JASWANT SUGAR MILLS LTD., MEERUT versus LAKSHMICHAND AND OTHERS
Supreme Court of India | Decided 25 September 1962 | [1963] SUPP. 1 S.C.R. 242 | 1962 INSC 267
Key facts
- Decided
- 25 September 1962
- Bench
- BHUVNESHWAR PRASAD SINHA*, P.B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, K.N. WANCHOO, K.C. DAS GUPTA, J.C. SHAH
- Bench size
- 5
- Case number
- CIVIL APPEAL No. 37/1961
- Disposal
- Dismissed
- Citation
- [1963] SUPP. 1 S.C.R. 242
- Neutral citation
- 1962 INSC 267
Text of the judgment
242 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963] SUPP.
1962
!Cham Chand
v.
Union o}· India
Das Gupta, J.
valid and consequently, in rejecting the appellant's
revisional application.
The appeal is dismissed. But, in view of the
circumstances of the case we make no order as to
costs. Though the appellant has failed in this appeal
which was brought by him as a pauper, we make no
order against him to pay the court-fee which would
have been paid by him if he had not been permitted
to appeal as a pauper.
Appeal dismissed.
1962
JASWANT SUGAR MILLS LTD., MEERUT
September 25.
v.
LAKSHMICHAND AND OTHERS
(B. P.
SINHA,
c. J., P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR,
K. N. WANCHOO, K. C. DAS GUPTA and
J. C. SHAH, JJ.)
Indu.•trial Dispute-Dismi.sal of workmen-Application
for permi>Bion before Conciliation OJ!ker-Direction of Conciliation Officer-Appeal to Appellate Tribunal, if maintainab/,eGrant of special leave-Competence-U. P. Industrial Disputes
Act, 1947 (U. P. 28 of 1947), 88. 3, 8-Industrial Disputes
(Appellate Tribunal) A.ct, 1950 (48 of 1950), 88. 2 (c) cl. (iii),
4--Constitution of India, Art. 136.
The workmen of the appellant company resorted. to direct
action in order to enforce their demands 'for bonus, leave etc.
Thereupon, the company served charge sheets upon sixty-three
workmen. The enquiry officer who investigated the charges
found that all the workmen were guilty of sabotage and slowdown strike and that they were liable to be dismissed. But as
at that time a dispute between the company and its workmen
relating to payment of bonus was pending before the Industrial
Tribunal, the conditions of service of the workmen could not,
by virtue of cl. 29 of the order issued in 1954 by the Governor
I S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
243
1962
ofUttar Pradesh under the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947,
be altered nor the workmen discharged without the previous
Jaswant Sugar Mil
permission of the Conciliation Offi~er. An application was
Ltd.. lv!eerut
made to the Conciliation Officer for permission to disri1iss the
v.
Lakshmichand
workmen. The Officer granted permission in respect of only
eleven workmen on the ground that the rest of the workmen
were mere passive participants in the go-slow campaign. The
compat'\" preferred an appeal to the Labour Appellate Tribunal
but it was dismissed as incompetent on the ground that the
C'.onciliation Officer wa'i not an authority within the meaning
of s. 2 (c) (iii) of the Industrial disputes (Appellate Tribunal)
Act, 1950. The company then obtained special leave to appeal
to the Supre1ne ~ourt against the direction of the Conciliation
Officer and also against the order of the Labour Appellate
Tribunal.
Held, that a Conciliation Officer under cl. 29 of the
Order promulgated in 1954 uµder the U. P. Industrial Disputes
Act, I 94 7, has to act judicially in granting or refusing per~
n1ission to alter the terms of employment of workmen at the
instance of the employer, but as he is not invested \Vith the
judicial power of the State, he cannot be regarded as a tribunal
within the meaning of Art. 136 of the Constitution· of In<lia.
Consequently, an appr.al under that Article is not competent
against the direction given by the Conciliation Officer.
Bharat Rank Ltd. v. Empwyees of Rlwrnt Bank LU.,
[1950] S. C. R. 459, Province of Bomba.y v. K. 8. Arfoa11i,
[1950] S. C. R. 621, Atherton West & Co. LU. v. Snti JJfilf
Mazdoor Union, [1953] S. C.R. 780 and I>urya Shan/.·ar Mehta
v. Thakur Ray/1uraj Singh, [1955] l S. C.R. 267, relied on.
Held, further, that an "authority" under s. 2 (c) (iii) of
the Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Act, l<J:io, to b~
an industrial tribunal must be a body constitutrcl for the
purpose of adjudication of industrial disputes under a law 1nadc
liv the State; since a Conciliation Officer is not invf'sterl 'vith
a;1y such po,ver, he can1tot be regarded as an "authority"
"'ithin thr mC'aning of that section. Accordingly, an appeal
ag·ainst the order of the Conciliation Officer is not maintainable
undf'r s. 4 of the Ind11strial Disputes (Apprllate 'l'rih11na.l)
Act, 19.10.
i9a..'isoon lf;- .4lliance Flilk Mill8 Co. Ltrl. v . .~fill Jlrr:iluor
Sabha, [1955] I L. L. J. 70, referred to.
CrvIL APPrJLLATE .Jumson"r!ON : Civil Appeals
Nos. 37 and 38 of 1961.
244 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963]SUPP.
1962
.,,,.itswoot Sugar Mills
Ltd., Meerut
v.
Lakshmichand
Appeals by special leave from the judgment
and orders dated July 9, 1956, and May 9, 1956, of
the Labour ·Appellate Tribunal of India, Lucknow,
and the Additional Regional Conciliation Officer,
Meerut, in Appeal No. III-111 of 1956 and P. D.
Case No. 15 of 1956 respectively.
Veda Vyasa, S. K. Kapur, J. B. Dadachanji,
Prem Nath Ghadha and Ganpat Rai, for the appellants.
A. S. R. Chari, R. K. Garg, S. C. Agarwala
and P. C. Agarwala, for the respondents.
1962. September 25. The Judgment of the
Court was delivered by
Sh4k, J.
SHAH, ].-Two questions arise in limine in these
appeals:
(1) Whether an appeal may be entertained in
exercise of powers under Art. 136 of the
Constitution against a direction of the
Conciliation Officer issued in disposing of an
application under cl. 29 of the Order promulgated by the Governor ofUttar Pradesh under the
U. P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 ; and
(2) Whether against the direction issued by the
Conciliation Officer exercising authority under
cl. 29 of the Order an appeal lay to the Labour
Appellate Tribunal under the Industrial
Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Act, 1950.
It would be necessary to consider the merits of
the appeal in the event of an affirmative answer on
either of these questions.
Facts whii;h have a beanng on the preliminary
questions are briefly these :Jaswant Sugar Mills .Ltd.-hereinafter referred
to as 'the Company'-owns factories at Meerut in
the State of Uttar Pradesh for manufacturing sugar
iii
I S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
245
1962
and straw boards. On December 13, 1955, the
Company received a notice relating to demands for Jaswant 'iugar Mil/1
bonus, leave, retaining allowance etc., from the Action
Ltd., Meerul
v,
Committee of one of the Labour Unions of the workLakshmichand
men employed in the Sugar Factory: It is the case
of the Company that on December 26, 1955, there
Shah, J,
was a meeting of the workmen and certain employees
exhorted the workmen to resort to "direct action"
and in pursuance thereof the workmen adopted a
"slow-down strike" which resulted in 'great reduction
in the operations of crushing sugarcane, and production of sugar. The Company thereupon served
charge-sheets upon sixty-three workmen charging
them individually and collectively for doing acts
calculated to destroy the machinery of the factory
and for deliberately adopting a policy of "go-slow"
and refusing to attend work a5signed to them at the
appointed time.
The Enquiry Officer who investigated the
charges against the delinquent workmen, by his order
dated J anu'!ry 9, 1958, held that all the workmen
were guilty of "sabotage and slow-down strike" and
were therefore liable to be dismi>sed. But at that
time a dispute relating to payment of bonus was
pending before the U ttar Pradesh State Industrial
Tribunal in which the Company and the workmen
were concerned, and the conditions of service of the
workmen could not, by virtue of cl. 29 of the Order
issued in 1954 by the Governor of U ttar Pradesh
under the U. P Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, be
altered, and the· workmen could not be discharged
without the previous permission of the Conciliation
Officer.
An application was accordingly submitted by
the Company to the Regional Conciliation Officer,
Meerut, for permission to dismiss the workmen who
were, on the finding of the Enquiry Officer, concerned
with "slow-down strike and other illegal tactics"
adopted by them with a view to cause loss to the
246 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963] SUPP.
1962
Jaswant Sugar Mills
Ltd., Meerut
••
Lakslmzichand
Company. The Conciliation Officer granted permission in respect of only eleven workmen, for in his
view, the remaining fifty-two workmen were mere
"passive participants in the go-slow campaign",
and that it "would not be fair and justifiable to grant
permission-to dismiss those workmen from service".
The Company preferred an appeal to the Labour
Appellate Tribunal, Lucknow, against the direction
of the Conci!iation Officer refusing to grant permission
to dismiss fifty-two workmen, but the appeal was
rejected, because in the view of the Appellate Tribunal the Conciliation Officer was not an "authority"
within the meaning of s. 2 (c) cL (iii) of the Industrial
Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Act, 1950, and the
appeal was therefore incompetent. The Company
has, with special leave, preferred appeals against the
direction of the Conciliation Officer, and the order of
the Labour Appellate Tribunal. The order of the
Conciliation Officer is challenged on the ground that
in refusing permission to dismiss fifty-two workmen,
the Conciliation Officer ignored the principles settled
by this Court and the Labour Appellate Tribunal in
cases dealing with applications for granting permission
to discharge employees under s. 33 of the Industrial
Disputes Act, 1947. In "the appeal against the order
of the Labour Appellate Tribunal, it is submitted
that the Conciliation Officer was an "authority"
within the meaning of s. 2 (c) cl. (iii) of the Industrial
Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Act, 1950 and the
direction made by the Conciliation Officer was a
decision within the meaning of s. 4 of that Act.
Counsel for the workmen contended that the
appeal against the direction given by the Conciliation Officer is not maintainable because that officer
exercising authority under cl. 29 of the Order
promulgated in 1954 under the U. P. Industrial
Disputes Act, 1947, is neither a 'Court' nor a
'Tribunal' within the meaning of Art. 136 of the
Constitution and no appeal lies to this Court against
the impugned direction.
l s.c.R.
SUPREM•E COURT REPORTS
247
Article 136(1) of the Constitution provides :
1962
Sugar Mi·
"Notwithstanding any/hing in this Chapter, the Jaswant
Ltd., Meerut
v.
Supreme Court may, in its discretion, grant
Lalcshmiclumd
special leave to appeal from any judgment,
Shah, J.
decree, determination, sentence or order in any
cause or matter passed or made by any court
or tribunal in the territory of India".
By cl. (2) judgments, determinations, sentences and
orders passed or made by any court or tribunal
constituted by or under any law relating to the Armed
Forces are exempt from the operation of cl. (1). This
Court is manifestly invested with jurisdiction to
entertain appeals from judgments, decrees, determinations, sentences or orders in causes or matters passed
by courts and tribunals except those constituted by or
under any law relating to the Armed Forces. It is
common ground that a Conciliation Officer exercising
authority under cl. 29 of the Order made under the
U. P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, is not a "court",
and the impugned direction does not amount to a
judgment or decree. In determining whether an
appeal still lies against the impugned direction of the
Conciliation Officer, two primary questions fall to be
considered:
(1) whether the direction made by the Conciliation Officer is a dete1mination or an order; and
(2) ~hether the -Conciliation Officer is a
'tribunal' within the meaning of the Act?
Reference to the detailed provisions of the
U. P. Industrial Disputes Act and Orders made
thereunder from time to time, will be made hereafter,. but it may suffice at this stage to observe that
the Order made by the Governor ofUttar Pradesh
in 1954 authorised the State Government by Notification in the Official Gazettee to appoint Conciliation Officers, and by cl. 29 provided that during the
pendency of any conciliation proceedings or
proceedings before a Tribunal or an Adjudicator in
248 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963] SUPP.
1962
·aswant Sugar A1ills
Ltd., Aleerut
v.
Lakshmichand
Sha.Ii, J.
respect of any dispute, an employer shall not alter
the conditions of service to the prejudice of the workmen concerned in such dispute or discharge or punish
any workman concerned in such dispute, save with the
express permission of a Conciliation Officer irrespective of whether the dispute is pending before a Board
or the Tribunal or an Adjudicator.
The Conciliation Officer is bv cl. :W authorised
during the pendency of any concilia'tion proceeding or
proceedings before a Tribunal or an Adjudicator to
permit the employer to alter to the prejudice of the
workmen concerned in such dispute the conditions
of service applicable to them or to discharge or
punish the workmen concerned in such disputes. If
the direction of the Conciliation Officer which
operates proprio dgore to authorise or to deny to the
Company the exercise of its powers under the common
law to terminate the employment of its workmen,
amounts to an order or determination within the
meaning of Art. 136, an appeal with special leave
would be maintainaple in this Court. The expression
'!determination" in the context in which it occurs in
Art. 136 signifies an effective expression of opinion
which ends a controversy or a dispute by some
authority to whom it is submitted under a valid law
for disposal. The expression "order" must have
also a similar meaning, except that it need not
operate to end the dispute. Determination or order
must be judicial or quasi-judicial : purely administrative or executive direction is not contemplated to
be made the subject-matter of appeal to this Court.
The essence of the authority of this Court being
judicial, this Court does not exercise administrative
or executive powers i.e. character of the power
conferred upon this Court, original or appellate, by
its constitution being judicial, the determination
or order sought to be appealed from must have the
character of a judicial adjudication. The Conciliation
Officer is authorised by cl. 29 to grant or withhold
I S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
249
1962
perm1ss10n to determine the employment of a
workman concerned in a pending dispute or to alter Jaswant Sugar 1Vfilis
Ltd., Mcerut
to his prejudice conditions of his service. Clause 29
v.
severely restricts the right of the employer to termiLakshmichand
nate employment according to the terms of the
Shah, J.
contract of employment, and the right is made
exercisable upon. the direction of the Conciliation
Officer if at the time when the right is sought to be
exercised, a dispute .in which the employer and the
employees are concerned, is pending before the
Conciliation Officer or in an Industrial Tribunal.
The true character of this direction must be. examined
in the light of the nature of the authority vested in
the Conciliation Officer and its impact upon the
rights of the parties. If the direction is purely
administrative, it will not be subject to appeal to this
Court.
Q~estion whether, a decision is judicial or is
purely admini.strative, often arises when jurisdiction
of the superior courts to issue writs of certiorari is
invoked. Often the line of distinction between
decisions judicial and administrative is thin : but. the
principles for ascertaining the true character of the
decisions are well-settled. A judicial decision is not
always the act of a judge or a tribunal invested with
power to determine questions of law or fact : it must
however be the act of a body or authority invested by
law with authority to determine questions or disputes
affecting the rights of citizens and under a duty to act
judicially. A judicial decision a.lways postulates the
existence of a duty laid upon the authority to act
judicially. Administrative authorities are often
invested with authority or power to determine questions, which affect the rights of citizens. The
authority may have to invite objections to the course
of action proposed by him, he may be under a duty
to hear the objectors, and his decision may seriously
affect the rights of citizens but unless in arriving at
. his decision he is required to act judicially, his decision
250 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1963) SUPP.
1962
want Sugar M.ills
Ltd., Meerut
v.
Lakshmichand
Shah, J.
will be executive or administrative. Legal authority
to determine questions affecting the rights of citizens,
does not make the determination judicial : it is the
duty to act judicially which invests it with that
character. What distinguishes an act judicial from
administrative is therefore the duty imposed upon the
authority to act judicially. Mukherjea, J., in
The Province of Bombay v. K. S. Advani (1)
observed at p. 670 "there cannot indeed be a judicial
act which does not create o,r imposes obligations ; but
an act, x x x x x x is not necessarily judicial because it affects the rights 0f subjects. Every judicial
act presupposes the application of judicial process.
There is well marked distinction between forming a
personal or private opinion about a matter, and determining it judicially. In the performance of an executive act, the authority has certainly to apply his mind
to the materials before him ; but the opinion he
forms is a purely subjective matter which depends
entirely upon his state of mind. It is of course
necessary that he must act in good faith, and if it is
established that he was not influenced by any extraneous consideration, there is nothing further to be
said about it. In a judicial proceeding, on the othrr
hand, the process or method of application is different. "The judicial process involves the application
of a body of rules or principles by the technique of a
particular psychological method", vide Robson's
Jt!stice and Administrative Law, p. 33. It involves
a proposal and an opposition, and arriving at a
decision upon the same on comideration of facts and
circumstances according to the rules of reason and
justice, vide R. v. London County Council('). It is
not necessary that the strict rules of evidence should
be followed : the procedure for investigation of facts
or for reception of evidence may vary according to
the requirements of a particular case. There need
not be any hard and fast rule on such matters~ but
the decision which the authority arrives at, must not
be his 'subjective', 'personal' or 'private' opinion.
(1) [1950] s.c.R. 621.
(2) [1931] 2 K. B. 215, 2SS.
l S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
251
It must be something which conforms to an objective
standard or criterion laid down or recognised by law,
and the soundness or otherwise of the determination
must be capable of being trstcd by the same external
standard. This is the essence of a judicial function
which differentiates it from an administrative function ; and whether an authority is required to exercise
one kind of function or the other depends entirely
upon the provisions of the particular enactment.
x x x x x Generally speaking where the language
of a statute indicates with ~ufficient clearness that the
personal satisfaction of the authority on certain
matters about which he has to form an opinion
finds his jurisdiction to do certain acts or make
certain orders, the function should be regarded as an
executive function."
It may be observed that Mukherjea, J., was on
the ultimate decision in the case, in the minority, but
the principle enunciated by him had substantially the
approval of the Court. Das, J., in the same case at
p. 719 observed: "a person entrusted to do an administrative act has often to determine questions of fact
to enable him to exercise his power. He has to consider facts and circumstances and to weigh pros and
cons in his mind before he makes up his mind to
exercise his power just as a person exercising a judicial or quasi-judicial function has to do. Both have
to act in good faith. A good and valid administratiw or executive act binds the subject and affects his
rights or imposes liability on him just as effectively
as a quasi-judicial act does. The exercise of an
administrative or executive act may well be and is
freque~t!y made dependent by. the Legislature upon
a. condition or contmgency.wh1ch may involve a question of fact, but the question of fulfilment of which
may, nevertheless, be left to the subjective opinion or
satisfaction of the .::xecutive authority".
To make a decision or an act judicial, the following criteria must be satisfied:
1962
Jaswant .Sligar Afills
ltd., Meirul
v.
Lakshmichand
Shah, J.
252 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963] SUPP.
1962
Jaswanl Sugar .NfillJ
Ltd., lltfeerut
v.
Lakshmichand
Shah, J.
(1) it is in substance a determination upon
investigation of a question by the application of objective standards to facts found
in the light of pre-existing legal rule;
(2) it declares rights or imposes upon parties
obligations affecting. their civil rights;
and
(3) that the investigation is subject to certain
procedural attributes contemplating an
opportunity of presenting its case to a
party, ascertainmant of facts by means of
evidence if a dispute be on questions of·
fact, an~ if the dispute be on question of
law on the presentation of legal argument,
and a decision resulting in the disposal of
the matter on findings based upon those
questions of law and fact.
Applying these tests, there is little doubt that
the Conciliation Officer in granting or refusing pennission to alt.er the terms of employment of workmen,
at the instance of the employer, has to act judicially.
His decision is not made to depend upon any subjective satisfaction; he is required to investigate and
ascertain facts, apply objective standards to facts
found, and to declare whether the employer makes
out a case for granting permission to alter the terms
of employment of his employees. The U. P. Indus•
trial Disputes Act and the Order framed thereunder
do not lay down any specific procedure, but the duty
cast upon him to decide after investigating facts by
the application of objective standards involves an
obligation to evolve a procedure consistent with the
purpose and nature of the enquiry, which assures to
the disputing parties an opportunity to present their
respective cases, and to substantiate the same by
evidence and argument. Therefore the direction of
the Conciliation Officer under cl. 29 of the Order,
cannot be said to be purely administrative.
1 S.C.R.
SUPREM.E COURT REPORTS
253
1962
But every decision or order by an authority
under a duty to act judicially is not subject to appeal
Jaewant Sugar Afit
to this Court. Under Art. 136, an appeal lies to
Ltd. Afeerut
.
v.
this Court from adjudications of courts and tribunals
Lakshmidiand
only. Adjudication of a court or tribunal must
Shah, J.
doubtless be judicial: but every authority which by
its constitution or authority specially conferred upon
it is required to act judicially, is not necessarily a
tribunal for the purpose of Art. 136. A tribunal,
adjudication whereof is subject to appeal, must
beside being under a duty to act judicially, be a body
invested with the judicial power of the State. For"
the purpose of ascertaining whether the Conc.iliatior
Officer exercising powers under cl. 29 is investee
with the judicial powers of the State, it is necessary
to set out the nature of the powers and functions of
the Conciliation Officer and the procedure, if any,
prescribed for the exercise of those powers and functions under the Order .issued by the Governor, and
which was in force at the material time. A historical
review of the emergence of the powers and functions
of the Conciliation Officer in operation at the date
when he passed the order impugned in these appeals
has an important bearing. The Legislature of the
United Provinces enacted the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, XXVIII of 1947, to provide "for powers
to prevent strikes and lock-outs, to settle industrial
disputes and for other incidental matters". By s. 3
of the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act, the Local
Government was authorised, if in its opinion it was
necessary or expedient so to do for certain specified
~urpo~es to rr_iake by gei;ier~l or . special order, provision, inter alia for appomtmg mdustrial courts and
for referring any industrial dispute for conciliation
or adjudication in the manner provided in the
Order.
The Governor ofUttar Pradesh on March 10
1948, issued an Order in exercise of the power~
conferred under ss. 3 and 8 of the U. P. Industrial
254 SUPREME COURT REP ORTS [1963] SUPP.
1962
:Jant Sugar Mills
Ltd., Meerul
v.
:akrhmichand
Shah, J.
Disputes Act, 1947. By cl. 1 of the Order power
was conferred upon the Provincial Government to
constitute Conciliation Boards for settlement of industrial disputes under the chairmanship of Conciliation
Officers, and by cl. 2 the Provincial Government
was authorised to appoint Conciliation Officers. By
cl. 6 the Conciliation Board had to commence an
inquiry into a dispute or matter brought before it
and to endeavour to bring about a settlement of the
same. Clause 7 prescribed the procedure to be
followed by the Board in the course of the inquiry :
the Board had to frame issues on points on which the
parties were at variance and to endeavour to secure a
settlement, of the dispute. If no amicable settlement
was reached, the Board investigated the dispute and
recorded an award together with the reasons thereof
on the issues on which the parties were at issue. The
award made by the Conciliation Board was subject
to appeal to the Industrial Court constituted under
cl. 10 of the Order. By cl. 18 the Conciliation Board
was invested with certain powers of a Civil Court
under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1903, such as
enforcing attendance of witnesses, compelling production of documents, inspection of any property or
thing, including machinery etc. By cl. 19 provision
was made for service of notice, summons, process or
order issued by the Board in the manner prescribed
by the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. But these
were the powers of the Conciliation Board, and not
of the Conciliation Officer. The only statutory
authority conferred upon the Conciliation Officer
independently of the Board was authority under cl. 23
to permit modification of terms of employment or
dismissal or discharge of workmen during the continuance of an enquiry under the U. P. Industrial
Disputes Act or appeal therefrom and pending the
issue of the orders of the State Government upon the
findings of the Board of Court. Under the, ~i1er
promulgated in J948, therefore, the Concihauon
Board was invested with authority analogous to that
l S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
255
1962
of an Industrial Tribunal under the Industrial
Disputes Act, 1947. But the power to sanction Jruwant Sugar Mills
discharge or dismissal of workmen during the
Ltd., Meerut
v.
continuance of the enquiry was vested exclusively
Lakshmichand
in the Conciliation Officer, irrespective of whether
Shah, J.
the enquiry was pending before a Conciliation Board,
or in appeal before the Industrial Court. This Order
was superseded by fresh Order which was promulgated in 1951. It was presumably because of the
enactment d the Industrial Disputes (Appellate
Tribunal) Act, 1950, by the Parliament which conferred authority upon the Labour Appellate Tribunal
to entertain appeals in certain matters against the
awards and decisions of the Industrial Tribunals
that the necessity of reorientation of the scheme for
adjudication of labour disputes under the U. P.
Industrial Disputes Act arose. By the fresh Order
rules were prescribed for constitution of Conciliation
Boards, Industrial Tribunals and Adjudicators. By
this Order a Conciliation Board of which the Conciliation Officer was to be the Chairman was only to
endeavour to bring about a settlement of dispute
before it. If a settlement was brought about; the
Conciliation Board prepared a memorandum of terms
of the settlement arrived at and the same was submitted to the Labour Commissioner of the State.
Where no amicable settlement was secured, the Board
made a report setting forth the steps taken for ascertaining the facts and circumstances relating to the
disJ?ute and the attempts made for bringing about an
amicable settlement. Power to make an award was
taken ~way fron. the Conciliation Board, and was
vested m the Industrial Tribunal. Powers exercisable. under the Code of Civil Procedure under the
p;:v1?us Order were also taken away from the Conc1hat10~ Board.bµt the authority to alter conditions
of serv1c~. d~mng the pendency of proceeding before
the Conohation Offi.cer or. a Tribunal or an' Adjudicator by cl. 23 remamed
. with the Conciliation Offi.cer
fth
o e area concemcd irrespective of the fact whether
256
1962
Jaswant Sugar Mills
l.td., /1/eerur
v.
Lak!·hmichand
Shuh, J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963] SUPP.
a dispute was pending before a Board, Tribunal or
an Adjudicator.
This Order was superseded by a fresh Order
made in 1954. The scheme of the Order made in
1954 was similar to the scheme of the Order made in
1951. Disputes could be referred under this Order to
the Conciliation Board which was to consist of the
Conciliation Officer appointed by the State Government and two members-one representing each of
the parties to the dispute-appointed by the Conciliation Officer on the recommendation of the parties.
The function of the Board was to prepare a memorandum of a settlement, if any, reached before the
Board or to report about the failure to bring about a
settlement, but it had no power to make an award.
By cl. 24 the Tribunal or the Adjndicator, bnt not
the Board nor the Conciliation Officer, were vested
with certain powers as were vested in the Civil Courts
under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, such as
summoning and enforcing the attendance of witnesses,
requiring the discovery and production of documents,
issuing commissions in the examination of witnesses
and inspection of any property or thing. Clause 29
(omitting the proviso thereto which is not material)
was enacted as follows :"During the pendency . of any conciliation
proceedings or proceedings before the Tribunal
or an Adjudicator in respect of any dispute and,
where sub-clause (3) of clause 5 applies, for a
further period of 30 days (excluding holidays
but not annual vacations observed bv courts
subordinate to the High Court), an employer
shall not(a) alter to the prejudice of the workmen concerned in such dispute th~ conditions of
service applicable to them immediately
before the commencement of such proceedings, or
1 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
257
(b) discharge or punish, whether such punishment is by dismissal or otherwise, any
workman concerned in such dispute, save
with the express permission in writing of a
Conciliation Officer of the area concerned,
irrespective of the fact whether the <lispute
is pending before a Board or the Tribunal
or an Adjudicator ;"
The scheme of the Order made by the Governor in
1954 was substantially the same as the Order which
was promulgated in year 1951. The Conciliation
Officer who was to be appointed by a Notification
under cl. 2 by the State Government had ·two-fold
functions. He was a member of the Conciliation
Board and he functioned in that capacity under els. 4,
5, 6 and 7 for the purpose of bringing about an amicable settlement of a dispute. Authority to entertain
applications submitted to the Conciliation Officer
about an industrial dispute, existing or apprehended
and to constitute a Conciliation Board were administrative duties in his capacity as a member of the
Conciliation Board. His power independently of the
Board was invested in him only by cl. 29. The true
nature of an order made by a Conciliation Officer
under cl. 23 of the Order promulgated in 1951-and
which was in terms substantially the same as cl. 29
of the 1954 Order, was examined by this Court in
Atherton ltest & Go. Ltd. v. Suti Mill .Mazdoor
Union( 1) where Bhagwati, J., announcing the Judgment
of the Court observed :
"It is clear that clause 23 imposed a ban on
the ?ischarge or dismissal of any workman
pendmg the enquiry of an industrial dispute
rn;fore the Board or an appeal before the Industnal Court and the employer, his agent or
manager could only discharge or dismiss the
workman with the wr;tten permission of the
Regional Conciliation Officer
x
x
x
concerned. Even if such written permission
0) (1953] S. C. R. 780.
1961
/uwant Sugar Milli
Ltd., Murlll
v.
LakshmichMi
SlvJr, /.
258 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963] SUPP.
1962
J~wanl Su:ar Mills
LtC., Me1rut
v.
I.Jdshmichand
Shnh, J,
was forthcoming the employer, his agent or
manager might or might not discharge or
dismiss the workman and the only effect of such
written permission would be to remove the ban
against the discharge or dismissal of the workman during the pendency of those proceedings.
The Regional Conciliation Officer x x x
concerned would institute an enquiry and come
to the conclusion whether there was a prima
f acie case made out for the discharge or dismissal of the workman and the employer, his
agent or manager was not actuated by any
improper motives or did not resort to any unfair
practice or victimisation in the matter of the
proposed discharge or dismissal of the workman.
But hf' was not entrusted, as the Board or the
Industrial Court would be, with the duty of
corning to the conclusion whether the discharge
or dismissal of the workman during the pendency
of the proceedings was within the rights of the
employer, his agent or manager. The enquiry
to be conducted by the Regional Conciliation
Officer x x x x x concerned was not
an enquiry into an industrial dispute as to the
non-employment of the workman who was
sought to be discharged or dismissed; which
industrial dispute would only arise after an
employer, his agent or manager discharged or
rlismissed the workman in acccirdance with the
written permission obtained from the officer
concerned. This was the only scope of the
enquiry before the Regional Conciliation Officer
x x x x x x concerned and the effect
of the written permission was not to validate
the discharge or dismissal but merely to remove
the ban on the powers of the rmployer, his
agent or manager to discharge or dismiss the
workman during the pcndency of the proceedings. Once such written permission was
granted by him, that order made or direction
1 S.C.R.
_,
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
259
1962
issued by him was to be final and conclusive
and was not to be questioned by any party
Suzar M
thereto in any proceedings. The only effect of J aswant
Ltd., M1mJ1
clause 24 (1) was to prevent any party to the
v.
Lakshmithond
pending proceedings from challenging the
written permission thus granted by the officer
Shah, J,
concerned.
x x x x
once the written
permission was granted by the of:licer concerned,
the ban against the discharge or dismissal of
the workman would be removed and the em·
player, his agent or manager could in the exercise of his discretion discharge or dismiss the
workman but in that event an industrial ·dispute
within the meaning of its definition contained
in section 2 (k) of the industrial Disputes Act,
1947, woulCl arise and the workman who had
been discharged or dismissed would be entitled
to have that industrial dispute referred to the
Regional Conciliation Board for enquiry into
the same."
The essential characteristics of a 'tribunal'
within the meaning of Art. 136 were examined by
Mahajan, J., and it was observed that in the Bharat
Bank Ltd. v. Employees of Bharat Bank Ltd.(') "tribu·
nals which do not derive authority from the sovereign
power cannot fall within the ambit of Art. 136.
The condition precedent for bringing a tribunal
within the ambit of Article 136 is that it should be
constituted by the State. Again a tribunal would be
outside the ambit of Art. 136 if it is not invested with
any part of the judicial functions of the State but discharges purely administrative or executive duties."
This view was adopted by the Court in Durga
Shankrir 3frht1t v. Thakur Raghuraj Singh(') where
Mukherjea, J., observed : "it is now well settled by
the majority decision of this Court in the case of
Bharat Bank Ltd. v. Employees of the Bharat Bank
Ltd.(') that the expression "Tribunal" as used in
Art. 136 does not mean the same thing as "Court" but
(1) (1950] S. C. R. 459.
(2) .(1955] l S. C.R. 267.
\
260 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [i963] stJPP.
includes, within its ambit, all adjudicating bodies.
J_.,t Suzar Milt; provided they are constituted by the State and are
Lid., Murul
invested with judicial as distinguished from purely
T.
administrative or executive functions."
l~1hmi<"-i
1962
"'·"· J.
The duty to act judicially imposed upon an
authority by statute does not necessarily clothe the
authority with the judicial power of the State. Even
administrative or executive authorities are often by
virtue of their constitution, required to act judicially
in dealing with question affecting the rights of
citizens. Boards of Revenue, Customs Authorities,
Motor Vehicles Authorities, Income-tax and Sales-tax
Officers are illustrations prima facie of such administrative authorities, who though under a duty to act
judicially, either by the express provisions of the
statutes constituting them or by the rules framed
thereunder or by the implication either of the stat1,1tes
or the powers conferred upon them are sti!l. not
delegates of the judicial power of the State. Their
primary function is administrative and not judicial.
In deciding whether an authority required to act
judicially when dealing with matters affecting rights
of citizens may be regarded as a tribunal, though not
a court, the princ'ipal incident is the investiture of
the "trappings of a court"--such as authority to
determine matters in cases initiated by parties, sitting
in public, power to compel attendance of witnesses
and to examine them on oath, duty to follow fundamental rules of evidence (though not the strict rules
of the Evidence Act), provision for imposing sanctions
by way of imprisonment, fine, damages or mandatory
or prohibitory orders to enforce obedience to their
commands. The list is illustrative ; some, though
not necessarily all such trappings will ordinarily make
the authority which is under a duty to act judicially,
a 'tribunal'.
Mahajan, J., in Bharat Bank Ltd. v. Employees
of Bharat Bank Ltd.(1) observed at p. 47G :
(I) (1950] S.C. R. 459.
1 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
261
1962
"As pointed out in picturesque language by
Lord Sankey L. C. in Shell Co. of Australia Jaswant Sugar Mills
Ltd., Meerut
v. Federal Commissi(frter of 'l.'axution('), there
v.
are tribunals with many of the "trappings of a
Lakshmichand
Court" which, nevertheless, are not Courts in
Shah, J.
the strict sense of exercising judicial power. It
seems to me that such tribunals though they are
not full-fledged Courts, yet exercise quasijudicial functions and are within the ambit of
the word 'tribunal' in article 136 of the Constitution. It was pointed out in the above case
that a tribunal is not necessarily a Court in this
strict sense because it gives a final decision, nor
because it hears witnesses on oath, nor because
two or more contending parties appear before it
between whom it has to decide, nor because it
gives decisions which affect the rights of subjects,
nor because there is an appeal to a Court, nor
because it is a body to which a matter is referred
by another body. The intention of the Constitution by the use of the word 'tribunal' in the
article seems to have been to include within the
scope of article 136 tribunals adorned with
similar trappings as Court but strictly not coming within that definition."
Reverting to the Order issued by the Governor
of Uttar Pradesh in 1954 it is manifest that no
procedure is prescribed for the investigation to be
made by the the Conciliation Officer, under cl. 29.
He is not required to sit in public: no formal pleadings are contemplated to be tendered; he is not
empowered to compel attendance of witnesses, nor is
he restricted in making an enquiry to evidence which
the parties may bring before him. The Conciliation
Officer is again not capable of delivering a determi·
native judgment or award affecting the rights and
obligations of parties. He is not invested with
powers similar to those of the Civil Court under the
Code of Civil Procedure for enforcing attendance of
(1) [1931] A. C. 275.
262 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963] SUPP.
any person an<l examining him on oath, compelling
production of documents, issuing commissions for the
Jriswant Sugar Afills
examination of witnesses and other m<itters. He is
Ltd., Meerut
v.
concerned in granting leave to determine whether
Lakshmichand
there is a 1iri 11ir~ frt~ie case for dismissal or discharge
Shah, J.
of an employee or for altering terms cf employment,
and whether the employer is actuated by unfair
motives; he has not to decide whether the proposed
step of disch<irge or dismissal of the employee was
within the rights of the employer. His order merely
removes a statutory ban in certain eventualities, laid
upon .the common law right of an employer to dismiss, discharge or alter the terms of employment
according to con tract between the parties. The
Conciliation Officer has undoubtedly to act judicially
in dealing with an application under cl. 29, but he
is not invested with the judicial power of the State:
he cannot therefore be regarded as a 'tribunal' within
the meaning of Art. 136 of the Constitution.
1962
We are not in this case called upon to decide
whether the proceeding for a writ may lie under Art.
226 of the Constitution before a competent High
Court against the order of the Conciliation Officer.
We are concerned only to deal with the limited question whether he is a 'tribunal' within the meaning
of Art. 136 of the Constitution having the attributes
of the investment of the judicial powers of the State.
It may be pertinent to note that provisions similar
to cl. 29 of the Order issued under the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act, HJJ7, are to be found in s. 33 of
the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. By virtue of s.33
an employer during the pendency of any conciliation
proceeding before a Conciliation Officer or a Board
or of any proceeding before a Labour Court or Tribunal or National Tribunal in respect of an industrial dispute is prohibited save with the express permission in writing of the authority before which the
proceeding is pending, from altering to the prejudice
of the workmen concerned in such a dispute, the
1 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
263
1962
conditions of service applicable to them immediately
before the commencement of the proceeding and J.uwant Su.gar Mi
Ltd., Meerut
from discharging or punishing, whether by dismissa 1
v.
or otherwise, any workman concerned in such dispute
Lakshmichand
for any misconduct connected with the dispute. Both
Shah, J.
the enactments place restrictions upon the power of
the employer to terminate rmployment during the
pendency of a dispute in which the employer and
employee are concerned, and which is pending before
a statutory authority. But whereas under cl. 29 the
power to grant permission is exercisable only by the
Conciliation Officer, the power under s. 33 is exercisable by the authority before whom the proceeding
is pending. Section 33-A of the Industrial Disputes
Act provides, in so far as it is material, that "where
an employer contravenes the provisions of section 33
during the pendency of proceedings before a Labour
Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal, any employee
aggrieved by such contravention, may make a complaint in writing, in the prescribed manner to such
Labour Court, Tribunal or N ationa] Tribunal and
on receipt of such complaint that Labour Court,
Tribunal or National Tribunal shall adjudicate upon
the complaint as if it were ·a dispute referred to or
pending before it, in accordance with the provisions
of this Act and shall submit its award to the appropriate Government and the provisions of this Act
shall apply accordingly". Contravention by an
employer of the provisions of s. 33 when the proceeding is pending before the Conciliation Officer or the
Board does not attract s. 33-A and does not make it
an in~ustrial dispute c_apa ble of being adjudicated
upon m accordance with the provisions of s. 33-A.
Action taken by an employer during the pendency
of conciliation. procee?ings coi:t~a.ry' .to s. 33, may
t~erefore s.ustam a cla1m for adjud1cat1on, only if the
d1~pute ansmg thereunder be referred by the appropnate Government to an Industrial Tribunal. For
breach of s. 33 of the Indt,!striaf Disputes Act or
cl. 29 of the Order by the Governor of U.
no
P.
264 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963] SUPP.
1962
Jaooant Sugar Mills
Ltd., Meerul
v.
Lakshmichand
Shah, J.
penalty may be imposed by the Conciliation Officer.
It is thus manifest that the Conciliation Officer does
not hold the status of an industrial tribunal in exercising powers under s. 33 of the Industrial Disputes
Act or cl. 29 of the U.P. Order. It must therefore
be held that an appeal under Art. 136 of the Constitution to this Court is not competent against the
direction given by the Conciliation Officer exercising
power under cl. 29 of the Order issued by the Governor of U. P. under the U. P. Industrial Disputes
Act, 1947.
The question whether an appeal lay to the
Labour Appellate Tribunal under the Industrial
Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Act, 48 of 1950, does
not present much difficulty in its solution. By s. 4
of Act 48 of 1950, the Central Government is authorised to constitute Labour Appellate Tribunals for
hearing appeals from the awards or decisions of
industrial tribunals in accordance with the provisions
of the Act; an 'Industrial Tribunal' is defined in s. 2
(c) as meaning-:
"(i) any Industrial Tri bun al constituted under
the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (XIV of
1947); or
(ii) in relation to cases where an appeal lies
from any court, wage board or other autho. rity set up in any State under any law
relating to the adjudication of industrial
disputes made, whether before or after the
commencement of this Act, by the legis. 1 lative authority of the State_ to any other
court, board or authority exercising appellate jurisdiction within the State; or
(iii) in relation to other cases, where no appeal
lies under any law referred to in sub-clause
(ii), any court, board or other authority
~et up in any State under such law,"
. ...~
>, l S.C.R.
SUPREl\fE COURT REPORTS
265
1962
. Conciliation Officer functioning· under a: 20- is not
an Industrial Tribunal coristitutcd urider ·the ;Indus- /a:itwnt Suga' ~l!ill.t ·
Ltd., .Aleerul
trial Disputes Act, 1047, his authority being derived
v ..
from the appointment made by the State of Uttar
Lo/;,J hmicliofitl
Pradesh under the U. P. Industrial Di~putcs Act,·
Shah, ·J.
HJ-! 7, Nor is any provision made in the U. P .. Industrial Disputes Act, l\J-17, or Orders made ~thereunder
for an appeal to anr similar authority against the
direction made by the Conciliation Officer in , exercise
of the power conferred ,under cl. 20. An appeal lies
under s. 4 of the Act.48 of 1950, against the direction
of a Conciliation ·Officer· only if he is a Court or
Authority•. The, Legislatu_re _has_,used,in, cl._,(iii), the '
expression "any court, board or other authority";· the·····
context indicates 'that' the word "other 'authority"
must be read' ejuadem geniris ·with Colli-tor Board.
The right .to appeal conferred ,bys. 4 is only against
awards or decisions, and a Conciliation Officer makes
no award, nor even a decision. . His function is . not
to"deliver a definitive judgment affecting' the rights
of the parties before him. He is not invested with
power to .adjudicate· industrial disputes.· It is true
that he is constituted under a statute which relates
to adjudication of industrial disputes,· !mt, 'his functions are purely incidental to industrial' adjudication. His power is not of the same character as , that of an
Industrial Court. or Board or Tribunal. Jn our view.
an 'authority' under s. 2 (c\ (iii) to · b~ an· indmtrial
tribunal must be a body. constituted
t.he purpose
of adjudication' of industrial disputes under a faw'
made by a State. '.~The Conciliation , Officer not
having been invesiedwith any such power, he, cannot
be regarded as an' 'authority' within the meaning of
s. 2(e) (iii) of the Industrial ·Disputes··' (Appellate
Tribunal) Act. The Labour Appellate Tribunal has
consistently held, arid we think rightly, that ari appeal
against the order ofa Conciliator is not maintainable_
under s. 4 ·of the · Industrial Disputes (Appellate
Tribunal) Ac.t, vide Sassoon & Alliance Sill~ .Mill.~ _.
Co. Ltd v • .Jli1f .Jfazdoor cabba (1).
·~
for
_ .. (I) [1955] I L.L.J. 70.
266 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963] SUPP.
1962
11.SWant Sugar Mills
Both the appeals therefore fail and are dismissed with costs. There will be one hearing fee.
Lli., Medrut
v.
Lakshmicha nd
A ppools dismissed.
Shah, J,
1962
UNION TERRITORY OF TRIPURA,
AGARTALA
v.
GOPAL CHANDER DUTTA CHOUDHURY
(B. P. SINHA, c. J., P. B. GAJENDRAG.ADKAR,
K. N. WANCHOO, K. C. DAS GUPTA and
J. c: SHAH, JJ.)
Public Servant-Temporary employment-Termination of
service-Appeal dismiss~An ex-convict for theft-Whether
ttrmination amounted to dismissal-Scope of enquiry-If same
a.o in Iudustrial Dispute-Central Services (Temporary Service)
Ruks, 1949, r.5-0onstiti.ttion of Iudia, Art. 311.
The respondent was appointed as a constable in the
Tripura Police Force. The employment was te!llporary. In
accordance with r. 5 of the Central Services (Temporary
Service) Rules, 1949, his services were terminated by giving one
month's notice. The respondent appealea. The Appellate
Authority wrote to him that as he was an ex-convict for theft
nothing could be done for him. The respondent filed: a writ
petition challenging the order of termination. The Judicial
"ommissioner held that the order was one of dismissal as
punishment on the ground that the respondent was an "exconvict" and that as no reasonable opportunity was given to the
respondent to show cause, the protection of Art. 311 was
not afforded to him and the order ·tenninating the respondents
employment was invalid.
Held, that the respondent had r.ot been dismissed by way
of punishment and there was· no violation of Art. 311(2). 'The
order in terms merely terminated the service of the responiient;
there was nothing in it to suggest that -the termination was on
account of the respondent being an "ex-convict". It could 11ot
be in the circumatanceo of this case inferred that an ~ of
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