prejudice
to national interests if considerations of merit are
completely excluded by whole-sale reservation of seats
in all Technical, Medical or Engineering colleges or
institutions of that kind. Therefore, considerations
of national interest and the interests of the community
or society as a whole cannot be ignored in determining
the question as to whether the special provision
1 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT RF.~ORTS
469
contemplated by Art. 15( 4) can be special provision
which excludes the rest of the society altogether. In
this connection, it would be relevant to mention that
the University Education Commission which considered
the problem ·of the assistance to back ward communities, has observed that the percentage of reservation
shall not exceed a third of the total number of seats,
and it has added that the principle of reservation
may be adopted for a period of ten years. (p. 53).
1962
M. R..Ba!flji
v.
Statt of Mysore
GaJendr.agad~ ar: .J.
We have already noticed that the Central
Government in its communication to the State has
suggested that reservation for backward classes, Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes may be up to 25%
with marginal adjustments not exceeding 10% in
exceptional cases.
The learned Advocate-General has suggested
that reservation of a large number of seats for the
weaker sections of the society would not affect either
the depth or efficiency of scholarship at all, and in
support of this argument, he has relied on the observations made by the Backward Classes Commission
that it found no complaint in the States of Madras,
Andhra, Travancore-Cochin and Mysore where the
system of recruiting candidates from other Backward
Classes to the reserve quota has been in vogue for
several decades. The Committee further observed
that the representatives of the upper classes did
not complain about any lack of efficiency in the
offices recruited by reservation (p. 135). This opinion,
however, is plainly inconsistent with what is bound
to be the inevitable consequence of reservation in
higher university education. If admission to professional and technical colleges is undulf liberalised it
would be idle to contend that the quality of our
graduates will not suffer. That is not to say that reservation should not be adopted; reservation should
and must be adopted to advance the prospects of the
weaker sections of society, but in providing for special
470
1962
M. R. B•l•ji
v.
State of Mysore
GojmJraiU/c•r, J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963] SUPP.
measures in that behalf care should be taken not
to exclude admission to higher educational centres to
deserving and qualified candidates of other communities. A special provision contemplated by Art. 15(4)
like reservation of posts and appointments contemplated by Art. lti( 4) must be within reasonable limits.
The interests of weaker sections of society which are
a first charge on the states and the Centre have to be
adjusted with the interests of the community as a
whole. The adjustment of these competing claims
is undoubtedly a difficult matter, but if under the
guise of making a special provision, a State reserves
practically all the seats available in all the colleges,
that clearly would be subverting the object of
Art. 15 (4). In this matter again, we are reluctant to
say definitely what would be a proper provision to
make. Speaking generally and in a broad way, a
special provision should be less than 50%; how much
less than 50% would depend upon the relevant prevailing circumstances in each case. In this particular case it is remarkable that when the State issued
July 10. 1961, it emphatically
its order on
expressed its opinion that the reservation of 68%
recommended by the Nagan Gowda Committee would
not be in the larger interests of the State. What
happened
between
July
JO, 1961,
and
July 31, 1962, does not appear on the record. But the
State changed its mind and adopted the recommendation of the Committee ignoring its earlier decision
that the said recommendation was contrary to the
larger interests of the State. In our opinion; when
the State makes a special provision for the advancement of the weaker sections of society specified in
Art. 15(4), it has to approach .its task objectively and
in a rational manner. Undoubtedly, it has to take
reasonable and even generous steps to help the advancement of weaket elements; the extent of the problem
must be weighed, the requirements of the community
at large must be borne in mind a11d a formula must
be evolved which would strike a reasonable balance
l S.0.R.. SUPREMECOURT REPORTS
(71
between the several relevant considerations. Therefore, we arc satisfied that the reservation of 68 %
diriCted by the impugned order is plainly inconsistent with Art. 15 (4).
The petitioners contend that having regard to
the infirmities in the impugned order, action of the
State in issuing the said order amounts to a fraud on
the Constitutional power conferred on the State by
Art. 15(4). This argument is well-founded, and must
be upheld. When it is said about an executive action
that it is a fraud on the Constitution, it does not
necessarily mean that the action is actuated by malafides. An executive action which is patently and
plainly outside the limits of the constitutional authority conferred on the St'ltC in that behalf is struck
down as being ultra virts the State's authority.
If, on the other hand, the executive action
does not patently or overtly transgress the
authority conferred on it by the Constitution,
but the transgression is covert or latent, the
said action is struck down as being a fraud on the
relevant constitutional power. It is in this connection that courts often consider the substance of the
matter and not its form and in ascertaining the
substance of the matter, the appearance or the cloak,
or the veil of the executive action is carefully
scrutinized and if it appears that notwithstanding the
appearance, the cloak or the veil of the executive
action, in substance and in truth the constitutional
power has been transgressed, the impugned action is
struck down as a fraud on the Constitution. We
l;iave already noticed that the impugned order in the
present case has categorised the Backward Classes on
the s~le basil: )f caste which, in our opinion, is not
perrrutted by Art. 15(4); and we have also held that
~e re;;erv~tion o.f 68% ~ade by the impugned order
IS pl~1!1ly mconsIS_tent with the concept of the special
provmon authonsed by Art. 15(4). Therefore it
follows that the impugned order is a fraud on 'the
.'962
M. R. &ll!i
v.
State of MJrore
Gajentir•gatlkar, J.
472 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963JSUPP.
1962
M. R. Bal•]i
v.
St11.fe •f Mysore
Gt1.jtrriuJgatlkar, J.
Constitutional power conferred on the
Art. 15( 4).
State by
The learned Advocate-General has made an
earnest and strong plea before us that we should
not strike down the order, but should strike down only
such portions of the order which appear to us to be
unconstitutional on the doctrine of severability. He
has urged that since 1938, the State has had to make
five orders to deal with the problem of advancing the
lot of the Backward Classes and the State is anxious
that the implementation of the impugned order should
not be completely prohibited or stopped. We do not
see how it would be possible to sever the invalid
provisions of the impugned order. If the categorisation of the Backward Classes is invalid, this Court
cannot and would not attempt the task of enumerating
the said categories; and if the percentage of reservation is improper and outside Art. 15( 4), this Court
would not attempt to lay down definitely and in an
inflexible manner as to what would be the proper
percentage to reserve. In this connection, it may be
relevant to refer to one fact on which the petitioners
have strongly relied. It is urged for them that the
method adopted by the Government of Maharashtra
in exercising its powers under Art. 15( 4) is a proper
method to adopt. It appears that the Maharashtra
Government has decided to afford financial assistance,
and make :'llonetary grants to students seeking higher
mucation where it is shown that the annual income
of their families is below a prescribed minimum. The
said scheme is not before us and we are not called
upon to express any opinion on it. However, we may
ebserve that if any State adopts such a measure, it
may afford relief to and assist the advancement of the
Backward Classes in the State, because backwardness,
social and educational, is ultimately and primarily
due to poverty. An attempt can also be made to
start newer and more educational institutions,
polytechnics, vocational institutions and even rural
1 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
473
1962
Universities and thereby create more opportunities for
higher education. This dual attack on the problem
M. R. B•lcji
posed by the weakness of backward communities can Stole ~J Mysn1
claim to proceed on a rational, broad and scientific
approach which is consistent with, and true to, the Gaj1nirt1ptlkar, J
noble ideal of a secular welfare democratic State set
up by the Constitution of this country. Such an
approach can be supplemented, if necessary by
providing special provision by way of reservation to
aid the Backward classes and Scheduled castes and
Tribes. It may well be that there may be other ways
and means of achieving the same result. In our
country where social and economic conditions differ
from State to State, it would be idle to expect
absolute uniformity of approach; but in taking
executive action to implement the policy of Art. 15(4).
It is necessary for the States to remember that the
policy which is intended to be implemented is the
policy which has been declared by Art. 46 and the
preamble of the Constitution. It is for the attainment of social and economic justice that Art. 15(4)
authorises the making of special provisions for the
advancement of the communities there contemplated
even if such provisions may be inconsistant with the
fundamental rights guaranteed under Art. 15 or 29(2).
The context, therefore, requires that the executive
action taken by the State must be based on an objective approach, free from all extraneous pressures. The
said action is intended to do social and economic
justice and must be taken in a manner that justice
is and should be done.
...
Whilst we are dealing with this question, it
would be relevant to add that the provisions of
Art. 15(4) are similar to those of Art. 16(4 l which fell to
be considered in the case of The General Manager,
Southern Railway v. Rangachari(1). In that case, the
majority decision of this Court held that the power
of reservation which is conferred on the State tmder
Art. 16(4) can be exerCised by the State in a proper
(I) [1962] 2 S. C. R. !186,
474 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963] StJPP.
19(;2
M R. Balt1ji
v.
Stcte of Mysar1
GtJjtntlrtttatlktir, J.
case not only by providing for reservation of appointments, but also by providing for reservation of selection posts. This conclusion was reached on the basis
that it served to give effect to the intention of the
Constitution-makers to make adequate safeguards
for the advancement of Backward Classes and
to secure their adequate representation in the
Services. The judgment shows that the only point
which was raised for the decision of this Court in that
case was whether the reservation made was outside
Art. 16(4) and that posed the bare question about the
construction of Art. 16( 4). The propriety, the
reasonableness or the wisdom of the impugned order
was not questioned because it was not the respondent's
case that jf the order was justified under Art. 16(4),
it was a fraud on the Constitution. Even so, it was
pointed out in the judgment that the efficiency of
administration is of such a paramount importance
that it would be unwise and impermissible to make
any reservation at the cost of efficiency of administration; that, it was stated, was undoubtedly the
effect of Art. 335. Therefore, what is true in regard
to Art. 15(4) is equally true in regard to Art. 16(4).
There can be no doubt that the Constitution-makers
assumed, as they were entitled to, that while making
adequate reservation under Art. 16(4), care would be
taken not to provide for unreasonable, excessive or
extravagant reservation, for that would, by eliminating general competition in a large field and by
creating wide-spread dissatisfaction amongst the
employees, materially affect efficiency. Therefore,
like the special provision improperly made under
Art. 15(4), reservation made under Art. 16(4) beyond
the permissible · and legitimate limits would be liable
to be challenged as a fraud on the Constitution. In
this connection it is necessary to emphasise that
Art. 15 (4) is an enabling provision; it does not impose
an obligation, but merely leaves it to the discretion
of the appropriate government to take suitable action,
if necessary.
·
1 s.c.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
475
In the result, we allow the writ petitions and
direct that an appropriate writ or order or direction
should be issued restraining the three respondents from
giving effect to the impugned order in terms of the
prayer made in clauses (i) and (ii) of paragrap? 38
of the petitions. The petitioners would be entitled
to their costs, one set of hearing fees.
Petitions aUowed.
19i2
M. R. B•l•ji
v.
St.I< •f Mysor•
G«jeninlt«ik•r, J,
19i2
HEGGADE JANARDHAN SUBBARYE
v.
THE STATE OF MYSORE AND ANOTHER
(And connected petition)
(B. P. SINHA, c. J., P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, K. N.
WANCHCO, K. C. DAS GUPTA and J.C. SHAH, JJ.)
Oolkg• Admiiision-Reservation of seats for socially and
educationally backward cl<l8su struck down-Reservation for
Schtdultd Castes and Tri/Ju uphel4-0onstitution of India,
Ari. 15( 4).
The petitioners challenged the validity of the orders
issued by the State of Mysore under Art. 15(4) of the Constitution on July 10, 1961, and July 31, 1962. The petitioners
contended that they had applied for admission to the PreProfessional Class in Medicine in the Karnatak Medical
College, Hubli and they would have secured admiision to the
said medical college but for the reservation directed to be made
by the orders mentioned above. They contended that the
al/ove-mentioned orders were ultra viru. They prayed for an
appropriate writ or order restraining the respondents from
giving effect to those orders and requiring them to deal with
their applications for admission on merits.
H•ld, that the petitioners were entitled to an appropriate
writ or order as claimed by tbem and the respondents were
restrained from giving effect .to the above-mentioned orders.
JI. R. Balaji v. Statt of Jlysor• [1963] Supp. l S.C.R. 439,
followed.
The impugned orders we.e quashed only with reference
to the additional reservation made in favour of the socially ana
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