DAVA SON OF BHIMJI GOHIL versus JOINT CHIEF CONTROLLER OF IMPORTS & EXPORTS
Supreme Court of India | Decided 16 April 1962 | [1963] 2 S.C.R. 73 | 1962 INSC 145
Key facts
- Decided
- 16 April 1962
- Bench
- T.L. VENKATARAMA AIYYAR*, BHUVNESHWAR PRASAD SINHA, K. SUBBA RAO, N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR, J.R. MUDHOLKAR
- Bench size
- 5
- Case number
- CIVIL APPEAL No. 226/1961
- Disposal
- Dismissed
- Citation
- [1963] 2 S.C.R. 73
- Neutral citation
- 1962 INSC 145
Text of the judgment
·'
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
DAVA
SON OF BHIMJI
73
GOHIL
v.
JOINT CHIEF CONTROLLER OF IMPORTS &
EXPORTS
(B .. P. SINHA, C. J.,. K. SuBBA ltAo, N. RAJAGOPAI,.A
AYYANGAR, J. R. MuDHOLKAR and T. L ..
VENKATARAMA AIYAR, JJ.)
, Export Control-Manganese Ore-Notifications canalising expo-rt and preventing new entrants from exporting-Oonsti~
tutionality of-State Trading Corporation-Monopoly of export
creat~d in favour of-!! infringes fundame.ntal right to carry on
trade-Notification dated May 26, 1958-Exports Control
Order, 1958-lmport~ and Exp6rts (Control) Aot, 194.7 (18 of
1947), s. 3-Constitution of India, Art.s.19 (1) (g) and 19 (6).
There was little internal demand for manganese ore and
it was extracted mainly for exporting out of India, TJlough
previously there was no restriction on the grant of export licen- '
ces from 1956, the Central Government started controlling and
restricting the export of manganese ore. On May 26, 1958,
the Central Government issued a notification which contained
the policy statemen.t for the period July 1958 to June 1959 under which export quotas were to be granted only to established
shippers and mineowners who had exported from 1953 onwards
and to the State Trading Corporation. Mine (\wner's, like the
appellant who did not have an} export performance in the
earlier years were excluded from the scheme. They could sell
their ore only to the established shippers are to the Corpora·
tion which they could do only at. unremunerative prices. By
sub~equent policy statements the export was canalised entirely
through the Corporation. Section 3 of the Imports and exports (Control) Act, 1947 empowered the Central Government
to make orders restricting or controlling the imports and exports of goods. The Central Government made the Exports
Control Order, 1958, cl. 6(h) of which empowered the Central
Government and the licensing authority to refuse to grant a
licence "if the licensing authority decides to canalisc exports
through special or specilized agencies or channels". The Noti·
fication of May 26, 1950, was issued under cl. 6(h). The
appellants contended: (I) that the withholding of the right to
engage in the export trade from a class of mineowners consti·tuted an unreasonable restriction on their fundamental right
guaranteed under Art, 19(1)(g), (II} that cl. 6 (h) ofthe order
was ultra virt! the Central Government as s. 3 of the Act
-
74
196Z
D(j,'!Ja ''" oj Bhimji
Uohil
-~- -:"k..
•··•........ '
''
.
~
/
SUPR~~IE COURT REPORTS [1963] ·
. permitted it to pfac~ restrictions only on good:! and not on the
persons who might participate in the export, and (iii) that the
notification by which canalisation of exports was affected wa..
v.
outside the contempiation of". agency and channel under
JaitJt Chi~! Con 'roller cl. 6 (h).
.
·
•f Imp•rls .II Exports .
.•
.
•
·
Held (per Smha, C.J., Ayyangar, Mudholkar and A1yar,
· 'JJ.) that the restrictions and control imposed on the export of
· manganese ore by the Central Government were legal and did
not offend~t._l9(1) (g).
The restriction or control in the form of channelling or
.
canalising the trade was not outside the limitations which
"'m:ght be imposed on export trading by s. 3 of the Act and
consequently cl. 6 (h) of the Order permitting canalisation of
exports was within the rule making pow:~r of the Ce~tral
Government. The power to impose restrictions was not
confined togoods but extended to persons also. The .canalis· .
ing of the exports through the established shippers and mine- .
owners was unobjectionable; canalising through the State
Trading Corporation and the progressive increase through
the corporation was a reasonable restriction in the interests of·
· · the general public. The object ·o r these restrictions and
control was to enable ·a regular supply of uniform quality of
the ore to the forei:;n buyers so as to ensure the optimum
earning of foreign exchange by the count! y~ and this could
best be attained with the Corporation as the main agency
engaged in the trade: The State Trading Corporation was
a "special" agency or channel as contemplated by d. (h) and
the canalising could be done through it. A ~pedal agency
is one which is more likely to achieve ·the object .than other
agencies or to achieve it in a larger measure than others.
Canalising n~cessarily implied the exciusion of some groups,
and if the canalising was valid the appellant could not
complain that he had been excluded fro:r;n the export trade.
'>-,.
"'-
,t
Per Subba Rao, J.-The Notifi~tfons and policy state•
ments which destroyed the trade of ·mine owners like the
appellant did not impose reasonable restrictions on their .
fundamental rights and · violated .Art. 19 (1) (g) . . The
creation of ,a monopoly or near monopoly ~or the export. of
man.,.anese ore in . favour of the State Tradmg Corporauon
could only be achieved by a law made in conformity with·
Art. 19 (6} (ii) and not by administrative action like issuing: --- ·
. of notifications and policy statement. The power conferred
- . on the authorities under d. 6 (h) of the Order to canalise
. exports through special or specialised. agencies or channels ·
. was well within the power conferred on -the Central Govern·
ment by s. 3 of the Act. Further, the State Trading Corpo. ···
ration wa!!l a "special" a~rency within the m;nin~r of cl. 6(h).
2 S.C.R.
~UPREME COURT
REPORTS
7.)
But the canalising had to be done in such manner that all
persons engaged in the trade could participate in th~ export
of the ore and no one was completely excluded.
DGtJa srm of Bhimjt
Civil Appeal
Join! CMefController
CIVIL APPELLATlll JURISDICTION:
No. 226 of 1961.
Appeal from the judgment and o~·der dated
October 22,. I9.j9, of the Bombay Htgh Court
(Nagpur Bench) at Nagpur in Special Civil
Application No. 63 of 1959.
A. S. Bobde, G. L. Sanghi and Ganpat Rai1 for
the appellant.
'
G. K.. Daphtary, Bolicitor-Genual of India,
Bishan Narain and P. D. Menon, for the respondents.
1962. April 16.
was delivered by
\
The Judgment of the Court
AYYANGAR, J.-Thi~ appeal comes before us
by virtue of a certificate of fitness granted by the
Nagpur Bench of the High Court of Bombay under
Arts. 132(1) and l33(l)(c) of the Constitution. It'
arises out of a petition filled by the appellant
under Art. 226 of the Constitution bef?re the High
Court of Bombay at N 1gpur impugning t.he constiw
tutional validity of certain notifications and direct·
ion~ issued under tbe I :nports and Ex: ports {Control}
Act, 1947, and the Export Control· Ord~-r. 1958,
fl'amod thereuuJor and substantially prM·ed tba.t
tT1e Joint Chief Controller of Imilorts & Exports,
Bombay impleadeu as the first respondent should
be directed to con ~ider the application of the app·
clln.nt for the grant of a licence to enable him to
export certain manganese ore which he had won
from his mines, without reference to the impugned
notifications. This petition was dismissed by the
learned Judges of the High Court who, howevN·,
-"( granted the appellar1t is certificate which has enabled him to file this appeal.
19GB
. Gohil
•f Imports ~ Exports
76
DoJv, 1rm of Bltimjc
Goh.ti
v.
Joint CAi~,t Crmlroller
•! 1~11"' Ex;oru
~~arJ.
SUPREME OOURT REPORTS [1963]
A few facts ar~ necessary to be stated to "'PPreciate the exact grievance of the petitioner and
the grounds upon which the notifications etc. issued
h.v government are stated to contravene the Constibtion and in particular to infringe the freedom
granted to the appellant under Part III of the
Constitution. The appellant is a lessee of certain
manganese mines in two aroas of Madhya. Pradesh.
The lea,es are stated to have been ~ant€d to him
in t.he _years l953 for a period of 20 years each,
with an option for renewal if the appellant so desired, under the Mineral ConcoSAion Rules 1949, for
a like period. It is an admitted fAct that the in·
ternal demand for manganese ore ~ India is very
inconsiderable, eo that the ore i~ extracted mostly
for the purpose of being ~xported out~ of India.
Having regard to the date when thu appellant obtained the mining leases, he couli ,ot have won
any appreciable quantity of the metal rluring 1953,
nor, of course, could he have exported any quantity of the ore won by him in or prior to the year
J 963.
It is now n~oes~ary to set out the history of
the restrictions on the export of manga"tese ore
from 1953 up to tho date relevant to the petition to
understand the points sought to be made on behalf
of the appellant. Prior to 1953, i. e., at a time
before tbt- appellant entered the managanese ore
business, export of manganese ore was freely
licensed, i. e., tho commodity was subject to no
restriction a.s ragards export, nor wa111 any control
exercised by government on the allotment of
wagons for the movement of mangane:~e ore. As
the export of the ore began to expand from that
date, the Railways found themselves unable to meet
the increased demand for wagons and were foroed
to regulate the appellant of euch wagons. The
government also took a hand in regulating the
I
'.
\,
! S.C.R.
-
•
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
77
movement of wagons by evolving a. system of regia..
tration of shippers for whom prioritiy in the allotment of wa.O'ons
was ensured. It has to be a..Jded
0
that this regula.tion and conbrol over wagon allotment a.nl wagon movement wa.s co-ordinated with
and corre]ated to certain changes which were elfeotrd fo~ reg11lating the export of the commodity
itself.
.)
t
'Seotion 3 of the Imports and .Exports (Contl'oll
Aot, 1947 (to be referred hereafter as the Aot)
enacts :
ua. Powers to prohibit or restrict imports and e:x:ports--(1) The c~ntrA.l GnvP-rnment say, by under publisherl in tlH'· Official
Gazette, make provisions for nrohi,.,iting-,
restricting or otherwise ControlJin.g, in all
cases or in specified classeR of cases, and subject to such exceptions if any, as may be
· made by or under the order :. {1\) the Import, export, carria~e <loastwise or
shipment as ships stores of goods of amy
specified description.
(b) the bringing into any port or place in
India of goorls or any specified description intended to be taken out of India.
without being reserved from the ship or
conveyance in which they are being carried.
(2) All goods is which any order under SIIbsect.ion (1) applies shall bA deemed to be
goods of which the import or expnrt has
been prohibited or restricted under seotion 19 of the Sea. Customs Act, 1878
(VIII of 1878) and all the provisions of
that Act shall have ~ffect accordingly.
except that section 183 thereof shaH
have effect as if for the word 'shalr
- 'ihere in the word 'ma.y' were substituted.
196~
Dat1a son nf Bhimji
Gohil ·
v
J ~nt C.'ti4 ConlroUn
11j Imports th ExptJrt.s
.i.yyongtz,. J.
78
J98t
D11~d sotr u/
n;u·,.Ji
Oohil
••
J~ira' CM,Jr:orrcr~l/u
oj lmptWrs d: Exporls
A.1) Ull~~, J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963)
(3) Notwithstanding anything contained in
the aforesaid Act, the Cent-ral Govern.
ment may, by order published in tbe
Official Gazette, prohibit, restrict or im·
pose ~onditions on the clearance, whet.her
for hnme consumption or for shipment
abroad of a.ny goods or class of goods
imported into India."
·
Under the powers conferred by this section the Cen·
tral Government iseue the Exports Control Ordtr,
1958 (or shortly the Contro) Order), cl. 3 of· which
provided that "no person shall export any goods
of the des('ription specified in Sch. I except under
and in accordance with a licence granted by the
Central GoverPment or by any officer specitied in
Sch. II." Manganese and iron ore _were specifitd
in the fin t schedule. Claase 6 of this or dcr seta
mJt the grounds upon which the Central Government or the Chief Controller of Exports and. lm·
porta may refuse to grant a licenoe or direct a licensing authority not to grant a lioence. In view of
certain points urged before us it would be oonveni·
ent to set out this clause in full :
''6. Refusal of licence,-The Central
Government or the Chief Controller of [mports and Exports ma.y rf'fuse to ~rant a
license or direct any other licensing authority
not to gr&.nt a licence :(a) if the appHcation for the licence does not
confers to any provision of this Order;
(b) if such application contains any false, or
fraudulent or misleading statt·ment;
(c) if the applicant uses in sup~ort. of the
application any document wh1ch IS fal~e
or fabricated or which has been tempered
with;
(d) if the applicant on any occasion has . _
tt>mpered with an export li~nce or has
~·
2 S.O.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
79
exported goods without a licence where
it is necessary, or has been a party to
any corrupt or fraudulent practice in his
commercial deallngs;
(e) ifthe applioatictn for an export licence
is defective and does not conform to the
prescribed rules;,
t
(f) if the applicant commits a breach of the
Export Trade Control Regulations;
{g) if the appellant is not eligible for a licence in accordance with the Export Trade
Control Regulations;
-
(h) if the licensing authority decides to ca.nali~e exports through special or specialized
agencies or channels;
(i) if the applicant is a partner in a partnership firm, or a director of a private limited co~pany, which is for the time being subject to any action under c1ause
8;
-
{j) if the applicant is a partnership firm or a
private limited company, any partner or
director whereof, as the case may be, is
for the· time being subject to .any action
under clause 8."
The first restriction on tht'l export of maliga-
ne~e and iron
ore was imposed in June, 1956 when
the Ministry of Commerce and Industry issued -a
public notice on June 26, 1956, settin!.! out their
policy as regards export during the half year July
to December. 1956.. After reciting that the government were oonv_inoed tha.t the then existing trading
mechanism as regard~ the export of ores was inade·
quate to code with ·the developments which had
t&ken place in tbe purchasing countries, it went on
to add that persons who entered into contracts
1962
Da~q son Q/ BJ.imji
Gohil
....
.1 oint Chi'/ Controiltr
oj I m/J01'1S &: Expo' Is
ApongarJ.
80
SUPREME OOURT REPORTS £1003)
1961
with foreign buyers bad been unable to fulfil their
commit-ments whirh had caused incovenienoo to
Gohit
foreign huyors and so undermined the latter's con·
Join I C~itl Cr ntrolltr fid(>nce in thf' capscity of this country to m!Lintain
•f lmporiJ. &: Elfporl, an assured lint'~ of supply. In order, thert·fore,
to overcome the obstacle in tho wa.:l' of tmg·
menting foreign exchange earningi! from the
t>xpert of thAse ores, the Government d~!clared
that they would help in reorientating t.be trading
jn ort's on more rational lines and that fur this
purpnse they proposed to ca.nalise the export of
ores in a. progr~Psively increasing measure through
the State Trading Corpora\ion whil'h would in its
turn rely on the minin~ interests in the country
and usc the AXisting trade mechanism to the oxtent prnctica.hlP.. For these reasons, thl·y announced that a. ref?ula.tion would take place of 1he
t>xpert. of the~ ores d•ning the half yt•ar July·
December, 1956 through thre~ classes of ex:por·
D;u •on of Bhimji
••
ters:
( 1) Established .shipper.<~ who would be granted
r'l:p()rt quotas on the avf'!rage of the quantities
exported during tho years 1953,' 1954 and 1955.
(2) M·ineowrz.ers ba.sf>d on a annual average of
the quantity of ore on which. roya.lt.y was paid
during the calender years 1953, 1954 and 1955, and
(3) The State Trading Corporation which would
be given a. quota on an ad lwc bagis. It iR onl.v
necessa.ry to mention that the State Trading Corpo.
ration which iR a. Corporation owned and rontrollf'd by the Union Government came i11to existf>nce
by. registration under the Indian Companks Act
in Ma.v, 1956. Rail transport facilitie~ co.extcnsive with the quota granted. were also a~sutcd
for those to whom · quotaB were granted. There
were clarifications .and un1mbstantia l varia1 ions
of this Press Note to whiJh, however, it iE< not
.-;
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
81
1962
necessary to refer as they are not material to the
points now in controversy.
Dorus sort of Bltimji
G~llil
It will be noticed that the control thu1
v.
exercised and the restrictions th.us imposed, mine- J oi'lt Chief OoJCtrlll~r
owners who had not t-ntered the field before 1953 ofimports &l Ex;011s
were excluded from the grant of any export ·quota.
By a public notice dated September 4, 1956, th~
Ministry of Commerce, however, announced
that the case of these "newcomers" was receiving
tbeir1 attention and that an announcement-in that
rega.rd would be made in due course. ·
' The same policy 'and the same basis of allocation was continued for the next half year Janua.ry to June 1957. For the period July, 1957 to
June, 1958, (the government having now started
pursuing the policy of announcing their quotas for
a year instead of for six months), a Press Note was
issued on ·June 1, 1957. by which exporters and
.mineowners wer~ allotted a quota equivalent to
60 per cent of their exports made in 1958 or
1956 to be selected by them. The quota thus
released was made available for being allotted to
the State Trading Corporation on an ad hoc basis
and the Press Note added: ''The State Trading
Corporation will be allotted. in adequate _quota to
enable them to maximise the exports of manganese: ore. The Corporation are being advised to
seek_: the co-operation of established trading and
mining interest ·to make this effort a success,'.
Here again, certain unsubstantial modifications
were made by further Press Notes but to these
we shall not refer.
As regards the next period July 1958 to
June 1959, the policy·deoieion of the government
was.indica.ted by a Public notice issued, on May 26,
1958. In the course of this Press--statement the
Gov":ernment of India stated that they had been
keeping under constant review the working of the
82
1161
Dt1H ••~ of Bhimji
Go/Iii
v.
J(lilo' Chvf Conttolltr
tJj lm;tnts &: Exlort;
SUPH.EME OOURT REPORTS [1963J
policy announced by them under the Preas Notes
to which we have already referred, and that they
had come to the conclusion that tho long-term
interests of Indian Manganese ore would be better
served if the export policy wero to discourage
fragmentation of quotas and encourage bulk contract-ing, movement, and shipment of ores. A~
the same time, the Governmont expreased their
keenness to maintain oontinuity in the export
arrangements to the extent practicable. Having
regard to these factors, they went on to state:
''("
1
''Government have decided that for the
period July 1958 to Juno 1959, the export
of manganese ore will be regulated as follows.
(i) The es~a.blished shippers, the mineowner. exporters and the state Trading
Corporation will be given &n allotment of
quota for a quantity oqual to the quota. for
1957-52.
(ii) Firms and parties whose individual
allotments are small aro advisod to form
Co·operative or limited companios. 11
At the date when the writ petition out of whioh
this appeal arises was filed, tho polioy.etatement
of May 26, 1958, was in force and it was the
validity of the restriction and control exeroised
by it that waa challenged as unconstitutional in
the petition filed by the appellant. The position
at that date may be summarised as follows:
(1) From and after July 1956 the export of
manganese ore had been controlled or restricted.
(2) The restriction had taken the form of
A allotment ~f quotas for export granted to: (a)
established exporters, i.e., comprising the oategory
or these who had exported from 1953 onwardfl,
(b) mine-owners who had simiJar1y exported the ,..
2 s.c.:R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
83
1962
ore won by them with a similar limitation as to
the year when they should have exported, and (c)
s1n of Ef.i,, ji
The State Trading Corporation which was _granted
G•hll
v.
an export quota on an ad hoc basis to cover every
Chief Conlrelkr
other quantity which could be exported and for Jofoinl
Imports d:~Ex;ow
which a foreign market could be found. Traders
&nd mine·owners who had not any export performance to their credit in ear1ier years were excluded
from the scheme and though the government were
repeatedly stating in their public statements that
the case of these persons termed "newcomers"
would be considered, this had never been done.
The appellant fell within the last category and was
not eligible to apy export quota and therefore
could not export. The result was that the ore won
by him had either to be sold (a) in the internal
market which, as stated earlier, was a very restricted one, tbis because the steel producing concerns
which were the principal or practioalJy the only
consumers of the ore in the country had their own
mines from which the ore required by them was
won~ and (b) in the absence of an internal market
the mined ore had to be sold either to established
shippers' or to the State Trading Corporation.
In regard to established shippers, their quota
of export was being progressively reduced,
so that their demand for ore.· natura1ly
shrank and unremunerative price had therefore
to be offered by. the ''newcornersu to induce them
to lmy. The only other . possible buyer was the .
State Trading Corporation which was being granted
quotas on an ad hoc basis sufficient .to enable it
to get all the good ore which it might buy for whioh
there might be a foreign buyer. In regard to the
State Trading Corporation, there was an allegation
made by the appellant, by reference to a. circular
issued by the Corporation on April 20, 1957, that
the terms offered for the purchase of ore were
~ unfair to the sellers because of the excessively large
()OJDmission it demanded. It should; however, be
84
1962
D, v, .- cf Bhimji
Gohil
v.
J oir.t Chl,j Contr Hff
of Jm~ts d: 1:.\po•ls
SUPRElJE CUORT REPOR'l'S (1963]
stated tha.t tho State Trading Corporation was not
implca.dc<.l a8 a party in the writ pet.ition in the
High Court, nor any reliof sought on the ba.ais of
that allegation. Tho circumstance was relied on
mel'uly to emphasise the hardship caused to the
appellant from the exclusion of those who had no
expert performance in the years which were fixed
a.a the basic years for the allotment of an export
quota to mineownera. The State Trading Corpora·
tion being owned and controlled by the Central
Government is an agency or instrument of govern·
ment for effectuating its commercial policy. If in
the pt·rformance of its duties as such publio authority it acts in any improper or unfair manner it
would be subject to the control of the Courts but
as no relief basod on such a complaint was olaimed
by the appeJlant, it is not necessary to pursue the
point or examine its merits.
The case of the appellant has to be judged on
the basis of two admitted features resulting from
the policy statements of Government we h~ve set
out earlier : (1) That mineowuers who were "newcomers", i. e., not having export performance in
certain basic years, were excluded from direct
participation in the export trade, but these pe-rsons
had, in view of the practical absence of an internal
market for manganese ore to sell their gooda to
others who had been granted facility for export.
(2) That the eat<>gory of persons to whom they
could sell their ore were two (a) Established shippers, and (b) The State Trading Corporation, and
with the nature of this market as already described.
The question raised for consi(;lera.tion by the
appeal is whether the withholding of the right to
engage in export trade from this clasa of mineown·
ers constitutes an unreasonable restriction on their
right to carry on buBinoss guaranteed by Art. 19 (I) ,.
{g) of the Constitution.
•
2 s.c.R..
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
85
Pausing here we might put aside one matter
which is beyond the pale of cont.roversy, and that
is that the constitutional validity of A. 3 of the
Imports .& Exports Control Act, 194,7, wl1ich forms
as it were the ultimate root from whir.h tlw impugned notifications and executive actions spring is
conceded. The points urged by learned. Counsel
for the appellant were two : (1) Clause 6 (h) of
Exports Control Order 1958, was beyond the rulemaking power under s. 3 of the Imports & Kx:port
) Control Act, 1947, (2) Even if cJ. 6 (h) and the
''canalising" of exports through "special" or "specialised" ageneies or channels be valid, the notifications by which the canaJisation was effected are
~mtside the contemplation of the 'agency or channel'
under cl. 6 (b).
Before proceeding further it is necessary to
mention that. the constitutional validity of cl. 6 (h)
of the Export Control Order 1953 was not disputed
before us, the controversy in relation to it having
·~ been conolnd~d by the decision by this Court i~
Glass Chaton.s Importers and Use1·8 A.ssom'ation v.
Union of India (1). The argument in support of
the contention that. cJ. 6 (h) was beyond the terms
of s. 3 of the Act was briefly this : Section 3 of
the .Act by its language, its setting and context
permits restrictions or controls only in rrgard to
goods which are the subject-matter of export and
does not permit restrictions being imposed on per·
• sons engaged in the export trade. In other words,
> the Central Government is enabled by a notified
order under s. 3 of the Act (a) to specify the goods
in respect of which the control or restriction is to
be exercised, along with (b) a matter which this
necessarily involves, viz., the quantjties that may
'- \
be exported, ( c} the quality of the goods that might
-pass out of the country and (d) as regards the.
destination to which they might be exported. But
·~ the restrictions could not extend any further.
An
(1) A•l•R· 1961 S.C. 1Sl4,
1962
D.JV4 ,·on Dj Bhimji
Oohil
v.
Joint Chi1j Con troller
of Tmj1orls & E;rpt.rP
A_1yangt1rJ.
86
19G2
f>11112 s.TI
•f Bflimji
c;.,.,z
v.
J ,;"t Cili1/ c.,.trQI/tr
•f 1m~• I,.{: .f)(~rl<
--
SUPREME OOURT REPORTS [19631
order under s. 3 cannot make provisions restricting
the persons who might pa.rticip~te in export trade,
restrict either their number or impose qualifications
which they must satisfy before being permitted to
export. Be1ides, even if a notified order might
validly prescribe the persons who might participate
in tho export trade, still it did not authorise an
order which would so canalise or channol the per·
sons who might engage in tho export trade aq
practicaJly to create a monopoly in favour of any , /
particular person or group which is \vhat r. o (h) 'v
has effected.
The argument was put in a. slightly different
fGrm by reference to the provisions of Art. 19 (6).
Article 19 (I) (g), after guaranteeing to all citizen8
the right to carry on any occupation, trade or
business, had gone on to provide in cl. (6) tho rest:ictions which may constitutionaJly be imposed on
the right thus guaranteed, and tho clause as it now
stands after the first Amendment of the Constitution
reads, to quote the material words :
"Nothing in sub-clause (g) of the said
clause shall affect the operation of any existing law in so far as it imposea, or prevent the
State from making any law imposing, in the
interests of the ~E>neral public, reasonable
restrictions on the exercise of the right conferred by the said sub-clause, and, in particular, nothing in the said sub-clause shall affect
the operation of a.ny existing law in so far as
it relates to, or prevent the State from making
any law relating to,(i} - - · ---(ii) the carrying on by the State, or by
corporation owued or controlled by tho StatR.,
of any trade, bu.sinese, industry or service,
whether to the exclusion, complete or partial, ~
of citizens or otherwise"•
..
-
2 S.C.R.
:
..'
J
, --J
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
87
The effect of the policy statements and directions
to the licensing authorities issued by virtue of the
powers conferred by cl. 6 (h) of the Export Control
Order, 1958 had resulted in the creation of a
monopoly or a near monopoly in favour of
the State Trading Corporation.
It was urged
that
the creation of such a monopoly
could: on the language of Art. 19 (6) (ii) be
effected only by the ~tate making a law in relation
to the matters there set out. Neither the Export &
Import Control Act, 1947 nor even the notified order
made there under-The Export Control Order, 1958
could be said to be "a law relating to the carrying
on by the :::lta.te of any trade, business, industry .or
service,, and therefore the validity of the preferen.
tial treatment granted to the Htate Trading Corporation could not be justified or upheld by reference
to t}le amendment effected to cl. ( 16) by the
Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1961. So much
could be accepted. But this, however, leaves for
consideration the question whether the provision
now impugned could not be sustained as "a reasona.
ble restriction" on. the exercise of the rights conferr.
ed by sub-cl. (g) of Art. 19 (l) in the interest of
the general public i. ·a., on the opening words of
para 1 of cl. (6). But as pointed out already~ the
constitutional validity of cl. 6 (h) in so far as
it permits the canalising or channelling of the
export trade is no longer res integra. this
having been upheld in the Glass.Ohatons case C).
In the circumstances, the very narrow question for consideration is whether the restrictions
and con~rol for which provision might be made by
a. 3 would not include a provision for canalishig
the trade in any particular commodity. We are
clearly of the opinion th~tt the restriction or control
in 'the form of channelling or Canal ising the trade is
~ not outside the limitations wbic~ might be imposed OJl
~ ~)
",qt. t$61 s.c. 1514.
1962
D'vo <On of Bhimji
Gohil
v.
Joint Chief Oontrolld
of 1 mports &1 Exports
88
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963]
export trading by 8 • _3 a~d ~hat consequen~ly cl. 6(h)
in its present form Is wtthm the rule-makmg power
n.vos•n of B~imji conferred on the Central Government .bY: B. 3 of the
a~~·l
Act. The argument that the restr.ICtxon~ which
Joint C~srJControll<r
ld be imposed or the control WhiCh m1gbt be
of ImpiJTls &: Exports COU
exercised on exports by ord ers J?a.d e un d er s. 3 of
A):l~"t"'
, the Act could not extend to restnctwns on persons
who might be permitted to (>Dgage ·in the export
trade has only to be st?-ted. If the quant~m of the .
export in a comrood1ty could be r estncted, the
control that would effectuate this must necessarily
extend to the persons engage<;! in or . desirous of
eno-agin(J'
in the export of that commodtty and this
0
wo"'uld a fortiori be so, if the restriction ta.kes the
form of a prohibition of exports in a commodity
altogether. If thert'>fore the control or restriction
could legally extend to the persons who are engaged
in the trade; it would appear to follow as
a. logical step that the restriction might take the
form of classifying tho persons who might particip·
ate in the trade- and the conditions aubjoct to which
any particular class might be permitted to do so.
It would be a. matter o( policy for the Government
to determine, having r egard to the nature of.the
commodity and tho ciroumsta.uces attendinl7 the
export trade in it, to lay down the basis -fo~ the
clasaification botweocn groups and fix: their relative
priorities eto. When cl. 6(h) permits "ca.na.lisinl7"
or th~ ··~hannelling" of exports through seleot~d
agencies 1t d_oos ~ot ~o more than make provision
for the clastHficatwn mto groups eto. which but one
of the ~odes which the ''control" under s. 3 of the
Act mtght assume.
1962
'
.
_ Th.e nex.t point to bo considered is whether the
. ~ohficatwns li!IIUocl. by which ( 1) tho export trading
m maugn.neso oro l!i confined to three o-roups of
!1e;sons ungagt:d irt tho trade, viz., (a) e~tablished
~ppers, _(b) mme-owners, and (o) the ~tate Trading
rr>rat.iou, tho two former being allotted 'ro~
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
89
--
J96Z
based upon the export effected by them during
certain basic years, (2) th-:; progressive reduction in DiJDtl son of B~Jim
.;
the quota of groups (a) & (b) with a view to enable
Gohil
v.
tha available export business to be handled by the Joint Chi,f
ConU'olln
State Trading Corporation, and (3) as a necessary 4 Imports rh &fmts
result of the above t·he elimination frcm the export
dyy1111gar J.
trade of the class k1iown in t.he trade as unewcomets" was permitted under cl. 6(h) of the export
Control ·Order, 1958. It would be seen from the
above that there are two grievances of the appellant
which are inter-related: (1) The first consists in the
complaint regarding the quota allowed to the
established shippers and mineowners who had an
export performance during a basic year. J..Rarned
Counsel however, did not put this forward as any
serious grievance because persons falling within
those already in the trade and the appellant who
wants to come into the export trade could not
legitimately ·object to those already in it being
allowed facilities 0r licences for effecting exports.
t.
~.
In his petition before the High Court the appellant
rajsed a complaint that the basic years fixed in the
policy-statement were arbitrary but the fixation of
any year must be so, and if the Government fixed
as a basic year, a period three years before the
announcement of the policy, i.e., took into account
performance within a period of three years before
that date, we do not see · any uureasonableness or
arbitrariness about it. (2) It waR in regard to the
inclusion of the State Trading Corporation among
those entitled to export and tho increasing quota
given to it on an ad hoc basis without reference to
any antecedent performance that the main attack
wa.s directed and it was this that learned Counsel
stated alllounted to a monopoly which was not
countenanced hy the law. It will therefore be sufficient for us to confine attention to the grounds upon
which the successive notifications which afforded
~ increasing facilities to the StatP. Trading Corpora...
tion for export were challenged.
00
SUP!tEME OOURT REPORTS [1963]
1962
Pau11ing herr. it would be convenient if wo set
out tho reasons why acoordin;s to the respondent
Gohil
the State Trading Corporation was preferred as a.
Y.
Joi"t Clti<f ('.(lllltoller principal agen0y for oanalising tho export trade in
of lntporls 1ft E-rJ-h this commodity. The vital
n~cessity of export
earnin~s for sustaining nationa.l economy not being
a matter of controvel'sy, the question whieh tho
government bad to consider was how beat to ensure
the optimum earning from exports of manganese ore.
India has no monopoly in the production of this ore
and cousequently the pric" of th~ commodity ·in
the foreign market is dependent on world-wide
factors. Having regard to ·the usc to which the ore
is capable of being put, viz., by steel factories in
the production of steel, tho foreign buyers, (and in
this one factor to be taken into account is that in
several forei~ countries external trade is conducted
through Sta.te agencies), are insistent that there
shall be a regular supply of ore of uniform
quality.
There had
been
complaints in
ear1y years, when the trade in the commodity was
unrcetrictcd and not under any control, that the
quality of the ore supplied was not according to
sample, with the result t.hat even the trade of those
who took pains to maintain their quality of supplies
suffered. It was in these oiroumstances that govern·
ment stepped in 19.56 by. imposing restrictions and
by assuring the foreign buyers of a regular supply
through the mechanism of the controls exercised in
this country. These facta were not disputed.
D•4 son ,f Bhimji
It is with this baJkground that the challenge
to the validity of the notification ha.a to be considered and answered. The imposition of any
reatriction on those entitled to engage in a.ny tra~e
would necessarily mean that those who do not
conform t<> the crit~rio. laid down would be dcniod
the right to participate in that trade; and this would t
bo a fortiori so if tho restriction takeR thf\ form of &
,
'
..
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME OOURT REPORTS
91
cana.li!!Jing of the trade in a commodity, for canalis·
ing necessarily implies the exclusion of some groups.
If therefore s. 3 of the Act permits a rule to be made
for oanalising export · trade' in a commodity and
such canalising is not unconstitutional, it would
necessarily follow that a person cannot have a.
legally sustainable complaint that he is eliminated
from among the groups entitled to participate in
the trade. The question whether the canalising has
beeuproper1y done in the sense that the groups
selected are no better than the groups eliminated
·poses a very different problem, and if that were
made out a question of discrimination might conoeiv·
ably arise. We should, however, hasten to point
"out that it is not the case of the appellant that the
established shippers and the mineowners to whom
quotas have been allotted in addition to the State
Trading Corporation have been improperly included
in the group of persons entitled to participate in
the .export trade, and that apart, there is a rational
and very proper classification between those who
have experience in the trade and the newcomers
who do not possess these experience. In other
commodities concerned in export or import, newcomers i.e.~ those with no previous experience in the
export line but who have experience in other
branches of the trade, have been allotted quotas,
though this should depend upon the circumstances
of each trade. It has not been suggested that
previous experience in the export trade would not
be a valuable qualification for the grant to a person
or.~group of a quotaJ and even a preferential quota
in the export trade in the commodity with which
we are now concerned. It would thus appear that
if the notifications had confined the entire export
trade to those with previous experienc~, no legal
objection could have been taken .to the notifications
on 'the arguments addressed to us by learned
--\ Counsel for the appellant. In such a state of circumstances the appellant would ha.ve been exoluded but
ll~l
D1JtJt1 son of Bhimji
Goliil
V,
I
Joi11l CM4 Ctndrolltr
oflmpr~tls ~ Exporll
A»•nc~~rJ.
92
1962
DavD sr.rt ~! Bhimji
Gohil
v.
.I oi..t
CA;.J Contr~/n
of lmpnls tf: EJ:potts
SUPREME OOURT REPORTS [1963]
he could not still oompl"in that he w"s illegally
eliminated because this exclusion was necessary
consequence of channelling or canalising of the
exports through persoru~ with previous experience
in the fielrl.
The real grievance of the appellant was that
in preference to him and those liko him, who win
the ore to be exported, the State Trading Corporation
which bad 110 previous experience of the export
trade should have been sc]ccted as the agency for
canalising exports. There is no doubt that if the
only teat of differentiation was previous experience,
the preference of the State Trading Corporation to
the appellant and the othors of the class to which he
bJlong:!, might not b(\ justified, but that is not '
the Hole test by which the matter has to be judged.
We have set out earlier the grounds upon which
choice of the State Trading Corporation as the
agency for effecting tho export trade was determined by the government and we consider that for
those reasont> there was nothing improper in the
choice, but that .on the ot.her baud the object of the .
export trade, viz., the earning of foreign ~change
to the maximum with benefit of a long range
charact-er for exports from this country could be
expected to be attained with the ~tate Trading
Corporation as the main agency engaged in the
trade. We do not therefore consider that there is
any substance in the argument of the learofld
Counsel for the appellant that the choice of the
State Trading Corporation and tho granting to it
if quotas on an ad hoc basis was either beyond the
powers conferred upon tho li<'ensing authorities
under cl. 6th) of the Export Control Order or was
otherwise open to objection.
There was one other matter that was urged in this
connection to which itisncceBSary to refcr.lJlause 6(h)
t>oablcs the lirensing authorities to canftliae exports
•.
.,
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME OOTTRT RFPORTS
93
'through special or specialised agencies or channels".
It was urged that the State Trading Corporation
was neither a special nor specialised agency or channel and that on that ground the choice of the corporition was outside 6 (b). We are wholly unable
to accept this argument. Whatever the term
''specialised" might mean, the word "special" can
not bear the construction that it must he an expert
agency in that line, in the sense that it possesses a
type of previous experience which cannot be claimed by others. Without going so far aa to say that
a special agency or channel might mean merely a
designated agency, it would be proper to construe
the word as meaning, an agency selected having in
view the purpose for which the channeling or c.Jl.nalising has to take place. In other words, an agency
would be ·'special' if having re~ard to the purpose
for which the canali~ing takes place it is more
likely to achieve that objective than other agencies
or achieve it in a larger measure than oth<lrs. In
that sense we have no hesitation in holding that
the State Trading Corporation might be a ''special"
agency or a channel for the purpose of enabling
the country to maintain and foster the continuity
of its. trade in the commodity by ensuring exports
in adequate quantity and of proper quality.
1
J
._.,
In this state of circumstances the e1imination
of the claas to which the appellant belongs, viz.,
newcomers who had no previous experience of t.he
export trade during the basic yE~ar or earlier was
the result of enforcing a permitted method of control and a type of restriction which it was legally
competent to be imposod under 6 (h). In the
case of other commodities, · rrnewcomers'' have been
granted a quota. That however naturally depended upon the ntt.ture of the trade, the nature of the
export market and other factors which it is the
province of government to t a.ke into account. Having s~tOO this leJ(al position. we would hasten to
I
D411<J stm
•f Bhimji
Go'M/
v.
J oine Clli,f Controlllr
of lmj#ls ell E'4JMtt
AJ)'GII94T J .
.94
1961
Dot1• 1011 of Bbimji
Conil
...
JoiraJ r,;tf c.. r,,u~
of 1m,.'" d; EqntJ
SUPREME OOURT REPORTS [1963)
add that it was not the view of the Government
that the export trade in manganese ore wa8 such
that newcomers could never be permitted into that
trade is clear from the several policy-statements
themselves in which, from time to time-, they con·
veyed an assurance that tho allotment of quotas
to the ''newcomers" was under consideration. In
the case of a commodity like manganese ore for
1Vhich there is not much of an internal market the
denial of a. right to any group or we aha)] add, to
any individual to export would in effect affect him
adversely forcing him to sell to others who have
been given such a facility. Persons like the appellant were being fed on hopes of some relief to
them and it was a case not merely of hope deferrep
making the heart sick, but of dashed hopes that
led the appellant to approach the Court for relief.
Though we consider that tho appellant hM no legal
right to the relief that he sought, his grievance is
genuine l).Dd it would be for the Government to
consider how best the interest of this cl888 should
be protected and it is made worth their while to
win the ore so as to expand, foster and augment
the export trade in this valuable commodity.
Reverting to the legal points raised in tho
appeal, it appears clear to us that on the premisos
(1) that s. 3 of the Import & Export Control Act,
1947 ie a valid piece of legislation, (2) that ol. 6 (h)
of the Export Control Order is within the rulemaking power of the Central Government and is
oonstitutional, there is no escape from the conclusion that no lega.Hy enforoea.ble right of the appellant has been violated for which he could seek redress under Art. 226 of the Constitution.
In this viow it is unnecessary to consider
whether the appellant having prayed primarily for
the issue of a writ of marulamU8 to direct the
licensing authorities to consider his application for
#"_
..
"
-
2 S.C.R.
SUPREM~ COURT REPORTS
95
an export licence for the half year current at the
date of the petition uwithout reference to the terms
of the impugned notifications and policy statement"
,and that half year· having long ago gone by, he
could be granted any relief by the High Court on
his petition or by this Court on his appeal. It is
possible that in such circumftances a person
situated like the appellant might be entitled to a
declaration as regards the validity of the restrictions imposed which continue to be ·in force even
beyond the half year or year to which the licence
relates. It is however unnecessary to pronounce
upon this question which does not really arise for
consideration in view of the conclut~ion that we
have reached that the restriotions and control to
which the trade has been subjected are legal and
justified by the Act and the Rules framed there
under.
..
1962
Dov/J sora of Bhiraji
Gohil
..
Joiral ChieJConttMI"
of Imports tl! &priJ
The result is that the appeal fails and is
dismissed. There will, however, be no order ·as
to costs.
SuBBA RAo, J.,-This appeal by certificate is
directed against the judgment of a division Bench
of the High Court of Judicature for Bombay,
Nagpur Bench, dismi~~ing the application filed by
the appeJJant under Art. 226 of the Constitution
praying for the issue of an appropriate writ directing
the first reflpondent to grant an export licence jn
his favour.
.
-·
The facts giving rise to this appeal may be
briefly stated: 'lhe appellant is the lessee of manganese mines situated in the State of Madhya
Pradesh. . He carries on the business of mining and
selling the ore raised therefrom. There is practically no internal market for manganese, and most
. of the manganese produced in India is exported to
___. foreign countries. The internal trade in regard to
manganese ore being neg1igible, it may be ignored
Subba Rfi()J,
96
SUPREl\·IE COURT REPORTS (1963]
1962
for the purpose of this case. Till about the middle
of 195:;, minors, including the appellant, were free
Da1a son ~1 Bltimj,
to deal with foreign buyers for exporting their proGo/til
v.
ducts and to sell them at th~ir sipingfl to exporters
Join• OhitfConlr~/1,
oflryort.l ct Ex~ts or to carry them to any port by obtaining necessary
wagon allotmen1s from the railways. But from
May 1956, the Governmr>nt of In~ia issued various
notifications progressively restricting tho export
quotas available to the shippers and mine-owners,
culminating in a stage when direct export by mine·
owners and shippers was stopped and the entire
trade canalized through the State 'J rading Corporation originally formed by the Government as a.
private company under the India Companies Act,
1956 and subsequently made into a public company.
We shall later on consider in detail tho particulars
of the said process. On December 1, H•58, the appellant filed an application before the Joint Chief
Controllel' of Imports and Kxports, the first respondent herein, for granting to him an export quota.
and licence for export of manganese ore under cl.(4)
of the Exports (Control) lirder, 1958, (hereinafter
called the Order), and also for the movement of the
ore from the railway sidings to Bombay port. The
first respondent, by hia reply dated DecE-mber 17,
1958, refused to comply with the said request on
the ground that export of manganese ore outside
India was on.ly allowed by established shippers and
established mine-owners according to the ''existing''
orders of the Government. Aggrieved by the said
order, the appellant filed the said writ petition before the High Court of Bombay, but that was diemis8ed. Henoe the present appeal. The Joint
Chief Contr()ller of Imports a.nd Kxports is made
the first respondent and the Union of Ind(a., the
second respondent to the appeal.
The argument of lf".arned counsel for the ap.
pellant may he summarized thus: C nder Art.lll( l)f¥) ..
of the Constitution the appellant had a right to
{
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
97
1292
carry on his business of producing and selling man·
.,.__
ganese ore and exporting it to foreign countries Davll tor• of Bhimii
either directly or through exporters. The policy
Gohil
\'.
statements issued by the Govermnent from time to Joint Chief
Conlrol/e r
time, on the basis of which his application was of Imports ch E"porlJ
rejected, crippled the trade of the miners like the
Subba Ra• J,
appellants, who .were newcomers in the field of
direct export. Clause (6) of the Order, whereunder
the said policy statements were · issued and which
)
empowered the Central Government of the Chief
Controller <?f Imports and Exports to canalize exports through special or speoialiE!ed agencies or
channels, is ultra vire.<; inasmuch as s. 3 of the Imports and Exports (Control) Act, 194 7 (XVIII of
1947), hereinafter caJled the Act, whereunder the
said order was made, does not empower the Central
Gover.nment to t:tke fot' itf.lelf or ·confer on others
such a power. Even if cl. 6(h) of the· Order was
valid, the said order empowers only canalizing exports through special or specialized agencies, that
~ is, through experts in the line of export business,
and it cannot be relied upon to. canalize the business·
through the State Trading Corporation, which is in
no way better than the businessmen in that lin0 and
whioh indeed has not get any experience in the
business of export compared to other experieJl~ed
exportt)rs. In a.ny view, the ultimate effect of tne
' I
policy statements is to create a monopoly in the
-r export trade in manganese in favour of the .State
\. Trading Corporation and other qualified exporters,
and later on solely in favour of the said Corpora.
tion, with<?ut at the same time safeguarding the
interests of miners like the appellant by fixing
appropriate quotas or otherwise: with the result,
they are compelled either not to do the business at
"'- all Ol' put themselves at the mercy of others, who
are in a position to dictate terms and who may or
~ not buy the ore from them. The implementation
of the policy to the detriment of miners like the
appellant is a.n unreasonable restri'Jtion on their
,
os· SUPREME OOURT REPOR~ (l~JQ]
1HZ
Dd'Da 1m1 ~1 Bhimji
Gohil
v.
.Joint Clauj C<mtroll•r
Pj Imporfl &1 &ports
Subb11~J.
right to carry on their buainees in mining and selling
manga.neee ore.
Learned oounscl for the respondents con~ndecl
that the petition filed by tho appellant under
Art. 2:W of the Constitution should be dismissed on
the ground that it ha.R become infruotuous, as the
year for which the licence was asked, namely, 1959,
had run out. The learned counsel also sought to
support the order made by the first respondent on
ground that cl.( 6) of the Order was validly made
and that the schemo of implementation or the
policy adumberatcd by the Government was not
only sanctioned by cl. 6(h) of the Order, but the
restriction imposed on the fundamental right of the
petitioner was also a reasonable one.
The first question is whether cl. 6(h) of the
Order was 'ldtra vires the Act. The relevant provisions may be noticed. The meterial part of s. 3 of
the Act reads;
\
.-J.
"Powers to prohibit or restrict import8 and
export.s.(1) The Central Government may, by
order published in the Official Gazette, make
provisions for prohibiting, restricting or otherwise c:ontrolling, in all cases of specified ola.s8CI of case~, and subject to such exceptions
if any, as may be maclo by or under the
order:(a.) the import, export, carriage
coastwise or shipment aa ships stores of
goods of any specified description.
X
X
X
X
Clause (6) of tl" : Order reads:
"Refusal of licence.-The Central Govern- ~
mentor the Chief Controller of Imports and
..
2 S.C.R.
99
SUPRBIE COURT REPORTS
Exports may refuse to grant a licence or direct
any other licensing authority not to grant a
licences:X
X
X
X
J
X
X
(h) if the licensing authority decided to
canalize exports and the distribution thereof
through special or speciaJized agencies or
channels.
)
The Order was made in exercise of the powers conferred by ss.3 and 4-A of the .Act. It is contended
that.s. J does not empower the Central Government
to issue an order conferring on itself or another a
power to canalize exports through special or specialized agencies or channels. There is no force in
this argument. Section 3 of the Act empowers the
Central Government to make provisions for prohibibiting, restricting or otherwise controlling in all ·
oases or in specified classes of cases the export of
· • r., goods. The power conferred is very wide and it js
not possible to hold that canalizing exports through
special or specialized agencies or channels is not
comprehended by the said words. · Canalizing exportll through specialized agencies or channels is
one way of controlling export. It is conte 1ded that
the
incidence of the section is only at the poin~ of
I
exportation and that the said section does ·not
r authorize the conferment of a power to regulate
\ internal trade with a view to control exports. This
is putting a very narrow construction on the wording of section 3 of the Act. It is true that the Central Government cannot interfere with internal trade
under the' colour of regulating export, but the power
'·,
to prohibit, restrict or control exports of goods
"<•
carries with it, by implication, the power to do all
things intimately connected with the regulation of
t.'tXport trade. If the power was confined 011ly to
~ the export point, it would defeat the purpose ofthe
Act. · The main object of regulating export trade
is to assist the national economy. This
198
Dava son of Bhimji
Gohil
v.
Joint ChieJControlltr
,f Imports &l ExptJriiJ
100
Jf6B
D•Pt1. son of Bhimji
Gohil
"· Con,ro/1,.
J oifll Clluf
of I ntpo•h ~ Ezputls
S!lbbt &to J.
SUPKEME COURT REPORTS (1963]
object can be achieved only by devising
ways and means to promote export and to seoure
favourable balance of trade. A machinery will have
to be evolved to St~lect the goods which the country
oa.n spare or may prefer to exchange for more
essential foreign good.a, to find suitable foreign
markets for them and to take necessary steps to
establish a reputation for Iudian goods by securing
qualitative standards, prompt deliveries and
hon68t dealings, and to prevent avoidable hardships
by allottwg quotas to busine~:~Smen or equitable
priucipleB, to fix reasonable rates for their goods
and to discharge aimila.r other duties. This C.'t-nnot
be achievod if th~ control of the Central Gover;:nment ili confined only to the exportation point. The
regulation of the export trade may have to commenoo even at an earlier stage ; in extrome cases
even at the stage of production. It is question of
fact in eMh case whether the control exercised by
the Contra! Government is only to regulate export
trade or is a coloura.ble exercise of controlling the
iaternal trade under the guiBc of regulating export
trade. l therefore, hold that the power conferred
under s. 3 of the Act cannot be conferred on the
authorities concerned under cl. 6(h) of the Order
to canalize exports through special or specialized
agenoiea or oha.nnols is well within the aoope of the
power conferred on the Central Government.
In this context another arguments of learned
counsel for the appo1lant may conveniently be dispose of. It is said that the specia.l or specialized
agencies or channels mean export agencies or
obannels. The dictionary menning of the word
"special" is ~'for a partioular purpose'' and "specialise" is "set apart for a ptnticular purpose." The
said words do not necessarily convey the idea that
the agency created for a special purpose should be
experts in the lino with certn.in qualifications. •
While tho Gov<.'rmucn~ may be c.xpectod to scleot
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME OOURT REPORTS
IOL
suitable agency well versed in export trade of particular commodities for achitw.ing maximum results,
the wording of the clause does not impose any such
qualifications. Iu this view, it is not necessary to
express my opinion on the question whether the
State Trading Corporation is in a better position .or
is ~ more qualified one than the experienced exporters in the line of export of manganese ore, for the
selection of the agency is within the exclusive pro)
vince of the Government .
. Even so, it is contended that the scheme, as
progreesively unfurled by the Government in the
shape of policy statements, infringes the fundamen·
tal right of the appellant and persons similarly
situated under Art. 10( l)(g) of the Constitution. To
apppreciate this argument it is necessary to notice
briefly the various policy statements issued by · the
Central Government-to aecertain the impact of the
said statements on the business of the appE"lla.nt.
The first statement is found in the Press NotEdated June 26, 1956, issued by the Ministry of
Commerce and Iudustry, New Delhi. Before the
issue. of the Press Note the miners who produced
manganese ore could enter into contracts with foreign
buyers and export their goods subject to the export
control rules. By this Press Note the Government
introduced a change in it.s policy. The followr ing reason are given for changing the
\i policy : ( 1) The existing trading mat:lbanism
is quite ~nadequate to cope with the ~develop·
menta that took place in certain countries in the
matter of purchase of ores. and their effect on
Indiap foreign trade. (2) The pre-occupation of
Cont~ol authorities with the equitable distribution
of available wagon space amongst mining and trading interests has made it virtually impossible for the
limited resources to be used to the maximum ad-..4
va.ntage or for economical arrangements to be
maqe· for_. tqe transportation of ores and for their
1962
Dava sMI of B h imji
Gohil
'
v.
Joint Chi1j Controlk
(/!Imports&: E ~F''
StJ6ba RaoJ.
102
SUPREME OOURT REPORTS [1963]
J!J~J
handling at the ports. (3) The trading interests
entcr~d into large contracts and some of them were
l>atlfl ~~ of Rltimji
not able to fulfil them. (4) The mining industry did
Gt~h•l
'· Control/, not have an adequn.to ~:~cope for development on
J •int Chuf
•J lm,o·ts lie E.v~orts sounri lines. For the foregoing reasons, the Government propounded the following new policy :
Subh Rot J.
•'Government have therefore come to the
conclusion that it would be necessary for
them to play a. more positive role to overcome the obstacles in the way of augmenting
foreign exchange earnings from tho export of
ores. It has accordingly been decided that
Government should help in reorientating the
trading in ores on more rat.iona.l lines and
with this object in view they propose to canalise the export of ores in a progresHively
increasing measure through the State Trading
Corporation and wiJl, in fulfilling its responsibility, rely mainly on tho mining interests in
the country and use the existing trading
mechanism to tho extent practicable. At the
same time, limited opportunities are proposed
to be provided to mining and trading interests
for direct participation in the export trade
within the limits of the board policy that
may be laid down by the Government of
India in this beh'llf."
Pui'8Uant to the said policy, the Press Note infor.
med the trading public that it had been decided to
regulate the export of iron and manganese orea
during the half-year July-December 1956 through
established shippers, mine-owners and the State
Trading Corporation and that export quotas would
be granted on the following basis :
(i) Established Shippers will be gi.-en export
quotas on the annual averago of the
quantities actually exported during the ..
three ('.a.lenda.r years, 1953, i954 and
1955.
+
..
"4
I
2 S.C.R.
.
'
·')
)
.
SUPR-E:ME COURT REPORTS
103
(ii) Mine owners will be given export quotas
on the ll.nnual average of the quantities
of ores on which royalty was actual1y
paid (excluding quantities supplieil for
domestic consumption) during the three
calender years, 1953, 1954, L~5f5. Mine
owners whose mining leases had expired
on 3·Ist December 1955 and have not
been renewed thereafter, will not be
eligible.
(iii) State Trading Corporation wi11 be given
quotas on an ad hoc basis.
It was also stated that the quotas would be valid
for rail transport facilities only on the section
which had been used by the shipper in the past
and that the quota-holders wopld not be permitted
to move on each section more than the quantity
moved by them during any of the three years 1953,
1954, 1955. Through the subsequent l'ress Notes
issued from time to time, the policy stated in the
first statement was implemented by gradually
elbilinating the shippers other than the State Tra·
ding Corporation. The High Court has considered
all the subsequE~nt Press Notes in detail and has
accurately and succinctly su~marized t he various
steps taken by the Government to achieve its object. In the circumstances, it would be unnecessary .
to oonsider them again in detail. The High Court
narrated t.h e said steps as follows :
(I) To begin with, the Manganese trade
was controlled by a system of licensing of
Export Quotas.
·
......
(2) Press Notes dated July 14, 1956,
July 30, 1956, August 6, 1956, September 4,
196'6, and June 1, 1957 show that the quotar
granted to shippers and mineowners were with
one exception progressively reduced for e~b
~ocessive period.
1962
Da!Ja tor~ of JJIIimji
GolriJ
v.
J .-il!i Cbi4 COIIIT~IIIr
q/ Impot ,_. "
&pw u
-Sllbh RtJDJ.
I
104
191t
MQIIO Jon of Bl,i'Tiji
Gu~tl
v.
Jai11t Cht~f Conlrollt'
of Imports ~ Exp~tJ
Sub~a RQo J
SUPREME OOURT REPORTS [1963]
(3) Until the fifth statement dated September 4, 1956 was made, the case of mineowners who had no previous shipment to their
cn·rlit was not within the contemplation or
Government policy. In that statement GoVtlrnment announced that it was considering
their <:ase but at no later stage does it appear
that their oaso was specifically provided for
until the St.ate Trading Corporation took
over.
..
During the period covered by the
7th statement, the State Trading Corporation
was introduced into the picture and fre-ely
competed with private interests. During this
period small quota holders were advised to
form co-operatives or companies and were
discouraged.
(5) Form the date of the 8th statement,
viz., March 12~ 1959, it iil clear that the full
freedom of private trading as before was vir- /"
tun lly stopped be('a use all orders were to be
ucanalized" through the State Trading Corporation. The terms und conditions on which
"canalization'' could take place were onerous
and difficult of fulfilment by individual small
interests. The State Trading Corporation itself laid down certain t-erms.
{4)
(6) There were no restrictions on the
activities of the State Trading Corporation
and it.s quota. was unlimited.
(7) The policy was put into effect with
the aid of the licensing aut horitiea appointed
under the Imports and Exports (Control) Act
and Order ; that port authorities a.nd by
controlling the allooa.tion or railway wagons.
It is clear from the aforeS~~.id summary of the ~
various notifications that the policy deol em in
~
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME OOURT REPORTS
105
1962
the first statement was gradually implementedfirst by confining the issue of quotas and licences DtJva 11111 of B/&imJi
only to recognized exporters and the State · Trading
Go"lfil
J
v. •
Corporation, and later on virtuaHy conferring a joint Chi1j
Contf'•Jl,
monopoly on the Sate 'rrading CorpQration. It ofJmpurtl &: }j];cports
would also be noticed that though the Government
Subb~tRao J.
stated in the earlier Press Notes that it· was consi·
dering the case of mine-ownera who had no previous
shipment to their credit, during the prescribed period
no attempt was made to provide forthem. The
result was that mine-owners, who had no previous
shipment tG their credit, like the petitioner. could
not move manganese ore outside·their mines for
export, for they could ~ot sell ~xcopt to the
established shippers and the State Trading Corporation till March 12, 1959, and thereafter only
to the said Corporation. In the anxiety of the
Government to push up export trade. in manganese
ore, persons who were not in the field of export
trade during the prescribed period were totally
ignored, with the result t.hat their industry and
business were crippled. Learned counsel for the
responden~ contends that the appellant filed the
application for licence on December 11, 1958, for
the grant of export not only to the State Trading
Corporation but also to other established shippers,
mineowners and exporters, and that, therefore,
j
the: appellant could not have much difficulty in
sel1,ing the manganese produced by him either to
the one or to the other. Apart from the validity
of this argument, which we will immediately con·
aider, it is not clear from the petition that the
export licence asked for was for a period· before
the issue of the 8th statement dated March 12,
1959. The previous period would expire on June
.l., 1959, and the 8th statement issued on March 12,
1959, provided for the period between July 1959
and 1960~ during whioh period the Sttate Trading
-..1 Corporation had obtained a virtual monopoly in
export trade ~ manganese.
It wu more likely
.106
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963]
that the licence and the quota asked for related .to
the year 195~)·60. This should also be clear from
Da11G son•J Bhimji
h r
h
disposed ·of by
Gohil
· . t e .1act that -t e application was
Joint ChufCJntrolJe, the f~rst respondent only . by .h_is 'order .. dated
oflmports &: Exports _December 17, 1958.
Be 1t as It may, I ·shall
·
.. ---~o~sider the _argument alternatively.· The argu~
Soob4 BaoJ.
_ ment based upon the alleged existence of a free
. market wherein the petitioner could ' sell' his
i manganese ·__ ore -to recognized exporters is not only
unrealistic but also unfair to the petitioner. _What
: ~as the market wherein the petitioner could sell h~s
. manganese ore for reasonable prices? Admittedly he
could not sell in the internal market, for there was
-, practically no such m-arket. None of the reco. gnized exporters~ either the_·· established shippers
or the State -Trading· Corporation, was bound to
purchase . any quota from _the _petitioner or- : the
miners . in _the -position .of. the- petitioner. _ . The
recognized exporters were in a position to dictate
terms and evim to ignore some of -the mine~owners.
_In short, an artificial market was created for the
. mine-owners like the appellant-wherein they . .-could
sell the mangan~se ; ore only to "established ship·
.. pers, ·if they wanted the ore and · for a price
- .dictated by them. ~he so-called market was fur.' ther circumscribed and . liinited to one' purchaser,·.
· .namely, the State _ Trading Corporation, after
' March 1959. . The appellant -complains that. he
. could riot sell his manganese ore because or the
said restrictions on _sale · and ;. export.
In. P,is
. petition, the appellant alleged thu&: ·
·~
~. - l
196Z
I
.
f'
l i
I·
l
.
-- .- ...,.. -
·.
· ,_ HThe State·· Trading Corporation, under .
. the colour of impugned Notices, has been
.. dictating_ its own price and has been thus in
· effect demanding every - exorpita'nt commission . for tho ' purpose of giving facilities- of '- .
exporting the petitioner's ore out . of the ·unlimited quota alloted to it. The. respond~Jlt Ne-. l. is thus pent on :~u.ttin~ .:. tbt' ..
,-
2 S.O.R.
-
SUPREME OOUR'f REPOR'I'S
107
1961
petitioner in heavy losses by forcing him to sell
his ore to the Corporation at lesser price. Dav., nn of B~imii
The petitioner has now at hand 200 tons of
Gohil
v.
manganese ore lying at his mined or sidings Joint Chuj
C011lnll/l'
and valued .at ab3ut Rs.20,000/- which is oflmjltn'ts d: &porls
just being wasted as will be clear from the
circular dated 20-4-1957 issued by the Cor-poration to the_ various mine-owners.
_)
\
j
If the petitioner is not allowed to export
his ore he would be st~ck piling. about 50
tons of ore per month valued at Its. 10,000/without any outlet or rolling of the capital
which he bas already invested as also the
running cost including the wage bill of about
Rs.4000/- per month. If on the other hand
the petitioner has to close his mines for want
of sale of the ore he will have to pay a
compensation running .into several ' thousands
of rupees to the workmen under the Industrial
laws. Besides, he may be threatened under
the Mineral Concession RuleR, 1949 for c:tneelJation of his lease for having a stopped
working of his areas. The petitioner there~
fore submits that an impossible situation has
been created by the respondent No. 1 by
issue of various Notices referred to above."
These facts are·not denied. Can this result, which
practica.lly destroyed the trade of the petitioner,
be described as a reasonable restriction on his
fundamental right? Under the colour of canalizing exports through specialized agencies or channels,
the Government conferred virtually a monopoly on
a public corporation, crippling in the process the
business of mine-owners like the petitioner.
Such
an unjust position cannot be brushed aside on a.
simple allegation that they ca.n export through the
C'?._rpo~ation. There may be some justification for
this, If the Corporation, after March 1959, and,
l>erore that, the establi~:Jhed ~~porters, were bouoq
108
1961
DartJ stm t~f BJ.imji
Oohil
v.
J oinl C/J ilj 011fttrolltr
ojlm~''' &.- J-;.•po•lr
Su66o Rao J .
SUPREME OOURT REPORTS [1063]
to some quota from the mine-owners like the
a.ppolla.ut.. The livelihood of a pen~on cannot be
made to depend upnn the pa88ing moods of an
offioor of a State corporation, however well-intentioned he may be in the discharge of his duties.
The sch~me of channelling of exports through an
agency or agencies could c~rtainly be dovetailed
with that of equitable apportionment of quotas
amongst porsons producing or doing business in
manganese oro without any dt!triment to the object
of promoting export trado. Any scheme of can·
allza.tion of oxport8 through specialized agencies
muMt be ~ovorned by d~finit.c rules whereunder
provhtiou ili made giving stability and ~uara.ntco of
fair treatment in ordinary times as wolJ aa in times
of emergency. For ins~mcc a.ppropriatf:l rules
could be fmmocl fixing quotaq for canh mine-owner
the expected total quantity of export, having
rogard to th.: quality and the quantity of manganese
produced. It may also bo no(;essa.ry to appoint an
expert body undl'r tho sa.id rules not only to adviso
ihe Stut(• in fixing the quota but al~o for fixing
reasonable priceA, having regard t.o the relevant
cirt:umsta.ncrs. Perhaps, many other methods may
be evoh•t->d to achieve the sa.id result. It is for the
Govt:rnment a.nd tho experts to do so. But what I
emphasize is
that matters
shall not
be
kept in & va6ue uncertainty in the minds
of, persons affoctod by the said
scheme,
but the Government shouhl evolve definite principles by making rules, of course providing for
omorgenciea and chango of <'ircumatanoes. I should
not he understood to have tied down the banda of
the r...cntral Government by tho said observatinnA,
for it ia left to it to make appropriate rules in the
light of the said observations.
At this stage, another contention of learned
counsel for the appellant may be noticed. He
argues that, unl688 a law is made by the State for
carrying on the business by a corporation, owned
..
2
s.c.n.
StlPREME OOUR'! REPORTS
109
1962
or controlled by the State, to the exclusion, complete or partial of citiz~ns, a virtual monopoly Daoa son of Bllimji
brought about by a,dministrative action under the
G()hil
v.
colour of a power to canalize the trade in . a Joint CMefControlJ"
commodity
through
specified of Imports~ EqrJf'tl
particular
channels must necessarilv be a.n unreasona;ble resSubbaRaoJ.
triction on the right of a.'' citizen to carry on his
business in that commodity. In support of this
contention reliance is place.d upon Art. J 9( 6) of the
Constitution, as amended by the Constitution (First
Amendment) Act, 1951, t.he material part of which
reads:
)
!
"Nothing in sub-clause {g) of the said
clause shall affect the operation of any t~xist
ing law in so fat· as it impo11ea, 1or prevent
the State from making any law imposing, in
the interests of the general public, reasonable
restrictions on the exercise of the right conferred by the said sub-clause, and, in particular, nothing in the said sub-clause, shall
affect the operation of any existing law in so
far as it relates to, or prevent the State from
making any law relating to,(i)
(ii)
.)
-..:
............ ' ........ ....... . ........ "' ........ .
~
the ca.rrying on by the State, or
by & ·corporation, owned or controlled by the State~ of any trade,
business, industry or service, whether
to the exclusion, complete or partial,
of citizens or otherwise."
The amended article does not proprio vigore confer
any power on the Stat_~ to create monopoJiea by
admini8trative action. But, it is only says that if
a valid law is made conferring a power on the
State to carry on trade or business to the exclu'sion,
complete or partial, of citizens, such a law will not
infringe the fundamental right. guaranteed under
llo
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [l003J
Jl/61
Art. 19 (l)(g) of the Constitution. It does not also
say,
as le-a.rn~d counst>l fot• tho appt•llant a.r,gue11,
D•"• JMI 11/ Bhimji
that. unle~s surh a lnw i~:~ madf•, every interference
(J~htl
v,
by the State with t.he trade of a citizen in exercise
J t~inl Cilitj C.UHur
uf lmptlrls d# &~~ of a powN und£'r 1wme other Jaw would neceBSarily
be an unreasonable restrictioll: such an interference
St~bb.t R.t1J,
will not have the protection of the amended provision of tho Constitution, but must be judged by the
standard provide-d by the first part of Art. 19(6); it
would be valid, if it was a reasonable restriction on
the exereise- of the petitioner's fundamental right
made in the intorest of the genPra.l public. The
decision of this Cmu t in Saghir Ahmad v. The State
of U. P. (1) does not rt>ally hdp the appeUant.
There, this Court W&B considering th~ question
whether the U. P. Road Transport Aot (II of 1951)
violated the fundamental rights of private citizens
guaranteed under Art. 19 ( 1)(g) of the Constitution,
and was protected by cl. (6) of Art. 19. The question fell to be considered on the basis of the article,
ae it stood before it was amended by the Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951. , This Court
held that it did offend the fundamental right. In
that context, this Court made the following observations:
"It ia quite true that if the present statute
was pa.Med after the C'oming into force of the
new clause in article 19l6) of the Constitution,
the question of reasonableneBS would not have
~risen at all and the appellant's ca.se on this
point, at any rate, would have been unarguable. These are however considerations which
cannot a.ft'ect our decision in the present case,
the amendment of tl:m" Constitution, which
oomc later, cannot be invoked to validate an
earlier legislation which must be re~arded aa
unconstitutional when it was pas&ed.'
(1)
(l9S5) 1 S.C R. 707, 727.
....
-:
·.
2 S.C.~.
SUPREME OOURr REPORTs
111
I do not see how these observations help the appellant. They only state the obvious, ne.mely, that if
the're was a law within the meaning of the amended
article, no question of infringing -the fundamental
right would arise. There is no force in this ,argument. This question anyhow does not affect my
decision, as I have come to the conclusion that the
Press Notes issued by the Government dearly infringed the fundamental right of the petitioner.
1961
Dava srm o( Bltimji
Goliil
\'.
Joint C!Ji1j Contro/u'
of Imports 46 Eyt~ttt
Sub~• BaoJ•
But, in view of the fact that the period for
which licence was asked had run out, the application in respect thereof has become infructuous and,
therefore has to be dismissed. In the result, the
appeal is dismissed, but, in the circumstances· of
this case, without costs.
STATE OF WEST BENGAL
v.
S. K. GHOSH
(H. P. SINHA, c. J., P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, K. N.
WANCHOO, N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR and
T. L. VENKATARAMA AIYAR, JJ.,)
I
>
: Attached Property, Dispasal of-Termination of Ot<imiMl
Proeeeding for scheduled offence-Order of District Judge-- Vali·
dity-Forfeiture, if a p~nalty-Oriminal Law Amendm~nt
Ordinance; 1944(38 of 1944), ss. 13(3), 12(1)3.-0riminal Law
Amendme11t Ordinance, 1943 (29 oj 1943), a3 amended by O,.iminal Law (1!143 Amendment) Amending 0, dinance, 1946{ 12
of 1945), s.10---0onstitution of India, Art. 20(1)-Indlan
Penal Oode, 1860(Act 56 of 1860), 86. 120B, 409, 53.
The respondent, who was the Chief Refugee Administrator
of Burma R.fugee Organisatjon from November, 1942, to
August 25, 1944, was tried under ss. 120B and 409 of the
Indian Penal Code by the Second Special Tribunal, functioning under the Criminal I.aw Ordinance No. 29 of 1943 as
amended by Criminal Law (1943 Amendment) Amending
Ordinance No. 12 ef 1945. On an application made ou
-
1962
.4pril 16.
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