SHANTI PRASAD JAIN versus THE DIRECTOR OF ENFORCEMENT
Supreme Court of India | Decided 19 April 1962 | [1963] 2 S.C.R. 297 | 1962 INSC 157
Key facts
- Decided
- 19 April 1962
- Bench
- T.L. VENKATARAMA AIYYAR*, BHUVNESHWAR PRASAD SINHA, P.B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, K.N. WANCHOO, N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR
- Bench size
- 5
- Case number
- CIVIL APPEAL No. 319/1961
- Disposal
- Case Partly allowed
- Citation
- [1963] 2 S.C.R. 297
- Neutral citation
- 1962 INSC 157
Text of the judgment
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2 S.C.R.
SUPREME pc>URT REPORTS
297
SHANTI PRASAD JAIN
v.
THE DIRECTOR OF ENFORCEMENT
(B. P. SINHA, c. J., P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, K. N.
WANOHoO, N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR and
T. L VENKATARAMA AIYAR, JJ.)
Foreign Eichangn-Foreige firm depositing money in
account of India in foreign bank.-Money to be used only for
purchases from for~ign firm-I.f contravenes prohibition to I.end
jQreign
exchange-Relationship·
bet-<1een
Bank
and
India-Whether of debtor ani creditor-Contingent debt-Power
to adjudge contravention given to Director of EnforcementDirector empoivered to send case to Court if penalty imposeable
by him not atiequate-If discriminatory-Foreign Exchange
Regulation Act, 1947 ( 7 of 1947), as. 4( 1), 23, 23D-Oonstitution
of India, Art. 14.
The appellant had claims, for compensation against
certain German firms in respect of machineries supplied by
them to the appellant's concerns. The appellant went to
Germany and arrived at settlements v1dth the- firms, under
which the firms deposited certain sums of money with the
Deutsche.Bank in the account of the appellant with the stipulation that the money was only to be used by the appellant
for purchases of new machineries from the same firm~ after
obtaining import licenses from the Government of India. The
appellant had not obtainca permission, general or special, of
the Reserve Bank for opening this account. Section 4 11) of
the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947, prohibits a
'person resident in Indi~.', inter alia, from lending to any
person outside India foreign exchange withf)ut the perrnission
of the Reserve Bank. Section 23 lays down the penalties for
contravention of s. 4(1) on adjudication by the Director of
Enfo,.cement and on conviction by a Court. Section 230
confers upon the Director the power to adjudicate whether
any person has contravened<. 4 (1) and empowers him, if he
is of the opinion that the penalty which he is empJwered by
impose would not be adequate in the circumstances of any
particular case, to make a complaint in writing to the Caurt.
The Djrector inquired into the appellant's Deutsche Bank
account, held that the appellant had contravened s, 4( 1) and
imposed a p·enalty of Rs. 55 lakhs. On appeal the Foreign
Exchange Appellate Trib1.1nal held that the deposits amounted
1951
298
1962
..
Tiu Dirtrtor ()f
z,.f.rumtnl
SUPREME OOURT REPORTS [1963]
in law to Joans by the appelJant to the Bank and consequently
s. 4(1) was contravened but it reduced the penalty to Rs. 5
lakhs. The appellant contended (i) thats. 23(1) of the Act
offended Art. 14 of the Constitution as two parallel procedures
were provided for the same offence and it was left to the discretion of the executive to choose which wa. to be applied in a
particular case, and (ii) that there was no loan by the appellant to the Bank and therefore there was no contravention of
•. 4( l).
Held, that the power conferred upon the Director ur.der
s. 23D to transfer cases to a court is not unguided or arbitrary
and, docs not offend Art. 14 and s. 23( 1) cannot be assailed as unconstitutional. .A serious offence should not go without being adequately punished; and in such case.< the accused
should have the benefit of trial by a Superior Court. Under
s. 230 the transfer is to a Court and that only when the
Director considers that a more severe punishment than what
he is authorised to impose should be awarded.
Held, further, that the appellant had not lent money to
the IJcutschc Uank and had not contravened the provisio11s of
'· 4( l) of the Act. Though normally when moneys arc depo3ited in a Bank, the relationship that is constituted between the
Banker and the custon1cr is one of debtor and creditor, there
may he special arrangement under which the relationship may
be diff<rent. The right of the appellant to the amounts in
deposit was contingent on the happening of certain events
some of which were beyond his control and until then there
,,•as no debt due to him. A contingent debt is no debt until
the contingency happens, and as the right of the appellant lo
the amount!ii in deposit in his name in the Deutsche Bank
arises only on the happening of the contingencies, i.e. granting
of the import licenses by the Government of India, there
was no debt due to him in prP..senti and there was Ill') loan
the:cof within s. 4( 1) of the Act. The fact that money has been
put in a Bank does not necessarily import that it is a deposit
in the ordinary course of banking. The purpose of the depo·
sits and the conditions attached to it indicated that the
Deutsche Bank held the money under a special arrangemt:nt
\vhich constituted it not a debtor, but a sort of a stakeholder.
0
~rhe words "a person rcsirlent in lnclia in s_ 4(1) hao; been
used in the sense of "resident of India", and it was not necessary that at the time of the contraventioa of s. 4( 1) shou)d be
actually in India.
Foley v. Hill, (1848) I I H. L. C. 28, Webb v. Stenlon,
(1883) 11 Q. B. D. 518 and Tapp v . ./onu, (1875) L. R. JO
Q. B. 591, rcferrr.d to
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME OOUR.T REPORTS
299
Civu. APPELLATE JuRISDIOTION: Civil Appeals
Nos. 319 and 320 of 1961.
Appeals by special leave from the order dat"ed
October 23, 1959 of the Foreign Exchange Appellate
Board, New Delhi, in Appeal No. 51 of 1959.
A. v: Viswanatha Sa.~tri, K. L. Misra, Advocate
General for the State of Uttar Pradesh, B. P. Khaitan,
S. K. Kapur and .B. P. Maheshwari, for the appellant
(in C. A. No. 319 of 1961) and the respondent
(In C. A. No. 320 of 1961).
M. O. Setalvad, Attorney General of India, 0. N.
Joshi and P. D. Menon, for the respondent8 (In C. A.
No. 319 of 61) and the appellant (in C. A. No. 320
of 1961).
1962. April 19. The Judgment of the Court
was delivered by
VENKATARAMA AIYAR, J.-The appellant in
Civil Appeal No. 319 of 1961, Shri S. P. Jain in the
Chairman of the Board of Directors of a Company
called Sahu Jain Ltd., which holds the managing
agency of two companies, the' Rohtas Industries
Ltd. or more 11hortly the Rohtas, and the New
Central Jute Mills Ltd. The Rohtas carry on
business in the manufacture and sale of paper, and
own a paper Mill at Dalmianagar in the State of
Bihar. Shri J'ain is the Chairman of the Board of
Directors of that Company also. The New Centre
Jute Mills Ltd. carry on business in the manufac·
ture and sale of Jute, and own Mill at Calcutta.
They also do business in the manufacture and sale
of chemicals and fertilisers at Varanasi. On June
30, 1958, bhri S. P. Jain left India on a tour to the
continent of Europe and on his return ·to this
country he was searched at the Palam Airport on
October 1, 1958, and the following document was
found in hi!! leather attaohe case :"Deutsche Bank Aktiengese.llschaft.
Shanti Prasad J•i·n
v.
Thi Dir1etor of
Enforcement
Ai~u J.
300
196Z
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Slr.a1i ~ruul Jain
TA1 lliuct#f' •f
E•fn-ctmntl
SUPREl\IB COURT REPORTS (1963)
Page 2 to our letter of 25th Sept., 1958 to
JHr. S. P. Jain, Hotel Briedenbacher .Hof. Dusseldorf.
The "DM-accoilnt ~ith limited. convertibility
No. 50180 .of l\Ir. S. P. Jain has.been credited in
1958, upto now, with the following amounts from
German sources ;
20th l\Iarch 195&.Dl\I · 210,ll8,65 from l\I/s.
J. M: Voith G. m: b. H. Maschinenfabrik, Heidenheim marked "Dl\I 210.081,31 less Dl\I. 262,65
banking charges" (the said charge was made by the
remitter's
bank
which is not
a branch of ours);
.
.
.
.
11th July 1958 DM, 205.000 from Messrs.
Escher Wyss G. m. b. H. ma.rked "as per letter of.
7th July 1958" in translation.
.
. ·· .
9th August 1958 DM 201.424,81 from Messrs.
J.M. Voith G. m. b. H. Maschinenfabrik, Heiden-·
heim marked . "DM. 201.676,59 less banking charges."
15th August 1959 DM 472.886,03 from Messrs •
. Friedr. Udhe G. in. b. H. Dertmund, ma.rked-in
· . translation-"derived expenses DM. 465.633,63
interest payment Dl\I. 7 .2.52,40."
24th Septe~ber 1958 · DM, 350.ooo; · from
Messrs. Pintsch-Bamag A.G., Butzbach marked-in
translation ••payment of excess price." · ·
25th September 1953 Dl\I. 250.000 .from
Messrs.. Pintech-Bamag A.C., Butsbech marked-in
translation "in respect of excess price."
·
Now s. 4(1) of the Foreign
Exchange
· herienafter
Regulations Act (VII of 1947)
referred to as 'the Act' provides that "Except
with the previous general or special permission
of . the Reserve Bank; no person resident .
in· India other than an authorised dealer shall .
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SUPREME OOURT REPORTS
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outside India buy or borrow from, or sell or lend
to, or exchange with, any person not being an
authorised dealer, any foreign exchange."
The
expression 'foreign exchange' as defined in s.Z(d)
means «foreign currency and includes all deposits,
credits and balances payable in any foreign currency and any drafts, travellers' cheques, letters of
credit and bille of exchange expressed or drawn in
Indian currency but payable in any foreign currency."
As Shri Jain had admittedly not obtained
the permission genera.I or specie.I of the Reserve
Bank, for opening the account aforesaid, the
proceedings
Director of Jl]nforcement started
age.inst him under s.4(1) of the Act. The explanation of Shri Jain was that the amounts in question
had been deposited into the Bank by four German
firms in settlement of claims which two Indian
Companies the Rohta.s and the New Centre.I Jute
Mills Ltd. had against them for delayed and defective supplies of machinery and equipment under pre-.
vious contracts, that the deposits in question had
been ma.de subject to the condition that they should
be utilised only for making initial payments towards
price of new machineries to be purchased from the
German firms and that in consequence there was
no loan by the appellant within s.4 ( l) of the Act.
The Director rejected this explanation and held
that s.4(1) had been contravened and imposed a.
fine of Rs. 55 la.khs on.Shri Jain under s. 23(i)(a.)
of the Act. · Age.inst this order there was an appeal
to the Foreign l!lxoha.nge Appellate .Board who,
examining the question in the light of fresh materials which were ma.de available to them accepted
t1' ~ version of Shri Jain, and held that the deposits
had been made by the German firms under the
circumstanoes and on the condition stated by him.
They however held that even so the deposits in
question would in law be loans by Shri Jain to the
1101
Shanti Prasad Jain
v.
Tht. Dir1ttor tf
En,for-•I
Ai,..rJ.
I
302
JIM>
S/renli Prosrd .Jain
'
rltt Dirtcto, of
Enfnumcit
AVor J.
SUPREME OOURT REPORTS (1963)
Bank, and that in conl!'.lquence, ·a.4(1) of the Act
had been infringed, as no permission had been
obtained a~ required by it. In this view they con·
firmtid the order of the Director but reduced the
fine to Re. 5 lakhs. Against this order both Shri
S. P. Jain and the Union of India. have preferred
the above appeals with the leave of this Court
under Art. 136 of the Constitution. In this judgment Shri S. P. Jain will be referred to as the
appellant and the Union of India. a.a respondents.
On the contentions urged before us the
questions that a.rise for our decision in these
appeals a.re :
...
( l) What a.re the terms and conditions
on which the deposits in question were made;
(2)whether on those terms and conditions
.there has been a violation of s.4( l) of the Act
by the appellant ; and
(3) whether the imposition of penalty
under s. 23 (i )(a) of the Act is bad on the
grouncl that the section is in contravention of
Art. 14 and in oonsequenoe void.
It will be convenient to disposti of the last
contention first, a.a it goes to the very root of the
jurisdiction of the Director of Enforcement to proceed under the impugned section. Section 23 ( l)
of the Act is as follows :
"23(1) If any person contravenees the
provisions of section 4, section 5, section 9 or
sub-section (2) of section 12 or of any rule,
direction or order made thereunder, he shall( a) be liable to such penalty not exceeding three times the value of the
foreign exchange in respect of which the
contravention has taken plaoe, or five
thousand rupees, whichever is more, u
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2 S. 0. R.
SUPREME OOURT REPORTS
·303
may be adjudged by the Director of
Enforcement in the- manner hereinafter
provided, or
(b) upon conviction by a Court, be punishable with imprisoLment for a term which
may extend to two years, or with fine,
or with both."
Then there is s. 2J-D which, omitting what is not
material, runs as follows : "23·D(l) For the purpose of adjudging under
clause (a) of sub-section (i) of section 23
whether any person has committed a contravention, the Director of Enforcement shall
hold ah inquiry in the prescribed manner
after giving th&t person a reasonable opportunity of being heard and if, on such inquiry,
he is satisfied that the person has committed
the contravention, he may impose such penalty· as he thinks fit in accordance with the
provisions of the said section 23 :
Provided that if, at any stage of the
inquiry, the Director of Enforcement is of
opinion that having regard to the circumstances of the case, the penalty which he is
empowered to impose would not be adequate,
he shall, instead of imposing any penalty
himself, make a complaint in writing to the
Court."
'
It will be seen that when there is a contravention of s.4( 1), action with respect to it is to be
taken in the first instance by the Director of
Enforcement. He may either adjudge the matter
himself in accordance with s. 23( 1)( a), or he may
send it on to a Court if he considers that a more
servere penalty than he can impose is called for.
Now the contention of the appellant is that when
the case is transferred to a Court, it will be tried in
1962
Shonli Prasad Jaili
••
Tll• Dirtelor of
Enfort:l11flfll
A;,., J.
a04
J96J
Shanti Pr01ad J,n,,
••
TN Dir"tOT of
EnjMurMnl
Ai,ar J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963]
accordance with the procedure presorihed by the
Criminnl Procedure .Code, but that wh<'n the Director him~P]f trit•s it, he will follow the procedure
prescribed ther<'for under the Rules framed under
the Act, and that whPn the law provides for the
same offence being tried under two procedures, which
a: e mhstautially different, and it is left to the dis
cretion of an executive officer whether the trial
should lake place nnder the one or the other of
them, there is clear discrimination, and Art. 14 is
contravened. Therefore s. '.!3 (l) (a) must, it is
argued, bo struck down as uncmnstituti0nal and the
imposition of fine on the appellant under that
section sot aside as illegal.
It is not disputed by the appellant that the
subject-matter of the l~gislation, viz., Foreign
Exchange, has features and problems peculiarly its
own, and that it forms a class in itself. A law
which prescribes a speoial prooedure for investigation of br!~aches of forei1m exchange regulation will
therefore be not hit by Art. 14 as it is based on a
classification which has a just and reasonable relation to the object of the legislation. The vii-es of
s. 23 (l) (a} is accordingly not open \.o attack on
the ground that it is governed by :. procedure
different from that prescribed by the Code of Crimi·
nal Procedure. That indeed is not oontrovertcd
by the appellant. That being so, does it make any
difference in the legal position that s. 23-D provides
for transfer by the Director of Enforce1Dent of
cases which ho can try, to tho Court ? We have
not here, as in St,ate of W ei;t Bengal v. Anwar Ali(')
a law. which confers on an officer an ·absolute
discretion to send a case for trial eithor to a Court
or to a l\Ia.gistrate, empo:wered to try oaB{'S under
a spcoial procedure. 8eotion 23-D oonfers authority
on the very officer who has power to try and dispose of a caso to sond it on for trial to a Court, and
that too only when he consider that a more severe
{I) (1952) s.
c. R. :ist.
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2 S.C.R.
SUPREME (,'OURT REPORTS
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punishment than what he is authorised to impose,
should be awarded. In a Judicial system, in which
there is a hierarchy of Courts or Tribunals, presided
over by magistrates or officers belonging to different
classes, and there is a devolution of powers among
them graded according to their class, 11 provision
such as s. 23-B is necessary for proper administration of justice. While on the one hand a serious
offence should not go without being adequately
punished by reason of cognizance thereof having
been taken by an inferior authority, the accused
should on the other hand have in such cases the
benefit of a trial by a superior court. That is the
principle underlying s. 34,9 of t.he Criminal Procedure Code, under which magistrates of the second
and third class, are empowered to send the ca8es
for trial to the District Magistrate or Sub-Divisional
Magistrate, when they consider that a more severe
punishment than they can inflict is called for. In
our view the power conferred on the Director of
Enforcement under s. 23-D to transfer cases to a
Court is not unguided or arbitrary, and does not
offend Art. 14 ands. 23 (I) (a) cannot be assailed
as unconstitutional.
(I) Passing on to the question as to the terms
on which the deposits standing to the credit of the
appellant in the Deutsche Bank were made, though
before the Director, and the Appellate Board, the
truth of the settlements between the German firms,
and the appellant was itself questioned by the
respondents, before us it is not disputed that there
were such settlements or that the deposits were
made pursuant thereto. The whole of the controversy before us is limited to the question whether
the deposits were unconditional and absolute or
whether they were made subject to the condition,
that the appellant could operate on them only for
payment of the price of new machineries to be
puroha.ood from those German firms.
.
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1962
Shanti Pr1Jt11I J •in
••
T lie Dir1&lfW r1
.Enforcl1l't1nl
-
AIJ•r J.
:106
1982
SI.anti Pro1od 'ain
v.
The Director of
Enf<ncemmi
Ai1ar J,
SUPREME COURT REPORTS fl963J
Before entering on a discussion of the materials be1~ring on this point, we may deal shortly with
a question which was agitated before the Director
of Enforcement and the Appellate Board. That is
wht>ther tho provisions of the Evidenoo Act arc
applicable to the proceedings under the Act. Rule
3 (5) of the Rules framed under the Act provides
that in taking evidence, "the Director shall not be
bound to observA the provisions of the Indian
Evidence Act, 1872 (I of 187; )", Section 24-A of
the Act provides that the court shall presume the
genuineness and the truth of the contents of certain
documents tendered in evidence by the prosecution
un !Pss tho contrary is proved. The Director of
Enforcement held that by reason of the above
provisions the Evidence Act had n.:> application to
procPedings under the Act. The Appellate Board
came to & different conclusion. It held that s. 24-A
had application only to proceeding in Court and
that Rules 3 (5) had uot tile effect of rendering
arlmis~ible evidence which was irrelevant or inadmissible under tho Evidence Act. In our opinion
thiR is the correct viow to take of tho scope of
a. 24- ~ and Rule 3 (5) and that wa~ conceded before us by the learned Attorney Gcnei al appearing
for thP respondents.
For a. satisfactory determination of the question as to the terms on which the deposits in
account No. 50180 were made, it is necessary to
narrate briefly the history and nature of the disputes, which form the subject-matter of tho
settl<ments.
They havo their origin in four
contracts entered into with four German firms, two
of them by the Hohtas and tho ot.her two by the
New Central .Jute Mills Ltd. Taking the first of
them, some time prior to 1953 the l~ohtas had
placed an order with a German firm called Messrs.
Voith & Company for the supply of three paper
Machines. The shipment of these machines was
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2 S.C.R.
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
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dela.yed beyond the time stipulated and moreover
when they were supplied their produrytion was found
to be far below what had been guaranteed under
the agreement. The Rohtas claimed compensation
from M/s. voith & Cumpany on both these accounts
and after some correspondence between them a
representative of the German firm Mr. Zimmer·
mann came over to India to make an enquiry on
the spot, and as a result of the discussion which he
had with the Rohtas he recommended on February
21, 1957 that a sum of£ 17,900/- might be paid by
the German firm as compensation for delay in shipment. He however declined to · admit the claim
made by the Rohtas on account of the deficiency
in the output of the machines. In accordance with
this recommendation Messrs. Voith & Co. remitted
on March 15, 1958, German Marks equivalent to
the sum of£ 17,900/· to the Deutsche Bank to be
credited in the name of the appellant and it was so
credited on Mawh 20, l\158. The appellant was in
due course informed of the deposit, hut on May 14,
1958, he wrote to M/s. Voith & Co. that he was not
prepared to accept the amount in full satisfaction
as no compensation was paid for deficiency in out·
put. Thus the dispute was still unsettled, when
the appellant left for Germany.
Coming next to the second contract, some
time in 1951 the R.ohtas had purchased from M/s.
Escher Wyss another firm in West Germany a
Yankee Paper-making Machine. As soon as it was
installed it was discovered that some of its parts
were defective and that its output was also below
what was guaranteed. On December 17, 1953, the
appellant brought these defects to the notice of the
German firm and asked them to substitute good and
suitable parts in the place of the unusable old ones.
On this a protracted correspondence followed btit
as the machines could not be worked without
replacement of the defective parts, the Rohtas coulq
198B
Sh'Onli Prasad Jai!J
v.
T be Director of
.En/orctment
AiyarJ.
308
Sh.nli p,.,ld Jain
••
Th. Dir1ttar oJ
En.fare""'"'
Aiyor J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1963]
not wait until a settl!'mcnt was reached and so
purchased the requisite parts from another German
firm called O'Dorril'S and made a demand on M/s .
Esoher Wy&s & Company for compensation.
A representative of the firm !\Ir. Staudenmaier
came over to India some time in 1956 to
investigate the matter and after making a
local inspection ho submitted proposals for
remodelling the machineR. On June Ii, l9;ii, tho
Rohtas wrote to tho Gorman firm that they were
not ·agreoable tu these proposals and requested
them "tu have the claims settll'd as put forward
by us in our previous lett.ers". Thus the claim
under this cont.met was also prrnling settlement
at tho material period.
The facts relating to the third an<l fourth
contracts concerned in t.hese disputes are that the
Xew Central Jute i\Iills Ltd. ha<l decided to instal at Varanasi a Gall and Synthesid Ammonia
Plant for the manufacture of ChcmicnlR and
Fertilisers and placf'd orders for t.Lc machineries
and partH with two German firms M/s. Frierlrich
U<lhe and Yl/s. Piuts('h Bamag. Tho ca.de of the
appellant i~ that many of the eqi!ipm1:nts which
were supplied by tho two firms were not in accordance with th" specifications, that the pipe lines
were not properly fabricated and were untailored
a.nd that there wa1 also Bhortag" in t.hc Buppliea
made by M/s. Pint.~ch Bamag. The New Central Jute
Mills Co. claimed compensation for the defective
supplies as aforesaid from the German firms, and
negotiations for settlement of these claims were
also pending at the relevant dates.
Another fa<'tor forminl! the backgronnd for
the settlements must now be mi>ntioncd. At
about. this time the appellant had come to a di>ci·
sion to instal a nP,w Paper Pinnt at Dnlmianngnr
and a new Ammonium Chloride Plant at Varanasi.
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
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To carry out those projects it was necessary to
secure the requisite foreign exchange and for that
the permission of the Government of India had
to be obtained. Accordingly the appellant wrote on
May 26, 1958, to the Ministry of C'Jmmerce &
Industries and again on June 5, 1958, to the Ministers for Industries and for Finance settling out
his proposals for expensations and desiring to
know the amounts of . foreign exchange which
could be made available for these projects. In
his reply to the appellant dated June 9, 1958,
the Minister for Industries stated: "As you know
under the present acute foreign <'xchange P°''i·
tion, no earlier paym•Jnts bofore production are
permitted . . .. Also export earnings from the
products of a particular plant lay only be allo.wod
to be used for payments for that very plant and
nor for the payment of Import and other capital
goods and equipment".
Thus the position when the appellant left
for the Continent was that he had outstanding
claims against four German firms and negotiations
for their settlement were pending, and that he
had on hand schemes for expansion of industries
at Dalmianagar and Varanasi which could be put
through only if the requisite machinery could be
imported ·but that the Government of India would
not permit imports which involved payments of
price at the time of delivery of goods.
The appellant left India for Europe on
June 30, 1958. In the following months he contacted the respresentative of the four German
firms mentioned above and all . the disputes were
settled. Acoording to the appellant, the terms of the
settlement which were same in all the four contracts
were as follows: The amount payable to the Indian
Companies as compensation was fixed. It was to be
deposited by the Geruia.n firms to the credit of the
1962
Shanti Prasad Jain
••
The Director of
Enforce_menl
~iyar J.
31<>
1951
Shanti Prua4 J.tn
v.
7-'ie cn,.acwr of
EriforCttMIJt
A;_,. J •
SUPREME OOURT REPORTS (1963]
appellant in the Deutiiche Bank. The Indian Com·
panies were to obtain import licences from the
Government of India and place orders with the
respective firms for the supply of new ma.chi·
neries. The amounts in uredit in the Deutsche
Bank were to be supplied pro tanto for the p11.yment of the price of these machines to the respective firms. The appellant was not to operate on
this account except for the purpose of making
payments to the German in tho manner aforesaid.
It is now noceBBary to refer to tho evidence
bearing on the settlements, because, as already
stated, while tho respondents admit that there were
settlements with the German firms and deposits
were ma.de pursuant thereto, they do not admit
that the deposits were ma.de subject to conditions, as stated by the appellant. It will be
remembered that on March 20, 1958, M/s. Voith &
Company had deposited with Deutsche Bank
DM. 210.081,31 Marke being the equivalent of
£ 17,900/- as compensation for delayed shipment,
which was the only portion of the claim admitted
by them, in full settlement of a.II the claims of the
Rohtae: :\ow pursuant to the settlement reached
with the appellant, they deposited on August I,
1958, a further sum of DM. 201,67,659 Marks in
the name of the appellant in the Deutsche Bank.
The terms of the settlement appear in two letters
written by M/e. Voith & Company on August I,
1958, one to the Rohta.s and the other to the
Deutiiche Bank. In the letter addressed to the
Rohtas M/s. Voith and Company say "Mr. Jain
informed us of your plans for tb.e future such as the
establishment of a new complete pulp and paper
making unit in ABSam, and in particular, of your
immediate desire to increase the proiuction of your
Board Machine P.M. I in Dalmia.nagar. For this
re-construction project we have already submitted
i.n offer ....•. Regarding the remodelling of your
•
~I
2 s.c.tt.
SUPREME OOtrRT Rll:POJ1.'.l'S
311
P.M.. I., we understand that you have already
obtained an industrial Iioence and that you expect
to get an import licence for the equipment offered
by us. An advance payment of 20% of the. exworks price is, however, for this comparatively
small brder a pre-condition for 'Our credit insurance.
In view of Mr. Jain's assurance that we ·will enjoy
preference for the supply of our machinery ill the
event that an import licence for the. new paper
mill will eventually be obtained, and fu order to
make the early placing of your order for the
reconstruction of P;M. I possible, we have finally
agreed to meet your claims for the paper machines
alrea!iy supplied to the extent of a total sum of
DM. 412,058 including the amount already placed
with the Deutsche Bank, Dusseldorf, in March,
representing 20% of the price quoted in our
offer of January 15th, 1958. We are, therefore,
remitting the balance ·to the Deutsche Bank as per
letters addressed to them translation of which we
attach hereto.· This settlement ofyotrt claims .is
considered on the, definite undersfanding that the
total amount can only be utilised by you to make
to us tpe initial payinent of 20"/c only and when
the iln.port licence for the tec:onstruction of p.M.I.
is received. The Bank is, therefore, instructed to
hold both remittances mt~e by .us ii.t yo~fr <;liap&slil
for thi~ purpose only." On 'the same dayM/s. Voith
& Company ,advised the Deutsche· 'Bank. t~at they
had r!lmitted a further siJm of DM. · 2frl,676.59
to it in addition to the previous remittance of
DM. 210,381.31 and then go on to.say "the two
amounts are paid in final set~lement of the claims
of 114.essrs. Rohtas lndustries Limited against us
in connection with the supply llf 3 paper maClh_ines.
We rl'IJ,6at that the said a.mounts may be.utilitled
by Mr. S. P ..Jain, Chairman of Messrs: Rohtas
~nq~tries Limited, only 'for the pur;POS\)
~kmg
mlt1a1,pay,nients to us 11igamst further. tJtJri:ililJ.Se <if
o,
1901
Shanti l'lasad Jam
v.
T!te Di;~dor of
Enfoimnint
[,
I
312
StrPREME COURT REPOR.TS (1963]
machinery, ·which payments ·will be made on final·
·
approval of our tender after receipt of the Indian
S.i~;,.li Prasad Jain
. ' v .. , ·..
.import licence. For other's sake please confirm
T /t4 DirtCt•1' •f
receipt of these instructions to us."
EnfM&etTUn'
1962 .
It sh~uld be mentio~ed that under the Export
Regulations in force in Germany no goods manufactured therein could be exported unless 20% price
-quoted were paid for before the goods left the
country.. The effect ·of the 'arrangement come to
between M/s Voith & Company and the appellant
was that the firm would be· free to export goods to
the Rohtas on payment. to it of 20% of the price
out of t~e funds standing to the credit of the
appellant in the Deutsche Bank,.· and· it may be
· gathered that the total amount of compensation
had relation to the 20 per .cent of the price of the ·
new machinery to be purchased., .
4
I
The settlement made in respect of the three
'.lther contracts was also on the same lines. M/s.
Escher Wyss & Company settled tb.e claim of the
. Rohtas on July 7, 1958, and wrote to the appellant
as follows: "We are pleased that a rnlution has
been ·arrived in the' course of the talks we had 'with ·
you to settle your long outstanding claim. We have
declared to pay the agreed amount of DM. 205.000,
1
as finally settled immediately for your satisfactfon
to Deutsche Bank to be held by them for your
utilising in purchase of machinery by Messrs. Rohtas
Imlustries Ltd., Dalmianagar from us after you
have finally decided on the several plans discussed.
here and obtained import licences from your
Gove~nment. We have pointed out to you that ·;
·we .. attach great· value to entertaining• good and
friendly relations and to do further business with
you .. We shall thank 'you also to Jet us have a
confirmation that all claims against· our firm in
connection with our delivery of Yankee Paper
. ~iachine are now definitely settled." On the same ·~
,
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME OOURT REPORTs
313
day M/s. Escher Wyss & Company transferred a sum
of DM. 205.000 to the Deutsche Bank icommunica.
ting to them a copy of the letter addressed to the
appellant containing the terms of the deposit with
them. The amount was duly credited to the
account of the appellant on July II, 1958.
On August 11, 1958, a settlement was reached
between the appellant and M/s. Friedrich Udhe &
Company, who, then addressed the following letters
to the Deutsche Bank : "We are releasing a sum
of DM. 472,866,03 as derived expenses DM.
465.633,63 and interests payment DN. 7.252.40
to meet claims of Mr. S. P. Jain, President, New
Central Jute Mills, Calcutta. We request you to hold
·this amount in the name of Mr. S. P. Jain but it
shall not be payable to him and is to be· utilised
only for payment to us against. purchase of expan·
sion machinery by Sahu Chemicals-Proprietor New
Central Jute Mills-··after they secure licence and DM
transfer guarantee from their Government." The
amount was actually credited in the Deutsche Bank
int-he mune of the appellant on August 15, 1958.
Confirming this. arrangement M/s. Friedrich Udhe
wrote to the appellant on August 18, 1958, as
follows : "As a v:ery special case, to promote our
pleasant business relations, we have, only in view
of your assurance for expansion order, released a
sum of DM. 472,886,03 calculated as aforesaid,
against our engineering fees and exP,enses on your
existing supply, which must be utillsed, however,
only towards your meeting payments to us against
order and shipments which are essential for our
credit insurance. .We have made over this amount
to Deutsche Bank A. C. · with instructions to hold
t-he same for payment aforesaid after your
Government grants you licence and DM transfer
guarantee is established as may be acceptable to
competent German authorities.''
Jiff
Skr.nti ·l'r~oi Jan
...
7 "4 Direel1r ./
E•for'ltnml
4.fJtfJ,
314
1931
SIKMli Pr.sod Jr.in
••
The Diudor oj
Bllf-.n<
A~ro· .}.
SUPREl\IE COURT REPORTS [1963)
On September 21, 1958, there waa a settlement
of the dispute with M/s. Pintsoh-Ba.mag under which
the latter a.~reed to pay 600.000 Marks in full
S•ltisfaction of the ola.im on the same terms as in
tho other contracts. On tho same day M/s Pintsch
Bama.g wrote tlie following letter to the Deutsche
Rank. "We hereby notify you t.hat we are placing
DM. 600.000 with you in payment of excess price
claimed by Mr. S. P. Jain, President of New Central
Jute Mills Co. Ltd., we further advise that the amount
is to be held by yon in the name nf Mr. S. P. Jain,
but it would not be ava.ila.ble to him except for
ma.king payment to us against extension machinery
to be ordered with us by Sahu Chemicals Proprie·
tors New Central Jute Mil!R Co., outheir obtaining
licence from their Government and approval of
payment conditions." ·on September 24, · 11158,
M/s. Pintsoh Bamag wrote to the appellant that
they had deposited the a.mount settled in the
Deutsche Bank and added ''we must however point
out expreBSly that but for the assurance of exten·
sion order to us, it would not have been poBBiblo
for us to meet your claims. This amount will be
available therefore only for making payment to us
against extension machinery and the bank has been
spccifica.lly advised to bold the same for you only
in accordance therewith."
The evidence aboTe referred to olearly establio1ics tb~t the deposits in account No ..50180, were
made subject to the conditions stated by the appellf•nt, and there is intrinsio evidence in the entries themselves in this aooount wbioh supi-ort this
oontentiou. Thus the entry relating to tb.i receipt
of deposit from Messrs. Friedrich Udbe ·speaks of
"derived expenses" and "interest' '; and those rela.·
ting to the receipt from MeBBrs. Pintsch Ba.mag read
as "payment of exce88 prioe and ''in respect of
exce88 price" These entries .have reference to the
nature of the claiii:ie OE account of which the deposit are made, and would be wh.olly out of place in
2 S.C.R;
~
~
._,
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
315
the case of ordinary deposits. On the other ha.nd,
they would b·e quite explicable if m11ode under spe·
cial directions from the depositors.
But the matter does not rest there. While
the appeal was pending before the Appellate Board
both ''the parties agreed that further information
should be elicited from the Bank as to several matters concerning the deposits, and on . August 21,
1959, a questionnaire agreed to by counsel on either
sides was sent by the appellant to the Bank
for its reply. Therein the Bank was 11,sked to fur·
nish particulars regarding the heading of account No;
50180· the certified copy of the relevant entries
therein, the certified copy pf page-I of the letter
dated September 25, 1958 from the Bank to Mr.
Jain, and ·the communications which passed between· the Bank and Mr. Jain in respect of the· six
items of deposit appearing in the account. Among
the questions sent to the Bank were the following :- .
(a} Please state whether the amounts referred 'to were deposited witu you.and were
held by you on the conditions mentioned
in the letters, copies whereof are enclosed
herewith.
~
~
(b) What is meant by the expression "DM"
account with limited convertibility'' ?
What does it signify in relation to the
deposits taken by you under the conditi·
ons mentioned in those letters ? Was the
acceptance of these conditional credits
by the Bal:\k confirmed to the persons who
, deposited thest> amounts ?
To this the Bank sent a reply dated September I,
1959; to ·the Chairman, of the Board, but addressed
to the- appellant.. Therein it give particulars of
the siX items of deposiias_contained·m the-letter
1962
Sh••l.i Pnffoa "-a i $
••
Tlw Ditulor 1•f
Enfor011Mnl
AVorJ.
316
s~-;
,,,••,Join
v.
Tl&t Barector of
Ewfnctt'Md
A~rJ.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [l963J
dated September 25, 1958. Then there are the
following statement which are material ;
"The deposited amounts are being held by
UR s11bject to the conditions given in the
enclosed certified copie.s of the rel1iva.nt
letters from the German parties concerned ...... As is evident from the stipulations mentioned above, you are not entitled to withdraw the amounts specified
or parta thereof, without fulfilling the
terms and conditions stipulated in the
said letters. The acceptance of these
conditions, has, of course, been confirmed
to the firms concerned and we a.re, therefore, bound to observe the conditions
vis-a· vis those firmB, t-00, before we poseibly could carry out any instructions
from your part to dispose of the funds.
It need not be empha.~ized that these conditions applied during all the time the
amounts have been maintained in this
account where, indeed, they continue to
be kept on the same bBSis."
As the letter of the Bank did not contain replies
to a.II the questions raised int-he letter of August 21,
1959, the Appellate Boa.rd directed that it should
be asked to sand a further reply with respP.ct to all
the questions. On September 17, 1959 the appellant a.ccordingl,v wrote another letter to the Bank
asking for a reply specifically to all the questions,
to which the Bank again replied on September 23,
1959. Tht'rein they stated that the heading
of the arcount was "Mr. Shanti· Prasad Jain, Aocount No. 50180'' that the account consisted in its
entirety of six items of credit totalling DM. l.689.
429,50 and that there were no further credits or
debits in the account. The reply then proceeds on
tp eta tr ; ' 'fl1e. restrictions prnailing agaiµJl~ thll
0
.
_;:....,_
\
2 S.C.R.
•
'
._,
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
317
disposal.of the amounts as imposed upon us by the
firms who deposited the money are-as is customary
in such oases-not expressed or referred to in the
heading of the account. Such restrictions are marked to the account ooqcerned by means of internal
instructions. That is what has been done in this
case too. We give below the exact copy of page
1 of our letter dated 25th September, 1958 except
for the. portion wherein we communicated to you
some particulars of a strictly confidential nature
concerning the affairs of a third party, some client
of ours. This information we cannot disclose
to any other party, as you evidently went us
to do...... we, however, state that this omitted
part page-I does not in any way relate either
to the account of the six items of deposit or to
you". The copies of the communications addressed
by the German firms to the Bank were enclosed.
It is not disputed for the respondents that if
t.he statements containf'd in the replies given by
the Bank are to be accepted at their face value
then the case of t]:ie appellant must be held to be
established beyond all reasonable doubt; But they
contend that there .are circumstances which give
rise to a suspicion that the above statements might
have been •inspired' by the appellant. They
argue that the letter of the Bank dated September
25, 1958, shows that what we have on record is
only the second page of the account of the appellant in the Bank and that s)lo ws that this is only
a continuation of a previou account which· has not
been produced. It is also pointed out that in the
letter which the Bank sent to the Appellate
Board on September 23, 1959, it was stated that the
annual statement of the account ending December
31, 1958, had been sent to the appellant but that
again has not been produced. All this, it is said,
throws · a cloud , of !!USpioion on the truth of the
~rran~e~eµ~ ~ set up
tJi11 &J>Jlellani,
b,
1961
Shanti ProimJ Jain
••
Tn1 Direct..- ef
Hinfore1111MI
A(Ja1 J.
318
1961
Sh 111 ti PrasOll J oiis
••
Thi Dit,tclcr of
Enfatc1fft#tl r
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963]
We are not impressed by this contention.
There is no basis the evidence for the supposition that the account as produc<Jd is not the whole
of tho dealing of the appellant with the Bank.
The Ba.nk has ca.tegorica.lly stated that the six
items of credit wore a.II tho tra.nsaotions standing
in tho na.mo of the appellant and' there is
no reason to discredit it.
Nor is
there
any force in the contention that the annual statement endllig December 31, 1958, had not been produeed by the appellant, because the total amount
standing to tho oredit of tho
appellant on
that date as stated in thE} letter of tho Bank, is
precisely what is shown in the a.ccour.t. a.t page·2.
It is, therefore, clear that there . W!'re no d!'alings
betwt·en the Bank and the appellant, other than
those we are concerned with. Nor is there any
[.O '· ; ' the oomplaint that it is only the second
pa.go of tho account tha.t ha.s been produced and
the first pago suppressed. The Bank has made it
clear th'l.t tho first page only contains some confidential communica.tionR relating to a. customer, a.nd
that there a.re no entries rolati:ig to tho deposits of
the a.ppella.nt in that page.
It is argued for the respondents tha.t it is
unusual for a Bank to. take deposits on the terms
stated by the appellant, and that furnish9s cogent
re:i.son for rejecting the settlements pleaded by him
e.s an afterthought. It should be mentioned tha.t
while the matter wa.s pending before the Appellate
Boa.rd, the respondents obtained the opinions of
German Banks a.nd a German Lawyer as to whether
deposit.II on the terms mentioned by the appell •nt
wero usual and what the incidence of suoh deposits we.s. Among tho opinions received was one
from Sal Oppa.nheim Kocin in whioh it is stated
"A German ba.n king pra.ctic!! in export trade with
India·-a.s described in your a.hove· lotter-ls not
jµlown to WI·" This is strongly relied on for tlle
•
•
·I
'.
-
2 S.C.R.
i
319
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
respondents, but then it is further stated in that
opinion : . "We think it possible however, that in
individual oases, agreements of this kind could be
arranged between .the two contracting partners ......
If the contracting parties reach such an agreement,
and if the. customer instructs liis bankers aooeirdingly, the bankers, will, as a matter of usual business oonduot inform the tliird pa..rty beneficiary
accordingly of the instructions md all relevant.
modalities which they have received .........If it
ha~ been· ·ascertained th-it the Indian beneficiary
ha.s ncit fulfilled or cannot fulfil the stipulations
agreed upon, he forfeits hia claims to conditional
payment a.nd. the bank can then, on principle, refund the customer of the secured amount. As in
the aforementioned case, proceedings here depend
on the terms stipulated in individual oases, between
the customer and his bankers."
..
We have then the opinion of the Dresdner
Bank on the_ practice of the German Banks. Therein after ·observing that they would as a matter of
principle a.void handling transactions of the sort
referred to lest they should get involved in dispute
)letween the depositor a.nd the payee, the Bank
proceeds on to state that "we will handle such
business only if the depositor a.nd the payee a.re
known to us aB well reputed businessmen'' and thatwhen a Blocked Aooount is opened a.t the depositor's request in the . name of the payee, the
responsibility of the Bank with refernnce to the
amount "vis-a-vis the depositor tn release the
deposited money to the payee is only upon receipt
of a special authorization to this effect f'rom the
da.positor" a.nd that "on the other hand Bank, ma.y.
refund this a.mount to the depositor only after
expiration of ·the term stipulated by the depositor
or, with the payee's cons!'nt, before expiration of
the stipulated .term.'' · This is relied on beha.ir
of the ·a.pJ>6ll&nt.
195B
Sh1nli Pro1ad. JaJr
••
T/uD;,.gton
Enforumeii•
.Aiyar.J.
.;:..
320
Jllfl
8/rall ,.,.,,d J1/n
•• of
n. Dil-'«
&f-•I
Ai,., J.
SUPREME OOURT REPORTS (1963]
Another Bank, Messrs. Schacht & Company
stated in their opinion that a Germ&n Bank when
handling deposits would follow exclusively the
instructions given by the deposjtor &nd that when
payments have to be made out of the deposits on
thti fulfilment of certain conditions the Bank would
"effect the payment only after fulfilment of these
conditions given by the depositor" and that conditional deposits would "as a rule be limited in
time so that after expiration of this limit amounts
which have not been p&id out for reasons of nonutilization or non-fulfilment of the conditions will
be at the depositor's free disposal."
One Mr. J. Bergermann a lawyer of Bonn
states in his opinion that "it is common practice to
accept deposits under conditions" and that in oaee
of such deposits the payee "could not enforce payment!\, if the conditions are not fulfilled."
There was some argument before us ae to who
will be entitled to the amounts in deposit in case
the conditions agreed to between the parties a.re
not fulfilled. One view is that the amounts would
then revert back to the depositors. The German
lawyer could not say on this question more than
this that "if the conditions are not fulfilled the legal
The correct position
situation is doubtfull."
possibly is that if the conditions become impossible
of performance, the contract becomes void on the
ground of frustration, and the parties are thrown
back on their rights prior to the settlement. It is
however unnecP11eary to enter into a. discussion of
this question, as all that we now concerned with is
to see whether deposits of the kind set up by the
appellant are so unusual, as to cast a suspicion on
their truth. The evidence on record shows that
such deposits are well known, though not very
common in German banking practice, and there afil
therefore DO sufilcient @,JC•UDO~ for diEnt ditir,F tho
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
321
statements of the Bank, as to the terms on which
the deposits were made.
But the respondents argue that stripped of
all its embellishments, the substance of the agreements between the appellant and the German
firms, was ·that the latter were to pay compensation to the Indirm Companies; not in cash, · but in
kind, by delivery of goods manufactured by them
against new orders, that that . object could have
been easily achieved by the Indian Companies and
German firms entering into a simple contract to
that effect, without complicating the matter by
associating the Deutsche Bank in tho transaction,
and that there is therefore ground for suspecting
that the present version of the terms of the arrangement is an after thought so conceived as to fit in
with deposits which must have been made previously
in the normal course.
A
We are unable to accept this ii.rgumPnt. The
DeutsC>he Bank occupies, it should be marked, a
position analogous to the State ·Bank in this country, and it is a Bank of great international repute,
and Rtatus. Its statements as regards the conditions
which the deposit• were mad(l &re not to b., lightly
brushed aside, and no grounds have been shown as
to why they should not be accepted. · On the other
hand, there is on record unimpeachable evidence
which fully supports them. · On M&rch 15, · 1958,
when M/s. Voith & Company temitted to the Bank
the sum equivalent to £ 17,900/- to the credit of
the appellant, they gave the following instructions
to the Bank:
"The said amount should be hold in the
name of Mr. S. P. Jain, Chairman of Messrs.
Rohtas Industries Ltd., who will arrive in Germany in the course of the next month. As soon·
as we have arrived on a final understanding
wjtb ~fr. S.
Jain would be authorised to
:r.
lllfJ
Bhanli Pr-4 J oitc
Y,
Thi Dinetor q/
Ellforumml
A./JO' J,
322
-p,_,_
BIMli
J #n
••
n.D....,t!
B"IJ .. _,
Al,,or J.
SUPREME OOURT REPORTS [1963]
utilise the above &mouat for pa.yment only of
the purcha.se of further machinery by Messrs.
Rohta.B Industries Limited from us. Please
be a.dvised tha.t the a.mount may not be used
otherwise by Mr. S. P. Ja.in or Messrs. Rohtas
Industries Limited."
Thus the deposit Wiii! conditions.I, and it was
to be reps.id to the. depositors in payment of the
prioo of goods, to be thereafter ordered by, and
supplied to the Rohtas.
The; importance of this
lies in this that it is tho first of tho Hix credits in
a.ocount No. 50180, which is now under scrutiny,
and it was long prior to the settlement reached
between the parties, which wa.s on August I, 1958.
This completely shatters the theory that the statement of the Bank might ha.ve been 'inspired'
a.s suggested for the respondents. The fact would
a.ppear to be that when Mr. Zimmermann ca.me over
to India. in February 1957 for settling the
claim of the Rohtlll! for compensation, he must
ha.ve been a.pprised of the intention of the appellant
to expand the industries, a.nd a.s practica.l businessmen, he, a.nd the appella.nt must have evolve the
scheme of conditional deposits, to be applied in
payment of future goods to be ordered by the
Indian Companies. Such a scheme would be of
a.dvanta.ge to M/s. Voith & Company because that
would insure them new business, a.nd they could
make up for it in fixUig the price. The Indian
Companies would uncler this a.rra.ngemeat be in a
position to overcome the difficulties of getting
foreign exchange, and it would be ea.sy to get
import lioonoe from the Government of India. And BS
for depositing the a.mounts in tbe Bank, that would
not merely lend a88Urance to the Indian Uompa.nies,
but also enable the parti«s to comply with the
German rel{Ula.t ions, as to payment of :!O
por cent of the prioe of ma.nufoct ured goods, before
they ue 11xported. This preoillely ill the eort of
'
2 S.C.R;
SUPREME COUR'l' REPORTS
32~
arrangement which businessmen might be expected
to conclude in the situation in which _the parties
were placed.
)
'
,.
I9~Z
It should be noted that when the proposal of
Mfs. Voith & Company and the deposits made by
them were communicated to the appellant, he, raised
no objection in his reply dated May 14, 1958, to the
conditions under which the deposit was made. He
declined to accept it only because no compensation
was awarded for deficiency in output, and it is
this claim which was also settled on August 1,
1958, when a second deposit was made by JI.Ifs.
Voith & Company. The schem!l evolved by
the appellant and JI.Ifs. Voith & Company set
the· pattern for settlement with the other three firms, and that is how all the four - contracts
came to be -settled on the. same terms. - On the _
evidence above referred to, we are satisfied that the deposits in account No. 50180 were made by the
German firms on the conditions stated by the appel·
lant. We have reached tbia·cnnclusion on a-con·
sideration of the evidence - on record, without
reference to any abstract doctrine as to burden_ of
proof. Ilut it is only right to observe, that the
proceedings under the Act are quasi-criminal in
character and it is the duty of the respondents -as
prosecutor to make out beyond all reasonable
doubt that there bas been_ a vio!ation of, the law.
Vide the decision in re. H. P. C. Productions Ltd. (')
cited for the appellant. The learned Attorney
General did not contest this position. ·
- (2) That brings us on to the next question
which is whether on our finding as to the nature of
the deposits the appellant has contravened .S. 4(1)
of the Act. The appellate Board has held that he
has, for the reason that under the law the true
relationship between a Banker and a customer is
that of a debtor and creditor and that it m'kes no
difference in that relationship that the deposits were
-conditional. The respondents maintain that this
(I) [1962] 2 W. L. R. 51.
•
Shanti PraJad J oln
T..
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rn~ Directn
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En/ofe.emt."':I.
'~i.!.ar:·J.
324
SUPREME OOURT REPORTS (1003]
Jllfl
Is the correct view to take of the relationship betSl1all Pru1' Jlfi,. ween the appellant and the Deutsche Bank with
reference to account No. 50180 and that he must
••
TluD-•f
be held to have lent out the monies deposited in
that account to the Bank. The contention of the
appellant ou the other hand is threefold. Firstly,
it is said, that on the terms of the deposits, he has
no present right to the amounts standing to his
credit in the account, that he would become entitled to them only on the happening of certain
contingencies, and that until then there was no debt
due to him and that therefore there could be no
lending in respect of that debt. Secondly, it is
contended, that when the German firms transferred
the amounts mentioned in account No. 50180 to the
Deutsche Bank that was not by way of deposit
with it as a. bank but by way of entruatment for
safe custody to be pa.id over to the person who
might become entitled to them in terms of the
agreement and that the monies deposited under
those agreements were not moni~ lent to the Bank.
And thirdly, it. is argued, that on the terms on
which the deposits were made in the Bank, the
position of the Banker was not that of a debtor but
that of a trustee,· the appellant being the beneficiary
entitled to the amounts on fulfilment of the conditions of which the Bank had been apprised. We
must now examine these oontentiona.
E.,.,_
Now the law is well settled that when moneys
are deposited in a Bank, the relationship that is
constituted between the banker e.nd the customer
is one of debtor and creditor e.nd not trustee and
beneficiary. The be.nker is entitled to use the
monies without being called upon to account for
such user, his only liability being to return "the
amount in accordance wi~ the terms agreed between him and the cuatomer. And it me.kes no
difference in the jural rele.tionship whether the
depoett.· were made b1 the 01111k>mer himself, or
>
>
'
2 S.C.R.
.
SUPREME ooun:r REPOR'rS
by ,some other persons, provided the customer
accepted them. There might be special arrangement under which a Banker might be constituted
a trustee·, but apart from such an arrangeme.nt, his
position qua Banker is.~hat of a debtor, and not
trustee. The law was stated in those terms in the
old and well-known decision of the House of Lords
in Foley v. Hill'('), and that has never been
questioned.
IHI
8~111111 Prosad J Iii•
If the point under oonsideration. fell
to be decided
solely on the basis of
account · No. 50180 in the Deutsche Bank,
there could be no answer to the oontentiion of the
respondents that the appellant was a creditor in
respect of the amounts deposited in that account
he must be h'eld to have advanced them as loan to
the Bank. It needs hardly to be stated that it
makes no difference in the legal position that the
amounts shown in the account were not deposited
by the appellant but by the -German firms as he
had accepted t.hem. Bqt it is contended for the
appellant that the acceptance of the deposits by him
was under special agreements entered into with the
German firms, which gave him no present right to
the amounts, that though the account stands in his
name he has no right to operate on it, that before
he can do so he .must obtain licence from the
Government of India to import the goods, then
place an order with the respective German firms for
supply of new machineries and parts and then only
draw on the account and that even then it can only .
be for the payment of the price payable to those
firms for the supply of new goods. The right of the .
appellant to the amounts in deposit is, it is argued,
contingent on the happening of these events and
that until then there was no debt due to him and
s. 4(1) had no application.
(IJ [1848] ll H.L.C. 28-9 B.R. IOO'l.
y,
TMD;..-o/
Enfm;....,.1
326
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SNnll Pr.,od J .V.
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Tiu Dimt"' •/
El!/.,.,_I
SUPREME OOURT REl>ORTS (1963]
.
T.n our opinion this oontention is well founded.
A contingent debt is strictly speaking not a debt at
all. In its ordinary as well WI its legal sense, a
debt is a sum of money payable under an existing
obligation. It may be payable · forthwith, solvendum in presenti, then it is a debt "due"; or it may be
payable at a future date, solvendum futuro; then it is
a debt "aocuring". But in either.case it is a debt.
But a contingent debt has no present existence, be·
cause it is payable only when the contingency
happens, and exhypotheei that may or may not
happen.'
The question whether a contingent debt is a
debt as understood in. law hWI often com~ up for
consideration before English Court in connection
with garnishee proceedings taker, by judgment
ore.ditors to att.ach it as a debt. The decision has
invariably been that they are not debte "accruing"
and could not be attached. In Webh v. 81R.nt<m ('),
the point for decision was wh.,ther an amount pay·
able by a trustee to the beneficiary in fmuro could
attached by a judgment. creditor as a debt "owing
or accruing" and it was answered in the negative.
Discussing the distinction between an existing debt
and a contingent debt, Lord Lindley observed: "I
should say, apart from any authority, .that a.debt
legal or equitable can be attached whether it be a
deb~ owing or accruing; but it must be debt, and a
debt is a sum of money which is now payable or
will become payable in the future• by reason of a
present obligation, debitum in preaenti, aolvendum in
futuro. An accruing debt, therefore, is a debt not
yet actually payable .but a debt which is represent.ed by an existing obligation.... The result seems
to me to be this: you may attach all debt11, ·whether
equitable or legal; but only debts can be att&ohed;
and moneys which may or may not'beOome payable
(I) (11185) 11 Q.B.D. 518.
'
2 s.c.R.
)
SUPRBME OOURT REPORTS
from a. trustee to his cestui que tmst are
debts.''
327
not
"The meaning of 'a.coming debt'· observed
Lord Black burn in Tapp v. Jones('), "is debitum in
preaenti BOlvandum in futuro, but it goes no further,
and it does not comprise 'anything which ma.y be a
debt; however, probable or however soon it mav be
a debt."
The law is thus well settled that a contingent
debt is no debt until the contingency happens, and
a.a the right of the appellant to the a.mounts in
deposit in his name in the Deutsche Bank .arises
only on the happening of the contingencies already
mentioned, it follows that there is no debt due to
him in presenti and there could be no loan thereof
within s. 4(1) of the Act.
We should add that our conclusion that there
is no present debt owing' to the appellant is based on
the fact that the contingency on which his title to
the a.mounts in deposit will arise, such as the grant
of import licence by the Government is one· the fulfilment of which is wholly beyond his control.
Different consideration might arise when the contin_gency is one which . can be fulfilled by the very
person, who is to take under it.
It is further contended on behalf of the appellant that the payments ma.de by the .German
firm in account No. 50180 cannot be regarded as
deposits made by or on behalf of a. ciuiltomer in the
normal course of banking business and that in consequence the principle of law that when a banker
receives monies from e. customer he becomes his
debtor in respect of those moneys bas no application. There is considerable for-0e in this argument. It is well know that Bank engage, in addition to their normal work as Bankers, in . several
(I) (l87S}L.R.10Q,B.-
1#11
Sh..11 Prosof,J«ia
••
. T1" Di.~ I/
Er!,f°"""'1fl
Ai,JarJ.
328
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SUPREME OOUl<T REPORTS [1963)
activities, which are not 888ociated with, and do
not involve any elements of banking. In Halsbury's Lawa of England, Third Edition, Vol. 2,
Note (g) it is stated "Numerous other functions are
undertaken at the present day by banks, such as
the payment of domiciled bills, custody of Valuables, discounting bills, executor and trustee business or scting in relation to stock exchan~ tr11.asactions, and banks have functions under certain
financial legislation, e. g. by delegation under the
Exchange Control Act, 1947, or as authorised dealers under that Act and subordinate legislation.
Theee function, are not strictly banking busine88."
In Paget's Law of Banking, Sixth Edition,
p. •3, it ia stated that ••superimposed on this general relationship of banker to customer there may
be special relationships a.rising from particular
circumatanoes and requirements" and that the expr- terms of those relationships overrides the implied terms arising from the general relationship.
It was argued for the respondents, that this statement of the law could have, as suggested by the
word 'superimposed', reference only to special
contracts entered into with customers, and that
involves the admission that the appellant is a customer. , Normally no doubt Banke would undertake these works for their customers, but there is
nothing to prevent them from doing so for others
as well. In Corpus Juris Secundum, Vol. 9, it•is
stated ''The intention of the parties controls the
charaoter of the relation between Bank and
depositor, which may be that of bailee and bailor.
but is ordinarily that of debtor and creditor"
(Page 546). And it is pointed out when money is
delivered to a Bank "for application to a. particular
specific purpose" it ia not a general deposit creating
the relationship of debtor and creditor, but a
"apecifio deposit" creating the relationship of bailee
and bt.ilor or trustee and beneficiary. Vide p. f>70.
•'
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2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
329
1llfl
Therefore the fact that money has been put in
a Bank does not necessarily import that it is a
deposit in the ordinary course of banking. We 8 h•rITT "'"'"" """'
n. Di,...,./
have to examine the substance of it to see whether
EnJ..it is in fact so or not. It is uoneceBBary for the
Ai1or .!.
purpose of this case to elaborately examine what
banking busineBS, properly so called, consists in. It
is summed up a11 follows in Halsbury's Laws of
England. Third-Edition Vol. 2 p. 150 Para 277:
"the receipt of money on current or deposit account
and the payment of cheques drawn by and the
collection of cheques paid in by a customer."
Applying these teats, can it be said that account
No. 50180 is truly a banking account? Did the
appellant open the account in the Bank with & view
to deposit his moneys from time to time, and to
operate on it by drawing cheques? The question
admits of only one answer, and that is in the negative. The account was opened ~ the Bank with a
view. to effectuate the arrangement between the
German firms, and the appellant, which was that
the amounts were to be repaid to the depositors a
price of new machineries to be supplied by them
and the appellant was not to operate on it except
for that purpose. The Bank was informed of this
arrangement and took the deposits with. notice of
the rights of the parties thereunder. Under the ·
circumstances the Bank has really only custody of
the money as if it were a stakeholder, with a
liability to hand it over to the persons who would
become entitled to it nnder the arrangement. On
these facts it cannot be said that there is a deposit
in a commercial sense of the .word. It would be
more correct to say that the Bank holds the money
under a special arrangement which constitutes it
not a debtor, but a sort of a stakeholder.
••
.
It was also argued on behalf of the appellant
that when DeiAtallhe llan\I; f60(liv11d tb,e &i1nounts
330
1911
SAati Pr•1U ·.u.
••
n, DirtUtJr of
£1f/"'ee/fVfet
AiJo<IT J •
SUPREME OOURT REPORTS [1963)
from the German firm• on the terms mentioned by
them, the relationship th'\t was constituted between
it a.nd tho appellant was one of trustee a.nd beneficiary a.nd not that of debtor and creditor a.nd that
therefore s. 4{ 1) was out of the wa.y. We a.re unable
to agree with this contention. Under the terms. of
the arrangement between the German firms a.nd the
appellant the deposits were to stand in the name of
the appolla.nt a.nd so they never vested in the Bank.
It is true that the Bank would have the right to use
the funds but that ie not because they belong to it
but because it must be taken to be the understand.
ing of the parties, when they entrusted the moneys
to it pending there repayment to the German firms
in terms of the agreement, that the Bank was to
have the right to use them uqtil a. demand is made
for their return. Relience w;as placed for the
appellant on the decision of the Privy Council in
Official .A.ui8gree v. Bhat('), where it was held that
a trust fund which was authorised to be invested in
business could be traced, on the principle laid down
in re. Hallett's EstalR. ('), into the a.ssets of the
business. But in that case it was admitted that the
deposit was a Trust and the point for decision was
only whether the undoubted rights of the beneficiary
to follow that a.mount was lost by the authority
given to the trustee to use it in his bueinesH. But
here the question is whether the Be.nk is a. trustee
a.nd the fact that. they a.re entitled to use the funds
does not clothe them with the cha.ra.ctor of a.
trustee. If that were not so every banker must
be a. trustee which clearly is not the la.w. Then
again who a.re the beneficiaries under the truHt, the
German firms or the appellant ? The fa.ct is that
the arrangement under which the monies were
deposited in the Bank is sui generis and its position
in truth is that of a bailee, not a debtor or trustee.
It is unnecessary to pursue the discussion further
ll) (193S)l. R.601.A.703.
(2) (1890) IS Ch. D. (196.
...
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2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
331
in view of our decision that the relationship between
the Bank and the appellant is not that of debtor
and creditor.
It remains to deal with the contention urged
on behalf of the appellant that even if it be held
that the appellant had made the deposits in question
in the Deutsche Bank as a customer, there had
been no oontravention of s. 4 (1) of the Act as the
prohibition enacted therein is only against lending
of foreign exchange by a person who is resident in
India and that at the time of the deposits in
question the appellant was not in India but in
Germany. There is no ~ubstance in this contention.
The intention of the Legislature was plainly t 0
prohibit all transactions in foreign exchange by
persons who are residents of India whether such
transactions take place during their actual residence
in India or during their sojourn in foreign parts.
To hold that tho prohibition under the Act does not
extent to acts done outside India by residents of
India must inevitably lead to large-scale evasion of
the Act resulting in its object being defeated.
A construction which leads to such a result must be
avoided. The expression "resident in India" is
clearly used in the sense "resident of India''.
(
<
.>t
It may be mentioned that the words used in
s. 1(1) of the corresponding British Statute Exchange
Control Act, 1947 are "no person resident in the
United Kingdom, other than an authorised dealer,
shall, outside the United Kingdom, buy or borrow
any gold or foreign currency from, or sell or lend
a.ny gold or foreign currency to, any person other
than an authorised dealer". It will be seen that the
language in the Indian Statute is in identical terms.
In re. H. P. O. Productdon Ltd. (') cited on behalf of
the appellant the question was whether certain
transactions entered into by a resident of England
(l) ll96212 W.L.R. SI.
11181
Shanti Pt,asad Jain
••
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Thi Dim:w llf
E•fornioftll
lf(JSIJ.
332
SUPREME OOURT REPoRTS [I963J
IHI
but outside England were hit by s. I and the basil
of
the decision is th!it they would be if the other
Sha>tl l'r-41.m
oonditions
were sa.tiafied. We have no hesitation
••
in
holding
that if the appellant did in fact land
n.&,Jm.....,
•''""" of
monies to the Deutsche Bank while he waa
in Germany he would, have contravened s. 4 (I)
"'il"r J,
of the Aot.
In view of our conclusion t.hat the appellant
h118 only a contingent right to the amounts atanding
in credit in account No. 50180 and that the depotJits
were made in the Bank not in the courae of normal
banking busineas but under a special arrangement,
it must be held that there we.s no lending of thoee
amounts by the appellant to the Bank within
s. 4( 1) of the Act and the order of the Appellate
Board impotJing a fine of Rs. 5 l&kbs on him under
s. 23(l)(a) must be held to be illegal and set aside.
In the resnlt Appeal No. 319of1961 is &llowed
and Appeal No. 320 of 1961 dismiNed lf'ith coets,
one hearing fee.
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