RAI BAHADUR DIWAN BADRI DAS versus THE INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, PUNJAB
Supreme Court of India | Decided 7 September 1962 | [1963] 3 S.C.R. 930 | 1962 INSC 253
Key facts
- Decided
- 7 September 1962
- Bench
- P.B. GAJENDRAGADKAR*, K.C. DAS GUPTA*, J.R. MUDHOLKAR
- Bench size
- 3
- Case number
- CIVIL APPEAL No. 20/1962
- Disposal
- Dismissed
- Citation
- [1963] 3 S.C.R. 930
- Neutral citation
- 1962 INSC 253
Text of the judgment
930
I9nt
SUPREME COURT REPORTS·
[1963]
RAI BAHADUR DIWAN BADRI DAS
Sepfember 'I.
,(
··~
v.
THE iNDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, PUNJAB
(P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, K. c. DAS GUPTA
and J. R. MUDHOLKAR,.JJ.)
•
. . Industrial Dispute-Earned leave-Different rule• for
tx'8ting and future emp/;oyees-Whethei' discriminatory-Indu•·
trial Tribunal-Power to interfere with contract between employer
and employee-Indian Factories ·Act, 1948 (LXIII of 1948),
8. 79.
. On July.I, 1956, the appellants made a rule that every
workman employed on or before that date would be ·entitled
to 30 days leave with wages after working for 1 t months and
workmen employed after that date would be entitled to earned
leavC in accordance with the provisions of s. 79 of the Indian.
Factories Act, 1948. •The State Government referred for
adjudication to the Industrial Tribunal the question whether
all the employees should be allowed 30 days earned leave
with full wages fOr every 11 mon1.hs' service without discrimi·
nation. The Tribunal held that all the workmen were
entitled to 3.0 days earned leave without making any distinction between workmen who joined before July 1, 1956, and
those who joined subsequently. The appellants contended
that they were entitled to fix the terms of employment on
which they would employ the workmen and it was open to the
workmen to accept those terms or not and the tribunal was
n9t justified in interfering in such a matter.
·
Held, per Gajendragadkar and Das Gupta, JJ., that
the Tribunal was justified in directing the appellants to
provide for the same uniform rule as to earned leave fOr all
their employees. The doctrine of absolute freedom of contract
had to yield to the higher claims for social jus1ice and had
to be regulated. In industrial adjudication no attempt
. should be made to answer questions in the abstract for
evolving any general or• inflexible principles. ·Each dispute
has to be decided on its own facts without enlarging
the scope of the enquiry. If some principles have to be
followed or evolved, care has to be taken not to evolve Jarger..c
·-
3 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
..
931
1963
principles. In order that industrial adjudication should be
free from the tyranny of dogmas or the sub-conscious pressure
of preconceived notions it is important that the temptation · Rai Bahadur
Dai
to Jay down broad principles should be avoided. Accordingly Diwan Baari
v.
it is not necessary to -decide the broad contention whether
The I ndu•lrial
industrial adjudication can interfere with the contract between Tribunal Pun/ab
the employers and the employees. In the present case, all
the workmen were governed by the same terms and conditions
of service, except in regard to earned leave, The discr_imination was not based upon any principle and was bound to lead
to disaffection amongst the new employees. The financial
burden imposed by the award on the employers was slight.
The provisions for earned leave in respect of old employees
were not unduly generous or extravagant. Earned leave
provided for by s.79 Factories Act was the minimum statutory
leave. If the appellants thought it necessary to provide for
additional earned leave for their old employees,. there was no
reason why they should not make a similar provision in respect
of new employees as well.
·
Western Indian Automobile Association v. Industrial
Tribunal, Bombay, A.I.R, 1949 F.C. 112 and Bharat Bank Ltd.
v. The Employees of Bh.arat Bank Ltd. [1950] S.C.R. 513,
referred to.
-'
Per Mudholkar, J .-The Tribunal was not justified in
interfering with the rule made by the appellants. It was
open to the appellants to grant leave according to s.79
Factories Act, to all the employees but still they did not wish
to reauce -the leave of 30 days which they were already
giving to the old employees. The __appellants have put into
one category persons who enjoyed the same kind of benefits
uptil July I, 1956, and have put in another category persons
who did not enjoy such benefits.
All persons in each
category were treated alike, and the question of dis·
crimination did not in fact arise. If the State had provided that persons entering its service after a certain date
.would be governed by a set of conditions which were different
and less favourable than those governing the existing servants
its action would not be open to an attack under- Art. 14 of
the-Constitution. An identical action of a private employer
could also not be regarded as discriminatory. An award
made with the intention of promoting social justice must
take into consideration the interests of the cominunity. Even
if there was discrimination it could not be a perpetual source
of bitterness as gracfu11.lly the old employees would fade out
•
•
932
1962
Rat Bahadu~
£!iwan i3atiri Dos
v.
The lndusfrir l
Trihunul, PUnju/J
SUPREME COURT REPORT8
(1963}
till only one category of workers would remain. The facts
that the ~ispute was co.mparatively of a .µiinor character and
that the financial burden imposed on the appellants was
small did not entitle the tribunal to alter the contrac·c between
the employer and employees. Since the· appellant had
provided for its new enLrants such leave faciliue:; as were
recognised by the Factories .Act itself' as fair, it was not
open to the Tribunal to revise the relevant term of the
cor,tract.
Budhan v. State of Bihar, A.I.R. 1956 S, C. 191,
Khandige Mam Bhat v. Agricultural Iucomc Tax Officer, [1963]
3 S.C.R. 809, Stcde of M.P. v. Gwalior Sugar Co. Ltd. C.A.
No•. 98 & 99 of 1959, dated 30.11.60, Ramjilal v. Income-tax
Officer, Mohindargarh, (1951) S.C.R. 127, Sardar Inder Singh
v. The State of Rajasthan, (1957) S.C.R. 605 and Hathisingh
Mfg. Co. v. Union of India, A.I R. 196l•S. C. 931 referrea to.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal
No. 20 of 6~.
Appe11l by special leave from the award
dated September 29, 1961T; of the Industrial
Tribunal, l'unjab, Patiala in reference No. 13 of
1960.
•
0. K. Daphtary, Solioitor-oenral of India,
Bhagirath Das and B. P. Maheshewari, for the
appellants .
. M. K. Ramamurthi, R. K. Garg, D. P. Singh and
S. 0. Aggarwal, for the respondent No. 2(i). '
1962. September 7. The Judgment of
Gajendragadkar and Das Gnpta, JJ., was delivered
. by Gajendragadkar, J. Mudholkar J. delivered a
dissenting judgment ..
Gaj•ndragadkarJ,
GAJENDRAGADKAR, J.-This appeal by special
leave arises out of an industrial dispute in relation
to a comparatively minor demand made. againijtt
the appellants by the respondente-their employeesh
but in challenging the Talidity of the award passed
by the In~ustrial Tribunal in favour of the
-3 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
.)· •.
933
respondents on that demand the learned SolicitorGeneral. has raised a general question before us.
He contends that in granting the dem.and made by
the respondents, the award has illegitimately and
unjustifiably trespassed on the appellants' freedom
of contract. Th,e appellants as · employers, are
entitled to fix the terms of employment on which
t-hey would be willing to employ ·workmen and
it is open to the workmen either to accept those
terms or not; .industrial adjudication should not
interfere ·in such a matter. That is the nature of
the general contention which has been raised before
us in the present appeal.
· The facts leading to the dispute are few and.
they lie within a very narrow compass. The
appellants are the Trustees of the Tribune Presa
and pa.per and the Trust is being worked in
accordance with the terms of the will executed by
Dyal Singh Majithia on June 15, 1895. In carrying
out the policy of the Trust, the five appellants
have executed a. power of Attorney in favour of
Mr. R.R. Sharma and the Press is managed and
the paper is conducted to carry out the policy laid
·down by the will.
·
,_
'
)
It appears that before ..Tuly 1, 1956, for the
purposes of leave, the appellants had divided
their employees into two clttegories ( l) the Lino.
operators and (2) the. rest of the workmen in the
Press Section;. and Rule 57 made provision for
leave on the basis of the said classification.
The effect of the said rule was that no Press worker
other than the lino-opera.tor was entitled to any
kind of paid leave although he w:as given the
right to claim 30 days' wages plus dearness
allowance payablelin January every year if he had
worked for 11 Months. In addition, the said press
worker was entitled to Quarantine leave on the
terms mentioned in Rule 53.
1912
Rai Bah'1dur
Diwon Badri Das
. v.
The I bdui1rial
Tribun•I. Ponjab
..
934
1962
Rai Bahaiur ·
Diwan Badrl Dai
••
T/!e lndurtrial
Tribrmal, Punjab.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1963]
This position was substantially altered on the · -·{'
July 1, 1956, when the appellants framed a new
Rule in respect of earned leave. This rule abolished the two categories of wor!rers on whioh the
earlier rule 57 was based and divided the workers
into two categories (i) workers who were employed
on or before l.7.1956 and (ii) .thoso who were
employed after 1.7. 1956. In respect of the former
category of workmen, the new Rule made the
following provision:
"Subject to the provisions of. the Indian
Factories Act, 1948, every workman in the
service of the Tribune on the 1st Jnly, 1956,
will be entitled to 30 days' leave with wages;
after having worked for a period of 11 months.
This leave shalf cease to be earned, when it
amounts to 60 days."
In regard to the workmen falling under the latter
category, earned leave was to. be governed by the
provisions of· s. 79 of the Indian Factories Act.
It is common ground that the provision for earned
leave made by the said se·ction is a provision for
minimum earned leave which the employer iii
bound· to give: whether or not additional leave
should be granted by way of earned leave is a
matter within the discretion of the employer.· As
a result of the new rule, the position .was that
the employees who had joined the service of the
appellants on or before July l, 1956, were enti·tled t<;> 30 days' earned leave with wages, whereas
those who joined after the said date became
entitled to the statutory minimum of 21 days of
earned leave.
·
.
.
At the time when this rule came into force
there were H4 old employees to whom ·the rule
applied and 27 new employees to them by virtu.e of
the new Rule, s. 79 ot the Factories Act was made
'•
3 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
,..
•.
935
applicable. Gradually, new hands have also _been
employed and to aU such new employees a. 79 is
applicable. It appears that by its resolution passed
on January 8,· 1960, the Tribune employees union
sent to · the Management · a charter eni bodying
about · 20 demands. Attempts at conciliation
were made but they failed and so, on April 4,
1960, eight of the said demands were referred by
the Punjab Government to the Industrial Tribunal
for its adjudication under s. 10 of the Industrial
Disputes Act. One of these demauds was in. relation to earned leave. The demand was that the
employees in the Press Section sllould be allowed
30 days' earned leave with full wages· for every
11 months' service without any disc1'imination. The
Tribunal ha.a allowed this demand and it had held
that all workmen of the Press are entitled to 30
days' earned leave without making a.ny distinction
between workmen who joined before July 1, 1956,
and those who joined subsequently. It is the
validity of this a.ward which is questioned before
.us. by the appellants.
· .
The broad and general question raised by the
learned Solicitor-General on · the ha.sis of the
employer's freedom of contract has been frequently
raised in indus~rial adjudication, and it has consistently been held that the said right is now subject
to certain principles which have been evolved
by .industrial adjudication in advancing the
cause of social justice. It will be recalled that as
early as 1949, it was urged before the Federal
Court in Western India Automobile Association v. The
Industrial Tribunal Bombay( 1) ·that the industrial
Tribunal ha.d no. jurisdiction to direct an employer
to reinstate his .dismissed employees and the plea
ma.de was that such a direction was contrary
to the known ' principles which govern the relationship between master and servant. This con-.
tention was· negatived by the Federal Court.
(l) A.I,R. 1949 F.C. 112, 120.
19111
R ai.Bahadut
Diwa11. Badri Das
.
..
T·•• Indu1lrial
Trib.un .t, Pun;••
--.
936
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1963]
Speaking for the Court, Mahajan J. as he then was,
observed that the award of the Tribunal may
Bai Bahadur
Diwan Badd Das contain provisions for the settlement of a dispute which no Court could order if it was
The indust1ial
the Tribunal is not
Tribunal, Punjab bound by ordinary law, but
fettered
in
any
way
by
these
limitations. The
Gajendraqadkor J •
same plea was again raised before this Court · in
The Bharat Bank Ltd.,. Delhi. v. The Employ~es ef
The Bharat Bank Ltd., Delhi (I) and Mukherjea J. as
he then was, emphatically rejected it. "Insettling
the disptites between the employers and the
workmen", observed the learned . Judge, "the
function of the Tribunal is not confined to administration of justice in accordance with law.
It can confer rights and privileges on either
party which it considers reasonable and proper,
though they may not be within the terms of any
existing agreement. It has n:it merely to interpret or to give effect to the contractual rights
·and obligations of tho parties. It can create new
rights and obligations between them which it
considers essential for keeping industrial peace."
This view has been consistently accepted by indus•
trial adjudication since 1949.
1962
•..
The doctrine of the absolute freedom of
contract has thus to yield to the higher claims
for social justice. Take, for instance, the •case
where an employer wants to exercise his. right
to employ industrial labour on any wages he
likes. It is not unlikely that in an economically
under·developed country where unemployment
looms very large, for Industrial work, employees
may be found willing to take employment on
terms which do not amount to a minimum basic
wage. Industrial adjudication does not recognise
the employer's right to employ labour on terms
below the termS" of minimum basic wage. This,
no doubt, is an interference with the employer's
(I) (1950)•S.C.R. 459, 513.
...
3 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS .
937
196$
right to hire lah~mr, but social justice requires
that the right should be controlled. Similarly
Rai IJahadur
the I'ight to dismiss an employee js also controlled Diwm v.Brdri D11'
subject to well rocognised limits in· order to Tne.ln:Juslrial
guarantee security of .tenure to industrial em-~ lribunul, Punja
ployees. In the matter of earned , le.ave., s.79 .of Gajendrag(JJdkar J. ·
the F 1ctories Act prescribes a minimum in regard
to establishments to which the Act applies. ·In
the matter of bonus which is not dgarded as an
item of d'eferred wages, industrial adjudication·
has evolved a formula by the working ofwhich
employees are entitled to claim bonus. We have
referred to these illustration to show how under
the impact of the demand of social justice, the
·doctrine of absolute freed0m of contract has been
regulated.
It is, however, necessary to add that the
general question about the employer's right to
ma.nag.a his own affairs in the best way he chooses
cannot be answered in the abstract without reference to the facts and ~ircumstances in regard to
which the question is raised. If general question
is posed and an answer must be given to it, the
answer would be both yes and no. The right would
be recognised and industrial adjudication would
not be permitted or would be reluctant to trespass
on that right or on the field of management
functions unless compelled by over-riding considerations of social justice. The right would not be
recognised and would be controlled if social justice
and.industrial peace require such regulation. That
is why we think industrial adjudication always
a.ttempts1 not to answer questions in the abstract in
order to evolve any general or
inflexible
principles.
The est course to adopt
in
dealing with industrial disputes is to consider the
facts of the case, the nature of the demand made ·
by employees, the nature of the defence raised by
a
)
938
SUPREME COURT REPORTS.
[1963]
the employer and decide the dispute without
unduly enlarging the· ·scope of the enquiry.
JJiwa•.~•dri D••. If in the decision of .the dispute, some principles
n, Jndutrial have to be full owed or evolved, that must be done:
Tribunal Pu,jab . but care .must be taken not to evolve larger princiGajeniragadkar ;J. pies which would tend to pre-judge issues not directly raised in the case before th.e Industrial Tribunal.
That is why we think we would not be justified in
giving any general answer to the broad contention
raised by the learned Solicitor-General before us in
the present appeal. ·
Rai Bnhadu•
.
The development and growth of industrial
law during the last. decade presents a close
· analogy to the development and growth of oons·
titutional law during the same period. In some
respects, it is well-know that Art. 19 of the
Constitution has guaranteed fundamental rights
to individual citizens and at the same time, bas
provided for the regulation of the said fundamental rights subject to' the prov1s1ons of clo.
(2) to (6)
of the said . Article. Where a.
conflict arises between the citizen's fundamental
right .to bold property and a restriction sought
to be imposed upon that right in the interest of
the general public, cour~s take the precaution of
confining their deoi.siOn to the points raised before
them and not to lay down unduly broad and general
propositions. As in the decision of constitutional
questions of this· kind, eo in industrial adjudication
it is always a matter of making a reasonable adjustment between two competing claims. The fundamental right of the individual citizen is guaran. teed and its roasonable restriction is permissible
in the interest of the general public, so, the
claims of the . interest of the general public have
to be weighed and balanced against the claims of
the individual citizen in rega.rd to his fundamental
right. So too, in ·the case of industrial adjudication
. .
.
.
.
3 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
~ ' the claims . of the employer baised on
939
11169
the free·
dom of contract have to be adjusted with the • Rai Bcihadur
D 1wan Badri Das
claims of indmitrial employees for so<iial justice.
.v •
. The process of making a reasonable adjustment is The lndustri'>I
not always easy, and so, in reaching aonclusions in Tribunal, Punjab
such a matter, it is essential not to decide more Ga.j1ndrag2tllt.ar J,
than is necessary. If industrial adjudiotion pur·
-' ports to lay tlown broad general principles, it ·
is likely to make its approach in future oasea
inflexible and that must always be avoided. In
order that industrial adjudication should be completely free from the tyranny of dogmas or the
sub-conscious pressure of pre-conceived notion,
it is of utmost importance that the temptation
to lay down broad principles should be avoided.
In these matters, there are no absolutes and no'
formula can be evolved which would invariably
give an answer to differernt problems which
may be posed in different cas11s on different facts.
Let us, therefore, revert to the facts of this case
and ·decide whether the appellant's attack against
..tl}e validity· of the propriety of the award can
be sustained.
In dealing with the narrow dispute presented by this appeal, it is necessary to remember
that all the . employees of the appellants are
governed · by the same ~erms and conditions of
service, except in regard to earned leave. It ii
only in respect of this term and condition of service that a distinction is made between workmen
employed on or
before 1. 7. 56 and those
employed after that date. Generally, in the matter
of providing leave. rules, industrial adjudication
prefers to havfl similar conditions of service in
the same industry situated in the same region.
'fhere is no evidence adduced in this case in
· regard to
the condition of earned
ieave
· prevailing· in the comparable industry in this
region. But we cannot ignore the fact that this
•
940
1962
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1963]
very concern provides for better facilities of earned
leave to a section of its employees when other terms
and conditions· of service are the same in respect
Thelndustrial
of bot]} the categories of employees. It is not
Tribnnal, Punjob difficult to imagine that the continuance of these
~aj'"''"c•dkar J. two different provisions in the same concern is
likely to lead to dissatisfaction and frustration
amongst the new employees. It cannot be denied that
the existence of industrial peace and harmony and
the continuance of the said peace and harmony are
releva:it factors, but their importance should not be
unduly exaggerated. If a frivolous demand is made
by the e'Ilployees and it is accompanied by a threat.
that non-compliance with the demand would lead to
industrial dis-harmony or absence of peace, it would
be unreasonable to· treat the throst 1\8 relevant in
deciding the merits of the demand. In this connection, it is necessary to remember that the continuance of harmonious relations between the employer
and his employees is tre'ated as relevant by industrial
adjudication, because it leads to more production
and thereby has a healthy impact on national
ec~nomy, and so it is necessary that in dealing with"
several industrial disputes, industrial. adjudication has to bear in mind the effect of its deciRions
on national economy. In their zest to fight for
their respective claims, the parties may choose to
ignore the demand of national economy, but industrial adjudication cannot. If the demand is plainly
frivolous, it has to be rejected whatever the conse. quences may be. In the present case, the argument
that the continuance of two different provisions
would lead to dis-harmony c"nnot,. however, be
treated as frivolous. It is difficult to understand
on what principle the discrimination is based. The
only argument urged in support of the discrimioa·
ti.on is the employer's right ·to provide for new terms
of service to the new entrants in service. in our
' .o.(
Ra; Bahadu,
D•wan Bad.i Da,"
-..
·3 S.C.R.
SUPR~ME COURT REPORTS
941
1961
opinion, the validity of this argument cannot be
accepted in the cir<:mmstances of this case.
•R.ai Ba/µJdur
Take the case of the wages or dearness allo-. Diwan Badr( Dai
v.
wance which the appellants paid to their employees. , The lndualri•I
Would the appellants bE:i justified in assertion of ..Tribunal; Pu(IJ•b
their right of freedom . of contract to offer less
favourable terms of wages or dearness allowance to
employees who would be employed after a certain
. date ? If the general point raised by the learned
. Solicitor-General is upheld without any qualifications, then it would be open to the employer t.o fix
•
different wages for different sets of workmen who
are doing the same kind of work in his concern_. We
have rarely come across a case where such a claim
has either been made or has been upheld. It is well
known that both industrial legislation and industrial
adjudication seek to attain similarity or uniformity of terms of service in the same industry _existing in the same region, as far as·it may be prac.ticable or possible, without d'oing injustice or harm to
any particular employer or a group of employers.
'!hat being so, we do not think the Tribunal was in
error in holding 'that in the matter of earned leave,
there should be uniformity of ·conditions of service
governing all the employees in the service of the
appellants.
·
There ·1s another aspect of this question to
which referen<le must be made. This is not a case
in which the financial liability imposed on the
employer by the award when it direoted the employer to grant the earned leave of 30 days to all
the employees, is·very heavy; and so, having regard
to the fact that the appellants have been conducting
their business in a profitable way and their financial
position is distinctly good, no attempt has been
made before us, and rightly, to suggest that the bur. den imposed by the award is beyond their means. It
j' not disputed that· the total annqal liabilit;:v which,
: : 942
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[19(13]
"
~ ·~1962
may aocru!l as a result of the award may not exceed
HaiB~hadur
Rs. l,000/-.. and it is also common ground that the
" Diiiion Badri Das · appellants a.re" a flourishing concern and their net
•·
· profits whioh were in the neighbourhood of a lac
of rupees in 1949, have shown an upward tendency
and have reached almost rupees eight lacs in 1959.
-·· 6JJ1nar~gadka•.J. That is another factor whioh has to be borne in
mind in dealing with the present dispute.
' The Iniiurtrial
>_.Tribunal, Punjab
•
It i~ not suggested by the appellants that the
provision made by them for earned leave in respect
of old' employees is unduly generous of extravagant
and. so, it has become necessary to invoke the
provisions of section .79 of the Factories Act in
. respect 'of new employees. On the other hand,
' earned leave provided by s. 79 ia the minimum
statutory leave to which employees are entitled and
. if the E1ppellants thought it neoessary to provide
for additional earned leave to their old employees,
there" is no reason why. they should not make
·a similar · provision ·in respect of the new
employees as well .. We ought to add to that on the
record, it does appear that the appellants are good
employees and they are treating their employees
in a liberal manner. It, however, appears that
they have brought the present dispute to this Court
more for asserting the genera.I principle of the
employer's ·right to fix conditions of service with
his new employees than Ior vindicating any real or
substantial grievance against the award which would
prejudicially affect their interest. In our opinion,
having regard to the nature of the dispute raised in
the present appeal and the other relevant facts and
· circumstances, it cannot be said. that the Industrial
Tribunal erred in law in direoting the appellants to
provide for the same ·uniform rule as to earned
leave' fo~ all their employees. We are satisfied
·.that ·the a.ward under appeal cannot be set a.side
•. only· on ·the a.oa.demic or .abstract point of law
raised by the appellants.
··
"
3 s:c.R. SUPREME co RT REPORTS
943 .
.. The result is, the a.ppeal fails and is dismissed
with costs.
MunHOLKAR, J.-This is an appeal by special
leave from the award of the Industrial Tribunal,
Pupj~b. The appellants before us are the trustees of
~ ••The T.ribune", Ambala Cantt. and the opposite
party to the appeal consists of the workmen of the
Tribune through their two unions, one the Tribune
Employees' Union and the other the Tribune
·Workers' Union.
The Trust was founded in Lahore by the late
Sardar Dayal Singh Majithia on February l, 1881. .
~ It publishes the newspaper "Tribune". By the will
of the founder dated June 15, 1895 the Management of tlie Tribune was vested in a public trust
in September, 1898. After the partition of India
the offices of the newspaper had to be shifted from
·Lahore and they are now located at Ambala. The
Trust naturally had to leave the entire machinery
, and other equipment of t.he Tribune Trust along
with its immovable property in Lahore. The value
of that property is stated by the appellants to be
Rs. 25 lakhs or so. The Trust was however, able
to tranefer its bank accounts and Government
"securitieH to India ia few days before the partition.
With the help. of these assets it re-established the
Tribune Press and office at Ambala and established
new machinery at a cost of Rs. 15 lakhs or so.
, . Gradually the Trust has been able to rehabilitate its
fortunes. It, is not disputed before us that despite the
heavy loss entailed by the Trust by reason of being
uprooted from Pa.kistll.n, the employees quite a
number of whom are old employees who were ab]e
to migrate to India, have been treated with a. great·
>deal of consideration. After the Tribune started
miking profitll the employees are oeing given bonus
every year. Moreover .ev~n before the Employees
Provident Fund boheme applicable to newspaper
1962' ~
Rai J3ahatfur.
Diwan Ba'dri .Dai.
v.
The 'Industrial,
Tribunali [1unjal> ,
M udholkar
J' .· ''
•
944
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1963.]
industry and even before the scheme of gratuity for
all categories of employees were enforced by statute
Di~.,. ;.~,; Das the Tribune had provided for both provident fund and
i:",m,1,;81 gratuity to its employees. In addition to this it has
T<tbua•I, Puwjab provided free housing accommodation to its workmen
in two colonies, one built in 1955 with the help of
Mwiholk<T J,
subsidy from the Government of India and .the other .·
in the year 1958 at a cost of Rs. 6 lakhs. The quarters
in the two colonies are provided with . modern
sanitation. Besides that, there are extensive
recreation grounds, .lawns etc., in these colonies.,
Even electricity is supplied free to the employees.
Several other amenities are also provided by the
Trust. It would thus appear· that the welfare of ·
the employees has been kept prominently i.n mind
by· the trustees.
· llU
R 1 R h ""'
T•.
.
'
.'
Even 'so, some disputes arose between the
management and the employees. Ultimately eight .
demands made by the employees were referred by
the Government of Punjab for adjudication under
s. IO( I) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 {14
of 1947) to the Industrial Tribunal, Punjab, Patiala
constituted under s. 7A of the Act. Four demands
were rejected by the Tribunal as having been .
withdrawn, one was settled amicably and on the
remaining ·three the Tribunal has. made its award.
One of those three demands is :
'
"Wl,ether the employees in the Press Section ·
should be allowed 30 days' earned leave with
full wages for every 11 months' service without
discrimination ?"
·'
·!'he Tribunal held in favour of the workmen and
it is only agaimt this part of the award of the
Tribunal that the tri1stees have come up in appeal
before us. Certain facts have to be stated in connec- -<.
tion w.ith tnis de.mal)d. The Trust had framed
, certain rules governing the conditions of service. of
•
3. S.C~R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
945
its employees. Rule 57 of those rules deals with
leave and reads thus :
"The Lino Operators shall be entitled to 30
days' leave of all description during the course
of a calendar year, which will be with pay
plus all allowances.
.
Press employees, other than the Lino·ope·
rators may be granted· leave by the compe. tent authority from time to time as the
authority may determine. Such leave shall
be without pay or allowance. · They shall,
however, be entitled to in the month of
January every year to receive a sum amounting to the leave pay pltis ordinary dearness
allowance
for the . preceding month of
Decembtilr for the period of 11 months' service
· or -to a proportionate amount for a lesser
period. In ·addition, Press · workers will be
entitled to quarantine leave on the terms
mentioned in Rule 53".
On July 1, 1956 a new rule was framed which reads
as follows:
:
..
"(1) Subject to the provisions of the Indian
Factories Act, 1948, every workman in the
service of the Tribune on the lat July, 1956,
will be entitled to 30 days' leave with wages,
after having worked for a. period of ll months.
This leave shall cea'3e to be earned,· when it
amounts to 60 days.
(2) A workman joining the service of the.
Tribune after the 1st July, 1956 will be entitled to leave, in accordance with'the provisions
of section 79 of the Indian Factories Act,
1948."
~ · Un~r ~ thf[l old rule the ,LiBo ·Operators in the presa
section were allowed 30 days' leave on full wages
Jtlfl
Rai Bahatlvr
Pi-11 Badri.J)u
...
Tli.1 l11d:islri~l
. Trib.uiial Punjab
M udh.Zt., J •
946
'
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
·. [191$3
including dearness allowance. The other workers
the press section were, however, allowed no,t
in
·~ R~i Ba.hail ir
leave with pay, but 30 -days' wages in the month
t.~ Dhtxin 'Badfl' i:Ja,
·y
of January calculated on the basis of the full wages
, The I~tlus,,idl
drawn in the preceding month provided that an
(' T,_/J~nal ... Pun,jab
employee had served for a period of 11 months till
• \; \ )-.-.- .. i.
M ttdholltar J.
the beginning of the month of January. If he had
served for a lesser period he was to be paid proportionately less amount. Bearing in mind the fact
that in industpies leave, vacation and holidays with
pay are regarded as supplemental pay practices
(see· Collective Bargaining,-principles and Cases by,
John T. Dunlop and James J. ·He~ly, revised edn.,
.P· 433), in substance. even the emplo)'ees in the
press section other .than lino operators got the sam.e
money equivalent of the leave allowed to lino
,operators. It may be mentioned that these other
. press section employees were also entitled to take
leave but the rule provided that they will not be
pajd any pay and allowonces for such leave. That
was perfectly reaso.nable because they got pay in
lieu of paid leave for an additional period in the
month of January. However, even this !'slight
distin;:ition in .the mode of conferring benefits on
the two categories of employees was abolished by the
new rule which came into force on July 1, 1956,
· and all employees in the press section upto that
~date were made eligible for the grant of 30 days'
1
· leave with wages after having worked for a pllriod
· of 11 months. I£ may be mentioned here that the
Factories Act of 1948 provided in s. 79 that every .
worker who has_ wor.ked for a period of 240 days
or more in a calendar year shall be given at lea.st ·
one days' ]e~ve for every 20 days of service. No
. ,doubt this was the minimum provided by the Act
bqt since the press section iii governed by the
Factories Act it was open to the Trust to modify its
rules with regard to all employees of this 'section and
' grant. ]eave according to the provi1ions ·of this
1
I
I
·'
h
..
;. r
,,
,
•
•'
3 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS ·
947
.section. There is no prohibition in la.w against
doing so but still it did not wish to revise unfavo~r
Rai BahadU•-.. ·
a.bly its rules regarding the quantum of leave to Diwan Bcdrf OGJ.:
v.
its existing employees. It, however, felt that in
Tho Industrial.
view of the statutory provision there was no obli· Tribunal; Punjall;·, >
glltion upon it to provide for a longer leave than
that laid down in s. 79 of the Factories Act. It was
for this reason· that it provided that all employees
engaged on or after July 1, 1956, will be granted
leave according to the provisions of s. 79 of the
Factories Act, the idea being that ~ventually all
employees should be governed by the rules. Appa· .
rantly, to forestal"l this consequence the employees
contend that the new rule has introduced discrimi·
nation. That is why they raised a dispute relating
to this matter and it was referred to the Tribunal
a.long with the other disputes they had raised .
.· . . The Tribunal, deali~g with' this matter, .ha11.
observed as follows :
·
"It may be of some importance to note that
till 1st July, 1956 the workmen who had·
entered service before that date and those.
who had been employed thereafter were in'
the matter of leav.e compensation, treated·
alike. It was on 1st July, 1956 for the first'
time that the workmen who had been in'
service before that date wete giveri 30 days'
pa.id leave but for new entrants the number of
days of that leave was reduced to that pl'ir·"
mitted by section 79 of the·. Factories Act:·
The Union's contention is that to allow 3ri
days' earned leave with full wages in an year·:
to a certain group of workmen in Press Seo~.
tion and to deny that benefit to the rest of the
workmen of that section simply on the scote
of ~hei~ having entered service after 1st July.
1906,, is to acknowledge the prominent ele~
ment of discrimination which has been tes-
948
1982
: ·Ral Bahidu.;.
Diwan B idri_ Dos
v. '
·r1r.·e tticJu.abial
Trib~I. ·PJJrcjab .
Mwlholk .. J •
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1963]
ponsible for the heart burning, resentment
and dissatisfaction of the workmen. It is
further urged with emphasis that all workers
. for the Press .Section should in the matter of
earned leave be treated equally. ·
For the long space of seven years even
after the Factories Act had come into force the
management had continued to treat all workmen of the Press Section alike irrespective o:f
.the date of their employment. There is no
reason why a distinction of a discriminatory
nature and effect be made between the two
artificially created sets of workmen belonging
to the same section."
It seems to me that the Tribunal's ultimate
finding is. vitiated by a misconception entertained by
it. The first sentence in the above quotation
would show that the Tribunal thought that those
persons who were employed after July 1, 1956 were
treated in the matter of ·leave on par with those
employed before. July 1, 1956, "till. July 1, 1956"
but were sought to be discriminated against only
thereafter .. It is difficult to und1orstand how persons
who were employed after July l, 1956, could possibly be treated before July 1, 1956, equally with
employees who were in service on that day. Apparently it is this confusion in the mind of theTribunal
which has influenced its ultimate conclusion. That
apart, it is quite clear that what the Trust has done
is to put in one category persons who enjoyed in
substance the same kind of benefit uptil July l, 1956
and permit them to enjoy the benefit they had
hitherto enjoyed. Then it put in a separate category
those persons who could never possibly lay any
claim to have enjoyed a similar benefit because
they were not its employees till July 1, 1956, and
decided that they will get leave only as provided
ins. 79 of the Factories Act. All persons in !Jach
- category are intended to be alike and, therefore the
3 S.C;R. SUPREME~COURT'REPOR:TS
949•
question of discrimination does not in fact arise.
It was, in my opinion; open to the management to
offer to the new entrants new terms. When the new
entrants entered service accepting the new terms and
knowing fully well that one of those terms i. e., th~
one relating to annual leave was different and
less beneficial from .·the one which obtained in the
case of the old employees, it is not reasonable for··
them now to sa.y that they are being discriminated
against.
The Tribunal, however, thinks otherwise. It
has held that the Trust, by treating the new
entrants less favourably in the matter of leave than
its old employees has practised discrimination and
that this discrimination has caused heart burning ..
Presumably,. therefore, the Tribunal felt impelled
to interfere and direct that the new entrants should
be treated in the matter of leave -on par with the·
old employees in order to avoid industrial unrest
which may result 'from' heart burning amongst the
·
new entrants.
What we must first consider is whether the
existing of heart burning has at all been established
in this case. It is said that the continuance of
different provisions in the same concern has caused
heart burning, dissa~isfaction and frustration among .
the new employees and this would lead to unrest '
in the industry. For one thing, there is no evidence,
before us to show that the · new employees are
making a very serious grievance of the fa.ct that
they would get a few days less of leave than the
old employees. All that Mr. Ramamurti could point
0ut to us was the statement in the evidence ·of
Som Nath, A. W. 7. that he should also be given 30
days, privilege leave in a year. Merely saying
that he should be given privilege- leave does not
mean that he is harbouring bitterness in his mind.
Apartfrom that it would· be extremely unreasonable
. to ·take notice of bitterness, if ·any, in: the minds of
0
Rai BaAadur- ·
DiWO'll 'B•dti Da;i
n, Ia~ial·
'l'rif,1111DI; P.unJtiJ
~
MudAoU..1r,J,
950
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1963]'
these new employees .in regard to this matter •
because. as already stated, they voluntarily took
Bai 1Jithridw r:
J?.iwan:Batlr.i ·Dar
up
employment knowing that they would get less
v.
than the old. employees. Som Nath's statelea.ve
'1'}11;[1,tlititrial
.'.fljll"ilq~ RunJab
ment. is no evidence of the fact that there is
-·-·
any heart burning. To .say that the very fact that two
Aiuilbo/E~~'J:'·
·sets of people are governed· by .different rules
will .necessarily: lead to heartburning; without
establishing anything more, 9uch as inadequacy of
the benefit enjoyed by one set will be to ignore that
such differences are a matter of common occurrence
and'no reasonable' person is expected to magnify
their consequences. It seems to me, further, that
the ·workers as a body did not think much of the
distinction between the extent of leave enjoyed by
old and new employees because during all the four
years while the rule has been in force .. they raiSed
rio'protests. No doubt they did ultimately make
a protest in the year 1960 when the dispute was
referre.d to the Tribunal. But then, this was not the
sole dispute but was one of eight disputes, at least
four of which were withdrawn by the Unions, appaien~ly after realising that there was no ail bstance in
them; The mere fact that they did not withdraw this
dispute would not of itself indicate that they regarded it as of great importance. It may well be that
they did not· withdraw it in an erroneous belief that
anything which is characterised as discrimination
will at once earn the sympathy of Industrial Tribuiia1s and the Courts.
··
·
-
. Even· assuming that that is creating heartburning· amongst the employees the question arises
whether they have a real grievance. They say tba~
the Trust has discriminated against .the new entrants and thiP is their grievance. In this connection
it ;may be observed that the mere refusal or failure
of, an employer to treat equally all its employees
doing a particular kind of work would . not neces.sarily .amount to discrimination. The subject of ia-d
'8,S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
951
• 19.61
crimination has come up for consideration before
this · Court in a largo number of oases in which a
RaT'/Ja"fiatlu•
Diw'i~ 'B 1<lri D~• ·
com plaint has been ma.de that the equality clause
.....
of the Constitution, Art. 14, has been violated. This
Th• lridu•lritsl
Tribunal, Pim;.~
Co:urt has held that it is open to the State tO make
·. ·. - 'l....,; _ _._ '·>-l
reasonable . classification both as regards persons
MIMllloU:ar J,
.
and as regards things (see in particular Budkan v.
State of Bihar( 1 ) ; Khandige Sham Bhatt v. Agricultural
Income-tax Officer (2 ); This Court has laid down
that a classification made by the State will be reasonable provided that· ( 1) it is founded on an intelligible differentia which distinguishes persons or thingt1
that a.re grouped together from other left out ofthe
group; and (2) that the differentia has a rational relation to the object sought to b~ achieved: by the
_statute. In the State of Madhya Pradesh v. Gwalior Sugar
Go. Ltd. ('); it has been held that it is. permiSHible to .
make classification on historical grounds, by putting
in one class one set of persons or things and in other
all those left out from the first class Court. In Ramjil.al
v. Income-tax Officer, Mohindargarh( 5 ) this Court has
held that a taxing law may provide that a law imposing a new'rate shall not apply to pending proceedings. In other worda this Court has upheld the
law where one rate of income-tax shall be applicable
to persons whose oases were pending for assessment
and another rate to persons whose oases were not so
pending. Thus, this Court has held as reasonable
classification made by reference to difference in
time. In Sardar Inder Singh v. The State ofRajaSthan (8 ) this Court has held that it is open to the
legislature to decide the date from which a law
should be given operation and that the law made by
it cannot be challenged as discriminatory because it
:
•1
· ( 1) A.I.R. (1955) S,C. 191
(2) ( 1963) 3 S.C,R. 809.
(3) CA. Nos. 98 & 98 of 1959 decided on November !O, 1969.
[1951] s.c.R,, 127.
15) [1957] s.c;R. 605.
<•l
•.
\''','".
.
;•_ \>
952
1962
.Ra_f BahadU•
Diwan 'Batlri Dos
••
· The .J11dustrial
·r;ilnuial ~ Putijab
·~7-
Mudkoll:ar J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1963] '
does not apply to prior transactions. Thus in this
case also classificiation made on the basis of difference in time has been upheld. Finally in Hathising
Mfg. Oo. v. Union of India (1) this Court has held
that tliere is no discrimination if the law applies
generally to all persons who come within its ambit
as from the date on which it is made operative.
This case likewise accepts that it will not amount to ·
discrimination if one set of persons is treated differently from another by reference to a point of time.
It would follow from these decisions that ifthe State
as an employer provided that persons entering its.
service after a certain date will be governed by a
set of condition which will be different and, may be
less favourable than those governing the existing
entrants that law will not be open to attack under
Art. 14 of the Constitution on the ground that it·
discriminates between one set of employees and
anvther.
In my judgment the principle laid down by
this Court that reasonable classification does not
amount to discrimination is of general application ..
Therefore, when an employer's action is challenged
before an Industrial Tribunal as discriminatory, the
Tribunal will also have to bear it in mio.d.. For if
an action cannot be regarded as discriminatory and.
violative of Art. 14 of the Constitution because it
is based on a reasonable classification an identical
action of a private employer affecting his employees
cali also not be regarded as discriminatory. The
content. and meaning of 'discrimination', wherever
the term is used, must necessarily be the 1ame and
we cannot adopt one standard for judging whether
an action when it emanates from the State, is discriminatory or not and another ~tandard for judging
an identical action, when it emanates from a private
citizen. Looked at this way, I hav\l no doubt that
the Trust has not practised what can in la.w be
regarded as discrimination .against its new entrants
.
(I) .AJ,R, 1960 S,C. 931.
'
<
3 KC.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
r ,
953,
by allowing them lesser leave than it has allowed to
its old entrants.
·
·
•
Rai,Btilradur ,·,
Diwan Bailri Dos: •
I may point out that it is not an unusuarl
v. · ,
,
thing even in Government service to find new , en- . .The 1.it1u11r.;~1
trants being treated differently in the matter o'f TribuniJl,·~l'i'!'l4 •·
leave, emolumems etc., from the old entrants. It
is a well-known fact that in most of the provinces
of India in the year 1932 or 1933 pay scales in vari·
ous categories of Gov~rnment serv.ice were revised
and new scales less favourable than the old ones
were introduced. Therefore, a large body of men
were performing the same duties as other large body
of men but were getting .les~er pay than the latter.
That happens often, is happening today in several
of the recently reorganised States and may happen
hereafter also. But merely because new t~rms of
service are less favourable than the old ones; would
it be correct to s11iy that there is discrimination
between the new entrants and the old entra.ntB?
As already pointe9 out, it is open t.o the employer to offer different and even less ,favourable
terms to new .entrants and if the new entrants
entered service with their eyes wide open they ca.n·
not reasonably complain of being discriminated ·
against. Mr. Ramamurthi who appears for the
employees, however, contends that it is open to an
employee to take up employment on the exie'ting
conditions of service and immediately st'art clamouring for improving his conditions of service.
It is sufficient to say that without establishing that
there was a change in circumstances subsequent to
the time when a workman accepted service a
demand for improvement in the conditions. of
servioe cannot, with justice, be entertained unless
of course the original conditions of service· were
plainly unfait. : Mr. Ramamurthi does not say that
the term regarding leave in the rule applicable t'o
the new elltraQts js unf~ir in the seniJe that tq:~
954·
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1963) ~
1~6if· 1 .
leave'allowed is inadequate. But, Mr. Ramamurthi
said that where a servfoe condition causes heartRq1Ba adur .. b
.
t t
t•
f
1
d"1sconDiiinn'B•dr(Das"' u.rnmg .amongs wo seCJ 10!1s o emp oyeee
!,
, .!• ·, . .
tent and unrest would he its natural outcome and
TAe.lndusl,ial ...
"t •
t th e T n'h una1 to revise
· t he cond'1t10n
·
Trihiinal ·Piln}ab · so ·I IS open o
'
_._:_..
.and thus eliminate that discontent. I am unable
Mv<lhalkar<J.\ ·
to accept the argument. No doubt, the provisions
· . of the Industrial Disputes Act are wide enough, like
those of other legislative enactments placed on the
statute hook, for promoting the welfare of the employees to permit an Industrial Tribunal to over•
ride the contract between an employer and his
employPes governing conditions of service of .the
employees. But it does not follow from · this that
no sooner a 'reference of a dispute is made to a
Tribunal for adjudication than the contract of
service ceases to have any force. The power to
interfere with a contract of service can only be
resorted to in certain limited circumstances.
1
1
,
~h . :1
. As has been pointed out by this Court in State
of Madras v. C. P. Sarathy( 1 ), the adjudication by·
a Tribunal is only an alternative form of settlement
of disput€s on a fair and just basis, having regard
to the prevailing conditions of the industry. Bearin,e: in mind this principle, it would follow that it is·
only for securing a fair and just: settlement of an
industrial dispute. that the Tribunal can over-ride
the contract between the parties. For deciding what
is fair and just, it is not enough for the Tribunal to
say that a particular demand be granted for doing
social justice. What it must ascertain is whether
the grie.vance is a real one and whether it is of a
type of which ,the employees can justly complain ..
In Muir Mills Co., Ltd. v. Suti Mills Mazdoor Union;
Kanpur (2 ) it bas been pointed out social justice is ·a
v'ery vague. and indeterminate expression.and no
clear-cut definition can be laid down which will
cpv.er:,all'
the
situations and that
the fancy
cif an
"-'• .
'
.
:·.
'
\ .
"",.._~·;
.
'
( I) [1953] S.C.R. 334.
•
'
(
(21 (1955) I S.C.R. 991 •
.~
3 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
•
955
·individual adjudicator is not social ju·stice. But,
of course, that does not mean that social justice
• Rai Baharl~r
has no place in the settlement of industrial dis- Diwan BJdii'D'ar
v.
putes. It is indeed a relevant consideration but . The ·1nt1u.ir'.;a1
it is well to bear in mind that doing social justice ·Trib~ni.I;' :Pi.ui)ab
in an industrial dispute is not merely doing justice
Mµdholk~r:J.
between the employer and the employee. The
question of doing anything in the interest of social
justice comes in when the State h.as a social interest
in a situation or in an activity because of its
repercussions on the community at large. Therefore, when the social interest of the community
· is involved in a situation or an activity, the intHests
of all parties who are affected by it have to be
borne in mind, the parties being not merely the
employers and the employees but also the community
at large which includes .also the consumers. So,
whei;e a direction in an award is sought t@ be
sustained on the ground that it was made with the
intention of promoting .social justice it must be
11hown that the adjudicator had borne in mind also
'the interests of the community.. This aspect ·Of
the matter has not been borne in mind · by the
Tribunal and, therefore, the relevant .direction in
. its award . cannot be sustained on the ground that
it is actuated by the need of promo.ting &ocial
justice.
·
The ground given by the the Tribunal, as '
already st.ated, is that there is discrimination and
the existence of the discrimination will be. a
perpetual source of unrest. Granting, again, that
there is discrimination it is difficult to appreciate
now it can be a perpetual source of bitterness
for, with the efflux of time, the old employees will
gradually be fading out till at. last there will be
left only that category of workers to which the
provisions of s. 79 of the Factories Act apply.
956
R.i.Baladlw
Diula1} 8dtlri Das
v.
-The lniustrial
·f"ribunal, Pr111jab
· JI uaho/iar- .1.
•·
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963]
Nor again, do I think the fact that a dispute
. is comparatively of minor ·character and that the
financial burden entailed on [the employer is
inconsiderable, a matter which would entitle the
. Tribunal to alter a contract between an employer
. and his employees.. In fact these factors are not
relevant for consideration. If the leave terms
offered to new employees were on their face unfair,
the mere fact th!j.t the employer did not have the
capacity to pay would not have been allowed to
influence the determination of the issue. I .would
go further and say that since the Trust has provided
for its new entrants such leave facilities as a.re··
recognised by the Factories Act itself as fair, it
was not open to the Tribunal to revise the relevant
term of the contract.
For all these reasons I am of opinion that the
a.ppea.I must succeed and the award of the Tribunal
· should be set aside in so far as 'it refers to the
demand made by the employees for grant of the
ea.me leave to new entrants as is being granted to
old employ~es.
BY COURT. In -accordance with the opinion,
of the majority, the appeal fails and is dismissed
. w,ith o_osts.
.
.
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