SMT. UJJAM BAI versus STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH
Supreme Court of India | Decided 28 April 1962 | [1963] 1 S.C.R. 778 | 1962 INSC 174
Key facts
- Decided
- 28 April 1962
- Bench
- S.K. DAS*, J.L. KAPUR, A.K. SARKAR, K. SUBBA RAO, M. HIDAYATULLAH, N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR, J.R. MUDHOLKAR
- Bench size
- 7
- Case number
- WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) No. 79/1959
- Disposal
- Dismissed
- Citation
- [1963] 1 S.C.R. 778
- Neutral citation
- 1962 INSC 174
Text of the judgment
77S
1962
SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1963]
SMT. UJJAM BAI
v.
STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH
(S. K. D.As, J. L. KAPUR, A. K. SARKAR. K. SUBB.A
R.Ao, M. HID.AY.ATULLAH, N. RAJ.AGOPALA
AYY.ANGAR and J. R.MUDHOLKAR, JJ.)
Fundamental Right, Enforcement of-Assessment by Sales
Tax Officer under a valid Act-If open to challenge o" the sole
ground of misconstructi·on of Act and Notificati"on-Oonstitution
of India, Arts. 19(l)(g), 32-Uttar Pradesh Sales Tax Act,
1948(U.P. XV of 1948), s.4(1)(b).
The petitioner was a partnt:r in a firm that carried on
the business of manufacture and sale of hand~made biilis. On
December 14, 1957, the State Government issued a notification
under s. 4(l)(b) of the U. P. Sales Tax Act, 1948.
Section 4(1)(b) of the U.P. Sales Tax Act, 1948, providos as
follows:-
"No tax shall be payable on( a) The sale of water, milk, salt, newspapers and motor
spirit as defined ii) the U. P. State Motor Spirit (Taxation)
Act, 1939, and of any other goods which the State Government
may by notification in the Official Gazette, exempt.
(b) The sale of any goods by the All India Spinners'
Association of Gandhi Ao;hram, Mcerut, and their branch("s or
such other persons or class of persons as the State Government
may from time to time exempt on such conditions and on
payment of such fees, if any, not exceeding eight thousand
rupees annually as may be specified by notification in the
Official Gazette."
The notification dated December 14, 1957, issued under
s. 4(1jtb) was as follows:"In partial modification of notifications No. ST 905/X,
dated March 31, 1956 and ST 418/X 902(9) 52, dated
January 31, 1957, and in exercise of the powers confer1ed by
clause (b) of sub-section !I) of section 4 of the U.P. Sales
Tax Act, 1948(U.P. Act No. XV of 1948), as amended up to
date, the Governor of Uttar Pradesh is pleased to order that
no tax shall he pavable under the aforesaid Act with effect
from December 14, 1957, by the dealers in respect of the
1 S. C. R. SYPRBME COURT RENRTS
779
following classes of goods provided that the Additional Central
Excise Duties leviable thereon from the closing of business on
December 13, 1957, have been paid on such goods and that
the dealers thereof furnish proof to the satisfaction of the
assessing authority that such duties have been paid.
I.
................. .
2.
. ........... .
3. Cigars, cigarettes, biris and tobacco, that is to say
any form of tobacco, whether cured or uncured and whether
manufactured or not and includes the leaf, stalks and stems of
tobacco plant but does not include any part of a tobacco
plant while still attached to the earth."
By a subsequent notification is•.med on November 25,
1958, hand-made and machine-made bidia were unconditio·
nally exempted from payment of sales tax from July 1, 1958.
The Sales Tax Officer sent a notice to the firm for the
as~essment. of tax on sale of bidis during the assessment period
April l, 1958, to June 30, 1958. The firm claimed that the
notification dated December 1.4, 1957, had exempted bidia
from payment of sales tax and that, therefore, it was not
liable to pay sales tax on,xhe sale of bidia. This position was not
accepted by the Sales Tax Officer who passed the following
order on December 20, 1958,"The exemption envi~aged in this n'>tification,applies ·to
dealers in respect of sales of biris provided that the additional
Central Excise duties leviable thereon from the closing of
business on 13. 12. 1957 have been paid on such go0ds. The
assessees paid :no such excise duties. Sales af biris by the
assessees are therefore liable to sales tax".
The firm appealed under s. 9 of the Act to the Jqdge
(Appeals) Sales Tax, but that was dismissed on May 1, 1959.
The firm had however moved the High Court under Art. 226
~f tlie Constitution before that date. The High Court took
the view. that the firm had another remed}'\ under the Act and
that the Sales Tax Officer had not committed any appareht
firror in interpreting~ notification of December 14, 1957.
An appeal against the order of the High Oourt on a certificate
under Art. 133 (l)(a) was dismissed bv this Court for non·
pros~cution anp the firm filed an application for restoration
of the appeal: and condonation .of dday. During the pendency
of that,~ppe!ll the present 'PeLitivn was filed by th~ ,petitioner
under Art. 32 of the constitution for the enforcement of her
fundamental
ri~ht under
Arts. 19(1)(g)
and
31
of the con'Stlhltions. Before the Consiitntion Bench
n61
Bmc. Ujjam B•i
••
SC.ti of UIUlr
l'r•tlish
780
1961
Smt. Ujjam Bai
v.
Slfll~ of UU11r
Pratksh
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [196S]
which
heard
the matter a preliminary
objection
was raised
against
the
maintainability
of
the
petition and the correctness of the decision of this
Court in Kailash Nath v. State of U.P. A I.R. 1957 S.C. 790
relied upon by the petitioner was challenged. That Bench
referred the following questions for derision by a larger
Bench," I. Is an order of assessment made by an authority
under a taxing statute which is intra vires open to challenge
as repugnant to Art. 19 (I) (g), on the sole ground that it is
based on a misconstruction of a provision of the Act or of a
notification issued thereunder ?"
2. Can the validity of such an order be questioned in a
petition under Art. 32 of the Constitution ?11
Held (per Das, Kapur, Sarkar, Hidayatullah and
Mudholka~, JJ.) that in the case under consideration the
answer to tht que!tions must be in the negative. The case of
Kai/,ash Nath was not correctly decided and the deci•ion is
not sustainable on the authorities on which it was baaed.
Kai/JJshNath v. State of U. P., A. I. R. 1957 S. C. 790,
disapproved.
Bengal Immunity Co. Ltd. v. State of Bih,ar, (1955)
2 S. C. R. 603 and Bidi Supply Co. v. Union of India, (1956)
s. C. R. 267, explained.
Per S. K. Das, J.-The right to move this Court by
appropriate proceedings for the enforcement of fundamental
right~ conferred by Pait IIJ of the Constitution is itself a
guaranteed fundamental right and this Court is not trammelled by procedural technicalities in making an order or issuing
a writ for the enforcement of such rights.
There is no disagreement that in the following three
classes of cases a question of the enforcement of a fundamental
right may arise and if it docs arise, an application under
Art. 32 will lie, namely, (IJ where action is taken under a
statute which is ultra vires the Constitution; (2) where the
statute is intra vir~s but the action taken is without jurisdiction; and ( 3J where the action taken is procedurally ultra vire•
as where a quasi-judicial authority under an obligation to act
judicially passes an order in violation of the principles of
natural justice.
Where, however, a quasi-judicial authority makes an
order in the undoubted exercise of its jurisdiction in pursuance
l s.c.R. SUPREME OOURT REPORTS
781
of a provision of law which is intra vires, .an error of law or
fact committed by that authority cannot be impeached otherwise than on appeal, unless the erroneous determination relates
to a matter on which the jurisdiction of that body depends.
A tribunal may lack jurisdiction if it is improperly constituted,
or if it fails to observe certain essential preliminaries to the
inquiry; but it does not exceed its jurisdiction by basing its
dedsion upon an incorrect determination of any question that
it is empowered or required (i. e. has jurisdiction) to determine. In such a case, the characteristic attribute of a judicial
act or decision is that it binds, whether right or wrong, and
no question of the enforcement of a fundamental right can
arise on an application under Art. 32.
Therefore, an order of assessment made by an authority
under a taxing statute which is intra vires and in the undoubted exercise of its jurisdiction cannot be challenged on the sole
ground that it is passed on a misconstruction of a provision of
the Act or of a notification issued thereunder. The validity
of such an order cannot be questioned on an application under
Art. 32. The proper remedy for correcting such an error is to
proceed by way of appeal or if the error is an error apparent
on the face of the record, then by an application under
Art. 226 of the Constitution.
Mall&arjun v. N_arhari, (1900) 5 L.R. 27 I.A. 216, Aniyoth
KunAamina Umma v. Ministry of Rahabilitation,(1962)1 S.C.R.
505, Gulabdas II Co. v; Assistant Collector of Customs, A.l.R.
1957 S. C. 733, Bhatnagar & Co. Ltd. v. Union of India, (1957)
S. C.R.- 701, and Parbhani Transport Co-operative Society Ltd.
v. Regional Transport.Authority, (1960) 3 S. C.R. 177, referred
to. Case law reviewed.
Per Kapur, J.-Since the statute was constitutionalJy
valid every part of it must be 10 and the determination by
the Sales Tax Officer, acting within his jurisdiction under the
Act, even though erroneous, was valid and legal.
An order of assessment under a statute that was ultra
tJ&ru could not be equated with one passed under another that
wu intra tliru, even though erroneous. Unlike the former
the latter was a constitutioJaal and legal Act and could not
violate a fundamental right and or· be impugned under
Art. 3~ of the Constitution.
If the Salea Tax Officer, acting quasi-judicially, miscon$..
trued the notification, which it had jurisdiction to c~nstruc)
and imposed a tax, there could be no infringement qf Art. 19
( 1) (g) of the ConatitutiQn
11161
Smt. fljjam Bai
v.
State of Ultar
Pradesh
782
1911
Sr.rt. Ujj•m B1i
••
Sl1u •I Uttlf'
P""4sh
SUPREME COURT REPORTS Ll963]
Case law discussed.
Per Subha Rao, J.-The Conslitulion is the paramount
Jaw. As the Constitution declares the fundamental rights and
also pres-:ribcs the restrictions that may be imposed thereon,
no institution can overstep the limits directly or indirectly by
encroaching upon the said rights. This Court has no more
important function to perform than to preserve the funda mental rights of the people, and has l:'-cen given all the instituti<r
nal conditions necessary to exercise its jurisdiction without
fear or favour. It is settled law that Art. 32 confers a wide
jurisdiction on this Court to enforce the fundamental rights
that the right to enforce a fundamental right is itself~
fundamental right, and that it j1 the duty of this Court to
entertain an application and to d~cidc it on merits whenever
a party approaches it, irrespective of whether the question
raised involves a question of Jurisdiction, Law or fart.
Though the Legislature can make a law imposing rcasonaplc
restrictions on a fundamental right in the interest of the
public, the Constitution docs not empower the Legislature tp
make an order of an executive authority final so '!S to deprive
the Supreme Court of its jurisdiction under Art. 32 of the
Constitution.
The principles and procedure evolved by the courts in
England in regard to the issue of prerogative writs cann.ot
circumscribe tbe wide power of the Supreme Court to issue
orders and directions for the enforcement of fuml11mcnta I
rights. The issuance of such writs can be regulated by evolving appropriate procedure to meet different situations. What•
ever may be the stage at which this Court is approached this
Court roay in i1s discretion, if the question involved is one of
jurisdiction or a construction of a provision, decide the qucs..
tion and enforce the right without waiting till the procedure
pres<ribcd by a law is exhausted; but if it finds that questions
of fact or mixed questions of fact and Jaw arc involved, it may
give an opportunity to the party, if he agrees, to renew the
application after he has exhausted his remedies under the Act,
or, if he docs not agree, to adjourn the petition till after the
remedies arc exhausted. If the fundamental right of the
petitioner depends upon the findings of fact arrivca at by the
administrative tribunals in exercise of the p0wcrs conferred
on them under the Act, this Court may in its discretion
ordinarily accept the findings and dispose of the application on
the basis of those findings.
The principle of rea jvdicata accepted by this llOW't in
Daryao v. Stal• of U. P. cannot be involved in the case 0£
orders of administrative tribunals.
That apart, when
a
1 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
783
petitioner seeks to quash the order of a tribunal, no question
of ru judicata arises, as that doctrine implies that there should
be two proceedings and that in the former proceeding an
issue has been decided inter-pa.rtes and therefore the same
cannot be rcagitated in a subsequent proceeding.
Daryao v. State of U. P. (1962) 1 S. C.R. 564. considered.
Whether relief can be given under Art. 32 against the
order of a court or not, it is c\ear that administrative tribunals
arc only the limba of the Executive, though they exercise
quasi-judicial functions, and therefore arc clearly comprchen·
ded by the expression "other authorities" in Art. 12 of the
Constitution and in appropriate cases writs can be issued
against them.
On a plain reading of the impugned notification it is
clear that hand-made bidis arc exempted from sales tax under
the Act and therefore the Sales-tax Authorities have no power
to impose sales tax thereon.
The decision of this Court in the case of Kailaah Nath v.
State of U. P., was not incorrect or based on irrelevant
decisions.
KailashNath v. State of U. P., A. I. R. 1957 S. C. 790,
followed.
Gulabdas & Co. v. Assistant Collector of Customs, A. I. R.
1957 S. C. 733, Bhatnagara &: Oo. Lid. v. Union of India,
(1957) S. C.R. 701 and Pharbani Transport Co-operative
.jociety v. Regional Transport Authority, (1960) 3 S. C.R. 1'77.
considered.
· Mjs. Ram Narain Sona Ltd. v • ...4,asU. Commisaion,er of
Sales Paz, (1955) 2 S. C.R. 483, J. V. Gokal & Oo. v. Asatt.
Collector of Salu Paz, (1960) 2 S. C.R. 852 and M. L. Arora
v. Ezcise and Tazation Officer, (1962) 1 S. C. R. 823
referred to.
'
'
Case-law discussed.
Per Hidayatullah, J .-Article 32 contains a gwµ-a,ntcc:d
right to move the Supreme Court for enforcement of fundain•
ental rights and any person whose fundamental rights bav~ been
invaded has a guaranteed right to ~k relict from the Court
without having to seek to enforce his remedies elsewhere first.
:-.nt the right which he can claim ·is no~ a general right of
.~ppeal tgain.'lt dcci!!ion, of courts ao.d tribqna1$, The Supreme Court in examining such petitions·would examine them
1961
Smt. Ujjam B•I
•• Ult•
s 1a.t1 •f
Prntl,sh
784 SUPREME OOURT REPORTS (1963]
198'
s,,.t. UJjam Bai
v.
Slat1 of U" 1r
Pr•tl1sh
from the narrow stand point of a breach of fundamental
rights. If a petitioner fails to establish that, he will fail
outright.
Taxing laws may sufl'cr froru mauy defects : they may
be opposed to the fundamental rights, they may be made by a
legislature beyond its own competence, or without observing
the formalities laid down by the Constitution. If a taxing
law is opposed to fundamental rights it can be challenged
under Art. 32. It is not necessary to resort only to Art.265
because Art. 32 stands in no need of support from Art.265.
The taxing authorities are instrumr.ntalitics of Govern..
ment. They are a part of the executive even though in
assessing and levying the tax they act as quasi-judicial bodies.
Their actions in demanding the tax in the ultimate analysis
are executive actions. If that action is not backed by law or
is beyond their jurisdiction an aggrieved person can have
recours• to Art. 32 of the Constitution. Where, however,
no question of vire• of the law or jurisdiction is involved the
Supreme Court would ordinarily not interfere in a petition
under Art. 32 even though the interpretation he erroneous as
the matter can be set right by recourse to such appeals or
revisions as the law permits. This is based upon the well
accepted rule that a court having jurisdiction may decide
wrongly as well as rightly. If there i• an error not involving
jurisdiction that error can be corrected by the ordinary means
of appeals and revisions including an appeal by special leave
to the Supreme Court. But if the law is unconstitutional or
the interpretation is about jurisdiction which is erroneous a
writ under Art. 32 can be claimed. The Supreme Court
will keep its two roles separate, namely, (a) as the Supreme
Appellate Tribunal against the decisions of all r.ourts and
tribunals and (b) as Court of guaranteed J"Cllort for enforcement of fundamental rights. It will not act as the latter
when the case is only for exercise of its power as the former.
It will, however, interfere if a clear case of breach of fundamental rights is made out even though there may be other
remedies open including an approach to the Supreme Court
in its appellate jurisdiction.
Ptr Ayyangar, J.-From the fact that a statute was
competently enacted and did not violate fundamental rights,
it did not necessarily follow that quasi-judicial authorities
created by it could not violate fundamental rights. Legislative competence covered only such action as could on a proper
interpretation of the statute be taken under it. If a law did
not create a liability an authority acting under it could Rot
do so by a 111iainterpret1ltion of it, for Legialative backing for
1 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
785
the imposition of such a liability would be plainly lacking.
The answer· to the question should, therefore, be that an
action of a quasi-judicial authority would violate a fundamental right where by a plain and patent misconstruction of the
statue such an authority affected fundamental rights. This
would constitute another category besides the three others in
respect of which violation of such rights was not in doubt,
namely, where the statute itself was invalid or unconstitutional, where the authority exceeded its jurisdiction under the
Act and where it contravened mandatory procedure prescribed
by the statute or vielated the principles of natural justice.
The exerciae of the judicial power of the State might alsq
equally with the Legislative and Executive part involve the
violation of fundamental rights guaranteed by Part III of the
Constitution.
Since in the instant case the construction put upon the
notification by the Sales Tax Officer was reasonable possible,
it was a c;ase of mere error of law and not a pat~nt error or an
error apparent on the face of the record which could justify
the issue of a writ of certiora1i.
Per Mudholkar, J.-The question of enforcement of a
fundamental right could arise if a tax wa! a§sessed under a
law whiCh was (I) void under Art. 13 or, (2) was ultra virea
the Constitution or, (3} where it was suborainate legislation,
it was ultra virea the law under which it was made or inconsistent with any other law in force.
A Similar question would arise if the tax was assessed
by an authority (I) other than the one empowered to do so
under the taxing law Qr (2) in violation of the procedure
prescribed by law or, (3) in colourable exercise of the powers
conferred by the law.
\Yhere a tax ~ a&Sessed bona· fide by a competent
authority under a vahd law ind under the procedu1e laid
down by it, no question of infringement of any fundamental
right could arise, even though it was based upon an erroneous
construction of law unless the tax imposed was beyond the
competence of the Legislature 01· violated any of the fundamental rights or any other provisions of the Constitution.
A mere misconstruction of a provision of ?aw did not
render the decision of a quasi-judicial tribunal void as being
beyond jurisdiction. It stood till it was corrected in the
appropriate manner and if such a decision a person was held
liable to pay tax he could not treat it as a nullity and contend
that it was not authorised by law: The position would be
1968
Smt. Ujjam 81J1
·v.
Staleiof Utta1
Pra<Jesh
786
Smt. U.iJam B11i
the same even though upon a proper construction the law
did not authorise the levy.
'
••
Sl.t• •f U1tar
l'rt1duh
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963]
0RIGIN.4.L JURlSDICTION :
l!J59.
Petition No. 79 of
Petition under Art. :!2 of the Constitution of
India for enforcement of Fundamental Rights.
WITH
Civil Miscellaneous Petition No. 1349 of 1961.
Application for restoration of Civil .Appeal
No. 172 of 1960 M/s. Mohan Lal Hargovind Dai
v. The_Sales Tax Officer, Allahabad.
M. 0. Setalvad, Attorney-General of India, G. K.
Daphtury, Solicitor·General of India, G. S. Pathak,
S. V. Khare, S. N. And.leg, Rameahwar Nath and
P. L. Vohra, for the petitioner.
H. N. Sanyal, Additional Solicitor-General of
India, M. V. Goswami and O. P. Lal, for the respon·
dents.
N. ,A. Palkhivala, B. Parthaaqrathi, J. B.
Dadachanji, 0. G. Mathur, and Ravinder Narain, for
Intervener (Tata Engineering and Locomotive Co.,
Ltd., Bombay).
A. S. fl. Chari, D. P. Singh and M. K. Ram11murthi, for Intervener (State of Bihar) .
H. N. Sanyal, Additioru&f, Bolicit<>r-Genera/, of
Ind.Us,, B, R. L. Iyengar and T.JI. Sen, for Intervener
(State of lly110re).
S. N. Andley, Rameahwar Nath and Vohra, for
the petit\oner (in C. M. f. No. 1349 of 1961).
H. N. 8anya/,, .ddditional Solicitor-General of
India, G. G. Mathur, M. V. Go&Wa'llJ,i for C. P .. ui,
for the respondent (in C. M. P. No. 1349 of 1961).
1 S. C. R.
--(
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
787
1961. April 28. The above petition coming
up for hearing in the first instance before the
Constitution Bench consisting of S. K. Das, J. L.
Kapur, M. Hidayatallah, J.C. Shah and T. L.
Venkataram Ayyar, JJ., the matter was referred
to the Chief Justice under O. V-A, r. 2 of the
Supreme Court Rules, 1U50, as a.mended, by a
Judgment delivered by
VENKAT.A.RAMA AIYAR, J.-The petitioner is
a partner in a. firm oa.lled Messrs. Mohan Lal
Hargovind Das, which carries on business in the
manufacture a.nd sale of biris in number of States,
and is dealer registered under the U .P. Sales Tax
Act 15 of 1948 with its head office at A1Iahabad.
In the present petition filed under Art. 32 of the
Constitution, the petitioner impugns the validity
of a levy of sales tax made by the Sales Tax
Officer, Allahabad, by his order dated December
20, 1~58.
On December 14, 1957, the Government of
Uttar Pradesh issued a notification under s. 4(1)
(b) of the Act exempting from tax, sales of certain
goods including biris, provided that the additional
Central Excise duties leviable thereon had been
paid. Jn partial modification of this notification,
the Government issued another notification on November 25, 1958, exempting from tax unconditionally sales of biris, both machinemade and handm ·tde, with effect from July 1, 1958, The effect
of the two notifications aforesaid taken together
is that while for the period, Deoember 14, 1957, to
June 30, 1958, the exemption of biris from tax was
s1~bject to the proviso contained in the notification
dated December 14, 1957, for the period commencing from July 1, 1958, it was unconditional and
absolute.
The petitiom~r's firm filed its return for the
quarter ending June, 1958, disclosing a gross turn-
1962
Sml. U]Jam 11-i
v.
Sto•• 11! Utl•r
Pruesh
-~---·
788
.. SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963]
over of Rs. 75,44,633(- and a net turnover of
Rs.
lll/- representing the sale proceeds of empty
Smt. Ujjarit Bwi.
packages,
and deposit~d a sum of Hs. 3.51 n.P. as
••
SttJllofUttar
sales
tax
on
the latter. On November· 28, 1958, the
Pradesh
. ·Sale~ Tax Officer, Allahabad, sent a notice to the
\ pe'. ... .>aer's firm for assessment of tax on the sale
of biris during the period, April J, 1958, to June 30, ·
··· ·1958, and·cin the date 'of enquiry which was held
on December 10, 1958, the petitioner filed a petition stating that by rea,son of the exemption grant, ed under tlie notification No. ST-4485/X dated
December 14, 1957, no tax was payable on the. sale
of biris.. By his order dated. December 20, 1958,
the Sale Tax Officer rejected tbis .. contention. He
observed:
.
1362 .
"The exemption envisaged in this noti. fication applies to dealers in respect of Biris;
. provided that the· additional Central Excise
. ·duties leviable thereon from the closing of
. business on December 13, J 957, have beeri
·paid on such· goods.. The assessee paid no
such Excise duties. Sales of Biris by the assessee are, therefore, liable to sales tax."
Against this order; there was an a}'peal (Appeal No.
441'of1959) to the Courts of the Judge (Appeals),
Sales Tax, Allahabad, who, by his order dated l\fay
·' I, 1959, dismissed the same on the ground that the
· ·exemption from sale tax under the notification
·r
· related "to such classes of goods only on which the
-~
Additional Central Excise Duty was . leviable.''
Under s. IO of the Act; a person aggrieved by an
order in appeal might take it up on revision before
·the Revising Authority, and under s, 11, the asses. see has a right to require that any question of law '" ..
,.... arising out of the order of assessment be referred
to the opinion of the High Court. The Petitioner
did not take any proceedings under· the Act against .
. the order.in appeal'dated l\Ia;v 11 1959, anq that 4a& ..
peco!lle fmal.
· .
. .
..
·
1 S. C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
789
While Appeal No. 441 of 1959 was pending,
the petitioner also filed under Art. 226 of the
Constitution a petition in the High Court of
Alla.ha.bad, for a. writ of certiorari to qua.sh the
assessment order dated December 20, 1958. That
was dismiSBed on January 27, 1959, by the learned
Judges on the ground that, as the assessee could
contest the validity of the order in appropriate proceedings under the Act, and as, in fact, an appeal had
b~en filed, there was no ground for exercising the
extra.ordinary jurisdiction under Art. 226. In this
view, the learned Judges did not decide the case on
the merits, but observed that the "language of the
notification might well be read as meaning that the
notification is to apply only to those goods on
which an additional Central excise duty had been
levied and paid." The petitioner then field an
application under Art. 133 of the Constitution for
certificate for appeal to this Courts against the
above order, and that was granted. But instead
of pursuing that remedy, the petitioner has chosen
to file the present application under Art. 32 challenging the validity of the order of assessment dateed December 20, 1958. It is alleged in the petition
that t.he imposition and levy of tax aforesaid
"amounts to tP,e infringement of the fundamental
rights of the petitioner to carry on trade and
busineSB guaranteed by Art. 19 (1) (g) of the Constitution," and that it is further "an illegal confisoation of property without compensation and contravenes the provisions of Art. 31 of the Constitution." The prayer in the petition is that this
Courts might be "pleased to issue(a) a writ of certiorari or other order in the
na.ture of certiorari qua.ahing the ~order of the Sales
Tax Officer, Al1ahabad, dated 20th December 1958;
(b) a writ of mandamus directing the opposit.e
parties not to realise any sales tax from the petitioner on the basis of the said order dated 20th
Deoember, 1958."
196B
Smt. Ujjam Bai
v.
Stet1 of Uttu
Praduh
.AiyarJ.
790
1962
Slilt. Ujja,. Bo;
v.
Sl•I• of Utltrr
p •tfnh
SUPREME COURT .REPORTS (1963]
No argument has been addressed to Ull that
the impugned nrder of aEsessment is in contnvention of Art. 31. Such a contention would be wholly
untenable in view of the decision of this Court in
Ramjilal v. Inwme-t,ax Officer (') and Laxmanappa
Hanumant,appa v. Union of India' ('), where it has
been held that when tax is authorised by law as
required by Art. 265, the levy is not open to attack
under Art. 31 of the Constitution. Th whole of the
argument on behalf of the petitioner is that the
assessinen t order is unconstitutional as infringing
Art. 19(1 )(g ). It is contended in support of this
position that the Sales Tax Officer has misconstrued
tlie notification dated December 14, 1957, in holding
that exemption of tax thereunder is limited to biris
OD which additional excise duty had b1 en levied,
that as s result of such misconstruction tax he.6
been imposed which is unauthorised, and that
constitutes an interference with the light of the
petitioner to <'arry on business guarantePd by
:Art. l9(l)(g). That is how the jurisdiction of this
Court un<ler Art. 32 is invoked.
To this, the answer of the respondents is that
the Sales Tax Officer had correctly construed the
notification in limiting the exemption to iroods on
which additional euise duty had been paid The
respondents fort her raise a preliminary o bjeotion
to the maintainability of this petition on the ground
that Jaws of taxation which are protected by
Art. 26.'i fall outside the purview of Part III of the
Constitution, and are not open to attack as infringing fundamental rights iruaranteed therein, 1tnd that
even if they are subject to the restrictions in Part
III, an order of assessment made by a tribunal
acting iudicially under a statute which b intra i>ires
such as the impugned order dat<'d DecPmber 20
1958. does not infringe Art. 19(1\(g), and that, further, a petition un<ler Art.32 is not maintainable
(1) [1951] S.C.R. 127. 136, 137.
(2) (1"55) 1 S.C.R 769, 772.
l S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
791
for challenging it, even if it is erroneous on the
merits.
On these contentions, the points that arise for
decision are whether taxa.tion laws are subject to
the limitations imposed bv Part III; whether th~
order of assessment dated December 20, 1958, is in
contravention of Art. 19(l)(g); and whether it can
be impugned in a. petition under Art. 32 of the
Constitution. The first question that fa.Hs to be
considered is whether the restrictions imposed in
Part
of the Constitution have application to
taxation laws. The contention of the respondl"nts
is that ·taxation is a topic which is dealt with separately in Pa.rt XII of the Constitution, that the
governing provision is Art.265, which enacts that no
tax shall be levied or collected except by authority
of la.w, that when there is a law authorising the
imposition of tax and that does not contravene any
of the inhibitions in Part XII, then the lery thereunder cannot be attacked as infringing any of the
fundamental rights declared in Pa.rt III. In support
qf thi.s contention, the following observations in
Ramjil,al,'s case (1) were relied on:
"Reference ha.a next to be ma.de to article
265 which is in Part XII, Chaptt•r I, dealing
with · 'Finanoe''. That article provides th11t ·tax
shall be levied or collected except by authority
of law. There was no similar provision in
the correspond in~ chapter of the Government
of India. Act, 1935. If collection of taxes
amounts to de.privation of property within the
meanin~ of Art. 31(1), then there was·no point
in making a. separate provision again as ·has
been made in article 265. It, therefore, follows
tha.t clause ( 1) of Article 31 must be regarded
as concerned with deprivation of propert.y
otherwise thnn by the imposition or collection
or tax, for otherwise article 265 becomes
m
(I l (1951) S C.R. 127, 136, 137.
1161
Smt U'J]tD11 Bai
'·
S~lefUtlti'
PNll'ish
A.iyar J.
792
19'2
Sml. Ujjam Bai
v.
Sl•I• of UUar
Pra'4sh
SUPREME COtmT REPORTs [1963)
wholly redundant. In the United States
of America the power of taxation is
regarded aa distinct from t,he exercise
"of police power or eminent domain. Our
Constitution evidently has also treated taxation as distinct from compulsory acquistion of
property and has made independent provisition
giving protection &gainst taxation save by
authority of law ......... In our opinion, the
protection against imposition and collectiol}
of taxes save by authority of law directly
comes from article 265, and is not secure<:l. by
clause (1) of Article 31. Article 265 not being
in Cha.pter III of the Constitution, its protection is not a fundamental right which can be
enforced by an applicAtion to this court under
article 32. It is not our purpose to say that
the right secured by article 265 may not be
enforced. It may certainly be enforced by
adopting proper proceedings. All that we wish
to state is that this application in so far as it
purports to be founded on article 32 read with
article 31 ( 1) to this court is misconceived
and must fail."
A similar decision was given in LaxmanaJYP<J
Hanurnant.appa v. Union of lntlMt (1). Where an
order of assessment made in November, 1953, was
attacked in a petition under Art. 32 on the ground
that the Act under which it was made, viz,, the
Taxation on Inoome (Investigation Commission)
Act (30 of 1947) was void under Art. 14 of the
Constitution. !{ejecting this contention, Mahajan,
C. J., delivering the Judgment of the Court, observed:
"The assessment orders under the Incometax Act itself were made against the petitioner
in November. 1953. In these circumstances
(I) (1955) I s.c.R. 769, 772.
I
l S.C.R.
SUPREME OOORT REPORTS
793
we are of the opinion that he is entitled to no
1911
Pelief under the provisions of article 32 of the
Constitution. It was held by this Court in
Bamji'lal v. lncome1f.az Officer, Mohindergarh(1)
that as there is a. specie.I provision in article
26.5 of the Constitution that no tax shall be
levied or collected accept by authority of law,
clause (1) of artiole:&l must therefore be r6garded as concerned with deprivation of property
otherwise than by the iimposition or collection
of taix, and ina~muoh as the right conferred
by article 265 is not a right conferred by
Part III of the Constituiion, it could not be
enforced under article 32."
Sml. Ujjam B d
v.
The argument of the re~pondents based on the
a.hove decisions is tha.t a law imposing a ta.x enacted
by a. competent Jegisla.tur~ .is not open to atta.1:k
under the provisions of Pa.rt III.
The contt>ntion of the petitioner, on the other
hand, is that a. law of taxation is.also subject to the
limitations prescribed in Part III of the Constitution, and the recent decision of this Cour:t in K. T.
MoopilNair. v. The 8wte of Keral,a (2 ) ie relied on
in support of it. There, the question was whether
the provisions of the Tra.vanoore-Coohin Land Tax
Act 15 of 1955, as amended by the 'l'ra..vanooreOoohin Land Tax (Amendment) Act 10 of 1957,
contravened Art. 14 of the Constitution. The Court
wurof:the opinion that the.y did. Then the contention WAS raised that in view of Art. 265 the legislation wae not open to attaok .under therprovisions of
Pa'dt III. •In repelling this contention, the Co.urt
Observed:
"Article 265 i~poses a. limitation on the
ta.zing power of the State in so far as it
prov:ides that. the State sba.11 not levy or
collect a tax, except by authority of law, that
(I) (19Sl) S.(;.R. 127, 136, 137.
(2) ( 1961) 3
s.c.a. 71.
s1ai. •I f1 ,,.,.
794
J96J
Smi. Ujjam Bai
••
S1at1 If UlltW
p,.tJ4s'
A\yar I.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1963]
ia to say, a tax cannot be levied or collected
by a mere executive fiat. It has to be done
by authority of law, which must mean valid
law. In order that the law may be valid,
the tax proposed to be levied must be within
the legislative competence of the Legislature
imposing a tax and authorising the collection
thereof and, secondly, the tax must be subject
to the conditions laid down in Art.13 of the
Constitution. One of such conditions envisaged by Art. 13( 2) is that the Legislature shall
not make any law which takes away or abridges the equality clause in Art. 14, which
enjoins the State not to deny to any person
equality before the law or the equal protec.
tion of the laws of the country. It cannot be
disputed that if the Act infringes the provisions
of Art. 14 of the Constitution, it must be
struck down as unconstitutional."
In the result, the impugned legislation was struck
down as unconstitutional.
It might appear at first sight that this decision
is in conflict with the decisions in Ramjilal's case (1)
and Laxmanapp's case ('). But when the matter
is closely examined, it will be seen that it is not so.
In Ramjilal's case (1) and in Laxmnappa's case('),
the contention urged was that the tax which is duly
authorised by valid legislation a.s required by
Art. 265 will still be bad under Art. 31(1) a.s a.mounting to deprivation of property. This was negatived,
and it was held that Art. 31(1) had no application
to a law, which was within the protection afforded by Art. 265. There are observations in the
above decisions which might be read a.s meaning
that taxation la.we a.re altoirether outside the operation of Pa.rt III. But, in the context, they have
reference to the application of A~ 31(1.). In
(I) ( 1951) s.c.R.127. 156, IS7.
(2) ( 1955) I S.C.R 769. 17Z.
1 S.C.R
SUPREME OOURT REPORTS
795
Moopil Nair's oase (1), the contention urged was
that even though a taxing law might be discriminatory. it was not open to attach under Art. 14 by
reason of Art. 265. In negativing this contention, this Court held that a law which authorised
the imposition of a tax under Art. 265 was also a
law within Art. 13, and that, therefore, if it contravened Art. 14 it was liable to be struck down.
This decision js clearly an authority for the position that laws of taxation must also pass the test
of the limitations prescribed in Part III of the
Constitution. But it is not an authority for the
position that a.11 the provisions contained in Part
III are necessarily applicable to those laws. It
did not decide contrary to Ramjilal's case (2 ) and
LaxmJJnappa's Qase.(3) that Art.31(1) would apply to
a taxation law, which is otherwise valid. In our
judgment. the correct position in law is that a
taxation law infringes a. fundamental right cannot
be shut. out on the ground that Art. 265 grants
immunity to it from attack under the provisions of
Part III, but that whether there has been infringement must be decided on a consideration of the
terms of the particular Article, which is alleged to
have been infringed, It is on this reasoning that
taxation laws were held in Rumjilal's case (2) and
in LaxmJJooppa's case C) to be unaffected by
Art. 31(1), whereas in Moopit Nair's case (1 ) tht1y
· were held to be within the purview of Art. 14.
In this view. the ·question that arises for
decision is whether Art. 19(1) (g), which is alleged
to have been infringed, is applicable to a sales tax
law which bas been enacted by a competent
legislature and which is not otherwise Ultra vires.
Article 19(1) (g) enacts that all citizens have the
right to practise any profession or to carry on
any occupation, trade or busines~. Is a law
imposing a tax on ea.le by a dealer an infringement of his right to carry on trade ? We . must
(l) (1961) S s.C.ll. '7.
· (2) (1951) S.C.ll. 127, 136. 137.
($) (1VS5) 1 S.C.ll. 769, 722.
1962
81111. Ujjom Bai
v.
State of Uttar
Praduh
796
1962
Smt. Ujjam Bai
••
Stat1 oj Uttar
Praderh
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963J
assume for the purpose of the prosent diaoussion
that the sales tax statute in question is within
the competenca of the legislature and is not ultra
vires. Where a law is passed by a legislature
which has no competence to enact it as when a
States Legislature imposes what is in substance, a
tax on income, a subject which is within the exclusive competence· of the Centre under Entry 82,
that legislation has no existence in the eye of 'law
and any levy of tax under the provisions of that
law will not be within the protection afforded by
Art. 265, and will, in consequence, be hit by
Art. 19( 1) (g). The same result would follow
when a law though disguised as a taxation law,
is, in substance a law which is intended to destroy
or even burden trade and not to raise revenue.
That is colourable legislation which cannot claim
the benefit of Art. 2tl5, and it must be held 'to
contravene Art. 19(1) (g) unless saved by Art. 19(6).
But where the law in within the competence of
the legislature and i9 otherwise valid and is not
colourable can it be said that it is liable to b~
attacked as infringing Art. 19(1) -(g)? The.object
of the legislation is not to prevent the dealer
from carrying on his business. Far from it it envi·
sages that the tra'ler will carry on his business
and carry it on a large scale so that the State
might iiarn the tax. It. is, therefore, difficult to
conceive how a sales tax law can fall within the
vision of Art. 19(1) (g). Arts. 19(1) (f) and 19(1) (gl
are in the same position as Art. 31 ( 1). They all
of them enact that the citizen shall have the right
to hold property or to carry on business without
interference by the State. If Art. 31( I) is as held
in Ramjilal'Bcase (1) and Laxamanappa'B case (')
inapplicable to taxation laws, Arts. 19(1) (f) must
on the same reasoning also be held to be inapplicable to such la.ws.
(I) (1~51) S.C.R. 127, 136, 137.
(2) ( 1955) I S.C:lt. 769, 772.
1 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
797
The question can also be considered from
another standpoint. Art.19(1) (g) and Art. l!J(6)
from parts of one law which has for its object the
definition of the fundam~ntal right of a citizen to
carry on bueiness. Article 19( l) (g) declares that
right. and Art. 19(6) prescribes its limits. The two
provisions together make-up the whole of the
fundamental right to carry on business. If a
taxation law is within Art. 19(1) (g) it must also
be capble of being upheld as a reasonable restriction under Art. 19(6). But can imposition of a tax
be properly said to be a restriction on the carrying on of trade within Art. 19(6)? It is only if
that is so that the question of reasonableness can
arise. If the imposition of sales tax is a restriction on the carrying on of business then the imposition of income tax must be that even to a greater
degree. Likewise land tax must be held to be
a res1'riotion on the right of a citizen . to hold
property guaranteed by Art. 18(1) {g). Indeed it
will be impossible to conceive of any taxation
law which will not be a restriction under Art.
19(1) (fj or Art. 19(1) (g). It is difficult to imagine
that that is the meaning which the word ''restriction" was intended to bear in Arts. 19(5) Hind (6).
That this is not the correct interpretation to be
put on the word "restriction" will be clear when
Art. 19(6) is further. examined. Under that provision, the question whether a restriction is reasonable or not is one for the determination of the
Court and tha.t determination has to be made on
an appreciation or the facts established. If it is
to be held th11it taxation laws a.re within Art. 19(1)
(g) then tbe qut'lstion whether they are reasonable
or not becomes justiciable and how is the Court
to· judge whether they are · so or not ? Can tht1
Court say that\hat the taxation is excessive and
is unreasonable? What are t.he materials on
which the matter could be decided, and what are
the criteria on which the decision thereon could
1962
Smt. Ujjam Bai
••
St7te of Uttar
Pradesh
Aiyar •
798
1961
..
Smt Ujjam Boi
State of Una.,
Prad~sh
•'
-I
~
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963)
be reached ? It would, therefore, seem that the
reasonableness of taxation laws is not a matter
which is justiciable and therefore they oould not
fall within the purview of Arts. 19 (5) and (6).
If it is to be held that taxation laws are within
the inhibition enacted in Art. 19(2) (g), then all
those laws must be struck down as unconstitutional, because they could never be saved under
Art. 19(5) and Art. 12(6). It should be noted
that Art. 19(1) (g) and Art. 19(6) form parts of
one soheme and for a proper understanding of the
one, regard must be had to the other, Article
19(1) (g) cannot operate where Art. 19(6) oannot
step iµ and the considerations a.rising under
Art. 19(6) being foreign to taxation laws Art. 19(1)
(g) can have no application to them.
We may now refer to the decisions of this
Court where the question of a.pplioability of
Art. 19(1) (g) to taxation laws has been considered. Himmat/nJ, Harilal Metha v. The St,ate of
Madhya Prade.sh (1) the question a.rose with refere·
nce to a sales tax which was sought to be imposecl
under explanation I~ to s. 2 (g) of the Central
Provinces and Ber:u Sales Tax Act 21 of 1947,
under which a sale was defined as a transaction by
which property in goods which were aotually
within the !State was transferred wherever the sale
might have been made. That provision was held to
be ultra vires the State Legislature. A dealer
then filed an application under Art. 226 in the High
Court of Nagpur questioning the vires of that
provision and asking for appropriate writ. The
State resisted the application on the ground that
as there was a special machinery provided in the
Act for questioning the assessment a. petition under
Art. 226 was not maintainable. In rejecting this
contention this Court-held that,
"Explanation II to seotion 2 (g) of the
Aot having been deola.red ultra
any
(1) [19MJ s.c.a. 1122,1121.
llirea.
1
s.c.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS '799
imposition of saJes tax on tbc appeJlant ·in
Madhya Pradesh is without the authority
of law, and that being so a threat by the
State by using the ·coercive ma·chinery of the
impugned Act to realise it from the appellant
is a sufficient infringement of his fundamental
right under Art. 19( 1) (g) a.nd it was clearly
entitled to relief under Art. 2~6 of the Constitution".
Thie decision is a direct authority for the proposition that when a provision in a taxing statute is
ultra vires and void any action taken thereunder is
without the authority of law, as required under
Art. 265 and that in that situation Art. 19 (1) (g)
would be attracted,
This decision was approved in The Bengal
Immunity Company Limired v. The State of Bihar (1).
The facts of that case are that the appellant-Company filed a petition under Art. 226 in the High
Court of Patna for a writ of prohibition restraining
the Sales Tax Officer from making an assessment of
sales tax pursuant to a notioe issued by him. The
appellant claimed that the sales sought to be assessed were made in the course of inter-State Trade
that the provisions of the Bihar sales Act 19 of 1947
which authorised the imposition of tax on such sales
were repugnant to Art. 286(2) and vofol and that,
therefore, the proceedings taken by the. Sales Tax
Officer should be quashed. That application was
dismissed by the High Court on the ground that if
the Sales Tax Officer made an assessment which was
erroneous the a.ssessee could challenge it by way of
appeal or revision under ss.24 & 25 of the Act and
that as the matter was within the jurisdiction of the
Sales Tax Officer, no writ of prohibition or certiorari
could be issued. There was an appeal against this
(l) [l95S] 2. S. C.R. 603, 619, 620.
.
'
-1111
Sm1. Ujjom Bai
v.
Slal1 of Vttat
Pradl11t
800
.)mt. Ujja1n ·Bai
••
Slot• of U11.,
p,•tksA
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963]
order to this Court and therein a preliminary objection was taken that a writ under Art. 226 was not
the appropriate remedy open to an asdeBBee for
challenging the legality of the proceedings before &
Sales Tax Officer. In rejecting this contention this
Court observed:
"It ia however clear from article 265 that
no tax can be levied or collected except by
authority of law which must mean a good &
valid law. The contention · of the appellant
company is that the Act which authorises the
assessment, levying and collection of Sales tax
on inter state trade contravenes & constitutes
an infringement of Art. 286 and is therefore
ultra vires, void and unenforceable. If however this contention be well founded the remedy
by way of a writ must on principle and
authority be available to the party aggrieved''.
And dealing with the contention that the petitioner
should proceed by way of appea,J or revision under
the· A<'t, this Court observed:
"The answer to this plea is short and simplb, The remedy under the Act cannot be said
to be adequate and is, indeed, nugatory or
useless if the Act which provides for such
reme<ly is itself ultra vires and void and the
principle relied upon can, therefore, have no
application where a party comes to Court with
an allegation that his right has been or is
beinii; threatened to be infringed by a law
which is ultra vires the powers of the legislature which enacted it and as such void and
prays for appropriate relief under article 226".
It will be seen that in this ease the queation
arose with reference to a provision in the taxing
statute, which was ultra 11ires, and the decision was
only that any action taken under such a proYision
-
I S.C.R.
SUPREME COUR1' REPOR11S
801
was without, ·the authority of law and was, therefpr.e, an unoonstitutiona.l interference with the right
to carry on business under Art. 19( l)(g). There is
nothing, in these two decisions which lends any support to the contention that, where the provision of
law under which assessment is made i~ intra vires,
the order is liable to be impugned as contravening
Art. 19(1 )(g), if the order is, on the merits, erroneous. fhat, howa.ver, was held in the decision ill
Kailaa Nalh v. Swt.e of U. P. (1).
In that case, a petition under Art. 32 of the
Constitution was filed in this Court challenging an
order of assessment on the ground that the l:>a.les
Tax Officer h.ad disallowed an exemption on a misconstruction of a notification issued under s. 4 of
tfle U. P. Sales Tax Act, and that thereby the right
of the petiti0ner to carry on business under
Art. 19(l)(g) had been infringed. An objection waa
taken that, even if the Sales Tax Officer had misconstrued the notification, no fundamental right of
tJie petitioner had been infringed, and that "the petition was not maintainable, Overruling this contentfo.D, Govinda Menon, J., observed:
"If a.tax is levied ~thout due lega.~ autho•
i:ity on any trade or business, then it. is open
to the citizen, aggriev.ed to approach this G:lowt.
for B writ under Art. 32, ''since his l'light to
O&l'1')7 Gil a irade is violated, or. infring~ by
the; impoaition ud suoh being. the oaae,
Art. 19(l)(g) oomes into play~'~
In SURPOrt of this view, the obser.~atione in The
Bengal lmmunib.J Oompany'a case ~;i) w,ere relied on.
Tll.e Petitioner contends. that, on this reasoning,
Ar.t~.19(L)(g),must. be held to be violated.not merely
whm an assessmont is made under a. sta.tute which
ia. ~ra vires, but also when it is made on a. misconatruction of & statute, which. iS intra tJires., It je
{l)i A:,t.R, 19512' S,1;.. 790; 792, 793,
(2) (1955) 2 8 C.R. 603, 619, 620
1161
S""· Ujj""' Ba
v.
Siat.·t>.f Ut1111
Pradailt
,{iJ!Clf' J.
802
1981
Sm1. Ujjam Bai
v.
Stau of uu.,.
Pr.drh
Aiyor J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963]
incontrovertible that that is the effect of the decision
in Kailask Nath's case('). But it is equally incon.·
trovertible that the decision in The Bengal Immunity
Company's case {2 ), which it purports to follow, does
not support it. There is a fundamental distinction
between an order of assessment made on a provision, which is ultra 'Vires, and one made on a valid
provision, which is misconstrued. Where the provision is void, the protection under Art. 265
fails, and what rt>mains is only unauthorised
interference- with property or trade by a State
Officer, and Arts. 19(1) (f) and (g) are attracted.
But where the provision itself is valid, Art. 265
operates, and any action taken thereunder is
protected by it. . An authority having jurisdiction to decide a matter has jurisdiction to decide
wrong as well as right, & the protection afforded
by· Art. 265 is not destroyrd, if its· decision turns
out to be erroneous. To such cas~s, Art. 19(I){g)
has no application. Both in Himmaflal's case ( •)
and in Bengal Immunity Company's case (') the
decision of the Court that the proceedings constituted an infringement of the rights of the citizen under
Art. 19(l)(g) was based expressly on the ground that
Art. 265 did not apply to those proceedings. But
this ground did not exist in Kailash NafJl's caae (6),
and that makes all the difference in the legal position. The decision in Kailash Nath's oase (6) which
merely purported to follow Tlie Bengal, Immunity
Company's case ('), is open to the criticism that it
has overlooked this distinction.
We may now refer to two decision subsequent
to the one in .Kailask Nath oase ( 1), which have
been relied on by the petitioner. In Tata
Iron and 8f£el Co., Lf,t},. v. 8. R. S~rkar (•), the question arose under the Central Sales Tax Act. Under
tbat Act, sales in the course of inter-State trade are
(I) AIR 1957 S.C. 790, 792, 793.
(3) ( 1954) S.C.R. 1122, 1127
(2) (1955) 2. S.C.R. 603, 619, 620(4) (1961) 1.s.c.R. 379, sas, 402.
.•
1 S.0.R.
•
SUPREME OOURT REPORTS
803
liable to be taxed at a single point. The petitioner
was assessed to tax on certain sales falling within
Act by the Central Sales Tax Officer, Bihar, and tbetax was also duly paid. Thereafter, the Central
Sales Tax Offioer in West Bengal ~ade an order
assessing to tax the very sales in respect of whioh
tax had been paid. The petitioner then moved this
Court under Art. 32 for an order quashing the order
of assessment. A preliminary objection to the
maintainability of the pe~ition_ was taken on behalf
of the respondent State on the ground that, under
the Act the petitioner could file a.n appeal against the
order of asseBBm:ent, .and that proceedings under
.Art.32 were, thJefore, incompetent. In overruling
this contention, Shah, J., referred to the decisions of
this Court in Himmatlal's case (1), Bengal Immunity
Ootnl/)(J,ny's case (2) and The Sfllt,e of Bombay v. UnitJ!,d
Motors (India) Ltd (') and observed;
••In these cases, in appeals from orders
passed by the High Courts in petitions under
Art. 226, this Court held that an attempt to
levy tax under a statute which was 'Ultra virea,
infringed the fundamental right of the
citizens, and recourse to tile High Court for
proteotion of the fundamental right was not
prohibited because of the provisions contained
in Art. 265. In the oa"le before us, the tMe8
of the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956, are not
ohallenged; but in Kailaah Nath v. Stat,e of
U. P., a petition chaJlenging the levy of a tax
was entertained by this .court ~ven though the
Act under the authority of whioh the tax was
sought to be recovered was not challenged as
'ldlra vires. It is not necessary for purposes
of this case to decide whether the principle of
Kaila81 N afh'a oase is inoonsistent with the
view e%pressed by this court in Ramjilal'a
Ca&e
(1) (19M> s c.&. 1122.
(3) (19.SS) S.c.R. •••
n21.
<2> (1955> 2 s.c:R. 603, &19, 620.
Smt. UJJom Bai
••
State -f Ullar
PrGtlllh
80A
1112
8ro1. UiJ- Biii·
•• ...
s-.ru11
,.,..,,.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS (19~3)
'.!:he learned Judges then proceeded to hold that,
as there was under the Act a single liability
and that had been discharged, proceeding11
for the assessment of the same sales a second
time to ~a.x infringed the fundamental right
of the pet1t10ner to hold property. Dealing with
this- point, Sarkar, J., observed in the ea.me case:
"This Court held that an illegal levy of
sales tax on a trader under an Act the
legality of which was not challen'ged viola~
his fundamental rights under -Art. 19(1) (g)
and a petition under Art. 32 with respect to
such violation lies. The earlier case of 1951
S. C. R. 127 does not appear to have been
considered. b is contended that the decision
in Kailash Nath's case, requires reconsidera·
tion .. We do not think, however, that the present is a fit case to go into the question whether the two cases are not reconcil&ble and to
decide the preliminary question raised. The
point was taken at a last stage of the proceedings after' much cost.a had been incur:ced".
It is clear from the above observations th'l.t the
learned Judges were of the opinion that t,he
decision in Kailash Nath' s <Jll8e (1) required
reconsideration. The ratio of the decition in Tat,a
Iron and St,eeJ, Go. Ltd. v. S.R. Sarlcar(') would appear
to be that, as the law did not autho11ise the _imposition of tax a second tim& on ea.Jes,. on wh1oh tax
hae be1>n levied and collected, proceedings for
assessment a second time. are without jurisdiction,
and, therefure, Art. 19 {l) (f} ii attracl;ed. In the
p~esent case, there is no contention that the
prooee<ii.ng11 of the Sales Tax officer a.:ce without
juriediotion.
The. petitioner also relied on a recent !Meision
Ill A.T.ll. 1957 SC 790, 792, 793.
(2l- (19611 I S.C R. 379 !Jl3, 402.
-
I S.C.R. SUt>REME OOURT REPORTS
865
of this Court in Bhri Madanla/, Arora v. The
Excise and Taxation officer, Amritsar (1). In tha.t
oase, a notice for assessment was · issued after the
expiry of the pl'riod prescribed therefor by the
Statute. The assessee thereupon applied to this
Court under Art. 32 for quashing the proeeedings
on the ground tha.t they were without jurisdiction,
and it was held that, as the taxing authority had
no pow~r under the statute to issue the notice in
question, the proceedings must be quashed. This
a.gain is a. case, in which the authority had no
jurisdiction under the Act to take proceedings for
assessment of tax, and it makes no difference that
such assumption of jurisdiction was ·based on a
misconstruction of statutory provisions. In the
present case, we ar& concerned with an alleged
misconstruction, which bears on the merits of the
assessment, and does not affect the jurisdiction of
the Sales Tax Officer to make the assessment, and
the two are essentially different. And we should
add that the present question wn not raised or
decided in that case.
It remains to refer to the decision in M oopil
Nair's case (2), which has been already discussed in
connection with Art. 14. In that. case, the
provisions of the Trava.ncore-Cochin Land Tax Act
15- of J 955 as amended by the Travanoore-Cochin
Land Tax (Amendment) Act 10 of 1957, were held
to be'bad as ·violative also of Art. 19 (l) (f). As the
considerations e.pplioable to Ans. 19 (1) (f) and 19
(l~ (g) are the same, we should have to examine the
ground on which this decision rests. They were,
thus stated:
•'Ordinarily, a taxing statute Jays-down a
regular machinery for making assessment of
the tax proposed to be imposed by the
statute. It lays down detailed prooedute as
(1)/(1962) J S.C.R. RZJ.
(2) <1961> s s.c.a. 11.
19'1
S1nl. Vijca11(Bal
"·
St•r. o/ Uuor
P,.0,11'
806
IHI
Sml, Ujjui Biii
••
SIM, •f Ullar
Prildlsll
Al_,., J,
SUPREME OOURT REPORTS [11163)
to notice to the proposed &88e88ee to ma.ke a
return in respect of property proposed to be
taxed, prescribes the authority and the
procedure for hearing any objeotions to the
lia.bility for taxation or as to the extent of
the tax propoeed to be levied, a.nd finally, as
to the right to challenge the regularity of
assessment ma.de, by recourse to proceeding
in a higher Civil Court ...... The Act being
silent as to the machinery and procedure to be
followed in making the asse88ment leaves it to
the Executive to evolve the requisite
machinery a.nd procedure. The whole thing,
from beginning to end, is treated as or a
purely administrative character, completely
i!!noring the legal position that the assessment
of a. ta.x on person or property 'is a.t least of a
qua.si-judicial
,character ...... It
is clear,
therefore, tha.t a.pa.rt from being discriminatory and imposing unreasonable restrictions on
holding property, the-Act is clearly oonfisoatory in character and effect .... For these
reasons, as also for the reasons for which the
provisions of ss. 4 and 7 have been declared
to be unconstitutional, in view of the provisions of Art. 14 of the Constitution, all these
operative sections of the Act, namely, 4, 6A
and 7, must be held to offend Art. 19 (1) (f)
of the Constitution also.''
From tJie above observa.tfons, it will be - n that
the ground on which the law was held to be in
contrav,ention of Art. 1 9 ( l) (f) wu not one
which had any reference to the merits of the
assessment but to the procedure laid down
for imposing tax. This decision is an authority
only for the position that, where the prooedure
laid down in a taxing statute is oppoaed to rulee of
natural justice, then any i'llposition of tax under
auoh a prooedure DlUSt be beld to vto1-te Art. llf
(1) (f).
i s.c.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
807
Reference may be made to the following
passage in Willoughby's Constitution of the United
States, Second Edn, Vol. 3, p. 1718 relied on for
the respondents :
"It is established that the guaranty to
suitors of due process of law does not furnish
to them a right to have decisions of courts
reviewed upon the mere ground that such
decisions have been based upon erroneous
findings of fact or upon erroneous determinations of law. Such errors, if committed by
trial courts, can be corrected only by ordinary
appeJlate proceedings as provided for by law.
Especially bas this doctrine been declared in
cases in which the Federal Courts have been
asked to review the decisions of State
courts".
Our attention was also invited to the decisions in
Mc Govern v. New York (1) and Amerioan Railway
Express Oo. v. Kentucky (2). It was observed in
the latter case:
''It is firmly e.Jtablished that a merely
erroneous decision given by a State court in
the regular course of judicial proceedings does
riot deprive the unsuccessful party of proper·
ty without due process of law."
The above remarks support the contention of the
respondent that an order of a Court or tribunal is
not hit by Art. 19 (i) (g).
The result of the authorities may thus be
summed up:
(1) A tax will be valid only if it is authorised
by a law enacted by a competent legislature. That
is Art. 265.
{I) [19131 229 U.S. 363. L. ed. 1228.
(2) [1927] 279 U. S, 269~ 71 L. ed .. 639, 64-2.
1962
Smt. Ujjam Bai
v.
Bttlte of Uttaf'
Prad,sh
808
1161
..
;s,.1. UJjam Bai
Stal1 oJ Ull•r
P1adtsh
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963]
(2) A law which is authorised as aforesaid
must further be not repugnant ·to any of the
provisions of the Constitution. Thus, .a law which
contravenes Art. 14 will be bad, Moopil Nmr'a
case (1).
(3) A law which ill made by a competent
legislature and which ·is not otherwise invalid, is not
open to attack under Art. 31 (1). Ramjilal's case (')
and Laxmanappa's case ( 2 ).
(4) A law which is Ultra vires either because
the legislature has no competence over it or it
contravenes, some constitutional inhibition, has no
legal existence, and any action taken thereunder
will b" an infringement of Art. 19 (l)(g) Himmatlal'a
case (') and Laxmanappa's case (') The remit will be
same when the law is a colourable piece of legislation.
( 5) Where assessment proceedings art> taken
without the i.uthority of law, or where the proceedings an• r~pugnant to rules of natural justice, there
is an infringement of the right, guaranteed under
Art. 19 (1 l(f) and Art. 19 (1 )le): Tata Iron & Steel Co.
Ltd. 1'); Moopil Nair's case (1) and Skri Madan Lal
Arora's easel').
Now, the question is, when a law is enacted
by a oompetent legislature and it is not unconstitutional as contravening any prohibition in the Constitution such as Art. 14, and when proceedings for
assessment of tax are taken thereunder in the
manner provided therein, and there is no violation
of rules of natural justicP, does Art. 19 (I )lg) apply,
even though the taxing authority might have, in
the exercise of its jurisdiction, misconstrued the
legal provisions? The decision in Kailash Nath'a
case ( 7 ) would appear to support the contention that
it does; but for the reasons already given, we think
tl) (1961) 3S.C.R. 77.
•2) (1951) S.C.R.1?7.13.6, 137.
13) (1955. I S.C.R. 769, 792.
(4) 11954) S.C.R. ll22, 1127.
(5) ( 1961) I s.c.R. 37 >. 383, 402. 161 (1962) I S.C.R. 823.
(7) AIR 1957 S.C. 790, 792, 793.
1 &O.R.
SUPREME OOUBT REPORTS
8@9
that its correctness is open to question and the
point ·needs reconsideration.
1961
'
There is another objection taken to the
maintainability of this petition. Art. 32, under
which it as presented, confers on a person, whose
fundamental right guaranteed in Pa.rt III is infringed, a right to move this Court for appropriate
writs for obtaining redress. 1.1he contention of the
petitioner is that the order of assessment dated
December 20, 1958, amounts to interference with
the rigl\t of the firm to carry on busineeis and is,
href~re, in collWavention of Art. l9 (l} (g), and
that reoJief Bbduld be'gra.nted under Art. 32. Now,
'1he objection that is taken on behitlf of the respondents is ~hat· the guarantee given under Art. 19 (1)
{g)'is-againflt &n action of the executive e>r Jegisla.ture
of the State, that the order of assesement now- in
question is one paSBed in judicial proceedings and
is, therefore, outside the purview of Art. 19 (1) (g).
1f this -contention is well-founded, then Art. 32
will have no application and the present petition
must fail on this ground. ·
'llhe consffitution&I pr<>Tisions bearing on· this
que..mon are Arts. 12, 13, 19 and 32. Article 12
enams that :
"In· this Part, unless the context otherwise requires, ~the State' in~ludes the _Government and Parliament of India and the Government and the Legislature of ea.ob of the States
and all local or other authorities within the
territory of India. or under the control of the
Government of India''.
A.rtiele, 1:3 (3) (a) defines 'law' as follows :
'' 'law includes any Ordinance, order, bye·
law, rule, regulation, notification, CUl'tom or
asage ha.vmg in the territory of India. the
force ofiaw;"
..
Srnl. Ujjam Bai
Stai. of Ut1ar
Pradl1h
SH>
[1963] ..
SUPRBUE COURT.REPOR'J',S'
1§62.
Article 19 (1) enacts.that the citizen·. shall have the
'.seven rights mentioned therein, and Arts. 19 (2) to
v.
19 (6) save· Jaws, whether existing or to be· made,
si.~.1u~i"''
which impose reasonable restrictions on the exercise·
- - . . of those rights, subject to the. conditions laid down
AiJorJ •. ·' therein. Article 32 (1) guarantees "the right to
. move the §upreme Court by. appropriate proceed.. - · ings for the enforcement of the rights conferred by
this Part". . Then we have Art. 32 (2), which is as
follows :
.
.. ·· .
.. :: ..... J~
~.
'•The Supreme Court shall have 'power
;
....
'
to
issue
directions 01' orders or writs, including
'
writs in the nature of habeas corpus, manclamus, .
. prohibition, quo . warranto. and .
· which ever ·may be appropriate;-for"'the
enforcement of any of the rights ·conferred by .
this Part".
·
·
·
smt.Uii•"!Bai
<
-
-
:
f
: -
'
-- :· • -.
certiOrari,
It will he convenient now to set out the contentions of the parties urged in support of their
respective positions., The contention of.the respondents based uponArt.12 is ;that the word "State"
. in Part III means only the Executive and the
Legislature, that the Judiciary is excluded therefrom,
and t.hat, therefore;"no question of a funqamental
right can arise with reference to an order passed by
an authority discharging judicial . functions. The
answer of the petitioner· to· this is that the word
"State" comprehends all the three organs, the
Executive, the Legislature. and the· Judiciary, that
. the express mention of the Governinent and the
Legislature in Art. 12 cannot·' be construed as <"Xclu·
ding the Judiciary, that the uiie of the word "iucludes" shows that. the enumeration which followsia
not exhaustive, and that, therefore, the 'ordinary •.
· ····· and the wider connotation of the word· ••State' is
not cut down by Art. 12. '
...
It is true that the word ••includes" ~ormally
·signifies that what is enumerated as included is not
1 S.C.R.
J
·---._..-
•
•
SUPREME cOuRT REPORTS
sit
exhaustive. But the question ultimately· is, what
is the intention of the Legislature, and that has to
be . gathered on a reading of the enactment as a
whole. It is possible that in some context the word
"includes" might import that the enumeration is
exhaustive. The following observations - of Lord
Watson in Dilworth v. Commissioner of St,amps (1)
were relied-upon:; - ---· · .,·
"The word 'include' is very generally
used in interpretation clauses in order to
enlarge the meaning of words or phrases
occurring in the body of the statute; and when
it is so used these words or phrases must be
construed as comprehending, not only such
thing3 as they signify according to their natu"
ral import, but also those things which the
interpretation clause declares that they shall
include. But the word 'include' is susceptible
of another construction, which may become
imnerative, if the context of the Act is sufficj.
ent to show that it was not i:nerely employed
for the purpose of adding to the natural
significance of the words or _expressions defi·
ned. It may be equivalent to 'mean and
include,' and in that case it may afford an
exhaustive explanation of the meaning which,
for the purposes of the Act, must invariably
be attached to these words or expressions." ·.
Now, when tho Legislature' wants to enlarge
the sense in which an expression is generally, used
so as to take in certain other things, it does so by
ming the word "includes". Therefore, it may be
argued that the word ••includes" would be appropriate only when the expression, the connotation of
which is sought to be extended by the word "inclu·
des", does not, in its ordinary sense; include_
. what is suught to be "included'', and that as the
(I) [1899] A. C. 99, !OS, 106.
1962
Smt. Ujj•m 8•i
v.
S t•t• 1J Uttor
PraUsfa
.di,yarJ.
812 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963]
1962
S1111.. UjJom B•i
Y.
S/41t.ofU11.,
Pritduh
.di)ar "·
Executive ·and the Legislature of a State are,
according to all accepted notions, understood as
included in the word "State", the use of the word
"includes" with reference to them would make no
sense. The Article ·also provides that the werd
"State'' is to include '~all local or other authorities".
With reference to them, the use of the word
"includes" will be quite appropriate, because they
would not in the ordinary sense of the words "the
State", be understood as inclu<led therein. A
reading of the Article, as a whole, would seem
to show that the intention of the Legislature ·was;
on. the one hand, to restrict the sccepted
connotation of the word "State", and, on the
other hand, to extend it by induding "local or
other authorities". There is much to be said in
favour of the contention of the respondents that
in the context the word "includes" must to be read
as "means and includes".
In further support of the contention that
orders of Courts and Tribunals are not, in general,
within the purview of Part III, the respondents rely
on the definition of 'law' in Art. 13(3). Judgments
and orders made in the course of judicial proceedings do not fall within that definition. It is contended that the soheme of the Constitution is that,
whenever there is an infringement of a fundamental
right by the Executive or the Legislature, the person aggrieved has a right of resort to this Court
under Art. 32, that being the consequenee of the
definition of '.State' under Art. 12 and of •law'
under Art. 13(3); that Courts and Cdbunals are not
law-making bodies in the sense in which law is defined in Art. 13(3), their function being to interpret
law; and that it will, therefore, be inappropriate to
bring them within Part III, which euact·s li:mitations on power to make laws.
It is urged that the scheme of the Constitution does no contemplate judicial orders being
brought up before this Court in a petition under
1 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
813
Art. 32. Whenever a fundamental right is infringed, it is said, the party aggrieved has a. right to
resort to the Civil Courts either in their ordinary
jurisdiction or under Art. 226, and the decisions of
the Courts will ultimately come up to this Court on
appeal under Arts. 132 to 136. Thus, when executive and legislative action infringes fundamental
rights, the Supreme Court oan deal with it under
Art. 32, whereas orders of Courte and Tribunals, in
which questions of infringement of fundamental
rights are decided, will come up for review before
the Supreme Court under Arts. 132 to 136.
We may now refer to the decisions where this
question has been considered by this Court. In
Bashesker Nath v. The Commissioner of lnoome-tax (1)
occur the following observations. relied on for
the respondents:
"In the third place it is to be observed
that, by virtue of Art. 12, 'the State' which is,
by Art. 14, forbidden to discriminate between
persons includes the Government and Parliament of India. and the Government and the
Legislature of each of the States and all local
or other authorities within the territory of
India or under the control of the Government
of India. Article 14, therefore, is an injunction to both the legislative as well as the
executive organs of the State and the other
subordinate authorities. As regards the legislative orga.n of the State, the fundamental right
is further consolidated and protected by the
provisions of Art. 13 ... That apart, the very
language of Art. 14 of the Constitution expressly directs that 'the State', by which Art. 12
includes the executive organ, shall not deny
to any person equality before the law or the
equal protection of the law. Thus Art. 14
(l} [1959) Supp. ( l) S.C.R. 528 551, 552.
1962
Smt. UJjam B.;.
v.
Stote of Uttar
Praduh
Apar J1
814
196t
Sm,, Ujjom Bai
v.
Stat1 of Utlar
PraJ1sli
-·-
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963]
proteots us from both lei:islation, and
executive tyranny by way of discrimination."
The above remarks are based on the view that the
words "the State" in Art. It comprehend only the
Executive and the Legislature.
A more direct deoision on this point is the one
in S. 8. Md. Amirabbas Abbasi v. State of Madhya
Bharat (1). There, the facts were that one
Amirabbas Abbasi applied to the Court of the
District Judge at Ratlam for an order that he
should be appointed guardian of the person and
properties of his two children. The application was
rejected by the District Judge, who appointed
another person, Sultan Hamid Khan, as the guardian. An appeal against this order to the High
Court was also dismissed. Amirabbas Abbasi then
filed a petition in this Court under Art. 32 of the
Constitution, challenging the validity of the order
of the District Court on the ground that it was di11criminative and violative of Art. 14 of the Constitution. In dismissing this petition, this Court observed:
"The second respondent was appointed
guardian of the minors by order of a competent court, and denial of equality before the
law or the equal protection of the laws oan be
claimed against executive action or legislative
proceSB but not against the deoision of a competent tribunal. The remedy of a person
aggrieved by the decision of a competent
judicial tribunal is to approach for redreSB a
superior tribunal, if there be one."
The following observations in Ratilal v.
State of Bombay (') are also relied on for the
respondents:
"The second observation which must be
made is that the protection ajforded b,Y tJu~
(1) [1960] 3. s. c. ~. 138, 142.
(2)
A.J.R.~[1959JBom. 2+2, 253,
l S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
815
Constitution to fundamental rights is against
executive, or legislative interference, A decision of a regularly constituted Court cannot
however be ehallenged as an interference with
fundamental rights in the abstract. The Court
in the very nature of things adjudicates upon
conflicting claims and declares rights and does
not by the operation of its own order seek to
· infring any Fundamental rights."
These observations would appear to apply with
equal force to judioial proceedings:before tribunals,
as they cannot be . regarded as representing the
executive or the~legislative function of the State.
.
"
It is next contended for the petitioner that
the Salee Tax Officer will at least fall within the
category of "other authorities" in Art. 12. The
meaning of the expression "other authorities" was
considered in The University of Madras v. Shantka
Bai (1). There, the question was as to whether
the University of Madras was "other authority''
within that Article. In deciding that it was not, it
observed that the words "other authorities" must
be construed ejus<km generis with what had been
enumerated in the Article, nemely, the Government
or the Legislature. Thie clearly supports the respondents.
It is contended for the petitioner that even
if Courts· could not be held to be 11 other authorities", quasi judicial tribunals must be regarded as
falling within that expression, and that Salee Tax
Officers are at best only quasi judicial officers, and
they cannot be put on the same footing as regular
Courts. It is argued that sales tax authorities are
Officers of Government to whom is entrusted the
work of levy and coJlection of taxes, that that is
primarily an executive function, that the officers
have, no doubt, to a.ct judicially ip deterJllin~ th('
(1) I.A.Jt. 195f M•d, f,7,
JIOB
imt. Ujj•m B•i
v.
S1at1 •f Ultar
Pradesh
.A~ar J,
816
J941
S•I. Ujj~m B•I
••
Slol• oJUUSf'
Prod.1h
~J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963)
tax payable but that that is only incidental to the
discharge of what iR essentially an adminis\rative
act, that, at best, the assessment proceedings are
quasi· judicial in character, and that accordingly an
Officer imposing a tax must be held to be "other
authority" within Art. 12. Io this view, it .is urged,
the assessment order dated December 20, 1958, fa.Ile
within the purview of Part III.
The respondents dispute the correctness of this
contention. They concede that a Sa.lee Tax O.ffioer
has certain functions of an administrative charaeter,
but urge that the proceedings with which we are
concerned, are entirely judicial. In this connection-,
it will have to be borne in miud that it is a feature
well-known in the Government of this country that.
ooth executive and judicial functions a.re vested in
the same Officer, and because of the undesirable
results-which followed from this combination, Art.
50 of the Constitution has enacted as one of the
Directive Principles that,
"The State shall take steps to separ&te
the judiciary from the executive in the public
services of the State".
When an authority is clothed with two functions,
one adruinistrative and the other judioial, prooeodings before it which fall under the latter category
do not cease to be judicial by reason of the fa.et that
it has got other non-judicial functions. What ha.a
to be seen is the capacity in which the authority
acts with reference to the impugned ma~ter. It will,
therefore, be necessary to examine the character in
which the Sales Tax Officer functions when he t&koa
proceedings for aaseBSmeint of tax.. Under the provisions of the Act, the Sales Tax Offioer ha.a to i-e
notice to the aBS08866, take evidence in the ma.Uer,
hear him and then decide, in a.ooorda.noe with, tlae
provisions of the statute, whether tax- is payable,
and if so, how much. Against hie order, there,is an
I S.C.R.
,__l
. ..
;
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
817
appeal in which again the parties have to be heard
and a decision given in accordance with law. The
legality or propriety of an order passed in an
appeal id again open to consideration on revision
by a Revising Authority who must be "a person
qualified under dause (2) of Art. 217 of the Constitution for appointment as Judge of a High Court".
Section ll, which is on the same lines as s. 66 of
the Indian Income-Tax Act, providee that the Revising Authority might refer for the opinion of the
High Court any question of law arising out of its
order, and under s. 11(4), the assessee has a right to
move the High Court for an order that the Revising
Authority do refer the question of law arising out
of the order, if there ha11 been an erroneous refusal
to refer. Now the respondents contend that the
proceedings commencing with a notice iPsued by the
Sales Tax Officer and ending wi~h a reference to the
High Court are entirely judicial, that it is in that
view that petitions for certiorari and prohibition are
entertained against orders of assessment under
Art. 226 of the Constitution, and appeals against such
orders are entertained by this Court under Art. 136.
It will be inconsistent, it is urged, to hold, on the
one hand, that the orders passed in these assessment
proceedings are open to appeal under Art. 136 on
the footing that they are made by Tribunals, and,
on the other, that they are open te attack under
Art. 32 of the footing that they are ma.de by executive authorities,
It is also contended for the petitioner that the
definition of "State" in Art. 12 is to govern Part
JTI "unless the context otherwise required", and
that in the context of Art. 32; "The State" wouH
include Courts and Tribunals exercising judicial
functions. Article 32, it will be noticed; confers
,~t,he Court jurisdiction to issue among others,
·~ii of Certiorari and prohibition. The argument
l@ th~t as these writs are issued only with reference to judicial proceedings, the restricted
1961
Smt. Ujjam Bai
••
Stale Df Utt r
Ptadesh
•
818
19'1
Smt. Ujjtm1 Bai
v.
Slot. of Ult.,
PrliUsh
SUPREME OOURT REPORTS [1963]
definition of "the State" in Art. 12 as excluding
them must give way to the express la.ngua.ge of
Art. 32. It is accordingly contended that even on
the footing that the order of assessment is judicial
in character, the present petition for issue of certiorari is within Art. 32. It is true argue the respondents, that certiorari and prohibition lie only in
respect of judicial and not administrative acts,
and it must, therefore, be taken that Art. 32 does
envisage that there could be a petition under that
Article with respect to judicial proceedings. It is
also true, as held by this Court, that the right of
an aggrieved party to resort to this court under
that Article is itself a fundamental right under
Art. J2. But the right of resort to this Court
under Art. 32(1) is only when there is an infringe·
ment of a fundamental right which had been guaranteed in Part III, that it is Articles 14 to 31 that
declare what those, fundamental rights are, for the
breach of which remedy can be had under Art. 32(2), and that what has to be seen, therefore, is
whether there is anything in the Article whioh is
said to have been infringed, which is repugnant to
the definition of ••the State" in Art. 12. Examining, it is said, Art.19( l)(g) which is alleged to
have been violated, there is nothing in it which is
repugnant to the restricted connotation of the expression ••the State" in Art.12, and judicial
proceedings therefore cannot be brought within
it. It is further argued that Art.19(2) to 19(6)
clearly show that it is only laws existing and to
be made that are within their purview, and judicial pronouncements not being law cannot fall
within the ambit of those provisions. In the result, it is contended that the definition of "State"
in Art. 12 stands and an order made by a Court
or tribunal cannot be held to infringe Art. 19(1) (g)
read along with Art. 12.
If that is the true position, 1eplies the petitioner, then what purpose is served by the provi-
l s.c.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
819
1B61
sion in Art. 32 that this Court might issue writs of
B 1i
certiorari or prohibition ? The answer of the res- Fmt. Ujjam
v.
Stale of UU,r
pondents is that among the subst.antive enactments
Pr<stkslt
forming Arts. 14 to 31, there a.re Rome which are
specially, directed against judicial proceedings, and
Aiyar J.
the writ of certiorari or prohibition will lie
in respect of them. One such, for example, is
Art. 20, which is as follows:
''20. (1) No person shall be convicted
of any offence except for violation of a law
in force at the time of the commission of the
Act charged as an offence, nor be subjeo.ted
to a penalty greater than that whioh might
have been inflicted under the law in force at
the time of the commission of the offence.
(2) No person shall be prosecuted a.nd
punished for the same offence more than once.
(3) No person accused of any offence
shall be compelled to be a witness against
himself."
Thia Article clearly applies to prosecutions and
convictions for offences. It bas reference~ there· .
fore, to judicial proceedings, and the restricted
definition of "Sta.te'' in Art. 12 is, in the context,
excluded. And prooeedings contemplated by
Art. 20 being judicial, writs of certimari and pro·
hibition can issue. In this connection, the respondents rely u~on the expression "whichever may be
appropriate' occurring in Art. 32(2). It means, it
is said, that when once an infringement of a
funda.menta.l rights is established, the writ which the
Court can iBSue must depend upon the nature of the
right involved. It is accordingly contended that
Art. 19{l){g) is, on its terms inapplicable to judicial proceedings, and no writ of certiorari can issue
for the infringement of a. right under that
Article.
It was alJto argued for the petitioner tli~t
820
Sml. Ujj.., Bid
Y.
St.ii •I Utt.,
p,tuf,1h
SUPREME OOURT REPORTS (1963]
under the American law certiorari lies against decisions of the i:-tate Courts when they ·are repug·
nant to the provision of the Constitution, and the
decision in National Association for the Advance·
ment of Colored People v. State of Alabama (')
was relied support of this position. There the
question related to the validity of a provision in
a statute uf Alabama requiring foreign corporations
to disclose, among other things, the names and
addresses of their local members and agents.
The appellant-Corporation having made default
in complying with this provision, the State instituted an action for appropriate relief, and the
Court granted the same. Then the Corporation
moved the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari
on the ground that the provision in the statute was
an invasion of the right to freely assemble, guaran·
teed by the Constitution. One of the grounds on
which the State resisted the application was that
no certiorari will lie for quashing an order of
Court. In rejecting this contention, the Court
observed'
"lt is not of moment that the State has
t,here acted solely through its judicial branoh
for whether legislative or judicial, it is still
the application of state power which we are
asked to scrutinize."
It is unnecessary to refer to other decisions in which
11imilar view~ have been taken. The principle on
which all these decisions are based was thus stated
in Virginia v. Rives (') :
"It is doubtless true that a State may
act through different agencies,-either by its
legiBlative, its executive, or its judicial auth·
oritiee ; and the prohibitions of the amendment extend to all action of the State denying equal protection of the laws, whether
(II (1958) 2 L. ed. 2d. 1488. 1500, 357 U- S. 449.
(1880) 100 U.S 313, 318: 25 SI. ed 667, 669.
(2l
1 s.c.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
821
it be action by one of these agencies or by
another."
These decisions have no bearing on the point now
under consideration, which is not whether a writ
of certiorari will lie under the general law against
decisions of Courts-on that, there could be and has
been no controversy-but whether, on the terms
of Art. 12, that will lie against an order a of Court
or Tribunal.
The above is a. resurM of the arguments addressed by both sides in support of their respective contentions. The question thus debated is
of considerable importance on which there has been
no direct pronouncement by this Court. It seems
desirable that it should b~ authoritatively settled.
We accordingly direct that the papers be placed
before the Chief Justice for conRtituting a larger
Bench for deciding the two following question :-·
1. Is an order of assessment made by an
authority under a taxing statute which is
intra vires, open to challenge as repugnant to
Art. 19(1) (g), on the sole ground that it is
based on a misconstruction of a provision of
the Act or of a notification issued thereunder?
2. Can the validity of such an order be
questioned in a petition under Art. 32, of
the constitution ?
1!162. April IO. The matter was finally
heard by a larger ·Bench consisting of S. K. Da.s,
J. L. K:tpur, A. K. Sarkar, K. Subba Rao, M.
Hidayatullah, N. Rajagopala Ayyangar and J. R.
Mudholkar, .TJ. and
The following Judgments were delivered
S. K DAs. J.-The facts of the case have been
1tated in the judgment of my learned brothor
sm1. UHtJm JJ11i
"·
St11t1·0/ Uttar
Pradesh
lhu .1.
I
822
19~1
Smo. Ujj.m Bol
v.
S1at1 •! Ull.,
Pr•dlih
D<uJ.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS (19631
K11.pur J., and it is not necessary for me to restate
them. I have reached the Sil.me conclusion as has
been reached by my learned brother. But in Tiew of
the importance of the question raised, I would like
to state in my own words the reasons for reaching
that conclusion.
The two questions which have been referred
to this larger Bench are:
1. Is an order of assessment made by
an authority under a taxing statute which is
Intra virllll, open to challenge as repugnant
to Art. 19 (1) (gl, on the sole ground that it
is based on a misconstruction of a provision
of the Act or of a notification issued there
under?
2. Can the validity of such an order be
questioned in a petition under Art. 3.2 of the
Constitution ?
These two questions are inter-connected and
substantially relate to one matter: is the validity of an order ma.de with jurisdiction under an Act
which is Intra virllll and good law in all respects, or
of a notification properly issued thereunder, liable
\o be questioned in a. petition under Art. 32 of the
Constitution on the sole ground that the provisions
of the Act, or the terms of the notification issued
thereunder, have been misconstrued?
It is necessary, perhaps, to start with the
very Article, namely, Art. 32, with reference to
which the question has to be answered.
"32. (l) The ri!!'ht to move thfl Supreme
Court by appropriate proceedings for the
enforcement of the rights conferred by this
Part is guaranteed.
(2) The Supreme Court shall have
power to issue directions or orders or writs,
•
1 $.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
823
including writs in· the nature of 1uJbms oorpua,
mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and
certiorari, whichever may be appropriate, for
the enforcement of the rights conferred by
this P:i.rt.
(3) Without prejudice to the powers
conferred on the Supreme Court by cla1110s
(1) and (2), Parliament may by law empower
any other Court to exercise within the local
limits of its jurisdiction all or any of the
powers exeroisable by the Supreme Court under
olause (2).
(4) The right guaranteed by this article
shall· not be suspended except as otherwise
provided for by this Constitution.''
The Article occurs in Part III of the Constitution headed 'Fundamental Rights'. It is one of
a series of articles which fall under the sub-head,
"Right to Constitutional Remedies". There can be
no doubt that the right to move the Supreme Court
by appropriate proceedings for the enforcement
of the right conferred by Part III is itself a guaranteed fundamental right. Indeed, cl. (l) of the
Article says so in express terms. Clause (2) says
that this Court sha11 have power to issue directions
.or orders or writs, including writs in the nature of
kabeJJs COr]YUs, mandamus, prohil>ition, quo warranto
and certiorari, whichever may be appropriate, for
the enforcment of any of the rights conferred by
Part III. Clause (4) makes it clear that the right
guaranteed by the Article shall not be suspended
except as otherwise provided for by the Constitution. Article 359 of the Constitution · states that
where a Proclamation of Emergency is in operation the President may by order declare that the
right to move any court for the enforcement of
such of the rights conferred by Part III as may be
mentioned in the order and all proceedings pending
116J
Sml. Ujj.,,. Bai
••
S,.,, oJ Uttar
Praiuh
DaJ.
824
J96t
Smt. Ujjam B.ii
v.
Statt of Ultar
Pradtsla
DasJ.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963]
in any court for the enforcement of the rights so
mentioned shall remain suspended etc. It is clear,
therefore, that so Joni;: as no order is made by the
President to suspend the enforcement of the rights
conferred by Part III of the Constitution every
person in India, citizen or otherwise, ha• the guaranteed right to move the Supreme Court for
enforcement of the rights conferred on him by
Part III of the Constitution and the Supreme
Court has the power to issue neceSBary directions, orders or writs which may be a.pp·
ropriate for the enforcement of such rights.
Indeed, this Court bas held in more than one decision that under the Constitution it is the privilege
and duty of this Court to uphold the fundamental
rights, whc>never a person seeks the enforcPment of
Ruch right•. The oath of office which a Judge of t.f1e
Supreme Court takes on assumption of office con·
ta.ins infer alia a solemn affirmation that he will
"uphold the Constitution and the laws".
The controversy before us centres round the
expression "enforcement of the rights conferred by
this Part" which occurs in els. (!}and (2) of the
Article. It has not been disputed before us that
this Court is not trammelled bv technical considerations relating to the issue of writs habeas corpus
mandAJmus, Prohibition, quo warranto and certiorar(
This Court said in T. 0. Basappa v. T. Nngnppa (I):
"In view of the express provisions in our
ConHtitution we need not now look back to
the early history or the procedural technicalities of these writs in English law, nor feel
oppressed by any difference or change of
opinion expressed in particu Jar cases by
English Judges. We csn make an order or
issue a writ in the nature of certiorari in all
approprfote case and in appropriate manner,
(I) [1955] I S.C.R. 250. 256.
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT RFPORTS
1110 long as we keep to
825
the broad and fundamental principles that regulate the exercise
of jurisdiction in the matter of granting
such writs in English law,"
Therefore, apart altogether from all technical consi·
derations, the broad question before us is-in what
circumstances does the question of enforcement of
the rights conferred by Part III of the Constitution
arise under Art. 32 of the Constitution, remembering all the time that the constitutional remedy
under Art. 32 is itself a fundamental right? On
behalf of the petitioner it has been submitted that
whenever it is primu facie established that there is
violation of a fundamental right, the question of its
enforcement arises; for example, (a) it may arise
when the statute itself is ultra vfres and some
action is taken under such a statute, or (b) it may
also arise when some action is taken under an intra
vires statute,but the action taken is without jurisdiction so that the statute though intra vires does not
support it; or (o) it may again arise on misconstruction of a statute which is intra vires, but the misconstruction is such that the action taken on the
misconstrued statute results in the violation of a
fundamental right. It has been argued before us
that administrative bodies do not cease to come
within the definition of the word ''State" in Art. 12
of the Constitution when they perform quasi-judicial
functions and in view of the true scope of Art. 32,
the action of such bodies whenever suoh action
violates or threatens to violate a fundamental right
gives rise to the question of enforcement of such
right and no distinction can be drawn in respect of
the three classes of cases referred to above. As to
the case before us the argument is that the taxing
authorities misconstrued the terms of the notification which was issued by the State Government on
December 14, 1957 under s. 4(1)(b) of the United
Provinces Sales Tax Act, U.P. Act No. XV of
1948 and as a result of the miscon-::.truction, they
19~1
Smt, U:ijam Bai
v,
State of Uttar
Pradesh
826
1961
~mt. Ujj•m Bai
••
St•t< •I Uuu
Pr•d11J.
•
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963]
have assessed the petitioner to sales tax on the sum
of Rs. 4,71,541.75 nP. which action, it is submitted, has violated the fundamental right guaranteed
to the petitioner under Art. 19(l)lf) and (g) and
Art. 31 of the Constitution.
The misconstruction, it is argued, may lead to
a transgression of constitutional limits in different
ways; for example, in a case where an inter-State
transaction of sale is sought to be taxed despite the
constitutional prohibition in Art. 286 of the Constitution as it etood previously, by wrongly holding
that the transaction is intra-State, there is a transgreseion of constitutional limits. Similarly, where
a quasi-judicial authority commits an error as to a
fact or issue which the authority has complete jurisdiction to decide under the statute, but the error is
of such a nature that it affects a fundamental right,
there is again a transgression of constitutional
limits. The argument is that there is no distinction
in principle between these clf\sses of misconstruction of a statute, and the real test, it is submitted,
should be the individuality of the error, namely,
whether the error impinge on a fundamental right.
If it does, then the person aggrieved has a right to
approach this Court by means of a petition under
Art. 32 of the Constitution.
On the contrary, the contention of the respondents which is urged as a preliminary objection
to the maintainability of the petition in that on the
facts stated in the present petition no question of
the enforcement of any fundamental right arises
and the petition is not maintainable. It is stated
that the validity of the Aot not being challenged in
any manner, every part of it is good law; ther1>fore,
the provision in the Act authorising the Sales-tax
Officer as a quasi-judicial tribunal to assess the ta.x
is a valid provision and a decision ma.de by the said
tribuniil strictly acting in exercise of the quasi-judicial power given to it must necessarily be a fully
l S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
827
valid and legal act. It is pointed out that there is
no question here of the misconstruction leading to a
transgression of constitutional limits nor to a.ny
error relating to a collateral fact. The error which
is (lomplained of, assuming it to be an error, is in
respect of a matter which the assessing authority ha.s
complete jurisdiction to decide; that decision is legally
valid irrespective of whether it is correct or otherwise. It is stated that a. legally valid aot cannot
offend any fundamental right and the proper remedy for correcting an error of the nature complained
of in the present case is by means of an appeal or if
the error is an error apparent on the face of the
record, by means of a petition under Art. 226 of the
Constitution.
Before l proceed to consider these arguments
it is necessary to clear the ground by standing that
certain larger questions were also mooted before us,
but I consider it unnecessary to examine or decide
them. Such questions were: (I) whether taxation
laws are subject to the limitations imposed by Part
III, particularly Art. 19 therein, (2) whether the
expression ''the State" in Art. 12 includes "courts"
also, and (3) whether there can be any question of
the enforcement of fundamental rights against decisions of courts or the action of private persons.
These larger questions do not fall for decision in the
present case and I do not consider it proper to
examine or decide them here. I should make it
clear that nothing I. have s!ated in the present
judgment should be taken as expressing any opinion
on these larger questions. It is perhaps necessary to
add alio that this 'writ petition. could have been
disposed of on the very short ground that there was
no misconstruction of the notification dated December 14, 1957 and the resultant action of the assessing authority did not affect any fundamental right
of the petitioner. That is the view which we have
expressed in the conneotrd appeal of M/s. Chhota.bhai J ethabhai Patel & Co. v. The Sales Tax Officer,
1961
Bmt. Ujjarn
v.
Stata of Uttar B1i
Pr11d1h
Ai.Jar J,
828
1962
Smt. Ujjam Bai
v.
State of Uttar
Pradesh
AiJarJ.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963)
Agra and another (Civil Appeal No. 99 of 1961) in
which Judgment is also being delivered to-day.
The writ petition, however, has been referrt-d
to a larger Bench for the decision of the two important constitutional questions relating to the scope
of Art. :12, which I have stated earlier in this judgment. It is, therefore, necessary and proper that I
·should decide those two questions which undoubtedly arise as a preliminary objection to the maintainability of the writ petition.
I now proceed to a consideration of the main
arguments advanced before us. On some of the
aspects of the problem which has been debated
· before us there has been very iittle disagreement.
I may first delimit the filed where there has been
agreement between the parties and then go on to
the controversial area of disagreement. It has not
been disputed beforA us that where the statute or a
provision thereof is ultra vires, any action taken
under suoh ultra vires provision by a quasi-judicial
authority which violates or threatens to violate a
fundamental right does give rise to a question of
enforc.iment of that right and a petition under Art.
32 of the Constitution will lie. There are several
decisions of this Court which have laid this down.
It is unnecessary to cite them all and a reference
nee,d only be made to one of the earliest decisions
on this aspect of the case, namely, Himmatlal
Harilal Mehta v. The State of Madhya Pradesh (1).
A similar but . not exactly the same position
arose in the Bengal Immunity Company Limited
v. The State of Bihr1r (').
The facts of the
the
appellant
company
case
were that
filed a petition under Art. 226 in the High
Court of Patna for a writ of prohibition
restraining the Sales Tax Officer from making an
assessment of sales tax pursuant to a notice iesued
by him. The appellant claimed that the sales
(I) [19541S.C.R.1122.
(2) '.1955) 2 S.C.R. 60,, 619, 620.
'
...
•
1 S.C.R.
I
I
'
'
t
1.,.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
829
sought to be assessed were made in the course of
inter-State trade, that the provisions of the Bihar
Sa.Jes Tax Act, 1947 (Biha.r Act 19 of 1947) which
authorised the imposition of tax on such sales were
repugnant to Art. 286(2) and void, and that,
therefore, the proceedings taken by the Sales Tax
Officer should be quashed. The application was
dimissed by the High Court on the ground that if
the Sales Tax Officer ma.de an assessment which was
erroneous, the assefj8ee could ·challenge it by way
of .appeal or-revision under ss. 24 and 25 of that
Act, and that · as the matter was within the
jurisdiction of the Sales Tax Oft'cer, no writ of
prohibition or ce'rliorari could be issued. There
was an appeal against this order to ~bis Court and
therein a preliminary objection was ta.ken that a
writ under Art. 226 was not the appropriate
remedy open to an assessee for challenging the
legality of the proceedings before a Sales Tax
Officer. In rejecting the contention, this Court
observed:
"It is, however, clear from article 2i5
that no tax can be levied or collected except
by authority of law which must mean a good
and valid law. The contention of the
appellant company is that the Act which
authorises the assessment, levying and
collection of Sales tax on inter-State trade
contravenes and constitutes an infringement
of Article 286 and is, therefore, ultra virea, void
and unenforceable. If, however, this contention by well founded, the remedy by way of
a writ must, an principle and authority, be
available to the party aggrieved.''
And dealing with the contention that the petitioner
should proceed by way of appeal or revision under
the Act, this Conn observed:
"The answer to this plea. is short and
simple. The remedy under the Aot cannot
196S
Smt. Ujjam B•i
v.
Stal1 of Ullor
Prad1rh
830
1962
mt. Vjjam Bdi'
••
Stai. of Utt.r
Prad1sh
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963)
be said to lie adequate and is, indeed, nugatory
or useless if the Act which provides for such
remedy is itself ultra vires and void and the
principle relied upon can, therefore, have
no application where a party comes to
Court with an allegation that his right has
been or is being threatened to be infringed by
a law which is ultra vires the powers of the
legislature which enacted it and as such void
and prays for appropriate relief under article
226."
It will be seen that the question which arose in
that case was with reference to a provision in
the taxing s_tatute which was ultra vires and the
decision was that any action taken under such a
provision was without the authority of law and
was, therefore, an unconstitutional interference
with the right to carry on business under Art. 19
(l)(f). In circumstances somewhat similar in
nature there have been other decision of this Court
which the violation of a fundamental right W&H
taken to have been established when the assessing
authority sought to tax a transaction the taxation
of which came within a constitutional prohibition.
Such cases were treated as on a par with those cases
where the provision itself was ultra vires.
The deci&ion in Bidi Supply Co. v. The Union
of India (')arose out of a somewhat different set of
facts. There the Central Board of Revenue
transferred by means of a general order certain
cases of the petitioner under s. 5 (7·A) of the Indian
Income-tax Officer, District III, Calcutta, to the
Income-tax Officer, Special Circle, Ranchi. It was
held that an omnibus wholesale order of tranfer
as was made in the case was not contemplated by
the su b·section and, therefore, the impugned order
of transfer which was expressed in general terms
without reference to any particular case and
{I) [1956) 2 S.C.R. 67.
II
I
I
i
•
l s.c.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
without any limitation as to time was beyond the
competence of the Central Board of Revenue. It
was also held that the impugned order was
discriminatory against the petitioner and violated
the fundamental right guaranteed by Art. 14 of
the Constitution. This decision really proceeded
upon the basis that an executive body cannot,
without authority of law, take action violative of
a fundamental right a;nd if it does, an application
under Art. 32 will lie. In that case no question
arose of the exercise of a quasi-judicial function in
the discharge of undoubted jurisdiction; on the
contrary, the ratio of the decision was that the
order pas9ed by the Central Board of Revenue was
without jurisdiction. The decision was considered
again in Pannal,al Binjraj v. Union of India (1 )
after further amendments had been made in s. 5
(7-A) of the India Income-tax Act, 1922 and it was
pointed out that s. 5 (7-A) as amended was a.
measure of
administrative
convenience and
constitutionally valid and an order passed
thereundet· could not be challenged as unconstitutionaJ.
There are other decisions which proceeded on
a similar basis, namely that if a quasi-judicial
authority acts without jurisdiction or wrongly
assumes jurisdiction by committing an error as to a
collateral fact and the resultant action threatens or
violates a fundamental right, the question of
enforcement of that right arises and a petition
under Art. 32 will lie. (See TafAJ !rem and Steel Co.
Ltd. v. S. R. Sarkar (2); and Madan Lal Arora v. The
Excise and Taxation Officer, Amritsar (3 ). In Tat,a
Iron and St,eel, Oo. Ltd. v. S.R. Sarkar( 2) the question
arose under the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956.
Under that Aot sales in the course of inter-State
trade are liable to be taxed at a single point. The
petitioner was assessed to tax on certain sales
(1) (1957] S.C.R. 233.
(2) [1961] 1 S.C.R. 379, 383.
(3) [1962] 1S.C.R.8~3,
~
(
-(
Ill{
831
-lHt
Smt. Ujj11m B•i
Vo
S t•ld oj Uttu
Pradtsh
832
1962
Sm,. Ujjam Bai
v.
Slat• OJ Uttar
Pradesh
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963]
falling within the Act by the Central Sales Tax
Officer' Bihar, and .the tax was also duly paid.
Thereafter the Central Sales Tax Officer in West
Bengal made an order assessing to tax the very sales
in respect of which tax had been paid. The petitioner then moved this Court under Art. 32 for an
order quashing the assessment. A preliminary
objection to the maintainability of the petition was
taken on behalf of the respondent State on the
ground that under the Act the petitioner could file an
appeal against the order of assesament and that
proceedings under Art. 32 were, therefore, incompetent. In overruling this contention Shah, J.,
referred to the decisions of this Court in
Himmatlal Harilal Mehta'.~ case (lj, Be:nga/, Immunity's Company's case(') and the State of Bombay v. United
Motors (India) Ltd. (')and observed:
"In these cases, in appeals from orders
passed by the High Courts in petitions
under Art. 226, this Court held that an
attempt to levy tax under a statute which
was ultra vires infringed the fundamental
right of the citizens and recourse to the High
Court for protection of the fundamental
right was not prohibited because of the
provisions contained in Art. 265. In the
case before us, the vires of the Central Sales
Tax Act,1956, are not challenged; but in Kailash
Nath v. The State of Uttar Pradesh (•) a
petition challenging the levy of a tax was
entertained by this Court even though the
Act under the authority of which the tax
was sought to be recovered was not challenged
as ultra vires. It is not necessary for purposes
of this case to decide whether the principal of
Kailash Nath's case(') is inconsistent with the
view expressed by this Court in Ramjilal v.
Income-tax Officer, Mohindargarh (')."
<D [1954J s.c R. m2.
(3) ll9~3] s.c.R. 1969.
(2) [195SJ 2 s.c.R. 603, 619, 620.
(4) A.I.R 1957 s.c. 790.
(S) [1951] S.C.R. 127.
,
1 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
833
The learned Judge then proceeded to hold that as
there was under the Act a single liability and that
had been disoha.rged, there could be no proceedings
for the assessment of the same sales a seoond time
to tax. The ratio of the decision would appear to
be that a.s the law did not authorise the imposition
of tax a second time on sales · on which tax had
been levied and collected, proceedings for
assessment a second time were without jurisdiction.
In Madan Lal Arora's case( 1) a notice for assessment
was issued after the expiry of the period prescribed
therefore by the statute. The a.ssessee thereupon
applied to this Court under Art. 32 for quashing
the proceedings for assessment on the ground the.t
they were without jurisdiction and it was held that
as the taxing authority had no power under the
statute to issue the notice in question the proceedings were without jurisdiction and must be quashed.
This again was a case in which the authority had
no jurisdiction under the Aot to take proceedings
for assessment of tax and it made no difference
that such assumption for juriadiOtion was based on
a misconstruction of statutory provision.
It is necessary perhaps to refer here
to
another
class of cases which have
sometimes been characterised as cases of procedural
Ultra vires. When a statute prescribes a manner
or from in which a duty is to be performed or a
power exercised, it seldom lays down what will be
the legal consequences of failure to observe its
prescriptions. The courts must, therefore, formul.i.te their own criteria for determining whether
the procedural rules are to be regarded as mandatory in which case disobedience will render void
or voidable what has been done, or as directory in
which case disobedience will be treated as a mere
irregularity not affecting t~ validity of what has
been done. A quasi-judicial authority is under an
obligation to act judicially. Suppose, it doea not
(1) (1962) J S. C.R. 823.
1961
Sml. UjJam Bdi
v.
Skl'e of Utt.,,.
hddash
834 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963]
196•
Sml, UjjtUn Bai
y.
Std• •I Ull"
p,...,A
so act and passes an order in violation of the principles of natural justice. What is the position then?
There are some decisions, particularly with regard
to customs authorities, where it has been held that
an order of a quasi-judicial authority given in
violation of the principles of natural justice is really
an order without jurisdiction and if the order threatens or violates a fundamental right, an application
under Art. 32 may lie. (See Sinha Govindji v. The
Deputy ControUer of Imports & Exports, Madras(l) ).
These decisions stand in a class by themselves and
really proceed on the footing that the order passed
was procedurally ultra vires and therefore without
jurisdiction.
So far I have dealt with three main classes of
oases as to which there is very little disagreement:
(1) where action is taken under an ultra virea
st11tute; (2) where the statute is intra vires, but the
action taken is without jurisdiction; and (3) where
the action taken is procedurally ultra vires. In all
these oases the question of enforcement of a fundamental right may arise and if it does arise, an
application under Art. 32 will undoubtedly lie. As
to these three classes of cases there has been very
little disagreement between the parties before us.
Now, I come to the controversial area. What
is the position with regard to an order made by a
quasi-judicial authority in the undoubted exercise
of its jurisdiction in pursuance of a provision of law
which is admittedly intra vires ? It is necessary
first to clarify the concept of jurisdiction. J urisdiotiun means authority to decide. Whenever a
judicial or quasi-judicial tribunal is empowered or
required to enquire into a question of law or fact
for the purpose of giving a decision on it, its findings thereon cannot be impeached collaterally or on
an application for certiorari but are binding until
(I)
1962) IS. C. R. 54-0.
I S.C.R.
..
I
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
835
reversed on appeal. Where a quasi-judicial authority has jurisdiction to decide a matter, it does not
lose its jurisdiction by coming to a wrong conclusion
whether it is wrong in law or in fact. The question,
whether & tribunal has jurisdiction depends not on
the truth or falsehood of the facts into which it
has to enquire, or upon the correctness of its findings on these facts, but upon their nature, and it
is determinable ''at the commencement, not at the
conclusion, of the inquiry'. ( Rex v. Bolten(1))
Thus, a tribunal empowered to d*"termine claims
for compensation for loss of office ha.a jurisdiction
to determine all questions of law and fact relating
to the measure of compensation and the tenure of
the office, and it does not exceed its jurisdiction
by determining any of those questions. incorrectly
but it hs.s no jurisdiction to entertain' a claim for
reinstatement or damages for wrongful dismissal,
and it will exceed its jurisdiction if it makes an
order in such terms, for it has no legal power to
give any decision whatsoever on those matters.
A tribunal may lack jurisdiction if it is improperly
constituted, or if it fails to observe certain essential
preliminaries to the inquiry. But it does not exceed
its jurisdiction by basing its decision upon an incorrect determination of any questipn that it is
empowered or required (i.e.,) has jurisdiction to
determine. The strength of this theory of jurisdiction lies in its logical consistency. But there are
other oases where Parliament when it empowers an
inferior tribunal to enquire into certain facts intend
to demarcate two areas of enquiry, the tribunal's
findings within one a.rea being conclusive and with
in the other area impeachable. ''The jurisdiction
of an inferior tribunal may depend upon the fulfilment of some condition precedent or upon the
existence of some particular fact. Such a fR.ct is
collateral to the actual matter which the tribunal
has to try and the determination whether it exists
(I) [1841] l Q. B. 66; 74.
1111
Smt. Ujjam B•i
y,
S !llU of Ult•r
Pr•itsb
896
i962
Sml, Ujiam B 1i
v.
Statl oj Uttsr
A(v•r J,
SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1963)
or not is logically prior to the determination of
the actual question which the tribunal has to ky.
The tribunal must itself decide :is to the collateral
fa?t when, at the inception of an inquiry by a
tribunal of limited jurisdiction, a challenge is made
to its jurisdiction, the tribunal has to make up its
mind whether it will act or not, and for that pur·
pose to arrive at some decision on whether it ha~
jurisdiction or not. There may be tribunals which,
by virtue of legislation constituting them, have the
power to determine finally the preliminary facts
on which the further exercise of their jurisdiction
depends; but, subject to that an inferior tribunal
cannot, by a wrong decision with regard to a collateral fact, give itself a jurisdiction which it would
not otherwise po~sess." (Halsbury's Laws of Eng·
land, 3rd Edn. Vol. II page 59). The character·
istic attribute of a judicial act or decision is that
it binds, whether it he right or wrong. An error
of !ll.w or fact committed by a judicial or quaeijudicial body cannot, in gPneral, be impeached
otherwise than on appeal unless the erroneous determination relates to a matter on which the juris·
diction of that body depends. ihese principles
govern not only the findings of inferior courts
stricto sensu but also the findings of administrative
bodies which are held to be acting in a judicial
capacity. Sueh bodies am deemed to have been
invested with power to err within the limits of their
jurisdiction; and provided that they ket1p within
those limits, their decisions must be accepted as
valid unless set aside on appeal. Even the doctrine
of res judicata has been applied to such decisions.
(See Livingstone v. Westminister Corporation (1};
Re Birkenhead Corporation (') Re 56 Denton Road
Twiclcenharn (')Society of ..illedical Officers of He,alth v.
Hope('). In Burn & Co., Calculta v. Their Employees(')
(I) [1904] 2 KB. 109.
(3) [1953] Ch. 51.
(5)
\2) (1952) Ch. 359.
•4) [195'l] 2 W.L.R. 377, 391, 396, 397, 402.
[1956] ~.C.R. 781.
1s.c.R.
•
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
837
this Court said that although the rule of re,s
judicata as enacted by s. 11 of the Code of
Civil Procedure did not in terms apply to an award
made by an industrial tribunal its underlying principle which is founded on sound_ public policy and
is of universal application must apply. In Daryao
v. The State of U. P. (1) this Court applied
tba doctrine of res judicata in respect of application
under Art. 32 of the Constitution. It is perhaps
pertinent to observe here that when the Allahabad
High Court was moved by the petitioner under
Art. 226 of the Constitution against the order of
a.SHessment. passed on a.n alleged misconstruction
of the notification of December 14, 1957, the High
Court rejected the petition on two grounds. The
first ground given was that the petitioner had the
alternative remedy of getting the error corrected
by appeal the second ground given was expressed
by the High Court in the following words:
"We have, however, heard the learned
counsel for the petitioner on merits also, but
we are not satisfied that the interpretation
put upon this notification by the Sales Tax
Officer contains auy obvious error in it. The
circmnst&nces make the interpretation advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner
unlikely. It is admitted that even handmade
biris have been subject to Sales Tax since
long before the date of the issue of the above
notification. The object of passing the Additional Duties of Excise (Goods of Special
Importance) Central Act No. 58 of 1957, was
to levy an additional excise duty on certain
important articles and with the concurrence
of the State Legislature to abolish Sales Tax
on those articles. According to the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner
during the period 14th December, 1957, to
(I) (1961] (2J S,
c. A, S91.
1962
Sml. Ujjam B•I
v.
Stille of Uttar
Prad1sh
,.
838
Smt. Uiiorn••i
T,
S1at1 t/ Utttr
Pr&Mslr.
.dij"9r J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963]
30th June, 1958, the petitioner was liable
neither to payment of excise duty nor to payment of Sa.lea Tax. We do not know why
there should h!Lve been such an exemption.
The language of the notification might well
be read as meaning that the notification is to
apply only to those goods on which a.n additional Central excise duty had been levied
and paid."
If the observations quoted a.hove mean that
the High Court rejected the petition also on merits,
a.pa.rt from the other ground given, then the principle la.id down in Daryao v. The St.ate of
U. P. (1) will apply and the petition under Art. 32
will not be maintainable on the ground of res jwUc.ata. It is, however, not neoesaa.ry to pursue the
question of re.a judicala any further, because I a.m
restinir my decision on the more fundamental
ground that a.n error of law or fa.ct committed by a
judicial body cannot, in general, be impeached
otherwise than on appeal unless the erroneous
determination relates to a matter on which the
jurisdiction of that body depends.
In Malkarjun Narhari (') the Privy Council
dealt with a oa.se in which a. ea.le took place after
notice had been wrongly served upon a. person who
was not the legal representative of the judgment.
debtor's estate, and the executing court had erroneously decided that he was to be treated a.s such
represenfa.tive. The Privy Council said :
"In so doing the Court was exercising its
jurisdiction. It made a. s!Ld mistake, it is
true; but a. Court ha.a jurisdiction to decide
wrong a.s well a.s right. If it decides wrong,
the wronged party can only take the course
prescribed by law for setting matters right;
(1) 1961 2 S.C.A. 5q1,
12) (1950) t.ll. 279, A, 216, 225.
1 S.C.R. SUPREME OOURT REPORTS
839
and if that course is not taken the decision,
however wrong, o"a.nnot be distu.rbed''.
. The above view finds support from a number
of decisions of this Court.
Aniyoth Kunhamina Umma v. Ministry of
Rehabilitation (1). In this case it had been held
under the Administration of Evacuee Property Act,
19f>O, that a certain person was an evacuee and that
certain plots of land wh\ch belonged to him were,
therefore, evaouee property and vested in the Custodian of Evacuee Property. A transferee of the
land from the evacuee then presented a pPtition
under Art. 32 for restoration of the lands to her and
complained of an infringement of her fundamental
right, under Art. 19 ( 1) (f) and Art. 31
the Cons·
titution by the aforesaid orders under the Administration of Evacuee Property Act. The petitioner
had been a party to the proceedings resulting in the
declaration under that Act earlier mentioned. This
Court held that as long aa the decision under the
Administration of Evacuee Property Act which had
become final stood, the petitioner could not complain of any infringement of any fundamental right.
This Court diSmissed the petition observing :
1.
of
"We are basing our decision on the ground
that the competent authorities under the Act
had come to a certain decision, which decision
has now become .final the petitioner not having
moved against that decision in an appropriate
court by an 8.ppropri"te proceeding. As Jong
as that decision stands, the petitioner cannot
complain. of the infringement of a fundamen·
ta.I right, for she has no such right".
2. Gulal:xla8 & Oo. v. Assiatant Collector of
Ouatoms (1) In this case certain imported goods had
been assessed to customs ta.rift'. The assessee con-
tenued in a petition under Art. 32 that the duty
(1) [1962] 1 S. o.R. SOS.
(2) A.J.R, [19S7] S.C. 733, 736.
190
Smt. Ujj• ;flli
•• U""'
St1l1 1/
Pr.Or/a
·--
'-fJGrJ.
840
1951
Smt. Ujjam Bai
v.
SI la •f Utt.r
Prwl•sh
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963]
should have been cha.rged under a different item.of
that tariff and that its fundamental right was violated by reason of the assessment order charging it
to duty under a wrong item in the tariff. This
Court held that there was no violation of fundamen·
ta! right and observed :
"If the provisions of law under which
impugned orders have been passed are with
jurisdiction, whether they be right or wrong
on fact, there is really no question of the infraction of a fundamental right. If a. parti·
cular decision is erroneous on facts or merits,
the proper remedy is by way of an appeal".
3. Bhatnagar&: Oo. LW,. v. The Union of India(!)
In this case the Government bad held that the
petitioner ha.d been trafficking in licences and in
that view confiscated the goods imported under a
licence. A petition had been filed under Art. 32
challenging this action. It was held :
"If the petitioner's grievance is that the
view taken by the appropriate authority in
this matter is erroneous, that is not a matter
which oan be legitimately agitated before us
in a. petition under Art. 32".
4, The Parbhani Transport Oo-operativeBociety
Ltd. v. Regional Transport Authority, Aurangabad (1).
In this case it was contended that the decision
of the Transport Authority in granting a permit for
a motor carriage service had offended Art. 14 of the
Constitution. This Court held that the decision
of a quasi-judicial body, right or wrong, could not
offend Art. 14.
There are, however, two decisions which stand
out and mast be mentioned here. A contrary view
wa.s taken in Kaila$h Nath v. The State of U. P. (•)
(1) [19~7) S.C.R. 701, 702.
(2) [1960] 3 S C.R. 177.
(3) A.I.R. [19S7] S.C. 790.
1 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
841
There. a question precisely the same as the one now
before us had arisen. A trader assessed to sales
tax had claimed exemption under certain notification R.lld·this claim had been rejected. Thereupon
he had moved this Court under Art. 32. It was
contended that the right to be exempted from the
payment of ta.x wa.s not a fundamental right a.nd
therefore, the petition under Art. 32 was not competent. Tf\i,s Court rejected that contention basing
itself on Bengal I mmunity Company's case(l} and Bidi
Supply Oo' s case (2). The two cases on which the
decision was rested had clearly no application to
the· questio~ der,ided. I have shown earliar that
in both those oases the very statute under which
action had .been taken was challenged as ultra vires.
In Kailash Nath's case (3) the question was not
considered. from the point of view in which it has
been placed before us in the present case and in
which it was considered in the four cases referred to
above. Therefore, I · am unable to agree with the
view taken in Kailash Nath'8 case (3).
In Ramavatar Budhai Prasad v. Assistant Sales
Tax Officer (' J the question raised was whether
betel leaves were exempted from sales tax under
certain provisions of· the C. P. & Berar Sales Tax
Act. This Court agreed with the view of the assessing authority that they were not exempted. The
question as to the maintainability of the application
under Art. 32 was neither raised nor was it decided.
This decision cannot, therefore, be taken as an
authority for holding that an application under
Art. 32 is maintainable even in respect of orders
which are made in the undoubted exercise of jurisdiction by a quasi-judicial ~uthority.
Certain other decisions were also cited before
us, namely, Thakur Amar Singkji v. State of Rajast}w,n (i); M/s. Mohanl,al Hargovind Dass v. The Stale
(I l [19SS] 2 S.C.R. fi03, 619, 620.
(3) A.I.R. [19S7] S.C. 790.
(2) [JQ<6] S.C.R. 267.
(4) LI962] 1 S.C.R. 279.
(S) [1955] 2 S.C.R.. ~.
196S .
Sml. UJ}am B•i
v.
State of Ut'cw
Pradish
A.!1ar J.
842
1962
Smt. Ujjam Bai
v.
St•te of U. P.
Praduh.
Aiyarh
SUPREME OOUR'!' REPORTS [1963j
.of Madhya Pradesh (1); Y. Mahaboob Sheriff v.
Mysore State Transport Authority ('), J. V. Gokal &1,
Go. (Private) Ltd. v~ The Assistant Collector of Salestax (Inspection) (');and Universal Imports Agency v.
Chief Controller of Imports and Exports('). These
decisions fall under the category in which an executive authority acts without authority of Jaw, or a
quasi.judicial authority acts in transgression of a
constitutional prohibition and without jurisdiction.
I do not think that these decisions support the
contention of the petitioner.
In my opinion, the correct answer to the two
questions which have been referred to this larger
Bench must be in the negative. An order of assessment made by an authority under a taxing statute
which is intra vires and in the undoubted exercise of
its jurisdiction cannot be challenged on the sole
ground that it is passed on a misconstruction of a
provision of the Act or of a notification issued
thereunder. Nor can the validity of such an order
he questioned in a petition under Art. 32 of the
Constitution. Thti proper remedy for correcting an
error in such an order is to proceed by way of
appeal, or if the error is an error apparent on the
face of the reoord, then by an .application under
Art. 226 of the Constitution. It is necessary to
observe here that Art. 32 of the Constitution does
not give this Court an appellate jurisdiction such as
is given by Arts. 132 to 136. Article 32 guarantees
the fight to a constitutionid remedy and relates only
to the enforcement of the rights conferred by Part
III of the Constitution. Unless a question of the
enforcement of a fundamental right arises, Art. 32
does not apply. There can be no qut:stion of the
enforcement of a fundamental right if the order
challenged is a valid and legal order, in spite of the
allegation that it is erroneous. I have, therefore,
come to ihe conclusion that no question of the
(I) [19SS] 2 S.C.R. .~O!I.
\3) (19601 's. c. R. 852.
(2) [1960] 2 S.C.R. 146.
(4) [1960] I s.c.R. 906.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
843
. enforeement of a fundamental right arises in this
case and the writ petition is not maintainable.
i
It is necessary to refer to one last point.
The petitioner's firrn had also filed an appeal on a
certificate of the Allahabad High Court against
the order of that Court dismissing their petition
under Art. 226 of the Constitution. The appeal
against that order was dismissed by this Court
for non-prosecution on February 20, 1961. In
respect of that order of dismissal the petitioner's
firm has filed an application for _restoration on
the ground that it had been advised that in view
of a rule having been issued under Art. 32 of the
Constitution, it was not necessary to prosecute the
appeal. The petitioner's firm has prayed for
condonation, of delay in filing the application
for restoration of appeal. In my opinion no
sufficient cause has been ma~e out for allowing
the application for restorR.tion. The petitioner's
firm had deliberately allowed the appeal to
be dismissed for non-prosecution and it cannot
now be allowed to get the dismissal set aside
on the ground of wrong advice.
Bmt. Ujiam B ti
v.
State of U~tw
Pradesh
AiyarJ.
Furthermore, in the appeal filed on behalf of
M/s. Chhota.bhai Jethabhai Patel & Co. v. The
Sales Tax Officer, Agra and another (Civil Appeal
No. 99 of 1961) we have decided the question on
merits and have held that the assessing authorities
did not put a wrong construction on the notification
in qusstion.
KAPUR,
J.-In this petition under Art. 32 of
the Constitution which is directed against the
order passed by the Sales Tax Officer, Allahabad,
dated December 20, 1958, the prayer is for a. writ of
certiorari or other order in the nature of certiorari
quashing the said order, a. writ of mandamus
against the respondents to forbear from realizing
the sales tax imposed on the basis of the said
Kapur J.
844
1962
Smt. Ujjam Bai
v.
S la:e of Uttar
Pradesh
KopurJ ..
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963)
order and such other writ or direction as the
·petitioner may be entitled· to.
The petitioner is a partner in the firm
M/s. Mohanlal Hargovind Das which carried on
the business of manufacture and sale of handmade
biris, their head office being in Jubbalpore in the
State of Madhya Pradesh. They also carr.Y on
business in U. P., and in that State their principal
place of business is at Allahabad.
Under s. 4 ( 1) of the U. P. Sales Tax Act
(Act XV of 194i>) hereinafter called the 'Act', the
State Government is authorised by a notification to exempt unconditionally under cl. (a) and
conditionally under cl. (bi any specified goods, On
December 14, 1957, the U. P. Government issued a
notification under s. 4( l}(b) of the Act exempting
cigars, cigarettes, biris and tobacC'o provided that
the additional Central Excise Duties leviable under
the Additional Duties of Excise (Goods of Special
Importance) Act, 1957 (Act 58 of 1957) had been
paid. This notification was subsequently modified
and on November 25, 1958, another notification
was issued unconditionally exempting from sales tax
biris both handmade and machine-made with effect
from July I, 1958. Tl:te exemption of biris from
sales tax was conditional under the notification
dated December 14, 1957, for the period December
14, 19.n, to June 30, l!J58, but was unconditional
as from July 1, 1958.
The petitioner's firm submitted its return for
the quarter beginning April 1, 1958, to June 30, 1958,
showing a gross turnover of Rs. 75,44,633 and net
turnover of Rs. lll. The firm claimed that as from
December 14, 1957, biris had been exempted from
payment of sales tax which had been replaced by
the additional central excise duty and therefore no
tax was leviab\e on the sale of biris. The requisite
sales tax of Rs. 3.51 nP on the turnover of Rs. 111
1 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
845
was deposited as required under the law. The petitioner's firm also submitted its return for the
periods December 14, 1957, 1;o December 31, 1957,
and from January 1, 1958, to March 31, 1958. For
the subsequent periods returns were made but
those are not in dispute as they fell within the notification of November 25, 1958. The Sales Tax
Officer on November 28, 1958, sent a notice to the
petitioner's firm for assessment of tax on sale of
biris during the assessment period April l, 1958, to
Jund 30, .H)58. On December 10, 1958, the petitioner's firm submitted an application to the Sales
Tax Officer stating that no sales tax was exigible
under the Act on the sale of biris because of the
notification dated December 14, 1957. This pla.ce was
rejected by the Sales Tax Officer and on December
20, 1958, he assessed the sales of t.he petitioner's
firm to sales tax amounting to Rs. 4,71,541· 75nP.
In his order the Sales Tax Officer held:"The exemption envisaged in this notification applies to deale,rs in respect of sales of
biris provided that the additional Central
Excise duties levia.ble thereon from the closing
of business on 13-12-1957 have been paid on
such goods. The assessees paid no such Ex0ise
duties. Sales of biris by the assessees are
therefore liable to sales tax".
Aga_inst this order the firm took an appeal under
s. 9 of the Act to the Judge (Appeals) Sales Tax,
Alla.ha.bad, being Appeal No. 441 of 1959, but it
was dismissed on May 1, 1959.
The petitioner's firm filed a petition under
Art. 226 of the Constitution in the High Court of
Allahabad challenging the validity of the order of
assessment and demand by the Sales Tax Officer.
This was Civil Miscellaneous Writ No. 225 of 1951-1
which was dismissed on January 27, 1D59 on the
ground that there was another remedy open to the
1962
Sml, Ujjam Bai
v.
Srate u.f U lfar
Pra<ksh
Kapur J.
846
Sml. Ujjam Bai
••
Stal• of Uttar
Pre de sh
Kapur J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963]
petitioner under the Act. The High Court also
observed:" We have come to the conclusion that the
Sales Tax Officer has not committed any apparent or obvious error in the interpretation
of the notification of 14th December 1957".
Against the order,ofthe High Court an appeal was
brought to this Court on a certificate under
Art.133(l)(a). During the pendeney of the appeal this
petition under Art. 32 was filed and rule was issued
on May 20, 1959. Subsequently the appeal which
had been numbered C-A. 572/60 was dismissed ·by a
Divisional Bench of this Court for non-prosecution.
An application has been filed in this Court for restoration of the appeal and for condonation of
delay. That matter will be dealt with separately.
In the petition under Art. 32 the validity of
the order of assessment dated December 20, 1958,
is challenged on the ground that the levy of the tax
amounts to "infringement of the fundamental right
of the petitioner to carry on trade and business
guaranteed by Art. 19(l)(gi" and further that it is
an "illegal consfiscation of property without payment of compensation and contravenes the provisions of Art. 31 of the Constitution". The prayers
have ..!ready been set out above.
As before the Constitution Bench which heard
the petition a preliminary objection against the
competency of the petitioner's right to move this
court under· Art. 32 of the Constitution, was raised
and the correctness of the decision in KailashNath v.
The, St,ate of U.P. ,(1) was chl\llenged, the Constitution Bench because of that decision and of certain
other decisions of this court and because of the im·
portance of the question raised made the following
order:
(I) A.I.R. 1957 S. C. 790.
1 s.c.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
847
1962
"The question thus debated is of consideSmt. l!jjam Bai
rable importance on which there has been no
v.
State of Utlar
direct pronouncement by this court. It seems
PiadeJh
desirable that it should be authoritatively
settled. We accordingly direct that the papers
Kapur J.
be placed before the Chief Justice for constituting a larger Bench for deciding the two
>
following questions:
1. Is an order of assessment made by an
authority under a. taxing statute which is intra
vires open to challenge as repugnant to
Art. 19(l)(g), on the sole ground that it is
based on a misconstruction of a provision of
the Act or of a. notification issued thereunder?".
2. Can the validity of such an order be
questioned in a petition under Art. 32 of the
Constitution?''
Tha.t is how this matter bas come up before this
bench.
·.
Before examining the rival contentions raised
and the controversy between the parties it is necessary to state that (i) in the present case we are not
called upon to decide whether els. (f) and (g) of
Art. 19 are applicable to a taxing statute or to express our preference for the view of this court ~s
expressed in a. group of oases beginning with
Ramjilal v. lncome-fAJx Qfficer, Mohindergarh( 1)
over the later view taken in the second
Koohunni (2 ) case or K. T. Moopil Nair v. State
of Ke.rala (3 ), (2) whether the word ·'State"
in Art. 12 of the Constitution Comprises judicial
power exercised by courts and (3) the wider
question whether Art. 32 is applicable in the case
of infringement of rights by private parties. The
controversy in the present case in this ; the petitioner contends that a.n erroneous order, in this
o
(I9Sl) s.c.R. 121,
'<2> (1960) 3 s.c.R. sa1.
(3) (1961) s s.c.R. 77.
848
1962
Smt. Ujjam Bai
v.
State of Ultar
Pradesh
XapurJ.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963)
case, of assessment resulting from a misconstruction of a notification iBsued under a statute by a
quasi-judicial authority like the Sales Tax Officer
even if the statute is intra 'lireB is an infringement
of the fundamental right to carry on trade under
Art. 19(1) (g) on the ground that the essence of
the right under that Article is to C!l.rry on trade
unfettered and that such a right can be infringed
as much by an executive act of an administrative
tribunal as by a quasi·judicial decision given by
such a tribunal. The petitioner mainly relies on
the decision of this Court in Kailash Nath v. St,ate
ojU.P.
The submission of the respondent, which was
urged as a preliminary objection to the maintainability of this petition, was that the impugned
decision of the Sales tax Officer does not violate
any fundamental right. The respondent argued
that if the constitutionality of the Act is not challenged then all its provisions must necessarily be
constitutional and valid including the provisions
for the imposition of the tax and procedure for
assessment and appeals against such assessments
and revisions therefrom would be equally valid.
A decision by the Sales tax Officer exercising
quasi-judicial power and ailting within his powers
under the Act and within his jurisdiction must
necessarily be ·valid and legal irrespective of
whether the decision is right or wrong. Therefore an order of the Sales tax Officer even if erroneous because of misconstruction of notification
issued thereunder remains a valid and legal order
and a tax levied thereunder cannot contravene
fundamental rights and cannot be challenged under
Art. 32. An aggrieved party must prooeed against
the decision by way of appeal etc. as provided
under the statute or in appropriate oases under
Art. 226 of the Constitution and finally by appeal
to this Court under Art. 136. For the order to
eJ.
1 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORrs
84~
be valid a.nd immune from challenge under Art. 32,
it is nece:3sary th'3refore that (l) the statute
is intra vires in all respects; (~) the authority acting
under it acts quasi-judicially ; (3) it acts within the
powers given by the Act and within jurisdictfon;
and (4) it does not contravene rules of natural
justice.
In Mulkarjun Bin ShidramaPpa Pasare v.
Narhari Bin Skivappa ('), Lord Hobhouse while
dealing with an erroneous order of a court said:
"The Code goes on to say that the Court
shall issue a notice to the party against
whom execution is applied. It did issue
notice to Ramlingappa. He contended that
he was not the right person, but the Court,
having received his protest, decided that he
was the right person, and so proceeded with
the execution. It ma.de a sad mistake it is
true; but a Court has jurisdiction to decide
wrong as well as right. If it decided wrong,
the wronged party oan only take the course
prescribed by law for setting matters right ;
and if that course is not taken the decision,
however wrong, cannot be disturbed."
In an earlier case dealing with the revisional powers
of the Court, Sir Barnes Peacock in Rajah Amir
Hassan Khan v. Sheo Baksh Singh (2) said:"The question' then is, did the judges
of the Lower Courts in this case, in the exercise of their jurisdiction, act illegally or with
material b:regularity. It appears that they
had perfect jurisdiction to decide the question
which was before them, and they did decide
it. Whether they decided it rightly or wrongly they had jurisdiction to decide the case ;
and even if they decided wrongly, they did
not exercise their jurisdiction illegally or with
•
material irregularity".
1
{I) [1900] L.R.. 27 I.A. 2I6.
(2) [1884] L.R. 11I.A.237, 239.
1962
Sml. U}jam B•i
v.
StaJ1 o/ U1tar
Pradesh
850 SUPREME COURT REl'OB.T5 (1963]
1961
..
Snd Ujjam Boi
SlaJe of Uttaf'
Pradesh
KapurJ.
This principle has been accepted by this Court in
cases to which reference will be made later in this
judgment. Although these cases were dealing with the
decisions of Courts they are equally applicable to
decisions of quasi-judicial tribunals because ill
both cases where the authority has jurisdiction to
decide a matter it must have jurisdiction to decide
it rightly or wrongly and if the decision is wrong
the aggrieved party can have recourse to the procedure prescribed by the Act for correcting the
erroneous decision.
Now Art. 32 is a remedial provision and is
itself a fundamental right which entitles a citizen
to approach this court by an original petition in
any case where his fundamental right has been or
may be infringed. The relevant part of the Artiole
provides :-·
Art. 32 (l) ·"The right to move the
8upreme Court by appropriate proceedings
for the enforcement of the rights conferred
by this Pa.rt is guaranteed.
(2) The Supreme Court shall have
power to issue directions or orders or writs
in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus,
prohibition, que warrant,o and oortiorari, whichever may be· appropriate for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by this
"Part".
Under Art. 32 (l) a citizen can approach this Court
when his fundamental rights guaranteed under
Part III of the Constitution are invaded the remedy
for which is provided in cl. (2) of Art. 32. Thus
the remedy under Art. 32 is not available unless
the fundamental rights of a. citizen a.re invaded.
In my opinion the contention raised by t.he
respondents is well founded. If the statute a.nd it.
constitutionality is not challenged then every pa.r.
i s.c.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
851
of it is constitutionally valid including the provisions authorising the levying of a tax and the
mode and procedure for assessment and appeals
etc. A determination of a question by a Sales
tax Officer acting within his jurisdiction must
be equally valid and legal. In such a case an
erroneous construction, assuming it is erroneous,
is in respect of a. matter which the statute has
given the authority complete jurisdiction to decide.
'fhe decision is therefore a valid act irrespective
o!.its being erroneous.
An order of assessment passed by a quasijudicial tribunal under a statute which is 11,ltra
vires cannot be equated with an assessment order
passed by that tribunal under an intra vires statute even though erroneous, The former being with
out authority of law, is wholly unauthorised and
has no existence in law and therefore the order
is an infringement• of fundamental rights under
Art. 19( l) (f) & (g) and can be challenged under
Art. 32. The latter is not unconstitutional and
has the protection of law being under the authority
of a valid law and therefore it does not infringe
any fundamental right and cannot be impugned
under Art. 32. To say that the doing of a legal
act violates a fundamental right would be a contradiction in terms. It may be pointed out that
by an erroneous decision of the quasi-judicial
authority the wronged party is not left without a
remedy. In the first place under the Act before
an assessment is ma.de the Sales tax Officer is required to 'give notice and hear objections of a taxpayer and give decision after proceeding in a judici..a.l manner that is after considering the objections,
aud such evidenoe as is led. Against the order
of assessment an appeal is provided by s. 9 of the
Act and against such an appellate order a revision
can be ta.ken under s. 10 of the Act under a. 11 a
reference to the High Court on a question of law
19611
Sml. Ujjam Bt1.1
v.
Shte of Uttar
Pradewh
KapurJ.
852
1982
Smt. Ujjam Bai
v.
S141e of Utlar
Pradesh
Ka;'tJr J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963)
is provided and if the revising authority refuses
to make a reference then the High Court can be
moved to direct the revising authority to state a
case and t.hen an appeal would lie under Art. 136
of the Constitution of India and it may be added
that a pritition under Art. 226 would lie to the
High Court in appropriate cases against which an
appeal will lie to this Court under Art. J 36. It
may here ba added that the prncedure prescribed by the Act shows that the Sales tax Officer
has to determine the turnover after giving the taxpayer a reason hie opportunity of being heard and
such an assessment is a quasi-judicial act Province
of Bombay v. Kusaldas S., Advani (1). If a Sales tax
Officer acts as a qutU!i-judicial authority then the
decision, whether right or wrong, is a perfectly
valid act which has the au thm:ity of an intra vires
statute behind it. Such a decision, in my opinion,
does not infringe any fundam11ntal right of the petitioner and any challenge to it• under Art. 32 is
unsustainable.
Before giving the reasons for any opinion I
think it necessary to refer to the constitutional
provisions dealing with the power to tax. This
subject is dealt with in Part XII of Constitution
and Art. 265 therein which is the governing provision provides : "No tax shall be levied or collected
except by authority of law."
Therefore a taxing law enacted by a legislature,
which it is not competent to enact, will have no
existence in the eye of law and will be violative
of Art. 19 (l)(g). The same result will follow if
f;he law is a colourable piece of legislation e.g., a
law disguised as a tl\xing law but. really law but
confiscatory measure the object of which i• not to
raise revenue but confiscation. Similarly, if a tax
is assessed by an authority which has no jurisdict.
(I) [19SOJ I s.c.R. 621, 725.
I S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
853
tion to impose it will also be outside the protection
of law being without authority of law. The same
will be the case· where an Executive authority
levies a.n unauthorised tax. Then there are cases
like the present one where a quasi-judicial tribunal
imposes a .tax by interpreting a notification under
a taxing provision and the objection ta.ken is that
the interpretation is erroneous. The cases relied
upon by counsel for the appellant a;nd the respondent fall within one or other of these categories.
A.s I have said above, the submission of the
learned Additional Solicitor _ General is well
founded. It has the support of the following
of this Court
which I
shall
decisions
In GUlahdas v. Assistant
now deal with.
Collector of Oustom (1) it was held that
if the order impungned is made under the -provisions of a. statue which is intra vires and the order
is within the jurisdiction of the authority making
it then whether it is right or wrong, there is no
infraction of the fundamental rights and it has to
be challenged in the manner provided in the
Statute and not by a petition undnr Art. 32. In
that case the petitioner was aggrieved by the order
of the Asc:iistant Collector of Customs who assessed
the goods imo0rted undJr a licence under~ different entry and consequently a higher Excise Duty
was imposed. The petitioners feeling aggrieved
bv the order filed a petition under Art. 32 and
the objection to its maintainability was that the
application could not be sustained because no
fundam~ntal right had
been violated by the
impugned order it having been properly and
correctly made by the authorities competflnt to
make it. The petitioner there contended that the
goods imported, which were called 'Lyra.' brand
Crayons werA not crayons at all and therefore
imposition of a higher duty by holding them to
be crayons was a.n infringement of fundamental
(I) A.I.R. l9j7 S.C. 733, 736.
1962
Smt. Ujjam B~i
••
Stat• of Uttar
Pradesh
Kapur J.
854
19~1
Sm'• Ujj.;m Bai
v.
Sl•t• of Uttar
PraJ,sh
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963]
right under Art. l9(l)(f) & (g). This contention was
repelled. Delivering the judgment of the Court,
S. K. Das, J., observed at p. 736 .:"What, after all, is the grievance of the
petitioners? They do not challenge any of
the provisions Of the India Traiff Act, 1934
(XXXII of 1934) or any of the provisions of
the Sea Customs Act, 1878 (VIII of 1878).
It is for the Customs authorities to determine
under the provisions of the said Acts "It" hat
duty is payable in respect of certain imported
articles. The Customs authorities ca.me to a.
decision, right or wrong, and the petitionera
pursued their remedy by way of an appeal to
the Central Board of Revenue.
The Central Board of Revenue dismiSBed
the appeal. D'nless the provisions relating to
the imposition of duty are challenged as
unconstitutional, or the orders in question
are oh&llenged as being in excess of the
powers given to the Customs authorities and
therefore without jurisdiction it is difficult to
see how the question of any fundamental
right under Art. 19(1) els. (f) & (g) of the
Constitution can a.t all a.rise.
If the provisions of law under which the
impugned orders have been passed are good
provisions and the orders ps.ssed are with
jurisdiction, whet.her they be right or wrong
on facts, there is really no question of the
infraction of a fundamental right.
If a
particular decision is erroneous on facts or
merits, the proper remedy is by way of an
appeal.
All that is really contended is that the
orders are erroneous on merits. That surely
does not give rise to the violation of &ny
1 S.C.R.
SUPREME OOURT REPORTS
855
fundamental right under Art. 19 of the Constitution." .
The second case is Bhatnagar Oo. Ltd. v. The Union
of lndift (1). In that case the Sea Customs
authorities ordered thA confiscation of goods on the
ground th!J.t the petitioner had been trafficking in
licenses under which the goods had been imported.
This order was challenged under Art. 32. It was
held that the order of confiscation made as a result
of investigation, which ·the Customs Authorities
were competent to make, was not open to challenge
in proceedings under Art. 32 of the Constitution
on the ground that the conclusions were not properly drawn. It was observed : ''If the petitioner's grievance is that the
view taken by the appropriate authorities in
this matter is erroneous that i1 not a matter
which can be legitimately agitated before us
in a petition under Art. 32. It may perhaps
be, as the learned So1icitor General suggested,
that the petitioner may have remedy by suit
for damages but that is a matter with which
we are not concerned. If the goods have
been seized in accordance with law and they
have been ~ized as a result of the findings
recorded by the relevant authorities competent to hold enquiry under the Sea Customs
Act, it is not open to the petitioner to contend that we should ask the authorities to
exercise discretion in favour of the petitioner
and allow his licences a further lease of life.
Essentially the petitioner's grievance is
against the conclusions . of fact reached by
the relevant authorities."
-
The
third case is The Parbhani
Transp<Yrt
Go-operative
Society Ltd. v.
The Re,gional
Transport Authority, Aurangabad (2 ) where the
(I) (1957) s.c.a. 101, 112.
t2) [19601 s s.c.R. in. 188.
1961.
Sml. Ujjom Bai
••
Sta~1 of Uttar
· Prad11h
EaparJ,
856
1962
...
Smt. Ujjam Bai
S1at1 of Ui'•
Prad1sh
-
Kapur J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963]
decision of a. Transport Authority in granting
a motor carriage permit was challenged as a
contravention of Art. 14. The Court held that
the Regional Transport Authority acts in a quasijudicial capacity in the matter of granting permits,
and if it comes to an erroneous decision the decision is not challengeable under Art. 32 of the
Constitution because the decision right or wrong
could not infringe Art. 14. Sarkar J., said at
p. 188:"The decision of respondent No. I
(Regional Transport Authorit}) may have
been right or wrong ......... but we are unable
to see that the decision offends Art. 14 or
any other fundamental right of the petitioner.
The respondent No. l was acting as a quasijudicial body and if it has made any mistake
in its decision there are appropriate remedies
available to the petitioner for obtaining
relief. It cannot complain of a breach of
Art. 14".
Lastly reliance was placed on an unreported
judgement of this Court in Aniyotk Kunkamina
Umma v.
The Ministry of RehabiUtatian,
Government
of India, New Delhi (')
The
petitioner in that case was
a
reprssen~
ative-in-interest of her husba.nd who had been
declared an evacuee by the Custodian of Evacuee
property. Her appeals first to the Deputy Custodian and then to the Custodian General were
unsuccessful. She then field a petition under
Art. 32 of the Constitution. It was held that J,he
appropriate authorities of competent jurisdiction
under the Administration of Evacuee Property
Act 1950 having determined that the husband
was an evacuee within that Act and the property
was evacuee property it was not open to the 'petitioner to challenge the decision of the CustOdian
(II) [1962] I s.c.R. sos.
t S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
85'1
General under Art. 32 of the Constitution. S. K.
Das, J., delivering the judgment of the Court
observed:"Where, however, on account of the
decision of an authority of competent jurisdiction the right alleged by the petitioner has
been found not to exist, it is difficult to see how
any question of infringement at right c~n arise
as a ground for. a petition under Art. 32 of the
Constitution unless the decision on the
right alleged by the petitioner is held to he a
nullity or can be otherwise got rid of. As long
as that deoision stands, the petitioner cannot
complain of any infringement of a fundamental right. The alleged fundamental right of
the petitioner is really dependent on whether
Kunhi Moosa Haji was an evacuee property.
Is the decision of the appropriate authoritie~
of competent jurisdiction cannot be otherwi~
got rid of, the petitioner cannot complaiq of
her fundamental right under Arts. 19( l )( f) and
31 of the Constitution".
These authorities show (1) that if a statute is intra
vir~B than a competent order under it by an authority
apting a.a a quasi-judicia] authority is equally intra
vires (2) that the decision whether 1·ight or wrong is
not violative of any fundamental right and (3) that if
the order is erroneous then it oan be qu~s~ioned
only under the provisions of that statute because
the order will not amount to an infringement of a
fund.a.mental right as_ long as the statute is consititutAona.l. In appropriate case it may be cha.llenged
under Art. 226 and in both cases an ,appeal lies to
this Court..
I may now examine decisions of this Court
relied upon by the learned Attorney General in
whioli the operation of. taxation laws as violating
.Ai.t. 19(1)(g) was considered and the pr<>oedure by
Smt. Ujjca B•i
V;.
BIGll of
u,;.,
PttJP.•"
E•,ur J.
858
...
Srt 1. Ujjam Bai
SI•,. •f UtMr
P,;.USA
x-,J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTs [1963]
which this Court was approached. In support of his
case the Attorney General mainly relied on KaiJaBh
Nath v. St,ate of U.P.(1) and tried to buttress that
decision by certain oases decided before and subs·
equent to it. He submitted that a misconstruction
of a provision of law even by a quasi-judicial tribunal is equally an infringement of fundamental
rights under Art. 19( l)(f) & (g) because as a· con·
sequence of such misconstruction the tax is an ilh•gal
imposition. In KaiJaBhNath's case it was contended
before the Sa.lea tax Authorities that cloths, on which
Excise duty had already been paid and which was
then processed, hand-printed and exported, no sales
tax was leviable as it was exempt under the notifi·
cation under s. 4 of the U. P. Sales Tax Act. The
Sales tax Authorities however held the exemption
ti:> be applicable only to cloth which had not been
processed and hand-printed and was in the original
oondition. A petition under Art. 32 was filed
against that order and it was contended that the
rights of the aliseSBee undE r Art.. 19( 1)(g) were
infringed by the order misinterpreting the notifica·
tion. The Court said:"If a tax is levied without due legal
authority on any tr~de or business, then it is
open to the citizen aggrieved to approach this
oourt for a writ under Art. 32 since his right
to oarry·on trade is violated or infringed by
the imposition and such being the case,
Art. 19(l)(g) comes into play".
The objection there taken on behalf of the
State was in the following terms:''That the imposition of an illegal .tax will
not entitle the citizen to invoke Art. 32 but he
muiit resort to remedies· available under ordinary law or proceed under Art. 226 of the
Constitution, in view of the fact that the right
(I) A.LR. 1957 S.C. 790,
1 s.c.R.
SUPREltE OOURT REPORTs
859
to be exempted from the payment of ta.x cannot be said to be a fundamental right · which
comes within the purview of Art. 32".
This contention was repelled because of the folio·
wing observations in the Bengal, l mmunity Oo. LW,.
v. 8ta'l6 of Bihar ( 1 f.
"We are unable to agree the above conclusion. In reaching the conclusion the High
Court appearH to have overlooked the fact
that the main contention of the appellant
oompany, as set forth in its petition, is that
the Act, in so f~r as it purports to tax a non·
resident dealer in respect of an inter.State
sale or purchase of goods, is Ultra vires the
Constitution and wholly illegal ......... ''
The other oases referred to in that judgment were
Mokam'TMilYasin v. Town Area Oommittee, Ja/,alabad.( 2 );
State of Bombay v. United Motors ('); Himmatlal
Haf'ilal, Mehta v. State of Madhya Pradesh (') and
Billi Supply Oo. v. Union of India (6 ). Thus the
decision in that case was bused on decisions none of
which supports the proposition that a misoonstrution by a quasi-judicial tribunal of a notification
under the provision of a statute which is intra viru
is· a violation of Art. 19( I )(g). On the other hand
they were all oases where the imposition of tax ol
license fee 01· executive action was sought to be sup·
port6d by an tdtra vires provision of the law and
was therefore void and violative of Art. 19 (l)(g).
As· this distinction was not kept in view the remedy
by way of petition under Art. 32 was held to be
available. The question as now raised was not
argued in KaUa8hNath'8 case.
The distinction between a competence order of
aase88nlen~ made .under a provision of law which is
intra tJires even if it is errone6us.and an order made
(&)
[1955) 2 s. C.- R. 603• 618.
(2) Ll~52l: S•·C. l,\o 1J12..
csJ U95JJ s.c.a. 1069 ·ion.
(4> C1954J s. c. a.. 1122.
(5) c19'61s.c.a.257, 211, 277,
IHI
..,,.
Sm1. Ujj- B•i
••
Stot1 of Ulln
~,
860
S.. 11. l:l'jjam B~i
v.
8lt1ll of UUar
Pr•thsh
Kirpur J,
SUPREME COURT REPORTS fl963]
under a provision of law which is ultra vires in
fundamental in the matter of applicability of Art.32.
In the former case the provision of law being
valid the. order will be protected as being under the
authority of a valid law and therefore it will not be
violative of Art. 19(l)(g) and Art. 32 is not available to challenge that order. In the latter case, the
provisions of .law being void the protection of law
does not operate and the order is an unauthorised
interference with the rights of a oitizen under
Art. 19(1 )(g). It can therefore be challenged under
Art. 32. This distinction does not seem to have been
kept in view in Kai/,ash Natk's case (1). That case is
further open to the criticism that it is based on
decisions which were not cases of erroneous interpretations of notifications under intra vires statutes
but were cases where an unconstitutional provision
of law was sought to be used to support a tax. For
the reasons I have given Kailash Natk's case(l)
cannot be accepted as well founded".
In yet another case where the remedy under
Art. 32 was sought to challenge the decision of a
Sales tax Officer is Ramavtar Budhaipraaad ero. v.
Asdstant Saks tax Officer, Akola ('). There a Sales
tax Officer on a construction of a Schedule of the
Sales tax Act had held that betel leaves were
subject to sales tax as they were not vegetables
which were exempt from that tax and this Court
upheld that decision. The question as to the availability of Art. 32 was not raised.
Besides Kaikuh Nath' s case which I have dealt
with above the other case relied upon by the learned Attorney General fall within the following categories in none of which the question as now ar.gued
&rose or was considered.
(I) Where the tax imposed Dr action taken is
under a statute which is unconstitutional.
(1) A.I.IL 1957 S.C. 790.
(2) [1961] 1 S.c.R. 279.
I S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
861
(2) Where the Executive action is without
authority of law.
196Z
Sme. Ujjom Bai
( 3) Where the taxing authority imposes a. tax
Y •.
Sro1t fl/ URar
or acts without authority of law.
Pradesh
(4} Where the quasi-judicia] authority without
having jurisdiction determines a fa.ct or gives a
Kap111 J.
decision.
I shall now discuss the cases which fall in the
first category i.e. where action is taken under a
statute which is unconstitutional. The action ta.ken
thereunder must necessarily be unconstitutional
which is challengeable by an aggreived party under
Art. 32.
In Himmaflal Hari"lal Mehta v. The State of
Madhya Pradesh (1) sales ta.x was neither levied nor
demanded but apprehending that an illegal sales
tax may be assessed and Jevied a petition under
Art. 226 was filed in the High Court which was dismissed and an appeal was ·brought to this Court and
thus it was not a petition under Art. 32. In that
case the sales tax 'Qnder explanation II to s. 2(g) of
the Central Provinces & Berar Sales tax Act (Act 2 of
1947) was held ultra vires of the State Legislature
because it offended Art. 286(l}(a) and its imposition
or threat of imposition was held without authority
of law and therefore infringement of the constitutional right guaranteed under Art. 19( l)(g} entitling
the petitioner to apply under Art. 226 of the
Constitution. This case therefore decided that
a tax under an Act which is unconstitutional,
ultra vires a.nd void is without authority of law
under Art. 265 and is an infringement of
Art. 19 (I) (g). This case and RamJilal's case (2)
received approval in The Bt?Jn(Jal Immunity Co.
case (8). In the Bt?Jn(Jal Immunity case also tho
right infringed was by an Act which was ultra 'Vires
(I)
(1954) S.C.R. 1122.
(2) (1951) S.C.R.. 127,
(ll (19SS) 2 S.C.R. ~. 61&
862
S•I, Ujjm Boi
Y.
Sl•t• •/ U11..,
Pralu"/t,
IC_,., .1
SUPREME OOURT REPORTS [1963]
and the remedy under the Act wa1 held to be
inadequate, nugatory or useless. The facts of
that case were that the appellant company filed
a petition under Art. 226 in the High Court of
Patna for a writ of prohibition restraining the
Sales tax Officer from making an assessment of
sales tax pursuant to a notice issued by him.
The appellant claimed that sales sought to be
asst'BSed were made in the course of inter-State
trade, that the provisions of the Bihar Sales Tax
Act, 1947 (Bihar Act 19 of 1947) which authorised
the imposition of tax on such sales were repugnant
to Art. 286 ( 2) and void, and that, therefore.
the proceedings taken by the · Sales tax Officer
should be quashed. The application was dismissed
by the High Court on the ground that if the Sales
tax Officer made an assessment whioh was
erroneous, the assessee could challenge it by way
of appeal or revision under ss. 24 and 25 of the
Act and that as the matter was within the jurisdic·
tion of the Sales tax Officer, no writ of prohibition
or certiorari could be issued. There was an appeal
against this order to this Court and therein a
prelimina.ry objection was taken that a writ under
Art. 226 was not the appropri:ate remedy open to
an assessee for challenging the legality of the
proceedings before a Sales tax Officer. In rejecting
this contention, this Court observed:"It is, however, clear from article 265
that no tax can be levied . or collected except
by authority of law which must mean a good
and valid law. The contention of the appellant
company is that the Act which _authorises
the asseBBment, levying and collection of
sales tax on- inter-State trade contravenes
and constitutes an infringement of Art. 286
and i11, therefore, tiltra virea, void and unenforceable. If, however, this contention be
yell "ded, tJie 1;81DedJ b7 wa7 of a wri&
1 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
863
must, on principle and authority, be available
to the party aggrieved."
And dealing with the, contention that the petitione1·
should proceed by wa.y of itppeal or revision under
the Act, this Court observed :"The answer to ~his plea. is short and
simple. The remedy under the Act cannot
be said to be adequate and is, indeed nugatory
or useless if the Act which provides for such
remedy is itself ultra vires and void and the
principle relied upon can, therefore, have
no application were a party comes to Court
with an allega~ion that his right has been
or is being threatened to be infringed by a
law which is ultra tJires the powers of the
legislature which enacted it and as such void
and prays for appropriate relief under article
226." (p. 620).
It will be seen that the question which a.rose in that
case was with reference to a provision in a taxing
statute which was ultra tiires and the decision was
only that action taken under such a provision was
without the authority of law and was, therefore, an
unconstitutional interference with th~ right 'to carry
on business under Ar.t. 19\l}(g).
In Mohmmad Yasin v. The Town Area O<Ymmittee, Jal<ilabad (1) the imposition of the license fee
was without authority of law and was therefore
held to be ohallengeable under Art. 32 because such
a license fee on a business not only takes
away the property of the licensee but also
operates as on unreasonable restriction on the
right to carry on business. In Balaji v. TM, Income
TQ4; Oj/icer, Special I nvesf,i,gation Oircl,e, .A.kola C') the
Income tax Officer included, after the registration
of a iil'.m,, the income of the wife and of the minor
olaildnm who had been admitted to partnenbip.
~·) (1152)8.C.Lm.
(_2~ (19$i) 2 &.c.L -
IHI
Smt. Ujjm Bt1
....
S1ot. of UllM
-
_Prad#h
KliJ*r J.
864
IHI
lfMI. Ujji.ne 6oi
v.
S••hWtsh
•!
Ultar
SUPREMlll OOURT REPORTS (1963]
The assessee attacked the constitutionality of
s." 16(3)(a)(i)(ii) of the Income tax Act. The first
question there raiserl was of the legislative competence of Parliament to enact the law· and that Parliament was h9ld competent to enact. Socondly
the constitutionality of the provision was questio.
ned on the ground that it violated tl1e doctrine of
equality before tho law under Art. 14 of the Constitution and that ground was also repelled and it
was held that tue legislature had selected for the
purpose of classification only that group of persons
who in fact are used as a cloak to perpetuate
fraud on taxation. The third ground of attack
was based on Art. 19(l)(f) & (g) of the Constitution.
Relying upon the case of Mohd. Yasin v. Town Area
Cammittee.( 1) which was a case of license fees and
llimmatlal Harilal .ilfrhta's case(') ·in which there
was no determination by any tribunal but there was
a threat of an illegal imposition, the court held that
not only must a law be valid in the sense of there
being legislative competence, it must also not
infringe the fundamental rights declared by the
Constitution. This again was not a case of a determination of a question by a taxing authority acting
quasi-judicially but the .const!tutionality and vires
of the statute were challenged.
The second category of cases is were the Taxing
Authority imposes a tax or acts without authority
of law and the assessment made by the Taxing
Authority is without jurisdiction. Tat,a Iron & 8f£el,
Co., Lf.d., v. S. R. Sarkar (') was a case under the
Central 8ales Tax Act under which sales in the
course of inter-State trade are liable to be taxed
only once and by one State on behalf of the Central
Government. The petitioner company in that case
was asse88ed to tax of certain sales falling within
that Act by the Central ~ales tax Officer, Bihar. and
the tax wa.e paid. 'l'hey were again taxed by tlle
Cll (1952; S.C.R. 572.
(2) ( 1954) S.C.R. 1122.
(~)
(l!Hil) I S.c:.ll. S19,,
a
I S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
865
Central Sales tax Officer, West Bengal who held that
under the statute that was the "Appropriate Statfl''
to levy the tax as the situs of sale was in West
Bengal and that was assailed under Art. 32. The
objection to the maintainablity of the petition on
tfte ground that an appeal against the order or
assessment could be taken and that proceedings
under Art. 32 were incompetent was overruled.
Shah J., in delivering the judgment of the majority
referred to the decision of this Court in Himmatlal
Harilal Mehta's case, (1 ); r.Phe Bengal Immunity Co.
case( 2 ) and the State of Bombay v. United Motors
India LU. (3) and observed as follows:"In these cases, in appeal from orders
passed by the High Courts in petitions under
Art. 226, this C0urt held that an attempt to ·
levy tax under a statute which was ultra vires
infringed the fundamental right of the citizen
and recourse to the High Court for protection
of the fundamental right was not prohibited
because of the provisions contained in
Art. 265. In the case before us, the vires of the
Central Sales Tax Act, 1956, are not challenged; but in Kailash Nath v. The Sta~
of Uttar Pradesh A. I . .R. 1957 S.C. 790 a petition challenging the levy of a. tax was entertained by this Court even though the Act under
the authority of which the tax was sought
to be recovered was not challenged as ultra
vires. It is not necessary for purposes of this
case to decide whether the principle of Kailash
Nath's case is inconsiste11t with the view expre1:1sed by this Court in Ramjilal's case [1951]
S. C. R. 127''.
The learned Judges also held that the statute made
it impossible to levy two ta.xes on the same ·sale
a.nd only one tax being payable it could be collected on behalf of the Government. of India. by one
(2) (1955) 2. S.C.R. 603,; 6~8.
( S) [l~SJ S.C.ll. 10691 1077.
(1) (1954) S.C.R. 1122.
1911
Sml. UJjamB
"· Ulta
Slate </
Produh
Kapur J.
866
Sml. Ujj..,. Bai
~·
St•l1 oj U ttar
Pr.i11h
SUPREME OOURT REPORTS [1963]
State only and one sale could not be taxed twice.
It having been collected once the threat to recover
it again was Prima Jacie an infringement of the
fundamental right of the petitioner. Sarkar J., who
gave the minority judgment observed:"In Kail,ash Nath v. The State of U. P.,
A.I.R. 1947 S. C. 790, this Court held that an
illegal levy of sales tax on a trader under an
Act the legality of which was not challenged
violates
his fundamental
rights under
Art. 19( l )(g) and a petition under Art. 32 with
respect to such violation lies. The earlier case
of Ramjilal v. Income tax Officer, Mohindergarh
[1951] S.C.R. 127 does not appear to have
been considered. It is contended that the
decision in Kailash Nath's case requires reoon·
sideration. We do not think however that
the present is a fit case to go into the question whether the two oases not reconcilable
and to decide the preliminary question raised·
The point was taken as a late stage of prooee·
dings after much costs had been incurred.
The question arising on this petition is further
of general importance a decision of which is
desirable in the interest of all concerned. As
there is at least one case supporting the competence of the petition, we think it fit to
decide this petition on its merits on the
footing that it is competent''.
It cannot be said that this case is an authority
which supports the contention of the petitioner.
Apa.rt from the fact that Kaifash N ath's case (1)
did not receive approval it was decided on the
ground of the Central Sates tax being a tax,
which could be collected on a sale once and by
one State on behalf of the Government of India,
and having been imposed and paid once could not
be imposed a second time. In other wo?ds lt wa11
(ll A.Lil- 1'57 s.c. 790.
l S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
867
a tax whioh was without jurisdiction and therefore fell within Art. 12( l )(f).
i968
Smt. Ujjam Biii
y,
A similar case also relied upon by the peti·
tioner is J. V. Gokal & Go. (Privat,e) Ltd. v. The
.AssisfJlmt Oolle0tor of Sales Tax (Inspection) ( 1).. The
There the petitioner had entered into contracts
with the Gov~rnment of India for the supply of
certain quantities of foreign sugar. When the
goods were on t.he high seas the petitioner deliver·
cd to the Government shipping do.cumeiits pertaining to the goods and received the price. On· their
arrival they were taken possession of by the
Government of India after paying the requisite
customs duty. Fvr the assessment year 1954-55
the petitioner was asseRsed to sales tax in calcula.ting whioh the prioe of the sales made to the
Government of India deducted. The Assistant
Collecter of Sales tax issued a notice to the petitioner proposing to review the said assessment
passed by the Sales tax Officer. Objections were
filed but were rejected and it waB held by the
Assistant Collector that sales tax was payable in
respect of the two transactions. Against this order
a petition was filed under Art. 3:~ which was
supported by the Union Government. It was
contended by the petitioner that the sales in
question were not liable to sales tax inasmuch as
they took place in the course· of. import of. goods
into India. This Court held that the property in
the goods passed to the Goyernment of India
when the shipping documents were delivered
against payment and that the sales of goods by
the petitioner to the Government took place when
the goods were on the high seas and were therefore e.x:emptfrom sales tax under Art. 286 (l)(b)
of the Constitution. 'l'his was also a case of lack
of legislative authority and jurisdiction to im{>OSe
the sales tax.
St.ti oJ Ull•r
Pradt1h
868
190!
Smt~ lTJj•rn Bai
v.
Sidle oj Uetar
PrU.sh
Kapur I
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963)
Then there are oases where the Executive
action is without authorjty of law. One such
case is Bombay Dyeing Manufacturing Co. Ltd.
v. The State of Bombay (I) which was not a petition under Art. 32 but an appeal against can
order under Art. 226. In that oase under the
Bombay Labour Welfare Fund Act, .which authorised the constituting of a fund for financing labour
welfare, notices were served upon the appellant
company to remit the fines and unpaid ac<Jumulations in its custody to the Welfare Commissioner.
The appellant company questioned in a petition
under Art. 226 the validity of that Act as a contravention of Art. 31(2). The High Court held that
Act intra vim~ and dismissed the petition. On
appeal against that judgment this Court held that
the unpaid accumulations of wages and fines
were the property of the Company and any direction for the payment of those sums was a contravention of Art. 31(2) and therefore invalid. It was
also held that assuming that the money was not
property within the meaning of Art. 31(2 )and
Art. 19( l) ( f) applied that Article would also be of
no help to the Welfare Commissioner bAcause it
co.uld not be supported under Art. 19 ( 5) of the
Constitution. Moreover this was not a case of a
determination by a quasi-judicial tribunal but
was a case of executive action without authority
of law.
In Bidi Supply Co. v. The Union of India(')
an order passed by Central Board of Revellue
transferring the assessment records and proceedings of the petitioner from Calcutta to Ranchi
under s. 5 ( 7 A) of the Inoome tax Act was challenged under Art. 32 as an infringement of the
fundamental rights of the petitioner under
Arts. 14, 19(l)(g) and 31 of the Constitution. The
impugned order by the Central Board uf Revenue
was made acting in its executive oapaoity and this
(II (19SB) S.C.R, 1122.
12) (l9S~) S.c;:.R. 257, 271,27l,
t s.c.R.
SUPREME OOURT REPORTS
Court, without deciding the question whether
the order could be supported on the ground of
reasonable clas8ification held that the order
expressed in genera.I terms without· any reference
to any particular case and without any limitation
aa to time was not contemplated or sanctioned by
sub-s. 7(A) of s. 5 and therefore the petitioner was
entitled to the benefit of the provisions of sub-ss.
1 and 2 of s. 64 of .Indian Income tax Act. The
question decided therefore was that the Central
Board of Revenue acting under s. 5(7A) was not
empowered to pass an ''omnibus wholesale order
of transfer". It was not a quasi-judicial order
of an administrative tribunal acting within its jurisdiction hut an unauthorised executive order of
an administrative tribunal acting in its administrative capacity. Section 5(7A) was subsequently
'a.mended and in a somewhat similar oase Pannal,·
al Binjraj v. Union of India ( 1) it was held that
the amended s. 5( 7A) was a measure of administrative convenience and was constitutional and an
order pa::sed thereunder was equally constitutional.
In Thakur Amar Singhji v. State of Rajastkan(2)
the State of Rajasthan passed orders assum·
ing certain jagirs under Rajas than Land Reforms
and H.esumption of Jagirs Act. In the case of one
o( the jagirs it was held by this Court that the
notification,· by which the resumption was made,
was bad as regards ·properties comprised in that
petition because the properties were not within
the impugned Act, and being dedicated for religious
1mrposes was exempt under s. 207 of the Act.
rhis again was not a case of any quasi-judicial
decision but it was a notification issued by the executive Governmeµt in regard to properties not
within the Act which was challenged in that case.
....
(1)[19S7]S.C.R.233.
(2)[195S]2S.C.R.303,
196!
Smt. Ujjam Bai
v.
BC•u 11} Ullar
Prathsh
Kapur J.
870
19611
Sml. Ujjam lfll
••
Bl•l"J Ull.,
p,iiuJ,
SUPREME COURT .ttEPORTS [1963)
A case strongly relied upon by the petitioner
was Mfs. Mohanalal Hargovind Das, Jabalpur v. The
St,ate of Madhy(J, Prad(',{Jh ( '). The petitioners
there were called upon to file their returns of the
total purchase of tobacco made by them out of
Madhya Pradesh with a view to assess and levy
purchase tax. The return was filed under protest
and the Sales tax Authorities, as it was required
under the law, called upon the petitioners to deposit
the purchase tax. No quasi-judicial determination
was made, no decision was given after hearing the
taxpayer, but deposit was asked to be made as
that was a requirement of the statute. In a petition under Art. 32 of the Constitution for a writ
of mandamus restraining the State of Madhya
Pradesh from enforcing Madhya Pradesh Act against the petitioners it was contended that the
transactions were in the course of inter-State trade.
The nature of the transaction was that finished tobacco which was supplied to the petitioners by tlie
suppliers moved from the State of Bombay to the
State of Madhya Pradesh and the tra.nsaotions
which were sought to be taxed were therefore in
the course of inter-State trade and were not liable
to tax by the State. That was not a case of misconstruction of any statue by any quasi- judicial
authority but that was a case in which the very
tra.Illlaction was outside the taxing powers of the
State and any action ta.ken by the taxing authorities was one '~ithout authority of l~w. The statue
did· not give jurisdiction to the Authority to decide
an inter-State transaction was an intra-State sale.
If it had so done the statute would have been onoonstitutional under Art. 286( 1)(a).
ln Madanlal Arora v. The Excise Taxation
Officer Amritsar (1), notices were issued to the assesee enquiring him to attend with the documents and
ll) [1955) 2 S. C.R. 509.
(2) [1962) I S.C.R. 823.
1 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPOR'l"S
871
other evidence in support of his returns. In the
last of these notices it was stated that on failure to
produce the documents &nd evidence the case will
be decided ''on best judgment assessment basis".
The petitioner did not comply with the notices but
filed a petition under Art. 32 of the Constitution
chellenging the right of the authority to make a
"best judgment assessment" on the ground that at
the date of the last notice the sales. tax authority
had no right to proceed to make any "best judgment assessment'' as the three years within which
alone such assessment could be ma.de had expired.
This contention was held to be well founded. In·
deed the respondent conceded that he could not
contend to the contrary. This therefore was a case
in which the taxing authority had no jurisdiction to
take proceeding for s.sseesment of tax because of
the expiry of three years which had to be courited
from the end of the each quarter in respect of which
the return had been filed. The question was one
of lack of jurisdiction and it made no difference
that the Sales tax Officer had misconstrued the provision.
Y. Mahaboob Sheriff v. Mysare 8tat,e Tran8p(lrl
Authority ( 1). was a case under the Motor Vehicles
Act. The petitioners' application for the renewal of
the permits were granted by the Regional Transport
Authority empo'!ered to grant renewal for the
period of one year. A petition under Arts.· 226
and 227 of the Constitution was filed against the
order of renewal after the usual appeals had been
taken and .proved unsuccessfol and the petition
was summari1y dismissed. Thereafter a petition
under Art. 32 of the Constitution was filed in this
Court and the question for determination was
whether on a. proper oonstruction of the provision
of s. 58 (1) (a) and (2) of the Motor Vehicles Act
the period of renewal like in the oaae of original
ll) C1%0l 2 s. c. R. ''"'
-1161
Smt. Ujjam B.t
V•
S.•11 of Ufl.r
Prada.A
rlajur J.
872
1111!2
Bmt. Ujjam. BtJi
Stet, of'· Utttu
l'ralltsh
SUPREME OOURT REPORT3 [1963]
permit had to· be not less than three and not more
than five years. It was held that it had to be for
that period as provided in snb-s. (ll (a) of s. 58
read with sub-s. 2 of that section. This, it was
submitted, was an authority for the proposition
that where a provision is misconstrued by an authority having jurisdiction to construe a section a
petition under Art. 32 is competents. In the first
place the question as to whether Art. 32 was applicable was not raised and was therefore not decided. Secondly what was held was that if the
authority renewed a permit the renewal had to be
for a particular. period as specified in s. 58 and
could not be for a lesser period. The question
was therefore of jurisdiction.
In Universal Imports Age:ncy v. The Okie/
Oontroller of Imports and EX'pOTts (1). the petitioners,
in Pondicherry, entered before its merger with
India, into firm contracts with foreign sellers and
the goods agreed to be imported were shipped before or after the merger. The gom;ls were confiscated by the Controller of Customs on the ground that
they were imported without a licence but as an
option in lieu of confiscation the goods were releas1>d
on payment of a fine. On a petition under Art. 32
it was held by a majority that under paragraph
6 of the French Establishments {Application of
Laws) Order 1054, the transactions in question fell
within the words "things done" il} the saving clause
and were not liable to tax. This saving olause W&H
contained in the Order applying Indian laws in
place of the French laws. The construction was
not of the taxing statute but of certain Orders by
which the taxing statute had been applied to Pondioherry. These Orders the Taxing Officer had no
power to construe and there was no law to support
the order of the Collector. In any case this is an
instance of want of jurisdiction tO tax transactions
(l) [1961} l S. C. R. 305.
1 S.C.R,
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
873
which the law excludes from the taxing powers of
the authority levying the tax. There again the
questign of the applicability of Art. 32 to quasi·
judicij,1 41,'ltermination was not raised.
There ie one other class of cases of which
K. T. Moopil Nair's case (1) is an example. That
was a. case where the tax was of a. confiscatory nature and the procedure was contrary to rules of
natural justice. The imposition of land tax at a
flat rate of Rs. 2 peir acre imposed under the pro·
visions of Travancore Cochin Land Tax Act (Act
15 of 1955) as amended by Travancore Cochin Land
Tax Act, (Act 10 of 1957) was held to be violative
of Arts. 14 and 19 (1) (f). A taxing statute it was
held by a majority of the Court, was not immune
from attack on the ground that it infringes the
equality clause under Art. 14, and the tax was also
bald to be violative of Art. 19 (1) (f), because it was
silent as to the machinery _and procedure to be
followed in making the assessment leaving to the
executive to evolve the requisite machinery and
procedure thus treating the whole thing as purely
administrative in character and ignoring that the
assessment on a person or property is quasi-judicial
in character. It was also held that a ta~ of Rs. 2
was unreasonable as it was confiscatory in effect.
The main ground on which the law was held to be
au infringement of Art. 19 (1) (f) was the procedure
or the want of procedure for imposing taxes and
therefore its being opposed to rules of natural
justioe. Here again the vice was in the A ct and
not in any misinterpretation of it. No donbt the
a.mount of the tax imposed was also held to be
uureasona.ble because it was in effect confiscatory
but this is not a matter which is necessary in the
present case to go into as the question whether
Art. 19 (l) applies to taxing laws or not w11.s not
debated by the parties before us. On the main
(I)
(1961) 3 S.C.R. 77.
1961
Smt. Ujjom B4i
v.
St,ee nf Uttar
PrtlrUsh
Kapur J.
874
•.
Smt. Ujjam Bai
Stale <'f Uttar
Pra<hsh
KapurJ.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963]
contention as to the applicability of Art. 32 these
were the submissions of the learned AttorneyGeneral.
A review of these cases shows that ( 1) the law
which is ultra vireR either because of the legis)a.
tive incompetence or its contravention of some
constitutional inhibition is .a non-existing law and
any action taken thereunder, quasi.judicial or
otherwise, would be contravention of Art. Ill (I)
(f) and (g) and the result will be no different if it
is a colourable piece of legislation; (2} where the
proceedings are repugnant to the rules of natural
justice the right guaranteed under Art. 19 (1) (f)
and (g) are infringed; (3) the consequence is the
same where assessment is made by an authority
which has no jurisdiction to impose the tax nnd (4)
if an administrative tribunal acting quasi-judicially
misconstrues a provision which it has jurisdiction
to construe and therefore imposes a tax infringement of Art. 19 ( 1) (g) would result according to
Kailash Nath' s case (') but there is no such infringe·
ment according to cases which the learned Additional ~olicitor General relied upon and which have
been discussed above. The reason why the deci·
sion in the latter cases is correct and the decision
in Kailash Nath' s case (1) is not have already been
given a.nd it is unnecessary to repeat them.
Mr. Palkhivala who intervened in C. M. P.
1496/61 in support of the petition in the main
argued the question whether a misconstruction of
a taxing statute can involve the violation of a fundamental right under Art. 19 ( 1) (g). His contention
was that an erroneous construction which result
in transgression of constitutional limits would vio late Art. (19) (1) (!!)and that the difference between
jurisdictional and non-jurisdictional error was
immaterial and that a misconstruction of a statute
can violate the right to trade and he relied upon
a
(I) A.I.R. 1957 S.C. 7>0.
I S.O.R.
SUPREME OOURT REPORTS
875
M/s. Mohanlal Hargovind Das v. The State of Madhya Pradesh C) which was a case of inter-State
sale and which has already been discussed. He
also relied upon the decision in R. S. Ram Jawaya
Kapur v. The State of Punjab (2 ) • . In that case it
was held that the acts of the Executive even if
deemed to be sanctioned by the legislature can be
declared void if they infringe any of the fundamental rights but no question of judicial determination
by quasi-judicial tribunal arose there. Similarly
in M/s. RamNarain Sons Ltd. v. Asstt. Commissioner
of Sales tax (a) the question raised was of the
meaning and scope of the proviso to Art. 286 \2)
and therefore the question was one of inter-State
sales which no statute could authorise to tmn into
intra-State sale by a judicial decision.
It was argued before us that the decision of a
tribunal acting quasi-judicially op~rates as res judicata and further that the judgment of the High
Court of Allahabad when it was moved by the petitioner under Art. 226 of the Consjtution against
the order of assessment passed on the ground of
misconstruction of the notification of December
14, 1957 also opera.tos as res judicata as the appeal
against that order has been withdrawn. The High
Court rejected the petition under Art. 227 firstly
on the ground that there was an alternative remedy
of getting the error corrected by way of appeal and
secondly the High Court said:"We have, however, heard the learned
counsel for the petitioner on merits also, but
we a.re not satisfied that the interpretation
put upon this notification by the Sales Tax
Officer contains any obvious error in it. The
circumstance-a make the interpretation advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner
unlikely. It is admitted that even hand-made
biris have been subject to Sales tax: since long
ll) [19551 2 S.C.R. 509.
(21 [19S5] 2 S.C.R. 225.
(3) (I95S) 2 s.c.a. of-98.
1961
Smt. Ujjam Bai
v.
Stale of Uttar
Pradesh
Kapur J.
876
1962
Sml. Ujj11m Bai
v.
Bta11 of Uttar
l'Tod,.,sh
Kapur J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963]
before the date of the issue of the above
notification. The object of passing the Additional Duties of Excise (Goods of Special Importance) Central Act, No. 58 of 1957 was to
le1•y an additional excise duty on certain important articles and with the concurrence of
the State Legislature to abolish Sales tax on
those articles. According to the argument of
the learned counsel for the petitioner during
the period 14th December, 1957 to June 30,
1958, the petitioner was liable neither to payment of excise duty nor to payment of sales
tax. We do not know why there should have
been such an exemption. The lanimage of
the notificatiou might well be read as meaning that the notification is to apply only to
those goods on which an additional Central
excise duty had been levied and paid."
It is unnece~sary to decide this questiou in
this case.
It was next argued that the Sales tax Authorities are all officers of the State charged with the
function of levy and collection of taxes which is
essentially administrative and that when they act as
quasi-judicial tribunals that function is only incidental to the discharge of their administrative function
and therefore the assessment order of December 20,
1958, was an executive order and falls within
Art.19(l)(g). Reference was made to BidiSupply Go.,
v. The Union of lndi:a ( 1 ) (at pp. 271 and 277), a
case under s. 5(7-A) of the Income tax Act. At page
271 the definition of the word "State" is set out and
at p. 277 Das, C. J., said that the "State" includ•s
its Income tax Department. There is no dispute
that the Sales tax Department is a department of
the State ~nd is included within the wnrd "State"
but the question is what is the nature and quality of
the determination made by a Sa.Jes Tax Officer
(I) (1956) S.C.R. 257, 271, 277.
l S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
877
when he is performing judidal or quasi-judicial
functions. The argument of 1he learned Attorney
General comes to this that even though in the
perform1.nce of quasi-judioial functions the Taxing
Officer may have many of the trappings of a court
still he is not a court and therefore the decision of
the taxing authority in the present case was not
entitled to the protection which an erroneous decision
of a proper court has; Ohaparala Krishna Brahman
v. Oururu Govardhaiah (1) where it was held that
the Income tax Officer is not a court within s.195 of
the Criminal Procedure Code was cited in support
of the contention that the taxing authority in the
present case was not a court. So also Bdl Co. of
Australia Ltd. v. The Federal Commissioner of
Taxation ( 2) 1 where it was held that a Board of
Revenue created by the Income tax Assessment
Act to review the decision of Commissioner of
Income tax is not a court exercising the judicial
powers of the Commonwealth. At page 298 Lord
Sankey. L. 0., observed:
"An administrative tribunal may act judicially, but still remain an administrative
tribunal as distinguished from a Court,
strictly so called. Mere externals do
not make a direction to an administrative
officer by an ad hoc tribunal an exercise
by a court of judicial power".
It was also observed in that case that there
are tribunals with many of the trappings of"' court,
which nevertheless are not courts in the strict
sense exercising judicial power. There is no gainsaying that Sales tax Officer is not a court even
though he may have many of the trappings of a
court including the power to summon witnesses,
receive evidence on oath and making judicial
determinations. In the strict sense of the term he
is not a oourt exercising judicial power; but the
(I) A.I.R. 1:>54 Mad. 822.
(2) (1931) A. C. 275, 298.
1962
Sml Ujj;m Bai
v.
Slota of Utlar
Prad,sh
Kapur J.
-
II
878
196Y
Smt. l.Jjj;.im Bai
v.
St•l~ of Utlar
Pradish
Kapur J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963)
question for decision in the present case is not
whether he is a Court or not but whether the
determination made by him in regard to the exemption available to the petitioners on the sale of
biris was a decision made by a quasi-judicial authority in the exercise of its statutory powers and
within its jurisdiction and therefore not an administrative act.
The rharacteristic of an administrative tribunal is that it has no ascertainable standards. It
only follows policy and expediency which being
subjective consideration~ are what a tribunal
makes them. An administrative tribunal acting
as an administrative tribunal and acting as a.
judicial tribunal may be distinguished thus:
"Ordinarily 'administrative' tribunals
need not act on legal evidence at all, but only
on such considerations as they see fit. A
statute requiring such evidence to be received
prevents a tribunal's making up its mind until
it has given thio evidence a chance to weigh
with it. But it is a fallacy to assume that
the tribnnal is thereby limited to acting on
that evidence. If it is an 'administrative'
tribm~al it must still be iroverned by policy
and expendiency until it has heard the evidence, but the evidence need not influence its
policy any further than it sees fit. A contrary view would involve the decision's being
dictated by the evidence, not by policy and
expediency; but if certain evidence with it a
right to a particular decision, that decision
would be a decision on legal rights; so the
tribunal would be administering •justice' and
would be exercising judicial not •administrative". ((1933) L. Q. R. 424).
There are decisions of thi~ court in which certain
1 S. C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
879
tribune.ls have been held judicial bodies; Bharat
Bank Ltd., Delhi v. Employees of the Bharat Banh
LtiJ,. (') Provinoe of Bombay
v. Kusaldas
S. Advani ( 2 ) where Das, J., (as he then was)
observed at p. 725:
"that if a statutory authority has power
· to do any aot which will prejudicially a.ffect
the subject then, although there are not two
parties apart from the a:uthority and the
contest between the authority proposing to do
the act and the subject opposing it, the final
determination of the authority will yet be a
quasi-judicial act provided the authority is
required by the statute to a.ct judicially".
See also N agendra Nath Bora v. The Commissioner
of Hills Division ch Appeals, Assam:(a).
It is unnecessary again to examine in detail
the provisions of the Act to determine the character of the Sales tax Officer when he takes assessment proceedings for they have already been
referred to. They are all characteristics of judicial
or quasi-judicial process and would clothe the Sales
tax Officer making assessment orders with judicial
or quasi-judicial' character. Indeed, because the
order of asseSBment was judicial or quasi-judicial
the petitioner filed in the High Court a petition for
oertiorari and against. that order an appeal
under Art. 136 as also a. petition for certiorari
under Art. 32. Taking the nature of the determination by the Sales tax Officer in the instant case it
cannot be said that he is purely a.n administrative
authority or the order passed by him is an executive order; on the contrary when he is determining
the a.mount of tax payable by a dealer, he is acting
in a. quasi-judicial ca.pa.city.
(1)
(1950) S.C.R 459, 463.
(2) (-19508.C.R. 621, 725.
(3) (1958) s.c.R. 1240, 1257, 1258.
1962
Sml, Ujjom Bai
...
Stall of Ultor
Prilrlesh
Kopur J.
880
l!JfJZ
,Smt. UJi~m Bai
v.
State rJj Uttar
P11desh
lrtJftur J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963]
Mr. Chari, intervening on behalf oft.he State
of Bibar, submitted that in Art. 12 the judicial
branch of the State was not included in the definition of t.he word "State" and the words "other
bodies" there <lid not comprise a tribunal having
jurisdiction to decide judicially and its decisions
could not be challenged by way of a petition under
Art. 32 of the Constitution. In view of my decision that a quasi-judicial order of the Sales tax
Officer is not challengeable by proceedings under
Art. 32, I do not think it necessary to decide the
wider question whether the d<'finition of the word
"State" as given in Art. 12 comprises the judiciar
department of the State or not.
In view of the decision as to the correctness
of the decision in Kailash Nath's case (I). it is not
necessary in this case to go into the conectness
or otherwise of the order of the Sales tax Officl)r.
The petition under Article 32 therefore fails and is
dismissed. There will be no orders as to cvsts.
(G. M. P. No. 1349of1961)
KAPUR, J.-11-Iessrs. 11-Iohanlal Hargovind Das,
the assessee firm had filed an appeal on a certificate.
of the All aha bad High Court against the order of
the Cou1 t dismissing their petition under Art. 226
of .the Conbtitution challenging the imposition of
the sales tax, on the ground that another remedy
was available. The appeal against that order was
dismissed by this Court for non-prosecution on
February 20, 1961. Against that order of dismissal
the assessee firm has filed an application for restoration on the ground that it had been advised that
in view of the rule having been issued under Art. 32
of the Constitution wherein the contentions were the
same as raised in the appeal against the order
undor Art. 226 it was unnecessary to prosecute the
appeal. It also prayed for condonation of delay in
filing the application for restoration.
\I) A. I. R. (1957 J S.C, /90.
1 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
881
No sufficient ca.use has been made out for
allowing the application for restoration. The
assessee firm deliberately allowed the appeal, which
was pending in this Court, to be dismissed for non.
prosecution and after deliberately taking that step
it cannot be allowed to get the dismissq.l set aside
on the ground of wrong advice. The application
for restoration is therefore dismissed with costs.
1962
Smt. Ujiam Bai
v.
Slute tf Uttar
P1ad1sh
Kapw J.
SARKAR, J.-I have had the advantage of
reading the judgments just delivered by my brothers
Das and Kapur and I am in agreement with them.
S1J1karJ.
SuBBA RAO, J.-I have carefully gone through
the judgment prepared by my learned brother
Kapur, J. I am unable to agree. The facts have
been fully stated in his judgment and it is therefore
not necessary to cover the ground over again.
Subha Rao J,
This larger Bench has been constituted to
canvass the correctness of the decision in Kailash
Nath v. State of Uttar Pradesh (1). After hearing
the elaborate arguments of learned counsel, I am
convinced that no case has been made out to take
a different view.
Learned Attorney General seeks to sustain
the correctness of the said decision. He broadly
contends that this Court is the constitutional
protector of the fundamental rights enshrined in
the Constitution, that every person whose fundamental right is infringed has a guaranteed right to
approach this Court for its enforcement, and that
it is not permissibe to whittle down that jurisdiction with the aid of doctrines evolved by courts
for other purposes. He argues that in the present
case an executive authority functioning under the
Uttar .Pradesh Sales Tax Act, 1948 (Act XV of
1948), hereinafter called the Act, made a clearly
erroneous order imposing tax on exempted goods,
(I) A.I.R. 1957 S.C. 790.
882
1962
Smt. Ujjam Bti
v.
State of Uttdr
Prade•h
Subia Rao J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963]
namely, bidis, and that it is a clear infringement ot
the fundamental right of the petitioner to carry on
business in bidis. Whenever such a right is infrin·
ged, the argument proceeds, by a State actionhere we are only concerned with State action-it is
the duty of this Court to give the appropriate
relief and not to refuse to do so on any extraneous
considerations.
The Additional Solicitor General appearing
for the State does not admit this legal position.
He says that the Act is a reasonable restriction on
the petitioner's right to carry on business in · bidis,
that thereunder a Sales-Tax Officer has jurisdiction
to decide, rightly or wrongly, whether bidis are
exempted from sales-tax, and that, therefore, his
order made with jurisdiction cannot possibly
infringe the fundamental rights of the petitioner.
Mr. Chari, who appears for the intervener,
while supporting the argument of learned Solicitor
General emphasizes the point that the fundamental
rights enshrined in Art. 19( I l(g) of the Constitution
is only against State action, that the definition of
•'State" in Art. 12 thereof excludes all authorities
exerc:ising judicial power, that the sales-tax authority, in making the a.ssessment in exercising judicial
power, and that, therefore, no writ can be issued
by this Court against the said authority.
Before attempting to answer the questions
raised, it is relevant and convenient to ascertain
precisely the position of the fundamental right.e
under the Constitution and the scope of the jurisdiction of this Court in enforcing those rights.
Fundamental rights are enshrined in Part III
of the Constitution as the paramount rights of the
people. Article 13(2) prohibits the State from
making any law which takes away 01! abridges the
rights conferred by the said Part and decl,area that
1 s.c.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
883
any law made in contravention of this clause shall.
to the extent of the contravention, be void. These
rights may be broadly stated to relate to ( i) right
to equality-Arts. 14 to 18, (ii) right to freedomAtts. 19 to 22, (iii} right against exploitationArts. 23 and 24, (iv) right to freedom of religionArts. 25 to 28, (v) cultural and educational rightsArts. 29 and 30, (vi) right to property--Arts. 31
and 31A, and (vii) right to constitutional remediesArts. 32 to 35. The~e are the inalienable rights of
the people of this country-some of them of noncitizens also-believed to be necessary for the
development of human personality ; they are
essential for working out one's way of life. In
theory these rights are reserved to the people after
the delegation of the other rights by them to the
institutions of Government created by the Constitution, which expresses their will : see observations of Patanjali Sastri, J., as he then was, in A.K.
Gopalan v. State of Madras(1). In State of Madras
v. Shrimati Champakam Dorairajan (2) the
same idea was more forcibly restated thus:
The chapter of Fundamental Rights is
sacrosanct and not liable to be abridged by
any legislative or Executive Act or order,
except to the extent provided in the appropriate article in Part III.
The directive
principles of State Policy have to conform to
and run as subsidiary to the Chapter of
Fundamental Rights."
In the context of fundamental rights, an important
principle should be borne in mind, namely, that the
English idea of legislative supremacy is foreign to
our Constitution.
As this Court pointed out
in A. K. Gopalan's case (l) the Constitution
of
has not accepted the English doctrine
absolute supremacy of Parliament in matters of
legislation, Therefore, every institution, be it the
'
1
(1) (19~0) S.C.R. 88.
(2) (1951) S.C.R. 525, 531.
196Z
Smt. Ujjam Bai
y,
Btate of Uttar
Pradesh
--
Subb1J Rao J.
884
1961
8mt. Ujjam Bci
v.
Stat• of Utrar
Pr.(l,sh
Subba R1Jo J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963)
Executive, the Legislature of the Judiciary, can
only function in exercise of the powers conferred
on it that is, the Constitution is the paramount
law. As the Constitution declares the fundamental
rights and also prescribes the restrictions that oan
be imposed thereon, no institution can overstep the
limits, directly or indirectly, by encroaching upon
the said rights.
But a mere declaration of the fundamental
rights would not be enough, and it was necessary
to evolve a machinery to enforce them. 80 our
Constitution, entrusted the duty of enforcing them
to the Supreme Court, the highest judicial authority
in the country. This Court has no more important
function than to preserve the inviolable fundamental rights of the people ; for, the fathers of the
Constitution, in their fullest confidence, have entrusted them to the care of this Court and given
to it all the institutional conditions necessary to
exercise its jurisdiction in that regard without fear
or favour. The task is delicate and sometimes
difficult ; but this Court has to discharge it to the
best of its ability and not to abdicate it on the
fallacious ground of inability or inconvenience.
It must be borne in mind that our Constitution in
effect promises to usher in a welfare State for our
country ; and in such a state the Legislature has
necessarily to create innumerable administrative
tribunals, and entrust them with multifarious
functions. They will have powers to interfere with
every aspect of human activity. If their existence
is necessary for the progress of our country, the
abuse of power by them may bring about an
authoritarian or totalitarian state. The existence
of the aforesaid power in this Court and the
exercise of the same effectively when the oroaRion
arises is a necessary safeguard against the abuse
of tho power by the administrative trilmnal~.
Tho scope of the power of this Court under
Art. 32 of the Constitution has l.icen expounded by
I S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
885
this Court on many occasions.
The decisions
not only laid down the amplitude of the power
but also the mode of exercising that power to meet
the different situationg that might present
them~elves
to
this
C)urt.
In
Ramesh
Thappar v. State of-MadraB
(1) this Court
declared that under
the Constitution the
Supreme Court constituted as the protector
guarantor of fundamental rights, and it cannot,
consistently with the responsibility so laid upon it,
refuse to entertain applications seeking protection
against infringement of such rights, although such
applications are made to the Court in the first
instance without resort. to a High Court having
concurrent jurisdiction in the matter. This Court
again in Rashi,d Ahmad v. The Municipal Board,
T(airana (2 ) pointed out that the powers given
to this Court under Art. 32 of the Constitution
are much wider and are not confined to issuing
prerogative writs only. This Court further elucida.
ted the scope of the jurisdiction in T. C. Basappa
v. T. Nagappa (3 ), wherein Mukberjea, J., speaking
for the Court defined the scope of the power thus:
"In view of the express provisions in our
Constitution we need not now look back to
the early history or the procedural technicalities of these writs in English law, nor feel oppressed by any difference or change of opinion
expressAd in particular cases by English
Judges."
Thi." Court again elaborated the scope of its power
under that Article in Kavalappara Kottarathil
Koch1tn1u: Moopil Nayar v. The State of Madras, 4 ).
Das, C. J., after reviewing the earlier case law on
the subject observed:
"Further, even if the existence of other
a~lequate Jegal remedy may be taken into oons1deration by the High Court in deciding
(I) (1950) S.C.R. 59~.
(2) (1950) S.C.R 566.
(3) (1955) I S.C.R. 250, 256. (4) (1959) Sup11 2 SC. R. 316, 325. 337,
1961
Smt. U}iam B11i
••
State of Uttar
Prad,sh
Subba Rao J.
886
1962
Smt. Ujjom BtJi
v.
Stat1 of U1tar
P1ad1sh
Suota Rao J.
SUPREME OOURT REPORTS [1963]
whether it should issue any of th& prerogative
writs on an application under Art. 226 of the
Constitution, as to which we say nothing
now-this Court cannot, on a similar ground,
decline to entertain a petition under Art. 32,
for the right to move this Court by appropriate proceedings for the enforcement of the
rights conferred by Part III of the Constitution is itself a guaranteed right."
In that case it was pressed upon this Court to hold
that in exercise of its power under Art. 32 of the
Constitution, this Court could not embark upon an
enquiry into disputed questions of fact, and various
inconveniences were pointed out if it was otherwise.
After conaidering the cases cited in support of that
contention, this Court came to the conclusion that
it would fail in its duty as the custodian and protector of fundamental rights if it was to decline to
entertain a petition under Art. 32 simply because
it involved the determination of disputed questions
of fact. When it was pointed out that if that view
was adopted, it might not be possible for this Court
to decide questions of fact on affidavits, the learned
Chief Justice observed:
"As we have already said, it is possible
very often to decide questions of fact on affi.
davits. If the petitions and the affidavites
in support thereof are not convincing and the
court is not aatisfied that the petitioner has
established his fundamental right or any
breach thereof, the court may dismiBB the
petition on the ground that the petitioner has
not discharged the onus that. lay on him. The
court may, in some appropriate cases, be incli·
ned to give an opportunity to the parties to
establish their respective cases by filing further affidavits or by issuing a commission or
even by ~etting the application down for trial
1 S. C. R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
887
on evidence, as has often been done on the
origina.1 sides of the High Courts of Bombay
and Calcutta, or by adopting some other appropriate procedure. Such occasions will be
rare indeed and such rare cases should not, in
our opinion, be regarded as a cogent reason
for refusing to entertain the petition under
Art. 32 on the ground that it involves disputed questions of fact.''
Finally,· this Court also held that in appropriate
oases it had the power, in its discretion, to frame
writs or orders suitable to the exigencies created by
enactments and that where the occasion so required
to make ev~n a declaratory order with consequential relief. In ·short, this decision recognized the
comprehensive jurisdiction of this Court under
Art. 32 of the Constitutio 1 and gave it full effect
without putting any artificial limitations t.hereon.
But in Daryao v. State of U. P. (1). this Court applied the doctrine of res judicata and held that the
petitioners in that case had no fundamental right,
as their right on merits was denied by the High
Court in a petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution and that as no appeal was filed therefrom, it
has become final. But the learned Judges carefully
circumscribed the limits of the doctrine in its application to a petition under Art. 32. Gajendtagadkar,J.,
speaking for the Court observed:
''If the petition filed in the High Court under
Art. 226 is dismissed not on the merits but becausei of the laches of the party applying for the
writ or because it is held that the party had an
alternative remedy available to it, then the
dismissal of the writ petition would not constitute a bar to a subsequent p~titfon under
Art. 32 except in cases where and if the facts
thus found by the High Court may themselves
be relevant even under Art. 3·~. If a writ
{1) (1962) 1 S,C.R. 574.
1962
Smt. Ujj"m B.ri
II•
State of Utt4r
P1ad1~h
Subba Ra1 J.
888
1952
Sml. Ujjam Bai
V,
Stat, oj Uttar
Pr"d~sh
Sulba Hao J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1963]
p3tition is dismissed in limine and an order is
pronounced in that behalf, whether or not the
dismissal would constitute a bar would depend
upon the nature of the order. If the order is
on the merits it would be a bar; if the order
shows that the dismissal was for the reason
that the petitioner was guilty of !aches or that
he had an alternative remedy it would not be
a bar, except in cases which we have already
ir.dicated. If the petition is dismissed in
limine without passing a speaking order then
such dismissed cannot be treated as creating
a bar of res judiwta. It is true that, prima
facie, dismissal in limine even without passing
a speaking order in that behalf may strongly
suggest that the Court took the view that
there was no substance in the petition at all;
but in the absence of a speaking order it
would not be easy to decide what factors
weighed in the mind of the Court and th:\t
makes it difficult and unsafe to hold that such
a summary dismissal is a dismissal on merits
and as such constitutes a bar of res judicaUJ
against a similar petition filed under Art. 32.
If the petition is dismissed as withdrawn it
cannot be a bar to a subsequent petition under
Art. 32, because in such a case there has been
no decision on the merits by the Con rt."
Though this decision applies the doctrine of res
judicata, the aforesaid observations indicate the
anxiety of the Court to confine it wit.bin the specified limits and to prevent nny attempt to overstep
the said limits. Shortly stated it is settled law that
Art. 32 confers a wide jurisdiction on this Court to
enforce the fundamental rights, that the right to
enforce a fundamental right is itself a fundamental
right, and that it is the duty of this Court to entertain an application and tr:i decide it on merits whenever a party approaches it to decide whether he has
1 s.c.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
889
a fundamental right or if so whether it has been
infringed irrespective of the fact whether the question raised involves a question of law or depends
upon questions of fact. The doctrine of res judicata
applied by this Court does not detract from the
amplitude of the jurisdiction, but only negatives
the right of a petitioner on the gr0und that a competent court has given a final decisiou against him
in respect of the right claimed.
In this case a further attempt is made on be·
half of the State to rnstrict the scope of the Court's
jurisdiction. Uninfluenced by judicial decisions,
let us approach the question on principle. An
illustration arii::ing on the fact;s of the present case
will highlight the point to be decided. A citizen
of India is doing business in bidis. He has a fundamental right to carry on that business. The State
Legislature enacts the Sales Tax Act imposing a
tax on the turnover and on the sales of various
goods, but gives certain exemptions. It expressly
declares that no tax-shall be levied on the exempted
goods. The said law is a reasonable restriction on
the petitioner's fundamental right to carry on the
business in bidis. Now on a true construction of the
relevant provisions of the Act, no tax is leviable on
bidis. But on a wrong construction of the relevant
provisions of the Act, the Sales-tax Officer imposes
a tax on the turnover of the petitioner relating to
the said bidis. He files successive statutory appeals
to the hierarchy of tribunals but without sucess.
The result is that he is asked to pay tax in respect
of the business of bidies exempted under the Act.
The imppsition of the said illegal tax on the turnover of bidfs is certainly an infringement of his fundamental right. He comes to this Court and prays
that his fundamental right may be enforced against
the Sales-tax Officer. The Officer says, ''It may be
true that my order is wrong; it may also be that the
Supreme Court may hold that my construction
lH!I
Smt. Ujjam Bai
v.
Sue ~1 Uit~r
Prwsia
SuUa Ra~ J.
--•
890
IHI
..
Swu. lJJjam Boi
,.,...,k
s•u.".. "·
SI-'< •f uu.,
SUPREME COURT REl>ORTS [1963]
of the section as accepted by the highest
tribunal is perverse; still, as under the Act
I have got the power to decide rightly or wrongly,
my order though illegal operates as a reasonable
restriction on the petitioner's fundamental right to
carry on business." This argument, in my view,
if accepted, would in effect make the wrong order
of the Sales-tax Officer binding on the Supreme
Court, or to state it differently, a fundamental
right can be defeated by a wrong order of an executive officer, and this Court would become a help·
less spectator abdicating its functions in favour of
the subordinate officer in the Sales-tax Depart·
ment. The Constitution says in effect that neither
the Parliament nor the Executive ran infringe the
fundamental rights of the citizens, and if they do,
the person affected has a guaranteed right to approach this Court, and this Court has a duty to
enforce it; but the Executive authority says,
"I have a right to decide wrongly and, there·
fore the Supreme Court cannot enforce the
fundamental right". There is nothing in the Constitution which permits such an extraordinary
position. It cannot be a correct interpretation of the provisions of the
Constitution
if it enables any authority to subvert the paramount
power conferred on the Supreme Court.
It is conceded that if the law is invalid, or if
the officer acts with inherent want of jurisdiction,
the petitioner's fundamental right can be enforced.
It is said that if a valid law confers jurisdiction on
the officer to decide rightly or wrongly, the petitioner ha.a no fundamental right. What is the ha.sis
for this principle ? None is discernible in the provisions of the Constitution. There is no provision
which enables the Legislature to make an order of
an executive authority final so as to deprive the
Supreme Court of its jurisdiction under Art, 32 of
the Constitution.
1 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPOR'rS
891
But the finality of the order is sought to be
sustained on the principle of re,s judicata. It is
argued that the Sales-tax Tribunals a.re judicial
tribunals in the sence they a.re courts, and, therefore
their final decisions would operate as res judicata
on the principle enunciated 1:>y this Court in Daryao's
case (1). Can it be said tha.t Sales-tax authorities
under the Act are judicial tribunals in the sense
they are courts? In a Welfare Sta.te the Governments is called upon to discharge multifarious
duties affecting every aspect of human activity. This
extension of the governmental activity necessitated
the entrusting of many executive authorities with
power to -Oecide rights of parties. They are really instrumentalities of the executive designed to function
in the discharge of their duties adopting, a.s far as
poBBible, the principles of judicial procedure.
Nonetheless, they are onl.v executive bodies. They
may have the trappings of a court, but the officers
manning the same have neither the training nor the
institutional conditions of a judicial officer. Every
Act designed to further the social and economic progress of our country or to raise taxes, constituted
some tribunal for deciding disputes arising thereunder, such as income-tax authorities, Sale-tax
authorities, town planning authorities, regional
transport authorities, etc. A scrutiny of the provisions of the U. P. Sales-tax Act with which we are
now concerned, shows that the authorities constituted thereunder a.re only such administrative
tribunals as mentioned above. The preamble to
the Act shows that it was enacted to provide for
the levy of tax on the sa.le of goods in UttarPradesh. The Act imposes a tax on the turnover
of sa.les of certain commodities and provides a
machinery for the levy, assessment and collection
of the said tax. Under the Act the State Government is authorized to appoint 1Jertain assessing
authorities. It provides for an appeal against the
order of the assessing authority and for a revision in
(1) (1912) 1
s.c.a. 57t.
S111t. Ujj•"' :A•i
v.
Bt•ts •f U(tar
Prsus1'
SuHs
'll•• J.
892
1961
Srnl- C!jj1Jm 81i
v.
Si.it• of U tta'
PrttdeJh
Su&ho Rio J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1963]
some cases and a reference to the High Courts in others.
The State Government is also authorized to appoint
a hierarchy of authoriti<'s or trilmnals for deciding
the appeals or revisions. The ll..>oessing authorities
are admittedly the officers of the Sales-tax Department and there is nothing in the Aot to indicate
that either the assessing authority or the appellate
authority need possess any legal qualification. It
is true that legal qu11.lification is prescribed for the
revising authority, but that does not make him a.
court or make the inferior tribunals courts. The
said authorities have to follow certain principles of
natural justice, but that doPs not make them courts.
The scheme of the Act clearly shows that the saleta.x authorities appointed under the Act, following
the principles of natural justice, ascertain the turnover of an assessee and impose the tax. The
hierarchy of tribunals are intended to safeguard the
interest of the assessees as well as the State by correcting wrong orders. The fact that, following the
analogy of the Income-tax Act, at the instance of
the party aggrieved a. reference can be made by the
reviewing authority to the High Court on a question of law shows only that the help of the High
Court can be requisitioned only to elucidate questions of law, but the High Court has no power to
make final orders, but on receipt of the judgments
of the High Court, the revising authority shall make
an order in conformity with such judgment.
Now let us consider the decisions cited at the
:Bar which would throw some light on the nature of
such tribunals. In considering whether the Board
of review created by s. 41 of the Federal InoomeTax Assessment Act, 1922-25 w1is a judicial authority, the Judicial Committee in Shell Company of
Australia Limited v. Federal Commission of Taxation(') observed.
"The authorities are clear to show that
there are tribunals with many of the trappings
ll) (1930) A. C. 275, 296, 298.
1 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
893
of a Court which, nevertheless, are not Courts
in the strict sense of exercising judicial
power."
The Judicial Committee further observed:
"An administrative tribunal may act
judicially, but still remain an administrative
tribunal as distinguished from a Court,
strictly so-called. Mere externals do not
make a direction to an administrative
officer by and ad hoc tribunal an exercise
by a Court of judicial power."
The Allahabad High Court in Messrs Kamlapat Moti
Lal v. Commissioner of Income Tax, U. P. (1 ) held
that the Incoma-tax authorities are not courts
and, thl)reforn, their decisions cannot operat,e as res
judicata. Malik, C. J., observed:
"The income-tax authorities rannot be
treated as Courts deciding a disputed poi11t,
except for the purposes mentioned ins. 37,
and further there is no other party before
them and there are no pleadings. As haEI been
said by Lord Herschell in Boulter v. Kent
Justices (2 ),''
"There is no truth, no lis, no controversy
inter partes, and no decision in favour of one
of them aad against the other, unless, indeed,
the entire public are regarded as the other
party''.
The Income-tax authorities are mainly concerned with finding out the assessable income for
the year and not with deciding any question
of title. But to arrive at that income they
have at times to decide certain general questions which might affect the determination of
the assessable income not only in the year in
question but also in subsequent years ...•••...
( 1) A.I.R. 1950 All. 249, 251.
~2)
(1897) A.C. 556.
196'
Smt. Ujjam Bot
v.
Slal1 •f 1Jtl•r
Pradesh
Subba Rao J.
894
1961
S11d. Ujj• l•i
••
SUu •/UU•r
- ~·""'
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963)
An assessment is inherently of a pauing
nat~re .and i~ cannot provide
an estoppel by
rea Judicata m later years by reson of a matter
?eing taken in to account or not being taken
mto account by the Income-tax Officer in an
earlier year of asseRSment."
An instructive discussion on the question whether
an Income-tax Officer is a court within the meaning
of s. 195 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
is found in Krishna Brahman v. Gornrdhanaiah ( 1),
where Balakrishaa Ayyar, J., after ·considering
the case Jaw on the subject and the provisions
of the Income-tax Act, held that an income-tax
officer was not a "court". The learned Judge
did not think that the sdoptation of norms of
judicial procedure or the fact that appeals were
provided for, was sufficient to make them courts.
The learned Judge obeerved:
"When exercising his powers under Chapter IV of the Act, it seems to me, that the
Income-tax Officer is acting in a purely administrative capacity. It is his duty to ascertain
what the income of the particular individual
is and what amount of tax he ehould be required to pay. There is therefore no '!is' whatever before him."
The same reasoning would equally apply to
sales· tax authorities. This Court in Bidi Supply Go.
v. The Union of lndia(1), speaking through Das, C.J.,
set aside the order of an Income-tax Officer and in
doing so observed :
"Here, 'the State' which includes its
Income-tax Department has by an illegal
order denied to the petitioner, as compared
with other Bidi merchants who are similarly
situate, equality before the law or the equal
protection of the laws and the petitioner can
legitimately complain of an infraction of his
fundamental right under article 14 of th4'
Constitution."
\1) ,\.Lll. l!IM Med. 822. &a~.
1 S. C. R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
895
Though this cannot be called a direct decision
on the question raised in the present case, it indicates that this Court treated the Income-tax
Officer as a department of the executive branch of
the Government. This Court again in GUllapalli
Nageswara Rao v. S'tate of Andhra Pradesh (1)
pointed out the distinction between a quasi-judicial act of an Executive authority and the judicial
aot of a court thus:
"The concept of a quasi-judicial act
implies that the act is not wholly judicial;
it describes only a duty cast on the executive body or authority to conform to norms of
judicial procedure in performing some acts
in exercise of its executive powers."
It is, therefore, clear that administrative tribunal
cannot be equated with courts. They are designed
to discharge functions in the exercise or the executive power of the State, and the mere fact that the
relevant statutes, with a view of safeguard the
interest of the people, direct them to dispose of
matters commin!t before them following the principles of natural justice and by adopting the same
well-known trappings of judicial procedure, does
not make them any the less the executive orgna.s
of the State. It is not possible to apply the principle of res judicata to the orders of such tribunals,
for obviously s. l l of the Code of Civil Procedure
does not apply to such orders, and the genera.I priciple of res judicat,a de'hors tha,t provision has
never been applied to such orders. It is true
that some statutes expressly or by necessary
implication oust the jurisdiction of Civil Courts in
respect of certain matters but such exclusion cannot affect the extraordinary powers or superior
courts conferred under Arts. 226, 227 and 32 of
the Constitution.
(1) [1959] Supp. I S.C.R. 319, 3~3-3st.
l.981
Sm1. Ujj,,,,, Bti~
v.
Slat. ej.Utt1r
Prritfi.Jlt,
Subb1 RaoJ.
896
lllJ
Sm.I. Ujj-. B 2i
••
Stal• •f UUsr
l'r•thilt
S u66eR•1J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963)
'l'here is a simpler answer to the plea of rtBIn the present case the Sales.tax authorities deoided thn ca.so against the petitioners .
The jJetitioners are seeking tho help of this Court
under Art.32 of the Constitution to enforce their
fundamental rights on the ground that he said
orde;: infringes their rights. To put it differently,
the petitioners by this application question the
orders of the Sales-tax authority. How is it possible to contend that the order which is now sought
to be quashed can operate as res-judicata precluding this Court from questionin_g its correctness ?
The prinoiple underlying the doctrine of res judicata
is that no one shall be vexed twice on the same
matter. This implies that there should be two
proceedings,and that in a former proceeding in a
court of competent jurisdiction, an issue has been
finally decided inter partes and therefore the same
cannot be reagitated in a subsequent proceeding.
On the said principle the impugned order itself
cannot obviously be relied upon to sustain the plea
cf res-judicata.
The argument ab-inronvenienti d0es not appeal
to me. As it is the duty of this Oourt to enforce
a fundamental right of a party if any authority
has infringed his right, considerations based upon
inconvenience are of no relevance. It is suggested that if the jurisdiction of this Court is not
restricted in the manner indicated, this Court will
be flooded with innumerable petitions. A part
from the fact that this is not a relevant circumstance, a liberal interpretation of Art. 32 has not
had that effect during the ten year8 of this Court's
existence, and I do not see any justification for
such an a.pprehension in the future. It is further
said that if a wider interpn.tation is given namely,
that if this Court has to aacertain in each ease
whether a statutory authority has infringed a.
judicata.
l S.C.B..
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
897
fnnda.mental right or not, it wiil have to decide
complicated questions of fa.ct involving ora.l and
documentary evidence, and the machinery provided under Art. :i2 of the Constitution is not adequate to discharge that duty satisfactory. This again
is an attempt to cloud the issue. If the jurisdiction
is there and there are difficulties in the way, this
Court will have to evolve by convention or otherwise some procedure to avoid the difficulties. A
similar argument of inconvenience was raised in
Kavalappara Kottarathil Kockuani Moopil Nayar v.
Stat,e of Madras (1 )'and was negatived by this Court.
This Court evolved a procedure to meet some of the
difficult situa.tions that might arise in particular oases.
That apart, this Court also may evolve or mould
further rules of practice to suit different contingencies. If a party comes to this Court for enforcem~n t of a fundamental right the existence whereof depends upon proof of facts and the said party
has not enhausted the remedies available to him
by going through the hierarchy of tribunal created
by a particular Act, this Court, if the party agrees,
may a.How him to withdraw the petition with
liberty to file it at a. later stage, or, if the party
does not agree, may adjourn it Si'ne die till after
the remedies are exhausted. If, on the other hand
the party comes here after exhausting bis remedies
and after the tribunals have given their findings
of fact, this Court may ordinarily accept the find.ings of fact as ic. does in appeals under Art. 136 of
the Constitution. If the party complains that the
order made a~ainst him by a tribunal is based
upon a wrong construction of the provisions of a
statute, this Court may ascertain whether on a
correct interpretation of the statute, the petitioner's fundamental right has been violated. There
ma.y be many other situations, but I have no doubt
(1) [19591 Supp.
(2) S.C.R. 316. 325, 337.
1962
Sml. Ujjam Bai
"·
Stat• 1/ Utt°'
p,.adish
Sul>ba RllO J,
898
1911
Smt. Ujjam Boi
••
St"" •! UUar
h.U•h
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1~63)
that this Court will deal with them as and when
they arise. I would, therefore, unhesitatingly
reject the argument based on inconvenience .
I shall now proceed to deal with the main
argument advanced by learned counsel for the
respondent. Briefly stated, the argument is that
the Sales- tax Officer has jurisdiction to construe
rightly or wrongly the provisions of the Act,
whioh is a valid Jaw, and that even if the so.id
authority wrongly corastructed .a provision of the
Act and imposed the tax, though on a right construction of the said provision it cannot be so imposed, the said order does not infringe the fundamental right of the petitioner. With respect, if
I may say so, this argument equates the guaranteed
right of a citizen under Art. 32 of the Constitution
with that of the prerogative writs obtaining in
England, such as writs of certiorari, prohibition
and manadamus, issued against orders of inferior
tribunals or authorities. This also confuses the
fundamental right enshrined in Art. 32 of the
Constitution with one or more of the procedural
forms this Court may adopt to suit each occasion.
Th" approach to the two question is different.
The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under
Art. 32 is couched in comprehensive phraseology
and, as pointed out earlier, is of the widest
amplitude: it is not confined to the issue of
prerogative writs, for the Supreme Court ha.s
power to issue directions or orders to enforce the
fundamental right; even in respect of issuing
the said writs, this Court is not oppressed by
the procedural technicalities of the prerogative
writs in England. While under Art. 32 this Court
may, for thA purpose of enforcing a fundamental
right, issue a writ of 1xrtiorari, prohibition or
mandamus, in a suitable case, it may give the relief
even in a case not reached by the said writs. The
limitations imposed on the prero~ative wrjts cannot
,
i S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 899
limit the power of the Supreme Court undPr Art. 32
·of the Constitution. In order a writ of certiorari
may lie against a tribunal, the said tribunal must
have acted without jurisdiction or in excess of
jurisdiction conferred upon it by law or there must
be somo error of law apparent nn the face of the
record. There are similar limitations in the case
of writs of prohibition and mandamus. In the
context of the issue of the said writs, courts were
called upon to define what -''jurisdiction" means.
,Turis<liction may be territorial, pecuniary, or persona.I. There may be inherent want of jurisdiction
or irregular exercise of jurisdiction. A tribunal may
have power to decide collateral facts for the purpose
of assuming jurisdiction; or it may have exclusive
jurisdiction to decide even the said facts. In
Halsbury's Laws of England, 3rd edn., Vol. III, the
scope of the power of mandamus, prohibition and
~rtiorari is stated thus at p. 59 :
"The primary function of the three orders
is to prevent any excess of jurisdiction (prohibition and certiorari; or to ensure the
exercise of jurisdiction (mandamus). The
jurisrliction of inferior tribunals may depend
upon the fulfilment of some condition precedent (such as notice) or upon the existence of
some particular fa.ct. Such a fact is collateral
to the actual matter which the inferior tribunal
has to try, and the determination whether it
exists or not is logically and temporalJy prior to the determination of the actual
question which the inferior tribunal has to try.
The inferior tribunal must itself decide as to
the collateral fact: when, at the inception of
an inquiry by a tribunal of limited jurisdiction
a challenge is made to its jurisdiction, the
tribunal has to make up its mind whether it
will act or not, and for that purpose to arrive
a.t some decision on whether it has jurisdictjoJJ
or not.''
·
196t
Smt. Ujjam Bai
v.
Sfale of Ute.,.
PrrJd.sh
Subba Rao J.
900
196•
Smt. UJi•m B•i
v.
Slllt. of Uttar
l'rrMUsh
Subba Rao J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963]
"There may be tribunals which, by virtue
of legislation constituting them, have the
power to determine finally the preliminary
facts on which the further exercise of their
jurisdiction depends; but, subject to that, an
inferior tribunal cannot, by a wrong decision
with regard to a collateral fa.ct, give itself a
jurisdiction which it would not otherwise
possess or deprive itself of a jurisdiction which
it otherwise would possess".
It is clear from this passage that a tribunal may
have to decide collateral facts to exercise its jurisdiction, but unless the relevant statute confers an
exclusive jurisdiction on that tribunal, it cannot
wrongly clutch at jurisdiction which it has not or
refuse to exercise jurisdiction which it possesses.
The doctrine of jurisdiction with its limitations may
be relevant in the matter of issue of prerogative
writs to quash the orders of tribunals made without
or in excess of jurisdiction, but the said restrictions
cannot limit the power of the Supreme Court in
enforcing the fundamental rights, for under Art. 32
of the Constitution for enforcing the said rights
it has power to issue directions or orders uncontrol
by any such limitations. That apart, even
within the narrow confines of the doctrine of
jurisdiction, it is wrong to confine the jurisdiction
to inherent want of jurisdiction. A person, who has
within the narrow confines of the doctrine of
no authority to function under an Act, if he
purports to act under that Act, his order will be
no doubt without jurisdiction. If an authority
by a wrong construction of a section purports
to exercise jurisdiction under an Act which it does
not possess at all, it may again be described as
inherent want of jurisdfotion. But there may
be many cases on the border line between inherent
want of jurisdiction and exercise of undoubted
juriEdictiC>n. 'Ihe authority may have jurisdiction,
to decide ceftain disputes under an Aot, ~t bJ a
1 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
901
wrong construction of the provisions of the Act, it
may make an order affecting a particular subjectmatter, which, on a correct interpretation, it cannot
reach. By a slight modification of the facts a.rising
in the present case, the point may illustrated thus :
A provision of the Sales-tax Act says that the sale
of bidis is not taxable; the statute prohibits taxation
of bidis; but the Sales·tax Officer on a wrong oon·
struotion of the provision holds that hand-made
l>idis are taxable; on a correct interpretation, the
Act does not confer any power on the Sales·tax
Officer to tax such bidis. In such a ease on a wrong
interpretation of the provisions of the Act, he has
exercised jurisdiction in respect of a subject-matter,
which, on their correct interpretation, he- does not
possess. In a sense he acts without jurisdiction in
taxing goods whioh are not taxable under the Act.
The criterion of jurisdiction must also fail in
a case where an aggrieved party approaches this
Court before the Sales-tax authority makes its
order. A Sales-tax authority may issue only a
notice threatening to ta.ke action under the Act : at
that point of time, there is no decision by the tribunal. The person to whom notice is given approaches
this Court and complains that the authority under
the colour of tb.e Act proposes to infringe his
fundamental right; in that case, if this Court is
satisfied that his fundamental right is infringed, it
ha.a a duty to enforce it. But it is said that when
the Sales-tax Act provides a machinery for getting
the validity of his ola.im tested by the tribunals,
he must only resort to that machinery. This argument may be relevant to the question whether a.
civil courts jurisdiction is ousted in view of the
special machinery created by a statutf>, but that
circumstance cannot have any bearing on the question of enforcement of fundamental rights, for
no law can exclude the jurisdiction of this Court
under Art. 32 of the Constitution. Nor is the
196t
S111e. Ujjam Bai
Slal1 of"·UUar
Pradlsh
Subba Ra~ J.
902 SUPREME OOURT REPORTS t1963]
1111
Smt. Ujjsn M•i
v.
S1at1 •I UllM
Prad,sl
Smk 11 .. J.
argument that if a citizen comes to this Court when
the proceeding before the Sales.tax authorities
is in the midstream, this Court will be permitting
a citizen to short-circuit the rest of the procedure
laid down by the Act, has any relevance to the
question of its jurisdiction under Art. 32. This may
be an argument of inconvenience and this Court,
as has already been indicated, may adjourn the case
till the entire proceedings come to an end before
the highest Sales-tax authority. This argument
of inconvenience cannot obviously a.rise when
a party approaches this Court after availing
himself of all the remedies available to him under
the Act.
I would, therefore, hold that the principles
evolved by the courts in England and accept by
the courts in India governing the iSBue of prerogative writs cannot circumscribe the unlimited
power of the Supreme Court to iSBue orders and
directions for the enforcement of the fundamental
rights. Even otherwise, in cases similar to those
covered by the illustration Supra, a prerogative
writ can be iSBued for quashing the order of an
inferior tribunal, and a fortiori an order can be
issued for enforcing a fundamental right under
Art. 32 of the Constitution.
Even if the said legal position be wrong, the
present oa.se falls within the limited scope of
the principle governing the issue of a writ of certiorari. In Hari Vishnu Kamatk v. Syed Almuul
Jshaque( 1), the scope of that power vis-a-vis an error
of law has been stated thus:
"It may therefore be ta.ken as settled
that a writ of certiorari could be issued to
correct an error of law. But it is essential
that it should be something more than a mere
error; it must be one which must be manifest
on the fa.oe of the record. The real diffi.
oult:y with reference to this ma"6r, however,
(l) [Jll55] l 8,0.ll; U06, 1129.
1 S. C. R~
SUPREME OOURT REPORTS
003
is not 80 mnch in the statement of the prin-
1161
oiple as in its app1ioa.tion to the faots of a
partioula.r oase. When does an error oa.se to
be mere error, and become an error apparent
on the face of the record ? Learned counsel
on either side were unable to suggest any
clear-cut rule by whioh the boundary between the two classes of errors could be
demarcated. Mr. Pathak for the first respondent contended on the Strength of certain
observations ofChagla, O.J., in Batuk K. Vyas
v. Surat M'Unioipality(1), that no error oould
be said to be apparent on the face of the
record if it was not self-evident, and if it
required an examination or argument to
establish it. This test might afford a satisfactory basis for decision in the majority of
oases. But there must be cases in whioh
even this test might break down, because
judicial opinions also differ, and an error
that might be considered by one Judge
as self-evident might not be so considered by another. The fa.ct is that what
is an error apparent on the face of the record,
cannot be defined precisely or exhaustively
there being an element of indefiniteness
inherent in its very nature, and it must be
left ·to be determined judicially on the facts of
eaoh case."
Snd. UJJam Ila
Whether there is an error of law on the f aoe of
the·record can be determined only on the facts of
ea.oh oase, and, as this Court pointed out, an error
that might pe considered as self-evident by one
Judge may not be 80 considered by another.
Except perhaps in a rare case, it is always possible
to argue both ways. I would not, therefore,
attempt to law down a father oriterion then that
which has been aooepted by this Cour~, .namely,
(1) A.LR. (1953] Dom. 153.
.
••
SIM• *f Uflcr
Prad11h
904
..
:mt. Ujjam Bai
Siott of Utt•r
Prode1A
SufbQ li'ooJ.
SuPREME COUltT REPORTS tl963)
that the question must be left to be determined
judicially on the facts of ea~h ca11e. In the present
case, the recitals in the notification clearly disclose
that there is an error of law on the face of the
order of the tribunals. If that error is corrected,
as we should do, the position is that the Sales-tax
tribunals imposed a tax on the sales transactions
of biris which they had no power to do. In that
event, there is a clear infringement of the fundamental rights of the petitioners to carry on business in biris.
Now let us look at the decisions of this Court
to ascertain whether all or any of them have
applied the criterion of jurisdiction in the matter
of enforcement of fundamental right of a
citizen.
Where under s. 11 of the Bihar Buildings
(Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1947, the
Controller was given jurisdiction to determine
whether there was non-payment of rent or not, as
well as the juridiction, on finding that there was
non-payment of rent, to order eviction of a tenant,
it was held by this Court in Rai Brij Raj Krishan
v. S. K. Shaw and Brolkrs (1) that even if the
Controller had wrongly decided the question whether there had hr.en non·payment of rent, his order
for eviction on the ground that the.~e had been
non-payment of rent could not be questioned in a
civil court. This decision has nothing to do with the
scope of this Court's power to enforce a fundamental right, but it deals only with the question of the
ouster of the civil court's jurisdiction when a special
tribunal is created to finally decide specific matters.
In Messrs. Mohanl,al Hargovind Das Biri Mercha.nts
Jabalpur v. The State of Madhya Pradesh (')
when the Sale-tax authorities of Madhya Pradesh
on & wrong view of the transactions carried on by
(I) [i951] S.c.R. 146.
i7) [1956] 2 S.C.R, 509,
1 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
905
1962
\he petitioners thflrein, held that the said transactions were intra-State transactions and on that Smt. Ujjam llal
basis required them to file a statement of return of
•• Utta.f
Stah of
total purch11se of tobacco ma.de by them, this court,
Pratlash
on a correct view of the transactions came to the
Subbo Ro•J·
conclusion that they related to inter-State trade
and, on that view, enforced thelfundamental right
of the petitioners. Though there was no decision
of the Sales-tax: authorities that the transactions
were intra-State, the notice was on that basis ;
but yet that did not prevent this Court from
oomin2 to a different conclusion and enforcing
the fundamental right of the petitioners. In
Messrs. Ram Narain Sons Ltd. v.
Asstt.
· Commissioner of Sale-tax (1) the Sales-tax
authorities
determined
the
turnover
of
the petitioners including therein the proceeds of
sales held by them to be intra-State transa.otions.
This Court held, considering the nature of the tran8&otions once again, that they were not sales inside
the State and were only sales in the course of interState trade and commerce, and, on that basis;
enforced the fundamental right of the petitioners.
This Court again enfm·ced the fundamental rights
of the petitioners in J. V. Gokul & Co. v. Asstt.
Collector of Sale-tax (2 j by reversing the finding of
the Sales-tax Officer, who had held that the sales in
that case were intra-State and holding that they
were made in the course of import.
Ignoring the first decision wherein there was
no order of the Sa.lea-tax Officer on merits, in the
other two decisions, the Sale-tax Officer in exeroise
of his jurisdiction decided on the facts before him
that the sales were intra-State sales, whereas this
Court on a reconsideration of the facts held that
they were outside sales. The criterion of jurisdio·
tion breaks in these cases, for the Salee-tax Officer
II) •19'5) 2 SC R 483.
(2) (19FO) 2 S.C.R. 152.
906
SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1963]
l96B
has inherent jurisdiction to decide the question
the sales were inside sales or outside sales.
whether
Smt. Ujjam Bai
v.
But an attempt is made to distinguish these oases
State of Ullar
on the ground that by a wrong view of the transacPradesh
tions, the sales-tax Officer violated the provisions of
Subba Bao J.
Art. 286 of the Constitution, and therefore he had
no inherent jurisdiction to impose the tax. There
are no merits in this distinction. The Sales-tax
Officer had jurisdiction to dAoide under the relevant
sales·tax Act whether a transaction was inside or
outside sale. He had the jurisdiction to decide
rightly or wrongly; on the basis of his finding,
though a wrong one, the sales were 11ot exempt
from taxt.tion. If, on the facts of the ease, the
Sales-tax Officer had arrived at the correct conolution, he would not have any power to impose a tax
on inter-State sales µnder the Act; he would also
have infringed Art. 286 of the Constitution, if he
had imposed a tax on such a sale. The absence of
juri.ddiotion or want of power in one case was traceable to a statutory injunction, and in the otb.er to a
constitutional prohibition; but that in itself cannot
sustain the distinction in th.e application of the
criterion of jurisdiction, for in either case the said
wrong finding of fact was the root of the error.
The decision of this Court in Kailash Nath v.
State of U. P. ('), which necessitated the reference
to this Bench, is another instance where this
Court enforced the fundamental right of the petitioner by accepting an interpretation of the provisions of the !'alesctax Act different from that put
upon them by the S:i.les-tax authority. l'here, as
in the present oat10, the question depended upon the
interpretation of the terms of a notifioatio1;1 iesued
under s. 3 of the Sales-tax Act exempting certain
goods from taxation. It is said that the view of
this Court was based upon the judgments of this
Court enforcing fundamental right!! on the ground
that the impugned provisions whereunder tax wu
(I) AI.R. 1917 S.C. 790.
l S.C.R.
SUPREME OOtJRT REPORTS 907
levied were ultra vires. But the objection taken
before this Court in that case was that the imposition of an illegal tax would not entitle a citizen to
invoke Art. 32 of the Constitution, but he must
resort to the remedies avai1able under the ordinary
law or proceed under Art. 226 of the Constitution.
"But that argument was negatived on the basis of
the decisions cited before them. The test of jurisdection now sought to be applied.was not directly
raised in that Case. It cannot therefore be said that
this Court went wrong by relying upon irrelevant
decisions. The discussion shows that this Court
held in the manner it did as it came to the conclution that a fundamental right h1-d been cle11rly
infringed by a wrong interpretation of the
notification.
Let me now consider the decisions of this
Court which a.re alleged to have departed from the·
view expressed in that case. In Gula/Jdas &: Co. v.
Asstt. Collector of Ct.t.!toms(l), the petitioners were
established importers holding quota rights for importing stationery articles and having their places
of business in Calcutta. They had a licence for a
period of 12 months to import goods known as.
"Artists' Materials" fa.Hing under Serial No. 168(C)
of Part IV of the Policy Statement. Item No. 11
of Appendix XX annexed to the Import Trade
Control Policy Book was described as ucrayons".
The petitioners, on the be.sis of the licence, imported "Lyra" brand crayons. The Assistant
Collector of Customs instead of assessing duty on
them under itP,m 45(A), assessed duty under item 45
(4) of the Indian Customs Tariff. On appeal the
Central Board 0f Revenue confirmed it. It was
argued, imer alia, that the Customs authorities imposed a. duty heavier than the goods had to bear
under the relevant provisions. This Court held that
no question of fundamental right arose in that case.
{1) .U R. [1957] S. C, 733, 736.
196!
Smt, Ujjam B• i
v.
Blet. 01 Utior
p,aduh
Bubba Rco J,
908
1968
Srr.t. Ujjam Bai
v.
SUPRBME COURT REPORTS [1963]
In that context, the following observations were
made.
"If the provision of law under which the
impugned orders have been passed are good
provisions and the orders passed are with
juriHdiction, whether they be right or wrong
on facts, there is really no queetion of the in·
fraction of a fundamental right. If a particular decision is erroneous on facts or merits,
the proper remedy is by way of an appeal."
"If the petitioners were aggrieved by the
order of the Central Board of Revenue they
had a further remedy by way of an application for revision to the Central Government
......•••... All that is really contended is that
the orders are erroneous on merits. That
surely does not give rise to the violation of
any fundamental right under Art. 19 of the
Constitution".
State of Uttar
P1a<ksh
Suiba Rao J.
In that case, on facts, the Customs authorities held
that the petitioners were liable to pay a particular
duty on the goods, and this Court accepted that
finding and, therefore, no question of fundamental
right arose. But, if on the other hand the observa·
tions meant that the order of the Customs authorities was binding on f,his Court, I find it difficult to
accept that view. It is one thing to say that this
Court ordinarily will accept the findings of administrative tribunals on questions of fact, and it is another to say that the said finding are binding on this
Court. I do not think that this Comt intended to lay
down that the findings of administmtive tribunals
are binding on thia Court, however, erroneous or
unjust the said findings may be. This Court again
in Bhatnagars and Co. LW,. v. The Unit:rn of India (1)
acceptPd the findings of fact recorded by the relevant Customs authoritiee, and observed:
{I)
[1957] $.C.R. 701, 712.
1 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
909
"Essentially the petitioner's grievance is
against the conclusions of fact reached by the
relevant authorities. If the said conclusion
ca.nnot be challenged before us in the present
writ petition, the petitioner would obviously
not be entitled to any relief of the kind
claimed by him."
The finding arrived at by the Customs authorities
was that, though the licences were obtained by the
petitioner in his name, he had been trafficking in
those licences, that the consignments had been
ordered by another individual, that the said individual held no licence for import of soda ash and as
such the consignments received by the said individual were liable to be confiscated. The finding was
purely one of fact, and this Court accepted: it as
correct: on that basis. no question of fundamental
right would arise. The decision in Tke Parbhani
:Pransport Co-operative Society Ltd. v. 11he Regional
Transport Authority, Aurangabad (1) related to the
fundamental right of the petitioner therein to carry
on the business of plying motor buses as staae
carriages. The State applied for permits for all the~e
routes under Ch. IV of the Motor Vehicles Act,·
1939, as amended by Act 100 of 1956, and the petitioner applied for renewal of its permit. The
Regional Transport Authority rejected the petitioner's right and granted the p<1rmit to the State.
One of the contentions raised was that the provisions
of Art. 14 of the Constitution had been infringed.
This Court held that the Regional Transport Authority, on the facts, had held that there was no discrimination. Dealing with that contention, this
Court observed:
"This contention is in our view elearly
untenable. The decision of respondent No. I
may have been right or wrong and as to that
we say nothing, but we are unable to see that
(1) (1960) 3 S.C.R. 177, 183.
196t
Sml. Ujjam BI
"·
State J Utta
Pradesh
Subba Rao J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1963]
910
196!
Smt, UjjGm /foi
v.
Sl•le rf Ull.,Pradtsh
Subba Rao J •
that decision offends Art. 14 or any other
fundamental right of the petitioner. The
respondent No. i was acting as a. qua.si-judi·
cial body and if it has ma.de any mistake in
its decision there are appropriate remedies
available to the petitioner for obtaining relief.
It cannot complain of a. breach of Art. 14."
This decision in effect refused to interfere with the
findings of fact arrived at by the tribunal for the
reasons mentioned therein. If the findings stand
no question of fundamental right would a.rise. The
decision in A. V. Venkateswaran, Collector of Cu;;toma
Bombay v. Ranwhand Sobhraj Wadhwani (') is of
no assistance, as it was a. decision under Art. 226
of the Constitution. In Aniyoth K·unhamina Umma
v. The Ministry of Rehabilitation, Government of
lnd·ia, New Delhi('), th'3 petitioner therein filed a.
writ petition for enforcement of his fundamental
right on the ground that the property in question
was not evacuee property. The authorities under
the relevant Act decided that it was an evacuee
property, and the petitioner carried the matter to
the appellate tribunals without su<Joess. This Court
dismissing the petition on the ground that the peti·
tioner had no fundamental right made the follow·
ing observations:
"It is, indeeJ, true that s. 28 of the Act
cannot affect the power of the High Court
under Arts. 226 and 227 of the Constitution
or of this Court under Arts. 136 and 32 of the
Constitution. Where, however, on account
of tho decision of an authority of competent
jurisdiction the right all!'ged by the petitioner
has been found not to exist, it is difficult to
see how any question of infringement of that
right can arise as a ground for a petition
under Art. 32 of the Constitution, unless the
decision of the authority of competent jurisdio( I)
(1962) Is c.R. 753.
(2)
(1962) I s.c.R. 5Q5,
3.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
911
tion on the right alleged by the petitioner is
held to be a nullity or can be otherwise got
rid of. As long as that decision stands, the
petitioner cannot complain of any infringement of a fundamental right. The alleged
fundamental right of the petitioner is really
dependent on whether Kunhi Moosa Haji was
an evacuee and whether his property is evacuee property. If the decision of the appropriate authorities of competent jurisdiction
on these questions has become final and cannot be treated as a nullity or cannot be
otherwise got rid of, the petitioner cannot
complain of any infringement of her fundamental right under Arts. HJ(l}(f) and 31
of the Constitution.''
Concluding the judgment, it was observed:
''We are basing our decision on the
ground that the competent authorities under
the Act had come to a certain decision, which
decision has now become final the petitioner
not ha.ving moved against that decision in an
appropriate court by an appropriate proceeding. As long as that decision stands, the
petitioner cannot complain of the · infring(lment of a fundamental right, for she has no
such right."
It would be seen that the tribunals found, on the
facts of that case, that the property was evacuee
property, and if that finding was accepted, no
question of fundamental right arose. It is true
that this Court accepted that finding on the ground
that it had become final and the petitioner had not
questioned the correctness of that decision in a
proper court by an appropriate proceeding. As I
have said earlier, this Court may ordinarily accept
the findings of fact arrived at by tribunals; but, on
the other hand, if the judgment meant tha.t under
no conceivable circumstances this Court could
!<162
Smt. Ujjam B11i
v.
St •ft of Tllt.ar
Pradesh
:::ivbba Rao J.
912
1962
Sml. U;Jam BM
v.
Stat1 of U.lat'
Pradesh
Subba Rao J,
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963]
interfere with the findings of an administ.ratiTe
tribunal even if there was a clear infringement of
fundamental right, in my view; it \vould amount
to an abdication of its jurisdiction in favour of
administrative tribunals. Nor does the decision of
this Court in JJf adan Lal Arora v. The Excise & Taxation Officer, Amritsar (1) carry the matter further.
There, the petitioner was a dealer registered under
the Punjab General Sales Tax Act. Notice1 were
served on him by the Sales tax authority, the last
of them being that i( the relevant documents were
not produced, within a particular date the case
would be decided on the •'best judgment assessment
basis". It was contended on the basis of s. 11 of
the Punjab General Sales Tax Act that at the date
of the notice last mentioned the Sales Tax authori ·
ties bad no right to proceed to make any "best
judgment" as8essment as the three years within
which only such assessment could be made had
expired before then. This Court accepted the construction put forward by the petitioner and held
that no assessment could be made on the petitioner;
and, in that view, it enforced his fundamental right.
There was no inherent want of jurisdiction in the
Sales Tax authorities, for they had jurisdiction to
construe the relevant provisions of s. 11 and hold
whether the assessment could be made within a
particular time or not. Notwithstanding that circumstance, this Court enforced the petitioner's fundamental right. It is not necessary to multiply
decisions. On a superficial reading of the aforesaid
decisions, though they may appear to be conflicting,
there is one golden thread which runs through all
of them and, that is, a citizen has a guaranteed
procedural right under Art. 32 of the Constitution,
and that a duty is cast upon this Court to enforce
a fundamental right if it is satisfied that the petitioner has a fundamental right and that it ha.s lieen
(IJ (1962) 1 s.c.R. s2s.
I S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
913
infringed by the State. That question was approa·
ched by this Court from different perspectives,
having regard to the faots of each case. When a
funda.menta.l right of a petitioner was infringed
by an action of an officer purporting to exercise
a power under an Act which is ultra vires or
unconstitutional, or without jurisdiction, this Court
invariably enforced the fundamental right. So
too, this Court give relief under Art. 3~ of the
Constitution whenever a statutory authority infrin·
ged a fundamental right of petitioner on a. wrong
construction of the provisions of a statute whereunder he purported to act. This Court, as a rule
of practice, accepted the findings of fact arrived
at by tribunals and on that basis held that no
f tllldamental right was infringed. But I do not
understand any of these decisions as laying down
tha.t the amplitude of the jurisdiction conferred
on this Court under Art. 32 of the Constitution
a.nd the guaranteed right given to a citizen under
the said article should be restricted orjlimited by
some principle or doctrine not contemplated by
the Constitution.
Mr. Cbairi, appearing for one of the
intervener&, raised a wider question. His argument
ia that a relief under Act. 3~ cannot be given against
an '4Uthority exercising judicial power and that the
Sales-tax a1n.tio.rities a.re authorities exercising
judicial power of the State. This argument is
elaborated thus : Under tbe Constitution, the
in~titutions created theireunder can exercise either
legislative, exeo11tive or judicial functions and sometimes the same institution may have to exercise
OiltJ or more of the said powers; institutions exercising legislative powers make la we, those exercising
powers, administer the laws, and those exercising
judicial powers deoide the disputes between citizens
and oitizeDB, between citizens and ~tate and ~tate,
the said judicial powers can be conferred in the
1962
..
Smt. Ujjam Bai
State of Utta1
!"rttlesh .
Subb11 Rao J.
914
SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1963]
1962
m'.l.uner prescribed by the CJn>titution on a.uy ins·
titution of individual offic~r, whether it is a court
Smt. VJ,j.rin Ba
v.
or not; with that background if Art. 12 of the Cons·
st.u of Uttar
titution fa looked at, the argument proceeds, the
Prad1sh
institutions exercising judicial power are excluded
Subba Rao J.
therefrom. Article 32 enables the Supreme Court
to enforce a fundamental right only against the
State action; no fundamental dght can he enforced
against an officer exercising judicial power as he
does not come under the definition of Htate in
Art. 12 of the Constitution.
It is not necessary in this case to decide the
two questions, namely, (1) whether a person can
approach this Court to enforce his fundamental
right on the ground that it was infringed by a decision of a court of law, and (2) whether the right
guaranteed by Art. 19 of the Constitution can be
enforced under Art. 32 a.gainst the action of a private individual. We are concerned only with the
narrow question whether such a right can be enfor.
ced against the action of an administrative tribunal.
It can certainly be enforced against it, if it comes
under the definition of a State under Art. 12 of the
Constitution. We have already held that an a.dmi·
nistra.ti ve tribunal is not a. court but is only an
executive authority functioning uhder a. statute
adopting the norms of judicial procedure. It is a.
department of the executive Government exercising
statutory functions affecting the rights of parties.
Under Art. 12, '•the State" has been defined to include the Government and the Parliament of India
and the Government and the Legislature of ea.ch of
the States and all local and other authorities within
the territory of India or under the control of the
Government of India. A Division Bench of the
Madras High Court in University of Madras v. Shanta
Bai (1) construed the words "local or other autho·
l'ities'' under Art. l~ of the Constitution thus:
"These words must be construed as
(I) A-1.R. 1954 Mad. 67 068.
1 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
915
ejusdem generis with Government or Legislature and so construed can only mean authorities exercising governmental functions. '!'hey
would not include persons natural or juristic
who cannot be regarded as instrumentalities
of the Government."
..
Applying this definition to Art. 12, it is manifest
that authorities constituted under the Sales-tax
Act for assessing the tax would be "other authori·
ties" within the meaning of Art. 12; for the said
authorities exercise governmental functions and are
the instrumentalities of the Government. But it is
contended that if the fathers of our Constitution
intended to include in the definition authorities
exercising judicial functions, having included the
Government and the Parliament, they would not
have omitted to mention specifically the judicial
institutions therein. This argument may have
some relevance if the question is whether a
court of law is included within the definition of '
'·St.ate", but none when the question is whether an
administrative tribunal is included in the said definition. An administrative tribunal is an executive
authority and it is clearly comprehended by the
words ''other authorities". If the argument of
learned counsel be accepted, Government also shall
be excluded from the definition where it exercises
quasi-judicial functions. So too, Parliament ·will
have to be excluded when it exercises a quasi-judicial function. That would be to introduce words
which are not in the Article. It is, therefore, clear
to my mind that the definition of the word, whether
it takes in a court or not, certainly takes in administr·itive tribunah1. If an administrative tribunal is a
•·State" and if any order made or action taken by
it infringes a fundamental right of a citizen under
Art. 19 of the Constitution, it can be enforced
under Art. 32 thereof.
••
Let me now restate the legal position as I
<
1961
Smt. Ujjam Bai
••
St•t1 nJ Utt11r
Pra'!esh
SubbaR.. J.
916
1961
Sn11. Uii•m B•i
v.
State of Ullgr
l'rade•h
Snbba Rao J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1963]
conceive it: (I) A citizen has a fundamental right to
carry on business in bidis under Art. 19 (1) of the
Constitution. (2) The State may make a law impo·
sing reasonable restrictions on that right: it is conceded that the Uttar Pradesh Sales Tax Act is such
a law. (3) The Sales-tax authorities constituted under
the Act, purporting to exercise their powers thereunder, may make an illegal order infringing that
right. (4) The order may be illegal because the authority concerned has acted without jurisdiction in the
sense that the authority is not duly constituted under
the Act or that it has inherent want of jurisdiction;
the order may be illegal also because the said autho·
rity has construed the relevant provisions of the Act
wrongly and has decid<!d the facts wrongly or drawn
the inferences from the facts wrongly. (5) The Act
expressly or by necessary implication cannot give
finality to the order of the authority or authorities
so as to prevent the Supreme Court from questioning its correctness when the said order in faot affects
the fundamental right of a citizen. (6) The aggrieved party may approach this Conrt before a d"lcision
io given by the Sa.Jes-tax authority or after the decision is given by the original authority or when an
appeal is pending before the appellate tribunal or
after all the remedies under the Act are exhausted.
(7) Whatever may be the stage at which this Court
is approached this Court may in it• discretion, if the
question involved is one of jurisdiotion or a oons·
truction of a. provision, decide the question and
enforce the right without waiting till the procedure
prescribed by a law ia exhausted; but if it finds that
questions of fact or mixed questions of fact and law
are involved, it may give an opportunity to the
party, if he agrees, to renew the application after
he has exhausted his remedies under the Aot, or, if
he does not agree, to adjourn the petition till after
the remedies are exhausted. (8) If the fundamental
right of the petitioner depends upon the findings of
fact arrived at by the M.Iministrative tribunals in
I $.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
~17
exercise of the powers conferred on them under the
Act, this Court ma.y in its discretion ordinarily
accept the findings and dispose of the application on
the basis of those findings.
The followin~ of this procedure preserves the
jurisdiction of thiR Court as envisaged by the Cons·
titution and safeguards the guaranteed rights of the
citizens of this country without at the same time
affecting the smooth working of the administrative
tribunals created under the Act. If the other view
is accepted, this Court will be abdicating its jurisdiction and entrusting it to administrative tribunals,
who in a welfare State cpntrol every conceivable
aspect of human activity and are in a dominant
position to infringe the fundament,a.l rights guaranteed to the citizens of this country. I would prefer
this pragmatic approach to one based on concepts
extraneous to the doctrine of fundamental rights.
I would, therefore, hold that in the present
case if the Sales-tax: officer; by a wrong construc~ion
of the provisions of the Act, made '1.n illegal order
imposing a tax on the .petitioner's] fundamental
right, it is liable to be quashed.
The next q1lestion is whether the Sales-tax
officer has wrongly construed the notification issued
by the Government under s. 4(l)(a) of the Aot. Section 4( 1) of the Act reads as follows:
"No tax shall be payable on(a) The· sale <;>f water, milk, sal~ newspa•
pers and motor Apirit as defined in the U. P.
State Motor Spirit (Taxation) Act, 1939, and
of any other ~oods which the State
Government may by notifioation in the official
Gazette, exempt.
( b) the sale of any goods by the AllIndia Spinners' Association or Gandhi Ashram,
1962
Smt, UiJam B•I
"·
Slate 11,f U tt•r
Pra<ksli
Subba Bt10 J.
918
1962
Sm.
·1jj•Hn Bai
Su
1/ Ullar
'·
aths~
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963]
Meerut, and their branches or such other persons or class of persons as the State Government may from time to time exempt on such
conditions and on payment of such fees, if
any, nr t exceeding eight thousand rupees
annually as may be specified by notification
in the Official Gazette."
The following notification dated December
14, 1957 was issued under the said section:
"In partial modification of notifications
No. ST-905/X, dated March 31, 1956 and
ST-418/X 902 (9)-52, dated January 31, 1957,
and in exercise of the powers conferred by
clause (b) of sub-section (1) of section 4 of the
U. P. Sales Tax Act, 1948 (U. P. Act No. XV
of 1948) as amended up to date, the Governor
of Uttar Pradesh is pleased to order that no
tax shall be payable under the aforesaid Act
with effect from December 14, 1957 by the
dea.lers in respect of the following cla.sillll of
goods provided that the Additional Central
Excise Duties leviable thereon from the closing of business on December 13, 1957 have
been paid on such goods and that the dealers
thereof furnish proof of the satisfaction of
the asseBBing authority that such duties have
been paid.
(I)
............................................... .
. (2)
••···············································
(3) Cigars, cigarettes, biris and to~cco,
that is to say any form of tobacco, whether
cured or uncured and whether manufactured
or not includes the leaf, stalks and stem• of
the tobacco plant but does not include any
part of a tobacco plant while still attached to
the earth."
-
1 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
The following facts a.re not disputed : In regard
to the sales of certain commodities with an interState market certain difficulties cropped up in the
matter ol impoaiti9.n of sales-tax by different States.
In order to avoia those difficulties, the Central
Government and the States concerned came to an
arrangement whereunder the States agreed for the
enhancement of the excise duties under the Central
Aot in respect of certain commodities in substitution for the sales-tax levied upon them, and that
the Central Government agreed to collect the enhanced excise duty on the sa.id commodities and
distribute the additional income derived amongst
the State Governments. To implement that arrangement, Parliament passed Act No. 58of1957 called
the Additional Duties of Excise (Goods of Special
Importance) Act, 1957, on December 24, 1957.
The long title of that Act shows that it was enacterl
to provide for the levy and collection of additional
duties of excise on certain goods and for the distribution of -a part of the net proceeds thereof among
the States in pursuance of the principles of distribution formulated and the recommendation made
by the Finance Commission. Under the Central
Act, before the amendment, there was excise duty
on tobacco used for various purposes, including
ma.chine-made bidis, but there was no excise duty
on hand-made bidis. Therefore, under the amended
Act; additional duty was payable only on tobacco
product.a already taxable under original Act ; with
the result, enhanced tax was imposed on tobacco
which went in to make hand-ma.de bidis, but no
additional tax was imposed on hand-made bidis.
With this background let us .Jook at the
notification issued under a. 4(1) of the Act. There
is some controversy whether that notification was
issued l_lnder s. 4(l)(a) or 4(l)(b) of the Act; but
that need not detain us, for I shall assume that
the notification was issued under s. 4( 1)(b). The
1961
Smt. Ujj•m B:1i
v.
Sta ' of Utf4r
Pradesh
Sub/JG Rao J.
920
1962
Smt. Ujj!Jm Bt.,
v.
St1l1 of Utlo 1
Pradesh
Sul.Ua ROD J,
SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1963]
goods specified therein were exempted conditionally.
The goods exempted under the notification were
bidis and tobacco. Bidis migpt be hand·made
or machine-made, and the tobacco included tobaoco
out of which bidis were made. Under the first part
of the notification the said bidis and tobaooo were
exempted from the sales-tax from Deoember 14,
1957. The condition imposed for the operation of
that exemption was that additional central excise
duties levia.ble thereon from the closing of business
on December 13, 1957, should have been paid on
such bidis and tobacco. Briefly stated, the bidiH and
tobacco, among others, were exempted from pay·
ment of sales-tax, if excise duties leviable thereon
were paid during the relevant period. So far as the
hand-made bidis were conoerened under the amend·
ing Act no tax was leviable thereon. The condition
was applicable to bidis as a unit. Out of bidis, no
excise duty was leviable on hand-made bidis, "bile
excise duty was leviable in respect of machine-made
bidis. Therefore, the condition imposed ha1 no appli·
cation to hand-made bidis, for 1mder the eaid condi·
tion only tax leviable on the said bidis had to be
paid, and, as no excise duty was leviable in
respect of hand-made bidis, they were clearly
exempted under the said notification, Assu·
ming that the said notification applied only to
goods in respect whereof additional excise duty we.a
leviable, the payment of additional duty in respect
of tobacco which went in makinjl' hand-made
bidis was also a condition attached to the exemption of such bidis from taxation. It is not disputed that additional exoise duty on the said
tobacco was paid by the appellant. I, therefore,
hold, on a plain reading of the expressed terms of
the notification, that hand-made bidis were exempted
•
from taxation under the Aot.
.
1 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
921
There was also every justification for such
exemption. It appears from tbe record that the
merchants doing business in hand -made bidis were
not able to compete with businessmen manufacturing machine-made bidis. Indeed, before the amending Act, excise duty was imposed on machine-made
bidis ma.inly, though not solely, for protecting the
business in the former in competition with the latter.
In the circumstances, it was but reasonable to
~ume that the State Government by the amending
Act did not intend to impC'se sales-tax on handmade bidis, though additional excise duty was imposed on tobacco out of which the said bidis were
manufactured. The entire scheme of protection of
one against unfair competition from the other would
break if the Central Government could impose additional excise duty on tobacco and the State could
impose sales-tax on bidis madti out of the said
tobacco. That this was the intention of the State
Government was made clear by the subsequent notification dated December 14, 1957, exempting handinad~ 1Jidi8 from taxation without any condition.
I
am, therefore, clearly of the opinion that, on a fair
reading of the said notification, sales of hand-made
bidis were exempted from taxation under the Act.c
!n the result, there will be an order directing
the respondents not to proceed to realize any salestax from the petitioner on the basis of the order
dated Deceiuber 20, 1958. 'The petitioner will have
h.~r costs.
.
Now coming to Ciyil Appeal No. 572 of 1960,
the saj~ app~l was dismissed for. non-prosecution by
order ()rthi& Court dated, February 20, 1961. The
M&e88ee~tirm has died an application for restoration
qfthe said e.ppe~ on the ground that it did' not
rpesa the appeal ii1 view of the decision of-this Court
Smt. Ujj•m Ba
v.
S1oll."1j Ul1ar
Pradeslt
--
922
-••
191!1
Sml. Ujjcrm Bai
St•ll •1 Uitar
P..U.Sh
Subj• Rao I.
HU/9.,.iW. J •
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963]
in Kailash Nath v. State of Uttar Pradesh('); but, as
I have said that the said decision is still good law,
this ground is not open to the said firm. In the
result the application for restoration of Civil Appeal
No. 572 of 1960 is dismissed with costs.
HIDAYATULLAH, J.-The facts have been set
out fully in the order of Venkata.rama Aiyar, J.,
and need not be stated at length. The petitioner is a
partner in a firm of bidi manufacturers registered
under the Uttar Pradesh Sales Tax Act. Under a
scheme by which certain additional Central Excise
duties are being levied under special Acts for the
purpose and are being distributed among the States
in respect of certain classes of goods, on which the
States have foregone collection of sales tax locally,
the Government of Uttar Pradesh issued notification on December 14, 1957, exempting bidis from
sales tax under the U. P. Sales Tax Act, provided
the additional duties of excise were paid. This was
followed by another notification on November 25,
1958, by which bidis, whether machine-made
or hand-made, where exempted without any
condition from sales tax from July 1, 1958. The
dispute in this petition is about the quarter ending
June 30, 1958, in which the firm claimed the
exemption. This claim was rejected on the ground
that the firm had not paid any additional exciae
duty on bidis. An appeal followed, but was unsucoessful, and though a revision lay under the
Sales Tax Act, none was filed. 'l'he firm filed
instead a petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution
in the High Court of Allahabad, but was again
uneucoeliBful, mainly because the firm had other
remedies under the Sales Tax Act which it had not
available of, The firm, however, obtained a oertificate from the High Court, and filed an appeal in
this Court. Ujjamhai filed this petition under
Art. 32 of the Conetitution for the aame relief's.
(I) A. I. R. 1957 S.C. 790.
l s.c.R.
SUPREME OOURT REroRTS
923
When she obtained a rule in the petition, the firm
did not prosecute the appeal and it was dismissed.
In this petition, she claims a writ of certiorari against
the order of the Sales Tax Officer as also a mandamus to the Department not to levy the tax. Aa a
further precautionary measure, lest it be held that
the remedy under Art. 3~ is misconceived, the· firm
has also applied for the revival of the appeal. · I
shall deal with the application later.
The question is whether the exemption granted by the notification of December 14~ IB57,
exempting bidis conditionally upon payment of
additional duty of excise applied to the petitioner
during the quarter ending June 30, 1958. .This
question depends upon the words of the notification
and the schedule of articles on which additional
duty of excise was payable and the fact whether
such excise duty was, in fact, paid or not. But
the question which has been debated in this oase is
one which a.rises at the very threshold, and it is
this: whether a petition under Art. 32 can lie if
the petitioner alleges a breach of fundamental
right.a, not because the tax ia demanded under a.n
invalid or unconstitutional law but because the
authority is said to have misconstrued certain provisions of that Jaw. The petitioner contends thttit
she has paid additional excise duty on tobacco used
in the m.a.nu!aoture of bidiB and the word "tobacco"
is 1l8ed comprehensively in the Central Excise Salt
Act, 1944, and in Aot No. 58 of 1957 and would
in~ude bidiB in the exemption. The Sales Tax
Oftioer rejeoted this claim, observing:
''The exemption envisaged in this notidoation applies to dealers in respect of uletl ·of
Biris, provided that the additional Central
Excise duties leviable thereon from the ol~g
of b~ess on December 13, 1967, !:\ave been
paid on such goods. The assesaee paid no auoh
ZHI
Bml, VjJcm 8il
"·
Slat. •f Utttr•
h&luA
'
924 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963)
JPQ
Sm'- UJi•m Boi
•
Sl1t1 of Ultar
P'°"sh
H ld94lull•h J.
Excise duties. Sales of Biris by the assessee
are, therefore, liable to Sales Tax."
Whether there has been a misconstruction of
any of the provisions is a matt~r which, of course,
could be considered on revision, or in a reference
to the High Court on point of law arising out of the
order finally passed or even ultimately by appeal to
this Court with its special leave under Art. 136. The
petitioner, however, contends that she is entitled to
file a petition under Art. ~2 of the Constitution, if
by a wrong construction of a provision of law, a
tax is demanded which is not due because it amounts
to a deprivation of property without authorit.y
of law and also a restriction upon her right to carry
on trade or business. The breach of fundamental
rights is thus stated to arise under Arts. 31( l) and
19( I )(g) primarily by the wrong int 'rpretation and
sooondarily by the result thereof, uamely, the de
mand of a tax which is not due. The other side
contends that no fundamental rights can be said to
be breached when the authorities act under a valid
law even though by placing their interpretation on
some provision of law they may err, provided they
have the judediotion to deal with the matter and
follow the principles of natural justice. Any such
error, according to the respondents, must be oorrec·
ted by the ordinary process of appeals or revisions
etc. and 11ot by a direct approach to the Supreme
Court under Art. 32 of the Conlltitution. Both l!lides
cite cases in which petitions under Art. 32 we.re previously filed and disposed of by this Court, eithor
by granting writ.I! or by dismissing the petitions. In
some of them, the question was oonsidjir,ed, but in
some it was not, because 110 objection waA ra;fled.
There, however, appears to be some conflict
on this point. ID KailaaANalA v. 8wte of U.P.(1),
where the allegation was that an exelbption was
(I) A,t.R. 1957 S.C. 790.
-
I S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
925
wrongly refused on a misconstruction of a notification under s. 4 of the U.P. Sales Tax Aot, it was
held that the fundamental rights of the taxpayer
were in jeopardy, and the remedy under Art. 32 was
open. Govinda Menon, J., then observed:
''If tax is levied without due leg&.l authority on any trade or business, then it is open
to the citizen aggrieved to approach this Court
for a. writ under Article 32 since his right to
carry on a trade is violated, or infringed by
the imposition and such being the case
Article J9(l)(g) comes into play."
<
This proposition was rested upon the case of this
Court in the Bengal Immunity Company (1 }; but a
close examination of the latter case shows that no
such proposition wa::? stated there. In the latter
case, exemption was claimed on the ground that the
sales sought to be taxed were made in the course of
inter-State trade and the Bihar Sales Tax Act,
which purported to authorise such levy, offended
Art. 286(2) of the Constitution and thus was invalid.
On the other hand, doubts were cast on the decision
in Kailash Nath's case (2 ) on this point, in Tata.Iron
&: Steel Oo. Ltd. v. S. R. Sarkar l3 ) ; but the question
was left open. The question has now been raised
and argued before this special Bench. In this judgment, I am only concerned with the -question of
constitutional law raised, since I agree with the
interpretation pla.cf\d on the notificatien by my
brother, Kapur, J.
The genera.I principles underlying Pa.rt III of
the Constitution have been stated so often by this
Court that it is hardly necessary to refer to them,
except briefly, before considering to what extent
and in what circumstances aC1tions or orders of judicial, quasi-judicial and aalminiatrative authoritie&
(1) (1955) 2
s.c.R. 603.
(3) (1961) i
l2) A.I.R.1957 s.c. 790,
s.c.a. S79.
19tll
8mt. Ujjam Bai
v.
State of Uttar
Pratl.,sh
H id1_yat11ltah J.
926
1961
Sml. Ujj•m ••;
v, .
,...,,,
Sith •f Utlar
HIJ•y••ull•h "•
SUPREME OOURT REPORTS [1963]
are open to question under Art. 32. The Constitution has accepted a democratic form of Government wi$h the characteri8tic division of authority
of
the
State
between
he
Legislature,
the
Judiciary
and
the
Executive. The
Constitution being federal in form, there is a
further division of powers between the Centre and
the States. This division is also made in the jurisdiction!' of the three Departments of the State. To
achieve these purposes, the distribution of legislative powers is indicated in Part XI and of taxes in
Part XII, and certain special provisions regarding
trade, commerce and intercourse within the territory
of India are placed in Part XIII. In addition to
the11e Parts .of the Constitution, to which some refe·
rence may be necessary hereafter, the Constitution
h&B also in other Parts indicated what things can
only be done by law to be made by Parliament or
the State Legislatures. These Articles are too
numerous to specify here. But this much, however,
is clear that where the Constitution says that a certain thing can be done under authority of law, it
intends to convey that no &ction is justified unless
the legality of that action can be supported by &
law validly made. The above is, in outline, the
general pattern of conferral of power upon the
Legislature and the Executive by the people.
The people, however, regard certain rights as
paramount, because they embrace liberty of action
to the individual in matters of private life, social
intercourse and share in the government of the
country and other spheres. The people who vested
the three limps of Government with their power
and authority, at the same time kept back these
rights of citizens and also sometimes of non-citizens,
and made them inviolable except under certain conditions. The rights thus kept back are placed in
Part III of the Constitution, which is headed
"Fundamental Rights", and the col!ditions under
I S.C.R.
I
·~
•
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
927
which these rights can be abridged are also indicated
in that Part. Briefly stated, the conditions are that
they can be abridged only by a Jaw in the public
interest or to achieve a public purpose. These rights
are not like the Directive Principles, which indicate
the policy and general pattern for State action to
enable India to emerge, after its struggle with
poverty, disease, inequalities and prejudires, as a
welfare State. These Directive Principles are not
justiciable, but any breach of fundamental rights
gives a causft of action to the aggrieved person.
The sum total of this is that the Constitution
insists upon the making of constitutional and
otherwise valid laws as the first step towards State
action. No arbitrary or capricious action affecting
the rights of citizens and others is to be tolerated,
if it is unsupported by such Jaw. But even the
Legislature cannot go beyond the limits set by the
Chapter on Fundamental Rjghts, because ingress
upon those rights is either forbidden absolutely or
on condition that the action is either in an emergency or dictated by the overriding public interest.
The executive can never affect the fundamental
rights unless a valid Jaw enables that to be done.
To secure these fundamental rights, the High Courts
by Art. 226 as part of their genera.I jurisdiction
and the Supreme Court by Art. 32 have been given
the power to deal with any breach complained of
and to rectify matters by the issue of directions,
orders or writs including certain high prerogative
writs. Article 32 is included in the Chapter on
Fundamental Rights, and provides an expressly
guaranteed remedy of approach to the Supreme
Court in all cases where fundamental rights are
invaded. This right is the most valuable right of
the citizen against the State. The Article provides
further that the right of moving the Supreme Court
is also a fundamental right. Thus, it was that this
Court said in RomR,ih, PIUJppar' s ease (1) that thia
fl) [19501 S.C.R. 594,596,597.
1961
Smt. Ujjam Bai
v.
Sl<de of UUor
Pf'aduh
Hidoyatullali J.
Ii
928
1911
wat. Ujjam Bai
••
Stal• 1J Uttar
Piathsi
Hido;1 11Uah J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963]
Court is the protector and guarantor of fuudamen.
ta.I rights, in Rashid Ahmed v. Municipal Board,
Kairana ('}that tho Supreme Court's powers under
Art. 32 !Lre wider than the mere right to issue
prerogative writs, in A. K. Gopalan's case (') that
the fundamental rights a.re the residue from the
power surrendered by the people and kept back by
them to themselves, and in Ohampakam Dora·ijan's
case (') that the fundamental rights are saoros'.l.not
and incapable of being abridged by any legislative
or executive action except to the extent provided
in the appropriate Articles in Part III. It may,
however, be stated that under certain Articles of
the Constitution, laws can be made without a
challenge in Court.a, notwithstanding the Constitution (•e<', for example Art. 329), and other con•iderations may arise in respect of those laws. In this
judgment, therefore, I shall deal with those laws
and situations only, which admittedly are affected
by the Chapter on Fundamental Rights.
The invasion of fundamental rights may
assume many forms. It may proceed directly from
Jaws which conflict with the guaranteed rights. It
may proceed from executive action unsupported
by any valid law or laws or in spite of them.
Examples of both kinds are to be found in the
Reports. In K. 1'. Moopil Nair's case ('), a taxing
statute was held to be discriminatory and also
unreasonable because of the restrictions it created
and was Mtruck down under Arts. 14 and 19 (1) (f)
of the constitution. In Tata Iran & Steel Go., ltd.
c11Be('), a threat to recover a tax twice over was said
to offend fundamental rights. In both these cases,
Art. 32 was invoked successfully. In the first kind
of oases the law itself fails, and if the law fails, so
does any action und~r it. In the second kind of
casee, the laws are valid but in their application,
(ll [19S01 S.C.R. :166.
Cql [106!] 3 S.C.R. 515, 531.
(2) [1950) S.C.R. 88.
{4) [1961) 3 S.C.R. 77.
cs> [196111 s.c.a. s'l!I.
-
I S.C.R.
(
(,
t
I
----.t'
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
929
the exeoutive departments make their own actions
vulnerable. A law can give protection to an action
only which is within itself, but it cannot avail, if
the action it outside. Thus, in Ohintaman Rao' s
case (1), a law was struck down because it arbitrarily ·
and excessively invaded a fundamental right and in
Lachmandas Kewalram Ahuja v. The State of
Bombay (2), s. 12 of the Bombay Public Safety
Mea'sures Act, 1947 was declared void (after January
~6, 1950) as it did not proceed upon any purported
classification. Of these two cases, the first was a
petition under Art. 32 of the Constitution and the
latter, an appeal on a certificate of the High Court
under Art. 132 of the Constitution. The method
of approach to this court was different, but it made
no difference to the application of the provisions of
Part III. There are other such decisions, but these
two will suffice.
The inference is, therefore, quite clear that
this Court will interfere under Art. 32 if a breach of
fundamental rights comes before it. and indeed, it
was so stated in Ramesh Thappar's case(") that this
Court"cannot, consistently with the responsibility so laid upon it, refuse to entertain applications seeking protection against infringements of such rights,"
although such applications are made to the Court
in the first instance without resort to a High Court,
and the American cases about exhausting of other
remedies were not followed. In Himmatlal'8. case(')
this Court issued a writ prohibiting asseBBD:tent of
a tax under an invalid law, even though there was
no assessment begun or even a threat of one. In
K. K. Kochunni Moopil Nayar v. State of Madras (11 )
(1) (1950)(5.C.R. 759.
(2) (1952) s.c.R. 710.
l3) (1950) S.C.R. 594, 596, 597.
(4) (1954) S.C.R. Jl22.
(~) 195 9) Supp. 2 S.C. R.. 316, 325,
11111
Smt. UJjdlTI B Ii
·~.
S1~r,:~
H id11yt11•llala J.
930
19~•
S,,,,, Ujj.., B•i
v.
p,.,,.,,
S,,,t. .fUllll>
SUPR.EME OOURT REPORTS [1963J
]i)as, C. J. after considering all previous oases of
this Court la.id down.
"Further, even if the existence of other
adequate legal remedy may be t11ken into
consideration by the High Court in deciding
whether it should isaue any of the prerogative
writs on a.n applioa.tion under Art. 226 of the
Constitution, as tci which we say nothing now
-this Court cannot, on a similar ground
decline to entertain a petition under Art. 32,
for the right to move this Court by appropriate proceedings for the enforcement of the
rights conferred by Part III of the Constitution is itself a guaranteed right."
In that case, the learned Chief Justice said that, if
nflcessary, this Court may even get a fact or facts
proved by evidence.
The view expressed in the last case finds
further support from what Gajendraga.dkar, J., ea.id
very recently in Darya-0 v. The, State of U. P. ('):
''If the petition field in the High Court
under Art. 226 is dismissed not on the merits
but because of the !aches of the party applying for the writ of because it is held that the
party had an alternative remedy available to
it, then the dismissal of the writ petition
would not constitute a bar to a subsequent
petition under Art. 32 except in cases where
and if the facts thus found by the High
Court may themselves be relevant even under
Art. 32."
Gajendragadkar, J. then went on to consider the
matter from the point of view of res judicata, and
held that in some cases, that principle would apply
if no appeal against the order of the High Court
was field, but not in others. This must be so,
(I) [1962] I s.c,a. 51t.
I S.O.R.
.,
I
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
931
because if there is a decision of the High Court
negating fundamental rights or their breach, then
the decision of the competent Court must be
removed by appeal to establish the rights or their
breach.
From these oases, it follows that what may be
said about a direct appeal to this Court without
following the intermediate steps may not be said
a.bout Art. 32, because resort to other forums for
parallel reliefs is strictly not necessary where a
party complains of breach of fundamental rights.
Of course, when he makes an application under
Art. 32, he take ~he risk of either succeeding or failing
on that narrow issue, and a finding of the High
Court or some tribunal below on some point, if not
1et aside in appropriate proceedings, may stand in
his way. The right under Art. 32 is not a right of
appeal, and cannot be used as such, and this Court
may not be in a position to examine the case with
the same amplitude as in an appeal. But, if a
party takes the risk of coming to this court direot
on the narrow issue, he cannot be told that he has
other remedies. To take this restricted view of
Art. 32 may, in some cases, by delay or expense involved in the other remedies, defeat the fundamental
rights before even they oa.n be claimed. But this
is not to say that the other remedies are otiose.
The iBBue to be tried under Art. 32 is a narrow one,
and once that issue fails, everything else must fail.
In jurisdictions like that under Art. 226 and/or in
appeals under Art. 132 or Art. 136, not only can
the breach of fundamental rights be considered but
all other matters which the Court may permit to be
raised. It, therefore, follows that if a person
chooses to invoke Art. 32, he cannot be told that
he must go elsewhere first. The right to move this
Court is gnara.nteed. But this Court in. dealing
with the petition will deal with it from the narrow
=int
of £und-.Jrtal • • and •ot as ..
1961
Sme. Ujjam Bai
v•
State of Uttar
Pra""sh
932
190I
.
Sml, Ujjom Boi
Slol< of Ullar
l'rodls•
Bld1f1dwlola J,
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963]
Though the
area
of
action
may
be thus
limited,
the power
exercisable
therein are vast. The power to issue writs in the
nature of the five high prerogative writs of heheas
corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and
certiorari is, in itself, sufficient to compel obedience
by the State (as defined in Art. 12) a.nd observance
by it of the Constitution and the laws in all cases
where a breach of fundamental right or rights is
established. The writ of mandamus is a very flexible writ and has always been called in aid to ampliate justice and proves sufficient in most cases of
administrative lapses or excesses. Then, there is
the writ of certiorari to get rid of orders which affect
fundamental rights, the writ of prohibition to stop
action before it can be completed, the writ of quo
warrnto to question a wrongful assumption of office,
and lastly, the writ of habeas corpus to secure liberty. Indeed, an observed by Lord Atkin (then,
Atkin, L. J.) in Rex v. Electricity Commissioners('):
"Whenever any body or persons having
legal authority to determine questions affecting the rights of subjects and having the duty
to act judicially act in excess of their legal
authority they are subject to the controlling
jurisdiction of the Kings Bench Division
exercised in these writs."
What was said of judicial action and of the
writ of certiorari applies equally to other writs and
actions of administrative agencies, which are executive or ministerial. The powers of the Supreme
Court and the High Courts in our country are no
whit less than those of the Kings Rench Division.
Indeed, the power conferred on him is made even
more ample by enabling these superior Courts to
issue in addition to the Prerogative Writs, directions orders and writs other than the named wtita,
and the concluding words of Art. 32 (2} "whioi.evet
(1) (l!laf) IL B.171, 20$.
..
1s.c.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
933
may be appropriate, for the enforcement of any of
IHI
the rights conferred by this Part (Part III)" show
SmJ, UjJ.,,.&I
the wide ambit of the power. As far back as
Basa'PPa v. Nagappa (1), Mukherjea, J. (as he then
was) observed:
"In view of the express provisions in our
Constitution we need not now Jook back to
the early history or the procedural technicalities of these writs in English law, nor feel
oppressed by any differences or change of
opinion expressed in particular cases by
English Judges."
Speaking then· of the writ of certiorari the
learned Judge added:
''We can make an order or issue a writ
in the nature o( certiorari in all appropriate
cases and in appropriate manner, so longa.s
we keep to the broad and fundamental principles that regulate the exercise of jurisdiction
in the matter of granting such writH in English
law.''
What has been said here has my respectful
concurrence, and is applicable to the other wtjta
also. These principles have now become firmly
esta.bli~ed in the interpretation of Arts. 32 '»ld 226
of the Constitution. The difference in tne two Ai:ticles is in two respects:· firstly, Art, 32 is available
only for the enforcement of fundamental rights, but
the High Courts can use the powers for other purpQaes (a power which Parliament can also confer
on the Supreme Court by law, vide Art. 139), and
secondly, that the right of moving the Supre1JJ.e
CQurt is itself a guaranteed right (Art. 32 (I) and
is unaffeoted by the powers o/ the High Court
(Art. 226 (2) ).
The foregoiqg is a ree,ume of the interpretfi,tlions pl8\Ced upon Art. ~2, but t~ere are other p~o
,viliont.Qf tbe Conatitut.iQll relating tP the Supi:eriie
(1) (1955) J. s. c. R.. 2$0, 256.
'·
Stal,.oJ U11a r
Pra"16
lliJf.1tdulU1t J.
934
1112
Smi. b'jjaa B•i
••
Stat~ of Utear
Pr•iesA
HiJoy•tulloA J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963)
Court whioh must be viewed alongside, beoause the
Supreme Court has other roles to perform under
the Constitution. Those provisions give an indication of how the Supreme Court is intended to use
its powers.
The Supreme Court is me.de, by Arts. 133 and
134, the final Court of appeal over the High Court
in all civil and criminal matters, though the right
of appeal arises only in certain ole.sses of cases and
subject to certain conditions. Under Arts. 132 and
133 (2), the Supreme Court is also the final Court of
appeal over the High Court in all matters involving
an interpretation of the Constitution. By Art. 136,
the Supreme Court has been given the power
to grant, in its discretion, speoie.l leave to appeal
to itself from any judgment, decree, determination,
sentence or order in any cause or matter passed or
made by any Court or tribunal in the territory of
India. The last power is overriding, beoause Art. 136
commences with the words "notwithstanding any
thing in this Chapter". Only one exemption has
been made in favour of a Court or tribunal constituted by or ordered under any law relating to the
Armed Forces.
There are other jurisdictions of the Supreme
Court also, whioh may be qescribed as advisory
and original, arising in special circumstances with
which we are not concerned. The appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court sets it at the top of the
hierarchy of civil and oriminal Courts of civil judicature. Articles 132, 133, 134 and 135 make the
Supreme Court the fine.I Court of appeal but only in
cases which are first carried before the High Court
in accordance with the law relating to those cases.
Access to the Supreme Court under Arts. 132-135
is not direct but through the High Court. There
can be no abridging of that process. But, under
Art. 136, the Supreme Court has the jurisdiction to
·-
J
t S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
935
grant special leave, though it has declared in several cases that it would exercise it1 discretion under
Art. 136 only against a final order. Bee Ohandi
Prasad Olwlckani v. State of Bihar (1). Indian Aluminium Co. v. OommiBsioner of lnoome tax (2 ) , and
Kankaiyalal Lokia v. Oommissioner of Income-tax (•).
In exercising the discretionary powers to grant
special leave, the Supreme Court now insists on the
aggrieved party exhausting all its remedies under
the law before approaching it.
From what has been said above, it is clear
that there are three approaches to this Court, and
they are: (a) by appeal against the decision of the
High Court, (b) by special leave granted by this
Court against the decision of any Court or tribunal
in India. and (c) by a petition under Art. 32. No
Court or tribunal in India other than the Supreme
Court and the High Courts has been invested with
the jurisdiction to deal with breaches of fundamental rights, though the Constitution has reserved the power to Parliament to invest by law this
jurisdiction in any other Court [Art 32 (3)]. As a
result, the enforcement of fundamental rights can
only be had iii the High Court or the Supreme Court.
In most taxation laws, there is a jurisdiction and a
right to invoke . the advisory jurildiotion of the
High Court and in some there is a right of appeal
or revision to the High Court, but the .question of
a breach of fundamental rights cannot be raised in
the prooeedings before the tribunals. In its advisory jurisdiction, the High Court can only anewer
the question referred to it or raise one which
arises out of the order passed and in its appellate
and revisional jurisdiction, the High Court oan deal
with ~he matter on law or fact or both (as the case
may be) but only in so far as the tribunal has the
jurisdiction. In these jurisdictions, the plain quest;.
ion of the enforcement of fundamental rights may
(1) (1962) 2
s. c. R.. 2'6.
(2) Cl'lil ADl>eal No.1'16of1959clecldod C111April2f, 1'61,
(I) C-) 2-ac.a,-
11111
sm~ cyjM.J.1.Bai
••
set..11,,JUuor
P"-tl1t11
HiBYlltulJM J.
936
196B
Smt. Ujjam Bai
••
Stall •I Uttar
Pradesh
H id41<Jlulld J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS £1963]
not arise. There is, however, nothing to prevent
a party moving a separate petition under Art. 32
of the Constitution and raising the issue, as was
actually done in this case. The result thus is that
no question of a hr-each of fundamental rights can
arise except under Arts. 226 and 32 of the Constit·
ution, and it must be raised before the High Court
and the Supreme Court respectively, by a proper
petition. But, where the High Court decide!! such
an issue on a petition under Art. 226, the question
can be brought before this Court under Arts. 132
and 136.
If this be the true position, and if this Court
can only deal with question of breach of fundamental rights in petitions under Art. 32 and in
appeals against the orders of the High Court under
Art. 226, I am of opinion that a petition under
Art. 32 must always lie where a breach)s complained
of, though, I must say again, if the matter is brought
before this Court under Art. 32, the only question
that can be considered is the breach of fundamental rights and none other.
The right to move this Court being guaran·
teed, the petition may lie, but there are other thing
to consider before it can be said in what cases
this Court will interfere. I shall now con8ider in what kind of cases the powers under Art. 32
will be used by this Court. Since this case arises
under a taxing statute, I shall confine myself to
taxing laws, because other considerations may arise
in other circumstances and the differing facts are
sometimes so subtle as to elude one, unless they
are before him. The challenge on the ground of a
breach of fundamental rights may be against a law
6r against executive action. I am leaving out of
account action by the Courts of civil judicature, and
am not pausing to consider whether the word
"State" as defined in Art. 12 includes the ordinary
Courts of civil judicature. That question does not
S.C.R.
SUPREME OOURT REPORTS
937
arise here and must be left for decision in a case in
which it properly does. Whether or not be word
"State'' covers the ordina.ry Courts, there is authority to show tha.t tribu11a.ls which play the dua.l role
as dooiding issues in a qua.si-judioial way and acting
as the instrumentalities or Governmeints are within
the word "State" as used in Part· III of the Constitution. In the Bidi Supply Oo., v. Union of lndia(1),
Das, C. J., observed:
"Here •the State' which includes its
lncome·tax department has by an illegal order
denied to the petitioner, as compa.red with
other Bi di merchants who , are similarly
situate, equality before the law or the equal
•protection of laws and the petitioner can legitimately complain of an infraction of ~is fundamental rights under article 14 of thA Constitution."
Again, in GuUapaUi Nage.JJWara Rao v. SUite of Andkra
Prade.sh (2 ) it was observed:
"The concept or a quasi-judicial act
implies that the act is not wholly judicial; it
describes only a duty cast on the executive
body or authority to oonform to norms of
judicial procedure in performinl? some acts in
ex~roise of its executive power."
The taxing departments are instrumentalities of the
State. They are not a part of the legislature; nor
a.re they a part of the judiciary. Their functions
are the assessment and collection of taxes, and in
the prooeas of assessing taxes, they have po follow
& pattern or •ctioa, which is 'considered judicial.
They &re not thereby coverted into Courts of civil
judio&ture. They stiU remain the instrumentalities
of the State l\Dd are within the definition of 'State'
in Art. 12. In this view of the m11.tter, their actions
(I'
(JCl!6) SC.R. 267, 277.
(2) {l 959) Sul'P. l S.C.R 319, 353, 3Sf.
1962
Smt. fljjam Bai
v.
SMeof Utlar
P1qt/eJh
Hida;ialullah J.
938
1962
Smi. Ujjam Bai
v.
Slatt of U. P.
Pradts~.
Hid•>alullflh J.
SUPREME COURT REI'ORTS [1963]
must be regarded, in the ultimate analysis, as executive in nature, since their determinations result in
the demand of tax wh.ich neithr·r the legislature nor
the judiciary c.m collect. TJ-rns, the actions of these
quasi-judicial bodies may be open to challenge on
the-ground of breach of fundamental rights.
I have already said that the attack on fundamental rights may proceed from laws or from executive aotion. Confining myself to taxation laws
and executive action in furtherance of taxation laws,
I shall now indicate how the breaches of fundamenta.l rights c»n arise and the extent of interference by
this Court under Art. 32. Taxing Jaws have to conform to provisions in Part XII of the Constitution:
they are circumscribed further by Part XIII, and
they can only be made by an appropriate legislature
as indicated in Part XI. These are the provisions
dealing with the making of taxing laws. The total
effect of these provisions is summed up in Art. 165,
which says:
"No tax shall be levied or collected except by
authority of law."
Law is thus a condition precedent to the demand
of a tax. A tax cannot be levied by the State, unless a law to that effect exists, and that law must
follow and obey all the directions in the Constitution about· the· making of laws. In other words,
the law must be one validly made.
Taxation laws may suffer from two defects,
and they are: (a) if they are not made within the
four corners of the powers conferred by the Constitution Oll thP particular legislature, Or (b) if ther,
are opposed to fundamental rights. A law may fail
as ultra vires, though it is not opposed to fundamental rights, because it, is outside the powers of the
legislature that enacted it, or because it is a colourable exercise of power, or if the law was not made
in accordance with the special procedure for making
l S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
939
it. A simple example is imposition of Profession
Tax by Parliament, which it has no power to
i~pose, or the imposition of a tax above Rs. 250
per year on a single person by the State Legislature,
which is beyond the powers of the State Legislature.
In these cases, the laws fail, because in the first
case, Parliament lacks the power completely, and
in the second, because the State Legis]ature transgresses a limit set for it. Such a law is no law at
all, and will be struck down under Art. 265 read
with the appropriate provisions of the Constitution.
A qu~stion arising under Art. 265 cannot be brought
before the Supreme Court under Art.32, because that
Article is not in the Chapter on Fundamental
Rights. But an executive action to enforce the law
would expose the executive action to the processes
of Arts. 226 and 32, if a fu~damental right to carry
on a profession or an occupation, trade or bui?iness
is put in jeopardy. In the order of reference in this
case, this position is summed up in the following
observation:
''Where the provision is void, the protec·
tion under Art. 265 fails, and what remains
is only unauthorised interference with property
or trade by a State Officer, and.articles 19(l)(f)
and (gl are· attracted."·
Where the law fails being opposed to fundamental rights as, for example, when it is void
because it involves discrimination or otherwise
invades rights protected by Part III, the protection
of Art. 265 is again lost. Indeed, the Jaw fails not
because of Art. 265 but because of Art. 13, and a
cause of action under Art. 35· may arise. This was
reco~ised in K. T. Moopil Nair v. State of Kerala( 1 )
where it w~s observed:
.
, "Article 265 imposes a limitation on the
taxing power .of the State in so far as it
provides that the State shall not levy or
CI> c1g&1) s s.c.R. 11.
1982
Smt. Ujjam Bai
v.
Stale of Uttar
Pradesh
Hida:ritullah J.
940
1951
Smt. Ujjam Bai
••
Slltte 'J Uttar
PrMfoh
Hid•µtullah J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1963]
collect a tax, except by a11thority of law, that
is to say, a tax cannot be levied or collected
by a mere executive fiat. It has to be don"
by authority of law, which· must mean valid
law. In order that the law may be valid, the
tax proposed to be levied must be within the
legislative competence of the Legislature imposing a tax and authorising the collection
thereof and, secondly, the tax must be subject
to the condit,ions laid down in Art. 13 of the
Constitution. One of such cJnditioos envisaged
by Art. 13(2) is that the L~gislature shall not
ma.ke any Jaw which takes away or abridges
the equality clause in Art. 14, which enjoins
the State not to deny to any person equality
before the law or the equal protection of the
laws of the country. It cannot be disputed
that if the Act infringe3 the provisions of
Art. 14 of the Constitution, it m1i<t be struck
down as unconstitutional".
This arose in a petition under Art. 32 of the Constitution.
It appears that taxation laws were unsuccessfully challenged under Art. 32 of1 the Constitution
as a brPach of Art. 31( 1) in Ramjilal's case(') and
Laxmanappa Hanumantappa v. Union of India(').
In the former, the reason given was:
"Reference has next to be made to article
265 which is in Part XII, Chapter I. dealing
with 'Finance'. That article provides that no
tax shall be levied or collected except by
authority of law. There was no similar provision in the corresponding chapter of the
Government of India Act, 1935. If collection
of taxes amounts to deprivation of property
within the meaning of Art. 31 ( 1), then there
was no point in making a separat.e provi8icn
(!)
(1951) S.C.R.127.
(2) (195) 1 S C.R. 769.
I
1 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
941
again as has been made in article 265. It,
therefore, follows that cla.use (1) of article 31
must be regarded as concerned with deprivation of property otherwise than by the imposition or . collection of tax, for otherwise
article 265 becomes wholly redundant ........ .
In our opinion, the protection against imposition and collection of taxes save by authority
of the law directly comes from article 265,
and is not secured by clause ( 1) of article 31.
Article 265 not being in Chapter III of the
Constitution, its protection is not a fundamental right which can be enforced by an application to this Court under article :.12.ilt is not our
purpose to say that the right secured by article 265 may not be enforced. It may certainly
be enforced by adopting proper proceedings.
All that we wish to state is that this applica.tion in so far as it purports to be founded ct>n
article 32 read with article 31(1) to this Court
is misconoeiv~d and must fa.ii."
Similar observations were made in the other case.
If by these observations it is meant ts convey
that - the protection under Art. 265 cannot be
soug~t b.y 8: ~tition .under Art. 32, I entirely agree.
But if it is meant to ·convey that a taxing law
which is ·opposed to funda.mentaJ rights must be
tested only under Art. 265, I find it difficult to
agree. Artiole3 31 (1) and 265 speak of the same
condition. A comparison of these two Articles
shows this:
Art. 31 (1)-:-"No person shall be deprived
of his property save by authority of law."
Art. 265-"No tax shall be levied or
collected except by authority of law."
The Chapter on Fundamenta;l, Rights hardly stands
in need of support from Art. 265. If t~
1968
Sml. Ujj11m Bal
V•
Btala of Uller
Protluh
Hil~.u.A.J.
942
Smt. Ujjam B•i
v.
Stute of Uttar
PradeJh
H ida.Jaliollah J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1963)
law is void under that Chapter, and property is
seized to recover a tax which is void, I do not see
Where the
why Art. 32 cannot be invoked.
authority of the law fails a tax, Art. 265 is offended,
and the tax cannot be collected. A collection of
such a tax will also offend Art. 32. Where the law
is opposed to fundi.mental rights, and in the collec·
tion of such a void tax, a person is deprived of his
property, Art. 31(1) is offended. It ;s not possible
to circumscribe Art. 32 by making the remedy
only upon Art. 265.
From this, it is clear that la.we whioh do not
offend Pa.rt III and a.re not otherwise ultra vires are
protected from any challenge whether under
Art. 265 or under the Chapter on Fundamental
Rights. Where the laws are ultra vires but do not
per se offend fundamental rights (to distinguish
the two kinds of defects), they are capable of a
challenge under Art. 265, and the executive action,
under Art. 32. Where they are intra vire8 otherwise but void being opposed to fundamental rights,
they can be challenged under Art. 265 and also
Art. a2.
This position, however, changes radically
when the law is valid but the action under it is
challenged. The real difference in such calll'S
arises, because the law is not challenged at a.II.
What is challenged is the interpretation of the law
by the taxing authorities, and · a breach of funda.·
mental rights is said to arise from the wrong interpretation. In considering this matter, several kinds
of cases must be noticed. Where the action of an
officer of the l:\tate is wholly without jurisdiction
(as, for example, wheJl a sales tax officer imposes
income-tax or vice versa, though such things are
hardly likely to happen), it can have no support from the law he purports· to apply. Cases of
jurisdiction thus come within Art: 32. Other examples are an attempt to recover a tax twice over,
1 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
943
1981
where the first collection is legal (Ta-ta I r<m and
Steel Company's case (1); or ·acting beyond the period sm1. l/jj4m Bal
of limitation (Madanlal Arora v. The, Exoi,se and
Stal6 pf Uttar
Taxatioh Officer, Amritsar) (2 ). In suoh oases, even
Prtululi
if the tax.ing ap.thority thought on its own understanding of the law that· it was acting within its Fli4;.,--;,,,"" J.
jurisdiction, it would not avail, and the want of
jurisdiction, if proved, would attract Art. 32. Speak-.
ing of suoh a situation, the ord,er of reference in
this case has said:
1 'This again is a case in ·which the autho- ·
rity had no jurisdiction under t.he Act to take
proceedings for assessment of tax, and it
makes no difference that such assumption of
jurisdiction was bas<:>d on a misconstruction of
statutory provisions."
...
'
'l he above was s~id of Madanlal Arora's case (2).
But where the law in made validly ~.nd in conformity with the fundamental rights and the officer
enforcing it aots with jurisdiction, other considera
tions arise. If, in the course of his duties, he ha
to construe provisions of law and miscarries,. it gives
a right of appeal and revision, where such lie, and
in other appropriate cases, resort can be had to the
provisions of Arts .. 226 and 227 of the Constitution,
and the matter brought before this Court by further
appeals. This is because every erroneous decision
does not give rise to a. breach of fundamental rights.
Every right of appeal or revision cannot be said to
merge in the enforcement of . fundamental rights .
.Such errors can onJy be corrected by the processes
of appeals and l'evisions. Article 32 does not, as
already stated, C<?nfer an appellate or revisional
jurisdiction on this Court, and if the law is valid
and the decision with jurisdiction, the protection of
· Art. 265 in not destroyed. There is only one exception to this, and it lie.s within extremely narrow
{I) . (1961) IS.CR. 379.
( 2) 0962) 1 S.C.R.. 823.
944 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (196:J]
-
$ml. Ujjant Bai
••
Stak oJ Uttar
h d·1h
Hidayolul/all J.
limits. That exception also bears upon j11risdiction,
where by a misconstmcticm the State Officer or a
quasi-judicial trib11nal embarks upon an action
wholly outside the pale of the law he is enforcing.
If, in those circ11mstances, his accion oonstitutes a
breach of fondamental rights, than a petition undt>r
Art. 32 may lie. The cases of this Court in whioh
interference can be sustained on this ground are
many; but as examples may be seen the follow~~:
Amar Singh, case (1) and Mohan/,al Hargwind 8
case('}. The firs\ is not a. case of a ~ing statute,
but the second is.
The decision in Kailas Nat,h,'s case ('), with
respect, appears to have u11duly widened the last
narrow approach by including cases of interpretation
of provisions of law where the error is not appa.ren·
tly one of jurisdiction a.s within Art. 32. It cited as
authority the case of Bengal Immunity. Company('),
which does not bear out the wide proposition. The
oa.se involved a.n interpretation of notification to
find out whether an exemption applied to a. pa.rti·
cula.r cMe or not, !Wld no question of want of jurisdiction, a.s explained by me, a.rose there. Kaila.'!
N ath's case (') does not appear to confine the exercise of powers under Art. 32 to oases cf errors of
j11risdiction. In my opinion-and I say it respectfully-it must be regarded as· having st.&ted the .
proposition a little too widely.
Whether taxing statutes whioh have the protection of Art. z65 can be questioned under
Arts. t 9(l)(fj and (g) is a subject, whioh need not be
gone into in this case. I do not, therefore, expreu
any opinion upon it. Hero, the several statutes and
the notification are not. challenged as ultra llirea.
What j.e claimed is that by a wrong interpretatioil
of the word 'bidis' and •tobacco' as Wied in the
notification of December 14, 1957, an exemption is
(ll (19'5) 2S.C.R. 303.
\3) A.l.R. 1957 S.C. 79.
(2! (r955
(1955l 2 S.C. R. 509.
2s.c.R.60S.
(4
I
I S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
945
denied to the petitioner, to which she wa.s entitled,
and this affects her f ..mcfamental rights unJer
Arts. 31( l) and l9( l)(g). This is not an tH-r0r of
jurisdiction. Whether the Sales Tax Officer's intapretation is right. .. or the contrary interpretation
suggested on behalf of the petitioner is right, is a
matter for decision on the merits · of the case. If
there is an error, it can be corrected by resorting to
appeals, revisions, references to the High Court and
ultimately by appeal to this Court. This Court can'
not ignore these remedies and embark upon an examina.tion of the law and the interpretation placed
by the authorities, when no question of jurisdiction
is involved. To do so would be to convert the
powers under Art. 32 into those of an appeal.
In my opinion, the petition under Art. 32 il5 misconceived in the circumstances of this case. I would,
therefore, dismiss it with costs.
As regards the application of the appeal, I am
of opinion that the party was negligent in not
prosecuting it. I would therefore, dismiss the
applioatio:µ for restoration but without any order
a.bout costs.
AYYANG.U, J.,-l'bis bench has been constitu. ted for deciding the following two questions set out
at the conclusion of what might be termed the order
.of reference (1) : Is an order of assessment made by
an authority under a taxing statute which is intra
vires, open to challenge ~s .repugnant to Art. t9( l)(g)
on the sole ground that it is based on a mis-construction of a provision of the Act or of a notification issued thereunder? (2) Can the validity of
r,uch an order be questioned in a. petition under
Art. 32 of the Constitution? Though the matter was
not discussed with any eJaborate.ness, both these
questions were answered in the affi.rm~tive by this
Court in Kailal1lmath v. The Stale of U.P. ( 1 )~ .ln
effect therefore the bench has been ooDStituted .
for
(1) A.I.R. [i957] S.C. 79.
1962
S11 t. Ujjam Bai
v.
State •f Utt.:i-r
Pr. deJh
Hid1y .tullah J.
AJJ'Ongar J •
946
Smi. Ujjom B• i
Y;
Sf1.l1 of Uttar
Prad-"slt
SUPREME OOURT REPORTS (1963]
coneidering the correctness of the decision on these
points in Kai,lashna.th's case.
Before proceeding to consider the submiasiOI\S
of learned Counsel on either side it is necessary to
point out two matters;
(I) It was agreed before us that in deciding
the first question set out above we need not consider the special features applicable to taxing legislation and in particular the point a.s to whether
the constitutional validity of such legislation could
be tested with reference to the criteria. laid down
by Art. 19(1 )(f); in other words, the limits to which
Art. 19 would be attracted to a. law imposing 'a tax.
The disou~sion in this judgment therefore proceeds
on the ba.slS of there being no distinction between
a law imposing a tax and other laws.
(2) · Th.e second matter which I consider it
necessary to state a.t the outset is that notwithstanding the industry of Counsel which has enabled
them top lace before us quite a. large number of
decisions of this Court which have been referroo to
in the judgments of Kapur and Subba Rao, JJ., in
none of them was the point approached with reference to the matters argued before us. Some of
these decisions proceed on the basis that in the
circumstances stated in question No. 1 a fundamental right had been invaded and on that basis
afforded to the petitioner before them the relief
sought. Other decisions state that no fundamental
right was involved in the grievance put forward by
the petitioners before them and relief has been
refused on that basis. In none of them was the
question discussed on principle as to when a.lone a.
fundamental right would be invaded and in particular as to whether a breach by a. quasi-judicial
authority of the provisions of a law which is otherwise valid, could involve an invasion of a. fundamental right. For this reason I propose to discuss
I
'
1s.c.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
947
the question on prinoiple a.nd without reference to
the decisions which· were placed before UB at the
hearing. I feel forth.er justified in doing so because
they have all been referred to in the judgment of
Kapur, J., and di~cussed in detail by Subba 1-t:w, J.
I shall now proceed to consider what in my
view should be the answer to the first of the questions propounded for our deoision and am ignoring
the ref~rence therein to a taxing enactment. Pa~.1sing here it might be useful to recall briefly the
function of Part III in the Constitution. The rule
of British Constitutional Law and in general of tho
Dominion Con1Jtitutions framed by the British Par. liament might broadly · be stated to be that it
asserts the sovereignty of the Legislature in the
sense that witliin the sphere of its . activity in the
ca~e of a Federal Constitution a.nd in every sphere
in the case of a unitary one its will was supreme
and was the law of the land which the Courts were
bound to administer. As Dicey has pointed out,
there are no legal limits to the sovereignty of
Parliament. Public opinion, as well as the fear
engendered by the possibility of a popular revolt,
might impose praotfoal restraints upon the exercise
of sovereignty but so would be the limitations or
restraints dictated by good sense, justice or a sense
of fairplay. But so far as the Jega.l position wa.s
concerned, any law made by Parliament was legal
and could be enforced. Our Constitution makers
did not conitider that to the conditions this country such a vesting ·of power in the legislatures or in
the State would be proper or just or calculated to
further the liberty of the individual which they
considered was essential for democratic progress.
It was in these circumstances and with these ideas
that they imposed fetterson ~tat"e action in Part
III, entitled "Fundamental Rights',. Article 13 laid
down'. .that "every law· whether made before or
after the Constitution which was inconsistent with
of
1962
..
Smt. Ujj11m B·1i
St11te <J' Ut•ar
P1ad11h
.Ay_~angar J.
948
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963]
.
/
-
1•6Z
Smt. Ujjam Dai
v.
Stalt nf UttfJr
Pradesh
the rights guarauteed by the succeeding Articles
should, save a.a otherwise expressly provided, be
invalid to the extent of the repugna.ncy". And
"law" was defined in a comprehensive manner so as
to include not merely laws made by Parliament or
the legislatures but every piece of subsidiary legis·
Jation including even notifications. The scheme
theref.1re of the Constitution makers was to prescribe a code of conduct. to which State action ought
to conform if it should pass the test of constitutio·
nality. The rights included in the eighteen Articles, starting from 14 up to 31, comprehend provisions for ensuring guarantees against any State
action for protecting the right to life, liberty, and
property, to trade and occupation, besides including
the right to freedom of thought, belief and worship.
The general scheme of Part III may be stated thus:
Certain of the freedoms are absolute, i.e., subject
to on limitations, e.g., Art. 17, Art. 20(1). In
respect of certain others the Articles ( vide Art. 19)
set out the precise freedom guaranteed as well as
its content and the qualifications to which the exercise of that freedom might be subjected by enacted law or action taken ·under such law. Having
thus enuJilerated these freedoms and laid down the
limitations, if any to which they could be subjected
Art. 32 vests in the Supreme Court the authority
and jurisdiction to ensure th~t the fundamental
rights granted by Part III are not violated, and
even the right to move this Court for appropriate
relief for infraction of a fundamental right is itself
made a fundamental right which ordinary legislation
may not affect. The purpose of my drawing attention to these features is two fold: ( 1) to emphasize
the great value which the Constitution-makers
attached to the :(reedoms guaranteed .as the sine
qua non of progress and the need which they considered for marking out a field which was immune
from State action, and (2) the function of this
,.
'
I
I S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
949
Court as a guardian of those righ~s for the maintenance of individual liberty enshrined in the Constitution. It was with advertance to this aspect
of the matter that this Court observed in Daryao
v. The State of U. P. (1 ):
I
\
"There can be no doubt that the fundamental right guaranteed by Art. 3~(1) is a
very impprtant safeguard for the proteotion
of ·the fundamental rights of the citizens, and
as a result of the said guarantee this Court
ha.s been entrusted with the solemn task of
upholding the fundament~l rights of the
citizens of this country. The fundamental
rights are intended not only to protect individual's rights but they are based-on high public
policy. Liberty of the individual and t.he
protection of his fundamental rights are t.he
very essence of the democratic way of life
adopted by the Constitution, and it is the
privilege and the duty of this court to uphold
those , rights. This Court would naturally
refuse to circumscribe them or to curtail them
exoept as provided by the Constitution Itself.
It iS because of this aspect of the matter
that in Ramesh Thr;ippar v. The State of Madras,
( 1950 S. · C." R. 594) in the very first year
after the Constitution came into force, this
Court rejec~ed a preliminary objection raised
against the competence· of a petition filed
under Art. 32 on the ground that as matter of
orderly procedure the petitioner should first
have resorted to the High Court under
Art. 226, and observed that 'this Courtis thus
constituted the protector and guarantor of the
fundamental rights, and it cannot, consistently With the responsibility BO }aid upon it,
refuse to entertain applications seekio~ protection against infringements of such rights'.
Thu9 the right given to the citizen to move
(I}
(1962) IS.CR. SH.
-1961
Smt. Ujiam Bai
v.
State. of Utt4r
Pradesh
..4yvangar J,
950
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963]
i
196!
Smt. Ujjam Bai
•• u11..
si... •!
,...,..,h
this Court by a petition under Art, 32 and
claim an appropriate writ against the unconstitutional infringement of his fundamental
rights itself is a matter of fundamental right,
and in dealing with the objection based on
the applications of the rule of res judicaf,a
this aspect ~f the matter has no doubt to be
borne in mind."
Before dealing with the merits of the case it
is necessary to mentio11 that the following positions
were conceded on the side of the respondent and,
in my opinion, properly: (1) If the ·levy was
imposed or the burden laid on a citizen (as the
petition before us is. concerned with a legislation
imposing a tax I am using phraseology appropriate
to such an enactment, but as would be seen, the
principle is of wider application and would cover
infringement of liberties other than in relation to
property and by laws other than in relation to
taxation) by a statute beyond the competence of a
legislature to enact as not falling within . the relevant entry in the le~islative. list the action by
government or governmental officers would involve
the violation of the freedom guaranteed by Art. 19
(l}(f)-to acquire, hold and dispose of property or
by clause (g) to .carry on any trade or busineBB,
either the one or the other and in some cases both
and could therefore furnish a right to . invoke .the
jurisdiction of this Court Art. 32 notwithstanding
that the particular action impugned was by a
quasi-judicial authority created under such an
enactment. The reason for this concession must
obviously be that the authority functioning under
such a law could have no legal basis for its existence .and therefore his or its action would be without authority of Jaw. (2) The legislature may
profess to legislate under a specified head of legislative power which it has, but might in reality be
seeking to achieve indirectly what it could not do
/
1 s.c.R.
•
•
'
\
~)
-
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
951
directly. In such a case also it was conceded that
the tax imposed would infringe the guarantee
etn.lndied in Art.l9(l}(f) and (g). It wo11ld, however,
be seen that this is in reality merely one manner in
which there might be lack of legislative power
already dea.lt with under head (U, (3) The same.
result would follow and there would be a breach of
a. fundamental right ~f though there was legislative
competence to enact the legislation in the sense that
the subject-matter of the law fell within one of the
entries of the Legislative List, appropriate to that
legislature, but the legislation was invalid as viola.t,
ing other fundctmen~al rights of a general nature
applicable to all legislation, such as the violation of
Art. 14, ~to. (4) Evenin cases where the enactment
is valid judged by the tests in I to 3 above, if on a
proper construction of the enactment; the 'quasijudicial authority created to function under the Act
and to administer its provisions, acted entirely out.side the jurisdiction conferred on him or it by the
ena.otment, such action, if violative of the fundamental rights, could be complained of by a petition
under Art. 32 and this Court would be both competent and under a- duty to afford relief under that
Article. Here· again, the ratio on which the concession is based is similar to, though not identical with
.the basis upon which the concession as regards action
under invalid legislation was made. (5) Whe~e even
if the officer or authority h&.d jurisdiction, still if he
ha.tJ adopted a procedure contrary to either the
m..t.nrlatory provisions of the statute or to the
prinoipl..i~ of natural justice, the resulting order and
the imposition of liability effected thereby were
conceded to involve a breach of the fundamental
right.
These exceptions having been conceded by
learned Counsel for the respondent, it is sufficient if
attention is confined to the question, whether a
patently incorrect order passed on a misconstruction
1961
Smt. Ujjam B11·i
v.
Statt of Uit1r
Prade11h
Avang~r J.
952
1962
Smt U jjam Bai
,..
Stale of Uttar
P1adesla
SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1963)
of a charging enactment would or would no.t result
in the violation of a fundamental right and is that
the very narrow question which this bench is called
upon to answer.
The argument of the learned Attorney-General
who appeared for the petitioner, was short and
simple. His submission rested on the correctness
of the following steps:
(1) The Constitution has vested in this Court
the power to ensure, when approached by a petition
under Art. 32, that fundamental righis w.ere not
violated and accordingly there is a corumtutional
duty cast upon the Court to afford relief when so
approached in every case where fundamental riglita
were violated.
{2) The two matters which a petitioner 81eek·
ing relief under Art. 32 of the Constitution would
have to establish would therefore be: (a) the exilltience in him of the fundamental right which he complains has been infringed, and ( b) ita violation by
State action. If these two conditions are satiefied
the petitioner is en titled as of right to the grallt of
relief and the Court would be under a duty $0 afford
him that relief by passir>~ appropriate orders or
directions which would be necessary to ensure 'he
maintenance of his fundamental right.
(3) There was no dispute that a fundamental
right could be invaded by State action which was
legislative in character, or where the complaint was
as regards the action of executi.-e and administrative authorities created even under. valid statutes.
(4) If the above premises which were not in
dispute were granted, the next step was whether
the decision of a qulM!i.judicial authority constituted
under a valid law could violate a guaranteed freedom. A quasi-judicial authority he urged is as much
r
1 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
953
part of the machinery of the S-tate as executive and
administrative authorities, and its decisions and
orders are as much State action and if the function
of Part III of the Constitution is to protect the
citizen against improper State action, the protection
should logically extend to the infraction of right.a
effected by such orders of quasi-judicial authorities.
The short question for decision may in the
circumstances be formulated thus: Can an action of
a quasi-judicial authority functioning under a valid
enactment and· not overstepping the limits of its
jurisdiction imposed by the Act and not violating
the procedure required by the principles of natural
justice but whose decision is patently erronepus
and wholly unjustified on any proper interpretation
of the relevant provision, be complained of as
violative of the fundamental ri~hts of a party
prejudicially affected by such mis-interpretation.
T~king the handy illustration of a taxing statute, if
by a plain misinterpretation of the charging•provi·
sion, an assessing-authority levies a tax on transaction A while the statute on its only possible construction imposes no ta~ on such a transaction, is
any fundamental right of the party who is subjected
to such an improper levy prejudicially affected by
such an imposition ?
·
In considering the proper answer to this question it is necessary to exclude one matter which is
a.pt to cloud the issue and it is this. The statute
under which the quasi-judicial authority functions
or makes the decision or order may contain provisions for enabling the correctness of the decision
reached or the order passed being challenged by an
appeal or may provide for a gradation of appeals
and further revisions. The existence of procedures
for redressing ~ri<'vances or correcting errors of
primary or appellate authorities is obviously wholJy
irrelevant for a. consirleration of the question as to
whether the order of the authority' involves an
----t
I
Bmt. Ujjam Be
v.
81u of UUar
/'radish
954
1962
..
Sml. Ujjam Bai
Stall of UUar
Prad.sh
Ayyangor J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963]
infringement of fundamental rights or not. This
Court bas laid down in a large number of cases of
which it is sufficient to refer to: Union of India v .
T. R. Varma (1), The Stat,e of UUar Pradesh v.
Mohammad Nooh ('), and A. V. Venkateswaran,
Oolle,ctor of Customs, Bombay v. Ramchand Sobharj
Wadhwani (') that the existence of an alternative
remedy is no legal bar to the exercise of the jurisdiction of the High Court 'under Art. 226 of the Constitution. If that is so in the case of the jurisdiction
under Art. 226 it must a fortiori be so in th9 case
of a guaranteed remedy such as is vested in this
Court under Art. 32 of the Constitution. Besides
it cannot be predicated that there is a violation of
a fundamental right if the party aggrieved has no
appeal provided by the statute under which the
authority acts, but that if other statutory remedies
are provided there would be no violation of a fundamental right, for the question whether a fundamental right is violated or not is depenflent on the
action complained of having an impact on a
guaranteed right, and its existence or non-existence
or the action constituting a breach of a fundamental
right cannot be determined by the absence or
presence of procedures prescribed by the statute for
correcting erroneous orders. The absence of any
provision for redress by way of appeal may have a
bearing on the reasonableness of the law, bnt it has
none on the point now under discussion. Besides,
it cannot be that if the remedies open under the
statute are exhausted and the authority vested with
the ultimate authority under the statute has made
its decision and there is no longer any poBBibility of
an objection on the score of an alternative remedy
being available, there wouLl. be a violation of a
fundamental right with the consequence that this
Court would have jurisdiction, but that if it was
(I) [195q) S.C.R. 499.
(3) [1962] I S.C.R. 753.
(2) [1958) S.C.R. ~95.
;
~.
. '
\.
i s.c.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
955
approaohed at an earlier stage there was no violation of a fundamental right and that it lacks jurisdiction to afford relief under Art. 32, for. it must be
admitted that in ultimate analysis there is no
distinction between the nature and quality of an
order passed by an original ae distinct from one by
an appellate or revisional authority-in its consequences vis-a-vis the fundamental right of the
individual affected. It is common ground and that
is a matter which has already been emphasized that
if a petitioner ma.de out to the satisfaction of the
Court that he has a fundamental right in respect of
the subject-matter and that the same has been
violated by State action, it is imperative on the
Court to afford reJief to the petitioner the Court not
having any discretion in the matter in those circumstances. On this basis the only ground upon which
the jurisdiction could be denied would be that the
order or decision of the authority which is impugned does not prfljudiciaUy affect the fundamental
right of the petitioner, for it cannot be that the order
of the ultimate authority under the statute could
involve the violation of a fundamental right but
that the same orders passed by authorities lower
down in the rung u'1der the statute would not
involve such a violation.
Pausing here, one further matter might a]so be
mentioned for being put aside. This Court has laid
down that the principal underlying the rule of res
judicata is based on principles of law of general
application and as such would govern also the right
to reli6f under Art. 32. That principle is not
involved in the consideration of the point under
discussion, beca.m~e w~at is sought to be challenged
as viola.ting a fundamental right is the very order
of the authority and we are not concerned with a
collateral attack on an order that had become
final as between the parties thereto.
1962
Smt. Ujjam Bili
v.
/Jtce ofUllar
Proauh
956
1161
Sml. Ujj .. Soi
y.
Blah •I Un;
Produli
--
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963]
Coming back to the point under consideration
it was conceded by the learned Additional Solicitor·
General who. appeared for the respondent that
legislative action might involve an infraction of
fundamental rights and that similarly the action
of the executive-authorities might involve such an
infraction even when the legislation under which
they acted or purported to act was within legislative competence and within the constitutional
limitation& imposed by Part III. His contention,
however, was that a very different state of circum·
stances arose when the action complained of 'was
by a quasi-judicial authority. His submission may
be summarised in the following terms:-Where a
stat ute was within legislative competence and dOtlll
not by its provisions violate any of the constitutional guarantees in Part III, it follows as a matter
of law that every order of a quasi-judicial authority
vested with power under the Act is also valid
and constitutional and that the legality and
constitutionality of the statute would cover every
act or order of such an authority if the same was
within his or its jurisdiction and prevent them from
the challenge of unconstitutionality. The same
argument was presented in a slightly different form
by saying that such a quasi-judicial authority has
as much jurisdiction to decide rightly as to decide
wrongly and that if there was error in suoh a decision the only remedy of the citizen affected was by
resort to the tribunals set up by the Act for rectifying such errors and that in the last resort, that is
after the entire machinery under the Act was
exhausted, the affected party had a right to
approach the High Courts under Art. 226 in oases
where the error was of a type which could be
brought within the scope of the remedial-writs
provided by that Article.
Before examining the correctne1111 of this
submission it is necessary to mention that Mr. Chari
,
I S.C.R.
'
'
I
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
957
who appeared for some interveners supporting the
Respondent, made a submission which if accepted
would have far-reaching consequences. His contention was that the State in Part III against whose
action the fundamental rights were guaranteed was
confined to the legislative and the executive branches
of State activity and that the exercise of the
judicial power of the State wou)d never contravene
the fundamental rights guaranteed by Part III. It
would be seen that this is wholly different from the
submission made on behalf of Government by the
learned Additional Solicitor-General and it would
be convenient to deal with this larger question after
disposing of the arguments of Mr. Sanyal.
The question for consideration is what exactly
is meant when it is said that a statute is valid in
the sense of: (a) being legally competent to the
legislature to enact, and (b) being constitutional a.s
not -..iolative of the freedoms guaranteed by Part
III. It is obvious that it can only mean that the
statute properly construed is not legally incompetent or constitutionally in valid. In this connection
it is of advantage to refer to a point made by Mr.
Palkhivala who appeared for some of the interveners in support of the petition. One of his submissions was this: Suppose there is an Act for the levy
of sales-tax which is constitutionally valid. On
its proper construction it does not purport to or
authorise the imposition of a tax on a sale "in the
course of export or import." If it did so expressly
authorise, it is obvious that such a provision in the
enactment would be ultra i-ires and unconstitutional
as violative of the prohibition contained in Art. 286
(1) (a). Suppose flJ.rther that an authority functioning under such an enactment vested with jurisdiction to assess dealers to sales tax proceeds to levy a
tax and includes in the computation of the assessable turnover not merely those items which are
properly within the legislative competence of the
1962
Smt. Ujjam Bai
v.
State of Uttar
Pradeth
Ayyangar J.
958
IHI
Smt. Ujjam B•i
v.
81°" of U<tar
P,.d.shJ
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963]
State Legislature to tax under the head 'Taxes on
the sale of goods' but also the turnover in respect
of transactions which are plainly "sales in the
course of export or import" and this it does on a
patent misconstruction of the statute, could it be
Raid that the fundamental right of the dealer
guaranteed by Art. 19 (I) (f) and (g) was not
violated by the imposition of the sales tax in such
circumstances? The logic behind this argument
might be stated thus: If the legislature had in
terms authorised the imposition of sales tax on
such a transaction it would have been plainly void
and illegal and hence ex-concessis the fundamental
right in respect of property as well as of business
under Art. 19 (1) (f) and (g) would be violated by
the levy of the tax and its collection. How is the
position improved if without even the legislature
saving so in express terms an officer who purports
to act under the statute himself interprets the
charging provision so as to bring to tax a transaction which it was constitutionally incompetent for
the legislature itself to tax. I find the logic in
this reasoning impossible to controvert, nor did the
learned Additional Solicitor-General attempt any
answer to this argument.
It appears to be manifest that the fact that
an enactment is legislatively competent and on its
proper construction constitutionally valid, i. e., it
does not contain provisions obnoxious to Pa.rt III
of the Constitution, does not ipso jure immunise the
actions of quasi-judicial authorities set up nnder
the statute from constituting an invasion of a
fundamental right. What the legislature could not
in express terms enact, could not obviously be
achieved by the State vesting power in an authority
created by it to so interpret the enactment
as to contravene the Constitution. It might
be suggested that such a case would fall
within the exception which it is conceded
r
1s.c.R.
"\
../
-
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
959
exists that an a.ct of a quasi-judicial authority
which is plainly beyond its jurisdiction could
give rise to the violation of a fundamental
right in regard to which this Court might afford
relief if moved under Art. 32. In my opinion,
this is not quite a satisfying answer because the
suggestion is coupled with the assertion of the wellwom dictum as regards thb jurisdiction of the
tribunal to decide wrongly as much as rightly. The
illustration I have given of tmconsitutional action by
authorities acting under valid and constitutional
enactments cannot be properly answered unless it
be held that a plain and patent mis-interpretation
of the provisions of the enactment could it self give
rise to a plea that it was beyond the jurisdiction of
the authority but that ,would be stretching the
concept of jurisdictional errors beyond what is
commonly understood by that term.
Let me next take a case where the mis-interpretation by the quasi-judicial authority does not
involve the levy of a duty beyond the competence
of the legislature enacting the statute. In the type
of case now under consideration the quasi-judicial
authority by a plain misinterpretation of, let us
say, the charging provision of a taxing enactment
(as that furnishes a handy illustration of the point
now under discussion) levies a tax on a transaction
which, under the Constitution, it was competent for
the legislature to levy if it had been so minded.
In other words, there a.re two related transaction
or taxable events-A & B. The taxing-statute has
selected the transaction or taxable event A and has
imposed a tax upon it, and it alone. The authority
vested with jurisdiction under the Act, however, by
a patent mi&oonstruotion of the enactment considers
that not merely the transaction or taxable event A
but also the related transaction or taxable event B
is within t!ie charging provision and levies a ta.x:
thereon and proceeds to realise it. The problem
196S
Sme. UjJom Br;i
v.
Seate oj Utfar
Pr.duh
960
196t
Smt. Ujjom Bal
v.
Stal1 of Utt.r
Prudish
~ya1;gar J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963]
now under consideration is, could or could it not
be said that in such a case the fundamental right
of a citizen who has been wrongly assessed to tax
in respect of the transaction or taxable event J3
which ex-concessis was not intended to be taxed
under the enactment has been violated. With the
greatest respect to those who entertain a contrary
view I consid~r that the question can be answered
only in one way and that in favour of holding that
the fundamental right of the citizen is prejudicially
affected. When once it is conceded that a citizen
cannot be deprived of his property or be restricted
in respect of the enjoyment of his property save by
authority of law, it appears to me to be plain that
in the illustration above there is no statutory
authority behind the tax liability imposed upon
him by the assessing authority.. The Act which
imposed the tax and created the machinery for its
assessment, levy and collection is, no doubt,
perfectly valid but by reason of this circumstance
it does not follow that the deprivation of property
occasioned by the collection of a tax which is not
imposed
by the charging
section
doe~
not involve the violation of a fundamental
right merely because the imposition was
by reason of an order of an authority created by
the statut3, though by a patent mis-interpretation
of the terms of the Act and by wrongly reaching the
conclusion that such a trnnsaction was taxable.
I consider that the four concessions made by
the respondent which I have set out earlier, all
proceed on the basis that in these oases there is no
valid legislative backing for the action of the authority-executive, administrative or quasi-judicial.
I consider that the reason of that rule would equally
apply to oases where the quasi-judicial authority
commits a patent error in construing the enactment-for in such a case also there would obviously
be no legislative backing for the action resulting
from his erroneous decision.
'
'
'
.
l S.C.R.
SUPREME OOURT REPORTS
961
There is however one matter to which it is
necessary to advert to avoid misconception, and
that concerns the effect of findings reached on questions of fact by quasi-judicial au~horities. Provided
there is relevant evidence on which the finding could
rest, the finding would preclude any violation of a
fundamental right because this Court, though in the
absence of a. finding of a duly constituted authority
would have the power and jurisdiction to investigate even disputed facts in an appropriate case;
would however accept findings of fact by duly constituted authorities and proceed to find out whether
on that basis a fundamental right exists and is prejudicially affected by the action impugned. The
distinction which I would, in this context, draw
a.nd emphasise is between a mis-interpretation of a
statute by which an authority brings within the
scope of an enactment transactions or activities not
within it on any possible construction of its terms,
and erroneous findings on facts by reason of which
the authority considers a transa.ction as being within
the Act even if properly construed.
To sum up the position: (I) If a statute is
of being within legislative competence of the relevant legislature and is
constitutional as not violating any fundamental
rights, it does not automatically follow that any
action taken by quasi judicial authorities created
under it cannot violate fundamental rights guaran
t9'3cl by Part III of the Constitution. The legislative
competence, the existence of which renders the
enactment valid,.. is confined to action by the authorities created under it, which on its proper construction could be taken. In an authority constituted u4der such a legal and valid enactment over
steps the constitutional limitations on .the legisl~
tive power of the State Legislature, the acts of such
an authority would be plainly unconstitutional and
the consequenoea a.rising out of unconstitutional
legally~nacted in the sense
4
4
4
1968
Smt. Ujjam Ba
v.
State of Uttar
Pr1desh
96'.l
1962
Sml. Ujjnn Bo
••
S1at1 of Ulla1
l:'radnh
Ayycngar J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1963
State action would necessarily attach to such action.
If an "unconstitutional Act" of the Mate Legislature would invade fundamental rights the same
character and the same consequence must a fortiori
follow when that act is not even by the i:1tate Legislature but by an authority constituted under an
enactment passed by it. (2) Where State aotion
without legislative sanction behind it would violate
the rights guaranteed under Part III, the result cannot be different because the State acts through the
mechanism of a quasi-judicial authority which is
vested with jurisdiction to interpret the enactment.
The absence of legislative sanction for the imposition of an obligation or the creation of a liability
cannot be filled in by the misinterpretation by an
authority created under the Act.
To hol;l that a patently increased interpretation
of a statute by a quasi-judicial authority by which
a liability is imposed on a citizen does not violate
his fundamental rights under Arts. 19( 1)(f) and (g)
might not have done consequences but for two
circumstances. The first is as regards the difficulty
of designating with certainty an authority as quasijudicial. The fact is that there is no hard and fast
formula for determining when an authority which is
vested with power to act on behalf of the State falls
within category which is termed 'quasi-judicial'. As
Prof. J:lobson stated; "Lawyers, of course, have
often had to decide, in practical cases arising jn the
courts, whether a particular activity was of a judicial or an administrative (or 'ministerial') character;
and important consequences have flowed from their
decisions. But those decisions disclose no coherent
principle, and the reported cases throw no light on
the question from the wider point of view ........... .
save to demonstrate, by the very confusion of
thought which they present, the difficulty of arriving
at a clear basis of distinction". The significance of
this point stems from the fact that it is a matter of
1 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
963
concession that where the power of the State is vested in an executive or administrative authority
under an enactment which is valid and constitutional and such an authority does an act which on
the proper construction of the relevant statute is not
justified by it, the act may be of such a character
as to violate a fundamental right guaranteed by
Part III, i.e., if the impact is in a field which is protected from State interference, and such a violation
could be complained of by a petition to this Court
under Art. 32. At the same time it is the contention
of the respondent that a similar act, order or decision by a quasi-judicial functionary which is not
warranted by the terms of the statute, does not give
rise to the violation of fundamental rights.
""
It is therefore necessary to examine somewhat
closely the dividing liue between an execut,ive
authority whose actions may give rise to the viola.tion of a fundamental right and what is termed a
«quasi-judicial" authority whose actions do not have
that effect. To start with, it is obvious that the
nature of the act or of the order might be the same,
so that if the same act proceeded from one authority it would have a particular effect but would
have quite a different effect or would not have tha.t
effect if the same act proceeded from a slightly
different type of authority also exercising the power
of the State. This Court in Express Newspapers
(Private) Ltd. v. The Union of India (1 ) quoted with
approval the following statement of the law as summarised in Halsbury's Law of .h;ngland (3rd Ed.,
Vol. 2 at pp. 53-56):
·
" .................. An administrative body in
ascertaining facts or law may be under a duty
to a.ct judicially notwithstanding that its proceedings have none of the formalities of, and
are not in accordance with the practice of a.
{l) (1959) S.C.R. lZ, ll3, l l4.
1962
..
Sml. U}Jam Bal
Sta~ 4 Ut111r
Pr~duh
~yy•ngar J
964
S"'t Ujjam Bri
••
Stare of Utl•r
P ad1sh
AJ; ant'" J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963]
court of law........................ A body may be
under a duty, however, to act judicially
although there is no form of !is inter partes
before it .....•...... "
and in a further passage from the decision in R. v.
.JJJanchester Legal Aid Committee (1) which this Court
extracted it was observed:
"The true view, as it seems to us, is that
the duty to act judicially may arise in widely
different circumstances which it would be impossible, and, indeed, inadvisable, to attempt
to define exhaustively."
The question therefore whether an authoritiy created under a statute is a quasi-judicial authority or,
in other words, an authority which is bound to act
judicially cannot be laid down by any hard and fast
rule but must be gathered from the entire provisions
of the Act read with the purpose for which the
power is vested in the authority as well as the
grounds for the creation of such authority. I must
however confess that this is a. branch of law in
which authorities far from shedding light are in
reality unhelpful-for one gets nowhere if these lay
down as they do. that an authority would be quasijudicial, if (not being a court) it is bound to act
judicially and that to find out when, apart from
clear provisions in the statute, it is bound to act
judicially-you are told that it is when it is a quasijudicial authority. Bearing in mind these. circumstances I find it not possible to accept the contention that if the power of the State be exercised by
an authority which on a conspectus of the statute
is deemed to be quasi-judicial and the exercise of
such power prejudicially affects rights of life, liberty
or property which are guaranteed by Part III the
same cannot amount to a violation of a fundamental right, whereas if on a proper construction of the
(I) [1952] 2 Q.B. 413.
'
1 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
965
statute that authority were a mere administrative
body but the a.ot remains the same, it would so
involve.
\
Let me next see whether there oould be any
rational or reasonable basis on which such a contention could rest. I take it that the reason why
quasi-judicial authorities are suggested as being exceptions to the general rule that State action
which involves a prejudicial r~sult on a person's
right to property etc. involves a violation of fundamental rights is that a quasi-judicial authority
is vested With the jurisdiction to dec·Ule and that the
conferment of such a jurisdiction carries with it by
necessary implication a right to decide rightly as
well as wrongly; in other words, that it does not
outstep the limits of the jurisdiction by a decision
which is erroneous. I consider that it is the case
of the transference of a principal to a branch of
law or a situation in which it has no place or relevance. The question for consideration in the
context of a petition under Art. 32 is whether
there is valid legal sanction behind the action of
the authority, for apart from such a sanction it
must be and it is conceded that there would be a
violation of a fundamental right. Besides, if this
proposition is right, then it must rest on the principal
that the quasi-judicial authority is vested with the
right to decide. Does it, however, follow that
executive action does not in vole a decision or posit
a right to decide? If it is clear Jaw, as must be
conced~d, that there is no necessity to have a lis in
order to render the body or authority deciding a
matter to be treated as a quasi-judicial authority,
then it is very difficult to conceive of few actions
by the *'xecutive which do not involve an element
of discretion. No doubt in the case of an administrative or executive body the decision is not
preceded by a hearing involved in the maxim
Audi Alteram Partem but this, in my opinion of the
1961
Sml. Ujjam B1
"·
Slat1 of Uita
Protin/a
.4panga• J.
966
1961
Sml. Uj;om B•r
••
State of Uu•r
Prmk•h
A.yyangar J.
SUPREME COURT RE.PORTS
(1963)
merely the procedure before the decision is reached
and is not the essence of the distinction. Besid.,s,
as pointed out by Prof. Robson in 'Justice and
Administrative Law' (a),
"Sometimes the administrative and judicial
functions of an office have been so inextricably blended that it is well-night impossible
to say which ca.pa.city is the dominant one."
In this state of affairs to determine the maintainability of a petition under Art. 32 by proceeding
on an investigation as to the nature of the authority
which passed that order when, as I have pointed
out earlier, there is no essential difference in either
the nature or the quautum of th<i injury suffered by
the citizen, cannot be sustained on any proper
interpretation either of the Constitution or the
principles of law governing the interpeta.tion of
statutes. I would, therefore, hold that the freedoms guaranteed by Part III may be violated by
the action ,,f a. quasi- judicial authority acting
within the limits of its jurisdiction under a valid
and constitutional statute where it plainly misinterprets th3 provisions of the statute under which it
functions or which it is created to administer.
As regards the practical effect of accepting
the contention of the learned Additional Solicitor
Genera.I there is a second matter to which I consider
it essential to draw attention. With a. very great
increase in governmental activity and the diverse
fields in which it operates owing to the State being
a welfare State as contrasted with a Police-State
concerned ma.inly with the maintenance of law and
order, there bas necesMrily been a great proliferation of governmental departments with the attendant creation of several authorities which have to
pass decisions in spheres affecting the citi:r.en at
manifold points. It is therefore true to say that in
a modern welfare State administrative agencies
'
1 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
967
,. exerc1smg quasi- judicial authority are vastly more
numerous and if I may add, more important and
more vital than even the normally constituted
Courts. In such a situation to hold that fundamental rights would not. be involved by the activities of these various authorities which are increasing
iu number day by day would, be, in my opinion, to
.. deny to the citizen the guarantee of effective relief
which Art. 32 was designed to ensure in the great
majority of oases. In such a situation to assert at one
breath the prime importance and significance of the
function of this Court as a protector and guarantor
of fundamental rights, and at the same time to hold
that these numerous statutory authorities which
are created to administer the law cannot invade
those rights would be to render this assertion and
this guarantee of relief mostly empty of meaning.
Though. if the words of the Constitution were
explicit, considerations such as there would be of
no avail, yet even if' the matter were ambiguous
I am clearly of the opinion that the rejection of the
broad contention raised on behalf of the respondent
.. is justified as needed to give effect to the intentions
of the framers of the Constitution. But as I have
pointed out already, on no logical basis couldjt be
held that where an act or order of a quasi- judicial
authority lacks legislative backing, it cannot still
impinge on a person's fundamental right and where
an order suffers from patent error, it is no legislative
sanction behind it.
It now remains to consider the point urged by
Mr. Chari that 'State" action which involves the
violation of a fundamental right does not include
that resulting from what be termed "the judicial
authority of the State". The argument put forward
in support of this proposition was rested in most
part, if not wholly, on the terms of Art. 12 of the
.. Constitution and the definition of the expression
"State" contained in it. Article 12 enacts:
190!
Smt, Ujjam Bai
••
Stat. of Uttar
Pradesh
~)yongar J.
968 SUPREME OOURT REPORTS (1963)
1961
Smt. U}jam Bai
y,
Slatt of Ultar
Pradesh
"In this part, unless the context otherwise requires, 'the State' includes the Government and Parliament of India and the Government and the Legislature of each of the i:itates
and all local or other authorities within the
territory of India or under the control of the
Government of India."
It was pointed out that the "State" whose action
might involve the violation of fundamental rights
or rather as against whom the citizen had been
granted a guarantee of oertain rights under this Part
was defined to include the "Government" and
"Parliament" of the Union and of the 8tates, and
the local authorities, did not name the "Judicial
power of the State" as within it. If learned Counsel
is right in this au bmission that the State in Part III
impliedly excludes judicial and quasi-judicial authorities by reason of the absence of specific mention
the further submission that by any of the actions
of such authorities fundamental rights could not
be violated would appear to be ma.de out and it has
to be added that if this contention is right some of
the concessions made by Mr. Sanyal would be unjustified.
There are several considerations to which I
shall immediately advert which conclusively negative the correctness of the inference to be drawn
from judicial and quasi-judicial authorities not
being specifically named in Art. 12. ( 1) In the first
placs, it has to be pointed out that the definition is
only inclusive, which itself is apt to indfoate that
besides the Government and the Legislature there
might be other instrumentalities of State action
which might be comprehended within the expres·
sion ".:'tate". That this expression "includes" is
used jn this sense and not in that in which it is very
occasionally nseJ as meaning "means and includes"
eoulrl be gathered not merely from other provisions
f
..
{
t S.C.R.
.,
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
969
of Part III but·also from Art. 12 itself. Article 20(1)
would admittedly refer to a limitation imposed upon
the judicial power of the State and is obviously
addresssed also, if not wholly, to judicial authorities. Mr. Chari however sought to get over the implication arising from Art. 20(1) by suggesting that
the definition in Art. 12 which excluded judicial
and quasi-judicial authorities from within the purview of the expression ''State" sbould be understood as applying only subject to express provision
to the contrary. I feel wholly unable to accept
the method suggested of reconciling the presence of
Art. 20(1) with the interpretation of Art. 12 as
excluding judicial and quasi-judicial authorities.
No doubt, the definition in Art. 12 starts with the
words ''unless the context otherwise requires", that
expression however could serve to cut down even
further the reach of the definition and cannot serve
to expand it beyond the executive and legislative
fields of State action if the word "includes" were
understood as ''means and includes" which is the
contention urged by learned Counsel. Again,
Art. 12 winds up the list of authorities falling within the 4efinition by referring to ''other authorities"
within the territory of India which cannot, obviously be read as ejusdem generis with either the
·Government and the Legislatures or local authorities. The words are of wide amplitude and capable
of comprehending every authority created under a
statute and functioning within the territory of
India. There ifl no characterisation of the nature
of the "authority" in this residuary clause and consequently it must include every type of authority
set up under a statute for the purpose of adminis·
tering laws enacted by the Parliament or by the
State including those vested with the duty to make
decisions in order to implement those laws (2 ).
Among the reliefs which on the terms of
Art. 32 this Court might afford to persons approaching it complaining of the violation of the
1962
Smt. Ujjam Bai
v.
State of Uttar
Pradesh
Ayya11gat" J.
970
1962
Sml. UJJam Biii
v.
Sllli,./ U11.,
Pr,,,,.sh
--
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963]
fundamental right is the issue of a writ of certiorari specifically enumerated in that Article. It
is common ground that that writ is available for
issue only against judicial or quasi-judicial authorities and it would normally follow tha.t quasi.judicial
authorities could equally with other instruments
of Stat.e action violate fundamental rights which
could be redressed by the issue of this type of writ.
(3) The theory propounded by learned Counsel is
based on what might be termed the rigid doctrine
of the separation of powers which is not any feature of our Constitution as has bean repeatedly
laid down by this Court. (4) Even on the words
of Art. 12 as they stand the construction suggested
by learned Counsel has to be rejected. The article
refers to the government (of Union and of the
States) as within the definition of a "State". It
is however admitted that both the Government
of the Union as well aH of the State, function as
quasi-judicial authorities under various statutory
enactments. The question would at once arise
whether when the "government" exercise such
powers it is deemed to be a "government" falling
within the definition of "State" or should be classified as a judicial authority wielding 'the judicial
power of the State" so as to be outside the definition, so that its decisions and orders do not give
rise to a violation of a fundamental right. Article
12 on any reasonable construction cannot permit
the dissection of "government" for the purpose
of discovering the nature or the quality of the
powers exercised by it, into the three fields of
executive pure and simple, judicial and legislative
for the purpose of a fresh reclaseifioa.tion into
certain categories. When government exercises
any power, be it executive pure and simple, or
quasi-judicial under a statute or quasi-legislative
in say framing subordinate legislation, it does so
as "government" and no forther sub-division of it
I
1 s.c.R,
SUPREME OOURT REPORTS
971
is possible except for the purposes merely of academic study or for determining the nature of the
relief which might be had by persons affected by
its activities in any particular field. Similarly,
Parliament is vested with a quasi-judicial power
to punish for contempt which itself is by reason of
such power belnnging to the Parliament of the
United Kingdom and this if anything is an indication that the constitution does not recognise any
doctrine of the separation of powers. In other
words, the reference to the Government and the
Legislature in the definition is a reference to them
as institutions known by that name and is not with
a view to describe their particular functions in the
body politic.
(5) That the reference to the Government and
the Legislatures is to them as institutions and is not
to be understood as a reference to thair functions.
viz., to bodies performing executive and legislative
functions is perhaps forcefully brought out by the
inclusion of "Local authorities'' in the definition of
''State". It is obvious that municipal and local
Board. authorities going under various descriptions
in the several State would be comprehended within
that term. Now municipal councils exercise, as is
well known, legislative, executive as well as quasi·
judicial functions. They frame Rules and bye-laws
which ara subordinate legislation and would fall
within the description of 11 laws'' as defined by Art.13,
Municipal Counci1s are vested with administrative functions and they also exercise quasi-judicial
functions when assessing taxes, hearing taxation
appeals, 1o mention only a small fraction of the
quasi-judicial power which they possess and exercise in the ·discharge of their functions as the local
administration. H the ''local authority" as a
whole is a ''State" within the definition there is no
canon of construction by which any part of the
.action of tha.j authority could be designated as not
1963
Smt Ujjam Bo •
v.
Stat1 of Ulla'
Prad1fh
AyyangarJ.
972
1962
Sml. UJj•m B•i
••
S 1ok of Utta,
Pradesh
SUPREME OOURT REPORTS [1963]
falling within State action for the purpose of giving
rise to violation of a fundamental right. (6) Them
is only one other matter which need be referred to
in this connection. Both this Court, as well as the
High Court have vested in them the power to make
rules, and it cannot be disputed that such rules
would be "laws" within the definition of the expression in Art. 13. If so, it is manifest that such
rules might violate the fundamental rights, i.e.,
their validity would depend inter alia on their passing the test of permissible legislation under Part
III. This would directly contradict any argument
that Courts and quasi-judicial authorities are outside the definition of State in Art. 12.
In the face of these deductions following from
the Constitution itself, I find it wholly impossible
to accede to the submission that what is termed as
judicial power of the State which, it is submitted,
would include quasi-judicial authorities created
under statuteB do not fall within the definition of
the "State" and that their actions therefore are not
to be deemed "State" action against which the
Constitution has provided the rights guaranteed
under Part III.
I would therefore answer the question referred
to the Bench by saying that the action of quasi·
judicial authority could violate a fundamental right
if on a plain mis-construction of the statute or a
patent misinterpretation of its provisions such an
authority affects any rjghts guaranteed under Part
III. This would be in addition to the three broad
categories of cases in regard to which it was
conceded that there could be a violation of fundamental rights: (I) where the statute under which it
functions was itself invalid or unconstittional, '(2)
where the authority exceeds the jurisdiction conferred on it by the Act, and (3) where the authority
though functioning under sta~ute, contravenes
mandatory procedure prescribed in the statute or
(
.
•
1 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
973
violates the principles of natural justice and passes
an order or makes a direction affecting a person's
rights of property etc.
Before concluding it is necessary to advert to
one matter which was just touched on in the course
of the agruments as one which might be reserved
for consideration when it actually arose, and this
related to the question whether the decision or
order of a regular ordinary Court of law as distinguished from a tribunal or quasi-judicial authority
constituted or created under particular statutes
could be complained of as violating a fundamental
right. It is a salutary principle that this Court
should not pronounce on points which are not involved in the questions raised before it and that is
the reason why I am not dealing with it in any fulness and am certainly not expressing any decided
opinion on it. Without doing either however, I
nonsider it proper to make these observations.
There is not any substantial identity between a
Court of law adjudicating on the rights of parties in
the lis before it and designed as the High Courts
and this Court are to investigate inter alia whether
any fundamental rights are infringed and vested
with power to protect them, and quasi-judicial
authorities which are created under particular
statutes and with a view to implement and administer their provisions. I shall be content to
leave the topic at this.
This brings me to the question as to whether
there has been a patent misinterpretation of the
statute, as I have described earlier, and whether
as a result the petitioner has established a violation
of a fundamental right. ~ection 4(1) of the U. P.
Sales Tax Act enacted:
"No tax shall be payable on:
(a) the sale of water, milk •••....•.•..
, .............. and on any other goods which the
196!
'
Smt. Ujjam Bai
v.
State of Uttar
Pf'adesh
Ayyan.l{ar J.
974
1962
Smt. Ujjo1m Bai
v.
Staf1 of Uttar
Pradesh
A:yy1n1ar J,
.::iUP.REME COURT REPORTS [l!J63J
State Government may, by notification in the
official gazette, exempt.
(b) the sale of any goods by the All India
Spinner- Association ........................ or such
other person or class of persons as the :State
GovernmPnt may, from time to time, exempt
on such conditions ............ as may be specified
by notification in the official gazette."
,.
Pursuant of the powers conferred by as. 4 (I) (b)
the Government of Uttar Pradesh published
dated
December 14, 1957
a notification
and it is the proper interpretation of this notification that forms the central point of the merits of
this petition. The notification read:
" ............ In exercise of the powers conferred by cl. (b) of sub-a. {I) of s. 4 of the
U. P. :Sales Tax Act 1948 as amended up
to date, the Governor of Uttar Pradesh is
pleased to order that no tax shall be payable
under the aforesaid Act with effect from the
14th of December 1957 by the dealers in
respect of the following classes of goods:
Provided that the Additional Central.
Excise Duties leviable thereon from the clos
ing of business on December 13, 1957 have
paid on such goods and that the dealers there
of furnish proof to the satisfaction of the
assessing authority that such duties have been
paid:
(I) ........................................................ .
(2)............... ... . . . . . . . . . ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .......... .
( 3) Cigars, cigarettes. biris and tobacco,
that is to sa.r any form of tobacco, whether
cured or uncured and whether manufactured
or not and includes the leaf, stalks and
'
'
1 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
975
stems of the tobacco plant but does not include any pa.rt of a tobacco plant while still
attached to the earth.''
The petitioners a.re manufacturers of hand-made
bfris and there was no duty of excise payable on
them under the relevant entrv in the Central
Excise Aot, nor was there any ~imposition of any
fr,esh duty on biris so manufactured under Central
Aot 58 of 1957 whose object was to provide for
the levy and collection of ''additional duties inter·
alm on tobacco and tobacco products and for the
distribution of a part of the net proceeds thereof
among the States in place of the sales tax whioh
was to be forborne by the States on those goods.
Briefly stated, the contention urged on - behalf of
the petitioner was that in the proviso to the
notification dated December 14, 1957, the expression have been pa.id on such goods" applied only
to those cases where an additional duty was payable and was framed to deny the benefit of the
exemption to parties who being liable to _pay such
duty failed to pay the same. Where, however, no
duty, was pa.ya.hie at all, no question of the levy
of duty arose and the proviso was inapplicable.
On the other hand, the Sales Tax Officer construed
the notification with the aid of the proviso as
meaning that the exemption from payment of. sales
tax was granted only in those cases where an
additional duty having become payable the ·same
had been paid i. e. the State was intended to be
deprived of the right to levy Sales tax only when
it obtained some benefit from the additional excise
duty which was distributed to it. The question
that arises ii not whether the construction contended for by· the petitioner is. the oorrect or the
preferable one; but whether ·that adopted by the
&~es Ta.x Offioer was not one which it was possiblo
for one reasonably to take of the provision. If
not 'With8'aJlditig that the one is preferable to the
ethe or th&t & Court of oonstntotion: would more
1962
Smt, Ujj11111 B• i
.
"·
&lo" o} Utllr
Pradlsh
Ayy•ngarJ.
976
19dt
.
Smt. Ujjam Bai
.Stat1 of Ut101
Pradesh
Ayyangar J •
SUPREME CUORT REPORTS [1963)
readily accede to the one rather than to the other,
the officer had adopted a construction whi oh it was
possible to take, could it be said that there was an
error apparent on the face of the record justifyiug
the issue of a writ of certiorari. Judged from the
point of view I am inclined to hold that where it is
possible reasonably to uphold the construction
adopted by an inferior tribunal it would be a case
of mere error of law and not a patent error, or an
error apparent on the faoe of the record whioh
should justify the issue of a writ of certiarari. In
this view I would dismiss the writ petition.
As regards the application to restore the
appeal to the file, I do not consider that the request
ought to be &llowed and for two reasons : Firstly,
the applicant having voluntarily withdrawn the
appeal I do not see any justification for accerlini;
to his present request. Secondly, if as I have
held, the error in the order of the officer was not
such as to justify the issue of a writ of certiorari
to quash the same the judgment of the High Court
under Art. 226 was correct and the petitioner would
not gain any advantage by the revival of the
appeal. In the circumstances I would dismiss the
petition for restoration of the appeal.
.:/ ud!iof.k,.. J.
MuDHOLKAR. J.-The question which a.rises
for consideration in this petition under Art. 32( l)
of the Constitution is whether a. right guaranteed
by Part III such as a right to ea.rry on trade or
business is breached because a. taxing authority,
though acting under a. law which is inter virea and
following a. procedure whioh is constitutionally as
well as legally permissible has erroneously assessed
and levied a. tax on a trade or business. Unless we
hold that an erroneous assessment, be it due to
misconstruction of law or misa.ppreciation of
facts, constitutes an invasion of a.
right
guaranteed by Pa.rt III, the remedy pt'<lvided
J>y Art. 32(1) will not be available,
The
•
,
1 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
977
substance of the petitioner's contention is that when
the constcuction placed: by a taxing authority upon
a provision of law is wrong the levy of tax is
one which is not authorised by law and ·thus
the assessee's right under Art. 19(l)(g) of the
Constitution is infringed.
1962
Smt. Ujjam Bai
v.
Sia:• of Utear
Prad1sh
Mudh•lkar J •
What had to be construed by the Sales Tax
Officer in the case before us was not a statutory
provision but a noti:tlcation issued by the Government of Uttar Pradesh on December 14, 1957
under s. 4(1) of the Uttar Pradesh Sales Ta.x Act,
1948 (U~P. Act XV of 1948). The aforesaid provision' of the Sales Tax Act and the notification
have been set out iii the judgments of some of my
learned brethren and need not be set out over
again. in this judgment. Upon the construction
placed by him on this notification the Sales Tax
Officer held the petitioner liable to pay sales tax on
the turnover of sales of l>idis for the period between
April l, 1958 and June 20, 1958. The petitioner's
contention before the Sales Tax Officer wa.a that
bidis were exempted from sales tax by the notification in question. The plea was negatived by the
Sales '.fax Officer. ThEI petitioner having unsuccessfu.lly challenged the assessment before the
sales .t~x authorities moved the High Court of
Allahabad under Art. 226 of the Constitution. The
petition was dismissed. Having failed them the
petitioner sought and obtained a certificate from the
High Court: to the effect that the case is fit for appeal
before this Court. Thereafter the petitioner moved
the present petition before this Court but took no
steps to bring the appeal bef~re this Court. That
appeal was thereupon dismissed for non-prosecution
on February 20, 1961. I-may incidentally mention
here that the petitioner has now applied for
restoration of the appeal. But that has nothing to
dO with the point whioh I have refen-ed to earlier.
(
978
196!
~mt. Ujjam B•i
v•
.!i ate of Uttar
Pr ad.sh
M udlrolkar J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963]
This petition went up before a constitution
bench of this Court. At the hearing reliance was
placed on behalf of the petitioner on the deoision of
this Court in Kaila8h Nath v. State of U.P.( 1) in which
by accepting an interpretation on a provision of the
Sales Tax Act different from that put upon it by
the sales tax autil.orities this Court held that the
petitioner before it was being deprived of his property without the authority ofle.w. The correctness
of the decision was challenged on behalf of the
respondent State on the basis of various decisions,
including some of this Court, and in view of the
importance of the question involved the case was
direoted to be placed before the Chief Justice for
constituting a large Bench. In the referring Order
the following two questions were formulated by the
learned Judges who made the reference :
(1) Is an order of assessment made by
an authority under a taxing statute which is
intra vires, open to challenge as repugnant to
Art. 111 ( 1 )(g) on the sole ground that it is
bMed on a misconstruction of a provision of
the Act or of a notification issued thereunder?
(2) Can the validity of such an order be
questioned in petition under Art. 32 of the
Constitution ?
I have not discussed the decisions of this Court as
they have been considered fully in the judgment&
of my brethren but have approached the questions
with reference to the principles of law applicable to
the questions placed before us.
The two questions are really one : •Can an
erroneous order of assessment by a taxing autho·
rity result in a breach of a right to carry on trade
or busineBS so as to entitle the person complaining
of the breach to approach this Court under Art. 32 ?
The remedy provided by this Article-whicll is
(I; A.1.R, 957 S.C. 790.
,
1 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
979
itself a fundamental right-is restricted to the
enforcement of fundamental rights and does not
extend to other rights such as a. right to have a
wrong order quashed. On the one hand it was
contended at one stage, on the authority of thedecisions in Ramjilal v. Income-Tax Officer,
Mohindargarh (') and Laxmanappa Hanumanwppa
Jamkhandi v. The Union of lndw (2) that a fundamental right will not be breached if the requirelQents
of Art. 265 are satisfied, that is to say, the tax is
assessed under authority of law. On the other hand
it is said, in substance, that an erroneous order of
a taxing authority is an unreasonable restreiction on
a person's right to carry on trade or business and
Art. 32 entitles that person to redress from this
Court. It has, however, been made clear in sereval
decisions of this Court that a law under Art. 265
must not violate a right guaranteed in Part III of
the Constitution. [See Mohommm1 Yasin v. The
Town Area Gmnmittee, J alalabad (3) ; State of Bombay
v. United Mok¥r8 (India) Ltd.,('); Skree Meenakshi
Mills LU/,., Madurai v. A. V. Viswanatha Sastri ( 5J;
Oh. Tilca Ramji v. The State of Uttar Pradesh(');
Balaji v .. Income Tax Officer, Speowl Investigation
Circle, (7)]. If it violates any of the guaranteed
rights, recourse to the provisions of Art. 32 is available 1;o the aggrieved person.
1961
Smt. Ujjam Bai
v.
Slate of Ult#
Pradlsh
Mudll.oltarJ.
Fundamental rights enumerated in Art. 19(1)
are, however, liable to be restricted by laws permis·
sible under els. 2 to 6 and, therefore, we must first
consider the Jimits within which a person can claim.
to assert and exercise his fundamePtal right. We
must also bear in mind the nature of a quasi-judicial tribunal and the legal efficacy of its decisions.
. The right to carry on trade, 1business etc.,
with which we are conoerned here falls under
[1951] S.C.R. 12'.
(S) {1952] S.C.R.. 572, 578.
(I)
cs> ll9'511 s.c.R. m.
(7) [19621 2
(2) [19.56] I S.C.R. 769.
(4) [1953] S.C.R. 1069.
<6> [19561
s.c.R. 5183.
s.c.&. m.
(
980
1902
Sml. Ujj .., Bai
v,
Sim of Ullar
Pra4sh
Mudllolk., .T.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963J
cl. (l)(g) and can be restricted by a law permissible
by cl. 6. This right is further subject to the sovereign
power of the State to levy a tax. For, the right to
levy a tax is essential for the support of the State
and in exercise thereof the State can impose a tax
on a trade or business. Article 265 of the Constitu tion provides that the imposition must be under
the authority of a law. Further our Constitution
being, broadly speaking, federal, the right to levy
taxes has been divided between the Union and the
States and the fields in which the Union and the
States can respectively levy taxes have been
demarcated in the lists contained in the Seventh
Schedule to the Constitution. Despite the demarcation, each is supreme in its own field in the matter
of levying taxes. There is yet another limitation
on the power of the State to make laws including
a law levying a tax and that is placed by cl. (2) of
Art. 13 of the Constitution which runs thus :
"The State shall not make any law which
takes away or abridges the rights conferred
by this Part and any law made in contravention of this clause shall, to the extent of the
contravention, be void."
..
A pre-constitution law like the U. P. Sales
Tax Act with which we are concerned here must
also be consistent with Art. 13(1) which runs
thus:
"All laws in force in the territory of India
immediately before the commencement of
this Constitution, in so far ae they are inconsistent with the provisions of this Fart, shall,
to the extent of such in consistency, be void."
Such a law or any provision thereof to the extent
of its inconsistency with the provisions of Part III
of the Constitution will be void. The law muat
further not be violative of anv other. oonati~onal
1
:- 1 S.O.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
981
provision as for example Art. 276(2), Art. 286,
Art.'301 etc. The law must also have been enacted
after complying with a.11 the requirements of the
Constitution and where it is subordinate legislation,
those of other relevant laws.
~
If a. law imposing a tax is in contravention
of any of the rights conferred by Part III of the
Constitution the Jaw would be void and a person
aggriev·ed would be entitled to move this Court
under Art. 32 on the ground that one of his fundamental rights has been infringed. Similarly, if a
law is beyond the competence of the legislature
whioh_!'nacted it or if it contravenes any provision
of the Constitution such as Art. 276 or Art. 286
it would be an invalid law as being ultra vires the
Constitution and the tax levied thereunder would
also be one which is not authorised by law and the
assessee can move this Court under Art. 32 on the
ground t;hat his right under Art. 19( l)(g) is breached.
Similarly, if a tax is levied by an authority not
empowered by law to do so, or by a competent
authority in violation of the procedure permitted
by law or in violation of the principles of natural
justice, ·the levy would be unauthorised and the
decision under which it was made would be a nulli·ty. In such a case also the assessee can move this
Uourt under Art. 32. All this is accepted before
us on behalf of the State.
1961
Smt. Ujjam Bai
v.
Stale of Utear
Prarksh
Mudholkar J,
But where a tax is levied by a competent.
legislature, after due compliance with all the require.
ments relating to the making of Jaws and when it
• is subordinate le~islation, the requirements of other
relevant laws, and is also not in violation of any
provision of the Constitution it will operate as a
reasonable restriction upon the right of a person to
carry on liis trade, business etc. Though a person's
right to oa.rry on a trade or business is a fundamental
dght it is thus subject to the aforesaid limitations.
The quantum of the right left to an individual to
/'
982
--••
1911
Sml, UjiG111 Bo\
Slat• oj Utt.r
Prat!1sh
Muiholkar J,
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963)
•
carry on his trade or business will be that which is
lef~ after a valid restriction is placed upon it by
the 8tate under cl. (6) of Art. 19. His actual right
would be to carry on business burdened with the
aforesaid restriction. Where, as her!', the rest1iction
is placed on a dealer and takes the form of a liability to pay a. tax on the t•1rnover of sales on certain
commodities by him then he can carry on his
trade subject to his liability to pay the tax as asses1ed from time to time. It is thi11 which is the nett
content of his right to carry on trade, ignoring for
the moment restrictions laid upon it by other competent laws made by the State. After a valid restriction is placed upon a fundamental right what
will be enforceable under Art. 32 would be not the
unrestricted right but the restricted right.
It was not disputed before us that where a
quasi- judicial tribunal constituted under the Act
whereunder a tax is levied, by an erroneous construction of the Constitution or of th11.t Act holds the
tax to be within the competence of the State legislature or ae not contravening a provision of the '
Constitution, its decision will still be deemed to
affect a fundamental right of the person upon whom
a tax is levied in pursuance of that decision. Thi&
position was rightly not disputed before us because,
in the premises, the Act would itself be void and
consequently no legal liability can arise by virtue
of the quasi-judicial tribunal constituted under it.
A restriction imposed by a void law being illegal
falls outside cl. (6) of Art. 19.
Now when a State wanta to impose a tax on ,
a trade or business it must necessarily provide for
the machinery for assessing and collecting it The
assessm~nt and collection of a tax cannot be
arbitrary and, therefore, the State must confer upon
the taxing authority the power and impose upon
it the duty to act judicially. Absence of such a
provision will make the law bad as being vlola.tive
t
1 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
983
of Art. 19 (l)(g): K. P. Moopil Nair v. State of
Keral.a (1).
The Sales Tax Act in force in Utt&r Pra.desh
is a law of this kind. It not only imposes a tax
on the sale of certain commodities but also provides
for the assessment of the tax as well as for .appeals,
revisions etc., from the ordera of assessment. It is
a law as contemplated by Art. 265 and it is not
contended that any of its provisions infringe the
petitioner under Art. 19(1) (g).
1962
Sn.I. Ujjam /Jai
••
Stote of Uttar
Pr.desk
Mudlrolkar .T.
Being an instrumentality of the State, like
others charged with administrative duties, a taxing
authority is not a court of law, as that expression
is understood. All the same it has, in the discharge
of its functiQns, to act judicially. Since, however,
it is ~ tribunal of limited jurisdiction and since
also it performs other functions which are administrative in character it is not a purely judicial but
only a quasi-judicial tribunal.
The qualification ~quasi', however, would not
make its duty to act judicially less imperative.
In it! role as an assessing authority is if incumbent
upon it io ascertain facts and apply- the taxing law
to tho.se facts. It must apply its mind to the relevant provisions of the law and to the fa.eta of et .ch
case and arrive at its findings. It is, therefore,
inevitable that the authority should have the power
to construe the facts as well as the laws. In other
words, it must have jurisdiction to do those things
or else its decisions can never have any value or
binding force.
A taxing authority which has the power to
make a decision on matters falling within the
purview of the law under which it is functioning
is undoubtedly under an obligation to arrive. at a
right decision. But the liability of a tribunal to
err is an accepted phenomenon. The bindlng force
(1) ( 1961) S S.O.R. 77.
I
984
Sml. Ujjam Bai
v.
Stat1 oj Uttar
l'rod'-sh
Mudhollrar J.
SUPREME ()OURT REPO:RT3 [1963]
of a decision which is arrived at by a taxing
authority acting within the limits of the jurisdiction
conferred upon it by law cannot be marle dependent
upon the question whether its decision is correct or
erroneous. For, that would create an impossible
situation. Therefore, though erroneous, its decision
must bind the assessee. Further, if the taxing law
is a valid restriction the liability to be bound by
the decision of the taxing authority is a burden
imposed upon a person's right to carry 0n trade or
bminess. This burden is not lessened or lifted
merely because the decision proceeds upon a
misconstruction of a provision of the law which the
taxing authority has to construe. Therefore, it
makes no difference whether the decision is right
or wrong so long as the error does not pertain to
jurisdiction.
The U. P. Act empowers the sales tax officer
to make the assessment, to ascertain the necessary
facts for holding whether or not a pnson is liable
to pay tax and if he is liable, to determine the
turnover of his sales.
Since sales tax is
imposed only on certain commodities and
tax
at
different
rates is
since
sales
chargeable an different eommodities the power of
the Sales Tax Officer to makes an assessment carries
with it the power to determine whether the sales
of particular commodities effected by the assessee
fall within th" ambit of the Act or not and if they
do, to dete•mine tho rnte or ratl•S of tax chargeable
in n'spPnt of sales of different commodities. In
regard to all thAse matters he has to follow the
procedure prescribed by the Act. If he finds upon
a construction of the Act and of the rules and noti·
fications issued thereunder that a certain oommo·
dity is liable to pay a tax then so long as the
transaction is one upon which the State legislature
oould impose a tax and the commodi~y is one on
which the State legielaturo could impose a tax it ia
•
•
•
t
I S.O.R.
SUPREME OOURT REPORTS
985
difficult to 15ee how the .decision arrived at by
the Sa.lea Tax Officer can be said to be otherwise
than within his jurisdiction even though he may
have made an error in coming to a partioula.r
conclusion. If he comes to a wrong conclusion
would he, in demanding the tax on the basis
of such concluion, be making an m;i.lawful
dema.nd? The conclusion may be obviouslr or
palpably wrong but so long as it is not sliown
to be dishonest would his decision be void? Of
course, if by placing an erroneous construction
on the law he holds, say, that a. transaction which
is bit by Art. 286 of the Constitution is one which
oan be taken into consideration for the purposes
of assessing the tax or if he bolds that a. commodity upon which the State legislature could not
impose a. tax is taxable und~r the Act he would
clearly· ha.ve acted beyond bis jurisdiction and his
asse88ment with respect. to snoh a transaction or
a commodity would be void. With respect to such
a&sessment the a.ssessee will of course have the
right to move this Court under Art. 32. But where
suoh is not the case and the error of the Sa.lee Tax
Officer lay only in holding that a tax is payable
on a certain commodity, as in this case bidis, even
though bidis may have been exempted from such
tax by a notification made by the Government,
how could he be sa.id to have acted without jurisdiotion ?
It· was, however, contended that where the
er.roueous · construction by the Sales Tax Officer
\ results in the levy of a tax _for whioh there is no
authority in law the fundamental right to carry
on trade or business will necessarily be breached.
The answer to this contention is th11t sinoe he ha.s
the power to construe the law and decide whether
a particular transaction or commodity is taxable
his decision though erroneous must be regarded a.s
one authorised by law and oonseqwmtly the tax
19G2
Smt. Ujj"rn Bal
V•
tstate of litt«r
Pr11deJh
Mudho/1,or I.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1963]
1151
Smt. Ujj11m Ba•
••
St•l1 of UtttW
Praduh
Mudholk" J.
levied there110der held to be one authorised by law.
For, what is authorised by law is that which the
appropriate authority upon consideration and
constr1rntion of the law holds to be within the law.
It was said that the answer would take in
even erroneous decisions as to commodities and
transactions with respect to which the State legis·
lature is incompetent to make laws. I have no
doubt that it would not, because the power of the
Sales Tax Officer to levy a tax cannot extend
beyond that of the State legislature.
The Sales Tax Officer functioning under the
Act in question has, clearly, the power to summon
witnesses, call documents, record evidence and so
on. The Act imposes a duty on him to give an
opportunity to the person sought to be asses~ed to be
heard. His decision upon matters falling within
the scope of the laws governing the proceedinits
before him, unless revised or modified by a tribu·
nal or authority or a court to which he is subordinate
must, therefore, be regarded as having R.s much
validity as that of a court of law in the exercise
of its judicial power subject, of course, to the
limitations stated earlier. The decision may be
erroneous. It may proceed upon a blatant or
obvious error on the face of the record. Even so,
it cannot be regarded as 'non est' or void or a mere
nullity. If that is the correct legal position, what
difference would it make if as a result of an
erroneous decision arrived at by a Sales Tax Officer
resulting from a misconstruction of a notification
under the Sales Tax Act, a person is held liable to
pay tax· upon sales ofa commodity which, upon a
proper construction, would appear to be exempted
from tax by the law likP the notification in question? Just as a person cannot complain of a breach
of his fundamental right to carry on trade or business because an erroneous decision of a court of law
renders him liable to pay a sum cf money, so too
•
•
• 1 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPOR'rs
987
he ca.nnot complain · agaimt an eq11a.Uy erroneous
decision of a-Sa.las Tat Officer. But that does riot
mean that an erroneous decision can never be
challenged before this Court. After exhausting
the remedies provided by the taxing statute the
aggrieved party can challenge it directly under
Art. .136 or indirectly by first moving the High
Court under Art. 226 · or 227 and then coming up
in appeal &j!ainst the decision of the High Court.
Though this Court is the guardian of b.11.
fundamental rights the Constitution has not ta.ken
away the right of the ordinary courts or of quasi·
judicial tribunals administering a variety of laws to
exercise their existing jurisdiction and to determine matters falling within their purview. If by
reason of the decision of a tribunal a person, for
instance, ·loses his right to occupy a house,
or has to pay a tax, that decision cannot
be thrown to the winds and a complaint
made to this Court that a fundamental right
has been violated. The decision being one made
in exercieie of _a judicial power and in performance
of a duty to make it is a valid adjudication .though
as a result of it a person may_ not be able to occupy
his house or may have to pay a ta.x. The decision
may be a right one or a wrong one. If it is not a
nullity when. it is right I fail to see how it can_ be
said to be a nullity l;>ecause it is erroneous,. so Jong
of course, as the law is a good law, the deci!'Jion is
of an authority competent to act under the law, the
procedure followed by it is as prescribed by the law
~ and the error does not pertain to jurisdiction.- The
error ma.y lie in the construction placed upon a.
statue by the trib1,1na.l. If it is that and no more,
such erroneous construction cannot render the
action ta.ken thereunder arbitrary or unauthorised.
'rhe erro,r Jiu to be corrected in the manner permit·
ted by law or the Constitution and until it is so
1962
Smt Ujjam Bai
v.
• Stat1 of Utt/JI'·
P1adesfi
M udliulka1. J.
988
1962
SmJ. Ujjom B.;
Mud/tolk(tr.. J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1963]
corrected it would not be open to the party to say
that its fundamental right is violated.
Looking at the matter from the aspect of the
nature of the right which is capable of being enforced under Art. 32 the same conclusion is reached.
Thus when the provisions of a taxing law entitle a
taxing authority to assess and levy a tax and for
these purposes to decide certain matters judicially
and give binding effect to its decision and none of
the provisions of that law are void under ;\rt. 13 or
otherwise invalid the right enforceable under Art.32
woul<l be the right to carry on business subject to
the payment of the tax as assessed by the taxing
authority and not a right to carry on trade or business free from that liability. It makes ne difference even if the assessment of the tax is based upon
an erroneous construction of the taxing law inas·
much as the right to have a.correct determination
of the tax is not part of the fundamental right to
carry on business but flows only from the taxing
law. It would follow therefore that 'in such a case
llothing is left for being enforced under Art. 32
when the taxing authority does no more than a88&as
and levy a tax after determining jt.
One more point needs to be dealt with. It
was said that a quasi-judicial tribunal beinp: an
instrumentality of the State its action is State
action ·and so it will be under the same disabilities
as the State to do a thing which it is incompetent
or impermissible. for the State to 'do. It is also said
that. what a State cannot do directly it cannot do
indirectly. In so far as the incompetency of the
State arises out of a constitutional prohibition or
lack of legal authority due to any reason whatsoever, it will attarh itself to the action of the quasijudioial tribunal purporting to act as the instrumentality of the State. Where, in such a oa.ee, any
fundamental right of a person is violated by the
action of the quasi-judicial tribunal that per1on i1
•
'
t
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
I S.C.R.
.
'<
(
989
entitled to treat the action as arbitrary or a nullity
and come up to this court under Art. 32 because
the action would be one which is not authorised by
law. But while an erroneous action of tne State in
exercise of its administrative functions can be challenged directly under Art. 32 if it affects a person's
fundamental right on the ground that it is not
authorised by law the action of the tribunal puraua.nt to an erroneous order will not be open to challenge for the reason that its action arises out of the
exercise of a judicial power and is thus authorised
by law, State action though it be. When, under
the provisions of a law, the State exercises judicial
power, as for instance, by entertaining an appeal
or revision or assessing or levying a tax it acts as a
qua.sHudicial tribunal and its decision even though
erroneous will no~ be a nullity and cannot be
ignored. It can be corrected only under Art. 226
or Art. 227 by the High Court or under Art. 136 by
this Court inasmuch as the State would then be
acting as a.quasi-judicial tribunal.
To summarise, my conclusions are these :
,.
~
I
.I
I. The question of enforcement of a
fundamental right will arise if a tax is assessed under a law which is (a) void under
Art. 13 or (b) is ultra vire.s the Constitution or
(c) where it is subordinate legislation, it is
ultra vire.s the law under which it is made or
inconsistent with any other law in force.
2.
A similar question will also arise if
the tax is assessed and/or levied by an authority (a) other than the one empowered to do
so under the taxing law or (b) in violation of
the procedure prescribed by the law or ( c) in
colourable exercise of the powers conferred
by the law.
3. No fundamental right is breached and
19H
Smt. Ujjam Bot
v.
State of Ultar
Pr•sh
M udholl:or J,
990
B.,. lljjam Bai
v.
Stolt oj U'to'
Pradesh
Muiliolkar J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [19631
consequently no question of enforcing a fundamental right arises where a tax is assessed and
levied bona fide by a competent authority
under a valid law by following the procedure
laid down by that law, even though it be
based upon an erroneous construction of the
law except when by reason of the constmction placed upon the law a tax is assessed
and levied which is beyond the competenc11
of the legislature or is violative of the provisions of Part III or of any other provisions
of the Constitution.
4. A mere misconstruction of a provision of law does not render the decision of a
quasi-judicial tribunal void (as being beyond
its jur~diction). It is a good and valid decision in law until and unless it is corrected in
the appropriate manner. So long as that
decision stands, despite its being erroneous,
it must be regarded as one authorised by law
and where, under such a decision a person is
held liable to pay a tax that person cannot
treat the decision as a nullity and contend
that what is demanded of him is something
which is not authorised by law. The position
would be the same even though upon a proper
construction, the law under which the decision
was given did not authorise such a levy.
•
My answer to each of the two questions is in
the negative.
BY CouRT:
Jn accordance
with the judg
No. 7ll of 1959
is dismissed, but the parties will bear their own
costs. C. M. P. No. 1349 of 1961 for restoration of
Civil Appeal No. 572 of 1960 is also dismissed, but
the parties will bear their own costs.
m~ntR of the majority, Writ Petition
--~
r
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