SMT. SOMAVANTI AND OTHERS versus THE STATE OF PUNJAB AND OTHERS
Supreme Court of India | Decided 2 May 1962 | [1963] 2 S.C.R. 774 | 1962 INSC 186
Key facts
- Decided
- 2 May 1962
- Bench
- T.L. VENKATARAMA AIYYAR*, BHUVNESHWAR PRASAD SINHA, K. SUBBA RAO, N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR, J.R. MUDHOLKAR
- Bench size
- 5
- Case number
- WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) No. 248/1961
- Disposal
- Dismissed
- Citation
- [1963] 2 S.C.R. 774
- Neutral citation
- 1962 INSC 186
Text of the judgment
774
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963]
1962
ta.ken by the Madras High Court and we see no
reason to diffor from it. Therefore the challenge
EZ..uio DU1ritu1;.n !'<> the validity of the Act on the g~ound
that its
(',.Lid.
IDlporta.nt provisions contained in section 5 offend
.sw. .j·Mab"' against Art. 31 (2) must be rejected. That being
. our view, we must held that the High Court was
f1oj•n4ro~alk•J. right in rejeoting both the writ petitions filed by
the l!'Ppellant. Op that view, it is unnecessary to
oons1der whether appellant would have been entitled
to get the relief of poBBession or mesue profits whioh
it purported to claim by its two petitions.
w,,1 Ramnu
The appeals accordingly fail and are di.amilllled
with costs. One set of hearing fees.
Appeals di.smisst,tl.
SMT. SOMAVANTI A~D OTHERS
Jl4y 2.
v.
THE STATE OF PUNJAB AND OTHERS
(And Conneote.d Petitions)
lB. P. SINHA, c. J., K. SuBBA. R.t.o, N. RA.J.t.GOP.ALA.
AYYA.NGA..R, J. R. MuoBOLXA.B and
T. L. VKN.K.A.TA..RA.JU. .AIYA.B, JJ .)
Land Acqu;.ifiqn....-Puhlic purpo..--Qovemmt>&I tltdaration l .
aa lo public purpo-1/ juaU<:iable-"ComlmitJO ellid•-"
"Concluafoe proof", Meaning of-Compen11alio..-~,,,.,.1'•
cofllribution of w•t-1/ •hould be aublllanlial-l..dia11 Et1i<UllU
Acl 1872 (I of 1872), u. J, 4-Land Acquiaition Act, 1894
(I~! 1894), ••· 4, 6A, 6-Conatilmion of lnrlia, Art. 14.
In February, 1961, the petitioners purchucd over si:r
acres of land situate in the State of Punjab for a 1um of
Its. 4,50,000 and claim to have done so for the purpo.sc of
establishing a paper mill. The sixth respondent, private
limited company, which had a licence from the Govcrn~ent
of India for 1tarting a factory for the manufacture of vanoua
2 s.c.R.
'
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
.775
ranges of refrigeration compressors and ancillary equipment,
requeoted the State of Punjab for the allotment of an ·appro·
priate site for the location of the fattory, Tn the official
Gazette of August 25, 1961, was published a notification of the
.Governor of Punjab dated August 18, 1961, unders~ 4ofthe
Land Acquisition Act, 1894, to the effect that the land belong·
ing to the P'titioners was likely to be needed by the Government at public expeoses for a public purpose, namely, for
setting up a factory for manufacturing various ranges of
refrigeration compressors and ancillary equipment. The
Govrrnment directed that action under s. 17 of tho Act shall
be taken because there was uriency and that the provisions of
s. 5A shall not apply to the acquisition. In the same Gazette
another notification under s. 6 of the Act dated August 19,
1961, was published to the effect that the Governor of Punjab
was satisfied that the land was.required by the Government at
public expense for the said purpose. The notification provide
for the immediate taking of possession of the land under
the provisions of s. 17 (2) (c} of the Act. On September 29,
1961, the Government of Punjab sanctioned an expense of
Rs. 100 for the purpose of acquisition of the land. The peti·
tioners filed an application under Art. 32 of the Constitution
of India challenging the legality of the action taken by the
Government on the grounds, inter alia, (I} that the acquisition
was nqt for a public purpose either under s. 4 ors. 6 of the
Land Acquisition Act; (2) that the land was in reality being
acquired for the benefit of t]le sixth respondent and that the
action of the Government amounted to discrimination against
the petitioners and violated. Art. 14 of the Contitution of
India; (3} that the alleged contribution of Rs. I QO made by
the Government was a colourable exercise of pnwer inasmuch
as the amount was so unsubstantial sum compared to the value
of the property that it could not raise an inference of Govern.
ment participation in the proposed activity; and (4) that foe
notifications under ss. 4 and 6 could riot have been made
simultaneously and were, therefore, without efficacy.
Helil. (per Sinha, C. ]., Rajagopala Ayyangar, Mudhol·
kar and V~nkatarama· Aiyar, JJ.), (l} that the declaration
made by the Government in the notification under s. 6 (I) of
the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, that the land was required
for a public purpose, was made conclusive by sub-s. 3 of s. 6
and that it was not open to a court to go behind it and try to
satisfy itself whether in fact the acquisition was for a public
purpose.
Whether in a particular case the purpose for which
land was needed was a public purpose or not was for the
1962
So11UW.inti
v.
81a1e tJj Punj,6
776
.
SomaDCMfi
St.te •f Pm/ab
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963)
Government to be satisfied about and the declaration of the
Government would be final subject to one exception, n{mely
that whi;re there was a colourable exercise of the power the
decl~raUon would be open to challenge at the instance of the
aggneved party.
Hamabai Framju Petit v. Secrela•y of Stale for India
(1914) L. R. 42 I. A. 44- and R. L. Arora v. Tha Stat.. of Utta~
Pra4t•h, (1962) Supp. 2 S. C.R. 149 distinguished.
VtdlaJ)tllla Suryanarayana v. The Provi..u of Ma<lrM
I. L. R. (19%) Mad. 153, approved.
'
(2) that there was no difference between the effect of
the expression "conclusive evidence" ins. 6 (3) of the Act
from that of "conclusive proof", the aim of both being to
give finality to the establishment of the existence of a fact fro n
the proof of another.
(3) that the conclusiveness in s. 6 (3) must neces•arily
attached not merely to a ' 1nted" but also to the question
whether the purpose was a public purpose. There could be
no "need" in the a 'Jstract.
(l) that the provisions of .the Act which provided that
the declaration made by the State that a particular land was
needed for a public purpose, shall be conclusive evidence of
the fact that it was needed, did not infring the Constitution.
St<Ui nf Bihar v. Maharajacfhiraja Sir Kam..hwar Singh of
Darbhanga d: Ors., [19~2) S. C.--R.. 889, Babu Barltya Thakur
v. Stal< of Bombay & Or.•.. [ 196 IJ I S. C. R. 128, and State of
Bombay v. Bhanji Munji & Anr., (1955] I S. C.R. 777, relied
on.
(5) that it was for the State to say whicn particular
industry might be regarded as beneficial to the public and to
decide that its establishment would serve a public purpose;
therefore, no question of discrimination would arise merely
from the fact that the Government had declared that the
establishment of a particular industry was a public purpose.
Accordingly, the notifications in qucation, did not contravene
.l\rt. 14 of the Constitution.
(6) that as •. 5A was out of the- way the publication in
the same issue of th<· Gazette of the both the notifications
that is the one dated August 18, 1961, and that dated August
19, 1961, was not irregular.
Held, further (Subba Rao, J, di88enfing), that the not~
fication daterl Acgust 19, 1961, under s. 6 of the Land Aco"'t·
sition Act, 1694, was not invalid on the ground that th'
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
777
amount contributed by the State towards the cost of the
acquisition was only nominal compared to the value of the
land.
The expression "party out of public revenues". in the
proviso to .s. 6 (I) of the Act did not necessarily mean
that State's contribution must be substantial; but whether a
token contribution by the State towards the cost of acquisition
would be sufficient compliance with the law would depend
upon the facts of each case and it was open to ' the court in
every case which came before it to ascertain whether the :.ction
of the State was a colourable exercise of power.
'-,;·
Sa11(ja Naicken v. Secretary of State, (1926) I. L. R. 50
Mad. 308 and Vadlapatla Suryanaryana v. The Province of
Jladraa, I. L. R. [1946] Mad. 153, approved.
Ponnaia v. Secretary of State, A. I. R. 1926 Mad. 1099,
disapproved.
Chatterton v. Oave, ( 1878) 3 App. Cas. 483 and
Maharajah &uch,,...war Singh v. Chairman of the Durbhanga
Municipality, ( 1890) L. R. 17 I. A. 90 held inapplicable.
Per Subba Rao, J.-in interp~ting the proviso to s. 6 (l)
of the Act a reasonable meaning" should be given to the
expression "wholly or partly." The payment of a part of a
compensation must have some rational relation to the
compensation payable in respect of the acquisition for a public
purpose. So construed "part can only mean substantial part
of the estimated compensation. What was substantial part
of a compensation depended upon the facts of each case. In
the instant case, it was impo'8ible to say that a sum of
Rs. I 00 out of an estimated compensation which might go
, even beyond Rs. 4,00,000 was in any sense of the term a
substantial part of the said compensation. The Government
had clearly broken the condition and, therefore, it had no
jurisdiction to issue the declaration under s. 6 of the Act.
' .
ORIGINAL JurosDIOTION: Petitions Nos. 246 to
248of196L
Petitions under Art. 32 of the Constitution of
India for the enforcement of Fundamental , Rights.
-O)
G. 8. Pathak, Rameahwar Nath, 8. 0. Andley
and P. L. Vokra, for the petitioners (in petition No.
246 of 1961).
1962
S•marxinti
••
Stoto of Punjab
778
1911
Somiu.,nti
Y.
St.II•[ PwajU
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963]
Rameshwar Nath, S.N. Andky andP. L. Vohra
for the petitioners (in petitions Nos. 24 7 and 248
of 1961).
S. M. Sikri, Advocate-General for the SI.ale of
Punjab, N. S. Bindra and P. D. Menon, for respondent No. 1 (in all the petitions).
8. P. Varma, for respondent No. 6 (in a.II the
petitions).
H. N. Sanyal, Atlclitional Solicitor-General of
India, R. B. Dhehar and P. D. Menon, for the State
of Gujarat !Intervener) (in a.II ihe petitions).
1962. May 2. The following judgments were
d..livered. The judgment of Sinha, C. J., Rajagopala
Ayyangar, Mudholkar and Venka.tarama Aiya.r, J J.,
waR delivered by Mudholker, J.
JlwlAJlor J.
MunHOLKAR. J.-Tbe petitioners who have
acquired over six acres of land by purchase for
Rs. 4,50,00'l in February. 1961, under five sale
deedq and one lease deed claim to ha.ve done so
for the purpose of establislling a pa.per mill in
collaboration with Messrs. R. S. Ma.dhoram and
Sons who had been granted a licenoe for the establishment of a pa.per plant in Gha.zia.had in Uttar
Pra.deAh. The aforesaid land is situate in the village Meola. Ma.harajpur, Tehsil Balla.bhgarh, District
Gnrga.on, and a.buts on the Mathura. Road, and is
only about IO or 12 miles from Now DPlhi.
Respon<lent No. 6, Air Conditioning Corporation
(P) Ltd., is a private limited concern and holds a
licence from the Government of India. for starting
a. fa.otor.v for the manufacture of various ranges of
refrigeration compressors and ancillary equipment.
We may mention here that initially this project
was allotted to the State of West Bengal but at
the raquest of St1.te of Punjab its location was
shifted to the State of Punjab.
•
2 S.C.R.
SOPR'F.Ml!l.COUR'r REPORTS
7tr9
Respondent No. 6 requested the State of
Punjab for the allotment of an appropriate site
for the location oi"' the factory. The petitioners
contend that respondent No. 6 being interested in
acquiring land in the village Meola .Maharajpilr
approached the State of Punjab in •or about the
month of March, 1961, for the purpose of acquiring
land for their factory under the Land Acquisitfon
Act, 1'894 (hereinafter referred to as the Act)., One
of the petitioners having learnt of this made an
applieation on March 23, 1961, to the Deputy
Commissioner, Gttrgaon, 'requesting him that ·none
of the lands purchased by the petitioners should
be acquired for the benefit · of respondent No. 6.
(l);vriers of adjacent lands Mr. Om Prakash,
'Mr Ram Raghbir, Mr. Atma.ram Chaddha and
Mr. Bari Kishen who are petitioners in W.. P. 247
'and 24!! of 1961 which were heard 11.long with this
petition Iilitde similar requests. The petitioners
allege th~t they 'were .af!Suforl by the Deputy
ConiniiSsioner that their 18.iids 'would not, be· acquired for the benefit ofrestiondent No. 6. Thereafter
retrponden't No, 6 pni'llhased by private treaty a
plot of %'tid measuririg · ii.pproxitnately 70,000 sq.
yards cont'lgaous to the land owned 'by the petitioners on ~r about April.21, 1961.
The petitioners' grievance is that notwithstanding 'the a.llSurances giVeil to them by the Deputy
Commissioner, Gtirgaon, . the. Governor of Punjab,
by not1fication dated. August 25, 1!161, under s. 4
oftlie Act declared tl,at the lands .of the petition,
era in this petition as well as those of the petitioners
in the other two writ petitioils were likely to be
ne11ded by Government at public · expense for a
public ,purpose, namely,. for retting up a factory
for manufacturing V&;J,"ious ra~es of refrig~ration
oompressors ·amd ancillary eqmpment. ·It ,accordingly notified that the land in the localit;y-desoribed
Smiiaooriti
••
SW• of Nir'1Jb
780
IHI
,y..,..,,,,i
••
si.u./Ponj<I>
M"'Mltn !.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS·[I963]
in the notifioation W&B required for the aforesaid
purp06e. Similarly it authorised the Sub.Divisional
Officer and Land Acquisition Officer, Palwal, to
enter upon and survey the land io the locality
and to do all other aots required or permitted by
s. 4 of the Act. It further directed that action
under s. 1 7 of the Act shall be taken because there
was urgency and also directed that the provisions
of s. 5A shall not apply to the acquisition. On
August 19, the Governor of Punjab made a notifieation under s. 6 of the Act to the effect that he
was satisfied that the land specified in the notification was required Ly Government at public expense for public purpose, namely, for setting up a
factery for the manufacture of refrigeration comprt>esors and other ancillary equipment and declared
that the aforesaid land was required for the aforesaid purposes. Thi~ declaration was made "to all
whom it may concern" and the Sub- Divisional
Officer, Palwal, was directed to take all steps for
the acquisition of this land. Finally the notification
provided for the immediate taking of possession of
the land under the provisions of .s. 17 (2) (c) of
the Act. Both these notifications were published in
the Punjab Government Gazette of August 25, 1961.
The petitioners contend that these notifications and the land acquisition proceedings permitted to be taken under them violate their fundamental rights under Art. 19 (1) (f) and (~)to po88e88
the said land and carry on th1>ir ocoupat-ion, trade
or business and that, therefore, they must
be qua.shed.
It is their contention that they have purchased.this land bona /irle for industrial purposes as
land in t.he vicinity of this land is being acquired
by industrialists for establishing various indastries.
The purpose is said to be the establishment of a
paper manufaeturiDg plant. Acoo~ to them
~.
\
/•
2 S.C.R.
.'
'
SUPREME OOURT REPORTS
781
they have entered into an arrangement with
Messrs. R. S. Madho Ram & Sons who· hold industrial licence No. L/2! ( l)/N-60/62. The proposed
industry, according to them, would employ about
200 people. The industry they wish to start is a
new one s·1 far as they are concerned, whereas
according to them, the respondent No. 6 is
already engaged in refrigeration industry and as far
as they know, it has established a factory for manufacturing refrigeration equipment at Hyderabad in·
the State of Andhra Prade~h.
·It may· be mentioned that some time after
the. notification was published, that is, on September 29, 1961, the Government of Punjab sanctioned
the expense of Rs. 100 for the purpose of acquisi·
.tion of this land. According to the petitioners
this was an after·thou1?ht and besides, a token oenti-ibution of this kind is not sufficient to show
that the acquisition is being made ·partlY at public
·
expense.
The petition was opposed not only by respondent No. 6 but also by the State of Punjab which
is respondent No. 1 to the petition. The respondent
No. 1 denied that the petitioners had purchased the
land for a bona fide industrial purpose and would
in. fact ·use it for such purpose. It also denied that
any assurance was give to the petitioners that their
lands would not be acquired. It admitted that .
the respondebt No. 6 had. made an application in
December, 196tl for acquiring land for setting up its
factory and that, therefore, the Punjab Government agreed to do tbe needful. According to respondent No. 1 the acquisition proceedings have been
undertaken fo.r a public purpose and at public
expense as stated in the notification and that the
State Governm.ent would make part contribution
towards the payment of compensation of ~he land
out of publio revenues. In the cirowut-anoee it if!
1958
'9'1m1•nli
v.
S - oJ l"u•J•b
· Jlulieoll:ar J.
782
1951
s-
••
8•,t• of P-jab
M...rAolloar J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1963]
contended that the petitionerB would not be entitled
to any relief whatsoever. fhey would of course
get compensation for the land as determined by the
Land Acquisition Officer.
The action of the State Government is said to
be legal and in accordance with the provisions of
the law because what was done was permissible
under ss.4 and 6 of the Act, that it was done bona
fide, that part of the compensation would be paid
out of the public revenues, that the declaration
made by the Government is conclusive evidence
under sub-s.(3) of s.6, that the land is needed for
a public purpose. that the notifications were made
on different dates though thev were published in
the same issue of the Gazette and are perfectly valid,
that the land is not being acquired for a company
but for a public purpose, that, therefore, the provieions
of Part VII of the Act arl' inapplicable and that the
lands are lying vacant and their owners will be paid
ccmoensation. No questio11 of depriving them of
their fundamental rights under Art. 19( I )(f) and
(11:) or <;>f violation of their right under Art. 14 therefore arises.
According to respondent No. I it would be
open to the petitioners to make their claim for
compensation to the L1md Acquisition Officer for
such IOHs as the acquisition would en tail on them.
It also stated that as the land purchased by the
respondent No. o through private negotiation has
no access to the main road and as the land is
inadequate to meet the minimum essential 1"1!qulr&ments the acquisition of the lands in question became necessary.
On behalf of the respondent No. 6 it is stated
that the need for a facto1y like the one in its contemplation is acutely felt in India inasmuch a.
manufacture of compressors and the C01I1pones
nts of"big and small air-oonditionen, refriger!Mors,
,,
f·
2 S.C.R.
SUPB.EME COURT REPORTS
783
water coolers and cold storage cabinets is not being
"'( carried out anywhere in the country so far. The
import of these goods naturally drains away a considerable amount of foreign exchange. It wa3,
therefore, felt that by starting manufacture of these
articles in our country not only will foreil!D exchange
be saved, but some foreign exchange will eventually
be earned by the export .of manufactured goods.
They further contend that the purpose for which
the faotory is being set up must be regarded as a
'y public purpose because inter alia it is intended by
manufacturing the aforesaid goods, to cater to the
needs of the public at large. It is in view of these
circumstances · that the Government of India,
accepting the recommendation made in. this regard
by the licensing committee under the Indmitries
Development and Regulation Act, 1951, issued a
licence in its favour on April 8, 1951. It then
pointed out that it has secured the collaboration in
this project of a . well-known Amerioan Company
named Borg•Warner International Corporation of
~· Chicago, which is the biggest manufacturers of air
conditioning plants and equipment in the wor~d,
and that the collaboration agreement has been
approved by the Government of India in the Minis·
try of Commerce. Its grievance is that .this agreement has not been implemented so far because ·it
· has not been able to get the land for constructing
the building in which the necessary machinery and
'implements' could be installed. Finally it says
that originally the licence was issued for setting up
a faotory in the State of West Bengal and that it
was at the instance of the Government of Punjab
that the Central Government permitted the looation
of the factory tQ be shifted from .West Bengal to
Ponjab; According to it· once the factory gets going it is likely to employ at least liOOO workem,
Y:r
':~
It is not necessary to refer to the other affidavits and the rejoinder affidavits except to some
1961
Somattanti
'·
Btat. .J Punjab
Mudholk" J.
78'
'S0111Gva11ti
v.
Strite of J>wVab
Mudll<l"'1r J.
8UPREME OO'URT REPORTS (1003)
portions of the additional a.ffida.vit filed by Mr. M.R.
Bhagat, Under Soo ..tita.ry on bcha.lf of the respond- '·
ent No. I. We a.re referring only to those portions
whioh were relied on durin~ the argu~1ents before
us. In tha.t a.ffidavit it is denied tha.t a.ny licence
had been gra.nted to Messrs. R. S. Madho Ram &
Sons for the csta.blishment of a. pa.per plant in the
Punj~b. According to respondent No. I McB8rs.
R. S. Madho Ram &,Sons were gra.nted a. lioenee on
August .17, 1960, for the establishment of an industria.l undertaking in Ghazia.bad (U.P.) for the ma.nu- •
facture of writing and printing pa.per and pulp. It
further stated that even this licence has been ca.ncelled by the Government of India by their letter
dated Ja.nua.ry 31, 1962. Sinoe the said licensee did
not take any etftictiva steps• to establish the same.
It then stated that the Air Conditioning Corporation whioh wa.s incorporated &B a. private limited
company h&B since, with the permiBllion of the
Gentral Government, been converted into a. pnblio
limited company with the name and style of "York ,
India. Ltd.", a.nd that the oompa.ny ha.e been gra.nted •
a licence to ma.nufa.oture refrigeration equipment
by the Industrial Licensing Committee. There is
an agreement between York India Ltd., and Me1111re.
York Corporation, U.S.A. a. subsidiary of BorgWarner of the U.S.A. whereunder the la.tter have
undertaken to give au technical &BBistanoe and
technical training to the Indian personnel a.e also to
contribute 500/o of the initial investment in the ·~
undertaking. The respondent No. 6 expects to 'manufacture 70% of the equipment in the very first
year and cent. per oent. by the end of 1966. It
further stated that the foreign collaborators also
have a.greed to sell the products of the iirm outai.de
India. at price11 and on terms and oondition11 mOllt
favourable to the.Indian iirm, thereby enabling it
...
to obtain aoceBB to the foreign market. The foreign 1 ·
collaborator would make available to the Indian
2 s.c.R.
SUPREME COURT R:E'PORTS
785
personnel the technical 'know-how' and other in·
formati:m necessary for the manufacture of refrigeration materials and that such assistance will itself
be very valuable. It dl3aied that the respondent
No. 6 has established a factory similar to the one
now intended to be establi~hed in Hyderabad as
alleged by the petitionera. It is admitted that
licences have been granted to two other concerns in
India for the manufacture of similar equipment.
Neither of &hose licensees has actually started production, at any rate, so far, and, therefore, it is not
correct to say that similar equipment is already
being manufactured in India. Then it stated "the
products that are to be manufactured. by the
respondent till now
were being imported
into India from foreign countries and goods
worth about Rs. 3,8:~, 70,000 in 1960 and for the
first ten months. in 1961 Rs. 3,55,50,000 were imported by the various licensees holding import licences." It also stated that the respondent No. 6 was
granted "licence to establish a factory in West
Bengal but since no one had been gMnted a licence
to establish a factory of this kind in the Punjab its
licence was tran,sferred .to Punjab. The proposed
factory would employ a large number of persons
and thus help to solye to some extent the exisiting
'problem of unemployment in Punjab. Finally it
stated that the establishment of the factory as such
is in furtherance of the industrial development of
the Punjab State and is, therefore, for a public
purpose.
On behalf of the petitioners Mr. Pathak has
raised the following five· contentions :
(1) The acquisition is not for a public
purpose either within s.4 or s.6 of the Land
Acquisition Act or for a purpose useful to the
public as contemplated in s.41 and that the
. action of the Government amounted to
1962
-
Samav.n•i
v.
State of Purl}•&
M wiADlkar J.
786
SUPREME CJOURT REPORTS [1963)
1~1
acquiring property from one peil!on and giving
it to another.
--
(2) The alleged contribution of Rs. 100
made by the Government is a colourable
exercise of power, that no such intention was
mentiontld prior to the noti.ficll.tion and that
the amount of Ra. 100 is so unsubstantial a.
sum compared to the va.loe of the propflrty
that it cannot raise an inference of Government participation in the propOl:led activity.
..
(3) 1hat the property is in fact being
acquired for a company and, therefore, the
provisions of Part VII of the Act should hav.e
been complied with. Non-complia.noe with
those provisions vitiates the acquisition.
(4) The petitioners' proposed paper mill
would be as good an industrial concern. as
the one intended to be established by re1pondent No. 6 and the Government, in prefer·
ring the jatter to the former, has viola.toil
the guarantee of equal protection of. law
provided by Art. 14 of the Constitution.
(5) That the notification under 88. 4 and
6 could not have been made simultaneously
and are, therefore, without effioa.cy.
We may deal with the third point raised by
Mr. Pathak first, that iR, regarding · non-<'ompliance
of provisions of Part VIL It is common ground
that those proviaiona were not complied with. The
reason for that ie, th~t according to tho respondents
the acquisition is not for a company but for a
public purpose, partly at public expense. Indeed,
the respondents at no stage have relied on the
provisions of Part VII of the Act and
therefor.,, the main question to be coQsidered
is whether the acquisition is for a public purpose
·~.
' .··
2 S.C.R
'SUPREME COURT REPORTS
•
:7g7
·pa:rtly. 'a:t •public · expense ur not. If it is ·so,
'then, .·of ·course, ·the petitions ··must succeed.
Therefore, it is ·the, ·first two contentions· raised by
Jnr. 'Pathak which ·primarily ·need ·our considera·
ttion.
. .
·
.
,
.According to learned .counsel ,for .the peti·
:tioners. the .statements made in the •.affidavits on
.behalf of .the State .as .well .as .on 'behalf of the
;respondent No, 6.makeiit petfectly clear that the
_land is .being .acquired for the .respondents .No.•6 •
.Reliance ;is placed particularly upon ·.that JJOrtion
.of the .affidavit of•the State where it .is stated that
the land Js acquired far •en.abling the .. respondent
No. 6.to.have·.access to the .main .road.and :for
m&eting their =inimum requirements .far ·establish.ing .their .factory. It .is .further .stated. that .the
, .co~pensation for.all the .land which.is .being.acquir- ·
ed.is .to come.out of.the .pockets .not .of ,the State
Government but the. responJent;· .No.·6 ;itself. No
•doubt, the ·Government.has said that it ·has sanctioned the 1payment -of Rs. 100 .towards the •P3iY·
.ment of .compensation.but that.is only an insignifi.cant fraction of the .total.amount of.con:ipensation
.that would be payable in respect .{if.these lands,
the,petitioners 'themselves:having paid Rs. 4,5U,OOO
.to.the persons .from whom . they acquired these ·
lands.
•
}
,.
I
i
'
~
I
I
.
~
·on behalf df the , respondents the 'learned
·Aavocate:General for Pu'rijab ·contended. that 'the
declaration of 'the' Government in the notification
'that the 'Jana is requirer! "Jor a ,pulilic .Pm:pos.e 'is
'Inade conclusive by sub's. 3 of a. '6 of the Act and, .
· therefore, it'is not open·to ·t!iis Court to go 'behind
'it and try ·to satisfy itself ·whether · in, fact .the
acquisition :is for a: pdbliC'purpose.or· not. '.Alternatively 'he contended 'that the :land 'is be~g
acquired '.for a ]>Ulilio ·pu~pose 'because the object
ct.the acquisition is to esta!JliSh a.new indust~y
.•.
·S9111a1'anti
~Stare'of Punja~
788
1151
s""""""""
••
S ate of PuflJob
SUPREME OOURT REPORTS [1963]
and do aw.~y with imports of refrigeration equipment and to tinable technical education to be imparted to Ind fan personne 1 in a new field. He further
said that the acquisition will not only save foreign
exchange by lessening imports but will enable
foreign exchange to be earned from the export of
goods manufactured in the proposed factory. The
new industry is said to be of great economic
importance inasmuch as it will enable the preservation of food which will otherwise be destroyed.
Refrigeration 1>q11ipment also contributes towards
the maintenance of health beca.11se it enables
storage of medicines such as a.nti·biotics which a.re
liable to be decomposed a.t norma.1 temperatures
prevailing in our country. The industry proposed
to be started will open a new avenue of employment and diminish unemployment and generally
advance the industrial development of the country.
Finally he said that a pa~t of the land is required
for building houses and <iUarters .for the workers
of the factory and to give amenities to them. All
these purposes a.re, therefore, said to be publio
purposes. Reliance was plaood by him on Vol. 19
of Encyclopaedia Britannica, pp. 49 to 57 for
showing the manifold applications of refrigeration
in various indu"tries and activities. Reft1rence
was also ma.de to Vol. 18 of Encyclopaedia. Britannica, p. 745 wherein facilities for providing refrigeration ha.ve been grouped under the heading
•publio utility'. Reference wa.s also ma.de to be
next pa.ge where it is stated "Every public utility
must be in poeaellBion of natural resources upon
whioh that industry is based. Their sites must
have strategic locations. Limitation in the ohoice
of this agent of production tends to ma.ke the cost
of acquiring or leasing these fa.oilities greater than
it would be if the indUBtry had a wider range of
ohoioo. Furthermore, utilities must make allowances in advance for probable increase in the required
oapaoit;y. For the&e reaso1111 utilities are provided
••
..,
.
'
2 S.C.R.
Stn>REME COURT :l!.EPO:l!.Ts
789
with the governmental power of eminent 4omain
which · makes possible the compulsory sale of
private' proporty." Relying upon the affidavit of
Mr. Bhagat, to which we have referred earlier, the
learned Advocate-Genoral of Punjab ·said t.hat the
object of the Government in acquiring these lands
is to enable a new industry ·to be· established not
only for saving foreign exchange and earning foreign
excha.ngd but al8J for s0curing the industrial advancement of the cmlntry, en&bling the citizens to
obtain tecbnic'.1.I ·~duc~tion in a new field, relieving to some extent' the pressure of unemployment
and so on. For a.II the,;e reaqo11s he contends that
the acquisition m11st Im deemed to be for a public
purpose eve_n though the bulk of the compensation
for the aoquisi~ion will come from the· pockets of
respondent No. 6.
In our opinion the question whether any of the
aforesaid purposes falls within the expression
public purpose woulrl ariAe for consideration only
if the declaration of the Government is not conolusive or if the action of the Government is colourable. If, as contended by the learned Advocate
General, sub-s. 3 of s, 6 concludes the matter-and
the validity of this provision is not challengedand the aotion of the Government is not co!ourable
the other question would not arise for oonsidera.tion.
It is strenuously contended on behalf of the
petitioners that sub-s, 3 of s, 6 does not debar
this Court from considering whether a. purposed
acquisition is for a public purpose or not. It is
said, in the first plaoe, that this provision only
ma.kes the declaration "conclusive evidence'' and
not· "oonulusive proof" and then con'tended tha.t
the declaration is conclusive evidence only of a
need and nothing more.
A distinction is sou~ht to be ma.de b11tween
''oonolusive proof" a.nd ''oonolusive evidence" a.nd
Somavanti
••
St<t..f Pun.ia/J
M udhol-or J,
790
SOPREUIECOURT REPORTS '.(l!J63]
it is·contended that where a law ·declares that a
fact
shall be conclusive proof of another, the Court
'Somt..aanti
v.
is _precluded from considering other evidence once
State-uf Punjab
such fact is established. Therefore, where the law
--·
makes ·a fact conclusive proof of another ·the fact
Muihollcar J. \
stands proved and 'the Court must ·proceed on that
basis. But, _ the argument proceeds, where the
-----law does· not -go ·that 'far and makes ·a fact only
••conclusive evidence" · as to the existence of
another 'fact, other evidence ·as to be existence of the other 'fact is not shut out. In support of the
argument· reliance is placed on·s. 4 of the Indian
Evidence Act which in its·third paragraph defines
'conclusive proof' as follows :
'
"When one fact is declared _.by this Act
to be conclusive proof of another, ·the Court
shall, on proof of the one fact, rl'lgard the
other as proved, and.shall ·not allow evidence
to'be given for the purpose of disproving'it".
.
I
I
.
This-paragraph thus provides that further evidence
is barred ·where, under the Indian Evidence Act,
one fact.is1regarded as proof •.of .another. But it
says nothing about what other laws may provide.
There.are a number of «laws which •m&ke certain
facts · conclusive •evidence of other ;facts: (see
Companies Act, 1956, s. 132 ; the Indian Snccession Act, 1925, s. 38 l ; Christian Marriages Act,
1872, s; 61 ; JUadras · 'Revenue Act, .1869, s. 38 ;
Oaths Act, 1873, s. ll ). ~The question is
whether s:ich provision also bars other evidence
after that which is conclusive evidence is produced.
The object of .adducing evidence is to
prove a . fact. The
Indian . Evidence Act, -• deals with the.question.as to what kind of evidence
is permissible to l?e ·adduced for ,that 1purpose .and
· states .in. s. 3 .when a fact is said to ba proved.
'.That section- reads thus :
•
2 S.C,R; ·
SUPREME OOURT REPORTS
791
•Evidence' means and includes(1) all statements which the court permits or requires to be made befare it
by witnesses, in relation to matters
of fact under inquiry ; such statements are called oral evidPnce ;
(2) all documents produced for the
inspection of the court ; euch documents are called documentary evidence.
A fact is said to be proved when,
after considning the matters before
it, the Court either believes it to exist,
or considers its existence so probable
that a prudent man ought, under the
circumstances of the particu Jar case,
to act upon the supposition that it
exists."
I
. ,.·~.
I
'
Since evidence means anti includes all statement
which the court permits or requires to be made,
when t1:te law says that a particular kind of evidence
would be conclusive as to the existence of a particular fact it implies that that fact can be proved
either or by evidence or by some other evidence
which the Court permits or requires to be advanced. Where such other evidence is adduced it
woulrl be open to the Court to consider whether,
upon that evidence, the fact exist . or not. Where
on the other hand, evidence which is made conclusive is adduced, the Court has no option but to hold
that the fact exists. If that were not so, it would be
meaningless to call a particular piece of evidence as
conclusi'f'e evidence. Once the law says that certain
evidence is conclusive it shuts out any other evidence which would detract from the conclusiveness
of that e'f'idence. In substance, therefore, there is
no difference between conclusive evidence . and
196t
Som.:i1Janti
••
Sta" of Punjab
Mudholkar J.
SUPRmnJ COU~T)~·Ji)I'.O:i;tTS [1963]
792
"
SomatJara#
v,
Sta.I• of Punjab
conclusive proof. Statutes may use the e:z;pression
'conclusive proof' where ··the obje9t is to make
a fact non-justiciable. But the le'gislature may use
some other expreBBion such as 'conclusive evidence'
for achieving the same resulk Th'ere is thus no
difference btitween tho :effect of the expr11ssion
'oonclusiv;e e.vidonce' from that of 'conclusive proof',
thA aim of both being tp give jiuality to ~he establishment of the existen'c<i 'of a. fact from the proof
1
of another.
• i.
Learned counsel cont.ends that it is open to
tho Court to examine whether the action of th!l
executive, even in the absenoo·nf 1tn allegation that
it is malafide, is related to the section or not and for
th.is purpose to consider whethnr 'the' acquisition is
for rt public purpose. In support of·this contention
he has relied upon the decision in State of Bihar v.
Mahriraja<fhiraja Sir KarneswaKBi1Jgh of Darbhanga(').
There, Mahajan, J. (as h!J then . was,). has~
expressed the view that the exorcise of power
to acquire compulsorily iR cnnditional on the
existence of public purpose and that. being so
this condition is not an express provision
of Art. 31 (2) but exists aliund in the content
of the power itself. That, however, was not
the view of the other learned Judges who consitituted the Bench. Thus according to Mukherjea,
J., (As he then was), the condition of the exisLence
of a public purpose is implied in Art. :11(2). (See
pp. 957, 958.). Das. J.· (aR he then was), was also of
the same view. (See pp. 986 .988). Similarly
Patanjali Sastri, C.J., has also taken the view that
the existence of public purpose iR an express condition of cl. 2 of Art. 3L
The Constitution permits acquisition by the
State of private property only if it is required for
a public purpose... But 'can ii; therefore, be said
( ll c19S11) s.c.a..• ,113~.
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
793
that tne provisions of a statute must be so construed that the declaration by the Govermn@nt as to
the existence of public purpose is necessarily justiciable ? We are not concerned here with a post
Constitution law but with a pre-Constitution law.
The Act has been in operation since 1894. The
validity of the law was challenged before this Court
in Babu Barkya Thakur v. The State of Bomhay ( 1)
on the ground that it infringes the provisions
of Arts. 31(2) and 19(l)(f) of the Constitution.
But this C"urt held that the law being a pre-Constitution law is prot3cted· from the operation of
·Art. 31(2) by the provisions of Art. 3l(f))(a}. It
also held, following the decision in the St.ate of
Bomhay v. BIUJnji Munji (') ·and that in Lilavati
Bai v. The St,ate of Bomhay (') that the attack
under Art. 19(l)(f) of the Constitution is futile.
The argument, however, is that the protection
which the Act enjoys is only to this extent that
even though any of its provisions be in conflict
with Art.3 Lp) the Act cannot be nballenged on that
ground ; the protection does not however extend to
other provisions of Part III of the Constitution,
such as Art. 19( l)(f). As we understand the decision in Bhanji Munji's case(') what this Court has
held is that for a right under Art. 19(1 l (f) to hold
property to be available to a person, he must have
the· property with respect to which he can assert
such right.
If the right to the possession of
the property is taken away by law protected
by Art. 31 (5) (a), Art. 19 (I) (f) is not attracted. That is the decision of this Court and
it has been followed in two other cases. All
the decisions a.re binding upon us. It is contended that none of the decisions has considered the
argument advanced before us that a law may be
(ll (1%1) 1 s.c.R.128.
(l) (19SS) I S.C.R. 777.
(!) 0957) S.c.R.. 721.
1981
Bomao1nei
••
Bl•IO of Punjab
Mudllolkar J.
794
Som<Jtiallti
••
Stal4 of Pu.11jc.b
Mudh.llun J.
SUPREME OOURT REPORTS (1963)
protected from an attack under Art. 3 l (2) ·but it
will still be invalid under Art. 13(2) if the reetri<>tion placed by it on the right of a person to hold
property is unreasonable. In other words, for the
law before us to regiuded as valid it must also
satisfy the requirements of Art. 19(5) and that only
thereafter oan the property of a person be taken
away. It is sufficient to say that though this Court
may not have pronounced on this aspect of tho
matter we are bound by the actual dociAions which
categorically negative an attack based on the right
guaranteed by Art. 19( l)(f}. The binding effect of
a decision does not depend upon whether a
particular argument was considered therein or
not, provided that the point with reference to whi(lh
an ar~umf>nt was subsequently advancE'd was
actually decided. That point bas been specifically
decided in the tlireo decisions referred to above.
We, therefore, hold that "inoe the Act provi·
des that the declaration made by the St~te that a
particular land is needed for a public purpose shall
be conclusive evidenee of the fact that it is so needed the Constitution is not thereby infringed.
For ascertaining the extent to which the
determinatfon by the State is conclusive it would he
desirable to examine the relevant provisions of
the Act. The preamble states that the law is for
the acquisition of land needed for public purposes
and for companies and incidental matters connected therewith. Section 2(f) defines publio purpose
as follows :
"the expression 'public purp<'Se' includes
the provision of village sites in districts in
which the appropriate Governm•mt shall have
declared by notification in the Official Gazette
that it is customary for the Government to
make such provision:"
•
""
<·
2 S.0.R. SUPREME COURT REPO!tTS
;.
795
Thie is an inclusive definition and not a compendious one and therefore, does not assist us very
much in aecertiiininiz the ambit of the expression
'public purpose'. Broadly speaking the expression
'pub.lie purpose' would, however, include a purpose
in which the general interest of the community,
as opposed to the particular interest of individuals,
iR directly and vitally concerned.. Then there is
s. 4 which enables . the State to publish a preliminary notification whenever it appears to it that
land in any locality is needed or is likely to be
needed for a public pmpose. The other aspects of
the section b.ave no bearing upon the point before
us and we need not refer to them. Then there is
s. 5A which gives to the person intnested in the
land which has been notified as being needed or
likely to be needed for a public purpose or for a
company, the right to object to the acquisition of
the land. Such objection has to be heard by the
Collector and after making such further enquiry as
he thinks necessary the record has to be submitted
to the appropriate Government along with the
report containing the Collector's recommendations
and the objections. .-;uh-section (2) of s. 5A makes
the decision oftbe Government on the objections
final. This is followed by a: 6 sub. a. ( l) of which
provides that when the Government is satisfied
that any particular land is needed for a
public purpose, or for a company, a declaration
should be made to that effect and such declaration
should be published in the Official Gazette.
Sub-section I 2) specifies the matters including the
purpose
for
which the land . is needed
which are to be set out in the declaration. Subsection (3) makes the declaration concinsive evidence of the fact tba t the land is needed for a public
purpose or for a company, as the case may he. Section· 17 of the Act ooofe1·s special powerd on the
Government which aro exercisable in cases of
emergency. Sub-section (4) therecif provides
--
Bontafflllti
v.
State of Punjab
MudAolkar J.
796
1'61
Scta0f1011ti
v.
St?k 1/ Pu,jab
Mudho;kar J.
SUPREME OOURT REl'OR.TS (1001]
tha.t in those oa.ees which fa.II under s11b.s. (l} or
Sub-s. (:!) the a.ppropriato Governmt>nt ma.y direct
that the provisions of s. 5A of the Aet shall not
apply and olso empowers the Gc'n'11•m .. nt to make
a declaration under s.6 in resptct of th" land to be
acquired at any time after the publication nf the
notification ur.der sub-s. (I) of s.~. These are the
pr,,visions which have a bearing on the point
under comideration,
..._.
It is clear from t.hese provisions thot the
object of the law is to empower Govt•r nment to
acquire land only for a public purpose or for a
company, and, wherP it is for a company the acquisitiun iH subject to the provisions of Part VII. As
has been pointed out by this Court in R. L. Arora
v. The Stale of Vilar Pradesh(') the acquisition for
a company contemplated by Part VII is confined
only to cases where the Govi>rnment ie satisfied
that tho purpose of obtaining the land is erection
of dwelliug houses for workmen employed by the
company or for the provision of amenities directly
connected therewith or for the construction of
some work which is likdy to prove directly useful
to tho public.
After a 110tification under sub.s. (1) of s.4 is
published a person interested in tho land is entitled
to object to the acquisition. That objection ma.y be
raised on any ground a.s for instance that the land
is not in fact needed at all for any purpose or that
it is not suitable for tho purpose for which it is
sought to be acquired or that tho purpose is not a
public purpose or what is sa.id to be a company is
not a company and so on. Finality is attached to the
decision of the Government which ultimately has to
decide euoh objectione. Then follows s.6 whioh enables
the Government to make a declaration provided
that it ie satisfied that a pMtioular land is needed
for a public purpose or for a. company. No doubt,
( I/
( 1116l) SUIJP. 2 S.C.R. H9.
··.)
2 S.C.R:
y
l
SUPREME OOURT REPORTS
'791
it is open to the State Government in. an emergency
by exercising its powers under sub. s. (4) of s. 17, to
say that the provisions of s. 5A would not ·apply.
But for construing the provisions of s. 6 it would
be relevant to heal' in mind Lhat section. The
scheme of the Aot is that normally the provisions
of s. 5A have to be complied with. Where, in pur·
suance of the provisions, objections are lodged,
these objections will have to be . decided by the
Government. · For deciding them the Government
will have before it the Collector's proceedings. ·It
would, therefore, be clear that the declaration that
a particular land is needed for a public purpose or
for a company is not to bo ma.de by the Government
ar bitra.rily, but on the basis of material placed before it by the Collector. The provisions of sub-s.
(2) of s. 5A ma.lie the decision of the Government
on the objections final while those of sub-s. (l) of
e. 6 enable the Government to arrive at its satisfaction Sub.section (3) of s 6 goes further and
says that such a declaration shall be conclusive
evidence that the land is needed for a public purpose or for a company.
It is, however, argued by learned counsel that
the conclusiveness or finality attached to the de.
ala.ration of Government ,is only a.a regards the fact
that the land is "needed" but not as regards the
question that the purpose for which the land is
needed is in fa.nt 'I public purpose or what i.s said
to be a company is really a. company. Sub-sec.tion
(1) does not effect a dichotomy betweQn "need"
and "public purpose or a company". There is no
justification for making such a dichoto::ny. By
ma.king it, not only will the la.ngna.ge of. the section
be strained but the purpose of the law will be stultified. The expression must be regarded as one
whole and the declaration held to be with respect
to both the elementa.of the 1>xpression,
1968
Somp:vqnti .
••
Slate of Puoja6
J
798
Samaoantl
••
Slat• of Ptuijab
MudlioU" J.
SUPREME OOURT REPORTS [I !11>'3]
The Government has to be ~atisfied about
both the elements contained in the e:xpreBSion
"needed for a public purpose or a company" .
Where it is so satisfied, it is ~ntitlt'd to make a
cledara.tion. Once such a declariition is made subs. (:l) invests it with conclu~ivenchs. That· con·
clusivene88 is not merely regarding the fact that the
Government is satisfied lmt also with regard to tho
question that the land is needed for a public purpose
or is neederl for a comµany, as the ·case may be.
Then again, the conclusiveness must neceBSarily
attach not merely to the need but also to the
question whether the purp·)se. is a public purp0so
or what is said to be a compauy is& company.
There 0011 be no "need" in t-hP 11bstract. It must
be a need for a 'public purpose' or for a company.
As we have already stated tho law permits acquisition only when there is a public purpose or when
the land is needed for a company for the purposes
set out. in s. 40 of the Act.J Therefore, it w0uld be
unreasonable to say tbat the eonclusiveness would
attach only to a need and not to 1he faet that that
need is for a public purpose or fur a company. No
lanrl can be acquired under the Act unless the need
is for one or the other purpose and, therefore it will
1Je futile to give conclusiveness merely to tho question
of need dissociated from the question of public purpose or the purpose of a company. Upon t,he plain
language of the relevant provisions it is not po88ible
to acoept the contention put forward by learned
counsel.
Learned counsel put the matter in a slightly
diffnent way anrl said that 11. 6 (3) presupposes
that the jurisdictional fact exists, namely, that
there is a public purpose or the purpose of a com.
pany behind the acquisition and, therefore, the
quest.ion whether it exists or not is justiciable.
The Act has empowered the Government to determine tho question of the need of land for a publio
•
·,
..
•
- j
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME OOURT REPORTS
799
purpose or for a company and the jurisdiction conferred upon it to do so is not made conditional upon
the existence of a collateral or extraneous fact. It
is the existence of the need for a public purpose
which give-; jurisdiction to the Government to make
a declaration under s, 6 (I) and makes it the sole
judge whether there is in fa.ct a need and whether
the purpose for which there is that need is n. public
purpose. The provisions of sub-s, (3) preclude
a court from ascel'taining whether either of these
ingredients of the declaration exists.
It is, however, said that that does not mean
that in so far as the meaning to be given to the
expression public purposEi is concerned the courts
have no power whatsoever. In this ·connection
the decision of the Privy Council in Hamaba.i Framjee Petit v. Secretary of State for India ( ') was referred to. In that ease certain land in Malabar
Hill in Bombay was being acquired by the Government of Bombay for constructing residences for
Government officers and the acquisition was objected to by the lessee of the land on the ground that
the le.nd was not being taken or made available to
the public at large and, therefore, the acquisition
was not for a public purpose. When t,he matter
went up before the High Court Batchelor, J.,
observed:
"General definitions are, I think, rather
to be avoided where the avoidance is possible,
and I make no nttempt to define precisely
the extent of the phrase 'public purposes' in
the J. ase; it is enough to say that., in my
opinion, the phrase, whatever else it may mean,
must include a purpc>se, that is, an object or
aim, in ·which the general interest of the
community, as oppo~ed to the particular
\I) t 191+) ~.R. 42 J.A. 44.
.
8omat10nti
State of Punjab
Mtulholkar
800
lllflt
s.-
••
s.....,,...,,.
.JlrdJtoll;,...J.
l!IUPREU OOU.R'r .REPORTS [1963)
interest of individuals, i1 directly and vitally
concerned."
In that case what was being considered we.e
a re.entry clause in a lease deed and not provieione
of the Land Acquieit.ion Act. That claUBe left it
absolutely to the le1111or, the Ea.et India Company
to say whether the poeae88ion should be resumed
by it if the land was required for a public purpose.
Jt. was in this context that the question whether
the land was needed for a public purpose was
considered. The argument before the Privy Council
rested uf10n the view that there cannot be a 'public
purpose' in taking land if that land, when taken, is
not in some way or other mad,. available to the
public at large. Rejecting it they held that the
true view is that expressed by Batchelor, J.,
and observed:
"That being so, all that remains is to
determine whether the purpose here is a
purpose in which the general interest of the
oc1mmunity is concerned. Prima facie the
Government are good judges of that. They
ar« not absolute ju.:lges. They cannot say
'sic volo sic jebro', but at least a Court would
not easily hold them to be wrong. But here,
so far from holding them to be wrong,
the whole of the learned judgea, who are
thoroughly convel'llSDt with the conditions of
Indian life, ii&y that they are satisfied that the
scheme is one which will redound to public
benefit by helping the Government to maintain the efficiency of its servants. From such
a conclusion their Lordships would he slow to
differ, and upon its own statement it com·
mends itself to their judgment".
l\l r. Pathak strongly relied on theee observations and eaid that the Privy Council have held
that the ma\t.er iB juatiaiable. n ii enov&Ja to 9AF
•
'
2 S.O.R.
'f
,
SUPREME 'COURT 'REPORTS
801
that that was not a. "Case under the Land Acquisition Act and, therefore, conclusiveness did not attach
itself .to the satisfaction of the Government that
a ·particular purpose fell within the concept of public purpose.
Mr. Pathak then contended that the question
as·to the meaning to be given to the phrase 'public
purpose' is not given conclusiveness by sub-s. (3)
of s. 6. According to him. all that sub-s. (3) of
s. 6 says is that the Government's declaration that
particular land is needed for. a public purpose or a
company shall be conclusive and that it does not
say that the Government is empowered to define
what is a public purpose and then say that the parti·
oUlar purpose falls ·within that definition. As al·
ready stated no atteinpt bas been ~ade in the Act
to define public purpose in a compendious way.
Public purpose is bound to vary with the times and
the-prevailing conditions in a given locality and,
therefore, it would not be a practical proposition
even to attempt a comprehensive definition of it.
It is· because of this that the legislature· has left it
to the Government to say what is a public purpose
and also to declare tho need of a given land for a
public purpose.
It was contended on the basis of the decision of
this Court in R. L. Arora v. The State 'Of U. P. (1 )
that the Courts have power to consider whether the
puri}ose for which land is being ac.quire'd is a public
purpose. In that case land was being acquired, as
already stated, for a company and the real question'
which.arose for consideration was, what is the.mean·
'ing to be attached to the words "useful to _the pub·
Hc'',ooourring in cl. (b) of subs. (1) CJf s. 40 of the
· Aot. The -)f!nd was requ4:ed by the company to
enable it to eatablish its works and it was contended
oofore.this:Comt t~t the products . JD&nufaotu,red
(I) (l!ie'J~. 2 S.C.&., ...
So11.iloontt
V•.
State oj Pu,;j(rb
MUdlioikn J.
802
--
s.,..aofftti
v.
lal1 of PuAjtth
Jluih.lhr J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [I 963]
by the company will be useful to·the public in gene,
ral a.nd, therefore, the acquisition would be covered
by cl. (b) of sub s. (I) of s. 40. Negativing this con·
lention Wanchoo, J., who spoke for the Court
observed :
"It is true thr.t it is for the Government
to be satisfied tha.t the "'ork to be constructed
will be useful to the public .................... but
this does not mean that it is the Government
which has the right to interpret the words
us11d in s. 40 (I) (b) ............................... ..
It is the Court which has to intorpret what
those words mean. AftRr the court has inter·
preted these word~, it is the Government which
has to carry out the object of 88. 40 and
41 to ita satisfaction. Tho Government cannot say that as. 40 and 41 mean this a.nd fur.
ther say tha.t tbPy a.re sati8fied tha.t the mean·
ing they ha.ve given to the relevant words in
these soetions has been carried out in the terms
of the agreement provided by them .. : ........... .
The Govnnment cannot both 11ive meaning
to the words and also say that they a.re satisfied on the meaning given by them. The
meaning has to be given by the Court and it
is only thereafter that the Government's sa.tisfa.ctiori ma.y not be open to challenge .......... .
We ba.ve nlrea.dy indicated what these words
mean and if it plainly a.p'Pea.rs that the Govern·
ment a.re satisfied as a result of giving some
other meaning to the words, the satisfaction
of the Government is of no use, for then they
a.re not" satisfied a.bout wha.t they should be
satisfied. In the present case the Government seems to have ta.ken a wrong view that
so long a.A the product of the works is useful
to the public and so long as tho public is entitled to go upon tbe works in the. way of
•
•
' _,
,·
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME OOURT REPORTS
803
· husiness, that is all that is required- by the
relevant words in ss. 40 and 41".
It wM no doubt argued before the Court that
tho declaration made by the Gove.rnment urider
s. 6 (l) that the land was needed for a company is
conclusive and, th~reforc, the question a9 to th~
actual purpose of the acquisition is not justiciable.
Court pointed out that s. 6 (3), makes the decy 'l'his
laration under s. 6 1(1)' conclusive evidence of the
fact that the land is needed for a public purpose or
for a company and that as the declaration . stated
that the land was needed for a company and that
fact 'was not disputed by the parties, the provisions
ofs. 6 (3) were of no assistance.- We may point
out that even aoeording to that decision conclusiveness attachf,s itself to the declaration .that the
land is required for a public purpose and. therefore,
instead of assisting the petitioners it in fact assists
the respondents. No doubt, in.so far
an acquisition for a company is concerned Part VII requires
that before a declaration under s. 6 (I) is made the
Governm<flt should he satisfied that the land is
required for one of tho two purposes set out in
s. 41i ( ! ) of the Act. The Government can consent
to the making of a declaration iinder s. 6 (I) after
it is satiAfied under s. 41 about •the fact that the
land is required for a company for .the purposes set
out in cl. (a) and (b) of that section. But the declaration made thereafter is confined only to one
mat.ter and that is that the land is reqnired for a
company and nothing more. The question whether
in fact the land is required by t,he company for the
purposes set out in cl. (a) and (b) ofs. 40 (I) is not
germane to the declaration. No doubt· the power
of the Government· to make a declaration with
'-; respeot to an acquisition for a company is circumscribed and, therefore, the, Goveinment ill expected
to exercise it with due regard to the limitation pla9ed upou it. Bat it doe3 Di>t foili>W tlu.t 1111>·~. (3)
as
1962
Somaoanli
v.
S~ale of Punja!
Alutlholkar J.
804
IHI
s.,,...,.ii
••
Slat• qf Punjab
SUPREME COURT REPOltTS (11>63]
of s. 6 makes the deol&ration concluBive evidenoo
not only of the fact that the land is required for a
company but also of the fact that the land is requir·
ed by a company for a purpose specified iu s. 40 (I)
of the Act. The observations made by Wanchoo,
J., therefore do not RBBist the petitioners.
Reliance was then placed on two decisions of
this Court in which the meaning of the "xpreBsion . ,.,,
"public purpose" is oon~idered. One is Babu Bark·
ya Thakur v. The State of Bornhay ('l. There this
Court observed :
"It will thus be noticed that the expre·
88ion 'public purpose' bas been used in its
gene.ric sen11e of including any purpose in
which even a fraction of thr' community may
be interested or hy whioh it may be benefited."
Later in the same judgment this Cou1t pointed
out that where a large section of the community is
concerned its welfare is a matter of public concern.
Tho other is Pandit Jhandu Lal v. The Slate
of Punjab ('). There this Court has pointed
out that the purpose of public utility referred to in
ss. 40 and 41 are akin to the public purpose.
No doubt in these decisions this Court stated
what, broadly ~peaking, the expression 'puLlic purpose' means. But in neither case the question ,
arose for oon~iderat.ion as to whether the m~aning
to be given to the expr088ion •public purpose' ie
justiciable.
Now whether in a particular oaso the purpose
for which land is needed is a p11blio purpose or not
is for the .State Government to be satisfied about.
If the purpoee for which the land is being acquired
by the State la within the legiailative oompetP.noe of
the St&te the deolarat.ion of~ Government will be
(I) 11!'61}1
ac.-. "91.
•
•
,
2 s.c.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
805
>-/ final slibjeot, however, to one eirneption.
That exoeption is that if there is a. ooJourabl<J exercise of
power the d~cla.ra.tion will bJ open to challenge at
the instanoe of the aggrieved party. fh~ power
committed to the · Government by the Act is a
limited power in the sense that it can be exercised
only where there is a public purpose, leaving aside
for a moment the purpose of a company. If it
appears that what the Government is satisJ.ed about
"f is not a public purpose but a private purpose or no
purpose at all the action of the Government would
be colourable as not being relatable to the power
conferred upon it by the Act and its declaration
will be a nullity. Subject to this exception the
declaration of the Government will be final.
A number of decision~ were cited before us
by the learned Advocate·General in support of the
contention that the declaration of the Government
is final. One of those decisions is Wijeyeseke:ra v.
li'-esting (1 ). In that case dealing with Ceylon
Ordinance No. 3 of 1876 (Aoquisition of Land
Ordinanoe, ,Ceylon), 1876) which incidentally did
not contain a provision similar to that of sub·s. (3)
of s. 6, their Lordships observed:
"The whole frame of the ordinance shows
that what the District Court is concerned with
is the assessment of compensation, but their
Lordships do not desire to rest their opinion
that the decision of the Governor is final
merely upon the question of the Court before
which the question is raised. It appears to
their Lordships that the decision of the Governor that t-he land is wanterl for public purposes is final, and was intended to be final, and
could not be questioned in any Court."
.._~ There, ·th~ land was required for a road and the
contention was that the Government- did not take
tho opinion of the Surveyor General 88 to ita fitne&11
(Jl P919JA.O. '4~.
19611
SamaD2nU
••
Sial, of p,,,.jab
Mudholloar J.
806
""
S.-OOOllCi
SI... •f'.Puai,_•b
M,.dh.l/«Jr J,
SUPB.EME OOURT REPORTS (1963]
for such purpose. On this ground it was contended
that the Governor's rleclaration could be questioned.
But this wa.s nega.tived by the Privy Council.
Following this decision in Vadlapatla Suryanarayana
v. The Provinoe of Madras ('} :\ Full Bench of
the Madras High Court held that a decla.mtion by
the Provinci.-.l Government under s. ti( l l of the Act
that certain lands were required for a public pllrpose
is fina.l and, where there is no charge against the
Provincial Government that it had acted in fraud of
its powers its action in directing the acquisition cannot be challenged in a Court of law. Simib.r view ha.s
been taken in Samrw.ldin Sheikh v. Su?.Divisional
Officer (') ; r. Gopalakrislma v. The 8ecreta1·y, Board
of Revenue, Madra8 ('); S. Jagannadha Rao v. The
State oj Andhrn Prade-~h (') ; Secretary/ of State for
lndi.a in Council v. Akbar Ali ('). Several other
decisions to the sa.me effect, some of them post·
Constitution, were also mentioned by tbu learned
Ad vooatc-Geoneral, whioh take the sa.me view as in
those deoisious. Not a single decision was however,
brought to our notice in whioh it ha.s been held th1Lt
the quest.ion as to what ie a public purpo~t• or
whether it exists oa.n be enquired into by the Court~
even in the absence of colourable exercise of powcJ,
because s. 6(3) has become voicl undm Art. 13(2) of
the Constitution.
\.•
•
It was next contended that s11b·s. (ill of
s. 6 cannot stand in the way in a proceeding under Art. 226 or under Art 32 of tho Constit11- •
tion and in support of this argument reliance was
placed upon the d~cision in Chudalmuthu l'illai v.
State ( ') ; Maharaja
Luchmeshwor Singh v.
Chairman of the
Darbhanga Municipality (') ;
( 1· l L.11 119461 Mad. 153.
(3) ,A.IR 19'.< Mad. 362.
15) \ J<)S, I.I R. ~5/11. 443.
(2) A.J.R (1954 Assam Kl.
(4) A J.R l!i<O A.P. 343
'~) l.L.R. (19~2)Tra" Cochin. ·fM.
~7) (H~Ci)t.R.171.A.90.
._#
•
2 S.C.R.
StJPREME coti~T REPO:l;tTS
80'7
Rajindra Kumar Ruia v. .Government of .West
Bengal (1); Major 8 .. Arjan Singh v. Btat,e of
Punjab (2 ) ;. In the first mentioned case it was ·contended that the order was actuated by mala /ides
and also that there were various irregularities in
the proceedings. As we. have already indicated,
if the declaration is vitiated by fraud, then the
declaration is itself bad and what is bad cannot be protected by sub-s. (3) of s. 6. In the next
case the act of the Court of Wards in· handing over
the· ward's lands for 'a nominal consideration for a
publifl · purpose was challenged in a suit. The
challenge ·was npheld by the .Privy Council on the
ground that lawfol possession could only be taken by
the State in strict compliance with the provisions of
the Land Acquisit.ion Act. The question raised here ·
did not aris<" for consideration iil that case. In the
other two cases the declaration was challenged
under Art. 226 and in both the cases the challenge
failed. In the first of the two latter mentioned uase
it failed on the ground that there was no fraud and
in the 'second on the ground that the provisions ·of
suh·s. (3) of s. 6 precluded' the court from challeng·
· ing the \•alidity of the declaration. None of these
cases, therefore support the contention of the petitioners.
Moreover we are not concerned here with the
powers of the High Court under Art. 226 but with
those of this Court, It is sait;I, however that the bar
created by s. 6(3) would not •tand in the way of this .
Court while dealing with a petition under Art. 32
and, therefore, it is open to us to ascertain whether
an acquisition is for a public purpose or not. While it
is true t.h11t the powers of this Court cannot be
taken away by any law· which may hereafter be
made unless the Constitution itself is amended we
are here faced with a provision of law which is a
pre-Constitutional law and whioh is protected by the
(I) .\.l.R. 1952. Cal. 573~
(~)
1.L.R. [ 1958] Punjab 1451.
1MB
Somavanli
'·
Si..te of Punj<•
Mud/.ollmr J.
808
JNI
s ....,,
••
Slal1 of Pwdab
SUPREME OOURT REPORTS [196a)
Constitution-to the extent indicated in Art. 31(5)(a) \~
and an attaok on it.a validity on the ground
that i~ infringes the right guaranteed by Art. J 9(1 )(f)
ha.s failed. Therefore it ia a good and valid law and
the restriotion placed by it on the powel'll of this
Court under Art. 32 must operate.
Though we are of the opinion that the ·courts
are not entitled to go behind the declaration of the
Government to the effect that a particular purpose
for which the land is being acquired is a public ' y '
purpose we must empha.sise that the declaration of
the Government must be relatable to a public pur·
pose a.s distinct from a purely private pnrpoee. If
the purpose for which the acquisition is being made
is not relatable to public purpose then a question
may well a.rise whether in making the declaration
there ha.e ~. on the part of the Government
a fraud on the power conferred upon it by the Aot.
In other words the question would then a.rise
whether that declaration wa.s merely a colours.- •
ble exercise of the power conferred by th<' Act,
•
and, therefore, the declaration is open to challenge
at the instance of the party aggrieved. To such a
declaration the protection of tl(3} will not extend.
For, the question whether a particular action wa.e
the result of a fraud or not is always jUBticiable,
provisions such ass. ti(3) notwithstanding.
We were referred by the lea.med Advoca.teGeneral to a reoent decision of the House of Lords •
in Smith v. Eaal EUoe Rural District Coon.cu (') to
which reference wa.s ma.de by a learned Advocate
General. In that oue their Lordships were conaider.
ing the Acquisition of Land (Authorisation of Procedure) Act, 1946, (9 and 10 Geo. 6, o. 49), Sob. I,
Pt. IV, pa.rae 15 and 16. Paragraph 15 (1) of
Part IV, Soh. I to the Aot provides a.s follows :
"If any person aggrieved by a oompuleocy 1
(I) [19561A.C.796.
2
s.c.:a.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
purchase order desires to queBtion the validity
thereof ................. on the ground that the
authorisation of compulsory purchase thereby
granted is not empowered to be granted under
this Act ......... he may, within six weeks from
the date on which notioe ·of the confirmation
or making of the order: ................. is first
published ............... make an application to
the High Court ...... .-........... ".
Para.graph 16 provides as folloWB :
"Subject to the provisions of the last
foregoing para.graph, a compulsory puroha.se
order .. : ...... shall not ....... be questioned in any
legal proceedings whatsoever .................. "
_".... __ ,
,)
The land having been ma.de the subject of oompul·
sory purchase the owner brought an action in which
among other things, a. declaration was added that ·
the order was ma.de and confirmed wrongfully and
in bad faith and that the clerk acted wrongfully and
in bad faith in procuring its order and confirmation.
The House of Lords held by majority that the
action could not proceed except against the clerk for
damages. because the plain prohibited in paragraph
16 precluded the Court challenging the validity of
the order. They also held that paragraph 15 gave
no opportunity to a person aggrieved t<? question
the validity of a. compulsory purchase order on the
ground that it was made or confirmed in bad faith.
As we have already said the condition for the exercise of the powers by the State Government is the
existence of a public purpose (or. the purpose of a.
company) and if the Government. makes a declaration ·under. s. 6(1) in fraud of the powers conferred
upon it by that sec.tion the satisfaction on which
the declaration· is made is not about a matter with
respect to which it is·required to.be satisfied by the
provision and, therefore, its.declaration .is open to
challenge a.e being without. any lepl eJl'eot. We
191l2
s....-u
y.
81!1,. of Punjab
ModhoUar I.
810
11/GJ
.
8---i
Star. of P-}11>
.\1""1ollar J.
SUPREME OOURT REPORTS [1963)
are not prepared to go as far 1M1 the ~ouSll of Lbrds
in tlle above CIM!e.
Thie brings us to the second argument
advanced before us on beh'llf of the petitioners.
The learned counsel contends that there could be
no acquisition for & public purpose unless the
Government had made a contribution for the
acquisition at pub!ie expense. According to him
the acquisition in question wal! mnely for the
benefit of a company and that the action of the
Government was only a colourable exercise by it
of its power to acquire land for a public purpose.
The contention is that before making a declaration
under sub-s. ( l) of s. 6 the Govemm•mt ought to
havfl taken a decision that it will contribute towards
the acquisition. In the case hE>t'ore us no such
decision was taken by the Government till ;September 29, 1961, that is, just one day after this writ
petition was admitted by this Court 1rnd stay order
issued by it. It is then said that, the contribution
of the Government towards the cost of acquisition
being a very small fraction of the total probable
cost of acquisition the inferen~.e must be that the
acquisition was not even partly at public expense
and, therefore, the declaration was a colourable
exercise of the power conferred by law. Then it
is said that not only does the declaration omit to
state that the contribution of the St>\te towards the
cost of acquisition was to be Re. 100 only but also
omits to mention that what was decided was that
the Government was to bear only a pa.rt of the cost
of acquisition and not the whole of it. The notification is said to be thus misleading and to create
the impression that the entire cost of the acquisition is to come out of the public exchequer. Finally
it is contended that the establishment of an industry by a private party for manufacturing refrigera.
tion equipment cannot fall within the meaning of
the expre1111ion 'publio purpose'.
\•
•
'
'
2 S.O.R.
SUPREME OOURT B.EPORTS
811
It is no doubt true that the financial sanction
for the cont.·ibution of Rs. 100 as part of the
expenses for acquisition was accorded by the Finance Department on September 29, 1961. No doubt
also that a day prior to the according of sanction
this petiti<m had been admitted by this Court and
a stay order iBBued. But from these two oircumstan!'es it would riot be n:asonable to draw the inference that the declaration made by the Government
was' a colourable exercise of its power. The provisions of sub-s. (ll of s. 6, however, do not require
that the notification made thereunder must aet
out the fact that the Government had decided to
pay a part of the expenses of acquisition or even
to state the extent to which the GovHnment is
prepared to make part contribution to the . cost of
acquisition.
·
·. · ·..· · ·
··
It is then contended that ·before the Gciverment
could sper1d any money from . the public <'lXChequer
for acquiring land a provision has to be made in
the budget and the ab8ence of such provision
would be a circumstance relevant for·consideration.
It is sufficient to say ·that th'3 absence.of a provisfon
in the budget in respect of the cost of acquisition,
whole or part, canriot affect. t4e 'validity. of the
declaration and that .jf G.ovemmerit doPs spend
some money without allotment in the · budget, its
expenditure may perhaps. entitle the Accountant
G.eneral to raise an audit objection ·or· inay' enable
the Public Accounts Committee. of the State Legislature to criticise the Government. But . that is
all. Again, where the expenditure is of a small
amount like Rs. 100 it may be possible for the
G.ovemment to make payment from .Cvntingencies
and thus avoid objections of this kiud. Whatever
tha.t may be, these are not circumstances .which
would suffice to show that the declaration was
oolourable. It was stated at the bar by the learned
Advooate-G.eneral that Uie entire scheme of esta-
1981
SOflY'Nnli
v.
Stale of P"'liab
MudAalka, J,
812
SUPRJ!;ME COURT REPORTS {1963]
blishing a refrigeration factory in Punjab was
examined at vario11s stages and at different levels
of Government as well as by different ministries vnd
it was then decided to make a part contribution
towards the cost of acquisition from public funds.
As required by the Financial Rules tho consent of
the Finance Department had to be obtained for
this purpose. This particular stage oooupied considerable time and that is why there was a delay
in according sanction. The statement of the lear·
ned Advocate-General was not challenged on behalf
of the petitioners. Moreover the declaration under
trub-s. (I) of s. 6 is clear on the point that the
land is being acquired at public expense, and the
provisions of sub·s. (3) of s. 6 precluded a Court
from going behind such a deolarat.ion unless it is
shown that the Government has in fact decided
not to contribute any funds out of the public revenues for that purpose. For, if the Government had
in fact taken a decision of· that kind then the exer·
cise of the power to make an acquisition would be
open to challenge as being colourable.
Then it is contended that the contribution
by the State towards the cost of acquisition must
be substantial and not merely nominal or token as
in this case. The argument is that though the law
premita acquisition for a public purpose to be
made by the State by contributing only a part of
the cost of acquisition that part cannot be a particle and in this connection reliance W88 placed on
the decision in Chatter too v. Cave (1) which was
followed in Ponnaia v. Secretary of St.ate ('). In
the latter case the High Court of Madras observed
that "the Legislature, when tbey provided that a
part of the compensation should be paid from public
revenues, did not mean that this condition would
be aatisfied by payment of a particle, e.· g. one anna
in Rs. 5, 985". In that case land was being acquired
(I) ([R78) 3 App. Cu . .S3, 491, 492.
(2) A. I. R. 1926 Mad. 1099,
~
I
.I
2 S.O.R.
..
SUPREME OOURT REPORTS
813
for making a road . betweea . two villages in
I96Z
· Ramnad District. ·A sum of Rs. 5, 985 was required .
S--'
for the acquisition .. Out of this amount only one
•·
anna .· was . agreed to be contributed by the 8""' llf ru•JM
Government· and it was contended on its behalf
MudholhrJ.
that this contribution satisfied the requirements
of a. 6 of the Act. It was also contended that the
declaration made under sub·s. (l) ofs. 6 could not
be challenged .in view of the provisions of sub-s.
(3) of s. 6 and reliance was placed on the decision
m Wijeyesekara v. Festing (l). According to the
High Court the .. fact that . the Government's share
in the cost of acquisition being l /90,000 part of
the amount, there was no real and bona fide compliance with the terms . of the section and that
this was an indication of the illusqry charaoter of
the . object for which ;the provisions of the Act
-were being made use of. . The High Court .then
referred to the . de<iiskn in Ohatterton's ·case. (')
and pointed out that the Rouse of 'Lords · were
averse to putting an interpretation on the words
"or ~rt thereof". occurring in the · Dramatic .·
.Copyright A-0t, (3 & •William IV; o. 15) as. wowld
make a part to mean a particle. The. High :Qourt . ·. .
also referred to the decision in Maharaja Lutihme· · ·
BW1Jr Singh' s case (•) and held that the acquisition .
was a oolourable exercise of the ·power conferred .
by the Act.
.
... · .
This decision was not followed by the :saine
High Court in Senja N aicken v: Sr.cretary of State (') ·
where it W88 .held that the State's contribution of
one anna .out of Rs. 926-8-6 for acquiring land for .·
a road, Rs. 926-7-6 having been contributed by
the ryots, was sufficient compliance with s. 6 {l).
of the . Act. Both these decisions .came up for .
consideration in Vadlapatla Suryanarayanas case (') ·
and there Ponnai,a's case(') was over-ruled and the.
view taken inSenja Naickens case (') was approved.
111 (1926) l,L.R. 50 Mad. 30?.
(3) (1690) L.R. 171.A, 90,
(5) l.L.R. [1946] Mad.153.
(?) ( 187n):3 App. c .. , 483. ·01, 49!
(4) (19261 I L.R: :o Mad. so&
(6) A. I. R. 1926 Mad. 1099•.
•
SUPREME COURT REPOl~TS [1963]
814
lMI
S«JY1J01Ui
v.
Slat• of ,,..jab
/lludltall-or J.
Chatter/en's case {1 ) WQS a case of infringement of copyright wbne two plays bad been adapted from a common sourne by the parties to the
litigation. Io that oaso it w&I! accopted beforn
the Court that the Dramatic Copyright Act prote·
cted ·•parts" of dramatic work aud prohibited their
use by persons other than the proprietor of the
Copyright. It wa8 pointed out that in the case of
ordio;1ry copyright of published work the protection was restricted only to the whole of.the work
aotl did not exwud to portions of those work.
The Dramatic t.Jopyright Act also contained a.
provision directing that infringement of the copyright would entitle the propnetor to dam..ges of
not leBB than 4U shillings. It W&I! suggtsted that
these diiferenoes indicated an inteotio11 to prevent
the invasion of the dramatic copyright independently of the quantity or ma.teriahty of the portion
of dialogue or dramatic incident proved to ha.ve
been copied by another. Dealing with this a.rgument Lord Ha.thorl~y observed:
"Now it appears to me, my Lords, that
•.his a.rgumeqt goes muoh too far. As wa.a
said by the co'unsel for the respondent, the
appellam w<mld wish to rea.d the word 'pa.rt'
in the Dramatic Copyright Act as 'particle',
so that the crowing of the cook in •J:la.mlet',
or the introduction of a line in the d1a.logue,
might be held to be au iovaaion of the copyright entitling plaintiff to 40s. damages and
consequently, a.e the Jaw stood l t)elieve at
the time of the p&88ing of the statute of a &
4 Will. 4, to the ooot.s of his o.otion."
(pp. 491-2)
Then after pointing out that while in the ca.ea
of an ordinary copyright of published works a. fair
uso made by others would not a.mount to a wrong
i ')
1~7X) 3 App. Cas. 485. 491,.492.
I
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
.815
justifying an action at law, the position of dramatic
p11rformaroe is not the same he observed :
"They are not intended to be repeated by
others or to be used in such a way as a book
may be used, but still the principle de minimis
non cur.at lex applies to a supposed wrong in
taking a part of dramatic works, as well as in
reproducting a part of a book''. (p. 492)
'J''
Finally he observed that the parts which were so
taken were neither substantial nor material parts
and as it was impossible to say that damage had
accrued to the plaintiff from such taking, his action
must fail.
' ·· '
.
'
.
• •
Lord O'Hagan observed :
" "Part"! as was· observed, is not necessarily the same as 'particle', and there may be
a taking so minute in its extent and so trifling
in its nature as not to incur the statutory
· liability."
'
'
'
'
'•
It is clear, th~refore, that the analogy of
Chatterton's case l'l cannot possibly apply to a case
under the Act. As was pointed outinSentia Naicken's
case (') :
,.\.....,·
I
'
"Admittedly both of the litigants · had
derived their compositions from a common
source and it stands to reason that before you
can compel a mnn to pay damages for steahng
the product of your brain, time and labour,·
you mu>t. be able to point out that any
resemblance between his ·production !'nd
yours is not merely accidental but is a
designed theft of the product of ~·our brain,
Otherwise ...... one might go to the absurdity
of objecting to a man using the same words
~1)(1811)
s Aw cas. 4M. 491, 492.
(21 (m6l µ..a. 511Med."!Gt
••
-
State of Punjab
Mudlwlkar .!.
SUPREME OOURT REPORTS [1963]
816
IHI
though in a. different collooa.tion ae you have
done."
With these ob orvations we agree.
.lfu6>1tar J.
Now, as regards Maharaja Lmhmuwar Siw;h'a
The fa.eta were theee. The pll\inti1f's land
was under the ma.nagement of the Court of W'\rds
during his minority. A notification under s. 6(1) of
the Land Acquisition Act, 1870 was made with
respect to certs.in land belonging to the plaintiff for
being acquired by the Government e.t the expense
of the Darbhe.nga Municipality for e. public purpoee,
that is, oonstruotion of a public ghat or landing
pla.ce in the town of Darbhanga. But instead of
complying with the provisions of the La.nd Aoquisi·
tion Act and enquiring into tli.e value of the land,
the Collector who was the Chairman of the Munioipa·
lity and also a representative of the Court of Wards
took possession of the land and ha.nded it over to
the municipality. Tbe compensation paid to the
plaintiff was Re. 1/-, e.n amount agreed to by the
Manager. The plaintiff, after a.tte.ining majority,
instituted e. suit for po88e88ion. of la.nd e.nd for
mesne profit.a. His suit wa.s di.iimiesed by the oourte
below and he preferred e.n e.ppee.l before the Judice.I COmmittee of the Privy Council. Allowing the
e.ppea.I, their Lordships observed :
C<Ue (' ).
•
"The offer e.nd accepts.nee of the rupee
was e. coloura.blc attempt to obtain e. titlt'I
under the Land Acquisition Act without pe.y· '
ing for the land ...... "
How this oe.se could e.t e.11 have a.ny bearing upon
the point whfoh arose for consideration in Ponnaia'8
C<Ue (') we fail to see.
This ca.se is also relied on
before us on behalf of the petitioners e.nd we he.v e
refered to it earlier in this Judgment. It has noth •
in·g whatsoe~cr to do with the question of contribu. '
tion by the ~tatt: tc,w1111ls the cost l!f e.oquisition.
(I) (18901 L.R. 17 J.A. 90,
(2) A l.Jt. !! ~G Mad. 1099.
2 S.C.R. ·
SUPREME COURT REPOR'.l'S
817
We would like to add that the view taken in
-
'">{ Benda Naicken'8 CQ88 (I) has been . rollowed by the
various High IJourts in India. On thP, basis. of the
correctness of that view the State Governments have
been acquiring private properties all over the
country by contributing only token a~ounts towards
the cost of acquisition. Titles .to many euoh properties would be unsettled if we were now to take
.A'
the view that 'partly at public .expense' meaJlB substantially at public expense. Therefore, .on the
y prinoiple of stare1 deci8is the view taken. in 81?/f/ja
Naicken'B case ( ) should not be disturbed. We
would, however, guard ourselves against being
understood to say that a token contribution by the
State towards the cost of acquisition will be suffi ·
cient compliance with the . law in each and every
oa.se. Whether such contribution meets the require·
men ts of the law would depend upon the· facts of
every case. Indeed the fact ·. that the State's
· · / contribution is nominal may well indicate, ·in parti· .
oular circumstances that the action ·Of the State. was
·"· a colourable exercise of power. · In our opinion
Y
'part' does not necessarily mean a subl!tantial part
and that it will be open to the Court in every case
which comes up before it to examine whether the
contribution made by the State satisfies the requirement of the law. In this case we are satisfied that
it satisfies the requirement of law. What is next te
be considered is whether the acquisition was only
for a company. beoause the compensation,wlMI to
v-r come almost entirely' out of its coffers and, therefore,
it waii in reality for a private purpose as opposed
to public purpose. In other words, the question is
whether there was on the part of· the Government
a polourable exercise of power. Elaborating the
point it is Ea.id that the establishment of a factory
for manufacturing refrigeration equipment is nothing
,i..
but an ordinary commercial venture and can by no
~
stretch of imagination fall within the weJ}-aooepted
(1) (1926) 1.1,.ll. 50,....SO!I.
Jin
SOllllSfJOtdi
••
.~1111 of PvnJaJ
M"'""111"'r J,
818
JHI
S.~t•
••
S.ok •/ Punj b
SUPREME OOURT REPOR7'S (1963J
meaning of the expression 'public purpose', that even
if it were to fall within that ~xpression the factory
is to be established not by the Government, nor by
Government ,participation but solely by the respondent No. 6, a public limited concern and that,
therefore, the concern could acquire land for such a
purpose only after complying with the provisions of
Part VII and that the uee of the provisions of s.6( I)
is merely a colourable device to enable t.he respondont No. 6 to do something, which, under terms of
s. 6( 1), could not be done.
"Public purpose" as explained by this Court
in Babu Barkaga Thakur's case (') means a purpose
whioh is beneficial to the community. But whether
a ·particular purpose is beneficial or is likely to be
bcnificial to the oommtmity or not is a matter
primarily for the ea.tiefaction of the State Government. In the notification under s. 6 (I) it has been
stated that the l. nd is being acquired for a public
purpose, namely, for setting up a factory for
manufacturing various ranges of rPfrigeration compressors and ancillary equipment. It W'lll vehemently argued before us that manufacture of refrigeration equipment cannot be regarded as b'!neficial to
the community in the real sense of the word and
that such equipment will at the most enable artioles
of luxury to be produced. But the ~tat.a Government has ta.ken the view that the manufa.oture of
these articles is for the benefit of the community.
No materials have been placed before us from which
we could infer that the view of the Government, is
perverse or that its action based on it constiiutes a
fraud on its power to acquire land or is a colourable
exerciae by it of such power.
Further, the notification itself set.s out the
purpose, for which the land is being acquired. That
purpose, if we may recall, is to set up a factory for
the manutaoture of refrigeration com:pr88110rs lllld
(I) (11111) I 1.C.&. IS.
..
'
'<
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
819
ancillary equipment. The importance of the under·
taking to a State such as the Punjab which has a
surplus of fruit, dairy products etc., the genera.I
effect of the establishment of this factory on foreign
exchange J'esources, spread of e'.luca.tion, relieving
the preSB11re on unemployment etc., have been set
om i.ti the affidavit of ihe respondent and their sub.
st&;. ~ appears in the ealier part of this judgment.
The .. 1.davits have not beeri controverted and we
have, therefore,
hesitation in acting upon them.
no
On the face of it, therefore, bringing into
existence a factory of this kind would be a. purpose
beneficial to the public . even though that is a.
private venture. As has already been pointed out,
facilities for providing refrigeration are regarded in
modern times as public utilities. All the greater
reason, therefore, that a factory which manufactures essential equipment for establishing public
utilities mus' be regarded as an undertaking carrying out a. public purpose. It is well-estl\blished in
the United States .of America that the power of
eminent domain can be exercised for establishing
public utilities. Such a pl)wer could, therefore, be
exercised for establishing ·a. factory for manufaoturfug equipment upon which a public utility depends.
It is, therefore, cleat that quite a.pa.rt from the provisions of sub·s. (3) of s. 6 the notification of the .
State Government under s. 6 cannot be successfully
challenged on the ground that the object of the
acquisition is not carry out a. public purpose. We
cannot, therefore, accept the petitioner's con~tion
that the action of the Government in making the
notification under sub·s. (l) of s. 6 was a coloura.ble
exercise of the power conferred by the Act.
·
'~.
The next. argument_ to be oonsidered is whether there. has been a disorimina.tion against the
petitioners. They claim that as they int.ind to
~blish a factory for mam1faoturing ~per whi°'
1961
s~
••
S""' of PfMllob
Mudliolkar .1,
820
-
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963]
is also an article usef'ul to the community they are
as good an industrial conoern as the respondent
No. 6 and the State Government in taking away
land from them and giving it to respondent No. 6
is practising discrimination against them.
In the first place it ie denied on behalf of
the respondents that the petitioners are going to
establieh a paper factory. It is not disputed that
no new factory can be established without obtain·
ing a licence from the appropriate authority under
the Industries Development and Regulation Act,
1951, and thnt the petitioners do not hold any
licence of this kind. According to the petitioners,
however, they had entered into an agreement with
the firm of MeSBrs. R. S. Madhora.m & Sons for
establishing such a. factory and th.at in collabora·
tion with them they propose to establish a factory
on the lands which are now being acquired. It is
true that a. licence for erecting a pa.per factory was
granted to Messrs. R. S. Ma.dhora.m and Sons but
the location of that factory is to he in Uttar Pra·
desh and not in the State of Punjab. Without,
therefore, obtaining the approval of the appropri·
ate authority the lOC11otion of' the factory conld not
be shifted to the land in question which, as already
stated, is situate in the S'ate of Punjab. More·
over this licence bas since been cancelled on the
ground that Messrs. R. S. Ma.dhora.m and Sons have
taken no steps so far for establishing a. paper factory. It is necessary to mention that the petitioners allege that this oa.noella.tion was procnrtd by
the respondent& with the object of impeding the
present petitionel'll. With that, however, wa need
not concern ourselves because that licence aa it
stood on the date of the petitions did not entitle
Messr& R. S. Madhor1am and· Sons to establish a.
factory in the State of Punjab,
•
•
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
821
• Apart from tha.t it is always open to the State
to fix priorities amongst · publio utilities of diffe·
rent kinds, bearing in mind the needs of thir State
the existing .facilities and other relevant faotors.
In the State like the Punjab where there is a large
surplus of fruit and dairy products there is need
for preserving it. There are already in exis·tenoe
a number of oold atorages in that . State. ·The
Government would, therefore, be. &oting reasonably in giving priority to &factory for manuf&oturing refrigeration equipment which would be &V&il·
al?le for replacement in these storages ·and whioh
would also be available for equipping new cold
storages.
Apart' from this it is for the State Govem.
ment to say which particular industry may be
regarded as beneficial to the public and to decide
that its establishm~nt would serve a publio pur·
pose. No question of discrimination would, therefore,' arise merely by reason of the faot that Government has declared that the establish inent of a. parti·
col&r industry is a public purpose. The challenge
to the notifioation ba&ld on Art. 14 of the Constitution must, therefore, fail.
It is the last and final contention. of the peti·
tioners in these petition11 th& t the notifioatioa1
under SS. 4 and 6 oailnot . be made 1imultaneously
and that since both the notifications were published
in the Gazette of th~ same date, that .is, August
25, 1961, the provisions of law have not been com·
plied with. The argument is that the Aot takes
away from a person his inherent tight to hold and
enjoy that property and, therefore, the exercise of
the st&tutory power by the State to take away
such property for a public purpose by paying compensation must be subject to·the meticulous ob&er·
vanoe of every provision oflaw entitling it to make·
the acquisition. It is pointed out that under s~b-1.
(1) of a. 4 th!l ~overninent has &.t to iiotiff tlaat
-
6--1
v. I
S""• 41,.,,_
Jlol,,,,_ J;
822 · SUPREME OOURT RE.PORTS (1963]
a particular land "is likely to bti needtld for a public purpose". Thereafter under s. 5A a person
inttmlsttid in the land has a right to object to the
acquiRition aod the whole queati·m has to be finally
consid11red and decided by the Government after
hearing such person. It is only thereafter that in
a normal oaRe the Government ie entitled to make
a notification under sub-a. ( 1) of s 6 declaring that
it is satisfitld "after considering the report, if any.
made under s. 5A, sub-s. (2)" that the land is required for a public purpose. This is the sequence
in which the notifications have to be mado. T,he
reason why the sequence has to be followed is to
m1>ke it olea.r tht<t the Government has applied its
mind to all t,be relevant facts and then come to
a decision or arrived at its satisfaction even in a
case where the provisions of s. 5A n<:>ed not bo complied with. Undoubtedly the law requires that
notification under sub-a. (I) of s. 6 must be made
only after the Government is satisfied that a particular l>J.nd is required for a public purpose. Undoubtedly also where the Government has not direl..
ted under sub-a. ( 4) of s. 17 that the provisions of
s. 5A need not be complied with the two notifications, that is, under sub·s. ( 1l of s. 4 and sub-a. (I)
of a. 6 cannot be made simultaneously. But it
seems to us that where there i8 an emergeney by
reason of which the State Government directs under
sub-s. (4) of s. 17 of the Act that the provisions of
s. 5A need not be complied with, the whole matter,
that is, the actual requirement oft he land for a
public purpose must necessarily have b~en considered at the earliest stage itself that is when it was
decided that compliance with the provisions of
s. 5A be dispenaed with. It is, therefore, difficult
to see why the two notifications oannot, in such a
case, be made simultaneously. A notification under
mb-s. (I) one of s. 4 is a conditiun vrecedent to the
making of notification under 1111b-B. (l) of B. 6. If
t)le Go'Yernment, therefore, takee a decsjejoa &o
'
2 s.c.R.
. ,_.,,
SUPREME OOtm'l' REPORTS
823
make such a nC>tification and, there after, takes two
further decisions, that is, to olispense with cowpliane,e with the provi.Sions of s. 5A and also to declare that the land comprised in the notification is
in fa.ct needed for a public purpose, there is uo
departure from a.ny provision of the la.w even
thollgh the two notifications are published on the
same day. In the case before us the preliminary
declaration under a. 4(1) was made on August 18,
1961, and a declaration as to the satisfaction
· of the Government on August 19, 1961, though
both of them were published in the Gazette
of August :!5, 1!161. 'l'he preliminary declara·tiou as well as the subsequent declaration are
both required by law to be published in the official
gazette. But the law does not make the prior publication of notification under sub-s. ( l) of s. 4 a
condition precedent to the publication of a notification under sub-s. ( l) of s. 6. Where ac4uisition
is being mad" a.fter following the uormaJ procedure
the notification under· the latter section will necess·
arily have to bti published subsequent to the notification uudt>r the former section because in such a
case the observance of procedure under s. 5A is
interposed between the two notifications. But
where s. 5A is not _in tho way there is no irregularity in publlishing those notifications on the same
day. Thu stirial numbers of the notifications are
No. 580J/41 B(l)/til/18755 dated August 18, l!iol,
and 5!!09-4 Ill1I)/til/1876U dated August 19, 1961,
and it would appear from them that th" preliminary
notification W.d in fact precede the final declaration.
These were the only objections raised before
us and as ~veryone of them has failed the petitions
must be d1Bm1ssed. We accordingly dismiss them.
with costs. As however, all petitions were heard
together there will be only one hearing fee.
JllOB
Bomdt1CJnfi
y.
St.,. oJ Puojsb
Mtt4/rolkar J.
!!24 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963)
'"'
"ef••'-Jilt
S•lo
SrMe /loo .J.
SuBBA. RAO, J.-I have perused the judgment
prepared by my learned brother, Mudholkar, J.
With great respect, I cannot agree .
••
The fact are fully stated by my learned
brother and they need not be restated except io
the extent relevant to the question I propose to
consider.
About six acres of land purchased by the
petitioners in Writ Petition No. 246 of 1961 for
a sum of Rs. 4,60,000 in February, 1961, is
situate in village Meola Maharajpur, Tehsil
Balabhgarh, Diatrict Gargaon. On August 25, 1961,
the Governor of Punjab published a notification
dated August 18, 1961, in the Official Ga~tte under
s.4 of the Land Acquisition Act., 1894, hereinafter
called the Act, to the effect that the eaid land was
likely to be needed by the Government at public
expense for a purpose, namely, for setting up a
faclory for manufacturing various ranges of refrigeration compressors and ancillary equipment.
Under s.17 of the Act the appropriate Government
directed that the provisions of s.5A will not apply
to the said acquisition. On the same tlay, another
notification unr1er s.6 of the Act dated August
19, 1961, was published to the effeot that the
Governor of Punjab w&& satisfied that the land
specified therein was required by the Government
at public expense for the said purpose. On September 29, 1961, the Government of Punjab sanctioned
an exJ?enee of Re. 100 for the purpose of acquisition
of the said land. The validity of the said notification is questioned on various grounds. But as I
am in favour of petitioners on the question of interpretation of the proviso to s.6 of the A1:t, I do not
propose to expre88 my opinion on any other question raised in the case. The material part of s.6( I )
of the Act reads :
''Subject to thfl provisions .of Part VII of
this Aot, when the appropriate Government is
•
•
2 s.o.R.
\_
-;<
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
825
'
sa.tisfied, ·after considering the report, if a.ny,
made under section 5A, sub,seotion (2), that
any particular land is needed for a public
purpose, or for a Company, a declaration shall
be made to that effect under the signature of
Secretary to such Government or of some
officer duly authorized to1 certify its order :
Provided that no such declaration shall
be made unless the compensation to be awarded for such property is to be paid by a Com~
pany, or wholly or partly out of public revenues or some fund controlled or managed by
a local authority."
Under that section, the Government may declare
that a particular land is needed for a public purpose
or for a company ; and the proviso imposes ii.
condition on tho issuance of such a declaration.
The condition is that no such declaration shall be
made unless the compensation to be awarded for such
property is to be paid by the company or, wholly, or
partly out of the public revenues, A reasonable construction of this provision uninfluenced by decisions
woul<!_ be that in the case of an acquisition for a
company, the entire compensation will be paid by
the oompany, and in the case of ~n acquisition for
a public purpose the Government will pay the
whole or a substantial part of the compensation out
of public revenues. 'The underlying object of the
section is apparent: it is to provide for a safeguard
against abuse of power. A substantial contribution
from public coffers is ordinarily a guarantee that
the acquisition is for a public purpose. But it is
argned 'that the terms of the section are satisfied if
the appropriate Government •JOntributes a nominal
sum, say a pie, even though the total compensation
payble. may -run into lakhs. 1'his interpretation
would lead to extraordinary results. The Govern•
ment may acquire the land of A for B for a declared
public purpose, contributing a pie towards the
IHI
......_,
"·
8111• of Panjd
Sub/Jo Rao J.
826
S••
'i
s,.,.of••Pwrjab
Sojk F.oo J.
SUPREME OOURT REPOR'1'3 fl963}
estimated oompe1111e.tion of say, Rs, 1,00,000. If
that was the intention of the Legislature, it would
not have imposed a condition of paymeut of part of
the compensation, for that provision would not
serve the purpose for which it must have been intended. Therefore, u. reasonable meu.ning should
be given to the expre11Bion "wholly or partly".
The proviso says that the compenBBtion shall be
paid by the company or, wholly or partly, out of
public revenues. A contrast between these two
modes of payment suggests the idea that in one
case the compensation 'llUBt come out of the company's coffers and in the oth..r casP th" whole or
some reasonable part nf it should come from
public revenues. This idea exolmles th•J assumption that practically no compnnBBtion need come
out of public revenues. The juxtaposition of the
words "wholly or partly" and the disjunctive between them emphasize the same idea. It will be
incongruo\18 to say that public revenue shall
contribute rupees one lakh or one pie. The payment of a part of a compensation must have some
rational relation t-0 the compensation payable in
respect of the acquisition for a public purpose.
So construed "patt" oan only mean a substantial
part of the estimated oompensation. There cannot
be an exhaustive definition of the words "substantial part of the compensation". What is substantial
part of a compensat\on depends upon the facts of
each oase, the estimate of the compensA.tion and
other relevant circumstances. While a court will
not go metiouloualy into the queethn to strike a
balance between a part and a whole, it will certainly
be in a poaition to ascertain broadly whetbel" in a
particular caae the amount oontribukd by the
Government towards compensation is so illusory
that it oannot conceivably be substantial part of
the consideration. There is some conflict of view
..
• _,
2 s.c.B..
SUPREME OOURT REPORTS
821
~,.
'
on this question. The House of Lords in Ohatterton
v. Gave (I) defined the word "part" in -th~ context
r
of the provisions of the Dramatic Cop~nght Act.
The words in the statute were "product10n or any
part ·thereof". The plaintiffa therein were the proprietors of drama called, "The Wandering Jew''
and it was alleged that· the --defendant produced a
drama on . the same subject, It was fOUJ:!d that
·----r' the drama of the defendant was not, except in res·
pect of two .sce~es or points, a copy from! o~ a
colourable im1tat10n of, the drama of the plamt1ffs.
In that context the House of Lords construed the
relevant words "production or any part thereof."
Lord O'Hagan observed :
a
" •Part', as was observed, is not necessarily the same as "particle", and there may
be a taking so minute in its extent and so
trifling in its nature as not to incur the statu·
table liability."
..
This decision may not be directly in· point, hut the
construction placed upon the expression "part" is
of general application. In the context of 'that
statute, the court found that the Legislature clearly
intended by the words "any part" a real substantial
part.. !'- division Bench of the Madras Righ Court,
cons1stmg of Spencer and · Ramesam, JJ., directly
considered this poin~ in Ponnaia v. Secretary of
St,ate ('). There, a total sum of Rs. 5 985
required for th~ acquisition of the property of' the
appellant therem and the Government contributed
from Provincial revenues a:n amount of one· anna
towards that compensation. The· learned Judges
held that it was an indication of the illusory character of the ohject. for which the provisions of the. Act
hml been made use of, Adverting to the argument
that any small contribution by the Government
(I) (1878) 3 App, Cas. 483, 498.
(2) A.I.R, 1!126 Mad. 1099.
1968
S•maDtMti
Y.
Sta,. ofP~
SubboRoo J,
828
SUPREME cot1Br REPORTS [1963)
would satisfy the requirement of s.6 of the Act,
R&mesam, J., observed at p. 1100 :
'•We think that the Legislature, when
they pe.11sed the Land Acquisition Act, did not
intend that owJJers should be deprivoo of
their ownership by a• mere device of private
persons employing the Act for private ends
or for the gratification of private spite or
malice."
These are weighty observationR of a judge of great
experience, who was also tho Government Pleader
before he beoa.me a judge of the Madras High Court.
The observations also indicate the statutory objeot
in insisting on a substantial contribution from pub·
lic revenues, for a strict insistence thereon would
prevent to a large extent the abuse of power under
the Act. But unfortunately the correctness of this
decision was not aooeptod by another division Benoh
of the same High Court, consisting of Odgers and
Madhavan Nair, JJ., in Senja Naicken v. Se,t;re/.ary
of State for India ('). I have oa.refully gone
through the judgment in that case, and, with great
respect to the learnoo Judges, I cannot see any
acceptable reasons for departing from the earlier
view of the same oourt. Odgers, J., concentrated
his criticism of the tiarlior judgment more on the
reliance by the earlier Bench on the decision of
the House of Lords than on the intrinsic merits of
the decision itself. It is true that the lea.mod
Judges in the earlier decision relied upon the observations of the House of Lords, but that was only in
support of their conclusion why tho expreaion
"part" should not be understood as a particle. But
the main i:ason they gave w~ that, having regard
to the obJect of that provuio, the Legislature in
11.11ing the word "part" could have only meant a
substantial part or otherwise the objeot would be
.(I)
(1926) I.L.R. SO Mad. 308.
2 s.o.R..
SUPREME OOURT REPORTS . 829 -
defeated and the abuse of power which it intended
to prevent. could easily be perpetrated under the
colour of the Act. The second reason given by
Odgers, J. was stated by the learned Judge thus
at p.314:.
" I invited the learned Advocate ·
for. the . appellant to say. where a
- "particle" would end and "part" begin of this
sum of Rs. 600. It is. true an anna is a very
small pa.rt of Rs. 600. But nevertheless it is
. a part."
This adherence to the 1trict letter in coomplete disregard of the spirit of the section certainly defeats ·
the purpose of the legislation: The word "partly'',
in the proviso should be .construed in the setting in
which it is used and not in vacuum, as the learned
Judge &ought to do. The third reason the learned
Judge gives for his conclusion was stated at p. 315
thus:
·
"Suppose on appeal the compensation
had been enhanced.. There is no doubt the
Government would have to defray the extra
sum out of the public revenues and having ·
once undertaken the acquisition they could
not call on the constituents again."
This comment again, in my view, is beside the
point. It is not the duty of the Government to
meticulously fix' a figure; it may agree to bear a
definite proportion of the compensation that may
ultimately be awarded to a claimant and in that
even subsequent variations by hierarchy of tribunals
would not cause any difficulty, for the proportion
would attach itself to the varying figures. That
a part, it need not be a particular fraction of the
compensation ultimately awarded. If the Government agrees to contribute a substantial part of· the .
1962
Somavanti
v.
State of Punjab
Su!iba Rao J.
830
Soneabnli
'"
5'<11 •f Plllflab
S
IIMJ.
SUPREME OOURT REPORTS tI963]
'·.
estimated oompensa.tion that would meet the requirement.a of the section. The other learned Judge,
Madhavan Nair, J., in substance agreed with the
jn<IJ[ment of O~ers, J., and did not disclose any
additional reasons for dift'<'ring from the decision of
the earlier Bench. In my view, the decision in
Benja Naidcen v. Secrewry of State (1) is not correct.
The.86 two were oonsidered by a Full Bench of
the Madras High Court in Suryanarayana v. Province of Madraa('). There Sir Lionel Leach, C.J., delivering the judgment of the Full Bench, noticed the
judgment of the division Bench in Pannaia v. Secretary of SfJlle (') and the criticism offered on the
judgment by the later division Bench in Senja
Naichm v. Secretary of StJJte (1) and observed:
l
'
"We are in entire agreement with this
oritioism.''
Then tho learned Chief Justice proceeded to observe:
"In interpre~ing the proviso we can only
have regard to the words uaed and, in our
judgment, it is sufficient oomplianoe with the
proviso if any part of compensation is paid
out of public funds. One anna is a part of
the compensation. It is true it is a small
part, but it is neverthelesa a part."
This literal interpretation of the word "part" de hora
the setting in which that word appears in the section,
in my view, makes the condition imposed on the
exeroise of the jurisdiction by the Governme it
meaningless and also attributes to ihe Legislature
an intention to impose a purposeless and ineffective
11) (1926) I.L.R. 50 Mad. 308.
(2) I.L.R. ( 1946) Mad. 155, US.
\5) A.I.R. 1926. Mad. 1099.
,,
.....
2 s.c.n:
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
831
formality. For the reasons already given, I cannot
accept the correctness of this judgment. I, therefore,
hold that unless the Government agrees to contri·
bute a · substantial part · of the compensation,
depending upon the circumstances. of each case, the
condition imposed by the proviso'on the exercise by
the appropriate Government of its jurisdiction is
not complied with. In the instant case it is impo88i·.
hie to say that a sum of Rs. 100 out of a.n estimated
compensation which may go even beyond
Rs.4,00,000 is in any sense of the term a substantial
part of the said compensation. The Government has
clearly broken the condition and, therefore, it has
no jurisdiction to issue the declare.tion under s. 6
of the Act.
In this view it is not necessary to express my
opinion on the other questions raised in this case.
In . the result the said notification is quashed
and respondents 1 to 5 are hereby prohibited from
giving effect to the said n,otification and ta.king any
proceedings thereunder.
(
It is common case that the order in Writ
Petition No. 246 of 1961 would govern Writ
Petitions Nos. 247 and 248 of 1961 also. A similar
order will issue in these two petitions also. The
respondents will pay the costs of the petitioners in
all the petitions.
·
'"'
•
BY COURT : In view ~f the · majority opinion
the Court dismissed the Writ Petitions with costs
There will be one set of hearing fee. · . .
'
Petitiona dismissed.
--
IHI
s_•...,,
y,
Slote of l'uojtb
SidAa RiMI J.
Report an error or ask for masking: grievance@lawgrids.org