THE GUJARAT UNIVERSITY, AHMEDABAD versus KRISHNA RANGANATH MUDHOLKAR AND OTHERS
Supreme Court of India | Decided 21 September 1962 | [1963] SUPP. 1 S.C.R. 112 | 1962 INSC 263
Key facts
- Decided
- 21 September 1962
- Bench
- BHUVNESHWAR PRASAD SINHA*, SYED JAFFER IMAM, K. SUBBA RAO, K.N. WANCHOO, J.C. SHAH, N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR
- Bench size
- 6
- Case number
- CIVIL APPEAL No. 234/1962
- Disposal
- Dismissed
- Citation
- [1963] SUPP. 1 S.C.R. 112
- Neutral citation
- 1962 INSC 263
Text of the judgment
112 SUPRE,ME COURT REPORTS [1963] SUPP.
1962
Sobhraf Odharmal
v.
State of Rajasthan
Shah, J.
are set out in the order dated May 3/4, 1962 were
lawfully cancelled. The objectors had since cancellation of their permits no fundamental right which
could be infringed by the State Government plying its
vehicles with or without permits issued by the Regional
Transport Authority under s.42( 1) of the Motor
Vehicles Act.
The appeal and the writ petition therefore fail
and are dismissed with costs. There will be one
hearing· fee.
Appeal and writ petition dismissed.
THE GUJARAT UNIVERSITY, AHMEDABAD
v.
1962
KRISHNA RANGANATH MUDHOLKAR
September 21.
AND OTHERS
(B. P.
SINHA
c. ]., jAFER IMAM, K. SUBBA RAO,
K. N. WANCHOO, J. c. SH.AH AND
N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR, lJ.)
University Education-F·ixation of exclusive ""'4ium of
mstruction-Legislative Competence of State Legislature-Constitution of India, Art. 254 (1), Seventh Schedule, List I,
Entry 66, List II, Entry lr---Gujarat Univer8ity Act, 1949
(Bom. 56 of 1949) as amended by Act 4 of 1961, 88. 4, 18, 20,
22, 38A-Univer8ity Statutes, 207, 208 209.
The second respondent joined the First Year Arts Class
of the St. Xavier's College, affiliated to the Gujarat University,
where instruction was imparted through the medium of English
and after successfully completing that course sought admission
to the cla~ses preparing for the Intermediate Arts Examination of the University through the medium of English. The
Principal of the college informed him that in view of the
provisions of the Gujarat University Act, 1949, and statutes 267,
208 and 209 framed by the Senate of the University, as amended
in J961, . he could not be admitted without the "11\Clion of the
University The first respondent (father of the second respondent)
1\
.
I S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
113
1962
moved the Vice-Chancellor but sanction was refused. The
respondents then moved the High Court under Art. 226 of the
Constitution for v.rrits requiring the university and the Principal Gujarat University
Ahmedabad
of the College not to enforce the provisions of ss. 4 (27) 18 (1)
v.
(XIV) and 38 A of the Gujarat University Act and Statutes 207, Krishna Rangarullh
A1udholkar
208, 209 and that Court holding in favour of the respondents
issued the writs prayed for. The State and the University filed
separate appeals to this Court. It was contended on behalf of
the University that s. 4 of the Act conferred power on the
University to impose Gujarati or Hindi as the exclusive medium
of instruction and examination, and that the impugned
provisions were valid. The questions for deternlination were,
(1) whether the Gujarat University had the power under the
Act to prescribe Gujarati or Hindi or both as exclusive 1nedium
or media of instruction and examination, (2) whether legislation
authorising the University to impose such 1nedia was constitutionally valid in view of Entry 66 of list I of the Seventh Schedule
to the Constitution.
Held, (Per Sinha, C. J., Imam, Wanchoo, Shah and
Ayyangar,JJ.), that neither under the Gujarat Uniyersity Act,'
1949, as originally enacted nor as amended by Act 4of1961,
was power conferred on the University to impose Gujarati or
Hindi or both as exclusive medium or media of instruction or
examination and since no power \Vas conferred on the University
the Senate could exercise no such power.
Clause (27) of s. 4 of the Act, which alone expressly dealt
with the subject of medium of instruction, properly construed,
did not indicate that the Legislature was therein indirectly
dealing with the subject of prescribing an exclusive medium of
instruction. From the use of the word "Promote" read in the
context of the indefinite article "a", it was clear that the Univer.
sity was not empowered to impose Gujarati or Hindi as exclusive
medium of instruction and examination. Use of the definite
article "the" in the proviso in relation to English as the medium
of instruction supported this view.
Since cl. (27) was not intended to authorise the imposition
of Gujarati or Hindi or both as exclusive medium or media,
cl. (28) of s. 4 could not also be held to do so. Nor did ss. 18,
20, 22 or any other section of the Act confer that authority.
J-\ corporation has ordinarily an implied power to carry
out its objects; but that rule could not by itself, in the absence
of express provisions in the Act, authorise the University to ·
impose an oxclusive 1nedium of instn1ction.
The letter dated Angus! 7, 1949, addressed by the Government of India to the Universities and ProvincLtl G·Jvernments
J
114 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963) SUPP
1962
Gujarat Unilldrsity,
Ahmttfabd
v.
Krishna Rangan"th
Mudholkar
requesting them to gradually replace English as the medium
of instruction· at the University stage by the regional or State
language cou] d not affect the interpretation of the plain language
of the Act.
Nor could the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Act,
which proposed to empower the University to adopt Gujarati or
the national language as the medium of instruction, justify the
court in assuming that the proposal \Vas carried out, the State..
ment of Objects and ·Reasons must be ignored in interpreting
the statute.
It was not correct to 3ay that legislation prescribing
the medium or media of instruction in higher education and
other instructions must fall within Item l l of List II of the
Seventh Schedule to the Constitution. The use of the expression "subject to" in that Item clearly indicates that legislation
in respect of matters excluded by that Item cannot be undertaken by the, State Legislature.
Hingir-Rampur Coal
I S.C.R. 537, referred to.
Co. v. State
of Orissa, (196\]
I tern 11 of List II and Item 66 of List I must be
harmoniously construed and where they overlap the power
conferred by Item 66 on the Parliament must prevail over the
power conferred on the Stale Legislatures by Item 11.
The test of the validity of a State Legislation on
University education or education in Technical and Scientific
Iii.stitutions not covered by Entry 64 of List I, would be whether
•uch legislation impinges "11 the field reserved for the Uriion
by Item 66 of List I and prejudicially affects coordination and
determination of standards, and not the existence of some
definite Union Legislation to that end. If there he one, that
would prevail over the State-legislation under Art. 254(1) of
the Constitution. Even if there is no such legislation, State law
trenching upon the Union field must still be invalid.
Item 66 of List I cannot be narrowly construed and the
power it confers extends to all ancillary or subsidiary matters
which can be fairly and reasonably comprehended by it, such
as disparities resulting from the adoption of a regional medium
of instruction resultin(( in a falling of standards in higher
education.
The, word 'co-ordination' does not merely mean
evaluation but also harmonising relationship for concerted
action. . The power under this Item is absolute and not conditioned by the existence of a state of emergency or unequal
standards calling for its exercise.
Since medium of instruction is not an item ill the legis-
lative Lists, it necessarily falls within Item 11 of List II, at
1 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
115
also within items 63 to 66 of List I and in so far as it is a
necessary incident of the power under Item 66 it must be deemed
to be excluded from Item 11 of List II.
)
If a legislation imposing a regional language or Hindi
as the exclusive medium of instruction is likely to result in
lowering of standards, it must necessarily fall within Item 66
of List I and be excluded to that extent from Item 11 of
List II.
Per Subba Rao, J.-Under what entry a legislation falls
must be decided by the scope and effect of the legislation and
by its pith and substance. Case-law has laid down various
tests to get at the core of the legislation but no case has yet
held that even if the pith and substance of a legislation falls
within one entry, it is liable to be struck down on the ground
that it may possibly come into conflict with another by a
co-ordinate legislature under another entry. If the impact of a
State law on a Central subject has the effect of wiping out or
a bridging the Central field, then the State law may be held to
be a colourable exercise of power and that in pith and substance
it falls not under the State entry but under the Union entry.
The case-law
does not, hoV1rever,
recognise an independent
principle of direct impact outside the doctrine of pith and
substance.
Prafulla Kumar v. Bank of Commerce, Khulna, A.I.R.
1947 P.C. 60, State of Bombay v. F. N. Balsara, [1951] S.C.R.
682, A. S. Kmhna v. Stn,te of Madras, (1957) S.C.R. 399,
Union Colliery Co. of British Columbia Ltd. v. Bryden [1899)
A.C. 580, Bank of Toronto v. Lambe, [1882112 A.O. 515 and
Atlorney General for Alberta v. Attorney General for Canada,
[I 939) A.C. l! 7, discussed.
The well-settled rules of interpretation arc that the widest
amplitude should be given to the language of the Entries and
when they overlap this Court should reconcile and harmonise
them.
So construed, it was clear that mediun1 of instruction
was included in Entry I I of List II and not in Entry 66 of List
1 \vhich relates
to "co-ordination"
and "determination of
standards". The State legislature could, therefore, make a law
empowering the University to prescribe a regional language as
the exclusive medium of instruction. The Gujarat University
Act wa' thus within Entrv I I and did not affect the Union
Entry which does not neceSsarily involve a particular medium
of instruction.
Calcu.tta (',as Co. v. The State of West Bengal (I 962)
Supp. 3 S. C. R. I applied.
1962
Gujarat University,
Ahmtdabad
v.
Krishna Ranganath
Mudholkar
116 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963).SUPP.
1962
Gujarc! University,
Ahm1dabad
v.
Krishna Rar1ganalh
Mwiholkar
When an act confers a power on a corporation such as
the University, it impliedly grants the power of doing all acts
which are essentially acce5sary for exercisiM that power. The
provisions of the Act leave no manner~of doubt that the
University had the implied power to prescribe for the purposes
of higher education a number of rr1edia or instructions or even
a sol.e and exclusive medium. That power is implicit in cl. (I)
of •A and the other clauses thereof. Clause (27) did not curtail
that power but conferred an additional power, to promote the
study of Gujarati or Hindi and the use of them as medium of
instruction aiid examination; the proviso to it also corresponds
with the scheme.
CIVIL APPELLATEJURISDICTION: Civil Appeals
Nos. 234 and 262 of 1962.
Appeals from the judgment and order dated
January 24, 1962, of the Gujarat High Court in
Special Civil Application No. 624 of 1961.
J. C. Bhatt, H.K. Thakore and V. J. Merohand,
for the appellants (in C.A. No. 234/62) and
respondents Nos. 2. and 3 (in C.A. No. 262/62).
N. A. Palkhivala, C. T. Daru, J. B.
Dadachanji, 0. 0. Mathur and Ravinder Narain, for
the respondent No. 1 (in both the appeals.)
M. C. Setalvad, Attorney-General of India
J, M. Thakore, Advocate-General for the State of
Gujarat, M. G. Doshit and R. H. Dhebar, for the
respondent No. 3 (in C.A. No. 234/62) and the appe·
Hant (in C. A. No. 262 of 1962).
I. M. Nanavati and G. Gopalakrishna, for the
intervener (in C.A. No. 234/62).
Frank Anthony, Charanjit Talwar, P. C.
Agarwala, J.B. Dad.achanji, 0. 0. Mathur and
Ravinder Narain, for Intervener No. 2 (in both \Pe
appeals).
1962. September 21. The Judgment of Sinha,
C. J., Imam, Wanchoo, Shah and AyYangar, JJ.,
was delivered by Shah, J., Subba Rao, J. delivered a
separate Judgment.
1 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
117
SHAH, J.-Shrikant son of Shri Krishna
Madholkar appeared for the Secondary School Certificate Examination held by the State of Bombay in
March, 1960, and was declared successful. He took
instruction in the various subjects prescribed for the
examination through the medium of Marathi (which
. is his mother-tongue) and answered the questions at
the examination also in the medium of Marathi.
Shrikant joined the St. Xavier's College affiliated to
the University of Gujarat, in the First Year. Arts
class and was admitted in the section in which
instructions were imparted through the medium of
English. After successfully completing the First Year
Arts. course in :Miarch, 1961, Shrikant applied for
admission to the classes preparing for the Intermediate
Arts examination of the University · through the
medium of English. The Principal of the College
informed Shrikant that in view of the provisions of
the Gujarat University Act, 1949, and the Statutes
207, 208 and 209 framed by the Senate of the University, as amended in 1961 he could not without
the sanction of the University permit him to attend
classes in which instrnctions were imparted through
the medium of English. Shri Krishna, father of
Shrikant then moved the Vice-Chancellor of the
University for sanction to permit Shrikan• to attend the
"English medium classes" in the St. Xavier's College.
The Registrar of the University declined to grant the
request, but by another letter Shrikant was "allowed
to keep English as a medium of examination" but
not. for instruction.
A petition was then filed by Shri Krishna
Madholkar on behalf of himself and his minor son
Shrikant in the High Court of Gujarat for a writ or
order in the nature of .Mandamus or other writ, direction or order requiring the University of Gujarat to
treat ss. 4(27), 18 (i) (xiv) and 38A of the Gujarat
University Act, 1949, and Statutes 207, 208 and 209
as void and inoperative and to forbear from acting
1962
Gujarat University,
A.hmedabad
v.
Krishna Ranganath
Mudholkar
Shah, J,
118 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963) SUPP.
1962
Gujarat Universil.J,
Ahmedabad
v.
Krishna Ranga11ath
Mudlwlkar
Sh'lh, J.
upon or enforcing those provisions and requiring the
Vice-Chancellor to treat the letters or circulars issued
by him in connection with the medium of instruction
as illegal and to forbear from acting upon or enforcing
the same, and also requiring the University to forbear
from objecting to or from prohibiting the admission
of Shrikant to "the English medium Intermediate
Arts class." and requiring the Principal of the College ·
to admit Shrikant to the "English medium Intermediate Arts class" on the footing that the impugned
provisions of the Act, Statutes and letters and circulars
were void and inoperative.
The High Court of Gujarat by qrder dated
January 24, 1962, issued the writs prayed for. The
University and the State of Gujarat have separately
appealed to this Court with certificates of fitness
granted by the High Court.
The judgment of the High Court proceeded
upon diverse grounds which are summarised in their
judgment as follows :( 1) Statutes 207 and 209 in so far as they seek
to lay down and impose Gujarati and/or
Hindi in Devanagri script as media of instruction and examination in institutions
other than those maintained by the University are unauthorised and therefore null
and void, for neither s. 4(27) nor any other
provision of the Act empowers the University to lay down Gujarati or Hindi as a
medium of instruction and examination in
such institutions or to forbid the use of
English as a medium of instruction and
examination for and in such institutions;
(2) In any event, the University has the power
only to lay down Gujarati or Hin.di as one of
the medium of instruction and examination
and not as the only medium of instruction
1 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
119
and examination to the exclusion of other
languages;
(3) The proviso to cl. 27 of s. 4 of the Gujarat
University Act as amended by Act 4 of
1961 constitutes an encroachment on the
field of Entry 66 of List I of the Seventh
Schedule to the Constitution and is therefore beyond the legislative competence of
the State and the Statutes 207 and 209
made thereunder arc null and void ; and
(4) ·~ven if on a true construe lion of s. 4(27)
and other provisions of the Act, the University is authorised to prescribe a particular language or languages as medium or
media of instruction and examination for
affiliated colleges and to prohibit the us•: of
English as a medium of instruction and
examination in afliliated colleges, the
provisions authorising the imposition of
exclusive media and the Statutes and circulars issued in pursuance thereof arc void
and infringing Articles 2!) ( 1) and 30 ( 1)
of the Constitution.
We have declined to hear arguments about the
alleged infringement of fundamental rights under
Articles 29 ( l) and :lo (l) by the Act assuming as it
authorises imposition of Gujarati or Hindi as an
exclusive medium of instruction, for, in our view, the
petition suffers from a singular lack of pleading in
support of that case, and even the St. Xavier's College
authorities who had at one stage adopted a noncontentious attitude but later supported the case of
the petitioner, did not choose to place evidence on
the record which would justify the Court in entering
upon an investigation of this plea of far reaching
importance. Manifestly, the decision of the question
whether such legislation infringes Arts. 29 ( l) and
30(1) depends upon proof of several facts such as
existence of a distinct language, script or culture of a
1962
Gujarat Uniuersily
Ahmedabad ·
v.
Krishna Ranganat.
Mudholkar
Shah,/.
..
120 SUPREl.vlE COURT REPORTS [1963] SUPP.
1962
;ujarat University,
Ahmedilhad
v.
;rishnw Ranganath
Mudholkar
Shah) J.
section of citizens for whom the St. Xavier's College
caters or the existence of a minority based on religion
or language having been by the enactment of the
impugned legislation obstructed or likely to be obstructed in the exercise of its rights to establish and
administer educational institutions of its choice. We,
therefore, express no opinion on the question whether
the provisions of the Act and the Statutes and circulars issued infringe any fundamental rights of any
section of citizens or any minority religious or
linguistic. We must, however, make it clear that we
refuse to decide the question not because the petitioner
had no right to maintain the petition under Art. 226
of the Constitution as contended by the University
and the State of Gujarat, but because of the paucity
of pleading and evidence on the record.
Two substantial questions survive for determination-(l) whether under the Gujarat University
Act, 1949, it is open to the University to prescribe
Gujarati or Hindi or both as an exclusive medium or
media of instruction and examination in the affiliated
colleges, and (2) whether legislation authorising the
University to impose such media would infringe Entry
66 of List I, Seventh Schedule to the Constitution.
...
St. Xavier's College was affiliated to the
University of Bombay under Bombay Act 4 of 1921;l.
The Legislature of the Province of Bombay en acted
the G1tjarat University Act, 1949, to establish and
incorporate a teaching and affiliating University "as
a measure of decentralization and re-organisation" of
University education in the province. Bys. 5(3) of
the Act, fmm the prescribed date all educational institutions admitted to the privileges of the University of
Bombay and situate within the University area of
Gujarat were deemed to be admitted to the privileges
of the University of Gujarat. Section 3 incorporated
by the University with perpetual succession and a
common seal. Section 4 of the Act enacted a provision
which is not normally found in similar Acts constituting
1 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
121
Universities. By that section various powers of
the University were enumerated. These powers
were made exercisable by diverse authorities of the
University set out in s. 15. We are concerned in these
appeals with the Senate, the Syndicate and the
Academic Council. Some of the powers conferred by
s. 4 were made exercisable by s. 18 by the Senate.
The Senate was by that section authorised, subject to
conditions as may be prescribed by or under the
provisions of the Act, to exercise the powers and to
perform the duties as set out in sub-s. (1). By s. 20
certain powers of the University were made exercisable
by the Syndicate, and by s. 22, the Academic Council
was invested with the control and general regulation
of, and was made resporisible for, the maintenance of
standards of teaching and examinations of the University and was authorised to exercise certain powers
of the University. The powers and the duties of the
Senate are to be exercised and performed by the promulgation of Statutes, of the Syndicate by Ordinances
and of the Academic Council by Regulations. In
1954, the Gujarat University framed certain Regulations dealing with the media of instruction. They are
Statutes 207, 208 and 209. Statute 207 provided :(1) Gujarati shall be medium of Instruction and
Examination.
(2) Notwithstanding anything in clause (1)
above, English shall continue to be the
medium of instruction and examination for
a period not exceeding ten years from the
date on which section 3 of the Gujarat
University Act comes into force, except as
prescribed from time to time by Statutes.
(3) Notwithstanding anything in clause (1)
above, it is hereby provided that nonGujarati students and teachers will have the
option, the former for their examination
and the latter for their teaching work, to
use Hindi as themedium, if they so desire.
1962
Gujarat Unil.iersity
AhmeiabaJ
v.
K rislma Rantan ct/,
Mutllwlkar
SiuJh, J.
122 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963}SUPP.
1962
iujarat University,
Ahmedabad
v.
-tri'.ikna Ranganath
Mudholkar
Shah, J;
The Syndicate will regulate this by making
suitable Ordinances in this behalf, if, as
and when necessary.
(4) Notwithstanding anything in (1), (2), (3)
above, the medium of examination and
instruction for modern Indian Languages
and English may be the respective languages.
Statute 208 provided that the medium of instruction
and examination in all subjects from June, 1955, in
First Year Arts, First Year Science and First Year
Commerce in all subjects and from June, 1956, in
Inter Arts, Inter Science, Inter Commerce and First
Year Science (Agri.) shall cease to be English and
shall be as laid down in Statute 207(1). This Statute
further provided that a student or a teacher who feels
that he cannot "use Gujarati or Hindi tolerably well",
would be permitted the use of English in examination
and instruction respectiveiy up to November, 1960,
(which according to the academic year would mean
June, 1961) in one or more subjects. Statute 209 is
to the same effect enumerating therein the permitted
use of English for the B.A., B.Sc., and other examinations. After the constitution of a separate State of
Gujarat, Act 4 of 1961 was enacted by the Gujarat
State Legislature. By that Act·the proviso to s. 4(27)
was amended so as to extend the use of English as
the medium of instruction beyond the period originally
contemplated and s. 38A which imposed an obligation
upon all affiliated colleges and recognised institutions to comply with the provisions relating to the
media of instruction was enacted. It was provided by
s. 38A(2) that if an affiliated college or recognised institution contravenes the provisions of the Act, Rules,
Ordinances & Regulations in respect of media of
instruction the rights conferred on such institution or
college shall stand withdrawn from the date of the
contravention and that the college or institution shall
cease to be affiliated college or recognised institution
jl
I
1 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
123
for the purpose of the Act. The Senate of the University thereafter amended Statutes 207 and 209.
Material part of Statute 207 as amended is as
follows:( 1) Gujarati shall be the medium of instruction
and examination :
Notwithstanding anything contained in subitem (I) above, Hindi will be permitted as an
alternative medium of instruction and examination in the following faculties :
(i)
Faculty of Medicine,
(ii)
Faculty of Technology including Engineering, and
(iii)
Faculty of Law ; and
(iv) in all faculties
studies ;
for
post-graduate
(2) Notwithstanding anything contained m
clause (I) above, English may continue to
be the medium of instruction and examination for such period and in respect
of such subjects and courses of studies as
may, from time to time, be prescribed by
the Statutes under sec. 4(27) of the Gujarat
University Act for the time being in force.
(3) Notwithstanding anything contained in
clause (I) above, it is hereby provided that
students and teachers, whose mother-tongue
is not Gujarati will have the option, the
former for their examination and the latter
for their instruction to use Hindi as the
medium, if they so desire.
(4) Notwithstanding anything contained in
clauses (I) & (3) above, it is hereby provided that the affiliated Colleges, recognised
Institutions and University Departments, as
the case may be, will have the option to
1962
Gujarat U11iversitv,
Ahmedabad
v.
Krirhna Ranganaih
Afudholkar
Shah, J.
124 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963) SUPP.
1962
Gujarat Universitp,
Ahmedah•d
v.
Krishna Ranganath
Mudho/kcr
Shah, J.
use, for one or more subjects, Hindi as a
medium of instruction and examination for
students whose mother-tongue is not
Gujarati.
(5) Notwithstanding anything in clauses (1), (2),
(3) and (4) above, the medium of examination and instruction for modern Indian
languages and English may be the respective
languages.
·
Statute 209 as amended provides that the medium of
instruction and examination in all subjects in the
examinations enumerated therein shall cease to be
English and shall be as laid down in Statute 207 as.
amended with effect from the years mentioned against
the respective examinations.
The Registrar of the University thereafter issued
a Circular on June 22, 1961, addressed to Principals
of Affiliated Colleges stating that the Vice-Chancellor
in exercise of the powers vested in him under
s. 11(4)(a) of the Act was pleased to direct that(i) Only those students who have done their
Secondary education through the medium
of English and who have further continued
their studies in First Year (Pre-University)
Arts Class in the year 1960-61 through
English, shall be permitted to continue to
use English as the medium of their examination in the Intermediate Arts Class for
one year i.e. in the year 1961-62, and
(ii) The Colleges be permitted to make arrangements for giving instructions to students
mentioned in (i) above through the medium
of English for only one year i.e. during the
academic year 1961-62, and
(iii) That the Principals shall satisfy themselves
that only such students as mentioned in (i)
I;
1 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
125
above are permitted to avail themselves of
the concession mentioned therein.
Shrikant had not app~ared at the S.S.C. Examination
in the medium of English and under the first clause
of the circular he could not be j)ermitted by the
Principal of the St. Xavier's College to continue to
use English as the medium of instruction in the
Intermediate Arts class: if the Principal permitted
Shrikant to do so the College would be exposed to
the penalties prescribed by s. 38A.
The petitioner challenged the authority of the
University to impose Gujarati or Hindi as the exclusive medium of instruction under the powers conferred
by the Gujarat University Act, 1949, as amended by
Act 4 of 1961. The University contended that authority in that behalf was expressly conferred under
diverse clauses of s. 4, and it being the duty of the
Senate to exercise that power under s. lS(XIV), Statutes 207 and 209 were lawfully promulgated. In any
event, it was submitted that the University being a Corporation invested with control over higher education
for the area in which it functions such a power must be
deemed to be necessarily implied.
In considering whether power to impose Gujarati
or Hindi or both as exclusive medium or media of
instruction is conferred upon the University by the
Gujarat University Act, 1949, clauses (l), (2), (7),
(8), (10), (14), (27), and (28) ofs. 4 only need be
ronsidered. By cl. (1) power is conferred upon the
University "to provide for instruction, teaching and
training in such branches of learning and courses of
study as it may think fit to make provision for rese3.!'ch
and dissemination of knowledge". We do not, having
regard to the phraseology used by the Le_gisla~e,
agree with the High Court that this power IS ~tnc
ted in its exercise to institutions set up by the University and d0es not extend to affiliated colleges. T~e
language used in the clause. does n~t warrant this
l'C9triction. But we agree with the High Court that
1962
Gujarat Uniwrsi~
A/und«h•d
v.
Krishru1 Ro.ntan•Mudholktir
Shilh, J.
126 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963] SUPP.
1962
the power conferred by cl. (1) docs not relate pri-Cujarct University, marily to the medium of instruction but to the syllabi
Ahmedabad
in diverse branches of learning and courses of study.
v.
The clause confers authority upon the University to
-rrislma Ranganath
Mudholkar
direct that instruction, teaching and training be imparted in different branches of learning and courses of
Shah, J.
study as the University thinks fit, but not to prescribe
an exclusive medium in which instruction in the
branches of learning and courses of study is to be
imparted. Clause (2) which authorises the University
"to make such provision as would enable affiliated
colleges and recognised institutions to undertake
specialisation of studies", has no direct bearing on the
subject of an exclusive medium of instruction. Nor
does cl. (7) which enables the University "to lay down
the courses of instruction for various examinations"
authorise the University to prescribe an exclusive
medium of instruction. Clause (8) which confers
power "to guide the teaching in colleges or recognised
institutions" has no bearing on the power to prescribe
an exclusive medium. Power to designate branches
of learning, or courses of study in which instruction
is to be imparted, or power to take steps to facilitate
specialized studies, or to guide teaching in institutions
affiliated to or recognised by the University undoubtedly includes the power to indicate the medium
through which instructions were at the date of the Act
normally imparted, but that power by itself does not
include, in the absence of a provision express or by
clear implication, power to compel instruction through
an exclusive medium. Clause (10) provides that the
University shall have the power "to hold examinations and confer degrees, titles, diplomas and other
academic distinctions on persons who -(a) have pursued approved COW'SCS of study in the University or
in an affiliated college unless exempted therefrom in
the manner p1'escribed by the Statutes, Ordinances
and Regulations and have passed the examination
prescribed by the University, or (b) have carried on
research under conditions prescribed by the Ordinances
1 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
127
and Regulations". Counsel for the University contended that by cl. lO(a), the University had the authority to approve courses of study in the manner prescribed by the Statutes, Ordinances and Regulations
and as power was given by s. 18 (XIV) to the Senate
to frame Statutes providing either Gujarati or Hindi
or both as medium or media of instruction, the power
of the University to impose an exclusive medium of
its choice was expressly entrusted to the University.
But the argument proceeded upon an incorrect reading
of the section. The provision does not by itself
empower the University to prescribe the use of any
exclusive medium of instruction and examination.
The University is thereby authorised to confer degrees
or academic distinctio;ms upon persons who have
pursued approved courses of study and have passed
the examination prescribed by the University. Power
is also reserved to the University to confer degrees or
academic distinctions upon persons who have not
pursued the courses prescribed by the University if
exemption in that behalf is prescribed by the Statutes,
Ordinances or Regulations. The expression "in the
manner" prescribed by the Statute, Ordinance or
Regulation has no reference to the class of persons
who have pursued approved courses of study in the
University or in an affiliated college, but qualifies
the expression "unless exempted therefrom" immediately preceding. By the clause the University is
authorised to confer degrees, diplomas or distinctions
not only upon persons who have pursued the courses
of instruction prescribed and have passed the qualifying examination, but upon other persons as well who
have not pursued the courses of instruction but have
passed the prescribed examination, if exemption in
behalf is given by the Statutes. Ordinances or Regulations. The power under sub-cl. (a) of cl. (10) does not
carry with it the power to impose an exclusive medium
such as Gujarati or Hindi. By cl. (14) power among
others to take measures to ·ensure that proper standards
of instructions, teaching or training are maintained in
1962
Gujarat University,
Ahmulabad
v.
Krishna Ranganath
Mudholkar
Shah, J.
128 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963]SUPP.
1962
Gujarat llniversity,
A.hmedabad
v.
Krishna Rangmiath
Mud!ltJlkar
Shah, J,
the affiliated colleges and recognised institutions is
granted, and cl.(15) invests the University with power
to control and co-ordinate the activities of, and give
financial aid to affiliated colleges and recognised institutions, but not the power to provide for an exclusive
medium as claimed by the University. The Legislature
in cl.(27) has dealt with the subject of medium of
instructions and the other clauses on which reliance
is placed do not expressly deal with that topic. It
would be difficult then to hold that the Legislature
while providing in cl.(27) about the medium of
instruction was also dealing indirectly with the subject
of prescribing an exclusive medium of instruction,
when it made provisions relating to instruction, teaching and ,training in educational institutions or for
enabling those institutions to undertake specialized
studies or giving guidance in teaching in colleges, or
for providing for degrees or academic distinctions or
for taking measures ensuring proper standard of
instructions, teaching or training or the conduct of
activities.
Clause (27), before it was amended, by Act IV
of 1961, ran as follows :"to promote the development of the study of
Gujarati and Hindi in Devnagari script and the
use of Gujarati or Hindi in Devnagari script
or both as a medium of instruction and examination;
Provided that English may continue to be
the medium of instruction and examination in
such subjects and for such period not exceeding
,ten years from the date on which section 3
comes into force as may from time to time be
prescribed by the Statutes."
By the first paragraph of cl.( 27) power is confen-ed to
promote the development and use of Gujarati OI'
Hindi or both as a medium of instruction. That clause
is not in its expression, grammatically accurate. It
1 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS.
129
1962
should, if it had been drafted in strict accordance
with the rules of grnmmar, have stated that the Gujarat University
Ahmedobad
University was invested with power to promote the
use of Gujarati or Hindi or both as a medium or A~rishna v.Ranganat!i
Mudho/kar
media of instruction and examination. The use of
the expression "promote" suggests that power was
Shah, J.
conferred upon the University to encourage the study
of Gujarati and Hindi and their use as media of
instruction and examination: it does not imply that
power was given to provide for exclusive use of
Gujarati or Hindi or both as a medium or media cif
instruction and examination and that inference is
strengthened by the indefinite article "a" before the
expression "medium of instruction''. The use of the
expression "a medium of instruction" clearly suggests
that Gujarati or Hindi was to be one of several
media of instruction, and steps were to be taken to
encourage the development of Gujarati and Hindi
and their use as media of instruction and
examination. From the use of the expression
"promote" read in the context of the indefinite article
"a" it is abundantly clear that power to impose
Gujarati or Hindi as the medium of instruction and
examination to the exclusion of other media was not
entI'ljsted to the University. It may be noticed that
if the expression "promote the use of Gujarati or
Hindi as a medium of instruction and examination"
was intended to mean "to promote the exclusive use
of Hindi or Gujarati", a similar interpretation would
have to be put on the use of the expression "to
promote the development of Gujarati and Hindi",
thereby ascribing to the Legislature an intention that
no other languages beside Gujarati and Hindi were
to be developed. Use in the proviso of the definite
article "the" in relation to English as medium
of instruction further supports this view. When the
Legislature enacted that English was to continue as
the medium of instruction and examination in
certain subjects it merely provided for continuance
of an existing and accepted exclusive medium of
1
130 SUPREJ'.IE COURT REPORTS [1963] SUPP.
.!!!!__
instruction.
It is common ground that in the
of Bombay the exclusive medium of
was English, in the various affiliated
Kdshn" Ranganath colleges in the region or area over which the Gujarat
Mudholkar
University acquired authority. By the proviso to
Shah, 1.
cl.(27) of s.4 in the subjects to be prescribed under
the proviso the medium of instruction was to continue
to remain English. By the operative part of cl.(27)
therefore the Legislature provided that use of
Gujarati or Hindi or both as a medium or media of
instruction was to be promoted thereby indicating
that Gujarati or Hindi or both was or were not to
be the exclusive medium or media but to be adopted
in addition to the accepted medium viz. English, for
instruction and examination, whereas under the
proviso in respect of the subjects prescribed, English
was to be the only medium for the periods specified.
Clause (28) which confers authority upon University
"to do all acts and things whether incidental to the
powers aforesaid or not as may be requisite in order
to further the objects of the University and generally
to cultivate and promote arts, science and other
branches of learning and culture" confers additional
powers which though not necessarily incidental to the
powers already conferred by. cls.(l) and (27) were
intended to be exercised to further the object of the
University. But if the object of the University as
indicated hy cl.(27) was not to authorise the imposition of Gujarati or Hindi or both, as an exclusive
medium or media it would be straining the language
of cl.(28) to interpret it as exhibiting an intention to
confer upon the University by using the somewhat
indefinite expression "requisite in order to further
the objects" power to provide for such an exclusive
medium.
Gujarat University, • University
Ah":dabad
instruction
Reliance was also placed upon s.18(1 )(xiv) by
counsel for the University in support of the contention
that the Senate was bound to make provision relating
to the use of Gujarati or Hindi in Devanagri script
I S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
131
or both as a medium of instruction and examination.
It is true that s.18(1) deals with powers and duties
of the Senate. Phraseology nsed in the diverse
clauses is prinw. facie not susceptible of the meaning
that each clause authorises the Senate to exercise the
powers of the University and imposes also a concomitant dutv. Assuming, however, that the power
conferred 'upon the Senate also carries with it a duty
to exercise the power, we do not think that the exercise
of power or performance of duty relating to the
use of Gujarati or Hindi or both as a medium
or media of instruction and examination postulates a
duty to make exclusive use of Gujarati or Hindi or
both for that purpose. The use of the indefinite
article "a" even in this clause clearly indicates that
Gujarati or Hindi or both were to be selected out of
several media of instruction and examination and not
the sole medium. No other clause of ss.18, 20 and
22 relating to the powers and duties of the Senate.
the Syndicate and the Academic Council was relied
upon and we are unable to find any which invests
the University or its organs, such as the Senate,
the Syndicate or the Academic Council with power
to impose Gujarati or Hindi as an exclusive medium
of instruction.
A corporation has ordinarily an implied power
to ~arry out its ohjects; power to indicate a medium
of mstruction in affiliated or constiturnt colleges may
therefore be deemed tn be vested in a University but
the power to indicate a medium of instruction docs
not ~~rry with it, in the absence of an express
~rov1S1on, power to impose upon the affiliated institut10ris an exclusive medium of instruction.
.
Reliance was placed by counsel for the University up,;m a letter dated August 7. 1949, (which is
reproduced in the University Commission's report),
addressed by the Government of India to various
Universities and Provincial Governments. It was
recited in the letter that the Government of India
1962
Gujarat University
Ahmedabad ·
v.
Krishna Ranganatl
Afudholkar
Shah, J.
132 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963] SUPP.
1962
,'ujarat l!niversity,
Ahrrudahad
v.
~rislma Rangnn'lth
Mudho/k(/r
S!t1h, J.
were of the opinion that in the interest of national
education it was hoped that Universities and Provincial Governments will take early steps towards the
implementation of certain recommendations viz :-
"!tern !.-The Government of India requests
the University and Provincial Governments
to take steps to :(a) replace English as the medium of instruction at the University stage, by
gradual stage during next five years
and
(b)
adopt in its place the language of the
State or Province or region as the
medium of instruction and examination.
Item JJ.-Universities are requested to:(i)
provide for a compulsory test in the
Federal language during the first
degree course of the University without
prejudice to the results of the Degree
Examination, and
(ii) provide facilities for the teaching of
the Federal language to all students
who wish to take it up as optional
subject."
Item 111.x
Item IV and V-x
Item VI.x
Itern VII.x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
The Government of India may have in the
year 1948 intended that English should be replaced
in gradual stages as the medium of instruction by the
language of the State or the Province, or region, but
that will not be a ground for interpreting .the p;ovisions of the Act in a manner contrary to the mtention
1 s.C.R.
1
'
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
133
of the Legislature plainly expressed. This recommendation of the Government of India has been
ignored if not by all, by a large majority of Universities. It is also true that in the Statement of Objects
and Reasons of the Gujarat University Act, it was
stated "............... As recommended by the Committee, it is proposed to empower the University to
adopt Gujarati or the national language as the
medium of instruction except that for the first t.en
years English may be allowed as the medium of
instruction in subjects in which this medium is considered necessary". But if the Legislature has made
no provision in that behalf a mere proposal by the
Government, which is incorporated in the Statement
of Objects and Reasons will not justify the Court in
assuming that the proposal was carried out. Statements of Objects and Reasons of a Statute may and
do often furnish valuable historical material in ascertaining the reasons which induced the Legislature
to enact a Statute, but in interpreting the Statute
they must be ignored. We accordingly agree with
the High Court that power to impose Gujarati or
Hindi or both as an exclusive medium or media has
not been conferred under cl. (27) or any other clauses
of s. 4.
The proviso to cl. (27) was amended by Act 4
of 1961 and the following proviso was substituted : "Provided that English may continue to be the
medium-·
(i) of instruction and examination for such
period as may from time to time be
prescribed by the Statutes until the
end. of May 1966 in respect of such
subjects and courses of study as may
be so prescribed.
(ii) of instruction and examination for
such period as may from time to time
be prescribed by the Statutes until
1962
Gujarat Uni<·'t:r;itp,
Ahmedabad
v.
](riJhna Ranganath
A1udholkar
Shah, J.
134 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963] SUPP.
1962
Gujarat Universil],
Ahmedabad
v.
Krishna Ra11ganath
Mudholkar
Shalt, J.
the end of :May 1968 in respect of
post-brraduate instruction, teaching and
trainmg in subjects comprised in
Faculties of Agriculture and Technology including Engineering and until
the end of May 1969 in respect of
post-graduate instruction, teaching and
training in the sulijects comprised in
the Faculty of Medicine, and
(iii) of examination at two successive
examinations in any subjects held
next after the period prescribed under
clause (i) or as the case may be, the
period prescribed under clause (ii) in
respect of those candidates who during
such period have failed to appear in
or pass the respective examination
held with English as the medium of
examination in the same su~jects :
Provided further that nothing in
this clause shall effect the use of English
as the medium of instruction and
examination in respect of English as a
subject."
It is common ground bdore us that if power to
impose Gujarati or Hindi as an exclusive medium
is not conferred by the operative part of cl. (27)
there is nothing in the proviso which independently
conferred such a power upon the University. The
proviso merely extends the use of English as the
medium of instruction in certain branches beyond
the period of ten years originally prescribed. The
proviso has however some bearing on the interpretation of cl. (21) : in the second proviso the distinction
between the definite article "the" preceding "medium
of instruction and examination" in so far as it relates
to English is further accentuated. The second proviso
savs-''Provided further that nothing in this clause
shall affect the use of English as the medium of
1 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
135
instruction and examination in respect of English as
a subject". \\Then the Legislature intended to provide English as the sole medium of instruction,
definite article the was used while in other cases
indefinite article a was used denoting thereby that
the medium would be one out of several. Therefore,
neither under the Act as originally framed nor under
the Act as amended by Act 4 of 1961 was there any
power conferred on the University to impose Gujarati
or Hindi or both as exclusive medium or media of
instruction and examination and if no such power
was conferred upon the University, the Senate could
not exercise such a power. The Senate is a body
acting on behalf of the University and its powers to
enact Statutes must lie within the contour of the
powers of the University conferred by the Act.
On the view we have expressed, consideration
of the question whether the State Government is
competent to enact laws imposing Gujarati or Hindi
or both as an exclusive medium or media of instruction in the Universities, may appear academic. But
we have thought it necessary to consider the question
because the High Court has declared certain provisions of Act 4 of ]!)()l relating to medium of instruction as nltra. l'ire8 the State Legislature and on
the question which was argued at considerable length
we were invited by counsel for the appellants to
express our _view for their guidance in anv future
legislation which may be undertaken.
'
Power of the Bombay Provincial Legislature to
enact the Gujarat University Act was derived from
Entry No. 17 of the Government of India Act, rn:J;;,
List II of the Seventh Schedule--" Education inclu<lingUnivers!ties other than those specified in paragraph
13 of List I". In List I item J :J were included the
Bcnaras Hindu University and the Aligarh Muslim
l!ni_vernity .. Therefore, except to the cxten~ expressly
limited by Item 17 of List II read with Item rn of
List I. a Provincial Lcgisbturc w;is invested \rith
1962
Gujarat University,
Ahmedabad
v.
Kri~hna Rariganath
~'1udholkar
Shah 1 J.
13fi SUPREME COURT REPORTS [l!Jfi3] SUPP.
1962
Gujan1t University,
Ahmedabad
v.
J(rishna Ranganath
Mudholkar
Shah, J.
plenary power to enact legislation in respect of all
matters pertaining to education including education
at University level. The expression 'education' is of
wide import and includes all matters relating to
imparting and controlling education; it may therefore
have been open to the Provincial Legislature to enact
legislation prescribing either a federal or a regional
language as an exclusive medium for subjects selected
by the University. If bys. 4 (27) the power to select
the federal or regional language as an exclusive
medium of instruction had been entrusted by the
Legislature to the University, the validity of the
impugned statutes 207, 208 and 209 could not be
open to question. But the Legislature did not entrust
any power ·to the University to select Gujarati or
Hindi as an exclusive medium of instruction under
s. 4 (27). By the Constitution a vital change has been
made in the pattern of distribution of legislative
powers relating to education between the Union Parliament and the State Legislatures. By item No. 11 of
List II of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution,
the State Legislature has power to legislate in respect
of "education including Universities subject to the
provisions of items 63, 64, 65 and 66 of List I and 25
of List III". Item No. 63 of List I replaces with
modification item No. 13 of List I to the Seventh
Schedule of the Government of India Act, 1935. Power
to· enact legislation with respect to the institutions
known at the commencement of the Constitution as the
Benaras Hindu University, the Aligarh Muslim Uni·
versity and the Delhi University and other institutions
declared by Parliament by laws to be an institution
of national importance is thereby granted exclusively
to Parliament. Item 64 invests the Parliament with
power to legislate in respect of "institutions for scien ·
tific or technical education financed by the Govern·
ment of India wholly or in part and declared by
Parliament, by law, to be institutions of national
importance". Item 65 vests in t~e Parlia~ent. po_wer
to legislate for "Union agencies and mstltut1ons
1 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT. REPORTS
137
1962
for (a) professional, vocational or technical training,
including the training of police officers; or (b) the Gujarat University,
Alime.dabad
promotion cif special studies or research; or (c} scienv.
tific or technical assistance in the investigation or Krishna Ranganal!r.
Mudholkar
detection of crime". By item 66 power is entrusted
to Parliament to legislate on "co-ordination and
Shah, J.
determination of standards in institutions for higher
education or research and scientific and technical
institutions". Item 25 of the Concurrent List confers
power upon the Union Parliament and the State
Legislatures to enact legislation with respect to
"vocational and technical training of labour". It
is manifest that the extensive power vested in the
Provincial Legislature to legislate with respect to
higher, scientific and technical education and vocational and technical training of labour, under the
Government of India Act is under the Constitution
controlled by the five items in List I and Ust III
mentioned in item 11 of List II. Item 63 to 66 of
List I are carved out of the subject of education and
in respect of these items the power to legislate is
vested exclusively in the Parliament. Use of the
expression "subject to" in item 11 of List II of the
Seventh Schedule clearly indicates that legislation
in respect of excluded matters cannot be undertaken
by the State Legislatures. In Hingir-Rampur Coal
Company v. State of Orissa (1), this Court in considering the import of the expression "subject to" used in
an entry in List II, in relation to an entry in List I
observed that to the extent of the restriction imposed
by the use of the expression "subject to" in an entry
in List II, the power is taken away from the State
Legislature. Power of the State to legislate in
respect of education including Universities must to
the extent to which it is entrusted to the Union
Parliament, whether such power is exercised or not,
be deemed to be restricted. If a subject of legislation
is covered by items 63 to 66 even if it otherwise falls
within the larger field of "education including
Universities" power to legislate on that subject must
,
(1) [1961] 2 S.C.R. 537.
138 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963] SUPP.
1962
Gujarat Vnfoenity,
Ahmedabad
v.
Krishna Ranganath
Mudlwlkar
Shuh.- J.
lie with the Parliament. The plea raised by counsel
for the University and for the State of Gujarat that
legislation prescribing the medium or media in which
instruction should be imparted in institutions of
higher education and in other institutions always
falls within item 11 of List II has no force. If it be
assumed from the terms of item 11 of List II that
power to legislate in respect of medium of instruction
falls only within the competence of the State Legislature and never in the excluded field, even in respect
of institutions mentioned in items 63 to 65, power to
legislate on medium of instruction would rest with
the State, whereas legislation in other respects for
excluded subjects would fall within the competence
of the Union Parliament. Such an interpretation
would lead to the somewhat startling result that even
in respect of national institutions or Universities of
national importance, power to legislate on the
medium of instruction would vest in the Legi~lature
of the States within which they are situate, even
though the State Legislature would have no other
power in respect of those institutions. Item 11 of
List II and item 66 of List I must be harmoniously
construed. The two entries undoubtedly overlap :
but to the extent of overlapping, the power conferred
by item 66 List I must prevail over the power of the
State under item 11 of List II. It is manifest that
thy excluded heads deal primarily with education in
institutions of national or special importance and
institutions of higher education including research,
sciences, technology and vocational training of labour.
The power to legislate in respect of primary or
secondary education is exclusively vested in the States
by item No. 11 of List II, and power to legislate on
medium of instruction in institutions of primary or
secondary education must therefore rest with the
State Legislatures. Power to legislate in resp_ec.t of
medium of instruction is, however, not a d1stmct
legislative head; it resides with the State. Le~islatures
in which the power to legislate on educat10n 1s vested,
1 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
139
unless it is taken away by necessary intcndment to
the contrary. Under items 63 to 65 the power to
legislate in respect of medium of instruction having
regard to the width of those items, must be deemed
to vest in the Union. Power to legislate in respect of
medium of instruction, in so far it has a direct bearing and impact upon the legislative head of co-ordination and determination of standards in institutions
of higher education or research and scientific and
technical institutions, must also be deemed by item 66
List I to be vested in the Union.
The State has the power to prescribe the
syllabi and courses of study in the institutiom named
in Entry 66 (but not falling within entries 63 to 65)
and as an incident thereof it has the power to indicate
the medium in which instruction should be hnparted.
But the Union Parliament has an overriding legislative
power to ensure that the syllabi and courses of study
prescribed and the miodium selected do not impair
standards of education or render the co-ordination of
such standards either on an All India or other basis
impossible or even difficult. Thus, though the powers
of the Union and of the State are in the Exclusive
Lists, a degree of overlapping is inevitable. It is not
possible to lay down any general test which would
afford a solution for every question which might
arise on this head. On the one hand, it is certainly
within the province of the State Legislature to prescribe syllabi and courses of study and, of course, to
indicate the medium or media of instruction. On
the other hand, it is also within the power of the
Union to legislate in respect of media of instruction
so as to ensure co-ordination and determination of
standards, that is to ensure maintenance or improvement of standards. The fact that the Union has not
legislated, or refrained from legislating to the full extent of its powers does not invest the State with the
power to legislate in respect of a matter assigned by
the Constitution to the Union. It does not, however,
1962
Gujarat UniversitP,
Ahmedabad
v.
1t:rishna Ranganalh
Afudholkar
Shah, J.
140 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963] SUPP.
1962
Gujarat University,
Ahmedabad
v.
K ri:hna Ranganath
Mudholkar
Shah, J.
;«
follow that even within the permitted relative fields
there might not be legislative provisions in enactmf'.nts
made each in pursuance of separate exclusive and
distinct powers which may conflict Then would arise
the question of repugnancy and paramountcy which
may have to be resolved on the application of the
"doctrine of pith and substance" of the impugned enactment. The validity of the State legislation on
University education and as regards the education in
technical and scientific institutions not falling within
Entry 64 of List I would have to be judged having
regard to whether it impinges on the field reserved for
the Union under Entry 66. In other words, the
validity of State legislation would depend upon
"-'hether it prejudicially affects co-ordination and determination of standards, but not upon the existence
of some definite Union legi~lation directed to achieve
that purpose. If there be Union legislation in respect
of co-ordination and determination of standards, that
would have paramountcy over the State law by virtue
of the first part of Art. 254( I) ; even if that power be
not exercised by the Union Parliament the relevant
legislative entries being in the exclusive lists, a State
law trenching upon the Union field would still be
invalid.
Counsel for the University submitted that the
power conferred by item No. 66 of List I is merely a
power to co-ordinate and to determine standards i. e.
it is a power merely to evaluate and fix standards of
education, because, the expression "co-ordination'.'
merely means evaluation, and "determination" means
fixation. Parliament has therefore power to legislate
only for the purpose of evaluation and fixation of
standards in institutions referred to in item 66. In the
course of the argument, however, it was somewhat reluctantly admitted that steps to remove disparities
which have actually resulted from the adoption of a
regional medium and the falling of standards, may ~e
undertaken and legislation for equalising standards m
1 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
141
higher education may be enacted by the Union
Parliament. We are unable to agree with this contention for several reasons. Item No. 66 is a legislative
head and in interpreting it, unless it is expressly or of
necessity found conditioned by the words used therein,
a narrow or restricted interpretation will not be put
upon the generality of the words. Power to legislate
on a subject should normally be held to extend to all
ancillary or subsidiary matters which can fairly and
reasonably be said to be comprehended in that subject.
Again there is nothing either in items 66 or elsewhere
in the Constitution which supports the submission that
the expression "co-ordination" must mean in the
context in which it is used merely evaluation, co-ordination in its normal connotation means harmonising
or bringing into proper relation in which all the
things co-ordinated participate in a common pattern
of action. The power to co-ordinate, therefore, is not
merely power to evaluate, it is a power to harmonise
or secure relationship for concerted action. The power
conferred by item 66 List I is not conditioned by the
existence of a state of emergency or unequal standards
calling for the exercise of the power.
There is nothing in the entry which indicates
that the power to legislate on co-ordination of standards in institutions of higher education, does not
include the power to legislate for preventing the
occurrence of or for removal of disparities in standards.
This power is not conditioned to be exercised merely
upon the existence of a condition of disparity nor is
it a power merely to evaluate standards but not to
take steps to rectify or to prevent disparity. By express pronouncement of the Constitution makers, it i~
a power to co-ordinate, and of necessity, implied
therein is the power to prevent what would make coordination impossible or difficult. The power is absolute and unconditional, and in the absence of any
controlling reasons it must be given full effect according to its plain and expressed intention. It is true
1962
Gujarat Univtrsi('1,
Ahmtdahad
v.
Krishna Ranganath
Mudholkar
Si\ah, J.
142 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963) SUPP.
1962
that "medium of instruction" is not an item in the
legislative list. It falls within item No. 11 as a
necessary incident of the power to legislate on educav.
Krishna Ranganath tion : it also falls with;n items 63 to 66. In so far
Mudholkar
as it is a necessary incident of the powers under item
Shah, J.
66 List I it must be deemed to be included in that
item and therefore excluded from item 11 List II.
How far State legislation relating to medium of
instruction in institutions has impact upon co-ordination of higher education is a matter which is not
susceptible, in the absence of any concrete challenge
to a specific statute, of a categorical answer. Manifestly, in imparting instructiom in certain subjects,
medium may have subordinate importance and
little bearing on standards of educatiori while in certain others its importance will be 'Vital. Normally, in
imparting ~cientific or technical instructions or in
training students for professional courses like law,
engineering, medicine and the like existence of adequate text books at a given time, the existence of
journals and other literature, availability of competent
instructors and the capacity of students to understand instructiom imparted through the medium in
which it is imparted are matters which have an important bearing on the effectiveness of instruction and
resultant standards achieved thereby. If adequate
text-books are not available or competent instructors
in the medium, through whkh instruction is directed
to be imparted, are not available, or the students are
not able to receive or imbibe instructions through the
medium in which it is imparted, standards must of
necessity fall, and legislation for co-ordination of
standards in such matters would include legislation
relating to medium of instruction.
Gujarat University,
Ahmedabad
If legislation relating to imposition of an exclusive medium of mstruction in a regional language
or in Hindi, haying regard to the absence of text·
books and journals, competent teachers and incapacity
of the students to understand the subjects, is likely to
1 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
143
result in the lowering of standards, that legislation
would, in our judgment, necessarily fall within item
66 of List I and would be deemed to be excluded to
that extent from the amplitude of the power conferred by item No. 11 of list II.
It must be observed, that these observations
have been made by us on certain abstract considerations which have been placed before us. We have no
specific statute the validity of which, apart from the
one which we will presently mention, is challenged.
Counsel for the State and the University invited
us to express our opinion on the question whether
legislation which the State may undertake with a
view to rectify the deficiency pointed out by us in
interpreting s. 4 (27), would be within the competence
of the State Legislature. What shape such legislation may take is for the State to decide. We have,
however, proceeded somewhat broadly to deal with
what we conceive is the true effect of item 66 in List
I in its relation to item 11 in List II in so far as the
two items deal with the power of the Parliament and
the State Legislature to enact laws in respect of
medium of instruction.
We are unable, however, to agree with the High
Court that Act 4 of 1961 in so far as it amended the
proviso to s. 4(27) is invalid, because it is beyond the
competence of the State Legislature. By the <imendment of the proviso to s. 4 (27), the Legislature
purported to continue the use of English as the
medium of instruct!on in subjects selected by the
Senate beyond a period of ten years prescribed by'
the Gujarat University Act, 1949. Before the date
on which the parent Act was enacted, English was
the .traditional medh~m o~ instruction in respect of all
subJ~cts at .the ~~uvers1ty level. By enacting the
proviso as 1t ongmally stood, the University was
authorised to continue the use of English as an exclusive medium of instruction in respect of certain subjects to be selected by the Senate. By the amendment
1962
Gu.jaral Universit_y,
Ahm~dabad
v.
Krishna Ranganath
Mudholkar
Shah, J,
144 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963] SUPP.
1962
Gujarat Universtv,
Ahmedabad
v.
Krishna Ranganath
Mudholkar
Shah J.
Su/Jba Rao, J.
it is common ground that no power to provide an
exclusive medium other than the pre-existing medium
is granted. Manifestly, imparting instruction through
a common medium, which was before the Act the
only medium of instruction all over the country,
cannot by itself result in lowering standards and coordination and determination of standards cannot be
affected thereby. By extending the provisions relating to imparting of instruction for a period longer
than ten years through the medium of English in the
subjects selected by the University, no attempt was
made to encroach upon the powers of the Union
under item No. 66 List I. If the University have no
power to prescribe an exclusive medium, the enactment of s. 38A which prescribes penalties for failing
to carry out directions relating to the media of instruction will doubtless be not invalid.
The order of the High Court relating to the
invalidity of the Statutes 207 and 209 of the University in so far as they purport to impose "Gujarati or
Hindi or both as exclusive medium or media" of
instruction, and the circulars enforcing those statutes
must therefore be confirmed.
We do not express any opinion on the alleged
infringement of fundamental rights of the petitioner
under Arts. 29(1), 30(1) of the Constitution. We set
aside the order of the High Court in so far as it declares s. 4 cl. (27) proviso and s. 38A invalid. This
will be, however, subject to the interpretation placed
by us upon the relevant provisions, and the power of
the State Legislature to impose Gujarati or Hindi or
both as exclusive medium or media for instructions
in the affiliated and constituent colleges.
The appellants will pay the co~ts of the respondents in the two appeals. One heanng fee.
SuBBA RAO, J.-With the greatest respect,. I
cannot agree. The facts have been fully stated m
the judgment of my learned brother, Shah, J., and I
1 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
145
need not restate them. Two questions arise for
consideration, namely, (1) whether the State Legislature has the constitutional competence to make a
law prescribing an exclusive medium of instruction
in the affiliated colleges, and (2} whether under the
Gujarat University Act, as amended by Act IV of
1961, the said University has the power to prescribe
an exclusive medium of instruction.
The first question may be elaborated thus: Is
the State Legislature competent to make a law
under entry 11 of List II of the Seventh Schedule to
the Constitution prescribing an exclusive medium of
instruction in the affiliated colleges of the University?
To put it in other words, can a State law enable a
University to prohibit, expressly or by necessary
implication, any media of instruction other than
those prescribed by it? Learned counsel, appearing
for the University of Gujarat and for the State of
Gujarat, contend that the State Legislature has such
a power under entry 11 of List II of the Seventh
Schedule to the Constitution, whereas learned counsel
for the respondents, while conceding that a State
Legislature has the power to empower a university to
prescribe a medium of instruction, broadly contend
that a State law which prohibits the use of a medium
of instruction, such as English, which is traditionally
the exclusive current medium of instruction in the
universities of this country, and directs the use of a
regional language as the sole medium or as an additional medium of instruction, along with other Indian
languages, impinges directly on entry 6(i of List I of
the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution, since, it is
said, the fixation of standards and co-ordination on
all-India basis is rendered difficult, if not made impossible, by such a State law.
. Before I conside~ the ~mpact of entry 66 of
List I on entry II of List II, 1t would be convenient
t? notice briefly the relevant principles of construction. Learnrd counsel. for the respondents contrnd
1962
Gujarat University,
Ahmedabad
v.
Krishna Ran,i:anath
Jrfudholkar
Suhba RafJ, J.
146 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963] SUPP.
1961
Gujarat University,
Ahmedahad
v.
Krishna Ranganath
Mudhokar
Subba Rao, J,
that the principle of pith and substance has no relevance to a case where one entry is made subject to
another entry; if -0ut of the scope of one entry, the·
argument proceeds, a field of legi5lation covered by
another entry is C<!rved out, there is no scope for overlapping and, therefore, there is no occasion for invoking the principle of pith and substance in the
matter of interpreting the said entries; to meet such
a situation, his further argument is, the courts have
evolved another principle of "direct impact", i.e.,
if a State law has a "direct impact" on an entry in
the Union List, the said law falls outside the scope of
the State entry. Let us see whether there is any such
independent doctrine of construction in decided cases
or in principle. The Judicial Committee, in
Prafulla Kumar v. Bank of Commerce, Khulna{'), had
invoked the principle of "pith and substance" to
ascertain whether the Bengal Money-lenders Act
(X of 1940) was ultra vires the Provincial Legislature.
There, the conflict was between items 28 and 38 of
List I of the Seventh Schedule to the Government of
India Act, 1935, namely, promissory notes and banking, and item 27 of List II thereof, namely, moneylending. The Judicial Committee held that the pith
and substance of the Act being money-lending, it
came under item 27 of List II and was not rendered
invalid because it incidentally trenched upon matters
reserved to the Federal Legislature, namely, promissory notes and banking. At p.65 of. the report the
following instructive passage appears :
"But the overlapping of subject-matter is not
avoided by substituting three lists for two or
even by arranging for a hierarchy of jurisdictions.
Subjects must still overlap and where they
do the question must be asked what fa pith and
substance is the effect of the enactment of which
complaint is made and in what list is its true
nature and character to be found."
(1) A. I. R. 1947 P. C. 60, 65.
1 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
147
Then their Lordships proceeded to state :
"Thirdly, the extent of the invasion by the
Provinces into subjects enumerated in the
Federal List has to be considered. No doubt it
is an important matter, not, as their Lordships
think, because the validity of an Act can be
determined by discriminating between degrees of
invasion, but for the purpose of determining
what is the pith and substance of the impugned
Act. Its provisions may advance so far into
Federal territory as to show that its true nature
is not concerned with Provincial matters, but the
question is not, has it trespassed more or less,
but is the trespass, whatever it be, such as to
show that the pith and substanc~ of the impugned Act is not money-lending om promissory
notes or banking ?"
It is clear from the said passage that the degree of
invasion cf a law made by virtue of an entry in one
List into the field of an entrv in another List is not
governed by a separate doctrine but is only a circumstance relevant for ascertaining the pith and substance
of an impugned Act. This Court, in The Stare of
Bombay v. F. N. Balsara (1), has accepted that principle. There, the constitutional validity of the
Bombay Prohibition Act (XXV of 1949) was in issue.
The question was whether that Act fell under entry
31 of List II of the Seventh Schedule to the Government of India Act, 1935, namely, "intoxicating
liquors, that is to say, the production, manufacture, possession, transport, purchase and sale of intoxicating liquors", or under entry 19 of List I,
namely, import and export across customs frontier,
which is a dominion subject. This Court held that
the pith and substance of the Act fell under the former entry and not under the latter, though the Act
incidentally encroached upon the Dominion field of
legislation. It was a~gued, inter alia, that the prohibition- of purchase, use, transports and sale of liquor
(I) [1951] S. C.R. 682.
1962
Gujarat University,
Ahmedabad
v.
Krishna Rangariath
Mudholkar
liubba Raa, J.
148 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963] SUPP.
1962
Gujarat lJniversity,
Ahmtdabad
v.
Krishna Ranganath
Mudholkar
Suhba Rao, J.
would affect the import. The argument was advanced
as a part of the doctrine of pith and substance and
was rejected on the ground that the said encroach.
ment did not affect the true nature and character of
the legislation. This Court again had to deal with the
vires of the provisions of the Madras Prohibition Act
in A. S. Krishna v. The ~late of Jladras(1). There, the
argument was that the said provisions were repugnant to the provisions of the existing Indian laws
with respect to the same matter, to wit, Indian Evi·
dence Act I of 1872 and Criminal Procedure Code
Act No. V of 1898. In that context the argument
based upon impact of the former legislation on the
latter was advanced. This Court rejecting the con·
tention observed :
"That is to say, if a statu~ is found in substance to relate to a topi-c within the competence
of the legislature, it should be held to be intra
vires, even though it might incidentally trench
on topics not within its legislative competence.
The extent of the encroachment on matters beyond its competence may be an element in determining whether the legislation is colourable,
that is, whether in the guise of making a law
on a matter within its competence, the legislature is, in truth, making a law on a subject
beyond its competence. But where that is not
the position, then the fact of encroachment does
not affect the vires of the law even as regards
the area of encroachment."
But it is said that the separate existence of the doctrine of "direct impact" was conceded in Union
Colliery Company of British Col,umhia, Ltd. v.
Bryden('). There, the question was whether s.4 of the
British Columbia Coal Mines Regulation Act, 1890,
which prohibited Chinamen of full age from employ·
ment in underground coal workings, was in that
respect ultra vires of the provincial legislature ·uas·
much as the subject of "naturalization and al ;ns"
(1) [1957] S. C.R. 399, 106.
(2) [1899] A. C. 580, 587.
•
1 S.C.R. SUPREM'.E COURT REPORTS
149
was within the exclusive authority of the Dominion
Parliament conferred under s.91, sub-s.25 of the
British North America Act, 1867. On a consideration of the material factors and on a construction of
the relevant provisions, the Judicial Committee observed:
"But the leading feature of the enactments
consists in this-that they have, and can have,
no application except to Chinamen who are
aliens or naturalized subjects, and that they
establish no rule or regulation except that these
aliens or naturalized subjects shall not work, or
be allowed to work, in underground coal mines
within the Province of British Columbia."
After arriving at that finding, their Lordships
proceeded to say :
"Thl'ir Lordships see no reason to doubt that,
by virtue of s. 91, sub-s. 25, the legislature of
the Dominion is invested with exclusive authority in all matters which directly concern the
rights, privileges, and disabilities of the class
of Chinamen who are resident in the provinces
of Canada. They are also of opinion that
the whole pith and substance of the enactments
of s. 4 of the Coal Mines Regulation Act, in so
far as objected to by the appelhtnt company,
consists in establishing a statutory prohibition
which affects aliens or naturalised subjects, and.
therefore trench upon the exclusive authority
of the Parliament of Canada."
This passage indicates that the Judicial Committee
found that, in pith and substance, the impugned
law affected the rights and privileges of Chinamen
which subject was within the exclusive authority of
the Parliament of Canada. This judgment only
reiterates the principle of pith and substance; and
it does not in any way countenance a new principle
of "direct impact" outside the scope of the said
1962
Gujarat !Jniversity,
Ah,,,,Jabad
v.
Krishna Ranganath
Mudholkar
Subha R®, J.
150 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [19G3] SUPP.
1962
Gujarat University,
Ahmedabad
v.
Krishna Ranganath
Mudholkar
Subba Rao, J,
doctrine. In Bank of Toronto v. Lambe (1) the
Qµebec Act was attacked on two grounds, first that
the tax was not "taxation within the Province", and
secondly, that the tax was not a "direct tax". The
Judicial Committee held that the Act was within
the legislative competence of the Province. It was
observed therein :
"If (the Judges) find that on the due construction of the Act a legislative power falls
withins. 92, it would be quite wrong of them
to deny its existence because by some possibility
it may be abused, or may limit the range which
otherwise would be open to the Dominion
Parliament."
The argument of anticipatory encroachment was
rejected. This case was considered and distinguished
in Attorney-General for Alberta v. Attorney-General
for Ct•na& ('). There, the Province of Alberta
passed an Act respecting "the taxation of Banks",
imposing on every corporation or joint stock company, other than the Bank of Canada, incorporated
for the purpose of doing banking or savings bank
business in the Province, an annual tax, in addition
to any tax payable under any other Act, of (a) 1/2
per cent. on the paid-up capital, and (b) 1 per cent.
on the reserve fund and undivided profits. The
Board held that the proposed taxation was not in
any true sense taxation "in order to the raising of a
revenue for Provincial purposes" so as to be within
the exclusive legislative competence of the Provincial
Legislature under s. 92 (2) of the British North
America Act, but was merely part of a legislative
plan to prevent the operation within the Province
of those banking institutions which had been called
into existence and given the necessary powers there
to conduct their business by the only proper authority, the Parliament of the Dominion, under s. 91 of
the British North America Act. The Board in effect,
therefore, held that the Provincial Act, though
(I} [1882] 12 A. C. 575, 587,
(2) [1939) A. C. 117, 130, 133,
11,.
fe
1 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
151
couched as a taxation measure, was a colourable
attempt to prevent the functioning of the banking
institutions, the regulation whereof was the Dominion
subject. The pith and substance of the statute was
not direct taxation or taxation within the Province
within the meaning of s. 92 of the British North
America Act, but was one that fell under the Dominion subject of "banking". The reason for this
conclusion is found at p. 133 and it is as follows :
"Their Lordships agree with the opinion
expressed by Kerwin, J. (concurred in by
Crocket, J.) that there is no escape from the
conclusion that, instead of being in any true
sense taxation in order to the raisirrg of a
revenue for Provincial purposes, the Bill No. 1
is merely "part of a legislative plan to prevent
the operation within the Province of those
banking institutions which have been called
into existence and given the necessary powers
to conduct their business by the only proper
authority, the Parliament of Canada."
That is to say, the constitutional validity of the Bill
was sustained on the ground that it was a colourable
piece of legislation in respect of a subject which in
substance was within the Dominion field. The
Judicial Committee in coming to the conclusion laid
down the rules of guidance for ascertaining the true
nature of a legislation. Their Lordships premised
their discussion with the following statement :
" ......... it is well established that if a given
subject-matter falls within any class of subjects
enumerated in s. 91, it cannot be treated as
covered by any of those within s. 92."
And ~o ascertain whether a particular subject-matter
falls m one class or other, their Lordships laid down
the following rules of guidance :
(I) "It is therefore necessary to compare the
two complete lists of categories with a
1962
Gujarat U11iversity,
Ahmtdabad
v,
Krishna Ranganalh
Mudholkar
Subba Rao, J.
152 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [19G3] SUPP.
1962
Gujarat University,
Ahmedahad
v.
Krishna Ranganath
Mudholkar
Subba Rao, J.
yiew to ~scertai?ing whether the legislation
1.n 9ues~10~, fairly considered, falls primu,.
jacte witlun s. 91 rather than within
s. 92.,,
(2) "The next step in a case of difficulty will
be to examine the effect of the legislation."
(3) "The object or purpose of the Act in
question."
.
It will, therefore, be seen that the Judicial Committee
did not lay down any new principle of "direct
impact" dehors the doctrine of pith and substance.
The heavy impact and crippling effect of an impugned legislation on a Dominion subject was taken as
an important indication of its colourable nature.
The foregoing discussion does not countenance the
suggestion that apart from the doctrine of pith and
substance, the courts have recognized an independent
principle of "direct impact".
Nor can I agree with the argument of learned
counsel that the doctrine of pith and substance has
no application in a case where one entry in a list is
expressly made subject to another entry in a different
list. In such a case it only means that out ol the
scope of the former entry a field of legislation has
been carved out and put in the latter entry. That
in itself has no bearing on the applicability or otherwise of the doctrine. The position is exactly the same
as in the matter of construing two entries in different
lists. Whether two entries are carved out of one
subject or deal with two different subjects, the principle of construction must be the same : in either case
the Court is called upon to ascertain under what entry
the impugned law falls. The doctrine of pith and
substance only means.that if on an examination of a
statute it is found that the legisl,ation is in substance
one on a matter assigned to the Legislature, then it
must be held to be valid in its entirety, even though
it may trench upon matters which are beyond its
1 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
153
comprehension: see The 8tate of Bombay v. Ji. N.
Balsara (1) and A. S. Ilriohna v. The &tate of Jfodr.as ('). The true character of the legislation is the
criterion and its incidental encroachment on other
items is not material. If that be so, once we come to
the conclusion that the impugned legislation squarely
falls within one entry, its incidental encroachment
on another entrv, whether carved out of the former
entry or has an' independent existence althrough, will
not make it any the less one made within the limits
of the former entry.
To summarize: When a question arises under
what entry an impugned legislation falls, the court
directs its mind to ascertain the scope and effect of
the legislation and its pith and substance. Decided
cases afford many criteria to ascertain its scope,
namely, comparison of conflicting entries, effect of the
impugned legislation, its object and purpose, its
legislative history, its colourable nature and similar
others-all or some of them would be useful guides to
get at the core of the legislation. But no authority
has gone so far as to hold that even if the pith and
substance of an Act falls squarely within the ambit
of a particular entry, it should be struck down on the
~pcculative and anticipatory ground that it may come
mto conflict with a law made by a co-ordinate Legislature by virtue of another entry. If the impact of a
State law on a Central subject is so heavy and devastating as to wipe out or appreciably abridge the
Central field, then it may be a ground for holding
that the State law is a colourable exercise of power
and that in pith and substance it falls not under the
State entry but under the Union entry. The case-law,
therefore, does not warrant the acceptance of a new
doctrine dehurs that of pith and substance.
In this context it will be useful to notice some
of the well settled rules of interpretation laid down by
the Federal Court and accepted by this Court in the
matter of construing the entries. In Calcutta Gas
(I) [1951] S. C. R, 682.
(2) [1957} S. C. R. 399, 406.
1962
Gujarat [Jnil!ersity,
~ Ahmedabad
v.
Krishna Ranganath
Jfudhnlkar
Subba Rao, J.
154 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963) SUPP.
1962
Gujarat University,
Ahmedabad
.
v.
Krishna Ranganath
Mudholkar
Company v. The State of West Be'fl{]al ('), it is
observed:
"The power to legislate is given to the appropriate Legislatures by Art. 246 of the constitution. The entries in the three Lists are only
legislative heads or fields of legislation: they
demarcate the area over which the appropriate
Legislatures can operate. It is also well settled
that widest amplitude should be given to the
language of the entries. But some of the entries in the different Lists or in the same List
may overlap and sometimes may also appear to
be in direct conflict with each other. It is then
the duty of this Court to reconcile the. entries
and bring about harmony between them .......
It may, therefore, be taken as a well settled
rule of construction that every attempt should
be made to harmonize the apparently conflicting
entries not only of different Lists but also of the
same List and to reject that construction which
will rob one of the entries of its entire content
and make it nugatory."
Subba Rao, J.
With this background let me look at the two entries,
namely, entry 11 of List II and entry 66 of List I.
The said entries read:
Entry 11 of List II. Education including
universities, subject to the provisions of entries
63, 64, 65 and 66 of List I and entry 25 of
List III.
Entry 66 of List I. Co-ordination and deter·
mination of Standards in institutions for higher
education or research and scientific and technological institutions.
We are not concerned with the question of medium of
instruction in regard to that part which has been
specially carved out and included in entries 63, 64
and 65 of List I. The entire field of education,
(I)
[1962] SUPP. 3 S. C. R. I.
1 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPOR;i'S
155
including universities, subject to the exceptions mentioned in entry 11 of List II, is entrusted to the State
Legislature. There cannot be education except
through a medium or media of instruction. Education can be imparted only through a medium. To
separate them is to destroy the concept. It is inconceivable that any reasonable body of constitutionmakers would entrust the subject of medium of
instruction to Parliament and education dehorB
medium to a State: it is like cutting away the hand
that feeds the mouth. That no such separation was
made in the case of elementary and secondary education is conceded. It cannot also be doubted that
medium of instruction is also included in entry 63 of
List I relating to the specified universities. If so
much is conceded, what is the reason for excluding it
from the university education in entry 11 of List II ?
There is none. Conversely, the express terms of entry
66 of List I does not prima facie take in the subject
of medium of instruction. The phraseology is rather
wide, but none the less clear. Let me look at the
two crucial expressions "co-ordination" and "determination of standards". The contention of learned
counsel for the appellant that the composite term
means fixing of standards for the purpose of correlation and equating them if they vary, appears to be
plausible, but is rather too restrictive and, if accepted
makes the role of Parliament that of a disinterested
spectator. it must be more purposive and effective.
The interpretation sought to be put upon it by learned counsel for the respondents, namely, that under
certain circumstances the Parliament can make a law
displacing the medium of instruction prescribed by
the State law by another of its choice, cuts so deeply
into the State entry that it cannot be countenanced
unless the entry in List I is clear and unambiguous.
"To determine" is "to settle, or decide or fix". The
expression "co-ordination" is given the following
meanings, among others, in the dictionary: "to place
in the same order, rank or division to place in proper
1962
Gujarat Universit)•,
Ahmedabad
v.
Krishna Ranganath
Mudholkar
Subba Rao, J.
156 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963] SUPP.
1962
position relatively to each other and to the system of
which they form parts; to act in combined order for
Ahmedabad
the production of a particular result". That entry
v.
enables Parliament to make a law for fixing the
·Krishna Ranganath
1\:fudholkar
standards in institutions for higher education for the
purpose of harmonious co-ordination of the said
Subba Rao, J.
institutions for the achievement of the desired result,
namely, the improvement of higher education. The
expression "co-ordination and determination of
standards" is a composite term; and the fixing up of
standards for the purpose of co-ordination does not
necessarily involve a particular medium of instruction. To illustrate: education cannot be imparted
effectively without books, professors, students, equipment, buildings, finance, proper medium of instruction, etc. All the said matters admittedly are comprehended by the word "education", for they are the
necessary concomitants of education. It would be
unreasonable to hold that all the said matters fall
under the heading "co-ordination and determination
of standards", for, if it was so held, the entry "education" would be robbed of its entire content. In
such a case the principle of harmonious construction
should be invoked and a demarcating line drawn;
the clue for drawing such a line is found in the word
"co-ordination". So understood, the State can make
a .law for imparting education and for maintaining
its standards; whereas Parliament can step in only to
improve the said standards for the purpose of coordination. The standards of some universities may
fall because of the deficiency in any of the aforesaid
things. Parliament may make a law providing for
facilities in respect of any or all the aforesaid matters
so that the backward universities may pick up and
come to the level of other advanced universities. It
may also make a law for raising the general standards
of all the universities. The law made by Parliament
may determine the general standards in respect of the
said and similar matters and provide the necessary
financial and other help to enable the universities to
Gujarat University,
1 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
157
reach the level prescribed. It may also be that the
said law may provide for a machinery to enrich the
language adopted as a medium of instruct!on by a
particular university so that it may become a useful
vehicle for higher educ a ti on and for technological
and scientific studies. If the pith and substance of
the law is "co-ordination and determination of standards" its incidental encroachment on the medium of
instruction for the purpose of enriching it may probably be sustained. But in the name of co-ordination it cannot displace the medium of instruction,
for, in that event, the encroachment on the subject
of education is not incidental but direct. For the
said entry does not permit the making of any law
which allows direct interference by an outside body
with the course of education in any university, but
enables it generally to prescribe standards and give
adventitious aids for reaching the said standards. In
short, the role of a guardian angel is allotted to
Parliament so that it can make a law providing a
machinery to watch, advise, give financial and other
help, so that the universities may perform their allotted role. The University Commission Act was passed
in the implementation of such a role. So understood,
there cannot be any possible dichotomy between the
two entries.
The scheme of the Constitution also negatives
the idea of legislation by Parliament in respect of
medium of instruction. When the Constitution was
passed, there ·were many fairly well developed
languages in different parts of our country and they
were mentioned in the Eighth Schedule to the Constitution. At that time, English was the medium of
instruction at all levels and was also the official
language of the administration. It was accepted on
all hands that English should be replaced at all levels,
but the process should be phased. Article 343 of
the Constitution declares that the official language of
the Union shall be Hindi in Devnagari script and it
1962
Gujarat University.,
Ahmedabad
v.
Krishna Ranganath
Mudholkor
Subba Rao, J.
158 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963] SUPP.
1962
Gujarat Univer.1ity,
Ahmedabad
v.
Krishna Ranganath
Mudholkar
Subba Rao, J.
permits the use of English for all official purposes
for a specified period. But in the case of education
no such go-slow process was indicated, presumably,
because it was left to the wisdom ol the Legislatures
of States and educationists to work out the programme
for smooth transition. But the insistence on the
replacement of English by Hindi for all official
purposes, the recognition of regional languages, the
omission of English in the Eighth Schedule, the
direction under Art. 351 that Hindi should be
enriched by a process of assimilation from . the
languages specified in the Eighth Schedule and from
Hindustani, all indicate that the makers of the
Constitution were confident that the regional
languages were rich or at any rate resilient enough
to be or to become convenient vehicles of instruction
at all levels of education. That is why no express
reservation was made for replacing English by regional
languages by convenient stages. It may, therefore,
be accepted that the makers of the Constitution
thought that the specified regional languages would
be suitable vehicles of instruction, though it may
equally be conceded that they require to be enriched
to meet the demands of higher education. In this
context entry 66 of List I must be construed on the
assumption that the regional languages would be the
media of instruction in all the universities, and if
so construed the law fixing the standards for coordination cannot displace the medium of instruction.
Let me now look at it from a different angle.
It is contended that English is the established medium
of instruction throughout the country, that following
the example of the Gujarat University other universities might follow suit, that consequently there
would be a steep fall in the standards of higher
education, and that if the argument of the appellant
was accepted, Parliament would be a helpless spectator
witnessi11g the debacle. In effect, on the appellant's
construction, th.e major part of the field of
1 S.C,R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
159
co-ordination would be wiped out. This in effect was
the argument of learned counsel for the respondents
though couched in different phraseology. This is
another way of saying that the pith and substance of
such legislation made by a State prohibiting the use
of English falls not under the subject of "education"
but under the entry "co-ordination". This argument
though appears to be attractive, is without legal or
factual basis. If the pith and substance of the
impugned law is covered by the entry "education",
the question of effacing the Union entry does not
arise at all. It is an argument of policy. rather than
a legal construction. The simple answer is that the
Constituent-Assembly did not think fit to entrust the
subject of medium of instruction to Parliament, but
relied upon the wisdom of the Legislatures to rise to the
occasion, and enact suitable legislation. Factually,
except in Gujarat, where the Legislature introduced
Gujarati as the exclusive medium of instruction by
ari accelerated process, all other States are adopting
a go-slow policy. Though that circumstance, in my
view, has no relevance in construing the relevant
provisions of the Constitution there is no immediate
danger of all the other States abolishing English as
an additional medium of instruction. I would prefer
to accept the natural meaning of the word "education" than to stretch the expression "co-ordination"
to meet a possible emergency when all the States,
following a policy adopted by a State, might set their
face against English. That apart, the picture drawn
by learned counsel is rather extravagant. It presupposes that, but for the continuance of English as one
of the media of instruction, education is bound to
fall in standards and co-ordination may become
impossible. But our Constitution-makers did not
think so, and they did not provide for the continuance
of English in the universities. Further, the standards
can be maintained, perhaps with some trouble and
expense, by imparting education through other media
of instruction, provided the languages are suitably
1962
Gufrct University,
Ahmedabad
v.
Krijhna Ranganatl
Mudholkar
Subha Rao, J.
160 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1963] SUPP.
1962
en~iche?:
The State Legislatures, and more so the
umvers1t1es, can be relied upon to make every
reasonable attempt to maintain the standards. It
~rishna Ranganath
cannot
be assumed that the State tegislatures would
Mudholkar
f~uction ~gainst t.he best interests of university educaSubba Rao, J.
tion, while Parliament can safely be relied upon to
act always in its interest. All the legislative bodies
under our Constitution are elected on adult franchise
and this Court rightly presumes that they act with
wisdom and in the interests of the people they
represent. If the Legislature of a State could in a
particular instance act precipitately by replacing
English by a regional language, Parliament also in
its wisdom, if it has power to do so, may cut the
Gordian knot by replacing English by Hindi in all
the universities. It is after all a constitutional choice
of institutions to implement a particular purpose and
it is, therefore, the duty of this Court to interpret the
provisions of the Constitution uninfluenced by ephemeral local conditions and situations. I would, there·
fore, hold that entry 11 of List II takes in the medium
of instruction and that it is not comprehended by the
phraseology of entry 66 of List I of the Seventh
Schedule to the Constitution. It follows that the
State Legislature can make a law empowering the
University to prescribe a regional language as the
exclusive medium of instruction.
The next question is whether under the pro·
visions of the Gujarat University Act, 1949, herein·
after called the Act, the University has the power
to prescribe a language as the exclusive medium of
· instruction; or to state it differently, whether the
University has power to prohibit, expressly or by
necessary implication, the use of <>.ny language other
than that prescribed as the medium of instruction.
At the outset it would be convenient to notice
briefly the scheme of the Act so .that ~e relevant
provisions may be constned m their prope1
setting. Under the Act, the Chancellor and the
Gujrat University,
Ahmedabad
v.
1 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
161
Vice-Chancellor of the University, and the members of
the Senate, the Svndicate and the Academic Council
of the University 'constitute a body corporate by the
name of "The Gujarat University". It is a teaching
and affiliating University. It has, inter alia, powers
to provide for instruction, teaching and training in
different branches of learning and courses of study;
to hold examinations and confer degrees; to control
and co-ordinate the activities of various institutions
connected with the University; and to do all acts
and things incidental to the said powers. The said
purposes are carried out through three instrumentalities, namely, the Senate, the legislative body, the
Syndicate, the executive, and the Academic Council,
which is responsible fqr the maintenance of standards
in the examinations of the University. The Chancellor is the head of the University. The Senate
passes statutes; the Syndicate, ordinances; and the
Academic Council, the regulations-all providing
for the subjects entrusted to them respectively. The
Chancellor and the State Government have the power
of inspection over the affairs of the University and of
giving necessary instructions. Briefly stated, the
University is a corporate body with a large degree
of autonomy, forming an institution for the promotion
of education in the higher branches of learning. It
has power to confer degrees and other privileges on
the successfol alumni of the institutions under its
control.
With this background let me look at the relevant provisions of the Act. Clause (1) of s. 4 empowers the University to provide for instruction
teaching and training in such branches of learning
and ~<?urses of study as it may think fit and to make
prov1s1ons for research and dissemination of know!edge; c!. (7) thereof, to lay down the courses of
mstruct10~ for :'arious examinations; cl. (8), to guide
the teachmg m colleg~s or recognized institutions·
cl. (I 0 ), to hold examinations and confer degrees:
1962
Gujarat University
Ahmedahad
v.
Krishna Ranganath
Mudholk•r
Suhba Rao, J.
162 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963] SUPP.
1962
Gujarat University,
Ahmedabad
v.
Krishna Ranganath
Mudlwlkar
Subha Rao, J.
titles, diplomas and other academic distinctions;
cl. (14), to inspect colleges and recognized institutions
and to take measures to ensure that proper standards
of instructions, teaching or training are maintained in
them; cl. (15), to control and co-ordinate the activities of, and to give financial aid to affiliated
colleges and recognized institutions; and cl. (28), to
do all such acts and things whether incidental to the
powers aforesaid or not as may be requisite in order
to further the objects of the University and generally
to cultivate and promote arts, science and other
branches of learning and culture. Apart from the
incidental powers expressly conferred by cl. (28), it
is well settled that a corporation can also exercise
powers incidental to or consequential upon those
expressly conferred on it. The legal position has
been neatly brought out by Viscount Cave L. C. in
Deuchar v. Gas Light and Coke Company (1), by
placing two passages of earlier decisions in juxtaposition, thus :
"Whenever a corporation is created by Act of
Parliament, with reference to the purposes of
the Act, and solely with a view to carrying
these purposes into execution, I am of opinion
not only that the objects which the corporation
may legitimately pursue must be ascertained
from the Act itself, but that the powen. which
the corporation may lawfully use in furtherance
of these objects must either be expressly conferred or derived by reasonable implication
from its provisions."
"I must stop there. To that statement I may
add a sentence from the speech of Lord
Selbome in the case of Attorney-General v. Gre.at
Eastern Ry. Co. (') where he said this : "I
agree with Lord Justice .James that this doctrine
ought to be reasonably, and not unreasonably,
undi;rstood and applied, and that whatever
may fairly be regarded as incidental to, or
(1)
[1925] A.C. 691, 695.
12) [1880] 5 A.C. 473, 478.
1 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
163
consequential upon, those things which the
Legislature has authorized, ought not (unless
expressly prohibited) to be held, by judicial
construction, to be ultra vires."
When an Act confers a power on a corporation, it
impliedly also grants the power of doing all acts
which are essentially necessary for exercising the
same.
Bearing the aforesaid principles in mind, I
must ask the question whether, on a fair reading of
the aforesaid provisions, it can be said that the University has the implied power to prescribe an. exclusive medium of instruction. If once I reach the
conclusion, namely, that such a power is necessary
for carrying out the purposes expressly authorized by
the statute, I must hold that the said power is not
beyond the competence of the University. The
University has to provide for instruction, teaching
and training in different branches of learning and
courses of study, to lay down the courses of instructions for various examinations and to guide the teaching in colleges or recognized institutions. The
power to prescribe a medium of instruction is implicit in the power to provide for instruction and the
power to guide the teaching. One can only instruct
through a medium. It is impossible to conceive of
instruction without a medium. Indeed, they are parts
of the same process. A university cannot make a
provision for instruction or teaching without at the
same time prescribing a medium or media for teaching it. If it can fix two media, it can equally prescribe a sole medium if it thinks that for the proper
instruction a particular language is the most
suitable medium. A perusal of the earlier Bombay
statutes and similar statutes of other universities of this country indicates that the said
universities prescribed the English medium only
in exercise of similar powers conferred on them. If
this fundamental power to prescribe the medium is
1962
Gujarat UniV1,sity 1
Ahmedabad
v.
Krishna Ranganath
Mudholkar
Subba Rao, J.
164 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963] SUPP.
1962
Gujarat Unfrersity,
Ahmedabad
v.
Krishna Ran.r:anath
J\fudholkar
Subha Rao; J.
denied to the universities, the substratum of their
~utono~y and utility under the Act will largely be
Jeopardized or affected. To illustrate, there may be
20 colleges affiliated tq a university; if the university
cannot prescribe a sole medium of instruction for all
the affiliated colleges, each one of them may adopt a
different language as its medium, with the result that
there will be chaos in the sphere of higher education.
If such a power does not exist, how is it possible for
a university to hold examinations in a particular
medium? It will be forced to hold examinations in
all the different languages chosen by the affiliated
colleges. Though the statute confers a plenary power
on the University to hold examinations and confer
degrees, it will not have the power, if the construction suggested by learned counsel for the respondents
be adopted, to hold examinations in the language
chosen by it. But it is suggested that .though it has
such a power, it must exercise it reasonably so as to
satisfy the needs of the different colleges affiliated to
it. I do not sec how, if the University has the power
to hold examinations in one language, the exercise of
that power could become unreasonable if affiliated
colleges choEe to ply their own course in utter disregard of the opinion of the Uuiversity. Be that as it
may, I have no hesitatiqn in holding that the University has the implied power to prescribe for the purposes of higher education a number of media of
instructions or even a sole medium of instruction to
the exclusion of others.
It is then said that cl. (27) confers an express
power on the University to prescribe a medium of
instruction and, therefore, whatever implied power it
mav have in its absence it can no longer be exercised
under the Act. As much of the argument turned
upon the construction of this dame, it would be
convenient to read it:
Clau.se (27): (The University shall have the
power) to promote the development of the
1 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
165
1962
study of Gujarati and Hindi in Dcvnagari
script and the use of Gujarati or Hindi in
Devnagari script or both as a medium of instruction and examination:
Gujarat lJniiiersity,
Ahmedabad
Provided that English may continue to be
the medium-
Subba Rao, J.
(i) of instruction and examination for such
period as may from time to time be
prescribed by the Statutes until the
end of May 1966 in respect of such
subjects and courses of study as may
be so prescribed,
x
x
x
x
x
It is said that this being the express. power conferred
upon the University in regard to the prescribing of a
medium of instruction, it can only exercise the said
power within the four corners of the said clause, and
that under that clause the University can only provide for Gujarati or Hindi or both of them in addition to other medium or media of instructions. To
put it in other words, the argument is that the University has no power to provide for au exclusive
medium of instruction, but it can only prescribe the
said languages as additional media. This argument
is sought to be reinforced by a comparison of the
indefinite article used in the substantive part of the
clause and the definite article used in the proviso
thereto. While the substantive part of the clause
says that the University has the power to promote
the development of the study of Gujarati and Hindi
in Devnagari script aud the use of Gujarati or Hindi
in Devnagari script or both as a medium of instruction and examination, the proviso says that English
may continue to be the medium of instruction and
examination. The use of the indefinite article
"a" in the substantive part of the clause in
contradistinction to the definite article "the"
used in the proviso, the argument proceeds, is
v.
Krishna Ranganath
Mudholkar
166 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963) SUPP.
1962
Gujarat U11ive1sity1
Ahmrdabad
v.
Krishna Ranganath
Afudholkar
Subba Rao, J.
decisive of the question that the University has no
power to prescribe Gujarati or Hindi as the medium
i. e., the exclusive medium, of instruction in the
University. I do not find any merits in this argument.
Clause (27) does not exhaust the power of the University to provide for a medium: that power is implicit
in cl. ( l) of s. 4 and other clauses thereof already
mentioned. Clause (27) confers an additional· power
on the University to promote the development of the
study of Gujarati or Hindi in Devnagari script and
the use of them as medium of instruction and examination. This is a composite power. It enables the
University not only to develop the study of the
said languages but also to use them as media of instruction. There is an essential distinction between the
expression "providing" and ""promoting". To
promote the development of the said languages means
· to further their growth. It also implies some action
anterior to the existence or occurrence of the thing
promoted. The power of promotion confers upon the
Uuivcrsity the power to prescribe adventitious aids
for the purpose of promotion. To illustrate, Gujarati
or Hindi is not the medium of instruction in the
University; the said languages have not got suffici~nt
vocabulary to express scientific and technological
concepts; there are no professors who are traind to
teach the said subjects in those languages; there are
no books in the said languages of a standard appropriate to the needs of higher education. The University can certainly help, financially or otherwise, to
enrich the said languages so as to make them suitable
vehicles for conveying scientific and technological
ideas. It may provide for intensive training of the
professors and lecturers in those languages to enable
them to have sufficient knowledge for communicating
their ideas in those languages. It may give concessions in fees etc., for students who take those languages
as their media of instruction instead of English or any
other language. It may start a pilot college where
the medium is only any of those two languages. It
I S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
167
may in extreme cases prohibit the use of any medium
other than the said two languages. There are many
other ways of subsidizing and helping the promotion
of the said languages. That apart, cl. (27) does not
deal only with instructiou.., but also with examination.
Should it be held that the power of the University to
prescribe a medium of instruction is derived only from
cl. (27) it should also be held that the power to prescribe a medium of instruction for examination is also
derived therefrom. If so, it would lead to the anomalous position of the University not being in a position
to hold examinations in any language other than the
said two languages, while in the case of instruction,
the affiliated colleges, if the argument of learned
counsel for the respondents be correct, will be able to
instruct in media other than the said l wo languages:
the University will be absolutely powerless to examine
the students of a colkge through the medium chosen
by it. It is, therefore, obvious that cl. (27) does not
in any way replace or even curtail the undoubted
power of the University to prescribe a medium of
instruction of its choice, but only confers an additional
power and a correlative duty to promote these two
languages. If so understood, the proviso also squarely
fits in the scheme. What the proviso says is that
English may continue to be the medium of instruction
and examination in such subjects and for such
period until the end of May 1966. It is enacted
as a proviso to cl. (27), as, but for that proviso,
English may continue to be a medium of
instruction, but it cannot be the medium or
the sole medium of instruction, for there is a
duty cast on the University to introduce one or
other of the aforesaid two languages as medium of
instruction. The proviso enables the University to
postpone the introduction of the aforesaid languages
as media of instruction for a prescribed period. In
this context, the argument based upon the use of the
indefinite article in the substantive part of the clause
and of the definite article in the proviso may be
1962
Gujarat University,
Ahmedabad
v.
Krishna Ranganalh
Mudholkar
Sttbba Rao, J.
168 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963] SUPP.
1962
Gujarat Universif:)•,
Ahmedabad
v.
Krishna Ranganath
Mudholkar
Subba Rao, J.
considered. The use of the indefinite article, it is said,
shows that the power of the University is only to
prescribe an additional medium, for otherwise the
Legislature would have used the words "the medium"
as it has done in the proviso. Grammatically the
definite article "the" could not have been used in the
substantive part: the definite article is used only to
mark the object as before mentioned or already
known or contextually particularized. That is why
in the proviso the definite article is used in the context of the English language which is already in the
field as the exclusive medium of instruction. But in
the substantive part of cl. (27) the Legislature was
providing for an additional power to promote one or
other of the two languages mentioned therein or both
of them. In that context when different languages,
which can alternatively be prescribed, are mentioned,
the appropriate article can only be the indefinite
article. If the argument of learned counsel for the
respondents be accepted, it may lead to a more serious
anomaly, namely, that after the prescribed period in
the proviso the University becomes powerless to introduce any· language other than Gujarati or Hindi as
medium of instruction and examination. This difficulty is sought to be met by the 'contention that the
power to continue English as a medium of instruction
after the period prescribed in the proviso, is necessarily implied in the proviso. The doctrine of necessary implication as. applied to the law of statutory
construction means an implication that is absolutely
necessary and unavoidable. It is not implication by
.conjecture. I would be attributing to the Legislature
an ineptitude in drafting if I should hold that such
an important power of prescribing a medium of
instruction is left to be •implied by construction. It
would also be against the natural meaning of the
phraseology used in the proviso. The Legislature in ,.
enacting cl. (27) of s. 4 must Ix; deemed to have hacY
knowledge that the University has prescribed ~sh
as .the medium in exercis<: of the powers ves~ed m it
1 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
169
and with that knowledge the Legislature proceeded to
enact in the proviso that the University could continue
English as the sole medium for a prescribed period.
The proviso, therefore, was enacted on the assumption
of an existing power : it was not conferring the power
for the first time. Should it be held that the proviso
conferred the power on the University to prescribe
English as a medium for the first time, it should also
be held that the University could not prescribe any
medium other than English, Hindi or Gujarati after
the period prescribed in the proviso. But, on the
other hand, if cl. (27) is construed in the manner I
have done, i.e., it is only a power conferred on the
University in addition to its existing power to prescribe a medium or media of instruction, the relevant
provisions fall into a piece. The University will then
have powers, to prescribe any medium or media, to
promote Hindi and Gujarati, to introduce the use of
Hindi and Gujarati, to continue English as the sole
medium of instruction for the prescribed period and
after the said period has run out to prescribe English
or any other language as the medium of instmction
in addition to Hindi or Gujarati. If the artificial
construction suggested by the respondents be accepted,
the Legislature should be held to have deprived the
University not only of its power to discontinue English
as the medium of instruction but also to have prevented it from introducing any medium other than
English, Hindi or Gujarati. For the aforesaid reasons
I would hold that cl.(27) of s. 4 of the Act gives only
an additional power and it does not derogate from the
implied power derived from other provisions of the
Act.
Some argument is advanced on the basis of
s. 18(l)(XIV) of the Act, which reads:
18. (1) Subject to such conditions as may be
prescribed by or under the provisions of this
Act, the Senate shall exercise the following
1962
Gujarat lfniversity,
Ahmedahad
v.
K1iJhna Ranganalh
A-fudholkar
Subba Rao, J.
170 SUPRE!\1E COURT REPORTS [1963] SUPP.
1962
Gujarat llniverjity,
Ahmedabad
v.
Krishna Ranganath
Mudholkar
powers and
namely:x
perform the
x
x
following duties,
x
(XIV) to make provision relating to the use
of Gujarati or Hindi in Devnagari script
or both as a medium of instruction and
examination.
Learned counsel for the appellant contends that while
cl. (27) of s. 4 confers a power on the University,
cl. (XIV) of s. 18(1) confers both a power and a duty
on the Senate to provide for the use of Gujarati or
Hindi in Devnagari script as medium of instruction
and examination. Learned counsel for the respondents
again emphasize upon the use of the indefinite article
in the said clause. I cannot agree with either of the
two contentions. When a power is conferred on the
University to promote the said two languages as medium of instruction, presumably for public good, there
is a correlative duty on the University to exercise that
power. The fact that under s. 4 only powers are
conferred, whereas under s. 18 both powers and
duties are mentioned, does not make much difference
in a case where a power is conferred for public good.
The statute uses three expressions, namely, "provide",
"promote", and "make a provision". Under the
statute the powers of 'the University can only be
exercised through the instrumentalities of the University in the manner prescribed. In s. 18 the words used
are neither "provide" nor ""promote" but "to make
provision" indicating thereby that specific provisions
have to be made presumably through statutes. As the
University has got power to provide for the exclusive
medium and also to promote the use of the said two
languages as media of instruction, the Senate is
authorized to make statutes providing for the former
in exercise_ of its power under s. 18 (I) (i) and for
the latter under s. 18 (I) (xiv). As to the promotion
of the development of the ~tudy of Gujarati and
1 S;C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
171
Hindi in Devnagri script, the Senate, the Syndicate
and the Academic Council may make the requisite
laws in exercise of the appropriate powers conferred
on them. The use of the indefinite article "a" in·
cl. (xiv) of s. l 8 (1) is not of much relevance, for, as
I have already pointed out, it is the appropriate
article in the context.
Another contention accepted by the High
Court, namely, that s. 4 ( l) and other clauses of the
section apply only to residential colleges, was faintly
advanced by learned counsel for the respondents.
There is absolutely no force in it, as the phraseology
of the said clauses is wide and comprehensive and
does not admit of any such limitation.
The argument that this construction will enable
the University to abolish English altogether as a
medium of instruction, as it is done in the present
case, has no relevance, for it can certainly do so, if it
has power in that regard. The Constitution depended
upon the State Legislatures and the universities for
imparting education at the university level. The
Legislature in its turn, rightly in my view, conferred
the necessary powers on the university, in the interest
of higher education. No one is better qualified than
the representatives of the intelligentsia of the State
who man the various instrumentalities of the Universitv to decide on the medium of instruction to be
introduced in the colleges affiliated to the University.
It may be that a particular university may have
accelerated the pace of the introduction of a regional
language as the medium of instruction at the university level, but other universities are following a more
cautious policy. It is for the university to decide its
own course. If the statute has conferred the power,
as I have said it has, these considerations are of no
avail.
It is not disputed that if the University has the
power to prescribe an exclusive medium of instruction
1962
Gujarat Uninersity,
Ahmedabad
v.
KriJhna Ranganath
MudhfJlkar
Subba Rao, J f
172 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963] SUPP.
1962
Gujarat University,
11hmedabad
v.
Krishna Rangariath
Mudholkar
Subba Rao, J.
under a statute, s. 38A of the Act which is a conse·
quential provision would be valid.
For the aforesaid reasons I hold that the University was w~ll within its rights in prescribing, by
statutes, the said two languages as media of instruc·
tion to replace English by stages.
. In the result the order of the High Court is set
aside and the appeals are allowed with costs of the
appeliants here and in the High Court.
BY COURT: In accordance with the view of the
majority, both the appeals stand dismissed in the
manner indicated in the majority judgment, with
costs. There will be one set of hearing fee.
Appeals dismissed.
1962
Septtmber 24.
THE AMALGAMATED COALFIELDS LTD.
AND ANOTHER
v.
THEJANAPADA SABHA, CHHINDWARA
(And connected appeals)
(B. P. SINHA, c. J., P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, K. N.
WANCHOO, K. c. DAB GUPTA AND J. c. SHAH, JJ.)
Coal Tax-Levy-ValUJity-Writ Petition, if barred by
rea ju&icata-Enhanced levy after first imposition-Absence of
premous sanction by Local Government-Legality of such levy-Constitution of India, Arts. 19 (1) (f), 32, 141, 226-Central
Provinces Local Self Government Act, 1920 (C. P. IV of 1920),
8. 51(2).
The 1st appellant in the first batch of appeals ~>ad filed
a writ petition in this Court challenging the nouces. calh~g upon
him to pay the tax of 9 pies per ton on coal mcluding coal
despatched outside the State of Madhya Pradesh on two grounds,
namely, that the levy of the tax by. th~ J.ndepende~~ Mining
Board was invalid at the date of its uutial mtposttion and,
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