DR. INDRAMANI PYARELAL GUPTA versus W.R. NATHU AND OTHERS.
Supreme Court of India | Decided 11 April 1962 | [1963] 1 S.C.R. 721 | 1962 INSC 137
Key facts
- Decided
- 11 April 1962
- Bench
- T.L. VENKATARAMA AIYYAR*, BHUVNESHWAR PRASAD SINHA, K. SUBBA RAO, N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR, J.R. MUDHOLKAR
- Bench size
- 5
- Case number
- CIVIL APPEAL No. 109/1957
- Disposal
- Dismissed
- Citation
- [1963] 1 S.C.R. 721
- Neutral citation
- 1962 INSC 137
Text of the judgment
•
1 S.C.R.
721
SUPR.EME UOL RT REPORTS
1
1
l>R. INDRAMANI PYARELAL GTJP1 A
v.
W.R. NATHU AND OTHERS.
J., K. SUBBA RAO, N. RAJ.A.GOP.A.LA
- (B. P. SINHA,
AYYANG.A.R, J. R. MunHOLKAR and T. L.
VENXA.T.A.RA.M.A. A!Y.A.R, JJ.}
c.
Forward Oontracts-Regulation of-Bye-laws empowering
cloaing out of hedge contracta--Validity of-If can operate
retrospectively-East India Ootton As1ociation Bye-laws cl.
62.A-Forward Contracts (Regulation) Act, 1962 (LXXIV of
1962), ss. 4, 11 and 12.
I
I
\
\
I
I
<
The appellants were members of the East India Cotton
Association which was an association recognised by the Cen•
tral Government under the Forward Markets Regulation Act,
1952. Prim to December 1955, they had entered into "hedge
contracts" in respect of cotton for settlements in February
and May 1956 in accordance with the bye-laws of the Associa·
tion. Towards tb.e end of 1955 it was apprehended that the
forward market in cotton was heading for a crisis aud the
Central Government issued notifications directing the Association to suspend business in hedge contracts for February
and May 1956 deliveries for short periods this did not improve
the situation. On January 21, 1956, the Central Govern·
ment, acting under s. 12 of the Act, made a new bye-law in
substitution of bye-Jaw 52AA of the Association which empowered the Forward Markets Commission, constituted under,
the Act, to issue a notification tlosing out all hedge contracts
at rates fixed by the Commission. On January 24, 1956, the
Commission issued a notification closing out all hedge contracts
including those subsisting on that date, and fixed the rates for
the settlement of such contracts. The appellants contended
that the amended bye.law 52AA was invalid as the power to
close out hedge contracts could not be conferred upon the
Commission and as the Association was in law incapable of
conferring such a power on the Commission or on any other
body and that in any cases the bye-law could not operate
retrospectively so as to affect existing contracts.
Held, (per Sinha, C. J., Ayyangar, Mudholkar and
Aiyar, JJ. Subba Rao, J. contra), that the amended bye-law
52AA was not ultra virc1 the Central Government and validly
empowered the Commission to close an hedge contracts in
cotton including existing contracts. Clause (f) of 1, .f. of the
Act provided that one of the functions of the Commission
722
~9G2
Dr. lnbom1r.i
p_,..,1.1 Gupta
v.
W.R. N itllu
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963]
shall be to perform such other duties and exercise such other
powers as may be assigned to the Commission "by or under
the Act, as may be prescribed". There was no limitation
upon the nature of the power that may be conferred under
cl. (f) except that .it must be in relation to the regulation of
forward trading in goods. It was not possible to place any
limitation on this power by invoking the rule of •jU11dt.m v•neri•
as there was no common positive thread running through
els. (a) to (e) of s. 4. To judge whether legally a rower could
be rested in a statutory body the proper rule o interpretation was that unless the nature of the power was such as to
be inconsistant with the purpose for which the body was
created or unless the particular power was contra-indicated
by any specific provisions of the Act, any power which fur·
thered the provisions of the Act could be legally conferred.
Judge by this test the power conferred by the bye-law could
be validly vested in the Commission. The power was one
conferred ''under the Act 0 • The words "under the Act 0
signified a power conferred by laws made by a subordinate
Jaw-making authority which was empowered to do so by the
Act. The impugned bye-law was clearly well within the
bye-Jaw making power under ••· 11 and 12. The bye-law
did not contravene article.• 64 of the Articles of Association of
the Association as articles 64 applied only to the Board and
placed no restrictions on the power of the Association.
We•tern India Thtatro• Ltd. v. Municipal Oorporaticn o/
Poona, [1959] Supp. 2 S.C.R. 71, Huhli Electricity Oo. Ltd. v.
Province of Bombay, 76 I.A. 57 and NarayanasUJamy Naidu v.
Krish11aMu,thi, I.L.R. 1958 Mad. 513, referred to.
' construction of the amended
Further, upon a proper
bye-law it applied not only to contracts to be entered into
in future but also to subsisting contracts. A statute which
could validly enact a law with retrospective effect could in
express terms v.alidly confer upon a rule making authority a
power to make a rule or frame a bye-law haviQg retrospective
operation. In the present case the power to make bye-laws
so as to operate on subsisting constracts followed as a necessary implication from the terms of s. I I. There was no contra
indication in the other provisions of the Act.
Per Subba Rao,J.-Under s. 12 (I) of the Act the
Central Governmei;it had no power to make a bye-law with
retrospective effect. The provision conferring rule making
power must be strictly construed and unless it expressly conferred a power to make a bye-law with retrospective effect, it
must be held that it was not conferred any such power. Evey
if it was permissible to inter such a power by nccessara
I
•'
1 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
723
impl\cation, it could :r\ot be inferred in the present
case. It co'uld not be said that i'mless retrospective operation
was gi·tren . to the provisions of s. 12, the object of the legislature would be defeated or the purposes for which the power
was conferred could not be fulfilled.
Further, the powers conferred on the Commission under
the impugned bye-law could not be performed by the Commission under cl. (f) of s. 4. Clauses (a) to (e) of s. 4 showed
that the functions of the Commission were wholly supervisory
and advisory in nature; the functions described in cl. (f) were
analogous to these and could only be supervisory or advisory.
The Commission had no administrative functions or powers
of management or powers of interference in the il).ternal
management of registered association which were vested in the
Association. The power conferred upon the Commission was
not conferred "under the Act". The words did not include a
rule or a bye-law, and applied only to an assignment made in
the exercise of an express power conferred under the Act.
The Central Government had no power under s. 12 to make a
bye-law assigning any functioa to the Commission.
Union of India v. Madan Gopal Kahra (1954) S.C.R. 541,
Modi Food Products Lt<i. v. Commissioner of Sales Tax, U .P.,
A.LR. 1956 All. 35, Strawboar<i Manufacturing Oo. Lt<i. v.
Gupta Mill Workers' Union, (1953) S.C.R. 439, India Sugar &
Rejineriu Lt<l. v. State of Mysore, A.I.R. 1960 Mys. 326,
O.W. Motor Service tP) Lt<l. v. State of Kerala, A.LR. 19)9
Kcrala 347, Howell v. Falmouth Boat Construction Co. Lt<l.
(1951) A.O. 837; The Western India TheatreJ Ltd. v. Municipal
Corporation onhe Oity of Poona, (1959) Supp. 2 S.C.R. 71 and
Hubli Electricity Oo. Ltd. v. Province of BomfJay ( 1948) 76 I.A.
5 7, referred to.
CrvIL APPELLATH JuRISDIOTION:
No.109of1957.
Civil Appeal
Appeal by special leave from the judgment
and order dated March l, 1956, of the Bombay
High Court in Appeal No. 20 of 1956.
G. 8. Pathak, K. H. Bhabha, H. M. Vakeel and
I. N. Shroff, for the appellants.
0. K. Daphtary, 8olic£tor General of India,,
B. K. [(hanna and P. D. Menon, for tho respondonts.
1962
Dr. l ~dram11ni
Py4relal Ouph
"·
W.R. JV1J1hu
...
724
1?8B
Jlr, Jnirtm•n•
/'µ111•1 0.:1..
••
W.ft. N•thu
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ~1963]
0. K. Daphtary, Solicitor General of India,
S. N. Andley, Rameshwar Nath and P. L. Vohra, for
the Interveners.
196l. April 11. The Judgm<>nt of Sinha
C. J., Ayyangar, Mudholkar and Aiyar, JJ., "ll'as
delivered by Ayyangar, J., Subha Rao, .J. deli'f'ered.
a separate judgment.
AYYANGAR, J.-This is an appeal by epecial
leave from the judgment of a Division Bench of the
Bombay High Court affirming the judgment of a
learned Single Judge whereby a petition filed under
Article 226 of the constitution by the appellants
was dismisaed. By their petition, the appellants
challenged the validity of a notification issued by
Forward Markets Commission a statutory body
created by the Forward Markets Regulation Act
1952 (LXXIV of 1952) (hereinafter referred to aa
the Act) to the authorities of the East India Cotton
Association, Bombay (which will be referred to as
the Association) intimating to them that the continuation of trading in certain types of forward contracts in cotton including that known as "hedge
contracts" was "detrimental to the interest of the
trade and the public interest and to the larger
interests of the economy of India" and directed
these contracts to be olo~ed out, to be settled at
prices fixed in the notification.
It is necessary tn set out briefly certain facts
in order to appreciate the points raised by the
appeal. The East India Uotton Association is an
"association" which has been recognised by the
Central Government under s. 6 of the Act. The
three appellants are members of the Association
carrying on business in partnership. The appellants had, prior to December 1955, entered into
•·hedges contracts" in respect with other membora
of the Asimciation for settlements in February and
May l!)(i(j. There was no dispute that these
l S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPL>RTS
-
725
contracts were in accordance with the bye-laws of
the Association as they stood at the date when the
contracts were entered into. The terms and
conditions of forward contracts in cotton including
"hedO'e contracts", a.nd the mannEir of their implement~tion, were governed by the provisions contained in certain bye-laws of the Association and of
these that relevant to the consideration of the
matters in this appeal was bye-law 52AA which
on the date when the appellantis entered into their
contracts ran aR follows:"52-A.A. ( l l whether or not the prices at
which the cotton may be bought or sold are at
any time controlled under the provisions of
the Essential Commodities Act, 1955, if the
Textile Commissioner with the concurrence of
the Forward Markets Commission and after
consultation with the Chairman (of the Board),
be of opinion that the continuation of hedge
trading i8
likely
to
result
in
a
sit~ation
deterimental
to the
larger
interests of t.he economy of India and so
informs the Board, the Board shall forthwith
cause ~ notice to be posted on the Notice
Boa.rd to that effect and on the posting of
such notice and notwithstanding anything to
be contrary contained in these bye-laws or in
any hedge or on call contract made subject to
these Bye-laws, the following provisions shall
take effect.
(2) Every hedge contract and every on
call contract in so far as the cotton is uncalled
thereunder or "in so far as the price bas not
been fixed thereunder entered into between
a member and a member or between a member
and a non-member then outstanding shall be
deemed closed out at such rate, appropriate
~? s1:1ch contr~c~ as shall be fixed by the
Iext1le Comm1ss10ner and the provisions
1962
Dr. lnd1•m•ni
,.y•rel.t Gu! tc
v.
W.R. N•ll'u
726
JOit
.Dt. lnlramani
P,.,,1al Gupta
••
W.R. N<tAu
..A.J:J•nt•t J.
SUPREME COlJRT REPORTS (1963J
of Clauses (3), (4) and (6) of Bye-laws 52A in
so far as they apply to hedge and on call
contracts, shall apply as if they formed part
of this Bye-law. After the affixation of the
said Notice on the Notice Board trading in
hedge and on call contracts shall be prohibited until the Textile Commissioner with the
concurrence of the Forward Markets Commission and after consultation with the Chairman,
permits resumption".
Towards the end of 1955 the Chairman of the
.Association appears to have apprehended that the
Forward Market in cotton was heading for a crisis
which was in part due to the transacting of unbridled option business, which though prohibited by the
Act and also by the bye-laws of the Association was
nevertheless indulged in on a large scale. The
chairman brought this situation to the notice of the
members of the Board of the Association at a
meeting held on December 16, 1955, and suggested
that they should give serious thought to this vital
problem. It may be mentioned that the government also were anxiously considering the steps to
be taken to solve or avert the crisiBI The action
which the government took in this matter iA reflectad in a notification issued by them on December 23,
1955, by which in exercise of the powers conferred
on them bys. 14;of the Act they directed the Association to suspend its business in Indian cotton
hedge contracts for delivery in February 1956 and
May 1956 for a period of 7 days with effect from
the date of the notification. The situation did not
apparently improve as a result of this temporary
suspension so that before the expiry of the work
fortnight, action under the same provision was
again taken). under a notification dated December
:10. 1955, by which the period of 7 days was extended by a further period of 7 days i. e. till 6. 1. 56'
A meeting of the Board of .Association was held on
I
1 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
727
January 6, 1956, i. e., the day on which the suspension of forward business expired 'when the following
resolution wa.s unanimously passed :"In view of the suspension of forward
trading by government the Boa.rd hereby /
resolves under bye-law 52 th!Lt an emergency
ha.a a.risen or exists and prohibits until further
notice, subject to the concurrence of the Forward Markets Commission as from Saturday,
the 7th January, 1956, trading in hedge contracts for February and May 1956, deliveries
above a maximum rate of Rs. 700/- per
candy".
Thereupon a suit (numbered as suit 2/1956) was
filed by a member of the AssoC'iation as repr~sen
ting himself and all other _members, on the original
side of the High Court, Bombay against the Association and its Board, challenging the validity of the
notification of Government suspending forward
trading, as also of the resolution of the Board, just
now extracted. An application for the grant of
interim stay was made for restraining the Board
from giving effect to its resolution but this was
refused by the learned trial Judge and an appeal
was filed against the refusal.
While things were in this state the Central
Government, in exercise of the powers conferred on
them by s. 12 of the Act, made a new bye-law
which was published in a Gazette of· India Extraordinary dated January 21, 1956, jn substitution of
bye Jaw 52 AA set out earlier. The n~w bye-law
ran:"52 AA (1) Whether or not prices at
which cotton may be bought or sold are at
any time controlled under the provisions of
the EQs mtial Commodities Act, 1955 if the
Forward Markets Commission is of the ~pinion
1111
Dr, fnd•11m1J11i
Pyar.Za(Gu;&•
v.
W.R. Nathu
.Ayyangar J.
728
-,.,.,!./ c.,,••
IHI
'Dr. lnt/raaai
w.a. ••N1111ru
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963]
that continuation or trading in hedge oontrao·
ts for any delivery or deliveries is detrimental
to the interest of the trading or the public
interest or to the larger interests of the economy of India and so notifies the Chairman, then
notwithstanding anything to the contrary
contained in these bye-laws or in any hedge or
on call contract made subject to these bye·
laws the following provisiona shall take
effect.
(2) Every hedge contract and every on
call contract in so far as the cotton is uncalled
thereunder or in so far as the price has not
been fixed thereunder and relating to the
delivery or deliveries notified under clause (1)
entered into between a member and a member
or between a member and a non-member then
outstanding shall be dermed closed out at
such rate appropriate to such contract and
with effect from such date a<1 shall be fixed by
the Forward Markets Commission and the
provisions or clauses (3 ), (4) and (6) of Byelaws 52-A in so far as they apply to hedge and
on call contracts shall apply as if they formed
pa.rt of this Bye-law".
This bye law was oommunioated to the Board
of the Association on Ja.nul\ry 23, 1956.
We might here state that the validity of this
new bye-law has been impugned on various grounds
and the alleged invalidity of this bye-law serves as
the ma.in foundlltion for cha.llene:ing the validity of
the notification of the Forward Markets Cvmmission
issued under the powers conferred by it.
On January 24, 1956, the appeal from the
order refusing the interim injunction in Suit No. 2 of
1956 was settled between the parties on the1e
terms:
"(l) 'fhe impu~ued resolution dated January
6, 1956, declared to be valid,
1 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT Rli:PORTS
729
(2) The Board of Directors to meet on Jann--~
111!
, &ry 25, 1958, and consider under bye-laws 52 (2)
whether the rate of Rs. 700 fixed under the said
resolution should continue or whether it should be
waived. In considering the same the Board will
apply its own mind and exercise its own judgment".
On the same day, i.e. January 24, 1956, the
Forward Markets Commission took action under the
,_,, powers vested in them under the new bye· law 52 AA
which had been made by government three days
earlier. By a communication addressed to the
Chairman of the Association, the Commission
stated:
"In pursuance of cl. (l) of the bye-law
52AA of the Bye-laws of the E.I.C.A. Ltd.,
Bombay I hereby notify to you that the Forward Markets Commission is of the opinion
that continuation of trading in the hedge
contracts for Febr1rnry and May 1956 delivery
is detrimental to the intPrests of the trade and
the public interest and the larger interest of
the economy of India and fixed under cl. (2)
of the said bye-law; that the rates prevailing
at the time at which the trading in the said
contracts clos·.'d on January 24, 195fi, viz.,
Rs. 700/- for February and Rs. 686 /8/- for
May delivery as tbB rates at which and January 25, 1956 as the date with effect from
which the hedge contracts and on call ccntracts in eo far as the cotton is uncalled thereunder or in so far as the price has not been
fixed thereunder relating to the said delivery
shall be deemed to be closed out".
Thereupon the three appellants who are partners cirrying on business in cotton und(•r the name
and st,yle of Indramani Pyarelal Co- moved the
. High Court of Bombay by a petition und 'r Art. 226
.,. of the Constitution on January 27, 1956, for a writ
bf mand'1.1nus or a direction in the nature of
Dr. lndrmfl•z'
'l'.JGr1lal G1111tc
"
WR. Nathu
730
-
1962
Dr. lntlrnt.ni
r,,...i.1 au;r.
v.
W.R. Nalflu
4yJa,,;01J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963]
mandamu,, against the members of the Forward
Markets Commission who were individually impleaded as respondents to the petition, ordering them to
ca.noel or withdraw the notification dated Ja.nuary
24, 1956, whose validity was impugned on varions
grounds. The petition was beard by a learned
single Judge who dismissed it by his order dated
February 23, 1956. An appeal was filed therefrom
to a Bench of the High Court and when this was
also dismissed the petitioners moved for & certificate
of fitness to appeal to this Court but the same having been rejected, they applied for and obtained
special leave from this Court, and that is how the
matter is now before us.
The submissions of Mr. Pathak learned Coun11el
for the appellant in support of the appeal may be
classified under three main heads : (l) The not ifiration dated 24th Jann&ry, 1956, served 'ln the Board
of the Association bv the Forward Markets Commission was ultra vires for the reason that bye-law
52AA as amended by the Central Government on
January 21, 1956, was invalid. (2) Assuming the
byelaw to be valid it oould not operate rfltrospectively or be availed of retrospectively so as to affect
rights under existing contracts subsisting on the day
the amended bye-law was notified in the Gazette but
that it could if at all. be validly applied only to
Forward hedge contracts entered into thereafter.
(3) The notification by the Forwa.rd Markets
Commission was improper and ma.la.fide and was
therefore invalid.
It would be convenient to deal with these
points in that order: (1) The first of the points
raised raises the question of the validity of bye-law
52 AA as amended by the Central Government on
Ja.nuary 21, 1956. Learned Counsel divided his
submission on this matter into two sub·hea.ils: (a)
that the Forward Markets Commission could not, on
a proper construction of the Act, be validly vested
1 s.c.R.
SUPREME OOURT REPORTS
731
with the power with which it was clothed by the
amended bye-law, and (b) that it was beyond the
power of the Association to have conferred the
power which it purported to do under the amended
bye-law 52AA. Put in other words, the objections
were that the Forward Markets Commission could
not, having regard to the terms of the statute under
which it was created, be a proper recipient of the
power with which it was vested by the bye-law and
secondly that the Association was in law incapable
of conferring that power on the Forward Markets
Commission or on any other body.
We shall first take up for consideration the
argument that the Forward Markets Commission
was in law incapable of being the recipient of the
power conferred by the bye-law under which it was
empowered to issue the impugned notification. For
this purpose it is n"'cessary to examine in detail
the rt>levant provisions of tbe Act. Section 2 (b)
defines 'Commission' as meaning "The Forward
Markets Commission" established under s. 3. Section
3 ( I ) enacts :
"3. (1) The Central Government may, by
notification in the Official Gazette establish a
Commission to be called the Forward Markets
Commission for the purpose of exercising such
functions and discharging such duties as may
be assigned to the Commission by or under
this Act."
The point urged by learned Counsel was that the
function or the duty cast upon it by the amended
bye-law 52 AA was not such as could be assigned
to the Commission "by or under this Act." The
meaning of the words 1 by or under' and the extent
and nature of the duties assigned to the Commission
by the Act will therefore i:eqnire careful examination. Section 4 relates to the functions of the
Commission and it is the l1roper com~truction of this
1962
Dr. 1nd1amani
Pyartlal Gupta
v.
W.R. N Chu
Ayyan7ar '·
732
SUPREME C()URT REPORTS (1963)
196t
se~tion. that has loomed ]urge in the arguments on
Dr. lntlramani
Pyar1/ol Gupta
this pomt. It is, therefore, necessary to set this out
in full :
v.
W.R.Nathu
"4. The functions of the Commission
shall be(a) to advise the Central Government in res·
pect of the recognition of, or the withdrawal
of recognition from any association or in respect of any other matter arising out of the
administration of this Act ;
•
(b) to lrnep""forward markets under observation and to draw the attention of the Central
Government or of any other prescribed autho.
rity to any development taking place, in or
in relation to, surh markets which, in the
opinion of the commission is of sufficient
importance to deserve the attention of the
Central Government and to make recommen·
dations thereon ;
(c) to collect and whenever the Commission
thinks it necessary publish information regarding the trading conditions in respect of goods
to which any of the provisions of this Act is
made applicable, including information regarding supply, dt>mand and prices, and to
submit to the Central Government periodical
reports on the operation of this Act and on
the working of forward markets relating to
to snt'h goods ;
(d) to make recommendations generally with
a view to improving the organisation and
working of forward markets ;
(e) to undertake the inspection of the
accounts and other documents of any reoognished association whenever it considers it
neceSBary ;"and
1 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
733
1961
(f) to perform such other duties and exercise
such other powers as may be assigned to the
Commission by or under this Act, or as may
be prescribed''.
Dr lndramani
Pyarelal Gupta
v.
W.R.Nalhu
.dyyangarJ.
Pa.using here it is neceBBary to add that the
expression "prescribed" fouud at the end of cl. (f)
has been defined by s. 2(h) of the Act to mean
''Prescribed by rules made under the Act".
Before considering the points urged as regards
the oonstruotion of this section taken in conjuction
with the terms of s.3(1) we shall refer to a few other
proyisions which are of some relevance in the present context. Section 3(2) which confers power on
the Central Government to call for periodical
returns from Recognised Associations and to
direct such enquiries as they consider necessary to
be ma.de, empowers the government to direct the
Commission to inspect the accounts and other
documents of any recognised Association or of any
of its members and submit its rAport thereon to the
Central Government [vide s. 3(2) (c)]. Sub·s. ( 4) of
this section enacts :
"8(4 ). Every recognised association and
every member thereof shall maintain suoh
books of account and other documents ad the
Commission may specify and the books of
account and other documents so specified
shall be preserved for such period not exceeding three years as the--Commission may specify
and shall be subject to inspection at all reasonable t.imes by the Commission".
- Section 28 reads :
"28. (l) The Central Government may, by
notification in the Official Gazette ma.ke rules
for the purpose of carrying into ~ffPct the ob-
jeote of this Act,
•
__
JHB ,
Dr. lodramaol
P:1ar1lal l1uplo
v.
W.R.Natlia
734 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1963]
(2) In particular, and without prejudice to
the generality of the foregoing power, such
rules may provide for(a) the terms and conditions of service of
members of the Commission ;
(b) the manner in whioh applications for
recognition may be made under section 5 and
the levy of fees in respect thereof ;
(c) the manner in which any inquiry for the
purpose of recognising any association may be
made and th<> form in which recognition shall
be granted;
(d) the particulars to be contained in the
annual reports of recognised associations ;
(e) the manner in which the bye-laws to be
made, amended or revised under this Act
shall, before boing so marie, amended or
revised be published for criticism ;
(f) the constitution of the advisory committees established under section 26, the terms of
office of and the manner of filling vacancies
among membPrs of the committee ; the interval within which meetings of the advisory
committee may be held and the procedure to
be followed at suoh meetings ; and the matters
which may be referred by the Central Government to the advisory committee for advice ;
(g) any other matter which is to be or may
be prPscribed."
The argument on this part of the case was brieCJy
t.his : The Forward Markets Commission is a
statutory body specially created for the purposes of
the Act. The powers which may ho conferred upon
the Commission and the duties which it may be
called on to discharge are therefore subject to the
provision~ of the Act. No more power can be
conferred upon this body than what the Act allows
1
s.c.R.
SUPREME COOH.1' REPORTS
735
and the power under the a.mended bye-law 52AA is
n<>t one which is contemplated by the Act as conferable on it. Section 4 <le fines the functions of the
Commission under five general heads (a) to (e) with
a. residuary clause contained in cl. (f ). The powers
or duties dealt with in els. (a) to {e) are in their
essence either recommendatory or advisory. In
the context therefore ''the other" duties or "other"
powers which may be assigned to the Commission
under cl. (f) must be either efuesdem ge:neri.-J with
advisory or recommendatory powers or of a nature
similar to those enumerated in the previous subclauses.
In support of t.hese submissions learned Counsel invited our attention to several decisions in
which ancillary powers which might be implied from
the grant of certain express powers were referred
to. In particular it was submitted that the Court
would not imply a power which it was not absolutely necessary to 'effectuate on express grant or was
need to prevent the nullification of an express
power that was granted. In our opinion, these decisions afford no assistance for resolving the controversy before us. There is no question here of deducing an implied power from the grant of an express
one. What we a.re concerned with is the scope of
an express power or rather whether the grant of the
power conferred upon the Commission by the bye·
law could be held to be a power which could be
assigned to the Commission under cl. (f). So far as
the terms of cl. (f) are concerned, there is no limitation upon the nature of the power that might be
conferred except, of course, that which might flow
from its having to be one in relation to the regulation of forward-trading in goods which the Act
is designed to effectuate. Any limitation therefore
would have to be deduced from outside ol.(f) of s. 4.
Ta.king ea.ch of the clauses (a) to (e), it is not possible to put them positively unuer one genus in order
1961
Dr. Indramani
PyartlaZ Gupla
v.
--
W.R. '1upta
A)')langat' J.
736
111111
Dr, lntlramani
Pp1lal Gup'a
••
W.R • .Nathu
dpcng,. J,
SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1963)
that there might be scope for the application of the
ejusdem generis rule of construction. Negatively, no
doubt it might be said that none of these five clauses
confer an executive power such as has been vested
in them by the amended bye-law 52AA but this cannot be the foundation for attracting the rule of
construction on which learned Counsel relies. On
the other hand, if there is no common positive
thread running throogh cls.(a.) to (e) such as would
bring them under one genus and negatively they do
not expressly include any administrative or executive functions, that itself might be a reason why
the expression "other" occurring in cl.(f) shoud receive the construction that it is intended to com·
prehend such a function. Learned Counsel further
suggested that even if the rule of ejusdem generis did
not apply, the allied rule referred to at page 76 of
the report of Western Jndi,a Theatres Ltd. v. Municipal Corporation of Poona, that the matters expressly
rflferred to might afford some indication of the kind
and nature of the power, might be invoked, but we
consider that, in the context, there is no scope for
the application of this variant either. What we a.re
here concerned with is whether it is legally competent to vest a particular power in a st!ttutory body,
and in regard to this the proper rule of interpretation would be that unless the nature of the power is
such as to be incompatible with the purpose for
which the body is created, or unless the particular
power is contra-indicated by any specifio provision
of the enactment bringing the body into existenoe,
any power which would further the provisions of
the Act could be legally conferred on it. Judged by
this test it would be obvious that the power conferred by the bye-law is one which could be validly
vested in the Commission.
A more serious argument was advanced by
learned Counsel based upon the submission that a
I S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
737
power conferred by a bye-law framed under s. 11
or 12 was not one tha.t was conferred "by or under
the Act or a.s m 1.Y be prescribed". Lea.rned Counsel
is undoubtedly right in his submissil)n tha.t a power
conferrAd by a. bye-law is not one conferred "by
the Act", for in the context the expression "conferred by the Act'' would mean "conferred expressly
or by necessary implication by the Act itself". It
is also common ground that a bye-law framed under
s. 11 or 12 would not fall within the phraseology ''as
may be prescribed", for the "expression" 'Prescribed'
has been defined to mean "by rules under the Act",
i.~., those framed under s. 28 and a bye-law is certainly not within that description. The question
therefore is whether a power conferred by a bye-law
could be held to be a power ''conferred iinder the
Act". The meaning of the word "under the .A.at" is
well-known. 1 'By" an Act would mean by a provision
directly enacted in the statute in question and which
is ga.therable from its express language or by necessary implication therefrom. The words "under the
Act'' would, in that context, signify what is not
directly to be found in the statute itself bu1; is conferred or imposed by virtue of powers enabling this
to be done; in other words, by laws made by a subordinate law-making authority which is empowered
to do so by the pa.rent Act. . This distinction ia thus
between what is directly done by the enactment
and what is done indirectly by rule-making authorities which are vested with powers in that behalf by
the Act. (vide Hubli Ekotricity Oompony Lt,d.
vs. Province of Bombay, and Narayanaswami Naidu
vs. Kriskna-Murthi.) That in such a sense bye-laws
would be subordinate-legislation ''under the Act"
is clear from terms of ss. 11 and 12 the:mselves.
Section 11 (1) enacts:
"l l. ( l) Any recognised association may,
subject to the previous approval of the Central
(1) 76 l.~. 57, 66.
(2) I.L.R. 1958 Mad 513, 547,
1962
Dr. fndramani
Pyarelal Gupta
"·
W.R. Nathu
Ayyangaf", J,
738
1962
Dr. lndramari
Pyarelol Gupra
v.
W.R.No.tlu
A)'yangar, .'
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963]
Government. make bye-laws for the regulation
and control of forward contracts'',
and sub-s. (2) enumerates the matters in respect of
which bye-laws might make provision. Sub-s. (3)
refers to the bye-laws as these made under this section
and the provisions of sub-s. ( 4) puts this matter
b~yond doubt by enacting:
"ll (4) Any bye-laws made under this
.•ection shall be subject to such conditions in
regard to previous publication as may be
prescribed, and when approved by the Central
Government, shall be published in the Gazette
of India r.nd also in the Official Gazette of
State in which the principal office of the
recognised association is situate ;
,,
Section 12 under which the impugned bye-law was
made states in sub-s. (2) :
"12 (2) where, in pursuance of this
section, any bye-laws have been made or
amended, the bye-laws so made or amended
shall be published in the Gazette of India
and also in the Official Gazette of the State
in which the principal office of the recognised
association is situate, and on the public&tion
there0f in the Gazette of India the bye-laws
so made or amended shall have effect as if
they had been made or amended by the
recognised association",
and in suh-s. (4):
"12. (4). The making or the amendment
or revision of any bye-laws under this section
shall in all cases be subject to the condition
of previous publication",
............................................................"
Having regard to these provisions it would not be
I S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
739
possible to contend that not .vithstanding that the
bye-laws are rulos made by an Association under
s. 11 or compulsorily m·t.de by the Central Government for the Association as its bye-laws under s. 18,
they a.re not in either case :)ubordinate legislation
under s. 11 or 12 as the case may be, of the Act and
they would therefore squarely fall within the words
'·under the Act" in s- 4(f). Indeed, we did not understand Mr. Pathak to dispu~e this proposition.
His contention however was that when cl. (f)
specifically made provision for powers conferred by
"rules" by the employment of the phrase ''or as may
be prescribed" and, so to speak, took the "rules"
out of the reach of the words "under the Act" it
must necessarily follow that every power confered by
Subordinate law-making body must be deemed to
have been excepted from the content of that expression and that consequently in the Content the word
"by the Act'' should be held to mean "directly by
the Act'' i.e., by virtue of positive enactment, of
the words "under the Act" should be held to be a
reference to powers gatherable by necessary implication from the provisions of the Act. As an
instance learned Counsel referred us 'to the power
of the Central Government to direct the Commission
to inspect the accounts and other doeuments of any
recognised association or of any of its members and
submit its report thereon to the Central Governm<'nt under s. 8 (2)(c) and suggested that this would
be a case of a power or duty which would be covered
by the words ''under the Act". We find ourselves
wholly unable GO accept this. If without the reference to the phrase "as may be prescribed'' the
words "under the Act" would comprehend powers
which might be conferred under ''bye-laws" as well
as those under "rules'' we are unable to appreciate
the line of reasoning by which powers conferred by
bye-laws have to be excluded, becau<ie of the
specific reference to powers conferred by "rules".
1962
Dr. Ind amani
Py12r1l I Gupta
v.
W.R. Nathu
A1yangar, J,
740
1961
Dr. lndramani
P.)11 rtlal Guptn
v.
W.R. Nathu
SUPREME-COURT REPORTS [1963]
Undoubtedly, there is some little tautology in the
use of the expression "as may be prescribed"
after the comprehensive reference to the powers
conferred ''under the Act", but in order merely to
avoii redundancy you Jannot adopt a rule of construction which cuts down the amplitude of the
words used except, of course to avoid the redundancy.
Thus the utmost that could be that though normally
and in their ordinary signification the words •'under
the Act" wou Id include both "rules" framed under
s.28 as well as "bye-laws" under s. 11 or 12, the
reference to "rules" might be eliminated as tautlogous since they have been specifically provided by
the words that follow. But beyond that to claim
that for the reason that it is redundant as to a part,
the whole content of the words "under the Act"
should be discarded, and the words "by the Act"
should be read in a very restricted and, if one may
add, in an unnatural sense as excluding a power confered by necessary implication, when such a power
would squarely fall within the reach of these words
would not, in our opinion, be any reasonable oonstruotion of the provision. We need only add that
the construction we have reached of s.4 (f) is reinforced by the hnguage of s. 3 ( 1) which is free from
the ambiguity created by the occurrence of the
expression "as may be prescribed" in the former.
We have therefore no hesitation in holding that
there was no incompetency in the Forward Markets
Commission being the recipient of the power which
was conferred upon them by bye-law 52AA as
amended.
The next pa.rt of the enomission in relation to
this matter was that it was not competent for the
Association to have framed this bye-law and that
the powers of the Central Government under s. 12
and of the Association under s. 11 in regard to the
framing of bye-law being co-extensive, the
bye-law framed was not competent to confer any
power on the commission.
...
I s.c.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
741
This contention was urged with reference to
two considerations:
(a) that a bye-law of the type now in controversy was llOt within s.11 of the Act, and ( lJ)
that haviug regard to the provision contained
in the Articles of Association of the Association the bye-law was beyond the powers of
the Association to frame. These we should
deal in that order.
1.962
Dr. Ind1amoni
Pyarllal J·upta
v.
W.R. NaChu
AyJangar J.
The first objection naturally turns upon whether the bye-Jaw is one which could be comprehended with s. 11 of the Act. Its first sub-section
enacts;
. "11(1) any recognised association may, subject to
the previous approval of the Central Govern·
ment, make bye-laws for the regulation and
control of forward contract."
That the impugned bye-law is one for the regulation and control of forward contracts cannot be
disputed, and the terms being very general would
include a bye-law of the type now impugned. In.
this connection reference may be made to byela.w 52AA which the impugned bye-law amended,
under which power was vested in the Textile
Commissioner with the concurrence of the Forward
Markets Commission, (though after consultation
with the Chairman of the Board) to direct the enclosure of hedge contracts and fix the 1~ates at
which such oontracts might be closed out -a provisi Jn whose validity was not impugned in the pres ~nt proceedings. Mr. Pathak no doubt submitted
that he was not precluded from challenging before
us even the earlier bye· law for the purpose of sustaining his argument that the amended bye-law
was 'tdt,ra vires, NevertheleEs it must be a.pparent
that it wa<J alwa.ys assumed that bye-laws which
vest in 1utllorities externa.l to the ABBociation the
..
I
742
19~B
--
Dr. /11tiramani
Pym/a/ Gupt.
••
W.R. N,tl.u
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963)
power to interfere with forward dealing was within· ,._
the scope of the. bye.Jaw making powers under
s. I I.
This general provision apart, sub-s. (2) of
a. 11 enact:
"ll(2). In particular, and without pre- •
judice to the generality of the foregoing "'
power, such bye-laws may provide for(a) ....................................................... .
(b) ........................................................ .
(c) ........................................................ .
(d) fixing, altering or postponing days for
settlement;
1
""'
(e) determining and declaring market rates,
including opening, closing, highest and lowest
rates for goods;
(f) ....................................................... ..
(g} ........................................................ .
•
(h) ........................................................ .
(i).
o o o o o o 0 o O O o o o O o O O o 0 O O O O o o o IO o o 0 o O O O o O o o O O O 0 t 0 0 0 0 O O O I I 0 0 I 0
(j) ........................................... ~·············
(k) ........................................................ .
(!)..........................................................
'-.
(m) .........................................................
(n) the regulation of fluctuations in rates ancl
prices;
(o} the emergencies in trade which may 11.ri!e
and the exercise of powers in such eme rgencies including the power to fix ma.ximum prices;
"'
1 S.C.R.
(p)
SUPREME COURT REPOR'l'S
743
--------------."
As the power of the Central Government to make
bye-laws under s. 12 is admittedly co-extensive
with the power of the Associations to frame byelaws, it is not necessary, to refer to the terms of
the latter section.
Before considering in detail the argument on
this part of the case we consider it useful to set out
a few of the bye-laws of the Association whose
validity has not been challenged and which would
show the manner in which the Association has
been functioning in emergencies such e.s that for
which the impugned bye-law provides, Bye-law 52
which still exists:
"52.( I) If in the opinion of the Board an
emergency bas a.rised or exists, the Board
may, by a resolution,
(i) passed by a majority of not less than - -
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - , . and
(ii) c o n f i r m e d - - - - - - - - - - prohibit, as from the date of such confirmation or from such later date as may be
fixed by the Board in the resolution referred
to in sub-clause (1),
(a) trading in the Hedge Contract for any
delivery or deliveries - - - - - - - - - or
(b) all tr&ding in such contracts as are referred
to in clause (a) for a specified period-----
''52A.-If the Board, at a meeting
specially convened in this behalf, resolve that
a st&te of emergency exists or is likely to
ooour such as shall in the opinion of the Boa.rd
make free trading in forward contracts extremely difficult, the Board shall so inform the
Forwal'd Markets Commission and 11pon the
J96Z
Dr. fndr•m•ni
P;111r1/al fJu~llJ
v.
W.R. N•thu
Ayyangar, J •
744
1968
Dr. lndramatti
Pyartlnl <Jupla
v.
W.R. Nalhu
.AJ;angar, J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963]
Forward Markets Commission intimating to
the Board its agreement with such resolution,
then notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in these bye-laws or in any
forward contract m.>de subject to these Bye.
laws, the following provisions shall take
effect( I) 'l'he Boa.rd shall at a. meeting speci·
ally convened in this behalf,
(a) fix a. date for the purpose hereinafter
contained,
(b) fix settlement process for forward con·
tract~,
(c) fix a special Settlement Day.
(2) ............... Every hedge contract
entered into between a member and a mem·
her or between a member and a non-member
outstanding on the date fixed under clause
(I)( a) hereof shall be demand closed out at
the rate appropriate to such contracts fixed
under clause (l)(b) hereof."
3-6-----------~~-~
and then follows Bye.Jaw 52AAA.
Apart for the amended bye-law occurring in the
group of existing bye.laws making provision for
emergencies to which sub-clause (o) of a.II (2)
refers. there is no dispute that there was an emergency in the forward market and that the impugned bye-law was framed to meet such a contingency.
It was not contended before us that the method by
which the emergency was resolved by the impugned
bye.faw-·viz., by closing out subsisting contraqt was
not the usual method employed for the purpose.
If therefore the bye-law was provision for an emer·
gency within s. l l (2)( o) then it would seem to
follow that for the resolution of that emergency,
1 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPOB'fS
745
every one of the matters which could be included
in such bye-laws would be attracted to it, and so
we find it impossible to accept Mr. Pathak's submission regarding the invalidity of the bye-Law.
An analysis of the impugnl3d bye-law 52AA and
comparison of it with that which it replaeed would
show that the main point of difference is that whereas formerly action to stop forward trading and for
closing out contracts and to fix the rate at which
contracts were to be closed out was vested in the
Textile Commissioner, acting with the concurrence
of the Forward Markets Commission, under the
amended bye-law the power is directly vested in the
Forward Markets Commission itself. The arguments addressed to us on this point are concerned
not so much with the propriety as with the vires of
a provisions by which the power to close out contracts by the issue of a. notification is veHted in the
Commission. Apart from an argument immediately
to be noticed, we do not see how, if such a power
could validly be conferred upon a Textile Commissioner or even exercised by the Board of the Association under a bye-law framed under s. 11, the
same would be beyond the power to make bye-laws
under s. 11 by the mere fact that the authority
vested with the power is the Forward Markets
Commission. We are clearly of the opinion that
bye-law 5.:'AA is well within the bye-law ma.king
power under s. 11 of the Act and therefore within
s. 12.
It was then said that the amended bye-law
52AA was invalid as in violation of the Articles of
Association of the Association being an impermissible
delegation of the powers vested in the board of the
Association by its Memorandum of Articles. In
this context Mr. Pathak placed reliance on cl. 64 of
the Articies as laying down the limits " ithin which
Dr. I11dran ani
Pyarelal Gupta
v.
W.R·Notliu
746
/Y6Z
Dr. Indramani
Pyortlal Gupttt
v.
W.R. Nat~u
4fJOngar J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1963]
the Board might delegate their powers. He contended that the conferment of the power to take action
on the Forward Markets Commission was thus con•
trary to and inconsistent with the powers of the
Association under this Article. It would be seen
that it' learned Counsel is right, this would render
invalid not merely bye-l&w 52AA as now amended
but even the bye-law as ·it originally stood, but as
already stated learned Counsel urged that he was
not precluded from raising this contention. This
point was not raised in the Court below but having
heard arguments on it we shall pronounce upon it.
We consider t.bat there is no substance in this
objection. Article 64 on which reliance was placed
runs in thPse terms:
"The Board may delegate any of their
powers, authorities and duties to committees
consisting of such mem hers or mem her.< of their
body or consiRting of such other members or
me-mbers Associate Members, Special Associate
Members or Temporary Special Associate Mem·
hers of the Association not being Directors, or
partly of Directors and partly of such other
ml'mbers and/or Associate Members, Speoial
Associate Members or Temporary Special AllSooiate Members as the Directors may think fit.
Any Committee so formed shall in the exercise
of the powers so delegated conforms to any
regulation that may from time to time be
imposed on it by the Directors".
In so far as the Memorandum is concemerl, its
paragraph III states the objects for which the
Association was established, as being, inter alia :
____
,,
-------"
(e) To make from time to time bye-laws
for--- - - - - - - - - - - t h e opening
a.nrl closing of market.II in cotton and the
l S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
747
times during which they shall open or closed;
the making performance and determination
of contr&cts-- - - - - - t h e prohibition
of specified classes of dealings and the time
during which such prohibition shall operate;
the provision of an dealing with 'Croners' or
•Bear Raids' in any and every kind of cotton
and cotton transactions so as to prevent or
stop or mitigate undue speculation inimical
to the trade as a whole; the course of business
between Original Members inter se or between
any of them on the one hand, and their constituents on the other hand, thef,forms of
contracts between them and their rights and
liabilities to each other in respect of dealings
in cotton-----------------"
The Articles dealing with bye-laws, the manner
in which they are to be made aR well as the subject to which they might relate is to be found in
Articles 73 and 74. The relevant portion of Article 73 runs:
"Under and in conformity with any Statutory provieions for the time being in force,
the Board may pass and bring into effect
such bye-laws as may be considered in the
interest of or conduciy-e to the objects of
the Association------------,----"
and Article 74 runs:
''Without prejudice to the generality of
the powers to make bye-laws conferred by
the Memorandum of Association and by these
Articles and under or in the absence or any
statute or statutes in force in that behalf, it
is hereby expressly declared that the said
powers to make, alter, add to, or rescined
Bye-laws including power to do so in reg-ard
to all or any of the followin~ m~tters--~-"
Sub-para. (7) repeats inter alia the contents of
1962
Dr. lndram11n;
Pyarelal Gupta
"·
W.H. Nalhu
Ayyangar J,
748
1961
IA. Jndramtni
P_,ar1lol Gupt•
y,
W.R. Natllu
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963]
Paragraph III (e) of the Memorandum of Association which we have extracted. The entire argu.
ment of Mr. Pathak on Article 64 was based on
the footing that the power to make a bye-law was
vested solely in the Board, because it is only the
powers of the Board that are subject to the limitation imposed by Article 64. If however the
power to make a bye-law was not confined to the
Board but bye-laws might be framed by the Asso.
ciation itself, the argument based on Article 64
would be seen to have no validity. That the
latter is the true position is clear from Article 73
which reads:
"The Board's powers as aforesaid in relation to bye-laws shall not derogate from the
powers hereby conferred upon the As~ocia
tion who may also in the same way and for
the same purpose from time to time pass and
bring into effect new bye-laws and rescind or
alter or add to any existing bye-law by resolution passed by a majority of two-thirds at
the least of the Members present and voting
at the General Meeting previous to which at
least fourteen day's notice has been given
that a Member intends at such meeting to
propose the making of such bye-law or the
decision, alteration of or addition to a bye.
law or bye-laws".
If therefore a bye-law could be made by the Association it is manifest that there is no limitation upon
its powers such as is to be found in Article (i4 which
applies only to the Board. The validity of the
bye-!R.w therefore cannot be challenge by reference
merely to the powers of the Board, because what is
contemplated bv s. 11 is the power of the "recognised Association" to frame the bye-law. We have
therefore no hesitation in rejecting the contention
that the bye-law as framed contravenes the rules of
the Association.
1 s.c.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
749
Mr. Pathak next contended that the impugned
bye-law was invalid because it operated retrospectively. This argument he presented under two
heads. His first submissjon was that consistently
with the rule that an enactment would not be
construed as retrospective unless the same were to
have that effect by express language or by necessR.ry
intendment, the impugned bye-law should be held
to affect and close out only those contracts, which
were entered into after the date on which tne byelaw came into operation and that if he was right in
this construction, the impugned notification had gone
beyond the powers conferred on the Commission by
the new bye law. We are wholly unable to accept
this submission as to the construction of the byelaw. The first paragraph of the bye-law hy its last
words points out the consequence of a notification,
by the Forward Markets Commi~sion. It provides
that if the Cha.irma.n were notified that the continuation of trading in hedge contracts for any delivery etc. "was detrimental to the interests of the
general public or the larger interests of the economy
of India.'' then notwithstanding anything to the
contrary contained in the bye· laws of the Association or in any hedl?e etc. contract the provisions
contained in the second paragraph should have
. effect. If one had regard only to paragraph I and
nothing more there might be some room for a
plausible argument that subsisting contracts were
not to be affected, though the expression "notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any
hed,l?A eto. oontraot'' would undoubtedly militate
a.gain~t any such contention. But such ambiguity
ifany is cleared by the provision in paragraph 2
which has effect on the notification under paragraph
r, for bv ex:ore~s terms it refers to "every hedCTe
contract" and "every on call contract" ''in so f~r
as cotton is uncalled therAnnder or in so far as the
pnoe has not been fix"ed thAreunder" This therefore places it beyond doubt that executory contracts
1962
Dr. 1ndramani
Py.re/al Guplt
v.
W.R. Nathu
Ayyangar J.
750
1962
Dr. Indrom."i
Pyar1lal c,,,1a
••
W.R. Nathu
@an1arJ.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1963]
which were subsisting on the date of the notification
were within its scope and were intended to be
affected by it. And this, if anything more were
needed, is made more certain by the reference in
parts (2) to the provisions of els. (3), (4) and (6) of
bye-law 52A. Bye-law 52A deals with oases where
the Board of the Association resolves, to repeat its
terms "that a state of emergency exists or i8 likely
to occur which makes free trading in forward contracts lifficult and on obtaining the concurrence of
the Forward Markets Commission, then notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in these
Bye-laws subject w these Bye-/,aws. The following
provision shall have effect :
"(l) The Board shall at a meeting specially convened in this behalf,
(a) fix a"date for the purposes herein·
after contained,
(b) fix settlement prices
contracts,
for
forward
(o) fix a special Settlement Day."
Clause (3) of bye-law-52A runs:"52A (3) All differences arising out of
every such contract between members shall
be paid through the Clearing House on the
Settlement Day fixed under clause (1) (o)
hereof.................................................. ".
Clause (4)
"52A ( 4) All differences arising out of
every such contract between a member and a
non-member shall become immediately due
and payable."
and Clause (6)
"52A (6) In hedge and on call contracts
entered into between a member and a nonmember and in contracts to which clause (5)
l S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
751
applies, any margin ·received sha11 be adjusted
and the whole or the balance thereof, as the
case may he, shall be immediately
refundable."
It is thus clear that the entire machinery for resolving emergencies such as is contemplated by bye-
law 52A includes the suspension of forward business together with the closing out of forward
oontra.cts of hedge and on call types whose . volume
or nature had led to the emergency. It proceeds
on the basis that the crisis could not be met unless
subsisting contracts were closed out and, so to
speak, a new chapter begun. That is the ratio
underlying the combined effect of bye-laws 52AA
and 52 A and in view of this oircumstanoe the
a.rgument that on a reasonable construction of the
amended bye-law it would apply to constracts to be
entered into in future and not to subsisting oontra.ots must be rejected.
If he was wrong in his argument that the byelaw on its proper construction did not affect subsisting contracts such as these of the Appellants, Mr.
PS.the.k's further submission was that the impugned
bye-law was invalid and ultra vires of the Act
because it purported to operate retrospectively
affecting vested rights under con tracts which were
subsisting on the day ·on which the bye-law came
into force.
Mr. Pathak invited our attention to a passage
in Craies' Statute Law, 5th Ed. p. 366 reading:
"Sometimes a. statute, although not intended to be retrospective, will in fa.ct have a
retrospective operation. For instance if two
persons enter into a. contract, and afterwards
a statute is passed whioh, as Cockburn, C. J.
aaid in Duke of Devonshire v. Barrow, eto,,
Co. (1877) 2 Q. B. D. 286, 289) 'engrafts an
enactment upon existing contracts' and
Il6t
Dr. lrulraaani
Py•rel11l fluJta
v.
W.H'. N•tlw
752
-1962
Dr. InJrammi
r,ar1lal <Jup' a
v;
W.R. Nal/iu
SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1963)
thus operates so as to produce a result which
is something quite different from the original
intention of the contracting parties, such
a statute has, in effect a. retrospective
operation."
The bye-law in so far as it affects executory contra.·
c1 s requiring such contracts to be closed out on a.
day not originally contracted for a.nd a.t a prioe
fixed by law is in the above sense undoubtedly
retrospective. The submission of learned Counsel
was that thoµgh a legislature which had plenary
power in this regard could . enact a statute
having a. retrospective operation, Subordinate
legislation, be it a. rule, a bye-law or a. notification,
could not be ma.de so as to ha.ve retrospective
operation and that to that extent the rule, bye-la.w
or notification would be ultra virea and would ha.ve
to be struck down, relying for this position on the
decision of the Mysore High Court reportt.d in AIR
1960 Mys. 326. We do not however consider it
neoessary to canvass the correctness of this decision
or the broad propositions laid down in it. It is
clear la.w th•.t a. Statute which could validly enact
a la.w with retrospective effect could in express
terms validly confer upon a rule-making authority
a. power to make a rule or .frame a. bye-la.w having
retrospective operation and we would add that we
did Iiot understand Mr. Pathak to dispute this
position. If this were so the same result would
follow where the power to enact a. rule .or a byelaw with "retrospective effect" so a.s to affect pend·
ing transactions, is conferred not by express words
but where the necessa.ry intendment of the Act
confers such a. power. If.in the present case the
power to ma.ke a. bye-law so a.a to operate on
contracts subsisting on the day the liame wa.s
framed, would follow a.s a neoessary implication
from the term ofs. 11, it would not be necessary
to discuss the larger question as to whether anrl the
1 S. C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
753
circumstances in which Subordinate legislation
with retrospective effect could be validly made.
Before proceeding further it is necessary to
notice a submission that under the Act, far from
there being a conforment of power to make a byela.w so as to affect rights uncler subsisting contracts,
there was a contra. indication of such a. power
being conferred. In this connection Mr. Pathak.
invited our attention to the terms of ss. 16and17
and 19 of the Act under which the Act has itself
made special provision for affecting rights such as
those if the appellants in the present case. Detailing the consequences of a notification under s. 15,
s.16 (a) enacts:~
"16 (a) Every forward contract for the
sale or purchase of any goods specified in the
notification, entered into before the date of
the notification and remaining to be performed
after the said date and which is not in
conformity with the provision of section 15,
shall be deemed to be closed out at such rate
- as the Central Government may fix in this
behalf.
S. 17 (3) enacts
''17. (3) Where a notification has been
isaued under au b-aection ( 1), the provisions
of section 16 shall, in the absence of anything
to the contrary in the notification, apply to all
forward contracts for the sale or purchase of
any goods specified in the notification entered
into before the date of the notification and
remaining to be performed after the said date
as they $-pply to all forward contracts for the
sale or purchase of any goods specified in the
notification under section 15."
and f. 19 (2) runs:"19 (2). Any option in good whioh has
been entered into before the date on which
--
Dr. lntlratHlll
Pyarllol Gupta
v.
W.R. Naehu
AJJ>angar, J.
754
1912
IJr. lndram•n.i
l'J•rtlal C.:u,;to
••
W, R.N•liw
SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1Q63]
this section comes into force and which remains to be performed, whether wholly or in
part, after the said date shall, to that extent,
becomes void."
Based on these provisio,ns the submission waa that
Act had made special provisions for retrospective
operation of certain notifications so as to affect rights
~nder subsisting contracts and that in cases where
there was no such specific provision it was not intended that a bye-law or a notification could haye
that effect.
We see nQ force in this argnment. The fact
that the Act itself makes provision for subsilting
contracts being affected, would in our opinion far
from ~upporting the appellants indicate that in the
context of a crisis in forward trading the closing
out of contracts was a necessary method of exercising control and was the machanism by which the
enactment contemplated that normalcy could be
restored and healthy trading resumed.
If therefore we eliminate the provisions in
ss.16, l 7 and 19 as not containing any indication that
a power to frame a bye-law with retrospective
effect was withheld from the Association, the question whether such bye-law-making power was
conferred has to be gathered from the terms of
s. 11 itself. Thus conside.red we are clearly of the
opinion that a power to frame a bye-law for emergencies such as those for which a bye-law like-52 AA
is intended includes a power to frame one so as to
affect subsisting contracts for resolving crisis in
Forward Markets. We have already referred to
the terms of bye-law 52A which shows that ll'hen
an emergency of the type referred to a. 11 (2) (a}
arises it is not praotioable t-0 rescue & forward market from a crisis without (l) putting ari end to
forward trading, and (2) closing out subsi1ting
contracts so as· to start with a clean slate for tho
l S.C.R.
SUPREME OOURT REPORTS
755
future. When therefore under s. 11 ( 2) power is
conferred to frame a. bye-law to provide for:
"(0) the emergencies in trade which may
arise and the exercise of power in such emergencies including the power to fix maximum and
minimum prices;"
and this is read in conjunction with clause (g)
reading:
"regulating the entering into, making, performcmoe, rescission and termination of contraots ••.•••.•.•.•... ''
It is manifest that the section contemplates the ma.king of a bye-law regulating the performance of contracts, the rescission and termination of contracts
and this could obviously refer only to the bye-law
affecting rights under contracts which are subsisting
on the day the action is taken. It is therefore
manifest that s. 11 authorises the framiQ.g of a byelaw which would operate retrospectively in the sense
that it affects rights of parties under subsisting
oontracts. Finally it should be . borne in mind is
that ultimately what we are concerned in s. 11 of
the Act is the power of the Association to frame
the bye-law, for if the·Assooia.tion could validly
frame such a bye-law, the Central Government
oould under s. U have a. similar power. We did
not hear any argument to establish that the Asso<'iation had no such power.
'
There is ·one other aspect in which the same
problem might be viewed and it is this : The
contract entered into by the respondents purported
he one. under the 'bye-laws jqr the time being inforce
&nd any change in the bye-laws therefore would
sa.m to be contemplated and provided for by the
contract itaelf, so that it might not be correct to
epeak of the new bye-law as affecting any accrued
'°
1961
Dr. lnlir•m•ni
Pyar1lol Gu~to
v.
11.R. N•thu
Ayy•nf•' J.
756
""
Dr. /ndren.ani
PJac1lal Gup'a
••
W,b. Nalhu
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963]
rights under a contract. For when those bye-Ia we
were altered the changes would get incorporated
into .the contracts themselvPs, so as to afford no
scope for the argument that there has been an
infringement of a vested right. In the view however which we have taken about the validity of the
bye· law on the ground that it was well within the
terms of as. 11 and 12 we do not consider it necessary to pursue this aspect further or to rest our
decision on it.
What remains to consider is the challenge to
the notification based on the ground that it was
vitiate<j by having been issued male.fide.
The
ground of malsfides alleged was that the impugned
notification was issued in order to prevent the
Board of Directors of the Association from applying their minds and exercising their judgment which
they were directed to do by the terms of the Con·
sent Memo filed on which the appeal from the judgment in C.S- 2 of 1956 was disposed of on Januar.Y
24, 1956. To the allegation made in this form in
the petition the first respondent, the Chairman of
the .Forward Markets Commission, filed an affidavit
in the course of which he pointed out that the continuance of trading in futur11s was in· the ciroums,
tances then prevailing in the market detrimental
to the· interests of the trade and that a conclusion
on this matter had been reached by the Commission
even before bye-law 52 AA was amended, that the
question of closing out existing contracts was
engaging the attention of even the Board of the
Aesociation from as early as· the beginning of
January 1956 and it was for the purpose of enabling
the Commission to take action to set right matters
that bye-law 52AA was amended and that immediately the amended bye-law came into force the Com·
mission took action and issued the notification ·now
impugned.. He also pointed. out that the lilierty
given to the Association to consider the matter
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1 S.C.R.
757
under the terms of the Compromise Memo was a
factor which had also been taken into account before the notification had been issued. The learned
Judges of the High Court accepted this explanation
of the circumstances in which the notification came
to be issued and considered that on the allegation
in the petition no malafides could be inferred. We
are in entire agreement with the learned Judges of
the High Court on this point. No personal motive
or ma.la.tides in that sense has been attributed to
the members of the Commission and in these circumstances we consider that there is no basis for
impugning the notification on the ground that it
was not issued bonafide.
196%
D1. J1,dr.,mani
Pyarelal Gupta
v.
W.R.N4;h,11.
.4.yyangar J.
\
This completes all the points urged by the
learned Counsel for the appellants. We consider
that there is no merit in the appeal which fails and
is dismissed with costs.
SuBBA.. RAO, J.-I regret my inability to
agree with the judgment prepared by my learned
brother Rajagopala Ayya.ngar, J. A.i the facts
have been fully stated in the judgment of my learned brother, I need not repeat them except to the
extent necessary to appreciate the two points on
which I propose to express my opinion.
The appellants carry on business in cotton
under the name and style of Indrama.ni Pyarelal
Gupta & Co. The said firm is a member of the
.E"st India Cotton Association Limited, which is a
recognized Association within the meaning of the
Forward Contracts (Regulation) Act, 1952, hereinafter called ''the Act". The Association has been
formed for the purpose of, int,er alia, promoting and
regulating trade in cotton and providing a cotton
Exchange and a Clearing House. Under the Act a
Forward Markets Commission W88 formed by the
Central Government and respondent is its Chairman and respondents 2 and 3 are it_s .Members.
Subi• Ra~J.
758
Jg6!
• . lnir•mAni
l'y1rel•l Gu,I•
~.
1'.lt. N •thu
SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1963]
Prior to Ja.nua.ry 21, 1956, on behalf of themsell'M
and their constituents, the appellants entered into
hedge contracts in cotton for Febru_a.ry 1956 and
Ma.y, 1956 Settlements with other members of the
Assooia.tion in accordance with its bye-la.ws. When
the said contracts were effected, bye-la.w 52 AA ra.n
a.s follows :
"(l) Whether or not the prices a.t which
cotton may be bought or sold are a.t any time
controlled under the provisions of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955, if the Textile
Commissioner with the concurrence of the
'.Forward Markets Commi8sion and after consultation with the Chairman, be of opinion tha.t
the continuation of hedge trading is likely to
result in a situation detrimental to the larger
interests of the economy of India. and so
informs the Board, the Boa.rd shall forthwith
cause a notice to be posted on the Notice
Board to that effect and on the posting of
such notice and notwithstanding anything to
the contrary contained in these Bye-laws or
in any hedge or on ca.11 contra.ct ma.de subject
to these Bye-la.ws, the following provision
shall take effect.
(2) Every hedge contra.ct a.nd every on
ca.11 contract in so far as the ootton is uncalled
thereunder, or in so fa.r as the price ha.a not
been fixed thereunder, entered into between
a member a.nd a. member or between a. member and a non-member then outstanding shall
be deemed olosed out at such rate, sppropri·
a.te to suoh oontract, as eha.11 be fixed by the
Textile Commissioner and the provisions of
clauses (3), (4) a.nd (6) of Bye.law 52-A, in 110
far as they apply to hedge and on call contracts, shall apply as if the formed part of thil
Bye-la.w.
After the affixation of the 1!111.id
notice on the Notice Boa.rd, trading in hedge
l S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
759
and on ca.11 contracts shall be prohibited until
the Textile" Commissioner with the concur·
rence of the Forward Markets Commission
and after consultation with the Chairman,
permits resumption''.
On January 21, 1956, the Centra.l Government, in
exercise of power conferred upon it by sub-s. (I) of
s. 12 of the Act, notified a new bye-law 52-AA to be
substituted in pla.ce of the earlier bye-law 52-AA.
The new bye-law reads as follows :
"(l) Whether or not prices at which
Jotton may be bought or sold are at any time
controlled under the provisions of t;he Essential Commodities Act, 1955, if the Forward
Markets Commission is of the opinion that
continuation of trading in hedge contract for
any deli very or deliveries is detrimental to
the interest of the trading or the public interest or the larger interests of the economy of
India and so notified the Chairman, then notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in these Bve-laws or in a.ny hedge or on
call contract ma.de subject to these Bye-laws
the following provisions sh,tll take effect.
(2) Every hedge contract and every on
call contract in 130 far as cotton is uncalled
thereunder and relating to the delivery or
deliveries notified under clause (I) entered
into between a member and a member or
between a member and non-member then
outstanding shall be deemed closed out at
such rate appropriate to such contra.ct and
with effect from such date as shall be fixed
by the Forward Markets Commission and the
provisions of Clauses (3), (4) and (6) of Bye-law
5·!A in so far as they apply to hedge and on
call contracts shall apply as if they formed
part of this Bye-law."
1911
a"""'
Dr. lnt/1
i
Pyar1lal GU'Jlt•
v.
W.R Nathu
Subba Ra.]J.
760
1962
D,. /ndn mani
P;1a tlol Gupta
y,
W.1'. Nathu
Subba Rao J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1963)
On January 24, 195(}, the Forward Markets Commission, in exercise of the power conferred on it
under the new bye-law, issued a notification closing
out all contracts of February 1956 and May 1950
Settlements at the rates mentioned in the said
notification. The petition for a writ of mandamus
filed by the appellants in the High Court of Judicature at Bombay for ordering the respondents to
oanclll or withdraw the said notification dated
January 24, 1956, was dismissed int.he first instance
by CoyajP.e, J., and, the appeal preferrPd against
the judgment of Coyajee, J., was also dismissed by
a division Bench consisting of Chagla, C.J., and
Tendolkar, J. Hence the appeal.
I pnrpose, as I have already indicated, to
consider the following two questions, as in the view
I will be taking on those questions, the appeal will
have to be allowed, and no other question, therefore, will arise for consideration. The said questions
are :, (I) Whether under s. 12 (i) of the Act the
Central G·overnment has power to make a bye-law
with retrospentive effect; and (2) whether under
s. 4 (f) of the Act, the Forward Markets Commission
can exercise a power assigned to it under a bye.Jaw
made by the Government under a. 12 of the Aot.
Before considering the soope of the power of
the Central Government under s. 12 (1) of the Act,
it is necessary to consider whether the new bye·
Jaw notified on January 21, 1956, has retrospective
effect. There are material differences between the
old bye-law 52-AA and the new one subs!·;tuted
in its place. Under the new bye-law the important provision is that all hedge contracts outstanding at the time it came into force shall be deemed
to be closed out at such rates as shall be fixed by
the Textile Commissioner. Whereas under the
old bye·law the Textile Commissioner had to form
his opinion with the concurrence of the Forward
l\farkets Commission and after consultathn with
1 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPOR~rs
761
the Cha.irma.n, under the new bye-law the said
power of forming an opinion is conferred solely on
the Forward Markets Commission. Whereas under
the old bye-law the opinion antt was in regard
to the question whether hedge trading was likely
to result in a situation detrimental to the larger
interests of the economy of India under the new
bye·law the opinion is in respect of the question
whether the continu&.tion of trading in hedge contracts will be detrimental to the interests of trading or the public interest or the larger interests of
the economy of India. While under the old bye·
law the question to be considered was in regard to
hedge trading as such, under the new bye-law it is
in respect of the continuation of trading in hedge
contracts for any delivery or deliveries. While
under the old bye-law the said opinion was comm.
unicated to the Board for action, under the new
bye-law it is notified to the Chairman. While
under the old bye-law trading in hedge and on call
contracts could be resumed if the Textile Comm·
issioner, with the concurrence of the Forward
Markets Commission and after consultation with
the Chairman, permitted the resumption, under the
new bye-law the said provision for resumption is
omitted. It is, therefore, manifest that the power
of closing out a contract under the new bye-Jaw
differs from that under the old bye law in respect
of the purpose of closing out, the authority empowered to order the close out and the consequences
of such closing out. It is idle to contend that the
new bye law makes only inconsequential changes in
the old bye-law. The new bye-law operates upon
an imvortant te1m of a contract entered into before
it came into force, namely, the mode of performance:
it carries on its face the vice of retroactivity. In
Craies on Statutes, 5th Edn. p, 366, the following
passage appropriate to the question now raised
is found
" .................. if a statute is passed which
l90t
Dr. lndramani
PJarelal Gupta
v.
W.R. N~thu
Subba Rao .1,
762
1111
Dr. lndt omor1i
Pyarelal Gupt•
v.
W.R. Nathu
SUPREME OOURT REPORTS [1963]
renders the performanoe or a contract impo.
ssible, the rule or law is that the contract is
frustrated hy supervening impossibility: con.
sequently in this case also the statute operates
retrospectively."
SubbaRao J.
The learned author proceeds to state at
p. 367:
"The principle or this case has ·been app·
lied in later cases to contracts the perfor.
mance of which in manner contemplated by
the parties has been rendered impossible by
reason of some change in the law."
It is, therefore, clear that the said bye-law,
in so far as it purports to effect the mode of per.
formance of the pre-existing contracts, is certainly
retrospective in operation. I am· assuming for the
purpose of the· present question ~hat the bye. Jaw
cannot be construed in such a way as to confine
jts operation only to contracts that are entered
into after it came into force. Ir so, the question
arises whether the Central Government had power
to make a bye law under s. 12 (I) of the Act with
retrospective effeot·Section 12 (l) of the Act reads:
"The Central Government may. either
on a request in writing received by it in thi1
behalf from the governing body of a recognized
association, or if in its opinion it is expedient
so to do, make bye-laws for all or any of
the matters specified in section .11 or &111end
any bye laws made by such association un<J.er
that section.'
Section 11 enumerates the matters in respect
of which the recognized associations can make bye.
laws for the regulation and control of forward con·
tracts. Neither s. 12 nor s. 11 expressly 1tates
that & bye-law with retrospective operation oa.n be
made under either of those two se.ctions. Full effect
1 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
763
oa.n be given to both the sections by recognizing a
power only to make bye-laws prospective in opera·
tion, that is, bye•la.ws that would not affect a.ny
vested rights. In the circumstances, ca.nit be held
that the Central Government to which the power
to make bye-laws is delegated by the Legislature
without expressly conferring on it a power to give
them retrosp"ctive operation can exercise a power
thereunder to make such bye-laws. Learned counsel for the respondents contends that, as the Legislature can make a law with retrospective operation,
so too a delegated authority can make a bye-law
with the same effect. This argument ignores the
essential distinction between a. Legislature functioning in exercise of the powers conferred on it under
the Constitution and a body entrusted by the said
Legislature with power to make subordinate
Legislation. In the case of the Legislature, Art. 246
of the Constitution confers a plenary power of
Legislation subject to the limitations mentioned
therein and in other provisions of the Constitution
in respect of appropriate entrieR in the Seventh
Schedule. This Court, in Union of India v. Madan
Gopal Kabra ( 1 ), held that the Legislature can always Legislate retrospectively; unless there is any
prohibition under the Constitution which has crf'ated it. But the same rule cannot obviously be
applied to the Central Government exercising
delegated Legislative power for the scope of their
power is not co-extensive with that of Parliament.
This distinction is . clearly broughtout by the
learned Judges of the Allahabad High Court in
Modi Food Produds Ltd. v. Commissioner of Sales-Tax,
U. P. \ 2 ), wherein the learned Judges observed:
"A Lf"gisla.ture can certainly give retrospecti 1e effect to pieces of v~gislation passed
by it but an exflcutive Government exercising subordinate and delegated legislative
(1) (\954-1 S. C. R. 541.
(2) A. T. R. 1'56 All. 35.
Jl61
Dr. Irultamnl
P_,orelal Gulltl
v.
W.R. Nothu
Subb11RuJ.
764
Iut
Dr. Ir dratn'11 l
PJar.lal Gup•o
••
W.R.Nalhu
S«U•RooJ.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963]
powers, cannot make legislation retrospective
in elf'eot unless that power is expreBSly
conferred."
In Strawboard Mamifacturing Co. Ltd. v. Gutt.a Mill
Workers Union (1 ) a question arose whether the
Governor of U. P., who referred an industrial
dispute to a person nominated by him with a
direction that he should submit the a.ward not later
than a. particular date could extend the date for a.
making of the award so as to validate the a.ward
made after the prescribed date. Reliance was
placed upon s. 21 of the U. P. Genera.I Clauses Act,
1904, in 1mpport of the contention that the power
of amendment and modification conferred on the
State Government under that section might be so
exercised as to have retrospective operation. In
rejecting that contention, Das, J., as he then was,
observed :
"It is true that the order of April 26,
1950, does not ex fac-ie purport to modify the
order of February 18, 11150, but, in view
of the absence of any distinct provision in
section 21 that the power of amendment and
modification conferred on the State Government may be so exercised as to have retrospective operation the order of April 26, 1950,
viewed merely as an order of amendment or
modification <'.annot, by virtue of section 21,
have that effect."
This decision is, therefore, an authority for the
position that unless a statute oonfers on the
Government an express power to make an order
with retrospective effect, it cannot exerciRe such a.
power. The Mysore High Court in a. considered
judgment in India Sugar & Refineries LW,. v. St,aoo of
JJfysore (') dealt with the question that now a.rites
for consideration. There, the Government iBSued
(I) [1953) S.C.R. <39, 447-448.
(2) A.[, R. 1960 Mys. 526,
1 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPOR~rs
765
there notifications dated 9-4-1956, 15-10-1957 and
13-2-1958 purporting to act under s. 14 (1) of the
Madras Sugar Factories Control Act, 1949, whereby
cess was impos~d on sugarcane brought and crushed
in petitioner's factory for the crushing season 195556, 1956 57 and 1957-58 respectively. One of the
question raised was whether under the said section
the Government had power to issue the notifications
imposing a cess on sugarcane brought and crushed
in petitioner's factory for a period prior to the date
of the said notifications. Das Gupta, C. J., delivering the judgment of the division Bench, held that
it could not. The learned Advocate General, who
appeared for the State, argued, as it is now argued
before us, that in a case where power to make rules
is oonferred on the Government and if the provision
conferring such a. power does not expressly prohibit
the ma.king of rules with retrospective operation,
the Government in exercise of that power can make
rules with retrospective operation. In rejecting
that argument, the learned Chief Jm:itice, delivering
the judgement of the division Bench, observed at
p. 332:
"In my opinion a different i-'rinciple
would apply to the case of an executive
Government exercising subordinate and
delegated legislative powers. In such oases,
unleBB the power to a.ct retrospectively is
expressly oonferred by the Legislature on the
Government, the Government cannot act
retrospectively."
With re!rpfct, I entirely agree with the said observations. The same question was a~ain raised and the
l&llle view was expressed by the Kera.la Hi~h Court
in O. W ..Motor Service (P) Ltd. v. State of Keral,a (1).
There the Regional
Transport
Authority,
Kozhikode, granted a stage carria.~e permit to the
third respondent therein in respect of a proposed
(I) A. I. R. (195 ·) Ker. 347, 34R.
196S
Dr. /ndramai
Pyartlal Gupt11
v.
W.R. Naih11
Subba RaoJ.
766 SUPREME OOURT REPORTS [1963]
1962
Dr. 1'rdromani
Pyorel'l Gupto
v.
W,B. Nathu
Suhh• R•1 J.
Ghat route. The grant of the permit was
challenged on the ground that when that order was
passed there was no constituted Regional Transport
Authority for the district. It was contended on
behalf of the contesting respondent that the said
defect was cured by a subsequent notification issued
by the Government where by Government ordered the
continuance of the Road Transport Authority from
the date of the expiry of the term of the said
Authority till its successor was appointed. The
High Court held thllt the notification with retrospective operation was bad. In that context, Varadaraja Iyengar, J., 0bserved :
"The rule is well.settled that even in a
case where the executive Government acts as
a delegate of a legislative authority, it has no
plenary power to prodde for retrospective
operation unless and unt ii that power is
expressly conferred by the parent enactment."
The House of Lords in Howell v. F1•lmO'uth Boat
Construction Co. Ltd. (1 ) expressed the same
opinion and also pointed out the danger of conc«ding such a power to n. delegated authority.
There,
a licence was issued to operate retrospectively and
to cover works already done under the oral
sanction of the authority.
Their Lordships
observed:
"It would be a dangerous power to place
in the hands of Ministers and their
subordinate officials to allow them, whenever they had power to license, to grant the
licence ex post facto; and a statutory pow.er to
license shou Id not be construed as a power to
authorise or ratify what has been done un'less
the special terms of the statutory provisions
clearly warrant the construction."
It is true that this is a case of a licence issued by an
(1) (1951) A. C. 837.
·1 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
767
authority in exercise of a statutory power conferred
on it, but the same principle must apply to a byelaw made by an authority in exercise of a power
conferred under a statute. Our Constitution
promises·to usher in a welfare State. It involves
conferment of powers of subordinate legislation on
government
and
governmental
agencies
affecting every aspt1ct of humman activity. The
regulatory
process
is
fast
becoming
an ubiquitous element in our life. In a welfare
State, perhaps, it is inevitable, for the simple reason that .Parliament or Legislature oannot be expected to provide for all possible contingencies.
But there ie no effective machinerJ to control the
rule-making powers, or to prevent its diversion
through authoritarian channels. If the conferment
of power to make delegated Legislation proprio
vigore carried with it to make a rule or bye-law
with retrolilpective operation, it may become an
instrument of oppression. In these circumstances,
it has been rightly held that the provision conferring such a power must be strictly construed and
unless a statute expreBBly confers a powers to make
a rule or bye-law retrospectively, it must be held
that it has not conferred any such power. It is
said that such a strict construction may prevent
a rule making authority from making a rule in an
emergency, though the occasion demands or justi ·
fies a rule with retrospective effect. The simple
answer to this alleged difficulty is that if the Legislature contemplates or visualizes such emergenci~s. calling for the making of such rules or byela.ws with retrospective effect, it Bhould expressly
confer such power. It is also said that the Government ·can be relied upon to make such rules only
on appropriate occasions. This Court cannot reoog_nize implied powers pregnant with potentialities for
mischief on such assumptions. That apart, the
scope or ambit of a rule cannot be ~&de to depend
upon the status of a functionary eiitrusted with a
1961
Dr, lndram•n•
Py•rel1l Gupt•
v.
W.R. Nathu
~v/Jba Rao J.
I
768
19~•
Dr l11Jramal
P,..,lal Gupta
••
W.R.Nathu
SuUoRoo J
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963]
rule making power. In public interest the least
the court can do is to construe provisions conferring
such a pow3r strictly and to confine its scope to
that clearly expressed therein.
Applying that rule of strict construction, I
would hold thats. 12 (1) does not confer a power
on the Central Government to make a bye-law
with retrospective effect and, therefore, the new
liye-law made on January 21, 1!!56, in so far as it
purports to operate retrospectively is invalid.
Assuming that it is permissible to infer such a
power by necessary implication, can it be said that
it is possible to so imply under s. 12 of the Act ?
The phrase "necessary implication", as applied in
the law of statutory construction means an implication that is absolutely necessary and unavoid·
able; that is to say, a court must come to the con·
clusion that unless such an implication is made,
the provisions of the section could not be given full
effect on the wording as expressed therein. Under
s. 12 of the Act, the Central Government may
either on a request in writing received by it from
the governing body of a recognized association, or
if in its opinion it is expedient so to do, make bye·
laws for all or any of the matters specified ins. 11
or a.mend any bye law made by such association
under that section. Now s. 11 says that any recog·
nized association may, subject to the previous approval of the Central Government, make bye-laws
for the regulation and contr()l of forward contracts;
under sub s. (2) thereof, the association is authorized to make laws providing for any of the matters
mentioned therein. A glance at those· matters
shows that all the bye-laws providing for those
matters could be framed without giving s. 12 any
retrospective effect. It is said thats. 11 (o) gives
an indication that a bye-law contemplated by that
sub-clause must necessarily provide for its reiro11·
pective operation. It reads:
l S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
769
"the emergencies in trade which may
arise and the exercise of powers in such emergencise including the power to fix maximum
and minimum prices;"
The learned Solicitor General contends tha.t
an occasion may arise when by a determined
action of a • bear" or a "bull'' the rates may
about up beyond a reasonable level or fall
down steeply below a particular point creating
an emergency in the market and in that emergency it would be necessary ior the authorities con.
cerned to step in and close out the contracts, and
unless the bye·law is made retrospective such an
emergency cannot be met and, therefore, the power
to make a by-law to meet an emergency contemplated ins. ll(o) of the Act must necessarily imply a
power to make a bye-law retrospectively. There is
an underlying fallacy in this argument. The conferment of a power on the Government to make a.
bye-law with retrospective operation must be absolutely necessary and unavoidable to provide for
the matter mentioned in sub-cl. (o) of s. 11 or any
other clause of sub-s. (2) of s. 11. A bye-law could
certainly be made to provide for an emergency
visualized by the learned Solicitor General or for
any other emergency contemplated by that clause
with only prospective operation. It oannot, therefore, be said that unless retrospective operation was
given to the provision• of s. 12, the objects of the
legislation would be defeated or the purposes for
whioh the power was· conferred could not be ful·
filled. I, therefore, hold that s. 12( 1) of the Act
does not confer any such power on the Central
Government by necessary implication.
The second question turns upon the interpretation of s. 4 of the Act. It reads:
''The function of the Commission shall
1
be(a) to' advise the Central Government in
1
1962
n,., lnd,.amani
Pyo11lal Qupla
Vo
W.R. Notb8
Subbr Ru,/.
770
SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1963]
respect of the recognition of, or the withdraw al of recognition from, any association or in respect of any other matter
arising out of the administration of this
Aot;
1962
..
Dr. 1Mr61nani
l')or1/al Gu;..
W.R. Nlllliu
Su'6111 R111tJ.
(b) to keep forward markets under observa-
tion and to take such action in relation
to them as it may consider necessary, in
exercise of the powers assigned to it by
or nnder this Act;
(c) to collect and whenever the Commission
thinks it necessary publish information
regarding the trading conditions in respect of goods to which any of the provisions of this Act is mad1> applicable, including information regarding supply,
demand and prices, and to submit to the
Central Government periodical reports
on the operation of this Act and on the
working of forward markets relating to
such goods;
(d) to make recommendation generally with a
view to improving the organisation and
working of forward markets;
(e) to undertake the inspection of the accounts and other documents of any recognized association or registered a88ooiation
or any member of such assocfotion whenever it considers it necessary; and
(f)
to perform such other duties and exercise
such other powers as may be assigned to
the Commission by or under this Act
or as may be prescribed."
'
Two questions arise under this section, namely,
(i) whether the duties imposed and the powers conferred on the Commission under cl. (f) of s. 4 shall
J.S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
771
be read ejusdem generis with those imposed or conferred under els. (a) to (e), and (ii) whether the
powers asdgned to the Commission by or under a.
bye-law can be performed by the Commission under
cl. ( f). To appreciate the first question it would
be necessary to know the constitution of the Commission and its rule in the scheme of control provided by the Aot. Under s. 2(b), "Commission"
means the Forward Markets Commission established
under s. 3. Section 3 empowers the Central Government to "establish a. Commission to be called
the }.'orward Markets Commission for the purpose
of exercising such functions and discharging such
duties as may be assigned to the Commission by or
under this Act". Clauses (a) to (e) of s. 4 show
that the function of the Commission are wholly
supervisory and advisory in nature. It keeps the
forward markets under observation, collects and
publishes information, undertakes the inspection
of the accounts and other documents, and makes
recommen:iations to the Central Government in
respect of matters mentioned in that 'section.
Under s. 8(2)(c), the Central Government may also
direct the Commission to inspect the accounts and
other documt'lnts of any recognized association or
any of its members and submit its report thereon
to the Central Government. It is, therefore, manifest that the Commission has no administrative
functions or powers of management or powers of
interference in the internal management of the
registered associations; on the otherhand, s. 11 and
the bye-laws fram£.d thereunder it is not necessary
to.go into them in detail show that .the regulation
anJ contro) of the business of forward contra.ots
and other businesses is entirely in the hands of the
Association. The doctrine of ejuadem generis is
very well~settled. The expression of ·ejusdem generis" means ''of the same kind'', and ''it is only an
illustration of specific application of the broader
maxim nosountur a sooiia i. e., general and specific
JIJ(J:t
Dr.111,rcrani
Py.,elfi 91J1tG
""
W,R.N•tliu
Suit• R.,J,
772
1111
D1. fnlratnanz'
l';lr«l•l G!Jltr
••
1'.R. N•tAu
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963]
words which are capable of an analogous meaning,
bein~ associated together, take colour from each
other, so that the genera.I words are restricted to a
sense, analogous, to the less general". While to
invoke the application of the doctrine of ej'U8dem
generis there must be a distinct genus or category,
that is to say, the specific words preceding -the
general word must belong to the same cla88, the
maxim noscuntur a sociis is of wider application.
This Court in The Western India Theatres Lf!J. v.
Municipal Corporation of the City of Prona, though
did not expressly say so, in my view was dealing
with the said two doctrines, and it observed therein:
" ........... although the rule of construction based on the principle of ejusdem generi8
cannot be invoked in thi1 case, for items
(i) to (x) do not, strictly speaking, belong to
the same genus, but they do indicate, to our
mind the kind and nature of tax whioh the
munioipalties are authorized to impose."
So, in the present case, it may be said that els. (a)
to (f) may not belong to the same class, but they
indicate that the fun\ltions described in the said
clauses, being supervisory and advisory in character, a.re so analogous to each other that they take
colour ,from each other and therefore the general
words following must be restricted to a sense analogous to the said functions. It is 1&id that ol.(f)
provides for duties and powers, whereas ols. (a) to
(e) only deal with functions and, therefore, cl. (f)
must be deemed to provide for altogether a different subject-matter. I cannot agree with this contention, for the heading of s.4 is "Functions of
the Commission", and the action opens out with
the words "The functions of the Commil8ion shall
be" and the functions are mentioned in ols.(a) to
1 s.c.&.
SUPREME OOURT REPORTS
773
It is, therefore. manifeat that the duties and
powers mentioned in cl.(f) are also functions.. To
put it differently, all the clauses deal with functions of the Commission. That apart, a power
and a duty are, the two facts of the same concept. Clauses (a) to (e) also, though ex facto they
read as if they impose only duties, on a closer
scrutiny indicate that the duties cannot be exer.
cised without the_ corresponding powers for the
discharge of those duties. I would, therefore, hold
that the duties and powers that may be assigned
to the Commission under ol. (f) can be only supervisory or advisory functions other than those
mentioned in cls.(a) to (e). The power conferred
on the Commission under the bye-law made b_y
the Government to close out contracts and thus
terminate the contr~ots is neither an advisory nor
& supervisory power, and, therefore, the Commission cannot legally exercise the same.
The second question turns upon the interpretation of the provisions of cl. (f) of s.4. The said
clause reads:
(f}.
"to perform such duties and exercise
such other powers as may be assigned to the
Commission by or under this Act, or as may
be prescribed.''
The crucial words are "by or under this Act, or as
may be prescribed". Under s. 2(h) of the Act
"prescribed" means "prescribed by rules made
under this Act'' ; an<l s. 2 (k) de.fines ''rules"
thua :
"rules", with reference to the rules relating in general to the constitution and management of an association, includes in the case of
an incorporated association its memorandum
and articles of &88-0ciation. ''
If read with the.definition of the word ''prescribed"
1111
Dr. lndrat1lflnl
Pyor1lal Gqla
v.
W.R. flu/I•
--
SuH•R,.J.
--
.
774
Dr. lt1tl1amani
l*Jor1lr.t Gup'4
••
1f,R. Nat/iu
tsrJ>k I!.. J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963]
cl. (f) indicate• that the commission can perform
the functions assigned to it by or under the Act,
or as may be prescribed by the rules made under
the Act. The specific mention of the rules made
under the Aot in the clause makes it abundantly
clear that the phrase "under the Act" excludes a
rule made in exercise of the power conferred under
the Act, for if the said phrase takes in a rule, the
word "prescribed" becomes redundant. S11oh ineptit11de and went of precision in drafting shall not be
attributed to the Legislature, except for compelling
reasons. If a rule was not comprehended by the
phrase "under the Act", it would be illogica.J to
hold that it woul<l take in a bye-law. It would
mean that the Legislature specially provided for a
rule, which has certainly a higher status than a
bye-law in legislative practice, while it treated a
bye-law as a provision of Act : that cannot be.
The other reason that may be suggested is that
the word "prescribed" was used in superabundant
caution or by mistake. If superabundant ca11tion
was required to mention separately the rules, greater
caution would have been necessary to provide
separately for a bye-law. A court ordinarily shall
attempt to give meaning to every word used by
the Legislature, unless it is impos<ible to do so.
Here there is not only no such impossibility, but
there is also a good reason for the Legislature in
excluaing the bye-laws from the operation of cl.(f)
of s. 4 of the Act.
Subordinate or delegated legislation takes
different forms. Subordinate legislation is divided
into two main classes, namely, ( i) statutory rules,
and (ii) bye-laws or regulations ma.de, (a) by
authorities concerned with local government, and
(b) by persons, societies, or corporations. The Act
itself recognizes this distinction and prtovides both
for making of the rules as well as bye-laws. A
comparative study of as. 11 and 12 whereunder
S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
775
power is conferred on the Central Governmant and
the recognized associations to make bye-laws on
the one hand, and s. 28, whereunder the Central
Government is empowered to make rules on the
other, indicate that the former are intended for
conducting the business of the association and the
latter for the purpose of carrying into effect the
objects of the Act. In considering the question
raised in this case in this distinction will have to be
borne in mind.
It would be unreasonable to assume that a
private usociation, though registered under the
Act, could confer powers on a statutory authority
under the Act. That is why under s .• 4{f), the
Legislature did not think fit to provide for the
asEiignment of a function to the commission in
exercise of a power under a bye-law. The nonmention of bye-law in cl. (f) is not because of any
acoidental omission but a deliberate one, because of
the incongruity of an .assignment of a function· to
the Commission under a bye-law. I would, therefore, contrue the words ''by or under this Act, or
as may be prescribed" as follows : "by this Act''
applies to powers assigned proprio ?Jigore by
the provisions of the Act ; "under this Act"
applies to an _assignment made in exercise of
an express power conferred under the provisions of the Act ; and ''may be prescribed"
takes in an assignment made in exercise of a.
power conft-rrerl under a rule. Thia construction
gives a natural meaning to the plain words used in
the section and avoids stretching the language of a
eta.tut Jry provision to save an illegal bye-law. In
this context two decisions are cited at the Bar. The
:first is that of the Judicial Committee in Hubli
El~rioity Company Ltd. v. Provino~ of Bomhay (1).
There, under s. 3(2)(f) of the Indian Electricity
Act (No. IX of 1910) "t.he provisions contained in
(I) ( 1948) "6 I.A. 57.
J91t
Subba Rao J.
776
1111
Dr. /ndrt111tni
"'W.R.
""'"••/YOlhu
' a_,,.
SdhRuJ.
•
SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1963)
the Sohedule shall be deemed to be incorporat.ed
with, and to form part of, every Jicenoe granted
under this Part". Under s. 4 ( 1)(a) of the said Aot,
"The Provincial Government may, if in itP opinion
the publio interest so requires, revoke a Iicenoe",
inter alia, if "the licensoe in the opinion of the
Provincial Government makes wilful and unreasonably prolonged default in doing anything required of
him by or under this Act". Under sub-cl. (6) of the
Schedule, a licensee had to comply with certain
conditions. The Government revoked the licenoe
on the ground that the lioensee did not comply
with the conditions laid down in Sohedule VI,
whioh were deemed to be incorporated in the
licence by virtue of s. 3(2)., and therefore he did
not do the thing required of him within the menn·
ing of a. 4 of that Act. The Privy Council held that
the performance by the JicPnsee of the conditions
of the Schedule to the Aot was clearly required to
be made under the Act. Thia decision does not help
us very much in the present case, as the question
of bye-law did not arise therein. Nor the decision
of the Madras High Court in Narayanaswamy v.
Kriahnamurthi (1) is of any assistance. There the
question was whether the regulations framed by the
Life Insurance Corporation by virtue of the powers
vested in it by Act 31 of 1956 prohibiting the employees from standing for election fell within the
meaning of the words "under any law" in Art. 191
(l)le) of the Constitution. The High Court held
that the regulations were law made under the Act
of ParliamPnt. The conclusion was based on the
principle that the rule made in purauanoe of the
dele!l'ated power has the same validity and hall the
same characteristic as a le w made directly by the
Parliament. Apart from the faot that the word1 to
be oonstrued there were different and in a 11eme
wider than the words to be construed in the present
oase, the principle accepted in the deoi1ion is only
(I) l.L.R. 1958 Mad .SIS.
1 s.c.tt.
SUPREME COURT R~PoR'l'S
777
of a genf'ral application and does not help to construe the specific words of cl. (f) of s. 4 ; their meaning can be gathered only by interpreting the said
words, having regard to the setting and the context
in which they are used.
For the foregoing reasons, I would hold that
the Government had no power under s. 12 of the
Act to make a bye-law assigning any function to
the Commission. It follows that notification dated
January 24, 1956, by the Forward Markets Commission was illegal and the appellants would be entitled to the issue of a writ of mandamuB in the terms
prayed for. In the result, the appeal is allowed
with costs.
ORDER
In view of the Judgment of the majority, the
appeal stands dismissed with costs.
Dr. Indramani
Pyar1/al Gupta
v.
W.tl. Nachu
Ayyangar J.
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