LACHHMAN DAS ON BEHALF OF FIRM TILAK RAM RAM BUX versus STATE OF PUNJAB AND OTHERS
Supreme Court of India | Decided 23 April 1962 | [1963] 2 S.C.R. 353 | 1962 INSC 161
Key facts
- Decided
- 23 April 1962
- Bench
- T.L. VENKATARAMA AIYYAR*, BHUVNESHWAR PRASAD SINHA, K. SUBBA RAO, N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR, J.R. MUDHOLKAR
- Bench size
- 5
- Case number
- WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) No. 92/1959
- Disposal
- Dismissed
- Citation
- [1963] 2 S.C.R. 353
- Neutral citation
- 1962 INSC 161
Text of the judgment
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COUR'l' REPORTS
353
LACHHMAN DAS ON BEHALF OF FIRM
TILAK RAM RAM BUX
v.
STATE OF PUNJAB AND OTHERl3
[And Connected Petition And Appeals].
(B. P. SINHA, c. J., K. SUBBA RAO, N. RAJAGOPALA
'{
I
AYYANGAR, J. R. MUDHOLKAR and T. L.
VENKATARAMA AIYAR, JJ.)
81,ate Ban/c-State Dues-Determination and reooveryStatute providing for special procedure-Constitutional validityMerger of States-Powers of Rule.,, of erstwhile States after
meger-Enactment, if in force-Patiala Reoovery of State
Dues Act, JV of 2002 BK, ss. 2, 3, 4, 5, · 6, 11-0onsUtution of
India, Arts. 14, 19(1) (!), 19(1) (g), 363.
On May 5, I948, the rulers of .eight States, including the
States of Patiala and Nabha, entered into a covenant
merging all the said States for the establishment of a new
State, called the Pepsu Union. By Art. VI of the covenant
all the rights, authority and jurisdiction of the Ruler in
relation to Government was vest in the Union. The exe..
cutive authority of the State was to vest in the Rajpramukh.
Article X provided that "until a constitution framed by the
Constituent Assembly comes into operation .. the Raj Pramukh,
shall have power to make and promulgate ordinance for the
peace and good Government of the, Union or any part thereof, and any ordinance so ruade shall, for the space of not more
than six mcnths from its promulgation have the like force of
law as an Act passed by the Constituent Assembly .... " The
new State came into existence on August 20, 1948, with the
Ruler of Patiala as its Raj Pralnukh. On the same date he
issued an Ordinance applying all the laws obtaining· in the
State of Patiala to the entire territories of the new State, and
as this Ordinance would have expired on February·20, 1948,
he promulgated another Ordinance on February 15, 1949, on
the same terms as the previous one. On April 9, 1949, all the
Rulers entered into a Supplementary Covenant, whereby Art.X
was amended by omitting the words " for the space of not
more than six months from its promulgation." The object of
this was to continue in force all the laws which had been
brought into forC'e by the Ordinances until repealed by fresh
legislation. After the Constitution of India came into force
Pepsu became a Part B State, and subsequently under the States
Reorganisation Act, 1956, Prpsu became part of the State of
1961
364
116!
J..aclrllmon Doi tm
behlJlj of Finn
Tilok Rom Rom Bux
v.
Sfot1 of Punj,b
SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1963]
Punjab, and all the laws in force in Pepsu continued to have
force in that area.
The Patiala State Bank was established in 1917 by the
then Ruler of the State of Patiala. The appellant had an
account in one of the branches of the Bank in the State of
Patiala, while the petitioner, in the connected case, had a
similar account in a Branch of the Bank in the State of
Nabha. The amounts due under the aforesaid accounl3 were
outstanding after the Constitution of India had come into
force. The Bank proceeded to realise the same in accordance
with the provisions of the Patiala Recovery of State Dues Act,
IV of 2002(BK), and the Rul<s framed thereunder. This Act,
had been enacted by the State of Patiala before it was merged
in the new State. Under s .. 3 of the Act debts due to the
Paliala State Bank were included in the definition clause as
•State Dues', and s. 4 authorised the Managing Director of the
PatiaJa State Bank to determine the exact amount of State
dues recoverable from the defaulter, while s. 5 enacted that
State dues may be recovered as if they were arrears of land
revenue. Under s. 6 a certificate issued by the Managing
Director of the Bank as to the amount of State dues was conclusive proof of the matter.; stated thereiO: and s. 11 barred the
jurisdiction of the Civil Court in respect of the matters entrusted to the Managing Director under the Act and rules
framcd under the act. The appellants challcnged the validity
of the Act and the proceedings taken thereunder on the
f.'TOunds (I) that the Act had ceased to be in force ~n the
expiry c;f the six months of the Ordinance issued by the Raj
Pramukh on February 15, 1949, because the Rulers had on
power to enter into the Supplementary Convenant after they
had surrendered completely all their sovereign powers to the
new State by the Convenant dated May 5, 1!K8, and had
therefore, no competence to confer on the Raj Pramukh any
authority to legislate; and (2) that, in any case, the Act and
the rules made there under became void on the coming into
force of the Constitution of lndfa as they were repugnant to
Arts. I 4, 19( I) (f) and (g).
\/
I
•..
Ileld, (Subba Rao, J., d~'8enting), that the Patiala
Recovery of State Dues Act, of2002 BK did not offend Art. 14
of the Constitution of India.
A Bank established by a St•t< had distinctive features
which difforentiated it from other Banks and formed a cate.gory in itself; and the Act, in settinl( up •eifarate authorities
for determination of di&putcs and in prescribing a sp<cial
procedure to be follow•d by them for the r<eovrry of the
,_
2 S.O.R. SUPREME COURTS REPORTS
355
I911B
dues by summary process, could not be considered to be
discriminator.y and was valid.
Lochhmon· Daa on
bMalf of Fif'fll
Manna/al and Another v. Oolketor of Jhalawar and Ti/ak
Ram Ram Bux
Others. (1961) 2 S. C. R. 962, followed.
v.
Slate of Punjaj
,)
Ohiranjit Lal Choudhury v. ·Union of India and others,
(1950) S. a. R. 869 and Ram Kriahna Dalmia v. Shri Justice
S. R. Tandolkar and others, (1959) S. C.R. 279, relied on. .
The Act was not discriminatory on the ground that
after the merger of the Pepsu State in the State ·of Punjab
the Act continued to be in force in the territories of the
erstwhile Pepsu State but had. no operation in the other
parts of the State of Punjab, because different laws prevalited
in differrnt parts of the State due to historical reasons and
this was a proper basis of classification under Art. 14.
Bhaiya Lal Shukla v. The State of Madhya Pradesh,
(1962) Supp. 2 S.C.R. 257 State ofMatihya.Pradesh v. G. 0 .
.l!fandawar, (1955) I S. C.R. 599, State of Maah11a Pradesh
v. The Gwalior Sugar Company Ltti., (1962) 2 S. C.R. 619
and Bowman v. Lewis, (1880) JOI U.S. 22: 25 L. ED. 989,
relied on.
Bela, further (per Sinha, C. J, Rajagopala Ayyangar,
Mudholkar and Venkatarama Aiyar, JJ.) that: (!)under
the Covenant dated May 5, 1948, there wa• a complete
divestiture of all the sovereign rights of the Rulers when
the new State came into existence on August 20, 1948, and,
therefore, the Supplementary Covenant entered fnto by the
Rulers on April 9, 1949; was n.ot effective for modifying the
provisions of the Original Covenant.
Prithi Singh v. State of Pepsu, A. I. R. 1952 Pepsu 161'
disapproved.
(2) the question as to whether the Patiala Recovery
of. Sta~e Dues Act, IV of 2002 (BK), was in force at the material t1D1es was one which arose out of a prov-Uioo in the
Covenant dated May 5, 1948, and, therefore, under Art. 363
of the Constitution of India, the civil court had no jurisdic·
tion to go into it.
Bholanath J. Thaker v. Siale of Saurashtra, A. I. R.
1956 S. C. 680, distinguished.
·
(3) the Patiala Recovery of State Dues Act was not
repugnant to Art. 19 (l)(f) on the ground that the procedure
prescribed by the Act and the rules for the sctilement of disputes was unfair and opposed to rule. of natural justice.
356
1P62
Lo..U.,on Du on
f,,\a/f <f Finn
Tilak Jlam Rim Rtu
••
Siale •' .Punj~
SUPREME OOURT REPORTS [1963]
I
The provisions of the Act and the rules, as a whole, were
reasonablcs.
(4) thr Act ~id not contravene Art. 19(1)(g).
Per Subba Rao. J .--The Patiala Recovery of State Dues
Act violated the doctrine of equality under Art. 14 of the
Constitution of India, and could not be justified on the basis
of reasonable classification. The doctrine of classification i!
only a subsidiary rule C\1olvcd by courts to give a practical
content to the said doctrine. 0\'1:r tmphasis on the doctrine
of clas~ification or an anxious and isustaincd attempt to discover some basis for cla~sification n1ay gradually and im~r
ceptibly deprive the Article of its gloiious content. That
process would inevitably end in ~ubstituting the doctrine of
classification for the dcctrinc of equality ; the fundamental
right to equality before the law and equal protection of the
laws may be replaced by the doctrine of classilication.
''•
In the present case, there were no real differences between the Patiala State Bank and other Bank vis a vi~ their
claim against their constituents which could reasonably sus·
tain the special treatment meted out to the former under the
Act. The provisions of the Act, in so far as they related to
the Patiala State Bank, were constitutionally void.
OmoINAL JURISDICTION
:
Petitions Nos. 92
and 128 of 1959.
Petitions under Art. 22 of the Constitution of
India for the enforcement of Fundamental Rights.
WITH
·Civil Appeals Noe. 210 and 211 of 1961.
Appeals from the judgment and order dated
Maroh 6, 1959, of the l'unjab High Court.in Civil
Writ Nos. 133 of 19f>7 and 389 of 1958.
Bishan Narain, and K. P. Gupta, for the petitioner (in Petn. No. 112 of 1959).
R. L. Aggarwal and tl. G. Ratnaparkhi, for the
petitioner (in Petn. No. 128 of 1959).
Bishan Narai11., R. K. Sinha, R. K. Garg, S. C.
.AggarwGl and P. C. .Aggarwala, for the appellants.
.,..
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COU.RT REPORTS 357
S. N. Sikri, Advncate-Oeneral for the State of
Punjab, N. S. Bindra and P. D. Menon, for the
respondents (in both the petitions and the appeals),
1962. April 23. The following judgments were
delivered. The judgment of Sinha C. J., Rajagopala Ayyangar, Mudholkar and Venkatarama
Aiyar, JJ., was delivered by Venkatarama Aiyar, J.
I
•
(
.
VENKATARAMA AIYAR, J.-Thc appellants are
a joint Hindu family firm which has been carrying
on business since 19ll in ~rains, dal, cereals,
cotton ginning and pressing, oil manufacture and
the like, at a· place called Lehragaga in what was
once the State of Patiala. The firm had an account
·called the Cash Credit Account in the Patiala State
. Bank which had a branch at Lehragaga and used
to borrow money in this account on a pledge of its
stocks. In 1951-52 there was a heavy slump in the
prices of the commodities with the re11ult that the
amounts advanced by the Bank on the security of
the goods were very much in excess of the market
prices thereof. To cover th.is shortfall which came
to Rs. 2,32,000/- the firm entered into an arrangement with the Bank on May 23, 1953, and it is this
that forms the source of the present litigation,
The Bank sanctioned a loan of Rs. 4,50,000/- on
what is called "Demand Loan Account". The firm
deposited title deeds of the properties belonging to
them as security for the amounts that may become
payable on that account and the adult members of
the family executed a promissory note for that
amount and also a memorandum evidencing the
deposit of the title deeds.
It should be mentioned that in 1951 a firm
called Yogiraj Neelkumar was started at Lehragaga
of which the partners were Bl~irathlal one of the
senior members of the joint Hindu family of the
appellant firm and two other strangers Shri Kiehore
I96B
Lachhman Da11 on
b,nalf of Finn
Ti/tJk Rom Rom BWt.
v.
Stale of Prmjab
Al)ar J.
368
SUPREME OOURT REPORTS [1963]
llHll
Chand and Shri Ba.nwa.rila.l. That firm did business
as Commission Agents and ha.d a. Ca.sh Credit
Uo~Do•on
6'11.Jf of Firm
Account in the Pa.tia.la State Bank at Lehra.ga.ga.
TU.I. RQm Rom B1.x
under which it borrowed money for th,, purpose of
••
&alt of l'unjab
its busiueBB. That firm also sustained heavy losses
during the period of the slump and on May 2;l, 1953,
it owed to the Bank a. sum of lts. 2,17,957-12-6 on
account of shortfall. Now what the Bank did
under the arrangement dated Ma.y 23, 1953, was to
adjust the loan of Rs. 4,50,000/- towards the shortfalls due to them both from the appellant's firm a.nd
the firm of Y ogira.j Neelkumar. Tho complaint of
the appellants is that they had nothing to do with
the firm of Yogiraj Neelkumar, that Bha.l(ira.thlal
started it a.long with strangers as his own separate
eonoorn and accordingly tho properties of the joint
Hindu family of the appellants are not liable for
the sum of Rs. 2,17,957-12-6 due to the Bank from
that firm.
The a.mount payable under the demand. loan
account not having been pa.id by tho appellants'
the Bank took stops to realise the same in accord"
a.nee with the providions of tho Pa.tis.la. Recovery
of State Dues Act, hereinafter referred to a.s 'the
Act', and tho rules framed thereunder. It will be
convenient a.t this stage t.o refer to these provisions
a.nd rules in so fa.r as they n.re material, as it is their
vire8 and constitutionality that form the principal
target of attack in these proceedings. Section 3 ( l)
of the Act defines "State Dues" a.a includinJ debts
due to the Pa.tiala. State Bank. "Department" is
defined in s. 3 (2) a.s including the Pa.tie.la State
Bank, and "Head of department" in a. 3 ( 6) as
meaning the Ml\Ila.ging Director in the oa.se. of the
Patiala State Bank. Section 4 ( 1) authorises the
Head of department to determine the exact amount
of State dues recoverable from the defaulter in the
manner prescribed under the rules. Section 5 (I)
{a) euaots that State dues may be recovered by the
..•
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 350
department through the Nazim as if these were
arrears of land revenue. Then comes s. 6 which
is as follows :"6. (I) The Head of department shall
send a certificate as to the amount of State
dues recoverable from the defaulter to the
Nazim in Form I appended to this Act and
to the Accountant-General in Form II appended to this Act :
'
'
_)
Provided that where the head of department is below the rank of a Minister or
Secretary, he shall, unless he is the Registrar,
Co-operative Societies, send the certificate to
the Nazim and the Accountant General through
the Minister or Secretary in oharge who shall
countersign the certificate after ·satisfying
himself that the amount of State dues stated
in it is correct.
(2) A certificate 'transmitted under the
preceeding sub-section shall be conclusive
proof of the matters stated therein and the
Nazim or the Accountant·General shall not
question the validity of the certificate or hear
any objections of the defaulter as to the
amount of State dues mentioned in the
certificate or as to the liability of the defaulter to pay such dues".
·
Section 11 provides that no civil court shall have
jurisdiction in respect of any matter which under
the Act or the rules is entrusted to the Head of
department or any authority or officer authorised
by him. Section 12 confers on the State authority
to make rules providing inter alia for the manner
in which the amount of State dues shall be determined. Rules framed under a. 12 of the Act were
published on August 8, 1945. Rule 3 requires that
the head of department shall cause a notice to be
196b
Lachhman Da3 on
b~half of Firm
Tilok Rtr.m Rom Bux
v.
State qf Purijab
Ai1ar J.
360
-
I96Z
LaeMman DtU on
b,hafJ •J Fi1m
T'lalc Bam Ram Bu
••
St<Jle of P...ju
SUPREME COURT REPORTS r1g63]
served on the defaulter in the manner prescribed.
The notice bas to specify the amount of state dues .
a.nd require the defaulter to pa.y such dues on or
before a. da.te specified, or to appear on such date
before the hea.d of department a.nd present a. written
statement of his defence. The date to be fixed
should a.How at lea.st fiftel'n days to the defaulter
to ma.kc payment or to appear a.nu answer the claim.
If thn defaulter docs not appear on the date specified, the head of department ma.y proceed ex parte
and determine by order in writing the a.mount of
State duos recoverable from him if he is satisfied
that the notice had been duly served, and if not so
satisfied, he may direct fresh notice. Rule 6 provides that "where the defaulter appears on the
date fixed in tho notice a.nd presents his writen
statement, the head of department or the Inquiry
Officer, a.a the case ma.y be,. shall examine the
objections of the defaulter stated in the written
statement in the light of the relevant records of the
department, and she.II then by lorder in writing
determine on the ea.me day or on a.ny subsequent
day the exact a.mount of State dues reoovera.ble
from him." Rule 7 provides that when the a.mount
determined a.a payable under rules 5 a.nd 6 remains
unpaid, the head of department might iBBue a. notice
on the defaulter requiring him to pay the State
dues within fifteen de.ye and that in default, the
amount could be recovered through the Na.zim.
Under Rule 8, an appeal a.go.inst a.n order determining the amount due under rule 5 or 6 lies to the
lleard of Directors. Against an Order rej 3Cting a.n
a.ppea.l under rule 8, a. revision is provided to the
Ministry. There is a.Isa a. provision for service of
notice on the defaulter, when proceedings for realising the a.mount are ta.ken.
We may now refer to the steps taken by the
Pa.tie.la Bank for recovering the amounts due from
the appellants. On February 17, 1955, the BIJ'lk
,
y
>
2 S.C.R.
l
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
361
196B
issued a notice to the appellants under rule 3 (2)
stating that a sum of Rs. 5,17,863-3-4 was due from L 1chhman Das on
them and calling upon them to pay the said amount behalf of Firm
Rom Bu•
or to file a written statement within fifteen days Titak llam
v.
setting out their defence to the claim. To this the Stal• of Punjab
appellants sent on March 26, 1955, a reply in which
<ltyar J,
they pointed out that they had been unable to pay,
because of "continuous slump in the market", and
requested that the Bank should accept payments
in reasonable instalments. It was also stated that
the Government intended to acquire some lands belonging to the appellants and that compensation
would become payable and it was prayed thatuntil
then the recovery proceedings might be poatponed.
On this, the Bank would appear to have stayed
their hands for some time. On November 21, 1955,
a fresh notice was issued under rule, 3 siating that
a sum of Rs. 5,24,593-10-10 was due from the appellants and asking them to pay the amount or to
file their defence to the claim within fifteen days.
To this aga;n the appellants replied on December 7,
1955, asking that the representation previously
made by them might be considered by the Board
of Directors. On January 6, 1956, the appellants
sent another reply stating that they expected to
pay a substantial amount of the loan within a short
time and prayed that further proceedings might be
suspended. The Managing Director did not accede
to this request and on January 27, 1956, he issued
a certificate under s. 7 of the Act certifying that a
sum of Rs. 4,98,589-1-6 was due from the appellants
and asking the Deputy Commissioner, Patiala, to
recover the same as arrears of land revenue. After
some more attempts at getting the recovery proceedings postponed, the appellants filed in the High
Court of Punjab on February 16, 1957, a petition
under Art. 226 of the Constitution, Writ Petition
No. 133 of 1957, wherein they challenged the validity of the Act and of the proceedings taken there·
under on various grounds. Meantime, on July 7,
362
-
L00Mma11 Du Oft
M1aiJ of Ffrm
T ila Rom Rt11t1 Bux
••
81,,,. of Pwrjob
A(1<UJ.
SUPREME OOURT REPORTS [1963]
1956, the Bank issued a notice under rule 3 (2) de·
mantling from the appellanta a. sum of Rs. 25,548-4-6
aa duo on the caBh credit account at Lehi-a.gaga.. To
this, the a.ppellanta sent a reply denying their liability. On October, 4, 1956, the B1tnk determined
the liability ex parte at Rs. :!5,478·15-9. A notice
under rule 7(1) was issued on December 6, 1956,
and that not having bPen complied with, a certifi·
cate under s 7 of the Act was issued by the Managing Director. On May 17, 11158, the appellant filed
Writ Petition No. 389 of 1958 in the High Court of
Punjab challenging the validity of the determina·
tion made on October 4, 1956, and of the subsequent
proceedings taken for the recovery of the said amount
on the same grounds as in Writ Petition No. 133 of
1957. Both these Writ Petitions were heard together, and by·their Judgment dated March 6,1959,
the learned Judges held that the impugned Act and
the proceedings were valid and dismissed the petitions. They, however, granted a certificate under
Art. 133, and hence these appeals.
t..·•
The appellanta also filed a petition under Art.
32 of the Constitution, attacking the vires of
the Act, and of the proceedings taken thereunder,
on the same grounds as are raised in the appeals.
We have accordingly heard them together, and this
Judgment will govern all of them.
Three contentions have been urged in support
of the appeals:( i) The prooeedings taken under the Act for
determining the amount payable by the appellants
and for recovering the same are illegal as the Act
had ceased to be in force on the material dates.
(ii) The Act and the rules made thereunder
became void on the coming into force of the Con·
stitution as they are repugnant to Arts. 14 and 19
( 1) (f) and (g), anJ the proceedings taken under
those provisions are therefore illegal.
'.
'
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
363
(iii) The oer1;ificate issued under s. 7 is not in
accordance with the rules framed under the Act and
in consequence the proceedings taken thereunder
are illeg"ll.
(i) Taking up t.he contention that the Act had
ceased to be in force on the material dates, it is
necessary first to state the facts on which it is based.
On May 5, 1948, the "Rulers of the independent State
of Faridkot, Jind, Kapurthala, Malerkotla, Nabha,
Patiala, Kalsia and Nalagarh entered into an agree·
ment referred to as "the Covenant" for the establishment of a new State called the Patiala and East
Punjab States Union or more briefly. "the l'epsu
Union" comprehending the territories of their respective States with a common executive, legislature and judiciary. Article III provides for the con·
stitution of a Council of Rulers. Article VI of the
Covenant provides that on the constitution of the
new State "all rights, authority and jurisdiction belonging to the Ruler which appertain, or are incidental to the Government of the Covenanting State
shall vest in the l'nion and shall hereafter be exercisable only as provided by this Covenant or by
the Constitution to be framed thereunder" and that
the Union shall take over "all duties · and obligations of the Ruler pertaining or incidental to the
Government of the Covenanting State" and "all
the assets and liabilities of the Covenanting State".
The executive authority of the State is to vest under Art. IX of the Covenant in the Raj Pramukh.
Article X provides for the formation of a Constituent Assembly and the framing of a Constitution
by it and thne is the following proviso to it which
is very material for the present discussion:
"Provided that until a Constitution framed by the Constituent ARsembly comes into
operation after rPceiving the assent of the
Raj Pramukh, the Raj Pramukh shall have
power to make and promulgate Otdinance for
19611
Laehhman D•s on
b.halj •f Firm
Tilol: Ram Ram Bux
..
State of Punjab
A.l,yar J.
364 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963]
1961
Laelihman Das on
bthalJ of Firm
T;J,I,; Rt.m Rom BUJt
••
St•lt 1/ Panjab
Ai11•r J.
the peace and good Government of the Union
or any part thereof, and apy Ordinance so
made shall, for the space of not more than six
months from its promulgation have the like
force of J,.w as an Act passed by the Constit·
uent Assembly, but any such Ordinance ma:r,
be controlled or superseded by any such Act. '
Article XI provides for the payment of the
amount fixed in the Schedule as the privy purse of
each Ruler. Art.icle XII guarantees to the Ruler
"all the personal privileges, dignities and titles en
joyed by them ......•••.................. immediately before the 15th day of AuguHt, I 947'' and Art. XIV,
euooession to the Gaddi according to hw and
custom.
Tho new State camo into existence on August
20, 1!)48, 8.s provided under the Covenant. The Ruler
of Patiala became its Raj Pramukh and on the same
date he promulgated an Ordinance. No. I of 2005
(BK) which provided inter alia that all Laws in
force in the State of Patiala on that date shall
apply mutaHs mutandi.~ to the territories of the
said State and with effect from that dato all Jaws
in force in such Covenanting State immediately
before that date shall be repealed". By force of
this Ordinance, the impugned Act became the law
of the Pepsu Union. Under Art. X of thfl Covenant this Ordinance would have expired on February
20, 1949, and so on February 15, 1949, the Raj
Pramukh promulgated another Ordinance No. 16
of 2005 (BK) in terms similar to the Ordinance
No. l of 2005. The appellants concede that this
law is intra vires and by force of this Ordinance the
impugned Act continued to be in force after February 20, 1949.
When Art. X of the Covenant provided that
the Ordinances to be pwmulgated by the Raj Pram ukb were to be in force for a. period of only six
c
v
2 S.C.R.
]
•
_)
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
365
months it was expected that the Constituent Assembly would in the mean time be convened and a
regular Constitution drawn up. But that did not
materialise and so on April 9, 1049, all the Rulers
met again and entered into another agreement
called "the supplementary Covenant", where by
Art. X was amended_ by omitting the words "for
the space of not a more than six months from its
promulgation". The result of this was that the
laws which had \:>een brought into force by Ordinance No. 16 of 2005 (BK) including the impugned
Act, would not lapse on August 20, 1949, but
continue to be in force until repealed by fresh
legislation.
But it is argued for the appellants that the
Supplementary Covenant is void and inoperative
because by the Covenant dated May 5, 1948, the
Rulers had surrendered complet.ely all their sovereign powers to the new State and that in consequence on April 9, 1949, when they entered into
the Supplementary Covenant they had no shred of
sovereignty left in them and had therefore no
competence to confer on the Raj Pramukh any
authority to legis1ate. To this the respondents
reply that the original Covenant on its true construction did not completely extinguish all the
powers of ·the Rulers and that the Supplementary
Covenant is therefore within their competence.
They further contend that it is a political question
whether the Supplementary Covenant is valid or
not, and that Art. 363 bars the jurisdiction of the
Civil Courts to entertain such a question. We now
proceed to consider these contentions.
To appreciate the true effect of the Covenant
it is necessary to state what the position is according to rules of International Law, when one independent State becomes merged in another. "A
State" s~;ys Oppenheim, "ceases to be an International
feraon, when it cease!! to exist. Practical oases
•
1962
Lacbhman Dos on
behalf of Firm
Tilak Ram Ram Bu.
••
61ale of Punjab
366
19~2
Lachlun-"• DflA on
brh'Jlj of 1-'irm
filok Ram Rr;m Bux
••
Sltalf of P1111jab
tfiyar J,
SUPREME COURT REPOR'l'S [1963]
of examination of States are: mer!!er of State into
another, annexation aft€r conquest in war, break·
ing up of State into several States, and breaking
up of a State into partR which a.re annexed by
surrounding States. Ry voluntarily merging into
another Stat(', a State Josee all its independence and
becomes a mero pa.rt. of another". (International
Law, Vol. l, 150). Thorofore when the new State
of Pepsu wn.q formed, the oight States which had
merged into it would cease to exist as independent
personae and thero could he no question of sover·
eignty of suoh States or of its ex-Rulers. But it is
aruged that the loss of sovereignty need not ocour
at a single point of timn, and that in the present
case it was grarlual, and spread over nc~rly a. year,
and that both the Covenants were made during this
period. It is no doubt true that loss of sovereignty
might bn a c:nntinuing process extending over a
considerable period of time, and that has also
been held quite recently by this Court in Promod
Cluindra Deb v. 'l'he Stal£ of Orissa ('). But
is that what has happened here ? The Covenant is quite clear and unequivocal on the point.
Article VI id the crucial provision, and it says
that all the rights, authority and jurisdiction of the
Ruler in relation to Government a.re to vest in the
Union. Then follow provisions for the exercise
of those powers by the Cnion. Thus there is on
the one hand an extinction of the powers of the
Rulers, and on the othn hand vesting of the same in
the new State. In strong contrast to this are the
provisions which guarantee to the Rulers their
privy purse, and their right to their personal properties, and privileges. On the wording of the
Covenant therefore there was a. complete divestiture of all the sovereign rights of the Rulers, when
the new State came int-0 existence on August 20,
1948.
(I) [1962] Supp. IS. C. R, ~.
I-
2 s.c.R.
,,.
..
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
367
1962
But it is contended . that the Covena.nt does
not . dispose of the entirety of the legislative power
Dar""'
possessed by the Rulers, because under Art. X the LacU~man
behalf of Fi,m
Tilak
Rain
Ram
Bux
Raj Pramukh·could enact laws only for a period
v.
of six: moriths. The legislative power not having Sia'• of Punjab
been completely transferred to him, it is argued,
Aiyar J.
the residuum must vest somewhere and that could
only b11 in the Rulers themselves. · Therefore, it
is said, there is some sovereignty•left
in them, and
1
that is disposed of by the Sqpplementary Covenant .
This argument sounds· plausible but cannot be
sustained on the terms of the origina!Covenant.
•
His not, in our view, correct to say, that under
Art. X the legislative powers of the Itulers were
not transferred in full to ·the new State of Pepsu.
The Raj Pramukh has the power under that Article
"to make and promulgate Ordinances for the peace
and good Government of the Union or any part
thereof". Stopping here, there is no reservation
whatsoever in. the grant of the power to the new
Ruler. Then follows the provision that the Ordinance is to be in. force for a period not exceeding
six months. The eft'ect of this is not to keep back
from the Raj Pramukh any portion or field of legislative power, and this will be plain from the fact
that the Raj Pramukh can go on renewing the laws
every six months ad infinitum. What the effect of
this provision would be if the Raj Pramukh chose
to ignore it we need not pause to consider. What
is relevant for the purpose of the present discussion
is, not whether the Raj Pramukh could have enacted
a law in disregard of the above provision but whether in view of it any residue of legislative power
could be helll to have continued in the Rule1·s. On
that question Art. VI is clear beyond all doubt.
The entirety of the rights, authority and jurisdiction
of the Hulers is to vest in the Union, and is to be
exercisable only as provided in the Covenant. It
cannot in our opinion be argued that the Rnle'fll of
368
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963]
1961
the Covenanting States could, subsequent to August
20, 1948, have passed any laws within their own
bt.holf of Firm
territories on the ground f.hat the power of the Raj
Tilak Ram R?m Bux
Pramukh did not exwnd, under Art. X, to enacting
State oj Punjab
legisla.tinn beyond six months. It is further to be
notod that under Art. VI, a II the powers of the
A€,1or J,
Rulers are to vest in the Union, and even if the
whole of the legislative power ie not exercisable by
the Raj Pra.mukh by reason of Art. X. it is in the
Union that the residue of the powtr must be hold
to he lodged and not with the Rulers .
•
It is noxt argued for the respondents that
though the R.ulers might have surrendered their
power to the Union under the original Covenant,
that did not., according to rules of Intern ationa.I
Law, deprive them of their right to enter into a
fresh C<ivonant.
Relianre was placf'd on the
following passage in Oppenheim 's International
Law:
Lachhman Das on
.
"A trPnty, although concluded for ever,
or for n period of time which ha.a not yet
f'Xpircd, may ncvcrth<>less always he diBBolved
by mutual consent of the c:ont.racling parties''.
(Vol. I, p. 842, para 537).
It is contended that on tho principal stated
above it was within the competence of the Rulers
to modify Art. X as thoy di<l under the Supplementary Covenant.
But tho passage quoted above
presupposes that on the date of the later t.z:eaty by
which the earlier treaty is rescinded or modified the
contracting parties are sovereigns and if, as we
have already held, the effect of the original Cov~
na.nt is to completely divest the Rulers of therr
sovereign power there can be no question of their
entering into any treaty thereafter as that could
be only between sovereigns and the Supplementary
Covenant cannot therefore be sust.a.ined on the
principle of Intemational Law enunciated above.
•
2 S.C.R.
)
-
--'
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
369
Our attention was also invited to the statement of the law in Hyde's International Law, Vol.
I, p. 396, that when there is a change of sovereignty
arising by reason of cession, the ·grantor is permitted, pending the actual transfer, to exercise authority with respect to certain matters and it was
argued that on this principle the Rulers must be
held to have the competence to conclude the
Supplementary Covenant with
a view to
implement the original Covenant.
But this
power which is an exception to the rule previously
stated by the learned author that on a change of
sovereignty all legislative and political powers vest
in the new sovereign is limited to the exercise of
"authority necessary to maintain order and safeguard the economic conditions" and even this interim authority ceases when the possession of the
territory is actually delivered to the new sovereign.
As that happened in the instant case on August 20,
1948, the Rulers cannot in any view be said to
have had any authority to enter into any Covenant on April 9, 1949.
We must now refer to the decisions which
have been cited on behalf of the respondents as
bearing on the true construction to be put on the
Covenant. In Virendra Singh v. State of Uttar
Pradesh (1 ), Rulers of 35 States entered into
a Covenant in March, 1948, constituting the United State of Vindhya Pradesh and as the intergrati on did not work well they entered into another
agreement in December, 19!9, dissolving that State
and on 1st January, 1950, acceded to the Govern·
ment of India under a merger agreement. There
after the State Government repudiated certain
grants of land made by the previous Rulers, and its
action was challenged on the ground that .the alienations were within the protection of Articles of the
·merger agreement. And this Court held that
( l)[ 1955] 1 s. C.R. 415, ~29.
1962
Lachhman Das on
heho~f of Firm
Tilak Ram Ram Bux
••
Slate of Punj"b
AiyarJ.
370
Ladlvna11 Das on
IHAalf of Firm
7 il.t R4m Ram Dux
v.
Stale of Punjab
"''"', J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1963)
though no rights could be founded on the merger
agreement as they were acts of State, the subsP..
quent conduct of the State in affirming the transfers
created justiciable rights. The question actually
decided has thus no bearing on the point now in
controversy. But in narrating the events leading
to such a merger agreement it was observed.
"The Rulers of Charkbari and Sa.rile. retained,
at the moment of final cession, whatever
mi>a~ure of so~reignty they had when paramountcy lapsed, leBB the portion given to the
Indian Dominion by their Instruments of
Acces~ion in 1947; thPy lost none of it during
tho interlude when they toyed with the experiment of intergration.''
Thl'se observations cannot in the context be held to
be a decision on the point under consideration. It
m:iy also be added that tho disintegration of the
United 8tate of Vinrlhya Pradesh and the reconstitution of the old States would itself be an act of
State.
l'i·ithi Singli v. Slate of Pcps11. ('i relied on for
the respondents is a tlircct dedsion on this point.
Thero it was held on a consideration of Arts. Ill,
XI, XII and XIV of tho Covennnt that tl1<: Rulers
had not surrendered all their sovereign powers to
the new State. We aro unable to agree with this
decision. Article I II provides for the formation of
a Council of Hulers which is to exercise such functions· as aro assigned to it by the Covenant and such
other functions, if any, as may be assigned to it by
the Constitution of the Union. This Article clearly
does not vest any sovereign powers in the Rulers.
As for Arte. XI, XII and XIV they relate to the
personal rights of the Rulers and as already stated
they emphasize by contrast that the l<ulers had no
110vereignty vested in them. The learned Judge11
(IJ A.J.R. (1953) hpsQ, 161,
•···
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
371
sought support for their conclusion in the passages
from Oppenheim on International Law, Vol. I, p.
842, quoted above but for the reasons already given
they are not in point. In the result we agree with
the appellants that the Supplementary Covenant
cannot be held to be effective for modifying the
provisions in the original Covenant.
.
It is next contended for the respondents that
even on the footing that the validity of the impugned Act, should be determined in accordance
with the provisions of the original Covenant, without reference to the Supplementary Covenant, the
appellants must fail because the question in dispute
is one which arises out of a provision in a Covenant
and under Art. 363 the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to go into it. The appellants do not dispute
that the H.ulers of the States who entered into the
Covenant are all Rulers within Art.363(2}(b), or
that the Government of the Dominion of India was
a party to it. What they urge is that they merely
seek to establish that they are not liable under the
impugned Act, because it is inoperative by reason
of Art. X in the Covenant, and that such a dispute
is not within the bar of Art. 363. And the decision
in Bholanatk J. Thaker v. State of Saurasktra(') is
relied on as supporting this · contention. There a
Judicial Officer of the erstwhile Wadhwan State,
had filed a suit questioning the validity <'fan Order
of the State of Kathiawar, whioh had been formed
as the result of the merger of a number of States
including Wadhwan, whereby his services were
prematurely terminated. The question was whether
the action was barred by Art. 363. This Court held
that the Officer had a right to continue in service
under a law of Wadlnvan enacted before the date of
merger, that the Covenant was relied on only for
showing that that right was at all times subsisting
and that Art. 363 was not a bar to the maintenance
(I) A.I.R. (1954) S. C. 680.
1962
La11hhman Dai oa
behalf of Fir•
Tilak Ram Ram Bu:t
v.
Stat• of Punj1b
AiJ<'r J,
372
1961
LO(h/1man Das on
Beltolj of Firtn
7 lok Ram Ram Bux
v.
S ~au of Plfl~o b
AVM' J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [19631
of such a suit. The ratio of the decision is.to be
found in the following observation:
j
"There was no dispute arising out of the
Covenant and what the Appellant was doing
was merely to eaforce his rights under tho
existing laws which continued in force until
they were repealed by approprii.te legislation."
In other words the dispute relate.d to a right which
arose independent of, and was affirmed in the
Covenant, and therefore Art. 363 had no application. That is not the pOHition here. The liability
of the appellants to pay to the Bank the amounts
determined in accordance with the impugned Act is
one which arises dehors the Covenant, and it is
sought to be got rid of only by recourse to Art. X.
The dispute is therefore one arising directly on a
provision in the Covenant, and Art. 363 will apply.
But even if the appellants are right in their
contention that Ordinances l and 16 of 2005 (Bk)
ceased to be in operation after the expiry of six
months from the date of their promulgation, they
can derive no advantage from it, because what
those Ordinances did was to extend the operation of
all Patiala laws to the territories which had formed
part of the other Covenanting States. So far as the
territories of the erstwhile State of Patiala are
concerned, its laws continued to be in force proprio
vigore and not by force of Ordinances 1 and 16 of
2005 (Bk). Therefore even if the Ordinances lapsed
on August 20, 1949, as contended for the appellant,
that would not affect their liability under the
impugned Act, as they come from the territory of
the erstwhile State of Patiala, and would in any
event be governed by it. Tho question therefore is
purely academic so far as appellants are concerned
but it do"B not arise for decision in Writ Petition
No. 128 of 195!1, wherein the validity of the impugned Act and of the prooeedinge taken thereunder is
••
.__
2 s.c.R.
SUP.REME COURT REPORTS
373
19fi2
challenged by a resident of the erstwhile State of
Nabha, on the same grounds as are raised in the L<Jchhman Das frt.
behalf of Firm
appeals. That is why we have gone into it fully, Tilalc
Ram Ram Bui:
and given our pronouncement thereon. In the
v.
result this contention must be found against the Slate of Punjab
appellants.
.diyar J.
(ii) We shall next consider the contention of
the appellants that the Act and .the rules framed
thereunder are repugnant to Art. J.4 and Art. .19
(l)(f) and (g) and that they have therefore become
void under Art. 13 of the Constitution. Dealing
first with the contention that they contravene
Art. 14, two grounds have been urged in support of
(i) that there is discrimination between the Patiala
State Bank on the one hand and the other Banks
on the other and (ii) that after the merger of the
Pepsu Union in the State of Punjab under the States
Reorganisation Act, 1926, there is discrimination
between the law as administered in the territories
of the erstwhile Pepsu Union on the one hand and
in the other parts of the State of Punjab on the
other.
l
As regards the first ground the argument of
the appellants might thus be stated. In the case
of Banks other than the Patiala State Bank a
, dispute between a Bank and its customers has to
be settled under. the ordinary law by resort to
courts or to arbitration and a decree passed in those
proceedings has to be realised in accordance with
the procedure prescribed in the Code of Civil Proce·
dure. But under the impugned Act and the rules a
dispute between the Patiala State Bank and its
customers has to be decided by the authorities
constituted thereunder and the jurisdiction of the
Civil courts is barred with respect to it. The procedure prescribed for the deoormination of the dispute
under the Act and the rules is a special one widely
different from that which is followed by the Civil
374
1962
Lochhmdn D•11 on
be \idj of r~,,m
Tiloli Ram Ram Bux
••
Slal1 oj Prmjab
Ai1ar r.
SUPREME OOURT REPORTS [1963)
courts. Then again wben the Ba.nk obtains a.
decree it can be realised by a summary process as
arrears of revenue and not according to the mode
prescribed for realisation of degrees under the Civil
Procedure Code. 'fhere is thus a substantial
difference between the rights of a customer who
deals with the Patiala State Bank and one who
deals with the other Banks. This differentiation is
arl;itrary and has no rational relation to the
objects of the legislation and so it is violative of
Art. 14.
It cannot be disputed that the impuglled Act
and the rules framed thereunder put the Patiala.
State Bank in a· position different from that of the
other Banks under the ordinary law. The question
is whether this difference amounts to discrimination
within Art. 14. The contention of the respondents
is that the Patiala State Bank forms a category in
itself and the law which prescribes a special procedure in relation to the settlement of disputes
between that Bank and its customers is valid becaUBe it is based on a cl&esification having a just
relation to the objeots of the legislation. It is the
correctnetlll of this contention that now falls to be
considered. When a State establishes a Bank, ;t
is the funds of the State to which the tax payers
contribute that are utilised for running it. In this
respect a State Bank differs from Banks established
JY private agencies in which the working capital ,is
;ubscribed by individuals. It should be noted that
it is not part of the gover.nmental functions of a
State to run a Bank, and when a State docs
establish a Bank, is with a view tu confer
benefits on the general public, such as, for example,
developing commerce and industry within its
territories. On the other hand when private
agencies establish a Bank it is as a.n investment for
th08e who subscribe capita.I to it. Thus a. Bank
established by a State has got distinctive features
\
...
~ S.C.R.
. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
375
1962
which differentiate it from the other Banks and .for
purpose of Art. 14 it forms a category' in itself. Laehhmin D•1 .n
61hal/ of Firm
The law is now well settled that while Art. 14 Tilak
Rom Ram BUii
v.
prohibits discriminatory legislation directed against
one individual or class of individuals, it does not Stat. of Punjab
.djyll' J,
forbid reasonable classification, and that for this
purpose even one person or group of persons can
be a class. Professor Willis says in his Constitutional Law p. 580 "a law applying to one person
or one class of persons is constitutional if there is
sufficient basis or reason for it." This statement of
law was approved · by this Court in Ohiranjit
Lal Ohowdhry v. Union of India (1). There the
question was whether a law providing for the
m'lnagement and control by the Government of a
named Company, the Sholapur Spinning & Weaving Company Ltd. was bad as offending Art. 14.
It was held that even a eingle Company might,
having regard to its features, be a category in
itself and that unless it was shown that there were
other Companies similarly circumstanced, the
legislation must be presumed to be constitutional
and tha attack under Art .. 14 must fail. In Ram
Krishna Dalmia v. Shri Justice S. R. Tendolkar ('),
this Court again examined in great· detail
the scope of Art. 14, and in enunciating the. principles applicable in deciding whether a law is in
contravention of that Article observed :
"that a law may be constitutional even
though it relates to a single individual if on'
acc<Junt of some special circumstances or
reasons applicable to him and not applicable
to others that single individual may be treated
as a class by himself.
On the principles stated above we are of the
opinion that the Patiala State Bank is a class by
itself and it will be with in the power of the State
to enact a law with respect to it. We are also of
(1) [1950] S.C.R. 869.
(2)
(1959) S.C.R. 279, 297.
376
SUPREME OOURT REPOR'.J.'S [196JJ
1902
of the opinion that the differentia between the
Patiala State Bank and the other Banks has a
61htJJ/ of Firm
rational bearing on the object of the legislation.
TUol: lfom &nn B IX
If the funds of the Patiala State Bank are State
••
Slat1 of Punjab
funds, a law which assimilates the procedure for the
determination and recovery of amounts due to the
Bank from its customers to that prescribed for the
determination and recovery of arrears of revenue
must be held to have a just and reasonable relation
to the purpose of the legislation. A law which
provides for State fund11 being advanced to
customers through State Bank can also provide
for its being recovered in the same manner as
revenue.
A direct decision on this point is
.ltfannalal v. Collector of Jhalawar ('). There
the State of Jhalawar had established a Bank
and the appellants as customers of the Bank owed
large amounts to it. The State of Jhalawar
became merged in the State of Rajasthan and
acting under R. 6 of the Rajasthan Public Demands
Recovery Act, 1!152, the Collector Jhalawar issued
a notice to the appellants proposing to recover the
dues as a public demand. The validity of this
demand was challenged on the ground that the
provisions of the Act were obnoxious to Art. 14 in
that they enabled the State to recover the amounts
due t-0 it on Banking account in a mode different
from that applicable to other Banks. Io rejecting
this contention this Court observed :
Lot~lmton Das on
•·It is mid that the Act makes distinction
between the other Bankers and the Government as a banker in respect of the recovery
of money due. It seems to us that Government oven as a banker, can be legitimately
put in a separate class. The dues of the
Government of a State are the dues of the
entire people of the State. This being the
position, a law giving special facility for the
(I)
(1961] 2 S.C.R. 962.
..........
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
377
recovery of such dues canno.t, in any event,
be said to offend Art. 14 of the Constitution."
We a.re in agreement with these observations.
In our view the same principles apply to the
impugned Act, and in setting up separate authorities for determination of the disputes and in
prescribing a special procedure to be followed by
them.for the recovery of the dues by summary
process, the impungned Act does not 'infringe
Art. 14 of the Constitution.
Then the second ground on which the impunged Act and Rules are attacked as offending
Art. 14 is that after the merger of the Pepsu Union
in the State of Punjab under the State Reorganisation A:ct, 1956, they continue to be in force in the
territories of the erstwhile Pepsu Union, but have
no operation in the other parts of the State of
Punjab, and thi~. it is said, is a fresh ground of
discrimination. We see no substance in this
objection, Prior to the States Reorganisation
Act, 1956, the Pepsu Union, and the State of Punjab were two different States. · The legislative
a.ii.thorities functioning in the two States were
different. Prior to the integration there could be
no question of discrimination under Art. 14 because
that can arise only witb. reference to a law passed
by the same authority, vide The State of Madhya
!'radesh v. G. C. Mandawar (1). And if after
reorganisation of States and integration of the
Pepsu Union in the State of Punjab, different laws
apply to different parts of the State, that is due to
histoFical reasons, and that has always been
recognised as a proper basis of classification under
Art. 14.
In Bowman v. Lewis(') relied on the judgment
of the Court below in support of the above position,
a law of the State of Missouri was assailed as
(I) [1951] l S.C.R. 599.
(2) [1880] IO U.S. 22; 25 L.ED. 989.
Lochhman 0111 on
bMalj of Firm
Tilak Ram Ram Bux
1
v.
State •f Punjab
378
SUPil.EME COURT REPORTS (19&3]
1151
violative of the guarantee of equal protection of
laws under the Fourteenth Amendment in that it
btlralf of Firm
provided
for appeals against judgments by Courts
'l"ilat B.m Rim Bwt
in
some
parts
of the Mate to one Court and in
••
Stat11/ Prinjob
others to another Court. In holding that this was
not unconstitutional, Bradley, J., observed: The
Ag11rJ.
14th Amendment docs not profess to seoure to all
persons in the United States the benefit of the
same laws o.nd the same remedies. Great diversities in these respects may exist in two States
separated only by an imaginary line ......... If
diversities of law and judicial proceedings may
exist in the several States without violating the
equality clause in the 14th Amendment, there is no
solid reason why there may not be such diversities
in different parts of the same State ......... If a
Mexican State should be aoquired by treaty and
added to an adjoininl!' State or part of a St.ate, in
the United States, and the two should be erected
into a new State , it cannot be doubted that such
new State might allow the Mexican laws and
judicature to continue unchanged in the one portion, and the common law and its corresponding
judicature in the other portion. Such an arrangement would not be prohibited by any fair colllltruction of the 14th Amendment. It would not be
based on any respect of persons or classes, but on
municipal considerations alone, and a regard to
the welfare of all classes within the particular
territory or jurisdiction."
In the Swt,e of Madhya Pr<ule,sh v. The Gwalior
StU.Jar Company Ltd. ('}, the validity of a law of
·the State of Gwalior imposing oess on sugarcane
was challenged after tho merger of that State in
Madhya Bharat on the ground that in the State of
Madhya Bharat there was no such tax and in oonsequence the law of the Gwalior State became
discriminatory under Art. 14. This Court sustained
the legislation as not hit by Art. 14.
IAcMman Da, •n
(1) (1962) S.Cl.R. 619.
..
-·
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
379
This question again came up for decision in
Bhaiyalal Shukla v. The State of Madhya Prarlesh (1).
There the facts were that after the reorganisation of . the State of Madhya Pradesh there
wt1re within that State as many as four Sales
Tax Acts different in their incidence in force
in different areas. Thus while a resident of the
former Vindhya. Pradesh State was liable to pay
sales tax on building materials used in works contracts a resident of the former State of Madhya
Pradesh was not under a similar liability and this
was assailed as offending the equal protection
clause under Art. 14. In overruling this content~on
this Court observed:
''We have already held that the sales tax
law in Vindhya. Pradesh was validly enacted,
and it brought its Talidity with it under s. 119
of the State Reorganisation Act, when it became a pa.rt of the State of Madhya Pradesh.
Thereafter, the different laws in different
parts of Madhya Pradesh can be sustained on
the ground that the differentiation arises from
historical reasons, and a geographical classification based on historical reasons, has been
upheld by this Court."
This decision furnishes a complete answer to this
contention of the appellants. In the result we are
of the opinion that the impugned Act. and the Rules
are not open to attack as repugnant to Art.14.
Then the question is, whether the Act and the
Rules are repugnant to Art. 19(l)(f) and {g). There
can be no questio~ of contravention of Art. 19(l)(g),
because
the impugned enactments do not
trench either directly or indirectly on the right of
t~e appellants to carry on trade or business. A law
with respect to the recovery of debts is not one with
(I) (1962) Supp. 2 S. C. R. 257, '
Lach~man Da.1 "'
behalf oJ Firm
Tilok Ram R!lm Bux
••
Stai. of Punjab
417., J.
380 SUPREME COURT REPORTS {1963)
1962
Luhhm1t1 Dain
be1ioJJ of Firm
Tilak Ram Rom Bux
v.
Stolt e1f PunJi.b
respect to the carrying on of trade or businoBB,
though tho debtor might be a trader,
Coming next to Art. 19 (I) (f), tbe argument
of the appellant with reference thereto may thus
be statRd: The Act ousts the jurisdiction of Civil
Courts over disputes between the Bank and its
customers, and sets up special authorities to settle
them. It is tho Managing Director who in the first
instance decides tho dispute. He is the very person
who is in charge of the affairs of tho Bank, and to
constitute him arbiter of the dispute which a.rise
out of its dealings. is to confer on him the roles of
both the claimant and the Judge and that is opposed to all canons of judicial fairness. Further,
the Act and the rules do not prescribe any procedure to be followed by the Managing Director in
the hearing of the dispute. He has simply to
decide it in accordance with the documents of the
Bank. Thus no real and effective opportunity is
afforded to the customer to present his case. An
appeal is provided against the decision of the Managing Director, but ho is also a member of the
Board which hears it, llnd so tho provision for appeal is an idle formality. The further revision to
the Minister is likewise a formal affair. Then the
amounts determined as due are liable to be recovered through the Nazim, as if they were arrears of
land revenue, and under s. 6 (2) the certificate of
the Head of the Department on which the recovery
is to be made is conclusive proof of the matters
stated therein. Thus the procedure laid down in
the Act, and the rules for settlement of disputes in
unfair, and opposed to all rules of natural justice
and proceedings taken against properties for obtaining satisfaction of orders passed under such a procedure must be held to infringe Art. 19 (I) (f) and
must be quashed,
The learned Advocate-General who appeared
for the respondents, contends at the very outset,
.,.
.
-·
,
.......
··•
....
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
381
1962
that Art. 19 ( l) (f) oould have no application to a
case like the present, that the liability of the L11cMman Das en
b1half of Firm
appellants arises und~r a contract, that the Talak
Ram Ram Bia
provisions of the Act and the Rules are
v.
State of Pun;ab
binding on them as terms of that contract, that
the provision that disputes shall be settled in the
Aiyar ";/,
first instance by the Managing Director is similar
to an arbitration clause in an agreement, and that
the restrictions enacted in the Act and the Rules
are in the nature of self imposed restraints, for which
no redress can be sought under Art. 19 (1) (f). In
our opinion this contention deserves consideration.
It is arguable that when Art. 19 speaks of laws
imposing reasonable restrictions, it has in mind
laws which are imposed on subjects, which they have
no option but to obey. But when the operation of
a law is attracted by reason of a contract, which a
person is free to enter into at his own will and
choice, it may be said that the inhibition under
Art. 19 has no application, the parties being left
to their rights and remedies under the contract.
But in the view we have taken of the contentions
of the appellants on their merits, we do not think
it necessary to pronounce on this question.
•'
We have already held that the State Bank is
a class by itself, that it is competent for the Legis·
lature to enact a law exclusively with respect to it
and that such a law does not contravene Art. 14.
On the question whether it is repugnant to Art.
19 ( l) (fJ, the point for consideration is whether
it is unreasonable as being unfair and opposed to
rules of natural justice, and is in consequence not
protected by Art. 19 (5).
_,..,
Have the appellants established that ? It
should be remembered in this connection that rules
of natural justice ar11 not a rigid code to which
proceedings must strictly conform, if they are to be
sustained. They must by their very nature vary
3S2
SUPHEME COURT REPORTS [1963]
with the facts and oircumstances of eaoh case, and
are incapable of a definition whic~' will apply to all
Luil'11~ Dai on
situations. "The requirements of natural justice"
b<hllf of Fimo
TJak Ram Rorn Bux observed Tuoker, L. J., in Russell v. Dulce of Nor••Punja6 follc ('), •·must depend on the oiroumstances of the
.Stoll of
oasi>, the nature of the inquiry, the rules under
which the tribunal is acting. the subject-matter that
is being dealt with, and so forth."
Now what are the facts ? An important factor
to be taken into account is that the impugned Act
and Rules are not legislation coil.fined to the recovery of money due to the Patiala State Bank. It
is a general law applicable to the realisation of all
revenue due to the State, dues to the Bank bl'ling
expressly included in the definition of "State dues"
in s. 3 (I) of the Act, and it is of the pattern usually
adopted in Revenue Laws. If State Ravenue~ can
be diverted for Banking purposes, it seems reasonable that their recovery should be governed by the
Revenue Laws.
We must next refer to the hierarchy of officers,
constituted under the Act. At the top are the
Ministers; then there is a Board of Directors; next
comes the Managing Director, and subordinate to
him are a host of officers in charge of the severe.I
departments and branches. The Board of Direotors
is to consist of the Prime Minister, Finanoe Minister
three members nominated by the Ruler, two of
whom are non-officials representing important
clients of the Bank, and the Managing Director.
The Mangaging Director has power to sanction
loans on personal security up to Rs. 3,000/- and on
pledge of goods up to Rs. 25,000/-. Beyond that
limit it is the Board that can sanction loans.
We may now examine how far the contention
of the appellants that the procedure prescribed by
the Act and the Rules is opposed to rules of natural
(I)
(19f9) I AU. E. R. 109, 118.
l .
.
t
•
-
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
383
1961
justice is well fouuded. The first complaint is that
it is the Ma.ngaging Director, who is in charge of 1At•hrn1n D.1 •n
the da.y to day administration of the Bank, and that
••holf •f Fi• ..
therefore he is not the proper person to decide the Tilalr Rafft
,,, Rni ~we
dispute, because his own action must be under chall- St•t• •f hnjdt
enge. We see no force in this contention. The
.fiJ•r J.
Managing D~rector is a high ranking official on a
salary scale of Rs. I,600-100-2,500, with a free furnished residence. He has no personal interest in
the transaction and there is no question of bias,
or any conflict between his interest and duty. Loans
are sanotioned by the appropriate authodties under
the Rules, and the customer operates on the account
through oheques and deposit receipts, and there could
be no question of any attack on the actions of the
Managing Director. How unsubstantiaf this objection is will be seen from the fact that the loan dated
May 23, 1953, with which we are concerned could
have been sanctioned under the Rules, not by the
Managing Director, but only by the Board.
It is then said that the hearing before the
Managing Director is perfunctory, that under Rule
6, he is only to examine the objections stated in the
written statement "in the light of the relevant
records of the department" and decide the dispute,
and that there is thus no real opportunity· afforded
to the parties to present their ease. This argument
proceeds on a misQonception of the true scope of
Rule 6. It does not bar the parties from examining
witnesses or producing other documentary evidence.
The Managing Director, has, under this Rule, to
examine the statement and the records of the Bank,
in so far as thay bear on the points in dispute and
that normally, would he all that is relevant. But
he is not precluded by the Rule from examining
witnesses. or ta.king into account other documentary
evidence, if he consider that that is necessary
for a proper determination of the dispute. And
whether he should do so or not is a miltter
384 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963]
Loehhmon nos on
b1holj of Firm
T ild Rum Ram Rux
••
StaJe of Punjob
.A.(1.,. J.
left to his discretion. Discussing a somewhat
similar question arising on the language of s.
68-D(2) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, this Court
obse1ved in Malik Ram v. State of Rajasthan (1) :
"It will therefore be for the State Government, or as in this case the officer concerned,
to decide in case any pa.rty desires to lead
evidence whether firstly the evidence is necessary and relevant to the inquiry before it.
If it considers that evidence is neceeea.ry, it
will give a reasonable opportunity to the party
desiring to produoe evidence to give evidence
relevant to the enquiry and within reason
and it would have a.II tile powers of controll ·
ing and giving and the recording of evidence
that any court has. Subject therefore to this
over-riding power of the Sta.to Government or
the officer giving the hearing, the parties
entitled to give evidence either documentary or
oral during a hearing under s. 68-D(2).
Then it is said that the provision for appeal
to the Board of Directors is an idle formality because the l\Ia.naging Director whose decision is
appealed against is also a member of the Board.
It has already been mentioned that a.mong the
members of the Board are Ministers, whose subordinate the Managing Director is, and two non-official
representatives of the customers. That is sufficient
to dispel any suspicion that the hearing before the
Boa.rd would be a fa.roe. We may mention tha.t the
prnctioo in England is for a Judge who tries a.
criminal case to sit as a member of the Court of
appeal, which hears the appeal against bis own
order, and this has been held not to be open to objection, vide R. v. LoVf,1.Jrove ('). A similar practice prevails in appeals preferred against the decision
of a single Judge under the Presidency Small Cause
(I} [1962] 1.S.C.R. 978, 984, 985.
(2) [19Sl] 1 All. E.R. 004.
. ..
<
'
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
385
Courts Act, 1882, when an appeal is taken to the
full court.
It is then contended that s. 11 of the Act bars
the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts with reference to
the disputes triable under the Act, and that is unreasonable. It is to:i late in the day to contend
that provisions in statutes creating a special jurisdiction and taking aw:i.y the jurisdiction of Civil courts
in respect of matters falling within· that jurisdiction
are unreasonable, or opposed to rules of natural
justice. It has only to be remembered that
provisions excluding the jurisdiction of Civil cou.rts
in such cases do not affect the jurisdiction of either
the High Court under Art. 226 or of this Court
under Art. 32 or Art. lil6 to interfere when grounds
therefor are eeta blished.
Lastly it is said that the provision in s .. 6(2}
of the Act, that the certificate of the Head of
Department shall be conclusive proof of its contents
is unreasonable. But this is to ignore that at that
stage the question is one of the recovery of what
had been determined to be due, and that is analo·
gous to tb.e provision in the Civil Procedure Code
that a Court executing a decree cannot go behind it.
· Examining the provisions of the Act and the
Rules as a whole we are of opinion that they are
reasonable and do not violate any Rules of natural
justice. If the proceedings under challenge before
us had in fact been taken in disregard of Rules of
natural justice, a.nd prejudice had resulted therefrom, the appellants would have been entitled to
obtain redreBB in the present proceedings under Art.
226. But that however is not their compJaint.
When notice wa.s served on them under rule 3 on
November 21, 1955, they remained ex parre. In
their notices to the Bank in reply to the demand,
they never disputed their liability but only asked
for time to pay the amounts. Having failed in
J96Z
Lachhm211 D11s on
beh.11/ of Firm
Titk llam Ram Bra
••
SttJte of Punjab
.divar J,
386
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963)
J91t
their attempt to gain time, they are obliged now to
take the high stand that the Act and the rules have
I...thlim•n o., .,,
k>Alf•I'''"'"
become void because they a.re unrea.sonable and
Tilck k •tn R• Bux
contravene Art. 19 (l) (g). In this they have failed .
••
S1•11 •J 'u".JGi
In our opinion the contention that there has been
a.ny infringement of Art. 14 or 19 (l) (f) or (g) must
be rejected as untenable.
(iii) It is finally contended for the appellant&
that the certificates iBSued by the Managing Director under s. 6 ( l) of the Act are defective in that
they a.re not countersigned by the Minister or
l::lecreta.ry, a.a required by the proviso to that sub1ection, and that in consequence the proceedings
taken thereunder are without jurisdiction. Reliance was placed in support of this contention on
the decision of the Full Bench of the Plilljab
High Court in General S. Shivdev Singh v.
TM, State of Punjab (l), that it wa.e not competent
to the Punjab Government to delegate the
functions aBBigned to it under a. 42 of the Ea.st
Punjab Holdings (Consolidation and prevention of
fragmentation) Act, 1948. to the Additional Director, the contention being that the Minister or the
Secretary oannot abdicate his functions under thfl
Act to the Managing Director. But the appell~ts
have overlooked that in Form No. I and II prescri·
bed under the Act, the provision for countersignature is directed to be struck out, when it is sent by
the Managing Director. The result of the combined
operation of s. 6 ( 1) and the Forms referred to there
is that countersignature is required only when the
certificate is issued by an officer subordinate to· the
Minister, other than the Managing Director. Thi1
contention must therefore be rejected.
All the contentions urged in support of the
appeals and Writ Petition No. 92/1961 fail, and
they are accordingly dismissed, with cost., one
Ilea.ring fee.
(I) A.l.R,. I 9l9 Pb. 453.
..
.t
'
I
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
In Ptiition No. 128 of 1959.
387
Jiii
DN • ;
This is a petition under Art. 32 of the Consti- /Athhm.,,
bek.Jf •f l'inn
tution. · The petitioner is a merchant running a Til.I< R.m 11.,,. i,,.
Steel Rolling Mills at Jaitu in what was at one ,,.,. •f l'WIJ••
time the State of Nabha. By a Covenant entered
into on May 5, 1948, the State of Nabh!i became
merged in a new State called the Patiala and East
Punjab States Union or more briefiy 'the Pepsu
Union' which came into existence on August 20,
1948. Then under the States Reorganisation Act,
1956, the Pepsu Union became merged on Novem·
ber 1, 1956, in the State of Punjab. The petitioner
ha.d a.n account in the Nabha Branch of the Patiala
State Bank under which he borrowed monies for
bis business. On February 20, 1951, be executed a
roortgage deed in favour of the Bank for Rs. 52,000/being the amount due by him to the Bank. In
November, 1953, the Bank took pro<Jeeding under
the Patiala Recovery of State Dues Act, hereinafter
referred to as 'the Act,' for recovering the amounts
due on the said mortgage and thereupon the petitioner filed Writ Petition No. 252 of 1955 int.his Court
under Art. 32 of the Constitution for quashing the
proceeding on the ground that the Act and the
rules were unconstitutional. On February 3, 1956,
a settlement was arrived at between the petitioner
and the Patia.la State Bank whereunder the petitioner paid some amounts and agreed to pay tho
balance by instalments; In view of this settlement the writ petition was withdrawn on May 11,
1956. The petitioner having made default in payment of the instalments, the Bank a.gain started
proceeding for recovering the a.mounts due and the
petitioner now seeks by this petition to have those
on the ground that
proceedings qua.shed
the impugned Act was not in force · at
the material dates and that it is vo.id being in
contravention of .Arts. 14 and 19(l}(f) and (g)
and that further the certificate issued by the
...
388
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963)
196t
Managing Director under s. 6(1) of the Act is not
in accordance with the proviso to that section and
LacliJ:man n.s·.,,
is therefore bad. The respondents contest the
Hhalf of f'rrm
Til1k liom Ram Bux application.
This petition was heard along with
v.
Civil Appeals Nos. 210 & 2ll of 1961 and Writ
Stal1 of Punj~ b
Petition No. 92 of 1961 wherein the same question
A,Ycr J.
have Leen raised for our determination. By our
Jud!!ment delivered in those oases to.day we have
disallowed those contentions. Following that
Judgt•ment, this petition is dismissed with costs,
one heating fee.
Subb• Rao J.
SunBA RAo, J.-I regret my inability to
agree with the view expreeeed by my learned
brother Venkatarama Aiyar, J. In my view the
Patiala Recovery of State Dues Act (:N"o. IV of
200~ BK.) is a typical instance of a glaring viola.tinn of the doctrine of Pquality enshrined in Art. 14
of the Constitution. As I propose to striko down
the ·ct on the ground that it infringes Art. 14 of
the Constitution, I will not express my views
on tho other questions raisPd before us. The
facts are fully stated in the judgments of my
learned brother, and lt is, therefore, not necessary
to restate them here, except those which are relevant to the said question.
The Bank of Patiala was established in 1917
bv the then llfaharaja of Patiala. On May l'i, 1948,
the Rulers of eight States, including the State of
Patiala, entered into a covenant merging a.II the
said States into one United State called the Patiala
and East Punjab States Union, briefly called
PEPSU. On August 20, 1948, the said State of
Pepsu was esta.bli~hed with the Maharaja of Pa.tia.la
a.8 its Rajpramukh. In exercise of the power
conferred on him under he said covenant the said
Rajpramukh issued, an Ordinance applying a.II
the !awe obtaining in the State of Pa.tiala., including the Pa.tiala. Recovery of State Dues Act, ~002
..
1
2 s.c.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
389
BK., hereinafter called the Act, to the entire State
of Pepsu. After the enquiry of six months, the
Rajapramukh issued a second Ordin'anoe extending
for another six months the laws made applicable to
the State of Pepsu.under the earlier Ordinance.
, Later on, in exercise of a. power conferred upon
the.said Rajpramukh by a Supplementary Covenant, the said Act. was indefinitely extended so as
to have operation throughout the State of Pepsu.
After the promulgation of the Constitution of India
on January 26, 1950, Pepsu became part of the
Indian Union as a Pa.rt B state, and under the
provisions of the Constitution, the s11id Act conti·
nued to have force throughout the said State. Subsequently, tinder the States Reorganization .Act,
Pepsu became part of the State of Punjab and
the said Act continued to have force in that part
of Punjab which was Pepsu before merger. After
the Constitution came ·into force, the petitioners
and the appellants in the aforesaid Writ Petitions
and Civil Appeals respectively borrowed money
from the said Bank on the security . of their properties. Tire Bank authorities ascertained the
amounts due to the Bank from the said parties
and were seeking to realise the same from the properties of the said debtors in the manner provided
by the provisions of the Act.
After the formation of, the State of Pepsu,
the Patiala Bank was operating in the entire Pepsu ·
area, and, after its merger with the State of Punjab, the Bank .was having branches not only in
Pepsu but in the other parts of Punjab. There
are also a number ·of other banks, includingthe
State Bank of India, doing the same business in
the said territory were the Bank of Patiala is opera·
ting.
The case of the appellants and the petitioners
before us is that though the said · banks and their
debtors were in the matter of ascertainment of debt.a
1962
lnch4man Das 1n·
behalf of Firm
'Tilak Ram Ram Bu
••
Sta'e rf Punjab
Bubba Rao J.
•
390
SUPREME OOURT REPORTS [1963}
JH2
and realisation of the amounts due from them to
the banks were similarly situated, the provisions of
•"""!•I F;.m tho Act discriminated the debtors of the Patialr.
TilM ,a.,,. Ron B.u:
Bank from those of other banks in that regard and
SI"' •f!'..jot
thereby infringed the equality clause enshrined in
Art.
14 of the Constitution.
s.... tl.oJ,
To appreciate this contention it is necessary
to consider in some deta.iJ the provisions of the
Act with a. view to ascertain whether there we.s o.ny
such discrimination and, if there was, whether
the BBme could be justified on the
basis of
reasonable classification. The long title of the
Act is Pe.tie.la Recovery of State Dues Act. In the
Act, "State dues" is defined to mean any amounts
due to the Rajpramukh of the State or the State
or anv department of the State from any person
and she.II include, a.mong others, debts due to the
Pe.tie.la. State Bank; "department" is defined to
include the Patia!a. State Bank; ''defaulter" means
a person from whom State dues a.re due and includes a person who is responsible as surety for the
payment of a.ny such due, and "hea.d of department" means the Managing Director in the case of
the Pe.tie.la State Ba.nk. Section 4 provides for
the determination of the State dues; under that
section, the hea.d of department shall dP.termine
in the prescribed manner the exa.ct amount of
State dues recovera.bll' by hie department from
the defaulter, a.nd it a.lso authorizes, pending determination of the dues, to move the Nazim to i88ue
a notioe prohibiting a.liena.tion of a.ny property by
the defaulter; a.nd payment of a.ny debt due to him
from any person or of any money payable to him
the State to the extent of the probable amount of
State dues recoverable from the defaulter, and to
move also the Accountant-General to withhold any
money payable to the defa.luter by the State to
the said extent. The mode of recovery of the
debt is provided by e. 5 : under that section, the
IM.V...
..
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•
n.,,,.
'
....
2 S.C.R.
...
"
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
391
1962
State dues shall be recovered by the department
through the Na.zim as i( they were arre&rl! of land Laebhmna Das on
revenue and through the Accountant,Genera.l by
behalf -I Ii'itm withholding payment to the defaulter of any TUak Ramv. Roa B "*
amount payable to him by the State. Under s. 6, Slat• of Punjab
the bead of department shall send a certificate as
Subba RaoJ.
to the a.mount of State dues recoverable from the
defaulter to the Nazim and the certificate so transmitted shall be conclusive proof of the matters
~tated therein. The Nazim and the AocountantGeneral are precluded from questioning the validity of the said. certificate or bear any objection
of the defaulter as to the amount of States dues
mentioned in the certificate or as to the liability
of the defaulter to pay such dues. Section 10 says
that neither the Nazim nor the AccountantGeneral shall a.ct·. upon such a certificate unless
it is sent within the perio_d of limitation prescribed under the Limitation Act within which the
said Bank could institute a suit in a ci vii court
for the recovery qf the dues; and sub-s. (2) thereof
directs the head of department to mention in the
certificate the date on w&.icb the debt has fallen
due and make a statement therein to the effect
tha.t the 'debt is within the period of limitation.
Section 11 bars the jurisdiction of a. civil court in
respect of any matter which the bead of department or any authority or officer authorised by the
head of department is empowered by the Act or the
rules framed thereunder to dispose of or take cognizance of the manner in which 'any such head of
department or authority or officer exercises any
powers vested in him or by or under the Act or the
ruleR made thereunder. In exercise of the power
conferred on the Government to make rules, the
Patiala Recovery of State. Dues Rules, 2002 BK.
were made. They provide a machinery for the
determination of the amount due ·to the Bank.
Under r. 3, the head of department to which the
392
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963]
state dues are payable she.JI ca.use a. notice to be
served on the defaulter in the ma.nner prescribed
L<Jchhmao n... on
specifying
the a.mount of the sta.te dues a.nd the da.te
il>tholJ •/ F wm
rtl,/c R1111 R,,,. B"" on which the same ha.s fa.Jien due and requiring the
defaulter to pay the ea.id a.mount before a. specified
se.c.. of P,,,.;ob
date, or to a.ppea.r before the hea.d of department
or 1uch officer as specified therein. Where the
defaulter does not a.ppear on the date specified in
the notice, the head of department or the Inquiry
Officer, as the case may be, is a.uthorized to
proceed e.: part,e and determine hy order in writing
the a.mount of state dues recoverable from him.
Where the order is ma.de by an Inquiry Officer, it is
subject to confirmation by the head of department.
Where the defaulter appears on the date fixed, the
hea.d of department or the Inquiry Officer, a.a the
case may be, shall examine the objections of the
defaulter stated in the written-statement in the
light of the relevant records of the department a.nd
shall then by an order determine the exact a.mount of State dutlll recoverable from him. If
the
inquiry is made by the Inquiry Officer,
he sh11oll submit his report to the head of depart·
ment, who aha.JI by an order in writing finally
determine the state uues recoverable from the said
defaulter. Rule 8 givies a. right of appeal to the
defaulter from the order of the head ot department
in the case of the Patia.la. State Bank to the Boa.rd
of Direooors of the Bank. Where the appeal filed
by the defaulter is ;ejected, the defaulter may file
a revision to Ijlas-i-Khas .
.Bnefly stated, under the Act and the rules
irlade thereunder, the Managing Director of the
Bank decides on the question of the existence and
the extent of the liability of the customer of the
bank after making a.n inquiry in tho manner pros·
oribed, subject to an appeal to the Board of
Directors uf the Bank and a revision to the !jla.s· j.
Kha.a. The amounts found due would be raa.liUd
1958
••
.. -
·--
2 S.C.R.
,
--:+-
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
393
1962
through the Nazim as if they were arrears of land
revenue and through the Accountant-General by Lachhmo:t Das on
behalf of Firm
authorizing him to withhold amounts due to the T ilak
Ram Ram Bu
defaulter from any department of the State. No,
v.
civil court has jurisdiction'in any matter which the State of Punjab
head of department or any authority or officer
Su-Oba Rao J.
under the Act is authorized to dispose of or the
manner of its disposal. In short, the creditor
decides his own claim and realizes the amounts by
a coercive process prescribed. It may also be
mentioned at this stage that the Managing Director
of the Bank is also the Secretary of the Board of
Directors. In any view, the appeal provided is
only from one authority of the bank to another
authority of the bank. The revision to the Ijlas-iKhas, apart from its limited scope, is in effect
only from a department of the Government to
another. In short, the creditor is made the judge
of his cause and is empowered to determine the
dues and realize them from the debtor. The debtor
is at the mercy of his creditor. He may plead and
protest, but he has no other remedy to get an unbiased determination of his claim or a decision on
his 0bjection8. Such a machinery may have some
relevance in feudal times, but the question is
whether our Constitution sanctions such an out·
moded procedure.
At this stage, it will be convenient to notice
briefly the scope of Art. 14 of the Constitution
relevant to the present inquiry. Art. 14 reads :
"The State shall not deny to any person
equality before the law or the equal protec·
tion of the laws within the territory of India."
This subject has been so frequently and recently
before this Court as not to require an extensive
consideration. In State of U. P. v. Deoman Upadhyaya (1 ), I/ have described briefly the doctrine
of equality thus :
(I) [1961] I S.0.R. 14, 34.
394
1962
l.u,l:hma11 Vaa on
~ \111/ of Jfi'"'
Tilok Ram Rum lJux
v.
Stolt•! P1111jP
Su6•• Rl!o J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS Cl963]
"All persons are equal before the law ia
fundamental of every civilised constitution.
Equality before law is a negative concept ;
equal protection of law is a positive one. The
former declares that ever:v one is equal before
law, that no one can claim sp.~cial privileges
and that all classes are equally subjected to
the ordinary law of the land; the latter postulates an equal protection of all alike in the
same 1ituation and under like circumstances.
No discrimination can be ma.d" either in the
privileges conferred. or in the liabilities imprn1ed. But these propositions conceived in
the interests of the public, if logically stretched
too far, may not achieve the high purrose behind them. In a society of unequal basic
structure, it is well nigh impossible to make
laws suitable in their application to all the
persons alike. So, a reasonable classification
is not only permitted but i8 necessary if
society should progreBB. But such a classification oannot be arbitrary but must be
based upon differences pertinent to the
subject in respect of and the purposes for
which it is made."
I would add to the ea.id statement tho following
caution administered by Brewer, J., in Gulf, Colo·
rada and Santa Fe Rly. Co. v. Ellis (1):
"While good faith and a knowledge of
existing conditions on \.he part of a Legislature is to be persumed, yet to carry that
presumption to the extent of alway" holding
there must be some undisclosed and unknown
reason for subjecting certain individuals or
Corporations to hostile and discriminating
Legislation is to make the protecting ol:iuses
of the 14th Amendment a m•Te rope of sand,
in no manner restraining ~tat.e action."
(I)
(1897) 165 U.S.150;41 L l!d.fi&6.
•
..
•
..
•
-·--·
.
2s.c.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
395
116!
It shall also be remembered that a citizen is entitled to a fundamental right of equality before the La1hl.man Dos Ml
law and that the doctrine of classification is only
behalf of Fir•
a subsidiary rule evolved by courts to give a practi· Tilak Ra,. Rom Bu.
cal content to the said doctrine. Over emphasis Slate of•• Punjab
on the doctrine of classification or an anxious and
Suiba B•• J.
sustained attempt to discover .some basis for classi·
Ii.cation may gradually and imperceptibly deprive
the article of its glorious content. That process
would inevitably end in substituting the doctrine of
classification for the doctrine of equality: the
fundamental right to equality before the law and
equal protection of the laws may be replaced by
the doctrine of classification.
·It is also well-settled that the guarantee of
equal protection applies against substantive as well
as procedural laws. Jennings in his "Law of the
Constitution", 3rd Edn., p. 49, describes the idea of
equality of treatment thus:
"Equality before the law means that
among equals the law should be equal and
should equally administered, that like should
be treated alike.''
The learned author further elaborates the theme
thus:
· "The right to sue and be sued, to prose·
cute and be prosecuted, forthe same kind of
action shou.Jd be the same for all citizens of
full age and understanding and without distinction of race, religion, wealth, social status,
or political influence."
Dicey in his "Law of the Constitution", 1959 at p.
193 states:
"Equality before the law does not mean
an absolutP equality of men, which is a physical impossibility, but the denial and any
special privilege by reason of birth, creed or
396
1962
LtUhlrmnn /)•1
01'
behalf"' Firm
TilGC R.m Bna Bwc
••
State •f Punjab
Subbr: R110 J.
SUPREME OOURT REPORTS [1963)
the like in favour or any individual and also
the equal subjection of all in di vi duals and
claeses to the ordinary law of the land
administered by the ordinary law Courts."
'
In Ram Prasad Narayan Sahi v. The Swte of Bihar(')
Mukherjea, J., observed:
"The meanest of citizens has a right of
access to a court of law for the redress of hie
just grievances ...... ".
Thie Court, in Th£ Stare of Weat Bengal v . .dnwar
.dli Sarkar('), struck down s. 5 of the West Bengal
Special Courts Aot (X of 1950), which provided
that "a special Court shall try such offences or
classes of offences or oases or classes of cases ae the
l:ita.te Government may by General or special order
in writing, direct", as contravening Art. 14 of the
Constitution. Mahajan, J., as he then wa.s, observed:
"Equality of right is - a principle of
republicanism and article 14 enunciates this
equality principle in the administration of
justice. In its application of legal proceed·
ings the article a.BSures to everyone the same
rules of evidence and modes of precedure.
In other words, the ea.me rule muet exist for
a.II in similar circumstances."
Mukherjea, J., ea.ye to the same effect at p. 322:
"A rule of procedure Ii.id down by law
oomes a.s much within the purview of article
14 a.a any rule of substantive law and it is
necefl'l&ry that all litigants, who are similarly
situated, are able to avail themselves of the
procedural rights for relief and defence with
like protection and without disorimin,.tion."
l:n Ram Prasad Narain Sahi v. Stat,e of Bihar('), the
ea.me principle has been restated by this Court.
Ill (I 9S3] S.C.R. 1129, 11~3,
(2) [19~2] S.C.R. 284, 313, 322.
..
·-·
.I•
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
397
There, the Court of wards granted to ·the appellants
therein a large area of land belonging to the Bettiah Lacb.hmon Va• cm
b•halJ of Firm
Raj which was then under the management of the T ilalc
Ram Ram Bux
Court of Wards; the Bihar Legislature passed an
••
Act declaring that the settlements granted to the Bia,. of Punjab
appellants shall be null and void and empowering
Sutl>a Rao J,
the Collector to eject the appellants if they refused
to restore the lands. In striking down the impugned enactment Patanjali Sastri, C.J., observed:
«This is purely a dispute between private
parties and a matter for determination by
duly constituted courts to which is entrusted,
in every free and civilised society, the importtant function of adjudicating on disputed
legal rights, after observing the well established procedural safeguards which include the
right to be heard, the right produce witnesses
and so forth. This is the protection which the
law guarantees equally to all persons, and our
Constitution prohibits by article 14 every State
from denying such protection to anyone."
Jn Ameerunnissa Begum v. Mallboob Begum (I) this
Court had to consider the validity of au Act made
by the Hyderabad Legislature which provided that
"the claims of Mahboob Begum and Kadiran Begum
and of their respective children to participate ln
the distribution of the matrooka of the late Nawab
are hereby dismissed" and that the above' decision
"cannot be called in question in ally court of hw".
This is no doubt an extreme case; but in declaring
that law unconstitutional, Mukherjea, J., as he then
was, observed :
"Nay, the legislation goes further than
this and denies to theue specified individual a
right ·to enforce their claim in a court of law,
in accordance with the personal law that
governs the co.mmunity to whic4 thel belong.
li) [1953] S.C.R. 404, '115.
398
SUPREME OOURT REPORTS [196:1)
1961
They, in fact, have been discriminated against
from the rest of the community in respect of
"'Aalf .t Frrm
a valuable right which the law secures to them
Tiklr Rsm R• Bux
all and the question is, on what ha.sis this
••
Slut. V Pu1-joi
apparently hostile and discriminatory legiala·
tion can be supported."
Subls R.. J.
A creditor deciding his own case cannot be in a
better position then tho Legislature. by an Aot,
rejecting the claim of a particular person. Thia
Court again, in Shre,e Meenakshi Mill8 LU., Madurai
v. Sri A. V. Viswanatha Sastri (1), struck down
a. 6( 1) of Taxation on Incom1, (Investigation Com·
mission) Act, 1!147 (Act XXX of 1947), on the
ground that the procedure preeoribed thereunder
is discriminatory in character, having regard to the
fact that under the amended s. 34 of the Indian
Incomo·tax Act, 1922, the persons coming under
both tho secti.ins from the same c)a.es. Thie Court
restatod the principle that Art. 14 of the Conatitu·
tion not only guarantees equal protection a.e regards
substantive laws but proct'dural laws as well. It
has also beeu pointed out that, though the Act was
valid during the pre.Oenatitution period, A.fter tho
Conetitut ion came into foroo the discriminatory
procedure cannot be continued'. In Suraj Mall
Mahta &: Co. v. A. V. Viswanath Sastri ('), in the
oontext of the same Act, viz., Act XXX of 1947,
this Court vointed out that though between the two
prooedurea there was some similarity tu h-o fullow·
ed for catching evaded income, the overall picture
wa.e that there was substantial diacrimiuation bet.
ween the two procedures. In ,Jluthiah v. 1'he Commissioner of Income-tax, .Madras(•), this Court held
thats. 5(1) of Act XXX uf 1947 offended Art. 14 of
the Constitution in viow of the amended of a. 34 of
the Indian Income-tax Act by amending Acte
XLVIII of 11148 and XXXIII of 1954. Thie
Court, in view of the discriminatory treatment
Z...~"-' Du
o•
-
(I) 1l~S~J I S.C.R. 787.
(2) [1955] I S.C.R. ffH.
(3) Ll9SSJ 2 S.C.R. 1247.
..
--
2 S.C.R.
.
'
'
SUPREME COURT R:lilPORTs
399
196!
in the procedure, declared that after the
inauguration of the C,>nstitution the persons Lachftman D'JS on
beholf of Firm
whose cases worn rp,ferrod fot· investiga.tion by the Tilak
Rarn R- Bl#
v.
Central Government after September 1, 19!8,
were being discriminated against under drastic S!ate of Punjab
procedure of Act XXX of 1947 when those similarly
Bubb• Rao J.
situated were being dealt with by the Income-tax
Officer under the amended provision of s. 34 of the
Income-tax Act, 1922.
11
Thia Court, therefore, has not, rightly,
countenanced discriminatory procedures which are
not formal in nature but substantially prejudicial
to parties in establishing their rights or in defending against unjust claims. It is, therefore, clear
that under our Constitution every person is entitled
to equal treatment under similar ciroumstanct's in
the matter of his access to courts.
It is true th~t if there is a reasonable ha.sis
for the classification, special tribunals may be
created for the trial of cases of a special nature;
but even so, it is not permissible to make differentiation between cases belonging to the same class
or nature. The question in the present case is
whether the impugned Act can be justified on the
ha.sis of rtJasonable classification.
To ascertain whether there . is a reasonable
classification, three questions have to be posed,
namely: (I) What is the object of the impugned
Act ?(2) What are the' differences between the classes
of persons hit by impugned Act and those left out ?
and (3) have the difference any reasonable relation
to the object sought to be achieved ? It is said
that the object is to realise the amonuts advanced
by the Government to finance businesses in full and
as speedly as possible, so that the money might
be available for further advances to others in the
interest of trade and industry. It i~ further
said that there are differences between the
()
400
1962
y,
81411 of Punjob
Subk Rao J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963]
St&te A.II a. creditor a.nd a. borrower from the State
a.nd a.ny other ba.nk 11.R a. cr11ditor a.nd the '1ebtor of
tha.t ba.nk. The next step in th11 argument is tha.t'
these differences ha.vc nexuR to the aforesaid object
for it is said that the recoupment of public funds
is more important than refilling of private purses.
Let me scrutinize this argument from different
The question ma.y be looked a.t from the
stand point of (i) creditor, (ii) debtor, (iii) debt, a.nd
(iv) realisation of debt. The Pa.tis.la. Act, after the
Constitution ca.me into force, extended to the entire
Pepsn a.rca.. Ta.ke three classes of creditors in tha.t
arca.-(i) The Patia.la. Bank. (ii) Thi' State Bank of
India, and (iii} any private Bank. Suppose each of
those three banks adva.nccR a. Rum of Rs. I 0,000/- to
one debtor or to three differPnt. debtors on a.deq ua.te
Hccurity. The Pa.tis.la. Bank, though its officers,
can decide what amount is due to it and realize the
ea.me by sale through the Nazim or recover the
a.mount through the Accountant General; and the
debtor is precluded from questioning the determination of the amount or ihc realization thereof in a.
civil Court.. The other two banks have to file suits
a.nd, if necessary, appeals obtain decrees and execute the same in the usual course. In the
ascertainment of the debt and the rea.1iz1ttion thereof, all the three banks are similarly situated. It
cannot be said with any justification tha.t the
summary procedure in derogation of a.II principles
of natural justice would be either rea.sonable or
necessary in the case of debt alleged to be due to
the Patiala Bank, while it is not. necesaa.ry in the
case of the other banks. If tho Managing Director
of the Patiala Bank could be relied upon for
determining the bank due~, why is it the Managing
Director of State Bank or even of a private bank
should be prevented from doing so ? It could not
be said as a propusitiun of la.w that the Managing
Director of the Patiala Bank would ne0088&l'i!y be
..
BBiJOCt&.
. )
-
,.._.
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
401
ISBB
more honest and more competent then his counter·
pa.rt in other banks so as to be made a judge of his Lac/Jlnttm D•i on
own cause. The entire procedure is travesty of the
bthO'l/ oj Firm
principle of natural justice. From the standpoint Tllak Ram Ram B.,,
••
. of the debtor, discrimination is more pronounced.
Blah of Punjab
The incongruity of the situation would be more
Subl>a Rao J,
emphasized if the same debtor borrowed different
amounts from the three banks: two banks would
proceed against him in a court of law and the
Pa.tie.la. Bank :would decide for it~elf the amount
due from the debtor and recover the same from him.
The debtors of the three categorjes borrowed money,
gave securities and ordinarily were entitled to equal
judicial process in the matter of determination and
realisation of their dues. They may have valid
defences to the claim. Ordinarily they shall be
entitled to an impartial tribunal for ascertaining the
a.mounts due from them, to a right of appeal to
other impartial tribunals to get any errors corrected.
What are the differences between the three ca.tego·
ries of debtors in the matter of the object sought to
be achieved. The three categories of debtvrs may ·
well have changed their places and borrowed the
same a.mount on the same .security from other
ba.nks, all the debtors are liable to pay their
creditors, all of them borrowed for their businesses;
a.II of them gave security, and therefore, all of them
would be entitled to raise their <:J.efences, if any.
The fact that one borrowed from one bank instead
of the other cannot be a difference ~hioh has any
nexus to the object sought to be achieved.
Let us look at the matter from the standpoint
of the debt. lt is not suggested that the Pa.tie.la.
Bank is advancing moneys on specially favourable
conditions without any security, while the other
banks impose onerous conditions. All the debts
a.re secured, all of them bear interest, and
all of them are payable just like· any other
debt. In the premises, the only thing th4t
402
SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1963]
can be sa.id is that the Pa.tiala Bank emerged
~~'ief ~:_"' Out of an authoritarian set up, while the
r;w. Rano R•m B.,. other two banks are functioning iu a democratic
v.
one. But the historical origin of thti bank, in the
SI al~ oj Pu,.jab
Bubb. II«> J.
oiroumstanoes, has no releva.nco, for we are judging
the constitutional validity of the provisions of tho
Aot in respect of debts a.dvanoed after the advent
of the Constitution. Artiole 13 (l) of the Constitu·
tion expressly declares. "All laws in force in the
territory of India immediately before the commencement of ~his Constitution, in so far as they
are inconsistent with the provisions of this Part,
shall, to the extent of such inconsistency, be void.''
Artiole 13, therefore, does not permit perpetuation
of an unconstitutional la.w on the ground of its historical parentage.
... ,
It is then said tha.t the Act, in effect a.nd substance, provided special tribunals for determining the
amount due to the Patia.h Ba.nk and, therefore, the
procedure prescribed is reasonable and the appellants and the petitioners cannot have any grievance
that they oannot go to a civil court. '!'his argument is untenable. What the appellants and the
petitioners complain is that this Act, in effeot and
en bstanoe, em powers thtiir oreclitor to determine the
extent of their liability and to decide on their objections to the creditor's claim, and that the said
procedure is against all principles of natural justice.
It is no answer to tl:Jat argument that the creditor,
being a department, of the Government, can be
relied upon to decide the case fairly, after follow- <
ing the principles of judicial procedure. The same
thing oa.n l·e said of the other banks, though they
are not depa.rtmt1nts of the Government. The a.n.
alogies sought to be drawn from Co-operative Societies Act or the Arbitration Act a.re not only unreal
but misleading, for under those Aots the creditor
dose not decide the validity of the objertions of the
debtor but a third party appointed by the Govern-
.
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPOR'l'S
403
196S
ment in one case or by the parties in the other oase,
following the principles of judicial prooedure, deDt1e on
cides the dispute between the contesting parties. Lachhman
behalf of Fit'nl
That apart, we cannot decide on the constitutiona- Tilak BtJrn Ram BuJ(
lity of an Act on tLe assumption of the validity of Blatt of Punj.ib
another Act. The constitutional validity of other
Su/J[;a RaoJ,
Aots will have to be considered on a scrutiny of the
provisions of those Acts. It may be asked why a
Managing Director of the Patia.la Bank or, as a
matter for that, the Board of Directors of the said
Bank, must be presumed to have greater rectitude
or efficiency than the Managing Director of the State
Bank or indeed any other reputed bank. It may
be contended with equal justification the every bank
in Patiala and indeed every bank in India can be
entrusted with judicial powers to decide its claims
and realise the dues through the governmental coercive machinery. If that was conceded, it would be
the end of the rule of law in our country.
Lastly it is contended that the sections of the
Act providing for recovery through the Nazim
through the coercive process or through the Accountant-General by the withholding payment of amounts, if any, due to the debtors, can be su1tained
on the basis of the doctrine ·of reasonable classification. The provisions for realizing the amounts cannot be considered separately from the provisions
providing for the determination of the debt. Both
set of provisions are integral parts of a single
scheme. The effect of the said provisions is, as I
have already considered in detail at the earlier
stage, that the debt would be determined and the
amounts realized through a coercive proce~s and the
debtor would be debarred from questioning either
the determination of the debtor the realization
therepf in any court of law. l<eliance is plaoed
upon the judgement of the Court in Manna Lal v.
Collector of Jhaln.war (1). The question raised in
that case was whether an:y loan due to theJhalawar
(~) [1961)2SC.R '62,
..
404
1951
L•d-Duon
bd•l/•f Fim
7 ilalt R.m B.,.. Bua
•.
S<att •/ Pullj.b
Bvbba~J.
SUPREME COURT REPOB.TS [I~]
Sta.te Bank could be recovered as a public demand.
This Court held that it oould be so recovered. It
also repelled the argument that the Act, in so far as
it enabled moneys due to the Government in respect of its trading activities to be recovered by way
of public demand, offended Art. 14 of the Constitution on the ground that the Governm ent, even as
a banker could be legitimately put in a separate
class. But the question now raised before us,
namely, whether a Slate Bank could be a judge in
its own cause, Wll.8 neither raised nor decided there.
The decision, therefore, does not cover the present
controversy. In my view, there are no real difl'erenoes between Patiala Bank and other banks vis-avis their claims against their constituents, which
could reasonably sustain the special treatment mated
out to the former under the Act. Discrimination is
writ large on the foce of the Act. In this view, no
other question arises for consideration.
)
In the result, I hold that the provisions of the
Act, in so far as they relate to the Pa.tie.la Bank,
are constitutionally void and I iBBue a writ of mandamus directing the Bank not to prooeed to recover
the debt alleged to be due from the appellants under the provisions of the Act. The appeals and the
writ petitions are allowed with costs.
BY CoURT : In view of the opinion of the majority, the appeals and the writ petitions are dismissed
with. costs, one hearing fee.
AppealB and petitions dismiaBed.
, ...
.
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