THE AUTOMOBILE TRANSPORT (RAJASTHAN) LTD. versus THE STATE OF RA.JASTHAN AND OTHERS
Supreme Court of India | Decided 9 April 1962 | [1963] 1 S.C.R. 491 | 1962 INSC 127
Key facts
- Decided
- 9 April 1962
- Bench
- S.K. DAS*, J.L. KAPUR*, A.K. SARKAR, K. SUBBA RAO, M. HIDAYATULLAH, N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR, J.R. MUDHOLKAR
- Bench size
- 7
- Case number
- CIVIL APPEAL No. 42/1959
- Disposal
- Dismissed
- Citation
- [1963] 1 S.C.R. 491
- Neutral citation
- 1962 INSC 127
Text of the judgment
1s.c.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
491
THE AUTOMOBILE TRANSPORT
(RAJASTHAN) LTD.
v.
THE STATE OF RA.JASTHAN AND OTHERS
(And Connected Appeals)
(S. K. DAS, J. L. KAPUR, A. k. SARKAR, K. SUBBA.
RAO, M. HIDAYATULLAH, N. RAJAGOPALA
AYYANGAR and J. R. MUDHOLKAR1 JJ.)
Fre~om of Trade-State carriages-Tax on Vehicles--Btafe
law imposing tax on vehicles used in public place. or kept for
use--Oonstitutional validity-Rajasthan Motor Vehicles Tax·
ation .Act, 1951 (Rajasthan 11 of 19.SZ), Rll, 4, 11, Bcher11ul~
Oonstitution of India, .Arts. 19, 245, 301, 304 Sevr:.nth Sch. List I,
entry 42, List JI, entry 57.
Sub-section (1) of s. 4 of the Rajasthan Motor Vehicles
Taxation Act, l 951. provided : " ...... No motor vehicle
shall be used in any public place or kept for use in Rajasthan
unless the owner thereof has paid in rcsper.t of it, a tax at the
appropriate rate specified in the schedules to this Act within
the time allowed ...... "
The appellants were carrying on the business of plying
shge carriages in the State of Ajmer. They held permits and
plied their buses on diverse routes. There was one route
which lay mainly in Ajmcr State but it crossed narrow strips
of the te1Titory of the State of Rajasthan. Another route,
Ajmcr to Kishangarh, was substantially in the Ajmer State,
but a third of it was in Rajasthan. Formerly, there was an
agreement between the Ajmer State and the former State ()f
K.ishan~arh, by which neither State charged any tax or fees
on vehicles registered in Ajmer or K.ishangarh. Later, Kishan·garh became a part of Rajasthan. On the passing ()f the
Rajasthan Motor Vehicles Taxation Act, 1951, and the
pr()mulgation of the rules made thcrcund~r, the Motor Vehicles
Taxation Qfficcr,.Jaipur, demanded of the appellants payment
of the tax due on their motor Vehicles for the period April 1,
1951, to March 3 l, 1954. By virtue of the provisions ()f s. 4
()f the Act read with the Schedules no one could use or keep
a motor vehicle in Rajasthan without paying the appropriate
.tax for it and if he did so he was made liable to the penalties
imposed under s. I l of the Act. The appellants challenged
the legality of the demand on the grounds that s. 4 of the Act
read with the Schedules constituted a direct and immediate
1962
April 9,
492 SUPREME OOURT REPORTS [1963]
1962
Automobile
Tf'ansp01t
(R•Jast""") Ltd.
v.
Stall of Raa 5tha n
restriction on the movement of trade and commerce with and
within Rajasthan inasmuch as motor vchiclr:S which carried
passengers and goods within or through Raja•than had to
pay the tax which imposed a pecuniary burden on a com·
mercial activity and was, therefore, hit by Art. 301 of the
Constitution of India and was not saved by Art. 304(b)
inasmuch as the proviso to Art. 304(b) was not complied with,
nor was the Act assented to by the President within the
meaning of Art.· 255 of the Constitution. The respondents
claimed that taxation for the purpose of raising revenue or
for the maintenance of roads etc., was not hit by Art. 30 I and
that the Act did not constitute an immediate or direct imp·
edimcnt to the movement of trade and commerce inasmuch as
the tax impnsed was a consolidate tax on the vehicle itself
though the quantum of ·the tax was fixed in some instances
with reference to the seating capacity or loading capacity etc.
Held (per S. K. Das, Kapur, Sarkar and Subba Rao,
JJ.), that the Rajasthan Motor VehiclesT..xation Act 1951, did
not violatr, the provisions ot Art. 301 of the Constitu1ion of
India and that the taxes imposed under the Act were comp·
ensatory or rrgu1atory taxc~ which did not hinder the freedom
of trade, commerce and intercourse assurcd__by that Article.
Such taxes, therefore, were legal.
Per S. K. Das, Kapur and Sarkar, JJ.-(1) The con·
cept of freedom of trade, commerce and intercourse postulated
by Art. 30 I must be understood in the context of an ordinary
society and as part of a Constitution which envisaged a
distribution of powers between the States and the Union, and
if so understood, the concept must recognised the n•ed and
legitimacy of some de!!fCe of regulatory control, whether by the
Union or the State!!!. Regulatory measures or measures impos•
ing compensatory taxes for the use of trading faciliti~s did not
hamper trade, commerce and intercourse but rather facilitated
them and, therefore, were not hit by the freedom declared by
Art. 301 ; such measures need out comply with the require·
ments of the provisions of Art. 304(b) of the Constitution.
(2) In view of the provisions of Art. 245; the restriciions in
Part XIII of the Constitution
applied to taxation laws ;
and such laws were not confined only to legislation with respect to entries relating to trade and clJmmcrce in any of the
lists in the Seventh Schedule. (3) On a proper co~struction
of the Act and the Schedules. the taxes imposed were really
taxes for the use of the roads in Rajasthan. Jn basing the
taxes on passenger capacity or loading capacity, the· legislature had n.<rt ly evolved a method and measure of compensation demanded by the State, but the taxes were still
compensation and charge for regulation.
1 S.O.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
493
Per Sobba Rao, J.-(1)
The freedom declared under
Art. 301 of the Constitution of India referred to the right of
free movement of trade without any obstructions by way of
barriers, inter-State or .intra-State, or other impediments
operating as such barriers ; and the said freedom was not
impeded, but on the other hand, promoted, by regulations
creating conditions for the free movement of trade, such as,
police regulations, provisions for services, maintenance of
roads, provision for aerodromes, wharfs etc., with or without
compensation. (2) Parliament. may by law impose restrictions on such freedom in the public interest, and the States
also, in exercise of its _legislative power, may impose similar
restrictions, subject to the proviso mentioned therein. (3)
Laws of taxation were not outside the freedom enshrined
either in Art. 19 or Art. 301.
Per Hidayatullah, Rajagopala Ayyangar and Mudholkafl JJ.-(1) St>ction 4(1) of th Rajasthan Motor Vehicles
Truta1ion Act, 1951, as rearl with Schs. · II, III and Part I
of Sch. IV, offended. Art. 301 of the Constitution, and as
resort to the procedure prescribed by Art 304(b) was not
taken it was ultr:a tiires .the Constitution. (2) The pith and
substance of the Act was the levy of tax on motor vehicles in
Rajasthan or their use in that State irrespc:ctive of where the
vehicles ca:me from and not legblation in respect of inter·
State trade or commerce. The Act was ~ithia entry 57 of
the List of the Seventh Schedule and not ·unt;ler .entry 42 of
Union List. (3) A tax which is made thc'e<;>ndition precedent of the right to enter upon and carry on business is a
restriction on the right , to carry on trade· and: commerce
within Art. 301. In the present case, the. trade, which
consisted in making use of .motor vehicles for carriage of·
passengers and goods, could be carried on only ·if the tcx was
paid, and, therefore, th~ taxes imposed by Schs.11, III and
IV( I) operated on trade and commerce directly. ('~) The
tax levied under the Act was not, truly a fair recompense
for wear and tear of roads, but a restriction, which
Art. 301 forbade. (5)' The Act was i:iot, in its true character,
regulatory becau~e there was no provisioµ therein; which
could be regarded as regulatory of motor vehicles. The Act
plainly levied a tax upon possession or use of motor vehieles.
Atiabari Tea Oo., Lta. v. The State of Assam· ana Othera
(1961] 1. S.C .R. 809, discussed.
·
·
·
American and Australian decisiens with .regard to the
Commerce Clause or the American Constitution and s. 92 of
the Australian Constitution, considered ..
19tll
A.ulomobile
Tr•11s/o'I
(Rajastlum) Lli.
v.
S1at1 of Rojastha
494
19f2
Automobile
Transpor'
( Rajasthcn) Ltd.
••
State of Rajas;han
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963)
C1vIL APPELLATE JumsnrcTION :
Appeals Nos. 4~ to 44 of l!J50.
Civil
Appeals from the final judgment and order
dated August 0, 1957, of thn Rajasthan High Court
(Jaipur Bench) at Jaipur in Cid] 'Vrit Petitions
Nos. 40J to 402 of 1954.
G. S. Pathak, J.B. Dadachanji, S. N. And/ey,
Rameshwar Nath and P. L. Vohra, for the appellants.
G. 0. Kasliwal, Advocate-General for the Stat~ of
Rajasthan, A. V. Viswanatha Sastri, S. K. Kap~tr and
P. D. Menon, for the respondents.
H. M. Seervai, Advocate-General for the State of
Maharashtra and Naunit Lal, for the Nate of Assam
(Intervener).
V. K. T. Chari, Advocate-General for the State of
Madras, R. Ganapathy Iyer, T. J[. Sen and P. D.
Menon, for the State of Madras (Intervener).
S. N. Sikri, Advocate-General for the State of
P.unj11J, N. 8. Bindra, T. JI. 8en and P. D Menon,
for the State of Punjab (Intcrvcr:er).
H. M. Seervai, Advocate-General for the State of
Maharashtra, T. JJf. Sen and P. D . .lfcnon, for the
State of Maharashtra (IntflTt•ner).
K. Bhimsankarom, 'l'. M. Sen and P. D. Menon,
for the State of Andhra l'rndesh (Int.e'1nmer).
B. Sen, S. 0. Bo-<e and P. K. Bose, for the
Sta to of 'Ve8t BengH l (Tnterv<.>ner).
L<1l Narain Sinha, Ln.lcshma?> Saran Singh.
D. P. Singh, R. K. Gara, 31. K. Ramn.mvrthi and
S. 0. Aggarwal. for the State of Bihar (Intervener).
Dinbandhit Sn.hit, Adi·ocate-Genrrnl for lh.e State
of Orissu, B. K.P. Sinha, 'l'. M. Sen nrn1 P. r>. l1Ie11on,
for the Stat<' of 01 isE9 (llltNv~ner).
1 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
495
K. D. Hathi and P. D. 2~enon, for the State of
Gujarat (Intervener).
ft!. Adhikari, Advocate-General .for the Stale of
Madhya Pradesh, B. Sen, B. K. B. Naidu, and
I. N. Shroff, for the State of Madhya Pradesh
(Intervener).
19li2
Automobile
Transport
( Rr.jasthun) L:d.
y,
State flf Rajastha11
Ranade.b Chaudhu1"i, S. N. Andley, Rameshwar
Nath and P . .L. Vohra,, for M.A. Tulloch and Co.
(Intervener).
K. Srinii•asniurty aud D. Gobu.rdhun, for
Nazeeria Motor Service, Nellore, and Andhra
Pradesh Motor Union (Interveners).
N. C. Chatterjee, S. O. ~laz'umdar and R.H.
Dhebar, for the Attorney-General for India.
(intervener).
1.962. April 9. The following judgments were
delivered. The judgment of S. K. Das, J. L. J{apur
and A. K. Sarkar, JJ., l\'as delivered by S. K. Das,
J. The judgment ofM. Hidayatul1ah, N. H,ajagopala
Ayyangar and J. R. Mudholkar, JJ., was delivered
by .M:. Hidayatullah, J.
S. K. DAS, J.-These aro three consolidated·
appeals which arise from the judgment and order of
a Division Bench of Rajasthan High Court dated
August, 9, 1957. They have been preferred to this
Court on the strength of a certificate granted by
the said High Court under Art. J 32 of the Constitution certifying that the cases involve a substantial
question oflaw as to the interpretation of Art. 301
and other connected articles relating to trade, commerce and intercouroe within the territory of India,
contained in Part XIII of the Constitution. These
appeals were originally heard by a Bench of five
Judges and on April 4, 1961, that Bench recorded
an order to the effect that having regard to tho
importance of the constitutional issues involved
DasJ.
496
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963]
19U
and the views expressed in the decision of this
Court in Atiabari Tea Co. /.,Id. v. The State of AsBam (')
l'u.up.I
the appeals should be heard by a larger Bench.
(Rttiasllon) Lt4.
The
appeals were then placed before the learned
••
s1a11 of a.;..,1,_
Chief Justice for necessary orders, and on his orders
.D., J.
have now come to this Bench of seven Judges for
disposal. As the constitutional issues involved
alfect tho state of the Union, notices were issued to
the Advocate1·General concerned. A notice was
also iasued to the Attorney General on behalf of
the Union of India. The St3tes of Andhra Pradesh,
.Asaam, Bihar Gujrat, Madras, Maharashtra, Orissa,
Punjab, Uttai Pradesh and West Bengal intervened
and were represented before u1 either through
their respective Advooate1·General or other Counsel
M/a. M. A. Tulloch & Co., Andhra Pradesh Motor
CongreBS and Nazeeria Motor Service, Nellore,
applied for intervention on the ground that they
would be affected in a pending litigation by the
decision of this Court on the consututional iasuee
involved. Those applications were allowed by ua.
The reault has been that we have heard very full
arguments not only from Counsel appear for the
appellants and the respondents, but alao from the
learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the Union
of India, the learned Advocates·General or Counsel
appearing for the intervening States and alao from
learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the three
int;erveners referred to above.
.4Womo6il1
The appellants in the there appea~ are.( l) ~h.e
Automobile Transport (Raj.) Ltd., A1mer m C1v1l
Appeal No. 42 of 1959. (2) the Rajasthan Roadways
Ltd., Ajmer in Civil Appeal No. 43 of 1959, and (3)
Framji C. Framji and others in Civil Appeal No .. 44
of 1959. The respondents are (1) the State of ~aJll.S·
than, (2) the Regional Transport Officer w!io JS ex.
officio Motor Vehicles Taxation Officer, J a1pur, and
(I) [11161] I. S. C.R. 809.
I S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
497
(3) the Collector of Jaipur. The first two Appel-
lants are priva.ta, limited liability companies registered under the Indian Companies Aot, 1913 and
having their reu;istered offices a.t Ajmer. The third
appellant is a partnership firm named Framji
Motor
Transport registered under the India
Partnership
Act.
These
three
a.ppel)ants carried on the business of plying stage
carriages. The first appellant had nine transport
vehicles plying between two .stations in the State of
Ajmer and between Ajmer and Kishangarh, a town
in Rajasthan at the relevant period. The two
stations in Ajmer were Na.sire.bad and DeoJi. The
road from Nasirabad to Deoli was mainly in the
former State of Ajmer but for some <listance it
passed through certain narrow strips of territory of
the State of Rajasthan. Similarly. the road from
Ajmer to Kisbangarh was partly in the former State
of Ajmer and partly in the State of Rajasthan,
approximately two-thirds of the road lying in Ajmer
and one-third in Ra.ja.sthan. The second and the
third appellant also had some transport vehicles
which plied on the Nasirabad-Deoli route or from
Kisha.ngarh to Sarwar, a. town situated on the
Nasiraba.d-Deoli road in the State of Rajasthan. On
the passing of the Ra.jasthan Motor Vehicles Taxation Act, 1951 (Ra.jasthan Act XI of 1951) (hereina.fter referred to as the Act), and the promulgation
of the rules made thereunder, the second respondent demanded of the appellants payment of the
tax due on their motor Vehicles for the period beginning on April 1, 1951. and ending on March 31,
1954. The first appellant was called upon to pay
Rs. 22,260, the second appellant Rs. 6,540 and the
third appellant Rs. 10,260 under r. 23 of the Rajasthan Motor Vehicles Taxatian Rules. When the
appellants failed to pay the tax demanded from
them, the second rt~sponclent issued ct'rtificates
under s. I:-3 of the Act to the third res11ondent
for the recovery of the tax due as arrears
1962
.A.utomol>ile
Trans/1<1'e
( Rajaslli•n) Ltd.
v.
Stat1 of R.Jasthon
DasJ.
498
J962
Auti,mobil•
Trans/HP t
.;asihan) Ltd.
v.
State of Rajc.5than
DasJ.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963]
of land revenue. On receipt of the demand
notices the second and the third appellants
filed appeals before the Transport Commissioner,
Jaipur, under s. 14 of the Act. These appeals were
however, dismissed by an order of the Transport
Commissioner dated October 21, 1953. The first
appellant did not file any appeal. Thereafter the
three appellants filed three separate writ petitions
in the Rajasthan High Court in which their main
contention was that the relevant provisions of the
Act imposing a tax on their motor vehicles were
unconstitutional and void as they contravened the
freedom of trade, comme:r;ce and intercourse through
ont the territory of India declared by Art.
30 I of t.he Constitution and therefore the
demand and attempted collection of such tax
were illegal and should be prohibited. The prayers which the appellants made in their respective
writ petitions were mainly there-(1) that it be
declared that the Rajasthan Motor Vehicles Tax·
ation Act of 1951 and the Rules made thereunder
are invalid and not in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution of India and consequently
null and void and inoperative, and (2) that a writ
of prohibition or mandamus or any other approp·
riate writ, direction or order directing the respon·
dents not to realise any tax from the appellants
under the provisions of the Rajasthan Motor
Vehicles Taxation Act of 1951 be iEsued. The three
writ petititions were heard together by a Division
Ben~h consisting of Bapna and Bhandari, JJ.
They dealt with and disposed of certain other objection to the validity of the Act, with which we
are no longer concerned; but as to the contravention
of Art. 30 l of the Constitution, they felt that in
view of the complexity of the points involved and
the apparent conflict between certain decisions of
other High Courts, the question should be referred
to a Full Bench. Accordingly, they referred the
question whether ss. 4 and 11 of the Act infringed
1 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
499
the right of freedom of tra.de, commerce or intercourse granted under Art. 301 of the Constitution.
The Full Bench dealt with the· question from two
different stand points. Firstly. they considered the
validity of the Act from the stand point of Act, 19
(1) of the Constitution which guarantees, to all
citizens of India the right to move freely throughout
the territory of India; this the Full Bench dealt
with under the heading of freedom of intercourse
from the stand point of the individual citizen and
came to the conclusion that restrictions which the
Act imposed on the individual citizen were reasonable restrictions having regard to the necessity of
raising funds for the maintenance of roads and the
making of new roads in the State of Ra.jasthan.
Then the High Court considered the validity
of the relevant provisions of the Act from
the stand point of trade, commerce and came to
the conclusion that the regulation of trade, commerce and intercourse within the territory of India,
both inter-8tate and intra-State. was not incompatible with its freedom and in the matter of such regulation of trade, commerce and intercourse a. distinction must be drawn between restrictions which are
direct and immediate and restrictions which are
indirect and consequential. The High Court expressed its final conclusion in the following words :
''Transport vehicles are provided by
individuals carrying on business in them
and those who carry on trade and commerce as a. whole, can use these transport vehicles. The fact that on account
of this taxation, the charges of transport
vehicles are higher, let us say by an anna
a maund is, in our opinion, merely an
indirect or consequential result of this
Act, and such an impediment may fairly
be called remote. It would be a diffe.
rent matter if the taxation is so high that
1962
AutomoWe
Transp,,,1
(Rajaslhan) Ltd.
v.
State of R'j aslh 'n
-DasJ.
500
1961
Automohrle
'TransptJri
( llqjaslhan) LJd.
v.
Stolt of Rajasthan
DasJ
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963]
it virtually kills trade and commerce by
compelling the traders to raise their
prices to an exorbitant rate. But this
being not the nature of the tax in this
case, and the taxation being not directly
on trade, commerce or intercourse ........ .
we are of opinion that this taxation can
not be said to offend against Art. 301,
for its effeut on trade and commerce is
only indirect and consequential and the
impediment, if any, may fairly be
regarded as remote."
In view of that conclusion the Full Bench answered
the question referred to it in the negative. The
cases then went back to the Division Bench with
the answer given by tho Full Bench and the writ
petitions were dismissed by the Division Bench by
its judgment and order dated August 9, 1957. The
three appellants then moved the High Court for a
certificate under Art. 132 of the Constitution whiah
certificate the High Court granted by its order
dated October 16, 195 7.
It may be here stated that neither the Division Bench nor the Full Bench of the Rajasthan
High Court had the advantage of the decision of
this Court in Atiabari Te,a Co., case ('), which decision
came much later in point of time. The main argument on behalf of the appellants before us has been
that the provisions of the Act under which the
appellants were @ought to be taxed in respect of
their motor vehicles plying on the Nasirabad-Deoli
or Kishangarh road contravened Art. 301 of the
Constitution and were not saved by Art. 304 (b) of
the Constitution. We shall presently read the relevant provision of the Act, but before we do so we
may breifly refer to one short point by way of olea·
ring the ground for the diaouasion which will follow.
Artie]., 30ii of the Constitution as it originally stood
said tllat nothing in Arts, 30 l and 303 shall affect
(1) [1961) 1. S. C.R. 809.
I S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 501
the provisions of any existing law except in so far
as the President may by order otherwise provide.
This article was substituted by another artiole, soz;.:ie
what wider in scope, by the Const.itution (Fourth
Amendment) Act, 1955. The new article repeated
the words of the old article in the first p11.rt thereof
and in the second part it said that nothing in Art.
301 shall affect the operation of any law made before the commencement of the Constitution (Fourth
Amendment) Act, 1955, in so far as it relates to, or
prevent Parliament or the Legislature of a State
from making any law relates to, any such matter
a.a is referred to in sub·cl. (ii) of cl. (6) of Art. l9
that sub·clau8e refers to the carrying on by the
State or by a corporation owned or controlled by
the State, of any trade, businefls, industry or service, whether to the exclusion, complete or partial,
of citizens or
otherwise.
The first _part
of Art. 305 does not apply in the present cases be,
cause the expression "existing law" means any law,
ordinance, order, bye-law etc. passed or made before the commencement of the Qonstitution. Tue
Act which we are considering now in the present
appeals was made in 1955, i.e., after the
commencement of
the Constitution.
The
second part of Art. 305 has also no bearing on the
questions which we have to consider in these
appeals. Article 3l!51 old or new, is, therefore1 out
of our way.
We now proceed to read th'e relevant pro'\'isions of the Act. The Act was ma.de by the
Ra.jpramukh of the State of Rajasthan on April 1,
195 i. The history of the constitution of the United
State of Rajasthan and the powers of the Rajpramukh under the covenant creating the State were
stated in Thakur Amar Singhji v. Staf,e of Ra}astkanC)
at pp. 312 to 316 of the report~ With that history
we a.re not concerned in the present cases. The
competence of the Rajpramukh to make the Act
(1) [1955] 2. S.C.R. 303.
L96S
Autamobil1
Transport
( Rf!iasthan) Ltd.
v.
State of ttajasthan
DasJ.
502
1962
~utmnniile
Trnnsport
(Rojast'1an) Ltd,
••
Stat~ of R<dasth'n
D•s J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963]
was challenged in the High Court but was decided
against the appellantK. That point has not been
agitated before us and we must proceed on the
footing that the Act was validly made by the R:i.jpramukb. Section 4 of the Act is the charging
section, the validity of which has been challenged
before us on the ground that it violates the
freedom of trade, commerce and intercourse granted
under Art. 301 of the Constitution. It is, therefore,
necessary to quote s. 4.
"4. Imposition of tax.-( l) Save as otherwise provided by this Act or by rules made
thereunder or by any other law for the time
being in force, no motor vehiole shall be used
in any public place or kept for use in Rajasthan
unless the owner thereof has paid in respect
of it, a tax at the appropriate rate specified
in the Schedules to this Act within the time
allowed by section 5 and, save as hereinafter
specified, such tax shall be payable annually
notwithstanding that the motor vehicle may
from time to time cease to be used.
(2) An owner who keeps a motor vehicle
of which the certificate of fitness and the
certificate of registration are current, shall,
for the purposes of this Act be presumed to
keep such vehicle for use.
(3) A person who keeps more than ten
motor vehicles for use solely in the course of
trade and industry shall be entitled to a
deduction of ten per cent on the aggregate
amount of tax to which he is liable.
"4. Explanation.-The expression trade and
industry" includes transport for hire."
Sections 5 to 7 deal with (1) payment of tax, (2) tax
payable on first liability to tax, and (3) refund of
tax. With these details we are not concerned here.
Section 8 imposes on the owner of every motor
1 S .C.R. SUPREl'CE COURT REPORTS
503
vehicle an obligation to make a declaration every
year in respect of the motor vehicle in the prescribed form stating the prescribed particulars etc.; it
also imposes an obligation on every owner to pay
the tax which he is liable to pay in respect of the
motor vehicle. This sectipn is also challenged as
unconstitutional and it is obvious that it is connected with s. 4. Ifs. 4 is unconstitutional, so must be
s. 8. Section 9 deals with the payment of additional
tax in circumstances which need not be stated here.
Section 10 deals with the grant of receipt and token.
Section 11 says :
''11. Penalties 'II/Mer this Act.-whoever
contravenes any of the provisions of this Act
or of any rule made thereunder shall on conviction be punishable with fine which may
extend to Rs. 100 and in the event of such
person having been previously convicted of an
offence under this Act or under any rule made
thereunder with fine which may extend to
Rs. 2-00."
Section 12 deals with the compounding of offences
ands. 13 lays down that when any person without
any reasonable cause fails orC"efuses to pay the tax,
the Taxation Officer may forward to the Collflctor
of the district concerned a certificate over his signature specifying the a.mount of tax due from such
person and the· CoJlector shall recover the tax as if
it were an arrear of land revenue. Section 14
provicies for appeals to the Transport Commissioner.
Section 16 Jays down that the liability of a person
to pay the tax shall not be questioned or determined otherwise than as provided in the act or in the
rules made thereunder. Sections 17 to 21 deal with
certain ancillary matters and s. 22 enables the
Government to make rules fo:r carrying into effect
the purpose of the Act. There are four Schedules
to the Act to which a more detailed reference will
be made later. It is _enough to state here that the
19~%
.dut,moi11i
Transport
( Raj111th4n) Ulf.
v.
Stat1 of Raja•than
504
JIG!
Automobi11
T1a•s;o1e
(R.iiutlum) Ltd.
••
Stfll1 -.! Rojas,...
DesJ.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963]
Schedules divide motor vehicles into two parts :
Schedule I deals with vehicles other than transport
vehicles plying for hire or reward; Schedule II deals
with transport vehicles of two kinds transport
vehicles and goods vehicles; Schedule III deals with
goods vehicles registered outside Rajasthan but
using roads in Rajasthan; and Schedule IV deals
with vehicles used for the carriage of goods in
connection with a trade or business carried on
by the owner of the vehicle under a private carrier's
premit. Various rates of tax are provided for
various kinds of vehicles in these Schedules. The
High Court has pointed out that Schedule 1 is
concerned with vehicles other than transport
vehicles and is mainly concerned with what would
come within the term "intercourse" in Art. 301 and
the other :--chedules deal with what would come
within the term "trade and commerce" in that article.
The result of reading s. 4 of Act with the
Schedules is that on one can use 01 keep a motor
vt·hicle in Rajasthan without paying the appropriate
tax for it and if he does so he is made liable
to the penalties imposed under s. 11 of the Act. In
brief, this appears to be the scheme of the Act.
Is this scheme in conflict with the freedom
of trade, commerce and intercourse within the
territory of India assured by Art. 301 anti other
connect.ad articles in Part XIII of the Constitution ?
That is tho problem before us. It is necessary,
therefore. to read at this 8tage the relevant articles
in Part XIII of the Constitution. For this purpose
we must reatl Arts. 301 to 304 as they stood at the
relevant time.
'•301. Subject to, the other provisions of
this Part, trade, commerce and intercourse
throughout the territory of India shall bc
free.
302. Parliament may by law impose
such restrictions on the freed om of trade,
_J
1s.c.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
505
commerce or intercourse between one State
and another or within any part of the territory of India. as may be required in the
public interest.
303. (1) Notwithstanding anything in
Articles 302, neither Parliament nor the
Legislature of a State shall have power to
make any law giving, or authorising the giving
of, any preference to one State over another,
or making, or authorising the making of, any
discrimination between one State and another
by virtue of any entry relating to trade and
commerce in any of the Lists in the Se·venth
Schedule.
(2) Nothing in clause (1) shall prevent
Parliament from making any law giving, or
authorising the giving of, any preference or
making, or authorising the making of, any
discrimination if it· is declared by such law
that it is necessary to do so for the purpose
of dealing with a situation arising from
scarcity of goods in any part of the territory
of India.
304. Notwithstanding
anything in
Article 301 or Article 303, the Legislature of
a State may by law-
(a) impose on goods imported from
other States any fi&x to which similar goods
manufactured or proiuced in that State are
subject, so, however.. as not to discriminate
between goods so imported and goods so
manufactured or produced; and
(b) impose suoh reasonable restrictions on the freedom of trade, commerce or
intercourse with or within that State as may
be required in the public interest:
Provided that no Bill or amendment for
IHI
.4utomobile
'l'ronrport
(RoJa1tfaa"} Ltd.
v.
Sta'1 of Rajasthan
DGl.T;
506
1962
.Automobil1
Transport
(Rajasthan) Ltd.
••
State of RajasChan
D1s I.
:iUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963J
the purposes of clause (b) shall be introduced
or moved in the Legislature of a State without
the previous sanction of the President"
Article 301) we have already stated is out of our
way. Article 306, which was later repealed by the
Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956, is also
not material for the 0onsideration of the problem
before us. Article 307 is also not material as it
relates to the appointment of an appropriate
authodty for carrying out the purposes of
Arts. 301 to 304.
The series of articles on the true scope
and effect of which the decision of the
problem before us depends were the Au bject
matter of consideration of this Court in the Atiabari
Tea Co. case ('), In that decision three views were
expressed and one of the questions mooted and
argued before us is whether the principle of the
majority decision in that oase requires reoons'ideration, or modification in any respect; or whether any
of the other two views expressed therein is the correct view. Another ccnnected question is that if
the majority view is the correct view, does the principle underlying it apply to the facts of the present
cases? It is, therefore, necessary to set out briefly
the facts of the Atiabari Tea Co. case (1 ) and the
three views expressed therein. The three appellants
in that case were tea companies, two of which
carried on the trade of growing tea in Assam and
the other carried on its trade in Jalpaiguri in West
Bengal. They carried their tea to Calcutta in
order that it mi2'ht be sold in the Calcutta market
for home consumption or export outside India.
Tea produced in Jalpaiguri had to pass through a
few· mi!Ps of territory in Assam, while the tea
produced in Assam had to go all the way through
Assam to reach Calcutta. Besides the tea which
was carried by rail, a substantial quantity bad to
go by road or by inland water-ways and as such
(1) (1961) I S.C.R, 809.
1 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
507
became liable to pay the tax leviable under the
Assam Taxation (on goods carried by Roads or
Inland Waterways) Act, 1954. That Act levied a.
tax: on certain goods carried by road or inland
waterways in the State of Assam and the validity
of the levy of such a tax: was in question in the
Atiabar·i Te,a Go. case (1). The principal ground of
attack was that the Assam Act violated the provisions of Art. 301 of the Constitution and was not
sa\'ed by the provisions of Art. :104(b). We may
now summarise the views expressed in that decision.
First, al!I to the views of the learned Chief Justice:
He expressed the view that taxation simpliciter was
not within the tor ms of Art. 3f) l and a tax on
movement of !!·l01~ or pai;isengeri:1 did not necessarily conn_ote impedim..:nt or restnint in the matter
of trade arid commerca. He drnw :t distinction betweon tax,l.tion a'I such for the purpose of revenue
on the one hand and taxation for the purpose of
making dlsorimina.tion or giving porfer.ance on the
other hand; the letter, he said, could be treated aa
impediment to free trade and commerce. He expressed his final conclusion in these words.
"Thus, on a fair construction of the provisions of Part XIII, the following propositions
emerge: (l) trade, commerce, and intercourse
throughout the territory of India are not
absolutely free, but are subject to certain
powers of legislation by Parliament or the
Legislature of a State; (2) the freedom dee.lated by Art. 30l does not mran freedom from
taxation simpliciter, but dors mean freedom
from taxation which has the effect of directly
· impeding the free flow of trade, commerce
and intercourse; (3) the freedom envisaged in
· Art. 301 is s11bject to non·discriminatory restrictions imposed by Parliament in public
interest (Art. :392); (4) evep <~is0dniinatory or
II> [l';l.il]
I. S.C.R,809~
1962
~utom,bi/1
Tr11mflo1 I
( Raj1Utllan) Lti.
v.
E late •f Rajasthan
DasJ.
508
196!
Auromobile
Tr111upo1t
( B'!/a.rllion) Lid,
v.
Sto.t1 oJ Raj•sthGtJ
Dasi.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1963]
preferential legislation may be made by Parliament. for the purpose of dealing with an
emergency like a scarcity of good~ in
any part of India (Art.
303(2) l; (5)
reasonable restrictions may be imposed
by the Legislature of a State in the
public interest (Art. 304(b)); (6) non-discriminatory taxes may he imposed by the
Legislature of a State on goods imported from
another State or other States, if similar taxes
are impoaed on goods produced of manufactured in that State (Art. 30t(a l; and lastly (7)
restrictions imposed by existing laws have
been continued, except in so far as the President may by order ot.herwise direct(Art. 305)."
(pp. 831-832.)
The majority view differed from that of the learned
Chief Justice in that it did not accept as correct the
contention that tax laws were governed by th<i provisions of Part XII of the Constitution only and
were outside Part XIII. The majority expressed
the view that when Art. 301 provided that trade
shall be free throughout the territory of India, it
was the movement or transport part of the trade
that must be free. The majority said:
••It is a federal constitution which we are
interpreting, and so the impact of Art. 301
must be judged accordingly. Besides, it is not
irrf'levant to remember in this connection that
the Article we are construing imposes a constitutional limitation on the power of the
Parliament and the State Legislatures to levy
taxes, and generally, but for such limitation,
the power of taxation would he presumed to
be for public good and would not be subject to
judioial review or sen.tiny. Thus considered
we think it would be reasonable and proper to
hold that restrictions freedom from which is
I S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
509
gua.ranteed by Art. 301, would be such restrictions as directly and immediately restrict or
impede the free flow or movement of trade.
Taxes may and do amount to restrictions; but
it is only such taxes as directly and immediately restrict trade that would fall within the
purview of Art. 30 l. The argument that all
taxes should be governed by Art. 301 whether
or not their impact on trade is immediate or
mediate, direct or remote, adopts, in our opinion, an extreme approach which cannot be
upheld." (p. 860.)
The third view held by Sh~h. J., was that the freedom contemplated was freedom of trade, commerce
and intercourse in all theit varied aspects inclusive
of all activities which constitute commercial intercourse and not merely restrictions on the movement
aspect. He said :
"The guarantee of freerlc1m of trade and
commerce is not ad<lresl3ed merely against
prohibitions, complete or partial; it is addressed to tariffs, licensing, marketing regulations,
price-control, nationalisation, economic or
social plaining, discriminatory tariffs, compulsory appropriation of goods, freezing or
stand-stiJI orders and similar other impediments operating directly and immediately on
the freedom of commercial intercourse as well.
Every sequence in the series of operations
which constitutes trade or commerce is an act
of trade or commerce and burdens or impediments imposed on any such slep are restrictions on the freed om of trade commerce and
intercourse. What is guaranteed is freedom
in its widest amplitude-freedom from prohi·
bition, control, burden or impediment in commercial intercourse." (p. 874.)
So far we have set out the factual and legal
background againdt which the problem before us
-
JBll
..fulomobiU
Transp.tt
(RaJuthan) Lid.
v.
Stot1 •f lltJjosU..
D<J1J,
510 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1963]
1963
A tomt;bi/1
Tran.sport
(Rajaslhao) ltd,
v.
State of RaJaathan
DasJ.
has to be solved. We must now say a. few words
regarding the historical background. It is necessary
to do this, because exten~ive references have been
made to Australian and American decisions, Australian decisions with regard to the interpretation
of s. 92 of the Australian Constitution and American decisions with regard to the Commerce Clause
of the American Constitution. This Court pointed
out in the Atiabari Tea Go. case (1 ) that it would
not be always safe to r~ly upon the American or
Australian decisions in interpreting the provisions
of our Constitution. Valuable as those decisions
might be in showing how the problem of freedom
of t,rade, commerce and intercourse was dealt with
in other federal constitutions, the provisions of our
Constitution must be interpreted against the historical back(lround in which our Constitution was
madt>; the background of problems which the Constitution makers tried to solve according to the
genius of the Indian people whom the Constitution·
makers represented in the Constituent Aesembly.
The first thing to be noticed in this connection is
that the Constitution-makers were not writing on a
clean slate. They had the Government of India
Act. 1935, and they also had the administrative
set, up which that Act envisaged. India. then consisted of various administrative units known as
Provinces, each with its own administrative set up.
There were differences of language, religion etc.
Some of the Provinces were euonomically more
developed than the others. Even inside the same
Province, there were under-developed, developed
and highly developed areas from the point of view
of industries, communications etc. The problem of
economic integration with which the Constitution.
makers were faced was a problem with many facts.
'.;rwo questions, however, stood out.; one question
was how to achieve a federal, economic and fiscal
integration, so that economic policies affecting the
interests of India. as a whole could be carried out
(I) [1961] I. S. C.R. 809.
1 s.c.R
•I
I
-
•
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
5U
198S
without putting an ever-inorel.sing strain on the
unity of [ndi 'l., pa.rtioularly in the oon'text of & devEr
.4utornobile
r,.a'ISp>rl
loping eol>nomy. The seoond question wa.s how to (R2jaslhan)
./.td.
fo3ter the development of areas which were underv.
developed without creating too many pre- Sta!1 of Ryruthafl
ferential or disoriminative barriers. Besides the
Dos J,
Provinoe, there were the Indian States also
known as Indian India. After India attained
political freedom in 1947 and before the
Constitution was adopted, the process of
merger and integration of the Indian States with
the rest of the country h11.d been accomplished so
tha.t when the Constitution was first passed the
territory of India consisted of Pa.rt A States, which
broadly stated, represented the Provinces in British
India., and Pa.rt B States which were ma.de up of
Indian States. There were trade barriers raised by
the Indian States in the exercise of their legislative
powers and the Constitution·makers had to make
provisions with regard to those trade barriers as
well. The evolution of a fe,dera.l structure or a
quasi-federal struoture necessarily involved, in the
context of the conditions t.hen prevailing, a distribution of powers and a basic part of our Constitution relates to that distribution with the three legislative lists in the Seventh Schedule. The Constitution itself says by Art. 1 that India is a Union of
States and in interpreting the Constitution one must
keep in view the essential structure of a federal or
qu!tsi-federal Constitution, namely, that the units
of the Union have also certain powers as has the
Union itself. One of th.e grievances made on behalf
of the intervening States before us was.that the
majority view in the Atiabari Tea Oo. case(1) did not
give sufficient importance to the power of the States
under the Indian Constitution to raise revenue by
taxes under the legislative heads entrusted to them,
in interpreting the series of articles relating to trade,
oomm3rce and intercourse in Part XIII of the Cons.
titution. It has been often stated that freedom of
(I) [~951] I ,S.C'.R. 809.
512
1961
.A.utomobi/1
Transporl
(Raj.,lhan) Ltd,
v.
Sl•lt ~ Hajt1Jth1n
-DasJ.
SUPREME OOURT REPORTS [19C13]
inter-State trade and commerce in a federation has
been a. baflling problem to constitutional experts in
Australia., in America a.nd in other federal constitutions. In evolving an integrated policy on this
subject our Constitution-makers seem to have kept
in mind three main considerations which may be
broadly stated thus: first, in the larger interests of
India there must be free flow of trade, commerce
and intercourde, both inter-State and intra-State;
second, the regional interests must not be ignored
altogether; and third, there must be a power of
intervention by the Union in any case of crisis to
deal with particular problems that ma.y arise in any
part of India, As we shall presently show, all
these three considerations have played their
part in the series of articles which we have to
consider in Part XIII of the Constitution.
Therefore, in interpreting the relevant articles in
Part XIII we must have regard to the general scheme
of the Constitution of India with special reference to
Part III(Fundamental Rights), Part XII (Finance,
Property etc. containing Arts. 276 and 286) and
their inter-relation to Part XIII in the context of
a federal or quasi-federal constitution in which the
l::itates ha.ve certain powers including the power to
raise revenues for their purposes by taxation.
On behalf of the appellants it has been contended before us that s. 4 of the Act read with the
Schedules constitutes a direct and immediate restriction on the movement of trade and commerce
with and within Rajasthan inasmuch as motor vehicles which carry passengers and goods within or
through Rajasthan have to pay the tax which, it is
stated, imposes a pecuniary burden on a commercial
activity and is, therefore, hit by Art. 301 of. the
Constitution and is not saved by Art. 30!(b) mas.
much as the proviso to Art. 30-!(b) was not complied
with nor was the Act assented to by the President
within the meaning of Art. 255 of the Constitution.
IS. C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
513
1962
Learned Counsel for the appellants has submitted
before us tha.t the correct interpretation of the
Autom.obile
series of relevant articles in Part XIII of the ConsTrcnsport
titution is the one made by Shah, J., in the Atiabari (Rdjosthan) Ltd,
Tea Go. case('). He has, however, submitted that Stall ofv.Rajasthan
even on the interpretation accep~ed by the majority
DasJ.
of Judges in the Atiabari Tea Co. case(') he is entitled
to succeed, because the relevant provisions of the
Act constitute a direct and immediate restriction on
the movement par~ of trade, commerce and intercourse. On behalf of the respondents the argument
has proceeded on the footing that taxation per se
i.e. taxation for the purpose of raising revenue or
for the maintenance of roads etc. is not hit by Art.
301 and the impugned provisions of the Act in question did not constitute an immediate or direct impP-diment on the movement of trade a.nd commerce
inasmuch as the tax imposed was a consolidated tax:
on the vehicle itself though the quantum of the tax
was fixed in some instances with reference to the
seating cq,pa.city or loading capacity etc. The argument is that in this respe.ct the factR of the present
cases differ from the facts of the Atiabari Tea Co.
caseC ); it is argued ~hat in the latter the tax was on
the carriage of goods, whereas in the present cases
the tax is a consolidated tax on the vehicle itself,
like a property tax, and, therefore, it does not
relate to the movement part of trade, commerce and
intercourse, though it may have an indirect effect
on trade and commerce by raising the tariff or fare
for passengers and goods. The l~arned Counse.l for
the respondents has in this way tried to distinguish
the majority decision in the Atiabari Tea Co. case(1),
but he has ma.inly argued in favour of the view
expressed by the learned Chief Justice. On behalf
of the interveners, some have supported the majority
view with or without modifications and some the_
other two views. Mr. N. C: Chatterjee appearing on
behalf of the Union of India supported the majority
view, though the stand taken by the Attorney
(1) [1961} l, S. C. R. 809.
514
SUPREME OOURT REPORTS [1963]
General on behalf of the Union of India in the
Atiabari Tea Oo. ca:Be(') was somewhat different.
Autom1bif1
Mr. Rana.deb Chaudhuri appearing on behalf of one
TronsjMI
(Rl!iuthu) Ud.
of the intervenera (M/a. M.A. Tulloch & Co.) has
v.
S1411 •f B•jOll,,.,, accepted the majority view with some modifications.
He has stated that ,Art. 301 relates to movement or
DasJ.
carriage; he bas ca.lied it the "channelling" of trade
and commerce: He has, however, tried to reconcile
the various provisions in Pa.rt XIII by suggesting
that there a.re two connected but independent sub·
jeots dealt with therein; one is freedom of movement
of trade, and commerce and incourae (this, he has
described, as "channelling" of trade, commerce and
intercourse), and the second is protection from dis.
crimination and preference which is not necessarily
connected with movement but may a.rise from subsidy eto. These a.re the two idea.a which, according
to him, inspired the relevant series of articles in
Part XIII. On behalf of some of the interveners
the argument bas been that the freedom declared
under Art. 301 is not freedom from such regulatory
measures as do not impede trade, commerce and
intercourse but rather facilitate such trade, commercf'I and intercourse, e.g. traffic regulations, regu.
la.tions for safeguarding public health, such as,
prohibiting the •ale of adulterated food etc. This
view suggests that in the matter of taxation, such
taxes a.'re compensatory in nature. namely, those
levied for the maintenance of roads on which
traffic is to move, do not come within the restriotions freedom from which is contemplated by
Art. 301. This is the view which Mr. Sikri, Advocate-General of Punjab, has mainly contended for.
Mr, Seerva.i appearing on behalf of the State of
Maharashtra. and some other States has contended
that Part XIII of the Constitution is confined to
such action, legislative or executive, as is taken in
relation to any of the entries relating to trade and
commerce in any of the lists in the Seventh Schedule, namely, entries relating to 41 and 42 in list
1111JI
·-
(I) [1964) l• S. C. lt. 809.
,•
l S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPOHTS
515
1962
I, entry 26 of list II, and entry 33 of list III. The
expression "throughout the territory of India"
AutomohJe
Tron·part
occurring in Art. ;.ml h:i.s reforencc, according to ( Rojaslhan)
Ltd
this view, to space rather than to movement.
v.
According to .Mr. Seervai the mode of approach Slate of R"ja,than
should be to consider (i) the position or the State8
Dos J.
in the Indian Constitution with plenary powers in
their respective fields; (ii) the historical background
of a. 297 of the Government of India Act, 1935; (iii)
the decisions of the Australian cases upto 1950 when
the Constitution of Indfo. was made; and (iv) Part
XIII of the Constitution as compared and contrasted with Part III and Part XII thereof. As to taxation, his contention is that it does not come within
Part XIII except to the extent mentionerl in Art.
304:{a). 1\1.r. Lalnarain Sinha appearing for the
State of Bihar bas supported the view of the learned Chief Justice in .A.tiaba.ri 'Pea Co. case(1) though
the reasons given by him are somewhat different.
His argument has been that Art. 30 l secures for
trade, commerce and intercourse throughout the
territory of India a qualified freedom from restrictions
based on geograpkioal classifications only; tho freedom
thus secured is in regard to barriers (in the geographical sense) impeding trade, commerce and intercourse between one State and another or between
one territory and another within or without tho
same State, and also against territorial discriminations in respect of trade, commerce and intercourse
either inter-State or intra-State. With regard to
taxation, his contention is that taxes (meant for
raising rev~nue on1y and called fiscal taxes) do not
operate as inter-State or inter-territorial barriers
nor involve any territorial discriminations, and they
do not come within Part XIII. Mr. D. Sahu appearing for the State of Orissa argued that the freedom
granted by Art. 301 was confined to ( i) inter-State
barriers, and (ii) customs-barriers which at one time
existed between the Indian States and adjacent
(l) [ 1961] l S.C.R. 809,
516
1962
A.utom ohile
T r410p01' I
(RnjG.1thon) Lid.
v.
Stale of Rojasthan
Do1J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963]
British Indian territory. According to him, the intraState aspect of the freedom assured by Art. 301
was confined to old customs-barriers only which
some of the Indian States which have now merged
in particular States of the Indian J:tepublic had
earlier imposed. Mr. C. B. Agarwala appearing for
the State of Utta.r Pradesh argued that the subject
matter of Art. 301 was trade, commerce and inter·
course, namely, the entries relating to trade and
commerce in any of the lists in the Seventh
Schedule ; but the restrictions from which freedom
was granted might come from any direction ; they
might come from legislative or executive action
relating to· other entries also.
We have tried to summarise above the various
stand points and views which were canvassed before
us and we sh:1.ll now proceed to consider which,
according to us, is the correct interpretation of the
relevant articles in Part XIII of the Constitution.
We m-iy first take the widest view, the view expressed by Shah, J., in the Atiabari Tw Oo. OOBe(1)
a view which has been supported by the 1.ppellants
and one or two of the interveners before us. Thie
view, we apprehend, is b11.sed on a purely textual
interpretatbn of the relevant articles in Part XIII
of the Constitution and this textual interpretation
proceeds in the following way. Article 301 wbich
is in goneral terms and is made subject to the other
provisions of Part XIII imposes a general limitation
on the exercise of legislative power, whether by the
Union or the States, under any of the topics-taxation topics as well as other topics-enumerated in
the three lists of the Seventh Schedule, in order
to make certain that "trade, commerce and intercourse throught the territory of India shall be free".
Having placed a general limitation on the exercise
of legislative powers by Parliament and the State
Legislatures, Art. 302 relaxes that restriction in
favour of Parliament by providing that that
(1)[1961] 1. S. C.R. 809.
1 s.c.R.
SUPRF,ME COURT REPORTS
517
authority ''may by law impose such restrictions on
the freedom of trade, commerce or intercourse
between one State and another or within any part
the territory of India as may be required in the
public interest". Having relaxed the restriction in
respect of Parliament under Art. 302, a restriction
is put upon the relaxation by Art. 303(1) to the
effect that Parliament shall not have the power to
make any law giving any preference to any one
State over another or discriminating between one
State and another by virtue of any entry relating
to trade and commerce in lists I and III of the
Seventh Schedule. Article 303 (I) which places a
ban on Parliament against the giving of preferences
to one State over another or of discriminating
between one l:)tate and another, also provides that
the same kind of ban should bf' placed upon the
State Legislature also legislating by virtue of any
entry relating to trade and commerce in lists II and
III of the Seventh Schedule. Article 303 ( 2) again
carves out an exception to the restriction placed by
Art. 303(1) on the powers of Parliament, by providing that nothing in Art. 303( l) shall prevent
Parliament from making any law giving preference
to one State over another or discriminating between
one State and another, if it is necessary .to do so for
the purpose of dealing with a situation arising from
scarcity of goods in any part of the territory of
India. This exception applies only to Parliament
and not to the ~tate Legislatures. Article 304
comprises ~wo clauses and each clause operates as a
proviso to Arts. 301 and 303. Clause (a) of that
article provides that the Legislature of a. State may
''impose on goods imported from other States any
tax to which similar goods manufactured or produced in that State are subject. so, howe'ver, as not to
discriminate between goods so imported and goods
so manufactured or produced." This clause, therefore, permits the levy on goods imported from
1962
Automobile
Transport
(Raj2sthan) Ltd.
v.
State of !1ajasthan
Das J.
518
1962
A.utotnQb;f,
Transport
Ltd. (H•jast'1ari)
v.
St:ile of Hojaslhan
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963)
sistor States any tax which similar goods manufactured or produced in that State are subject to
under its taxing laws. In other words, goods
imported from sister States are placed on a par
with similar goods manufactured or produced inside
the State in regard to State taxation within the
State allocated field. Thus the States in India
have full power of imposing what in American
State legislation is c:Llled the use tax, gross receipts
tax etc., not to speak of the familiar property tax,
subject only to the condition that ~uch tax is
imposed on a'l goods of the same kind produced or
manufactured in the taxing ::ltate, although such
taxation is undoubtedly c:Llct1!.ted to fotter inter8tate trade and commerce. As was observed liy
Pat1njali Sa~tri, C.J., in State of Bomba;11 v. United
Motors(') the commercial unity of India is made to
give w.i.y before the State power of imposing 'any'
non-discriminatory tax on goods imported from
sister St>ttes. Now, cl. (b) of Art. 30! provides
that notwithstanding anything in Art. 301 or
Art. 303, tha L~gislature of a State may by Jaw
impose suc11 reasonable restrictions on the freedom
of trade, commercu or intercourse with or within
that State a~ m11.y be required in the public interest.
The proviso to cl. (b) says that no bill or amend·
ment for the purpose of cl. ( b) shall be introducad
or move'l in tho Lsgislature of a State without the
previous sanction of the President. This provision
appears to lio the State analogue to the Union
Parliament's authority defined by Art. 30t, in spite
of the omission of the word 'reasonable' before the
word 'restrictions' in the latter article. Leaving
aside the pre-requisite of previous Presidential
sanction for the validity of State legislation undeir
cl. (b) provided in the proviso thereto, there are
two important differences between Art. 302 and
Art. JO!(b) which require spacial mention. The
firat is that while thti power of Parliament under
(1) [1953] S.C.R. 1069.
1 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
519
Art. 302 is subject to the prohibition of preferences
and discrimina;tions decreed by Art. 303(1) unless
Parliament makes the declaration contained in
Art. 303(2), the State's power contained in
Art. 304(b) is made expressly free from the prohibition contained in Art. 303(1), because the opening words of Art. 304 contain a non obsta.nte clause
both to Art. 301 and A:ft. 303. The second diffe.
renoe springs from the fact that while Parliament's
power to impose restrictions under Art. 302 upon
freedom of commerce in the public interest is not
subject to the requirement of reasonableness, the
power of the States to impose restrictions on the
freedom of commerce in the public interest under
~rt. 304 is subject to the condition that they are
.
reasonable.
On the basis of the aforesaid textual construction, which is perhaps correct so far as it goes, the
view expressed is that the freedom granted by
Art. 301 is of the widest amplitude and is subject
only to such restrictions as are contained in the
succeeding articles in Part XIII. But even in the
matter of textual construction there are difficulties.
One of the difficulties which was adverted to during
the Constituent Assembly debates related to the
somewhat indiscriminate or inappropriate use of
the expressions "subject to" and ''notwithstanding"
in the articles in question. Article 302, as we have
seen, makes a relaxation in favour of Parliament.
Article 303 again imposes a restriction on that
relaxation "notwithstanding anything in Article 30~
but Art, 303 relates both to Parliament and the
State Legish.ture, though Art. 302 makes no relaxation in favour of the State Legislature. The non
obstante clause in Art. 303 is, therefore, somewhnt
inappropriate. Clause (2) of .Art. 303 carv s out an
exception from the restriction imposed on ParJiament by cl. (1) of .Art. 303. But again c1. (2) relates
only to Parliament and not to the State Legislature
even though ol. (I) relates to both. Article 304
0
1962
Automobil1
Transporl
(Rajaslhan) Ltd
V•
S1at1 of R·ljaslhatr
DasJ.
520
1962
Aulomobil1
Transport
{Rajaslhan) Lid.
••
Stat1 of Ba}Qstho n
DasJ.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963]
again begins with a non obstante clause mentioning
both Art. 301 and Art. 303, though Art. 304 relates
only to the Legislature of a State. Article 303
relates to both the State Legislature and Parliament and again the non obstante clause in Art. 30!
is somewhat inappropriate. The fact of the matter is that there is such a mix up of exception upon
exception in the series of articles in Part XIII that
a purely textual interpretation may not disclose the
true intendmeut of the articles. This does not
mean that the text of the- articles, the words used
therein, should be ignored. Indeed, the text of the
articles is a vital consideration in interpreting them;
but we must at the same time remember that we
are dealing with the constitution of a country and
the inter-connection of the different parts of the
constitution forming part of an integrated whole
must not be lost sight of. Even textually, we must
ascertain the true meaning of the word •free'
occurring in Art. 301. From what burdens or
restrictions is the freedom assured ? This is a
question of vital importance even in the matter of
construction. In s. 92 of the Australian Constitution the expresaion used was 'absolutely free' and
repeatedly the question was posed as to what
this freedom meant. We do not propose to
recite the
somewhat chequered history of
the Australian decisions in respect of which
Lord Porter, after a review of the earlier
cases, said in Commonwealth of Australia v. Bank of
New South Wales (1) that in the "labyrinth of
cases decidnd 1mder s. 92 there was no golden
thread." What ie more important for our purpose
is that he expressed the view that two general propositions stood out from the decisions: (i) that
regulation of trade, commerce and intercourse
among the States is compatible with its absolute
freedom, and (ii) that s. 92 of the Australian
Constitution is violated only when a legislative or
ii) [1950] A.C. 235,
I s.c.R.
SUPREME OOURT REPORTS
521
1962
executive act oper11tes to restrict such trade,
Automobile
commerce and intercourse direct.ly and immediately
T1ansp rt
as distinct from creating some indirect or inconse(Rajastlian) Ltd.
quential impediment which may fairly be regarded St1t of v.Rajaslhan
1
as remoto. Lord Porter admitted "that in the
application of these general propositions, in deterDasJ.
mining whether an enactment is regulatory or something more or, whether a restriction is direct or only
remote or incidental, there cannot fail to be difference1' of opinion." It seems clear, however, that
since "the conception of freedom of trade, commerce
a.nd intercourse in a community reguJated by law
presupposes some degree of restriction upon the
individual", that freedom must necessarily be
delimited by consideratio~s of social orderliness.
In one of the earlier Australian decisions (Duncan
v. The State of Queensland) (1), Griffith, C.J., said :
"But the word "free" does not mean
extra legem, any more than freedom means
anarchy. We boast of being an absolutely
free people, but that does not mean that we
are not subject to law". (p. 573)
As the language employed in Art. 301 runs unqua]ified the Court, bearing in mind the fact that provision bas to be applied in the working of an orderly
society, has necessarily to add certain qualifications
subject to which alone that freedom may be
· ·exercised..This point has been very lucidly discussed
in the dissenting opinion which Fullagar, J., wrote
in Mc Carter v. Brodie (2 ), an opinion which was
substantial1y approved by the Privy Counoil in
Hughes and Vale Propriewry Ltd. v. State of New
South Wales (3). The learned Judge gave several
examples to show the distinction between what was
merely permitted regulation and what true interference with freedom of trade and commerce. He
pointed out that in the matter of motor vehicles
(1) [t9f6] 22 C.L.R. 556
(2) [1950) 80 C.L. R. 432.
(3) (1955) A.C. 241.
522
19111
Aut1mob:U
Traruftorl
(Rojasthan) Lid.
v.
Stat1 of Rojostlum
DaJ.
SUPREME OOURT REPORTS [1963)
moat countries have legislation which requires the
motor vehicle to be registered and a fee to be paid
on reghtration. Every motor vehicle must carry
lamps of a specified kind in front and at the rear
and in the hours of darkness these lamps must be
alight if the vehicle is beinit driven on the road,
every motor vehicle must carry a warning device,
such as a horn; it must not be driven at a speed or
in a manner which is dangerous to the public. In
certain localities a motor vehicle must not be driven
at more than a certain speed. The weight of the
load which may be carried on a motor vehicle on a
public highway is limited. Such examples may be
multiplied indefinitely. Nobody doubts that the
application of rules like the above rloes not really
affect the freedom of trade and commerce; on the contrary they facilitate the free flow of trade and com·
merce. The reason is that these rules cannot fairly
be said to impose a burden on a trader or deter him
from trading: it would be absurd, for example, to huggest that freedom of trade i~ impaired or hindered by
la.we which require a motor vehicle to keep to the
left of the road and not drive in a manner danger·
ous to the public. If the word 'free' in Art. 30 l
means •freedom to do whatever one wants to do,
then chaos may be the result; for example, one
owner of a motor vehicle may wish to drive on the
left of the road while another may wish to drive on
the right of the road. If they come from opposite
directions, there will be an inevitable clash. Another
class of examples relates to making a charge for the
use of trading facilities, such as, roarls, bridges,
aerodromes etc. The collection of a toll or a tax
for the use of a road or for the use of a bridge or
for tho use of an aerodrome is no barrier or burden
or deterrent to traders who, in their absence, may
have to take a longer or Jess convenient or more
expensive route. i-:uch compensatory taxes are no
hindrance to anybody's freedom so long as they re·
main reasonable; but they coulrl of cour~e be converted into a hindr1moe to the freedom of trade. If the
.J
'
1 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPOJ;tTS
523
authorities concerned really wanted to hamper anybody's trade, they could ea.gily raise the a.mount of
tax or toll to an amount which would beprohibitive
or deterrent or create other impediments which
instead of facilitating trade and commeroe would
hamper them. It is here that the contrast, between
'freedom' (Art. 301) and •restrictions' (Arts. 302 and
30t) clearly appears: that which in reality facilitates
trade a.nd commerce is not a restriction, and that
which in reality hampers or burdens trade and
commerce is a restriction. It is the reality or substance of the matter that has to be determined.
It is not possible a priori to draw a dividing line
between tba.t which would really be a. charge for a.
facility provided· and that which would really be a.
deterrent to a trade; but the distinction: if it has to
be drawn, is real and clear. For the tax to become
a prohibited tax it ha.1 to be a direct tax the effect
of which is to hinder the movement part of trade.
So long as a. tax rem'\ins compensati)ry or regulatory
it cannot operate as a hindrance.
The most serious objection to the widest view
canvassed before us is that it ignores altogether
that in the conception of freedom of trade, commerce and intercourse in a community regulated by
law freedom must be understood in the context of
the working of an orderly society. The widest view
proceeds on the footing that Art. 301 ·imposes a
general restrtction on legi15lative power and grants
a freedom of trade, commerce and intercourse in
all its series of operations, from all barriers, from
all restricthns, from all regulation, and the only
qualification that is to be found in the article is the
openinf! clause, namely, subject to the other provisions of Part XHI. This in a otual practice will
mean that if the State Legislature wishes to control
or regulate trade, Cl)mmerce and in teroourse in such
a way as to faoilitat~ its free movement, it must
yet proceed to make a law under Art. 30!(b) and
1
I Ht
Aulomobil1
TrGtJSport
(Raja.rlhan) Lld.
v.
Slate of B j11.11han
DatJ.
524
1962
A.1ti()m1bil e
T1ansp&rt
(Raj.,than) ltd.
v.
St..i.te 11/ Rajasthan
n.sJ.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963)
no such bill can be introduced or moved in the
Legislature of a State without the previous sanction
of the President. The praotioal effect would be
to stop or delay effective legislation which may be
urgently necessary. Take, for example, a case where
in the interests of public health, it is necessary to
introduce urgently legislation stopping trade in
goods which are deleterious to heal th, like the trade
in diseased potatoes in Australia. If the State
Legislature wishes to introduce such a bill, it must
have the sanction of the President. Even such
legislation as imposes traffic regulations would
require the sanction of the President. Such an
interpretation would, in our opinion, seriously affect
the l~gislative power of the State Legislatures wlii<-h
power has been held to be plenary with regard to
subjects in list II. The States must altto have
revenue to carry out their administiation and there
are several items relating to the imJ!osition of tans
in list II. The Constitution-makers must have
intended that under those items the States will be
entitled to raise revenue for their own purposes. If
the widest view is accepted, then there would be
for all practical purposes, an end of State
autonomy even within the fields allotted to them
under the distribution of powers envisaged by our
Constitution. An examination of the entries in the
lists of the Seventh 1-icbedule to the Constitution
would show that there are a large number of entries
in the State list (list II) and the Concurrent list (list
III) under which a State LPgislature has power to
make laws. Under some of these entries the State
Legislature may impose differ·ent kinds of taxes and
duties, such as property tax, sales tax, excise duty
etc., and legislation in respect of any one of these
items may have an indirect effect on trade and
commerce. Even laws other than taxation Jaws,
made unrler different entries in the lists referred to
above, may indirectly or remotely affect trade and
commerce. If it b.i held that every Jaw made by
1 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
525
the T....~!?islature of a State which has repercussion
on tariffs, licensing, marketing regulations, pricecontrol etc., must have the previous sanction of the
President, then the Constitution in so far as it gives
plenary power to the States and State Legislatures
in the fields allocated to them would be meaning·
less. In our view the concept of freedom of trade,
commerce a.nd intercourse postulated by Art. 301
must be understood in the context of an orderly society and a.s part of a Constitution which envisages 1t.
distribution of powers between the Sta.tea and the
Union, and if so understood, the concept must recognise the need and the legitimacy of some degree of regulatory control, whether by the Union or the States:
th{s is irrespective of the r(>striotions imposed by
the other articles in Part XIU of the Constitution.
We are, therefore, unable to accept the widest view
as the correct interpretation of the relevant articles
in Part XIII of th~ Constitution.
We proceed now to deal with another
interpretation of the relevant proYisions in Part
XIII : this interpretation may be characterised as
the narrow interpretation.
According to this
interpretation taxing Jaws are governed by the
provisions of Part XII of the Constitution and
except Art. 304(a) none of the other provisions of
Part XIII extend to taxing laws. An additional
argument is that the provi"ions of Part XIII apply
only to such legislation as is made under entries in
the Seventh Schedule which df'al with trade,
commerce and intercourse. According to this
argument entry 42 in list 1, which refers to interState trade and commerce, entry 2n in list II which
deals with trade and commerce within the Sta.te
subject to the provisions of entry 33 in list III, and
entry 33 in list III which deals with trade and
commerce as specified therein, are the only entries
lc·gislation relating to which attracts the provisions
of Part XHI, at1d legislation on oth0r topics is not
affected by these pruvisions. ln support argument
196S
Antomolil1
Transp11t
(R•jastli11~) Lt4,
v.
Stall of Rojoslhtn
526
1162
Automohi/1
.Tr•11.SP°''
( Rajasthan) Ltd,
v.
Stai1 of R ajastlum
DasJ.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963)
assistance has been sought from the heading of
Part XTII and from the use of the expre>sion
'subject to' in Art.301. It has been pointed out
th'1.t the title of Part XIII is trade, commerce and
interoours11 ; intercourse, it is stated, means
commercial intercourse there being no separate
legislative entry in any of the three list relating to
intercourse and the word 'throughout' has reference
to spaoe rather than to movement. The expression
•subjeot to' it is stated, means 'conditional upon',
thus oonueotin~ the provisions of Art. 303 with
the provisions of Art. 301. Article 303 specifically
uses the expression "by virtue of any entry relating
to trade and commorce in any of the lists in the
S3venth Schedule." It is argued that by reason
of th0 connection between Art. 30 I and Art. 303,
the words "by virtue of any entry relating to trade
and nommerce etc." must hs read into Art. 301
also so that Art. 301 will then ho construecl as a
fetter on the commerce power i. e., the power given
to the Legislaturo to make laws under entries
relating to trade and commerce only. As to taxation bein.g out of the provisions of Part XIII of the
Constitution except. for Art. 304(a l, the argument
ia that we must look to the historical background
of s. 297 of the Government of India Act, 1935,
and Arts. 274, 27ll and 285 to 288 in Part XII of
the Constitution. It is pointed out that t.he power
to tax is an incident of sovereignty and it i~ divided
between the Union and the States un<ler the
Co11stitution ; Part XII of the Constitution deals
with several aspects of taxation and all the restrictions on the power to t11x are contained in Part XII
which, accordin~ to this interpretation, is selfoontained. Therefore, so it is argued, the freedom
guaranteed by Art. :;01 does not mean freedom
from taxation, becau~e taxatiun is not a restriction
within the meaning of the relevant articles in
Part XTII.
1 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
- 527
-1962
It would appear from what we have stated
above that this interpretation consists of two main
Aut1JmGbil1
Tran1,otl
parts : one pa.rt is that taxation simpliciter is not
l.Jd.
within the terms of Art. 301 and the second part (Rojast~on)
v.
is that Art, 30 l must take colour· from the pro vis· Seate of Rajosthan
ions of Art. 303 whicb, it is said, is restricted to
legislation with respect to entries relating to trado
and commerce in any of the lists in the Seventh
Schedule. In Atiabari Ten. Oo. Gase (1 ) thii'.1 Court
deal with the correctness or otherwis~ of this
narrow interpretation and by the majority decision
held against it. The majorit.y judgement in tho
Atiubari Te.a Co. Ca.se (1) deals, with tbe arguments
advanced in support of the interpretation in detail
and as we are substantially in ag1·eement with the
reasons given in that judgment. we do not think
that any useful purpose would be served by
repeating them. It is enough to point out that
though tho power of Jevying ta.x is essentially for
the very existt'lnce of government, its exercifle may
be controlled by constitutional provisions made in.
that_behalf. It cannot be laid down as a general
proposition· that the power to tax is outside the
purview of any constitutional Jimitations.
We
ha.ve carefully examined the provisions in Part XII
of the Constitution and are unable to agree that
those provisions exhaust all the limitations on the
power to impose a tax. The effect of Art. 265 was
considered in tho majority decision and it was
pointed out that the power of taxation under our
Constitution was subject to the condition that no
tax shall be Jevied or collected except by authority
of law. Article 245 which deals with the extent
of laws made by Parliament nnd by the Legislatures of States c~xpressly states that the power of
Parliament and pf the State Legislatures to make
laws is ,'subject to the provisions of this Constitu·
tion." The Ax: press inn ' 1subj11ct to the provisions of
this Constitution" is surely wide enough to takfl in
--
(l) [19611 l. S. C.R. 809.
li28
19GZ
Aulomobil1
Tran•Jort
(Rajaslh•n) ltd.
v.
St•le of Roja .tJ 1t11
D•sJ.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963]
the provisions of both Part XII and Part XIII. In
view of the provisions of Art, 245, we find it
difficult to accept the argument that the restrictions
in Part XIII of the Constitution do not apply to
taxation law~. As to the argument that Art. 301
must take colour from Art.. il03, we are unable to
accept as correct the argument that the provisions
of Art. 303 must delimit the general terms of Art.
301. It seems to us that so far as Parliament is
concerned, Art. 303(1) carves out an exception
from the relaxation given in favour of Parliament by
Art. 302; the relaxation given by Art. 302 is itself
in the nature of an exception to the general terms
of Art. 301. It would be against the ordinary
canons of construction to treat an exception or
proviso as having such a repercussion on the
interpretation of the main enactment so as to
exclude from it by implication what clearly falls
within its express terms.
After carefully considering the arguments
advanced before us we have come to the conclusion
that the narrow interpretation canvassed for on
behalf of the majority of the State cannot be
accepted, namely, that the relevant articles in Part
XIII apply only to legislation in respect of the
entries relating to trade and commrrce in any of
the lists of the Seventh SchPdnle. But we must
advert here to one exception which we have already
indicated in an earlier part of this judgment. Such
regulatory measures as do not impede the freedom
of trade, commerce and intercourse and compensa·
tory taxes for the use of trading facilities are not
hit by the freedom declared by Art. 301. They are
excluded from the purview of the provisions of
Part XIII of the Constitution for the simple reason
that they do not hamper trade, commerce and
intercourse but rather facilitate them.
This disposes of two of tlw main inte1pret. at·
ions which have been canvassed before us. We
I S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
529
accept neither the widost interpretation nor the
narrow interpretation for the reasons which we
ha.ve alrea.dy indicated. It remains now to oonsider
some of the other interpretations which have been
canvassed before us. Mr. Lalnarain Sinha. has in
substance contended th!i.t Art. 301 is restricted to
freedom from geographical barriers only; Mr.
D. Sahu has contrnded that Art. 301 is confined to
(i) inter-State barriers, and (ii) customs- barriers
which at one time existed between the Indian
States and the adjacent British Indian territory.
In our opinion both these interpretations proceed
on a somewhat narrow basis and are not justified
by the general words used in Art. 301 and the other
relevant articles in Part XIII of the Constitution.
In our opinion the ambit of the relevant articles
in Part XIII is wider than what these interprf-\tations assume it to be. While on this point it may
be advisable to refer to the contrast between Art.
19 in Part III and Art. 301 in Part XIII of the
Constitution. Article 19 guarantees to all citizens
certain rights which are c:impendiously stated to
be the right to freedom ; two such rights are (i) to
move freely throughout the territory of India and
(ii) to carry on any occupation, trade or business.
The right to move freely throughout the territory
of India is' subject to reasonable restrictions in the
interests of the general public or for the protection
of any scheduled tribe. The right to carry on any
occupation, trade or business is subject to reasonable restrictions in the interests of the general
public a.nd in particular to any law relating to the
carrying on by the State, of any tradeJ business
etc., whether to the exclusion, complete or partial,
of citizens or otherwise. The first contrast
between Art. 19 and Art. 301 is that Art. 19
guarantees the right to freedom to a citizen whereas freedom granted by Art. 301 is not confined to
eitizens. Another distinction which has been
<lra.wn is that Art. 19 looks at the right from the
1962
Aut1m1iil1
T111ns;1rt
( Ra,j1.Sth.a) Lti.
v.
St•le •f R•i• thin
D1sJ.
530
Automo6Ue
TrattJftorl
(l!•j•slhan) ltd.
v.
81•te '1/ Rajastlum
JJuJ.
SUPREME OOURT REPORTS (1963)
point of view of an individual. whereas Art. 301
looks at the matter from the point of freedom of
the general volume of trade, commerce and
intercourse. We do not think that this distinction,
if anv such distinction at all exist1, is material in
the present cases, because an individual trade
may complain of a violation of hi~ freedom
guaranteed under Art. 19(1)(,z) and he may
also complain if the freedom assured by Art. 301
has been violated. In a particular set of circums·
tances the two freedoms need not be the same or
need not coalesce.
In some of the Australian
decisions a distinction was sought to be drawn
between the frea flow of the same volume of
inter.State trade and the individual's right to
carry on his trade in more than one State and it
was argued that s. 92 of the Australian Constitution
related to the free flow of the volume of trade as
distinguished from an individual's right to oarry
on his trade. Such a distinction was negatived
and the l'rivy Council pointed out th~t the
redoubtable Mr. James who fought many a battlo
for the freedom of his trade and occupation was
after all an individual. Another aspect of this
contrast between Art. 19 and Art. 301 of the
Constitution which has been adverted to before
us is this; it has been argued that if a law imposing a restriction on the right of a citizen to carry
on his trade or business is justified under cl. (6)
of Art. 19 as being in the interests of the general
public, that law oanaot again be impeached as
being violative of Art. 301; otherwise, so it is
argued, the Constitution will be taking away by
Art. 301 what it has granted by el. (6) of Art. 19.
The argument is that tra:le or business must be
such as a person is entitled to carry on before he
can complain of any impediment to the freedom
of that trade or business. This is an aspect of the
problem which may require a more detailed and
careful examination in an appropriate case. If we
I S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
531
a.re right in the view which we are expressing that
the freedom granted by Art. 301 does not take
in regulatory measures or compensatory taxt s for
the use of trading facilities, then whethor we look
at such measures from the point of view of Art.
19(l)(g) or from the point of view of Al't. 301, the
result will be the same. It is not poesiblo, however,
to say from a contrast of Art. 19 with Art. 301 that
the Jatter article relates only to freedom from
geographical barriers as was contended by Mr.
Lalnarain Sinha. By geographical barrier Mr.
Sinha apparently meant something like a customs
barrier. His point was that the freedqm assured
by Art. 30 l was a freedo;n from any restriction for
goods crossing that barrier in the course of trade.
He said that that barrier might be put up anywhere,
that is, either at the State border or even within
the territories of a State. Thus, according to him,
it was only when a restriction was put upon goods
crossing such a. barrier either in the shape of an
imposition or otherwise, .that Art. 301 was violated.
It seems to us that this will be restricting too much
the freedom which Art. 301 is intended to assure.
Suppose that instead of saying that a tax will be
paid upon goods carried in the course of trade over
a. certain imaginary line drawn across any part of
India, it was said that if a contract was made for
the sale of goods lying or to be manufactured at
place A and to be delivered at place B situated
across the line, there would then be no restriction
put upon the goods crossing any imaginary line or
any geographical barrier. We think that Art. 301
contemplated that trade in the given illustration
would be free from the restriction mentioned. If
Art. 301 is intended to protect trade in movement
from restrictions, with which view we think Mr.
Laina.rain Sinha also agreed, then it would be
impossible to interpret Art. 301 as conteiaplating
only
freedom
from
restrict.ions
against
movement of goods in the course of trade
196B
Automobile
Transpo1I
(Rajasthon) Lkl,
v.
Stale of Rajasthan
DasJ,
532
i962
Autom•bile
Tr•n•pnt
(R•j<sthan) Ltd.
v.
Sltte •f R•jasth,111
DasJ.
SUPRE~ COURT REPORTS [1963]
across geographical barriers. We are for this
reason unable to accept l\Ir. Sinha's contention.
Mr. Ranadeb Chaudhuri appearing on behalf
of one of the interveners accepted the majority
view that Art. 301 was aimed at tho movement
aspect of trade, commerce and intercourse; this he
called the "channelling" of trade, commerce and
intercourse. But he raised the question of subsidy
and said that Art. 303 which related to discrimination and preference also aimed at the mischief of
subsidy which might be given to a State by way of
perference or discrimination; that mischief, he saicl,
would come within Art. 30 l even if it did not rela.te
to the movement aspect of trade and commerce.
We are not concerned in the present cases with the
question of subsidy and need not, therefore, consider
the argument of llfr. Ranadeb Chaudhuri with
regard to it.
As to the word "intercourse" there has also
been some argument before us. On behalf of some
of the States it has been contended that the word
'intercourse' in the context in which it occurs in
Art. 30 l means commercial intercourse. On beha.lf
of the appellants it has been argued that the word
•intercourse' takes in not merely trade and com·
merce in the strict st>nse, but also activities, such
as, movement of persons for the purpose of friendly
association with one another, telephonic communi·
cations etc. For the purpose of the cases which we
are considering nothing very much turns upon
whether we take the word 'intercourse' in a wide
sense or in a narrow sense. Even taking the word
•intercourse' in a wide sense, the question will still
be what does the word 'free' mean? Does it mean
free from all regulation which is necessv.ry for an
orderly society? Wo have already stated that the
word •free' in Art. 301 cannot be given that wido
meaning.
We have, therefore, come to the conclusion that
neither the widest interpretation nor the narrow
I s.c.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
533
interpretations canvassed before us are acceptable.
The interpretation which was accepted by the majority in the Atiabar-i Tea, Co. case (1) is correct, but
subject to this clarification. 1-<.egulatory measures
or measures imposing compensatory taxeR for. the
use of trading facilities do not come within the purview of the restrictions contemplated by Art. ~O l
and such measures need not comply· with the
requirements of the proviso to Art. 304(b) .of the
Constitution.
Now the qt1estion is, <lo the relevant provisions of the Act reaa with the Schedules fall within
what we have called permitted regulation which
does not really or materially affect freedom of
trade, commerce and intf"rcourse; or do the taxes
imposed by the relevant provisions of the Act read
with the Schedules come within the category of
compensatory taxes which are no hindrance to freedom of .trade, commerce and intercourse, being
taxes for the m.e of trading facilities in the shape of
roads, bridges, etc. In an earlier part of this judgment we have quoted s. 4 which is the charging
section, Th~t section makes it quite clear that the
tax is imposed· on a motor vehicle which shall be
used in any public place or kept ,for use in Rajasthan; the tax is to be at appropriate rates specified
in the Schedules to the Act and sA.ve as specified in
the Act the tax shall be payable annually notwithstanding that the motor vehicle may, from time to
time, cease to be used. Section 7 says in effect· that
if the motor vehicle in respect of which such tax
has been paid has not 'been used for a continuous
period of not less than three months, then the
owner shall be entitled to a refund of an amount
equal to 1/12 of the annual rate of the tax paid. It
appears from the Schedules that a vehicle other
than a transport vehicle is charged with a. consolidated tax, according as the motor vehicle is fitted
with pneumatic tyres or not. The rate of tax varies
{l) [1961] 1. S. C.R. 809,
196S
,fot~m••il•
Trasport
(RaJast'l•n) Lei.
v.
S at1 •f R•jaslh•n
D.sJ.
534
1962
A1Jtomohi!t
Transport
Rajastn ,,, Ltd.
v.
S /ate of Ra, asthan
D!l.> J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963]
according to the nature of the vehicle, whether it is
a motor cycle, or a motor tricycle drawing a tractor,
or a side car etc. Schedule II relates to transport
vehicles with again are classified into various categories, those fitted with pneumatic tyres and those
not so fitted, motor vehicles plying for conveyance
of passengers and light personal luggage, goods
vehicles plying under public carrier's permit etc.
The qui.ntum of tax fixed with regard to the seating
capacity in some c&ses and loading capacity in
other cases. The tax on some goods vehicles is
fixed per day or per annum. Schedule III relates
the goods vehicles only. A classfication is again
made between different claeses of goods vehicles
fitted with pneumatic tyres, conveying a trailer etc.
The tax fixed is a tax for use per day. Schedule
IV deals with vehicles plying with a private carrier's
permit. Here again a classfication is made of
vehicles fitted with pneumatic tyres, with a general
permit for use in Rajasthan and those with a permit
for plying within the limits of one region only. The
tax varies according to the loading capacity etc.
An examination of these provisions indicates
clearly enough that the taxes imposed are really
taxes on motor vehicles which use the roads in
Rajasthan or are kept for use therein, either
throughout the whole area er parts of it. The tax
is payable by all owners of motor vehicles, traders
or otherwise. In dealing with the queotion whether
these taxes were reasonable restrictions on the
right of individuals to move freely throughout the
territory of India etc. the High Court said:
"In this connection, it is well to remember that the State maintains old roads, and
makes new ones, and these roads are at the
disposal of those who use motor vehicles
Pither for private purposes or for trade or
commerce. This naturally costs the State.
It has, therefore, to find funds for making
t
'\
1 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
535
new roads and maintenance of those that a.re
already in existence. These funds can only
the ra.iserl through ta.xa.tion, and if the State
taxes the users of motor vehicles in order to
make a.nd maintain roads, it can hardly be
said that the State is putting unreasonable
restrictions on the individuals' right to move
freely throughout the territory of India., or
to practise any profession or to carry on any
occupation, trade or busineRS. We have looked into figures of income and 'expenditure in
this connection of the Rajasthan Stu.te to
judge whether this taxation is reasonable.
We find that in 1952-53 income from motor
vehicles taxation under the Act was in
neighbourhood of 34 lakhs. ·In that very year,
the expenditure on new roads and maintenance of old roads was in the neighbourhood of
60 lakhs. In 1954-55, the estimated income
from the tax was 35 lakhs 1 while the estimated
expenditure was ov:er 65 lakhs. It is obvious
from these figures that the State is charging
from the users of motor vehicles something
in the neighbourhood of 50% of the cost
it has to incur in maintaining and making
roads."
The High Court further pointed out that in the case
of private motor ca.rs the tar was Rs. 12 per seat
and for an ordinary five-seater car, it came to
Rs. 60 per year. On payment of this amount the
owner of the motor vehicle could use the car anywhere in Rajasthan and the roads were open to
him. In the case of a goods vehicle, the tax was
Rs. 2000 per year for a goods vehicle with a load
capacity of over five tons i.e. over 135 maunds.
Assuming that such a vehicle could be l'easonably
used for 2ff0 days in a year, the ta'I: amounted to
Rs. 10 per day for a.bout 140 maunds of goods carried over any length of the road in Rajasthan. This
worked out to about Rs. 1 for 14 maunds i. e. almost
1961
A.utomobi/1
Tronspore
(R ;josthan) Ltd.
v.
State of RojaotAan
Da1J
536
11162
Automobile
T1a11spM't
(Rnjosthon) Ltd.
••
Stale of Rajasth•n
Das J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963)
an anna a maund. If the Act and the Schedules
appended thereto are examined in this manner, it
will be noticed that the tax imposed is really a
tax for the use of the roads in Rajasthan and it
cannot be said that it hinders the free movement
of trade, commerce and intercourse. The taxes are
compensatory taxeF which instead of hindering
trade, commerce and intercourse facilitate them by
providing roads and maintaining the roads in a
good state of repairs. Whether a tax is compensatory or nor cannot be made to depend on the
preamble of the statute imposing it. Nor do we
think that it would be right to say that a tax is
not compensatory because the preuise or specific
amount collected is not actually used to providing
any facilities. It is obvious that if the preamble
decided th0- matter, then the mercantile community
would be helpless and it would be the easiest thing
for the Legislature to defeat the freedom assured
by Art. 341 by stating in the preamble that it is
meant to provide facilities to the tradesmen. Likewise actual user would often be unknown to tradesmen and such user may at some time be compensatory and at others not so. It seems to us that
a working test for deciding whether a tax is
compensatory or not is to enquire whether
the trad~s people are having the use of
certain facilities for the better conduct of their
business and paying not patently much more than
what is required for providing the facilities. It
would be impossible to judge the compensatory
nature of a tax by a meticulous test, and in the
rniture of things that cannot be done.
Nor do we think that it "ill make any difference that the money collected from the tax is not
put into a separate fund so Jong as facilities for the
trades people who pay the tax are provided and the
expenses incurred in providing them are born by
the State out of whatever source it may be. In
1 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
537
the cases under our consideration the tax is based
on passenger capacity of commercial buses and loading capacity of goods vehicles; both have some
relation to the wear and tear caused to the roads
used by the buses. In basing the taxes on passenger capacity or loading ca.pa.city, the Legislature
has merely evolved a method and measure of compensation demanded by the State, but the taxes
are still compensation and oharge for regulation.
We were addressed at some length on the
distinction between a tax, a fee and an excise duty.
It was also pointed out to us that the taxes raised
under the Act were not specially ear-marked for the
building or maintenance of roads. W'e do not think
that thf~se considerations necessarily determine
whether the taxes are compensatory taxes or not.
We must consider the substance of the matter and
so considered, there can be no doubt that the taxes
imposed are no hindrance to the freedom of trade,
commerce and intercourse. If a statute fixes a
charge for a convenience or service provided by
the State or an agency of the State, and imposes it
upon those who choose to avail themselves of the
service or convenience, the freedom of trade and
commerce may well be considered unimpaired. In
such a case the imposition assumes the charactm
of remuneration or consideration charged in respect
of an advantage sought and received. In Armstrong
v. St,ate of Victoria No. 2 (1) Dixon, C.J., said;
"The reason, as I venture to suggest, simply is that, without the bridge, the aerodromes
and airways, the wharves and the sheds, the respective inter-State operations could not he carried out and t.hat the charges serve no purpose
save to maintain these necessary things at a
standard by which they may continue.
However it may be stated the ultimate ground
why the exaction of the paym<"nts for using
(1),(1957).99 C. L. R. 28
1941
Automobile
'I' ran.sport
Raj 1st/, an LtJ.
v.
Stat1 of Rajaslhan
Das J.
538
196t
Autcimohile
r,a-.sport
R,,jasf/urn Ltd.
••
Stat1 of Rajasthan
Das J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963]
the instruments of commerce that ha.ye been
mentioned is no violation of the freedom
of inter-State trades lies in the relation to
inter-state trade which their nature and purpose give them. The reason why public
authClrity must maintain them is in order
that the commerce may use them, and so for
the commnrce to bear or contribute to the
cost of their upkeep can involve no detraction from the freedom of commercial intercourse between States." (p. 43)
The learned Cheif Justice reiterated the same
view in Commonwealth Freighters Property Ltd. v.
Sneddon (1 )
We have, therefore, come to the conclusion
that the Aot does not vi0late the provisions of Art.
:!01 of the Constitution and the taxes imposed
under the Act are compensatory taxes which do
not hinder the frceckm of trade, commerce and
intercours'' assured by that article. 'l'he taxes
imposed were, therefore, legal and the High Court
rightly di~mi•Red the writ petitions filPd by the
appell>tnts. In the result the appeals fail and a.re
dismiPsed with costs ; one hearing fee.
Su6!c Rao J.
SOBBA RAO, J.-I agree with the conclusion
arriv(lr\ at by my learned brother, S. K. Das, J.,
but, in view of the importan~-e of the question
raised. I wou Id prefer to giv" my own reasons for
the construct.ion of the releva.nt provisions of Part
XIII of the Constitution.
The qnestion in these appeals is, what is the
ambit of the fre .. d0m emihrinecl in Art. :101 of the
Constitution and what arA the limitations h1plicit
in it or envisaged in the succeeding artides ?
Tho onnflicting and sometimes mutually destructive arguments of learned counsel appearing for
the various parties and interveners, omitting the
(1) (1959) 102 C. L. R. 2RO, 291.
1 S.C.:R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
539
immaterial variations, may conveniently be pla.oed
under following heads: (l) ''Trade, commerce and
intercourse" is a term of widest amplitude ta.king
in the gamut of activities starting from production
or manufacture and ending with the completion of
a. particular commercial transactions ; and every
restriction imposed by any law or executive
action on any part of the said integrated activity would be violative of the freedom under
Art. 301. (2) The expression "trade, commerce
and intercourse" means only transportation in
the course of trade across the State or interState barriers, and any law be, it taxation
or otherwise, directly and materially affecting the
said transportation, would infringe the freedom. ( 3)
The freedom rocognized under Art. ~01 is only the
freedom against geographical barriers between States
or intra-State units created by law ; and laws,
including only discriminatory laws of taxation, creating the said barriers would offend against Art. 301.
(4) The freedom envisaged by Art. 301 is only
a freedom from Jaws showing preference to one
State over another and discrimination between one
State and another made only by virtue of
entry, 42 of List I entry 26 of List II
and entry 33 of List III of the Seventh
Schedule to the Constitution. (5) The law of fiscal
taxation is entirely outside the domaiµ of freedom
dec~ared hY. Art. 301. All the learned counsel a.pp,
earmg in the case has a.greed, or at any rate no
argument was advanced to the contrary, that the
freedom, whatever may be its content or scope on
which there is difference of opinion, relates to both
inter-State and intra-State trade.
Before considering the provisions of the said
articles, it will be useful to make certain general
observations. We have to bear in mind in approaching the problem presented before us that our Constitution was not written on clean slate. Many of
the concepw were borrowed from the Government
1961
AulamobU1
Transporl
(Baja1tllon) LU.
v.
State of Rajasl,,.,,
Subba Bao J.
540
1962
Automobi't
'l'ransport
(Rajas!h,n) Ltd,
••
St:.itt of RfljaJthan
SubhrJ Rao J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963)
of India Aot or from other Constitutions and adap·
ted to suit tho conditions of our country. We cannot ignore the fact that the Constitution was drafted
by persons some of whom had a deep knowledge of
the constitutional problems of other countries; and
therefore, they must be assumed to have had the
knowledge of the interpretation put upon certain legal
concepts by the highest tribunals of those countries.
At the same time, it can be reasonably assumed that
they have made a sincere attempt to accept the good
and to avoid the defects found by experience in the
other constitutions and also to mould them to suit our
conditions. ]forther, a brief survey of the relevant
provisions of thoso constitutions, which form the
background of this article, and the interpretation
put on them by the highest tribunals of the respective countries would not only be relevant but also be
necessary for appreciating the correct ~cope of
Art. 301 of our Constitution. Our Constitution provides
for a federal structure with a bias towards a Central
Govemment. But real and subctantial autonomy
was conferred on the States withtn the boundaries
of tho fields chalked out for them. Therefore, in
approaching the problem of construing the provisions of Part XIII of our Constitution, unless the
terms of the provisions of thl) said Part are clear
and unambiguous, it would be thn duty of this Court
to construe them in such a manner as not to disturb
the framework uf the Constitution. Before I
attempt to construe the relevant provisions of the
Constitution, it would be convenient at this stage to
consider briefly the American and Australian Jaw
material to the present inquiry.
Clause 3 of s. 8 of Art. I of the Constitution of
the United States of America says that the Congress
shall havo power to regulate commerce with foreign
nations Rnd among the several States and with the
Indian tribes. This clause has two aspects, namely,
(i) it is a source of national power and (ii) it operates as a curb on state power. This clause gave rise,
I S.C.R.
54:1
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
among others, to two questions, namely, (i) what
was the scope and content of the commerce power?
and (ii) bow to resolve the oonflicts that arose between the law made by the Congress in exercise of
that power and the law made by the State in exercise of its police power, or their powers expressed
or implied, when they came into conflict with each
other? An authoritative definition of the word
"commerce" was given by Marshall, C. J., in Gibbons
v. Ogrlen (1 ), wherein he observed:
"This would restrict a general term applicable to many objects to one ofits significations
Commerce, undoubtedly, is traffic, but something more-it is intercourse."
The decisions of the Supreme Court of the United
States of America on the subject are not uniform.
Indeed, they have
adopted the commerce
d('mands, namely,
power to meet all the
economic, commercial, industrial and transport
revolutions of that country. It is not necessary
for the purpose of this case to consider
the conflict or the various nuances of the decisionthe concept of commerce was enlarged or reduced
to meet the exigencies of different situations; but the
common thread was that transportation across the
borders, either physically or conceptually, was
uniformly held to be a necessary ingredient of the
expression ."commerce". After noticing the conflict,
Willis in his book on Constitutional Law, summarizes
the latest position thus, at p. 288:
" ............... today the correct definition of
commerce is that it is traffic and commercial
intercourse. This, of course, gives Congress
power wherever traffic or intercourse concerns
an inter-State market. When "commerce'' is
properly defined as traffic, and the mental
picture is formed, not of an isolated journey
across a state boundary line, but of an onward
(1)
(1824) 9 Wheat T; 6 L. ed. 23.
/
1962
A tomobi/1
Transport
( Rajasthan) Ltd.
v.
State of Rajasthan
Subba Rao J,
542
1962
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963]
coursing stream of business which knows no
state lines, which is constantly fed and as
constantly feeds tho streams of production,
and which debouches into the inter-state
market, then regulations of it by Congress,
whether taking the form of a prohibition of
cortR,in phases of transportation or some other
form, ceases to be open to the charge
of an ul~rior intention to usurp their power,
because it operates most upon tho very subject
matter entrusted to Congress or, at most
upon local incidents thereof, the fringe, so t~
speak, of a nation-spread fabric."
Automobilt
Transport
(Rajasthan) Ltd,
v.
Stat1 of Rajasthan
Subba Rao J.
In this context the following references are instructive: Carter v. Carter Coal Company('), Kidd v. Pearson('), Welton v. State of Mussouri ('),Public Utilities
Commission v. Landon\'). It may be stated broadly
that in America "commerce" means traffic in its
operation across the State borders.
On the second question some of the American
decisions adopted a vragmatic approach to resolve
the conflict. To solve the conflict that a.rose between
the laws made by the Congress r.egulating commerce
and those made by the State in exercise ofits police
power, the Supreme Court of America evolved certain doctrines, such as, "original package", "silence
of Congress", "pre-emption", 'undue and unreasonable burden", and "direct and ir.diroct effect". The
following decisions dealing with "direct and indirect
effect" on inter-State trade can be usefully referred
to in this regard, for, in my view, they ·afford some
guide to resolve the difficulties that might ari8e under
our Constitution: M' Cul[()(;h v. The State of Maryland('), John T. Hendrick v. The State of Maryland('),
(I)
\2)
(SJ
(4)
(SJ
(6)
(1936\ 298 U.S. 238: 80 L. cd.1160.
0888\ 128 U.S. 1: 32 L. ed. 346.
(1876) 91 U.S. 275; 2' L. ed. 347.
(191912<9U.S. 216: 63 L. ed. 577.
(1819, 17 U.S. 316; 4 L. ed. 579.
(1915) 235 TJ.S. 610; S9 L. ed. 385.
•·
i
I s.C.R.
•
'
SUPREME COURT REPOR'rS
543
Interstate B'usses Corporation v. William H. Blodgett( 1),
Interstate :Transit v.DfokLindsey( 2 ), and A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corporation v.United 8tc1,te of America(3 ). The
said decisions show that in America the principle
accepted was that every restriction imposed by a.
State law did not offend the commerce clause, unless it directly affected it, and that even taxation
was permissible, if it was for services rendered by
the State to promote trade.
The Commonwealth of Australia Constitution
Act was pa.ssed in 1900. At 1.he time that Act was.
made, the framers of that Act ha.d the background
of the evolution of the American law on the com·
merce clause. Under that Act, oert.ain defined
powers of legislation are conferred on the Commonwealth in respect of trade and commerce. Section
51 reads: "Trade and commerce with other countries :.md among the States''. Section 98 says: ''The
power of the Parliament to make laws with respect
to trade and commerce extends to navigation and
shipping and to railways the property of any State".
Section ~9 prnhibit.s the Commonwealth, by any law
or regulation of trade, commerce, or revenue, from
giving preference to one State or any part thereof
over another State or any part thereof. Section 100
prohibits the Commonwealth from abridging, the
right of a State or of the residents therein to the
reasonable use of the waters of rivers for conservation or irrigation. Other legislative powers are conferred in respect of specific subjects of trade
and commerce, such as, bounties, currency, coinage,
bills of exchange, bankruptcy, copy-rights, customs,
excise, etc. Section 92 says: ' 10n the imposition of
uniform duties of customs, trade, commerce, and
intercourse, among the States, whether by means
of internal carriage or ocean navigation, shall be
(I) (1928) 276 U.S. 245; 72 L. ed, 551.
(1931) 283 U.S. 1113; 75 L. ed. 953.
(3) (1935) 72 U.S 495; 79 L. ed. 1570.
('.>)
Automobile
Transport
(Rajast~an) Ltd.
v.
S1a·e of Rajasthan
Subba Rao J.
544
1968
Automohtle
Trarspnrt
(Rqjasthon) Ltd.
v.
Stat1 of Rojasthan
Subba Ruo J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963)
absolutely free". Unlike the American Constitu- ..,
tion, the Australian Constitution confers a legislative power on the Commonwealth Parliament to
make laws in respect of trade and commerce with
other countries and among the States, and also in
respect of certain specific subjects of trade and
commerce and then declares that trade, commerce
and intercourse among the States shall be absolutet
ly free. Unlike the American Constitution, in the
Australian Constitution, there is a declaration of
freedom of trade, commerce and intercourse among
the States. While in America the expression used
is "commerce", ins. 92 of the Australian Constitution the expression, "trade, commerce and intercourse" is used.
The Australian Constitution
Act not only does not provide for any
restrictions on the freedom of trade, comm"lrce ,..
and intercourse, but also used an expression of
the widest amplitude, viz., "absolutely free"
emphasizing the freedom declared by the section.
This section, just like the commerce clause in the
American Constitution, was the subject of judicial
scrutiny and conflict of decision. The interpretation of this sub-section fell to be considered in the ~
context of marketing, banking and transport legislation. The question raised was whether the
freedom of trade, commerce and intercourse was
interfered by the laws made by the State. Paradoxically, the Com-ts of Australia and, in appeals from
some decisions of those Courts, the Privy Council
evolved the power to restrict the said freedom by ..the States from the concept of absolute freedom
itself. This was necessitated because there were no
statutory provisions limiting the absolute freedom
and, as uncontrolled freedom in the field of interState Commerce may lead to chaos, limitations on
the freedom were evolved to save the said freedom.
The scope of the limitations so evolved would be
useful to construe the relevant provisions of our_ -4,
Constitution which expressly provides for similar
limitations. The scope of the freedom and it s
I S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
545
limitations are found in the leading decisions on the
subject, wb1ch throw considerable light on the
question now raised, and they are : Smither' s case(1 ),
W. & A. McArthur Ltd. v. The State of Queensland (2),
James v. Commonwealth of AitStralia (3 ), Commonwealth of Australia v. flank of New South Wales (4 ).
In the aforeRaid Australian decisions the expression
''trade. commerce, and intercourse among the States"
has been understood in the widest sense as including
trade in all its manifestations involving transportation or movement across the frontiers of the State ;
it also includes non-commercial intercourse.
'>
•
''
On the seeond question, some of the leading
Australian decisions contain an interesting and
instructive exposition of the conflict of jurisdiction
and useful suggestions for resolving it. In this
context the following decisions may usefully be
consulted: James v. Cowan {6 ), Commonwealth of
Australia v. Bank of New South Wales (4 ), Hughes
and Vale Proprietary Ltd. v. State, of New South
Wales (6 ), Hughes and Vale Private Limited v. The
State, of New South Wales [No. 2) (7 ) , Grannall
v. Marrickville Margarine Proprietary Ltd. ( 8 ),
Armstrong v. State of Victoria [No. 2] (9 ), Commonwealth Freighters Proprietary Ltd. v. Snedrlon (10).
The Australian decisions broadly laid down the
following three propositions : (i) the impugned law,
whether fiscal or otherwise. shall directly and
immediately restrict traffic across the borders before
it could be said to violate the freedom under s. 92
of the Commonwealth of Australia ·constitution
Act ; (ii) compensatory measures for the purpose of
regulating oommerce are not restrictions on the
said freedom ; and (iii) when a question arises
whether a fiscal statute amounts to a .restriction on
(1) (1912) 16 C.L.R.. 99.
13) [19361 A.C. 578.
(S) [1930] 43 C.t.R. 31!6.
171 [1956) 93 C.L.R. 127.
(9) [1957J 99 C.L.R. 28.
(21 (1920) 28 C.L.R. 530.
(4) [1950] A.C. 235.
(6) [1955] AC. 241.
(8) [1955] 93 C.T .• R. 155.
(l_O) [1959J 102 C.L.R. 280.
1962
A.utomobi11
Transport
(Rajisthan) Ltd.
v.
State of Rojaslhan
Subba Ruo ,T.
546
196~
Automobile
Tr•nsPw'
(RojGslhan} Ltd.
v.
State of Rr.,jasthm
SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1963)
the said freedom, a careful scrutiny of the provisions may rebut the presumption that otherwise
may arise that the impugned Act is really a compensatory measure for the amenities provided or
services rendered.
The following principles emerge from the
foregoing American and Australian decisions : ( 1)
Though in American law the commerce clause only
confers a power upon the Congress, under the
Australian Constitution Act, freedom of trade,
commerce and intercourse is enshrined in s. 92 as a
cherished freedom : the composite expression in
s. 92 of the said Act was borrowed from the
American decisions. (2) The expression "trade,
commerce and intercourse", though it is not an
expression of art, has acquired a definite significar
tion in the constit.utional law of both the countries,
namely, it is traffic and commercial intercourse
concerning an inter-State market, or, to put it differently, the free flow or movement of trade across
the State borders. (3) The said freedom should not
be infringed by any law, whether taxation or otherwise or by executive action. ( 4) The restriction
may be before or after movement : it may be a
prior restraint or a subsequent burden. (5) The
word «freedom" does not mean anarchy, but
assumes transactions based on law and carried out
under the superintendence and direction of law :
such laws are, (11) laws of contract, property, tort,
etc., (b) regulations for preserving and maintaining
the freedom, sun.h as, police regulations about
safety, speed, lighting, rule of the road, etc., (c)
laws providing for services and for compensation
for services rendered, namely, the construction and
maintenance of wharfs, toads, aerodromes, etc., and
the levy of taxes to meet the expenditure incurred
in connection therewith ; the said laws are not
restrictions on the said freedom but only facilities
to promote the same.
•
1 S.O.R.
SUPREME OOURT REPORTS
547
Now, let us look at the provisions of Art. 301
of the Constitution. The article reads :
"Subject to the other provisions of this
Pa.rt, trade, commerce and intercourse
throughout the territory of India shall be
free."
J
-"
Three groups of words in the said article, in their
juxtaposition and interaction, furnish the key to the
problem, and they are : (i) trade, commerce and
intercourse, (ii) throughout the territory of India,
and (iii) shalJ be free. The' expression ''trade,
commerce and intercourse" is a composite one ancl
has received, as already noticed. the fullest judicial
attention from the highest courts of America and
Australia : though they may not be words of art,
they have acquired a secondary meaning or
significance. I shall accept the meaning acquired
by that expression by the gradual evolution of law
in those. countries.
Now, let us analyse the words "shall be free".
Three questions occur to one's mind in regard to
this, namely, (i) what is free ? {ii) free from what ?
and (iii) where is it free ? As I· have already
indicated, the said composite expression means
trade across the borders: what is free is that trade. It
is implicit in the concept of freedom that there will
be obstructions to it. ~uch obstructions or barriers
may be, in the present context, to the freedom to
trade across the borders. Article 301 provides for
frdedom from the said barriers or impediments in
effect operating as barriers. This freedom from
barriers cannot operate in vacuum and must be
limited by space. A barrier may be put up between
two States at the boundary of the States or
between two districts, two taluks, two towns or bet·
ween two parts of a town. The barrier may be at
a particular point at a boundary or might take the
form of a continuous impediment till the boundary is
196!
Aulomobil6
TrarulO'I
( lajo.rtlaan) Ltd•
••
Sia '8 ,.j Rojas,han
Sublla Rao J.
548
Automobile
r,.,'/sport
.
( Rajuth•n) Lia,
Stat1 of Rojos.han
SubJa Ra1 J.
--
SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1963]
crossed. It may take different forms. The restrictions may be before or after movement. It may be
a pi·ior reslrnint or ti subsequent burden. But the
essential idea is that a barrier is an obstacle put
across trade in motion at a particular point or diffe.
rent points. The expression "shall be free" decla"·es
in a mandatory from a freedom of such transport
or movement from such barriers.
The next question is, where is it free ? The
second expression "throughout the territory of
India" demarcates the extensive field of operation
of the said freedom. l'he said intercour1e shall be
free throughout the territory of India. The use of
the words "territory of India" instead of "among
the several States" found in the American Constitution or "among the States" found in the
Australian Constitution, removes all inter-State or
intra-State barriers and brings out the idea that
for the purpose of the freedom declared, the whole
country is one unit. Trade cannot be free throughout the territory of India, if there are barriers in
any part of India, be it inter-State or intra-State.
So long as there is impediment to that freedom, its
nature or extent is irrelevant. The difference will be
in degree and not in quality. The freedom declared
under Art. 301 may be defined as aright to free move·
ment of persons or things, tangible or intangible, commercial or non-commercial, unobstructed by barriers,
inter-State or intra-State or any other impediment
operating as such barriers. To State it differently
all obstructions or impediments whatever shape
they may take, to the free flow or movement of
trade, or non-commercial intercourse, offend
.Art. 301 of the Constitution execpt in so far as they
are saved by the succeeding provisions. But
we are not concerned in this case with non·commer·
cial intercourse.
The next question is, what is the content of
the concept of freedom ? The word ''freedom" is
....
...
I S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
549
not capable of precise definition, but it can be stated
what would infringe or detract from the said freedom. Before a particular law can be said to infringe
the said freedom, it must be ascertained whether the
impugned provision operates as a restriction impe<ling
the free movement of trarle or only as a regulation
facilitating the same. Restrictions obstruct the freedom, whereas regulations promote it. Polico regulations, though they may superficially appear t(' restrict
the freedom of movement, in ,fact provide the ueces·
aary conditions for the free movement. Regula·
tions such a provision for lighting, speed, good
condition of vehicles, timings, rule of the road and
similar others, really facilitate the freedom of movement rather than retard it. So too, licensing syfltem
with compensatory fees would not bo restrictions
but regulatory provisions ; for without it, the necessary lines of communication, su1.:h as roads, waterways and air-ways cannot effectively be maintained
and the freedom declared may in practice turn out
to be an empty one. So too, regulations providing
for necessary services to enable the free movement
of traffic, whether charged or not, cannot also be
described as restrictions impeding the freedom.
To say all these is n~t to say that every provision
couched in the form of r,egulation but in effect and
substance a restriction can pass off as a permissible
regulation. It is for the Court in a given case to
decide whether a provision purporting to regulate
trade is in fact a restriction on freedom. .If. it be
a coloura.ble exercjse of power and the regulatory
provision in fact a restriction, unless the said provision is one of the permissible restrictions under
the succeeding articles, it would be struck down.
This view is consistent with the principles laid
down by the Australian High Court ·and the Privy
Council in the· context of interpretation of the words
"absolutely free" ins. 92 of the Commonwealth of
Australia Constitution . Act, which is more emphatic than the word ufree" in Art. 301 of our Constitution.
196Z
Aut~mobil1
Transpo1>
(Rajt1sthAri) Ltd.
v.
S1alt of Rajaathan
Subla Rao J.
550
1961
..4.utnrnoiJlt1
Tr•nsporl
(Rojastlwl) Lid.
••
Slalt1 of HojatMn.
Sul>hR.. J.
SUPREME OOURT REPORTS [1963]
The Constitution confers on the Parliament
and the State Legislatures extensive powers to make
laws in respect of various matters. A glance at the
entries in the Lists of the Seventh Schedule to the
Constitution would show that every law so made
may have some repercussion on the declared free·
dom. Properly tax, Profession tax, sales-tax,
excise duty and other taxes may all have a.n
indirect effect on the free flow of trade. So too,
laws, other than those of taxation, ma.de by virtue
of different entries in the Lists, ma.y remotely affect
trade. Should it be held that any law which
may have such repercussion must either be passed
by the Parliament or by the State Legislature with
the previous consent of tho President, there would
be. a.n end of provincial autonomy, for in that event,
with some exceptions, all the said laws should
either be made by the Parliament or by the State
Legislature with the consent of the Oen·
tral Executive Government. By so construing,
we would be making the Legislature of a State
elected on adult franchise the handmaid of the Central executive. We would be re·writting the Constitution and introducing by sidewind autocracy in
the field of legislation allotted to the States, while
our Consititution has provided meticulously for
democracy. Therefore, any construction which may
bring about mob an unexpected result shall be
avoided, unless the Constitution compels us by expre88 words to do so. There are admittedly no
such words of compulsion. At the same time it is
also difficult to accept the argument advanced by
the States that the laws made under entry 42 of
List I, entry 26 of List II and entry 33 of List III,
of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution only
are subject to that freedom ; for firstly, the article
does not restrict the freedom to the area covered
by those entries, and, secondly, laws made under
the other entries may more effectively and directly
affect the movement of trade. If a law direotl;y
1 S.C.R.
SUPR.EME COURT REPORTS
551
and immediately imposes a tax for general revenue purposes on the movement of trade, it would
be violating the -freedom. On the other hand, if
the impact is indirect and remote, it would be unobjectionable. The Court will have to ascertain
whether the impugned law in a" given case affects
directly the said movement or indirectly and remotely affects it.
At this stage, an argument elaborated by Mr.
Lalnarain Sinha may also be noticed. The learned
Advocate said that the filed occupied by Art. 19 of
Part III of the Constitution and that occupied by
Part XIII thereof are distinct, that Art. 19 deals
generally with freedom of trade and that Art. 301
with discriminatory barriers and that fiscal statutes
could not be restrictions under Art. 19 and, therefore, they could not equally be restrictions under
Art. 301. He would say that whatever might be
said of "regulatory taxes'' or "destructive ones",
fiscal taxes are always in public interest and it is not
possible for a court to decide whether a particular
tax is reasonable or not. On this premises, the
argument proceeds, a reasonable restriction is a
restriction, the reasonableness whereof oan be ascertained by court, and in & ·case where the reason·
ableness of a particular restriction is impossible of ascertainment by a court, suoh as a law fixing a rate,
the Constitution must be deemed to have released
such _a restriction from the impact of the concept
of the freedom. This is an argument in reverse
gear. The freedom declared by the Constitution
cannot be controlJed by . an involved process of
reasoning. It is not permissible to limit the content of the freedom by the criterion of a court's
ablity to ascertain the reasonableness of a restriction
imposed thereon. What is guaranteed to a citizen
by the Constitution is a fundamental right to carry on
business. If cl. (5) of Art. 19 were not in the Constitution, every restriction on that right, be it by a
1951
.Aulomo/Jil1
TraN/Jorl
(Rojaslllim) Lltl.
v.
State oJ Rojasllion
Su6baRao J,
552
1961
A."tmob;le
Tran.spt1rl
(Raiastlian) Lid.
v.
Slate of R·jasthan
Subba Rao J.
SUPREME OOURT REPORTS [1963]
law of taxation or otherwise, which limited the
freedom, would certainly violate the sa.me. The
fact that the Constitution saves laws made imposing
reasonable restrictions on the freedom has no relevance to the content of the freedom, though it protects certain laws ~de infringing that freedom. If
on a construction of the provisions of Art. 19(6), it
should be held that a fiscal ta:1:ation was not a restriction within the meaning of the sa.id clause, every
law imposing such a tax would infringe the funda·
mental right. This result could not have been intend·
ed by the makers of the Constitution. Therefore,
the contention should be that every law of taxation
is a reasonable restriction in public interest. There
are no merits in the contention either. It is sa.id
that taxation is always in public interest, and that
it is not possible for any court to ascertain on the
material placed before it that. a rate is reasonable
or not. It is conceileil that regulatory taxes or
laws of taxation intended to prohibit or restrict an
activity and not to raise a general tax in the interest
of revenue may be a restriction and a court may be
in a position to see whether such laws pass the test
laid down in Art. 19 (6) of Constitution. The
arguments is confined only to what is describOO a8
"fiscal taxation" that is taxation soleiy intended for
raising revenue for the State. It is also not denied
that unreaaonable procedural restrictions imposed
by law of taxation would infringe the freedom. It
is also admitted that a fiscal law may offend the
fundamental right enshrined in Art. 14 of the Con.
sitution. If so, it is beyond my comprehension on
what principle the law of taxation could offend
with impunity the freedom enshrined in Art. 19
(1) (g). Article 13(2) says in express terms:
"The State shall not make any law which
takes away or abridges the rights conferred
by this Part and any Jaw made in contravention of this clause shall to the extent of the
contravention, be void."
1 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
553
A law of taxation is made by Parliament or the
Legislature of a State, as the case may be, in exercise of the power conferred under the Constitution by
virtue of the entries, found therein. It is a law
just like any other Jaw made under the Constitution.
This Court, in K. Thatkunni Moopi,l Nair v.
SflJte of Kerala (1) and in Balaji v. I. P.
O.tficer (1), held that a law of taxation would
be void if it infringed the fundamental right
guaranteed under Art. 19 of the Constitution.
Therefore, the law of taxation also should satisfy
the two teats laid down in Art. 19(~) of the Constitution. It is said that a law of taxation is always
in public interest. Ordinarily it may be so, but it
cannot be posited that there cannot be any exceptions to it. A taxing law may be in public interest
in the sense that the. income realised may be used
for public good, but there may be occa.sions, when
the rate or the mode of taxation m'ly be so abhorrent to the principles of natural justice or even to
well settled principles of taxation that it may ca.use
irremediable harm to the public rather than promote public good, that the Court may have to hold
that it is not in public interest. Noc can I agree
with the contention that it is impossible for a court
to hold in any case that a rate of taxation is
reasonable or not. As a proposition it is unsound.
It may be legitimately contended that it is difficult
for a court to come to a definite conclusion on the
correctneM of a rate fixed by the Legislature.
Dixon. C. J., in OommonweaUh Freighters Propriet,ary Limite.d v. Smddon (8 ), gives a very cogent
answer to such an argument in a different con text.
The learned Chief Justice said:
11
Highly inconvenient as it may be, it is
true o.f some legislative powera limited by
definition, whether according to subject-matter
to purpose or otherwise, that the validity of
(1) [1961] 3 S.C.R. 77.
(2) [1962] 2 S.C.R. 983.
(3) (1959) 102 C. L.R. 280, 292.
19~1
~utomobiu
Trans/ml
(R~aslhon) Lid.
Vo
Stal1 of R ijutha11
Subba R'o J.
554
Automobil•
Trarport
[)d. ( R•jaslhan)
v.
Sl•I• of R•Jasthan
Su66a Ra• J.
SUPREME OOURT REPORTS [1963]
the exercise or the power must sometimes
depend on facts, facts which some how muat be
ascertained by the court responsible for deciding the validity or the law ..........•.........••.•
All that is necessary is to make the point that
if a criterion of constitutional validity con·
sists in matter of fa.ct, the fact must be ascertained by the court as best it can, when the
court is called upon to pronounce upon
validity."
I entirely agree with these observations. It is
common place to point out that intricate problems
come before a. court involving decision on different
and complicated aspects of human activity. Questions involving science, medicine, engineering,
geology, ~iology, economiflll, Psychology, etc. all
come for judicial scrutiny, and I have never heard
any court saying that it is difficult to decide upon
such a question and, therefore, the proceeding raising such a. question is outside the jurisdiction of
such a court. In saying this, I am not ignoring
the difficulties inherent in a problem of fixing the
rate of taxes by a court. Experience shows that
the court applies certain presumptions, such as
that of the wisdom, knowledge and the good intentions of the Legislature, and does not a.110 meticulously go in to the question, but only looks at the
broad features. On the argument of lea.med counsel
when it is permissible and possible for a court to
ascertain whether a tax is fiscal or regulatory, I do
not 11ee how it becomes impossible, though it may
be difficult, to hold whether a fisc.al tax is reason·
able or not. The distinction lies not in the nature
of the enquiry but only in degree. That a.pa.rt, no
restriction, if it is unreasonable, can be more deleterious to the freedom than the imposition of fiscal
burden on it, which may in certain circumstances
destroy the very freedom. I, therefore, hold, on a
true construction of the expressed words of Art. 19
l S.C.B. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
555
of the Constitution, that it is not possible or even
permissible to hold that laws of taxation are
outside the scope of the freedom enshrined therein.
As the premises of Mr. La.Ina.rain Sinha's argument
lack a. reasonable basis, his further argument that
the freedom in Art. 301 excludes from its scope
fiscal laws must be rejeoted.
Having ascertained the scope and content of
the freedom envisaged in Art. 301 of the Constitution, let us look at the succeeding provisions which
place limitations on the said freedom. Under Art.
302.
"Parliament may by law impose such
restrictions on the freedom of trade, commerce or interoourse between one State and
another or within any p~rt of the territory of
India., as may be required in the public interest."
This is a.n exception to Art. 301. The restrictions
contemplated therein are restrictions on the said
freedom. But the restrictions can be imposed by
Parliament only by law. Parliament's power to
make law is derived from Arts. 245 and 246 of the
Constitution. Thereunder, it can make laws with
respect to any of the matters enumerated in Lists
I and III of the Seventh Schedule and in respect of
a territory not included in a States with respect to
matters enumerated in any of the .three Lists.
Therefore, in exercise of the said power and by
virtue of the language of the entries correlated to
that power, Parliament can make any law imposing
restrictions on the said freedom. The article in
terms, or even by necessary implication, does not
~xclude restrictions by way of taxation. It is not
the source or the nature of the law that matters
but the impact of that law, be it a law of taxation
or otherwise, on the freedom that is crucial. It is
1981
Automobile
rra•·spo•t
(R1jasthan) Lti.
v.
Stale of "a.i•slba
SubJa Ra• J.
556
SUPREME OOURT REPORTS [1963]
also not possible to
..iutomobi/1
Trans/JO''
(Bojruthon) Ltd.
v.
11 td< of Bojaslha•
Bubi• Roo J.
accept the
argument that
.Art: 302 confers an independent power on the Parliament, that ill, a power in addition to that conferred
on it by Arts. 245 and 246. There is no room for
this argument, for the words "by law" in the article
clearly refer to the power of the Parliament to
make law under the Comtitution. That apart, if
it was the intention of the Constituent Assembly
to confer a fresh power, those world not have been
ueed in Art. 302, but instead world suitable to
confer a new power, namely, "shall have the power"
would have been used. Therefore, under this article
the Parliament can only impose restrictions by
virtue of any of the entries in the Lists in respect
of which it can make laws. A perusal of the entries
in List I shows that laws can be made restricting
the said freedom under most of the entries, for
instance, entries 22, 23, 24, 25, 27, 29, 42, 52, 53,
56, 81, 89, 91, etc. Whether there is a restriction
or not, does not depend upon the relevant entry,
but on the nature of the impact of the law on the
freedom. But a limitation is 1ought to be placed
upon this power by an attempt to confine it to the
entries mentioned in Art. 303. Article 303, which
prohibits ~he Parliament from making a law giving
preference to one State over another or makin~ any
discrimination between one State and another, is
confined only to the entries relating to trade and
commerce. But Art. 303 is in the nature of an
exception or proviso to Art. 302. "The proviso
leaves the generality of the substantive enactment
unqualified except in so far as it concerns the parti·
cular subjects to which the proviso relatee." "Where
the language of the ma.in enactment is clear and
unambiguous, a proviso can have no re}lf'rcussion
on the interpretation of the main enactment so as
to exclude from it, by implication, what clearly
fa.Ha within ita expressed term11": 11ee M. & 8. JI.
Railway v. Bet:W(Jda Municipality ('). The worcis
(I) A. J. R. 19# P. C. 71, 73.
1 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
557
in Art. 302 are clear a.nd unambiguous a.nd they do
not confine its operation to any particular entries
a.nd, therefore, the limitation imposed under Art. 303
cannot curtail the generality of the provisions of
the said article.
But the more, difficult question is, what does
the word "reatriotions" mean in Art. 302? The
dictionary meaning . of the word ''restrict" it "to
confine, bound, limit." Therefore, any limitations placed upon the freedom is a restriction on
that freedom. But the limitation must be real,
direct and immediate, but not fanciful, indirect or
remote. In this context, the principles evolved by
Amerioa.n and Australian decision in their attempt
to reconcile the commerce power and the State
police power or the freedom of commerce and the
Commonwealth power to make laws affecting; that
freedom can usefully be invoked with suitable
modifications and adjustments. Of all the doctrines
evolved, in my view, the doctrine of "direct and
immediate effect" on the freedom would be a
reasonable solvent to the difficult situation that
might arise under our Constitution. If a law, whatever may have been its source, directly and immediately a.ffect8 the free movement of trade, it
would be restriction on the said freedom. But a law
which may bave only indirect and remote repercussion on the said freedom cannot be considered
to be a restriction on it. Taking the illustration
from taxation law, a law may impose a tax on
the movement of goods or persons by a motor-vehicle
it directly operates as a restriction on the free
movement of trade, except when it is compensatory
or regulatory. On the other hand, a law may ta.x
a vehicle as property, or the garage wherein the
Tehicle uaed for conveyance is kept. The said
law ma.y haYe indirect
repercussion on the
moYement but the said law is not one directly
imposing restrictions on the free movement.
In this oontext, two difficulties may have to
lie
faced: firstly, though a. law purporting
J911
Aut11mebil1
Transport
(R1Jjasthan) Lti.
v.
Stale •f daj1u•~a11
Subia R!IO J.
558
dutomehi/,
TrOllSfJOl'I
(Rajasthan) Lid,
v.
81•11. qf R'!f111lh,.
--
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963]
to impose a tax on a property or a motor-vehicle,
as the case may be, may in fact and in reality
impose a tax on the movement itself; secondly, a
law may not be on the movement of trade, but on
the property itself, but the burden may be so high
that it may indirectly affect the free flow of trade.
In the former casa, the court may have to scrutinize
the provisions of a. particular statute to ascertain
whether the tax: is on the movement. If the provisions disclose a tax on the movement, it will be a
restriction within the meaning of Art. 302. In the
latter case, if the provisions show that the tax is on
property, the reasona.bleneBB of the tax may have
to be tested against the provisions of Art. 19 of the
Constitution. The question whether a law impose&
a restriction or not depends on the question whe·
ther the said law imposes directly and immediately
a. limitation on the freedom of movement of trade.
If it does, the extent of the impediment relates to
the question of degree rather than to the nature of
it. If it is a restriction, it must satisfy the conditions laid down in Art. 302 of the Constitution.
Article 303 is a.n exception or a proviso to
Art. 302. Article 303 opens out with a non-obstanle
clause, namely, "Notwithstanding anything in
article 302". This phrase is equivalent to saying
that "in spite of article 302" or that ·"article 302
shall be no impediment to the operation of article
303". It is accepted on a.II hands that there is
a defect in the phraseology used in this article.
This article prohibits both Parliament and the State
Legislature from making a law giving preference
to a State or Sta.tee or making a dieorimination
among the States. The non-obst,ante clause bas no
relevance so far as the Legislature of a State is
concerned, for Art. 302 does not deal with Legislat·
ura of a State. In these circumstances, the non·
obstante clause can only be made applicable to that
to which it is appropriate i. e., only to the limits.·
tions imposed on Parliament under Art. 303. Tb.e
1 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
559
article, so far a.s it relates to Parliament, may be
read:
"Notwithstanding anything in article 302,
the Parliament shall not have power to make
any law giving, or authorising the giving of,
any preference to one State over another, or
making, or authorising the making of, any
discrimination between one State and another,
by virtue of any entry relating to trade and
commerce in any of the Lists in the Seventh
Schedule".
Now this provision prohibits the ma.king of laws of
the nature mentioned therein only by virtue of the
entries relating to trade and commerce in any of
the Lists in the Seventh Schedule. This article
clearly says that neither Parliament nor the Leg~
lature of a State can make a law imposing a restriction which has the effeot of giving preference or
ma.king discrimination, as the case may be, among
the States. But a difficulty that ,confronts one is
whether the limitation on the laws is confined only
to the law made by virtue of the entries referring
to trade anj commerce or by virtue of any entry
in the Seventh Schedule, which may affect trade
and commerce. The entries which refer to trade
and commerce are entries 41 and 42 of List I, entry
26 of List II and entry 33 of_ List Ill of the Seventh
Schedule, to the Constitution. But it is contended
that the words "by virtue of the entries relating to
trade and commerce in any of the Lists in the
Seventh Schedule" are of wider import than the
words "by virtue of the said entries" and, therefore,
any law specified in Art. 303 made by virtue of any
entry in any of the Lists in ~he Seventh Schedule,
if it relates to trade and commerce, would- be covered by the exception. The words "any entry relating to trade and commer<>..e in any of the Lists" are
of the widest import and they yield to a. ~ery liberal
.interpretation. . The phraseology used supports
19~!
Autamobill
Transpfltt
(R4)aslhan) Ltd.
v.
Stat1 of Raj11st1'ot1
SubboRuJ.
560
1911
Aut1m1hi/1
TrMis,.,t
Jta;aslhan
v.
St•I• •! R11j,Jthan
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963)
this interpretation. The reason for the exception
also sustains it. There cannot be any distinction
on principle, from the standpoint of the mischief
sought to be averted, between a Jaw made by Tirtue
of an entry ex facie referring to trade and commerce
and that made by virtue of any entry affecting
trade and commerce. For instance, a law may be
made by Pariiament under entries relating to railway~, highways, shipping etc.-these entries do not
expressly refer to trade and commerce, though they
may directly affect trade and commerce. If a law
made under entry 26 of List II giving preference
or makmg discrimination among the States is objectionable, it should also be objectionable, if made
by virtue of any other entry. I would, therefore,
hold that any law made by l:'arliament by virtue of
any entry imposing the said discriminatory restrictions would be bad under the said article.
Article 303 t2) lifts the ban imposed on Parliament under Art. 303 (!), if a law made by Parliament imposing such discriminatory restrictions i11
necessary for the purpose of dealing with a situation
arising out of scarcity of goods in any part of the
territory of India. That part of Art. 303, which
prohibits the Legislature of a State from making a
law of the 11ature mentioned therein, also bears the
same constructions and it is not necessary to re1tate
it, except to mention that clause (2) of Art. 303
does not lift the ban in re3pect of the State
Legislature.
Coming to Art. 304, we are again confronted
with a defoct in phraseology. The article opens
out again with a non-ob8tante clause, namely, "Notwithstanding anything in article 301 or article 303""
Under Art. 301 (a), the Legislature of a State may
by law impose on goods imported from other States
or the Union territories any tax to which eimilar
iooda manufactured or produced in that State are
11ubjeot 10, however, a.a not to discriminate between
I S.C.R.
....
SUPREME OOURT REPORTS
561
them; and Art. 304 (b) enables the State Legisla.ture
to impose such reasonable restrictions on the free·
dom of tra.de, commerce or . intercourse with or
without that State as may be required in the public
interest. B11t no Bill or &mendment for the purpose
of cl. ( b} shall be introduced or moved in the
Legislature of a State without the previous sanction
of the President. Clause (a), .therefore, only enables the Legislature of a Sta.te to impose non-discriminatory taxes on goods imported from other Sta~es
or the Union territories. The non-obstante clause
vis-a.vis Art. 30! (a) may have some relevance so
far as Art. 301 is concerned, for it enables the
Legislature of a State to impose an impediment on
the free movement of trade in spite of the freedom.
declared under Art. 30 !. But it has no relevance
to Art. 303, which <?nly prohibits the State Legislature from making a discriminatory law and it does
not in any way prohibit the State Legislature from
imposing a non-discriminatory tax permitted under
Art. 304: (a). But, with reference to Art. 304 (b ),
the non-obstante clause has significance and meaning
even in regard to Art. 303, as cl. (b) lifts the ban
imposed by Art. 303, subject to the limitations
mentioned therein.,
Therefore, the rion-obstiante
clause must be deemed to apply only to tha.t part
of Art. 304 appropriate· to the said ola.use. If so
read, the difficulty in the construction . disappears.
Article :~04 (a) lifts the general ban imposed by
Art. 301 in respect of imposition of non-discriminatory taxes on goods imported, which indica.tes that
but for the said provision the law of taxation in
that regard would infringe the freedom declared
under Art. 301. Clause (b) of Art. 304 enables a
State to make laws imposing reasonable restrictions
on the freedom of trade, commerce and intercourse;
and I would interpret the word ''restrictions" in the
same way aa I have interpreted the said expresaion
in Art. 302. It cannot be 8&id, &8 it is oontonded,
that cl. (b) only lifts the ban imposed by Art. 303
1912
A.utem1•;1,
Trenap,,1
( fi11Jt1s,han) Lei,
"·
8tat1 of Rt1ja6'h•1t
S111'1'eltuJ.
562
1162
Auttmobilt
Tranf/Jort
..
(Ri!i,,lhon) LtJ.
SW. •f dajasth ..
-.....-
Su66• Ratt J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963]
on the power of the Legislature of a. State, but it
does more than that. It enables the State Legislature to impose a.II reasonable restriotions on the
said freedom in the sense I have already explained,
subjeot to the proviso.
Again, in the context of Art. 304 (b), a. strong
plea is made by some of the learned Advocates
appearing for the States, relying upon the other
vrovisions of the Constitution for holding that
taxation laws a.re outside the ken of the said provi·
sions. Reference is made to Arts. 31 (5) (b) (i), 248,
265, 276, 285, 287 a.nd 288. I do not propose to
consider the argumPnts based on the said articles in
detail, a.s, in my view, these and similar articles of
the Constitution do not even remotely touch the
question raised before us. They fit in the scheme
of the Constitution. The Constitution confers power
on the Legislatures to make laws of taxation, oircumscribes that power with reference to the entries
in the Seventh Sohedule and other constitutional
provisions, and provides for resolving confliot of
powers. The aforesaid articles, except Art. 31 (5)
(b) (i) and Art. 248, appear in Cb. I of Pa.rt XII
under the general heading Finance", Article 265
declares that no tax shall be levied or collected
except by authority of law; that is to say, tax
cannot be levied or collected by a.n executive fiat.
Article 276 fixes a. ceiling on taxes pa.ya.hie to looal
boards on professions, trades, callings and employments. Article 285 exempts property of the Union
from State taxation Article 286 prohibits the
States frum imposing a tax on inter-State sales,
subjeot to a. provillo. Article 287 exempts the
Union from the State law of taxation on electricity;
and Art. 288 gives a. 1imila.r exemption to the Union
from taxes by States in respect of water or eleotricity in certain oases. Artiole 31(5)(b)(i) exempts a.
Ia.w imposing or levying any tax from the im pa.ot.
of the fundamental rights enshrined in Art. 31(2)
1 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 563
of the Constitution. Article 248 preserves the
residuary power of the Parliament in respect of any
matter not enumerated in the Concurrent-List or the
State-List, including the power to impose taxes.
These artioles, therefore, generally impose limitations on the appropriate legislative power of taxation of States or give exemption in special cases.
By and large, the said articles and similar others
Qperate as limitations, or restrictions on the power
of taxation conferred upon Parliament and the
appropriate Legislatures under Art. 246 of the Constitution. But, in exercise of the power of taxation,
subject to these limitations, the appropriate I~gisla
ture cannot make a law infringing the freedoms
conferred under the Constitution. The conditions
prescribed for imposing a tax or the ceilings .fixed
thereon may affect the ambit of the power but cannot either sanction encroachment on the freedom
guaranteed by Art. 331 or curtail the same. Assuming that some of the conditions prescribed in
Art. 286 appear to come into conflict with those in
Art. 304(b)-in my view, there is no such conflict---the
said articles can co-exist by a process of harmonious
oonsbruotion. In short, these articles may limit the
power of the appropr.iate legislature in imposing
tax, but cannot be relied upon to curtail the ambit
of the freedom under Art. 301 of .the ConJtitution.
Reliance is also placed on Art. 26 which provides that every religious denomination or any section thereof shall have the right, inter alia, to own
and acquire movable and immovable property. It
is said that the freedom conferred by that article
cannot preclude the State from imposing a tax on
the said property, and that, by the same parity of
reasoning, Art. 301 which coQfers the freedom
cannot preclude the Legislative power imposing a
tax affecting that freedom. It is true that the marginal heading of this article is "Freedom to manage
religious affairs'', but the. subject-matter of Art. 26
a.nnot be equated to thMi of the freedom of trade
JIH
Automobil"
Tr1mpm
(Rt1jasehan) Lti.
v.
Stal1 of Rojasl/ian
SubbaRuJ.
564
,,,z
.J.ut•mojil •
Trans;Q•t
(/!•j<Ulhcnl Ltc.
••
S t•tt "/ Raa,th•n
s.u. l!.. J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963]
declared under Art. 301. I should not be understood to have expressed any view on the construction of that article in the present case.
Article 305, as it stood before the Constitution (Fourth Amendment) Art. 1955, only saves the
existing Ia ws from the operation of Art. 30 I, and
Art. 303, and it does not throw any light on the
construction of Art. 301. Article 306 was omitted
by the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act,
1956; but the said article saved the operation of
any law made by any States specified in Part B in
the First Schedule before the commencement of the
Constitution levying any ta.x or duty on the import
of any goods in to the State from other States or on
the export of goods from the State to other States
and enacted th'!.t if there be an agreement between
the Government of India and the Government of
that State in that behalf, the said ta.x · or d11ty
might be levied or collected for such period not
exceeding ten years from the commencement of the
Constitution, subject to the terms of the said agreement. If a law of t&xation cannot, undn any conceivable circumstances, be a restriction on the freedom of trade, why did it become necessary to introduce a saving clause in terms of Art. 306 in the
group of articles in Part XIII? It is suggested that
the saving clause might have become necessary as
there was an impediment under the other proyisions of the Constitution. But that circumstance
cannot deprive the force of the non-obstante clause
in Art. 301 in its application to the provisions of
Part XIII. This article indicates the consciousness
of the makers of the Constitution that restrictions
contemplated in that Part take in restrictions by
way of taxation and, therefore, it was necessary to
provide for an exemption in the case of Part B
States for a specified period of time.
The foregoing discussion may be summarized
in tbs following propositions: (1) Art. 301 dHlars11
••
•
l
1 s.c.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
565
a. right of free movement of trade without a.ny obstructions by way of barriers, inter-State, or intraState or other impediments operating a.a such barriers. (2) The said freedom is not impeded, but, on the
other hand, promoted, by regulations creating conditions for the free movement of trade, such as, police
regulationH, provision for services, maintenance of
roads, provision for aerodromes, Wharfs etc., with
or without compensation. (3} Parliament may be
law impose restrictions on such freedom in the public interest; and the said law can be made by virtue
of any entry with respect where of Parliament has
power to make a law. (4) The State also, in exercise of its legislative power, may impose similar
restrictions, subject to the two conditions laid down
in Art. 304 (b) and subject to the proviso mentioned therein. (5) Neither Parliament nor the State
Legislature can make a law giving preference to
one State over another or making discrimination
between one State and another, by virtue of any
entry in the Lists, infringing the said freedom. (6)
This ban is lifted in the case of Parliament for the
purpose of dealing with situations arising out of
scarcity of goods in any part of the territory of
India and also in the oase of a State under
Art. 304 (b}, subject to the conditions mentioned therein. And (7) The State can impose a
non-discriminatory tax on goods imported from
other States or the Union territory to which similar
goods manufactured or produced in that State are
subject.
The ·construction I have placed on the provisions of the Constitution brings out the harmony
between the various articles in Pa.rt XIII of the
Constitution and also discloses an integrated scheme
of freedom of trade, commerce and intercourse
maintaining a balance between federalism and pro·
.-facial autonomy.
I agree with my learned bruthor, Das, J., tha.t
the provisions of the Raja.sthan Motor Vehicles Taxci.tion Act {XI of 1951) a.re regulatory in ohara.ote r
1962
.Aut-1118iile
Tr11.is/"t
( trcj•stlr•n)
....
Lt•.
Stru •f Rdjutha
Su6j• l't.H J.
566
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963]
1911
Aulomobil1
..
Trtlflspote
(Raja1t"'1n) Lid•
and that they do not infringe the freedom enshri- .·
ned in Art. 301 of the Constitution.
The appeals fa.ii a.nd are
&oi. of Roja.o•ht.n
Bo/Jbo Rao J.
dismissed with
eosts.
HIDAYATULLAH, J.-The Ra.jasthan Motor
Vehicles Tf\xation Act, 1951 (No. XI of 1951), in
s. 4 provided:
"( 1) Save as otherwise provided by this
Act or by rules ma.de thereunder or by any
other law for the time being in force, no motor
vehicle shall be used in any public pla.oe or
kept for use in Ra.jastha.n unless the owner
thereof ha.s paid in respect of it, a. ta.x at the
appropriate rate specified in the schedules to
this Act within the time allowed by section
5 and save as hereinafter specified, such tax
she.II 'be payable actually notwithstanding
that the motor vehicle may from time to timi>
cease to be used.
(2) An owner who keeps a motor vehicle
of which the certificate of fitness and the
certificate of registration a.re current shall,
for the purposes of this Act be presumed to
keep such vehicle for use.
(3) A person who keeps more than ten
motor vehicles for use solely in the course of
trade and industry shall be entitled to a deduction of ten per cent on the aggregate
amount of tax to which he his liable.
Explanation.-The expression "trade and
industry" includes transport for hire."
The Schedules referred to in the first sub-section
a.re four in number. They specify the kind of
vehicles liable to the tax, the rates of the ta.x applicable to each kind, and some other conditions. A
detailed reference to the Schedules will be made by
1 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
567 -
us later. Section 11, which created penalties for
contravention of the Act, was follows:
''Whoever contravenes any of the provi·
sions of this Act or of any rule made thereunder shall on conviction be punishable with
fine which may extend to Rs. 100 and in the
event of such person ha.Ting been previously
convicted of an offence under this Act or
under any rule made thereunder with fine
which may extend to Rs. 200."
The appellants who held permits, plied their
buses from the State of Ajmer. Their routes
passed through the territory of Raja.stha.n, and /.they
were required to pay the tax in Raja.Sthan.
They filed petitions under Art. 226 of the
Constitution in the High Court of Rajasthan, impugning the demand as a contravention of the
provisions of Part XIII and of Art. 19 of the Constitution. A Divisional Bench of the High Court,
which heard the petition, referred for the decision of
a Full Bench the following question:
•
•'Whether ss. 4 and 11 of the Ra.jasthan
Motor Vehicles Taxation Act, 1951, infringe
the right of freedom of trade. commerce or
intercourse grant"" "'lder Article 301 of the
Constitution?''
The Fall Bench answered the question in the negative, and in vbw of the answer, the petitions were
dismissed. The appellants were, however, granted
a certificate under Art. 132 of the Constitution, and
the present a.ppoals hav~ been filed.
The appellants contend that the Rajasthan Motor
Vehicle!!! Taxatio·J Act. 1951, is outside the competence of the,Stnte Legislature inasmuch as its pith
and substance is "Inter-State trade and commerc~". which is a Union subject under Entry 42 of
1911
Aut111110bi1'
TrOllSJWrl
(Rojostlla,,) Lii.
v.
St•ll of Rajoitho
H ida.1awllah J •
568
Automobif1
Tra1v1port
( Rajasthan) Lid.
v.
8IGl1 of RajaJlhan
Hii•ytitullaA I.
SUPREME OOURT RE.PORTS [1963]
Union List; that it is null and void being in viol&·
tion of Art. 19(1) (d), (f) and (g) of the Constitution;
that it is ultra vire.9 and illegal, as it contravenes
the freedom guaranteed under Art. 301; that even if
permissible, it is not a reasonable restriction of
trade and commerce within Art. 304, and that not
having been enacted with the previous sanction of
the President, it is not effective as law under
Art. 265.
At an earlier hearing, the attention of the
Constitution Bench of this Court was drawn to
Atiabari Tea C'o. Ltd. v. State of Assam ('),where
this Court struck down by majority the Aeaam Taxation (on Goods Carried by Roads or Inland Waterways) Act, 1954, as offending against the freedom
of trade, commerce and intercourse. On that occasion, three views were expressed. Sinha, C. J.. held
that the freedom guaranteed by Art. 301 was against
"trade barriers, tariff walls, or imposts which have a
deleterious effect on the free flow of trade, commerce and intercourse" but not against taxation Sim·
pliciter. Shah, J., held that the freedom envisaged wae
wide enough to comprehend within itself a ban of
prohibition, control or impediment of any kind
whatever and of taxes whether they fell on movement of trade or commerce or otherwise. The
majorit.y(Gajendragadkar, Das Gupta and Wanchoo,
JJ.) held that though taxes as such were not within
the ban of Part XIII, such taxes as impeded the
free flow of trade and were directly placed on
movement were included in it. The appellant•
relied on the views of Shah, J., and failing that, on
the majority view which, they contended, also held
good here, while the State Government haeed its
case upon the views of the learned ChiP.f Justice. The
ConAtitution Bench was thus of the opinion that
"ha~ing regard to the importance of the Constitutional issues involved and the views expreesed in
.Atiabari Tea Co. Lt,d. v. State of .4ssam ( 1 )'', tJiia cue
(I) 11961] I s.c.R.809.
1 s.c.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
569
should be heard by a larger Bench, and these
appeals have thus come before this special Bench.
Certain other parties obtained permission to intervene, and notices having issued to the AdvocatesGenera.l of States, we have had the benefit of arguments from various angles.
That freedom of trade, commerce and intercourse is secured by Art. 301, subject to the other
provisions of Part XIII, has not been disputed in
this case. The dispute is · only as to what is comprehended within that freedom, and a. further
question is whether the powers of Parliament and
the State Legislatures to levy taxes according to
the Sundry Entries in the Legislative Lists are meant
to be circumscribed in any way, and if so, to what
extent.
Art. 301 of the Constitntion, so far as its
language goes, is fairly modelled on s. 92 of the
Australian Commonwealth Act, 1900, and numerous
decisions of the High Court of Australia and on
appeal, by the Privy Council, were cited before us
to define the content and extent of the freedom envisaged. Besides, the Government of India. Act, 1935,
also containP-d in s. 297 a provision on the subject of
freedom of tratle and commerce, and the contention
of the State partly has been that Part XIII enacts
little more than wha.t was contained -there.
Sinoe the arguments made much of these two
analogies, it is necessary to state first certain wellk ·1own and well-accepted propositions relating to
the interpreta.Lion of Constitutions, in which there
are fundamental limits upon the power to legislate.
In Queen v. Burah (1), Lord Selborne laid down a
proposit.ion which in its exposition of the subject
and the manner of expression ca.n hardly be improved. Lord Selborne said :
"ThA established Courts of justice when a
ftUestifJn arises whether the prescribed limits
(1) (1178) 3 App. Cu. 8 89.
1912
.Automobile
Transport
{Rojasthan) Ltd.
v.
Stal• of Rajasthen
Hidayaiullah J.
570
JHI
A.utomobil1
Tyaruporl
Rajadhan Ltd.
v.
S1at1 of Rojostlum
n;a.,,,.11 .i. J.
SUPREME OOURT REPORTS [1963]
have been exceeded, must of necessity determine that question; and the only way in which
they can properly do so, is by looking to the
terms of the instrument by which, affirmatively, the legislative powers were created, and
by which, negatively, they are restricted. If.
what has been done is legislation within the
general scope of the affirmative words which
give the power, and if it violates no express
condition or restriction by which that power
is limited ...it is not for any Court of justice
to inquire further, or two enlarge constructively those conditions or restrictions."
We have thus to see what powers have affirmatively been conferred on the legislatures of the State
and what are the restrictions on that power. In
this connection, we must also bear in mind the
weighty ohservations of Gwyer, C. J., in BhoT,a
Prasad v. The King Emperor (1)
''We must again refer to the fundamental
proposition enunciated in The Queen v. Burak(•)
that Indian Legislatures within their own
sphere have plenary powers of legislation as
large and of the same nature as those of
Parliament itself. If that was true in 1878,
it cannot be less true in 1942. Every intend·
rnent ought therefore to be ma.de in favour of
a Legislature which is exercising the powers
conferred on it."
The legislative powers of the States after the
establishment of the Republic of India are certainly
not any the less; and it must be conceded at once
that within the range of their powers as conferred
the legislative entries in Sch. VII, the State Legislatures are supreme, subject, of course, to such restrictions as are to be found in the Constitution itself
(!)
[1942] F.C.R. 17, 27.
(21
( 1878) 3 App. Cas. 889
1 S.C.R.
SUPREME OOURT REPORTS
571
The power to tax motor vehicles is the subject of
Entry 57 in the State List, and it reads:''Ta:x:es on vehicles, whether mechanically
propelled or not, suitable for use on roads,
including tramcars subject to the provisions of
entry 35 of List IIT."
I
I
The words "suitable for use on roads" describe the
kinds of vehicles and not their condition. They
exclude from the Entry, farm machinery, aeroplanes,
Railways etc. which though mechanically propelled
are not suitable for use on roads. The inclusion of
trams using tracks which may be on roads or off
them, makes the distinction still more apparent. It
is thus clear tha.t the power to tax motor vehicles is
plenary, subject to Entry 35 of the Concurrent List
or any other restriction to be found elsewhere
in the Cons~itution. Entry 35 ahove referred to
reads:
''35. Mechanically propelled vehicl~s
including the principles on which taxes on such
vehicles are to be levied."
The existence of such an Entry in the Concurrent
List cuts down the supremacy of the State Legisla\ures, and in respect of taxation of motor vehicles,
if the principles of ta.xtion are laid down by ParJiamentary legislation, the State laws repugnant thereto must, be void, in view of the provision of Art. 254
of the Constitution. The question whether the
power of Parliament to legislate and lay down principles of taxation under Entry 35 of the Concurrent
List would also have to be considered under Part
XIII, does not arise in this case, .for admittedly
there is no law by ParHa.ment that Entry either
prior or subsequent to the State Act. Thus, so f~r as
the taxing power of the State Legislature is concerned, it must be admitted that it was not only exerciflP.d under Entry 57, but, if judged solely under that
Entry, that it was properly exercised.
1961
..4.u1amobil1
Tramputl
(Rajasthan} 1.l4,
v.
S 1411 of Bqjalhd
H ida.JOlulz.h J.
572
196!
Automobil•
Trans/Jori
(8ajaalh<n) Ltd.
v.
State of Rajasihm
Hidayalullah J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963]
The question thus is whether on the
exercise of this power there are to be found
other curbs in other parts of the Constitution, and
whether those curbs have not been observed. Such
curbs may be of three kinds. The first may arise
from the operation of the power of legislation
granted to Parliament by Entry 42 of the Union
List, and the contention in this connection is that
the present impugned Act in its pith and substance
is legislation under that Entry and thus void. The
second may arise from Art. 19; sub-cl11. (d), (f) and
(g), if the law deprives the motor operators of the
right (a) to move freely throughout the territory of
India, (b) to acquire, hold and dispose of property,
and ( c) to practise any profession, or to 0&rry on
any occupation, trade or business, and the restriction is incapable of being justified as reasonable.
The third may arise from the provisions of Part
XIII where freedom of trade, commerce and intercourse throughout the territory of India has been
'guaranteed', subject only to the provisions of that
Part. These, in the main, are also the contentions.
and these appeals can be effectively disposed of
from these three Tiew points.
The first contention that the impugned Act is
bad because it is legislation directly under Entry
42 of the Union List need not detain us long. The
subject of Entry 42 of the Union List i8 not taxation but "inter-State trade and commerce". The
scheme of the Legislative List11 shows that taxation
entries are separate from other entries, and the other
entries do not include a power to impose a tax,
though the power to levy fees is included as it is
expressly so stated. •The subject of Entry 57 of the
State List is taxation on vehicles. An Act which
seeks directly to levy a tax on motor vehicles even
though there may be incidental and subsidiary
provisions about the regulation of a particular
inter-State trade carried on with the aid of or in
I S.C.R.
<
•
'
t
\
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
573
motor vehicles is legislation really within Entry 57
and not within the other Entry though it may.
touch it, and is thus within the competenc~ of
the State Legi~lature. That these motor vehicles
come into the taxing State from an extra. State
point and are taxed within the taxing State by
reason of their use or presence there, may raise
problems under Part XIII but not under Entry 42
of the Union List. The words of the charging section are:
"No motor vehicle shall be 1used in any
public place or kept for use in Ra.jasthan
unless the owner thereof has paid, in respect
of i~. a tax at the appropriate rate specified
in the Schedule to this Act ...... ''
The pith and substance of the Act is the levy of a
tax on motor vehicles in Rajasth~n or their use in
that State irrespective of where the vehicles come
from. In one sense, it · does not seek directly or
immediately to legislate on inter-~tate trade or commerce or to prohibit the entry of such motor vehicles if the tax be paid, except in so far as a person
deterred by the 'tax m~y k,eep out. This may be a
point for consideration under Part XIII or even
Art. 19 of the Constitution, but not under Entry 42
of the Union List. Even if the levy of the tax may
be said to touch inter-State trade or commerce, it
is not legislation in respect of inter-State trade .or
commerce. Tt has been held consistently by this
Court, the Privy Council and the Federal Court
that a law substantially in its pith and substance
under an Entry in one List may touch incidentally
on a topic of legislation in a rival List without
being void or 'Ultra 'Vires. This, in our opinion, is
sufficient to dispose of the first point.
The next attack is with the aid of Art. 19 of
the Constitution. That Article guarantees to the
citizens of India cartain basic freedoms. Freedom
from taxation is not one of them. It is hardly
1981
Automobil•
Transpa1I
(Raja than} Lid.
v.
Stal1 of Rajaslluz•.
Hid~IUUah J •
574
Automobllt
Transport
(Ilojaslh•n) Ltd.
••
Btf,. of Rajoithon
Bida.!"lullaA ,/,
SUPREME OOURT REPORTS [1963)
necessary in this case to examine the subject from
the angle of Art. 19, because a law to be good under
that Article must satisfy the test of reasonableness. If the impugned sections here are declared
to be unreasonable restrictions upon the freedom
of trade, commerce and intercourse, they would
fall also under Part XIII. If this were to ha.ppen,
it would be wholly unnecessary to decide whether
taxation laws are within the reach of Art. 19 and
also whether the impugned provisions have to pass
the independent scrutiny of Art. 19 before they
can be sustained.
This brings us to the consideration of the last
point on which argnments occupied the Court for
several days. It would be necessary (if not, impossible) to try to discuss the arguments which, though
proceeding from the same side, were often conflicting. The use of language borrowed from s. 92 of
the Australian Constitution in Art. 301 of our Constitution led to the citation of many Australian
rulings. Those rulings are so numerous that they
provoked a former Chief Justice of the High Court
of that Country to say that when he died, s. 9~
would he found to be written on his heart ! But
it is reasonable to suppose that those who borrowed
the language in India were fully aware of the conflict of opinion in Australia. It is reasonable to
assume that the framers of our Constitution must
have sought to avoid there dangers. It must not
also be overlooked that the decisions of the Privy
Council in Comrrwnwealth of Australia v. Bank of
New South Wales( 1) and Hughes and Vale Pty. Ld.
v. State of N.S.W. ('),which to some extent have
narrowed down the controversy in Australia, were
not rendered when the draft Constitution was
framed or the Constitution was adopted. A note
baa, however, to be taken of the fa.ct that the
history of the e1tabliahment of federation in the
two Countries is so vastly diffe1·ent that in spite of
(I) [1950J A,C, 235.
(2) [1955] A,C, 2fl,
1 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
575
certa.in resemblance in the language employed in the
comparable provisions of the two Constitutions,
they cannot mean the same thing. Indeed, thfly
differ in so many respects tbat nothing is more
dangerous than to suppose that the Indian Constitution wished to secure freedom of trade, commerce
and intercourse in t.he same way as did the Australian Commonwealth. These differences are not to
be found solely in the language of the corresponding
provisions but in the evolution of the two Countries
and the checks and balances provided in our
Constitution which are not to be found in the
Australian Constitution. We shall refer to these
differences briefly before examining what checks
and balances have been provided in our Constitu·
tion.
-
The Commonwealth of Australia was formed
out of a number of Colonies which were separated
by high tariff walls ·and numc rous differential
inter-Colonial duties. The idea of a federation was
born out of a desire to secure free trade on a.
reciprocal basis between the Colonies. The Federation was, however, delayed by the failure to reach
agreement on the financial aspects of the Constitu·
tion. Numerous conventions took place which
tried unsuccessfully to solve the problem which
was aptly described "as the lion in the path of
unity". It was after surmounting many diffiou)ties
that the financial clauses were settled by agree·
ment. It is in the background of these historical
facts that the provisions relating to freedom of
trade, commerce and intercourse have been inter·
preted by the High Court of Australia. The provisions of the Australian Constitution themselves
enaot the underlying agreements. Sections 51, 88,
89, 90, 100 and 102 insist upon uniformity and the
absence of discrimination in matters of trade and
commerce after the imposition of uniform duties of
customs whioh was to be achieved in two years.
Aulomobil 1
Transpar&
(Rajastllan) Lti.
v.
S1a11 of Roja•lh u
Hii11,J1.Ml.Ji J.
576 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963]
A.utomobi/1
TrtlttSfttwl
(R•jaslhan) Ltd,
v.
St.te of B njosllian
Section 92 then epitomizes the whole concept of
this unity and freedom from preferential treatment
by enacting :
"On the imposition of uniform duties of
customs, trade, commerce and intercourse
among the States, '"hether by means of internal carriage or ocean navigation, shall be
absolutely free."
It may be pointed out here tha,t the alternative
phrase "throughout the Commonwealth" was not
accepted, though it was suggested as an amendment
more than once.
The provisions of the Australian Constitution
such as bear on trade and commerce, are no more
than covenants entered into at the Conventions,
which have been introduced bodily into the AU!tralian Constitution, the fate of which depended for a
long time on how to secure an agreement about
uniform tariffs, customs, excises and bounties. The
declaration of freedom of trade, commerce and
intercourse was the logical culmination . of the
negotiations for the establishment of the Federation. The language of s. 92 was thus made emphatic,
even though its full purport remained vague. As
observed by Viscount Haldane, L. C., in AttorneyGeneral for the Comnwnwealth of Australia v. Colonial
Sugar Refining C<Ympany Limit,e,d (1) :
"It is a matter of historical knowledge that
Australia the work of fashioning the future
Constitution was one which occupied years of
preparation through the medium of conventions and conferences in which the most distinguished statesmen of Australia. took pa.rt.
Alternative systems were discussed and weighed against other with minute care. The Act
of 1900 must accordingly be regarded as an
instrument which was fashioned with great
(1) [1914] A.C. 237.
-
1 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
577
deliberation, and if there is as points obscurity in its language, this may be taken to
be due not to any uncertainty as to the adoption of the stricter from of federal principle,
hut to that difficulty in obtaining ready agreement about phrases which1 attends the drafting of legislative measures by larger assemblages.''
But declle.rations in a Constitution, however worded,
must be given effect to, and they always loom large
on the horizen of law-making, if they curtail legislative power, and it is not surprising that t.he Australian High Court was faced with the problem of
de<'iding which laws rendered trade, commerce and
intercourse unfree and which did not. In the course
of these decisionR, a wide cleavage in opinion soon
appeared- one view holding that any burden on
trade, commerce or intercourse between the States
was bad.. and the other view attempting justification to s;a.ve laws which were impugned. Various
grou~ds for such justification were evolved. Some
laws were upheld on the ground that they were
merely regulatory but some others were declared
void as having cro8sed the Jine of legitimate regulatory action. Some taxation laws were upheld on
the ground that though they burdened trade or
commerce, they were compensatory in character.
Even th4~re, differences arose about the test.a to be
applied to discover when such laws could be said
to have e,xoeeded the limits. The number of such
cases is fogion, and almost any view can be supported by cita.tions from some judgment or other from
the Au1tralian law Reports. Lord Porter in Oommonweal,tJ.~ of AUAtralia v. Bank of New South Jf aks (1)
aptly summed up: ''In this labyrinth there is no
golden thread!" (p. 310). The maze of law round
a: 92 was, of course, something of which the framers
of our Constitution were not unaware. They knew
(1) [195CJ1] A. C. 235.
J962
Automobile
Transpo1e
(Rajasthan) Ltd.
v.
Stale of Rajasthan
.I
578
J91t
.itu&omohi/1
Tr1Jnspt»t
(R.j.slh•n) Ltd.
v.
SW1 of R j a~ll.an
Hiiayatulla!t J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1963]
that in spite of the foroe of the words "absolutely
free", it was well-settled that the freedom so contemplated was a qualified freedom. In Duncan v.
St,ate of Queensland(') Griffith, C. J., had observed,
what was generally accepted, that "the word •free'
does not mean extrµ legem, any more than freedom
means anarchy". The task of the Bench as also
the Bar was to ascertain the limits of freedom or
more appropriately, the limits to which restrictions
could go. In this, the Au3tralian High Court was
the actor in the main ; but the Privy Council also
delivered four judgments. Of these, two were before our draft Constitution and two, thereafter. It
is, therefore necessary to investigate, to find out
what was the accepLed position in about 19!8 to be
able to see if any of the principles so laid down were
accepted and to what extent they were modified to
suit our Constitution in the light of our own history.
We shall first notice those cases which were
decided before our Const·itution was drafted in
1948.
This first point on which difference arose in
Australia was whether s. 92 of the Commonwealth
of Australia Act was addressed only to the States,
or whether it bound the C0mmonwealth as well. In
W. & A. McArth1ir Ltd v. State of QU£ensland (')
the majority held that the Commonwealth was not
bound. Gavan Duffy, J., alone held that the language of the section clearly controlled both the
powers conferred on the Federal Parliament and
those reserved to State Parliament. The view of
the majority was negatived by the Privy Council
in James v. Commonwealth of Australia('). Indeed,
the IDgh Court of Australia had already doubted
the correctneBB of the view, but it felt itself bound
by it. The Privy Council traced the development
of that view and pointed out that though in The
King v. Vizzard (') the Commonwealth agreed to be
(I) (1916) 22 C. L. R. 656, 573
(3; (1936] A. C. 578.
(2) (920) 20 C. L. R. 530.
{f) (1933) 50 C.L.R. 30.
.,
.
l
'
'
'
'
I s.o.R..
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
579
1911
bound within certain limits, the ruling in McA.rtkur's
case (1) was not departed from and that though the
.A.ulomobil1
view was reaffirmed in Australia from time to time,/
Transpt>'ll
Lti.
it was not applied in practice. The Board, however, Rojastlum
v.
did not "shelter under the decision in JJf cArt11;u1·'s Stat. of Rqjaslhan
r.ase (1), and decided that the Common'!ealth was
also bound. Thus, the opinion of Issacs, J., in Hid':1atullah J.
Foggitt J()'ftes & Co. LuJ,. v. The Bta,te of New South
Wales (2) thats. 92
·
"makes Australia one indivisible Country
for the purpose of commerce and intercourse
between Australians" and that it was "beyond
the power of any State Parliament, or even
of the Commonwealth Parliament, by any
regulation of trade and commerce, to impair
that fundamental provision"
·Was accepted at least in its first part.
The .second point was what was meant by
"a.bsolutely free''. The Attorney-General for Australia in the course of his arguments in James v.
Commonwealth of Australia (3) summarised the propositious which were urged and supported by authorities in the arguments before the Privy Council in
that case, and· they were six, as follows :
"(l ) The first meaning of 'free' is free of all
law of every description ;
(2) Free of any restiriotfons imposed upon
trade and commerce by . reason of its interState character. That is, free of &ny discriminating trade law;
(3) Free as trade and commerce of all
interference whether specially directed to it
or not;
(4) Free of all laws the pith and substance
(lJ (1920) 28 C.L.R. 530.
(2) {1916) 21 C. L.R. !57..
13) (19~] A.C. S78.
580
1962
A·~tomobife
TransftMI
R·ijastla .n Lid.
v.
Staee of R~ asthan
lli'd~11otullah J.
SUPREME COURT RE.PORTS {1963)
of which is a regulation of inter-;:,tiite trade
or commerce;
(5) :Freedom attaches to trade and commerce regaided as a whole and not distributively. Individuals are not guaranteed freedom in relation to their trade and commerce
so long as trade and commerce as a whole are
not impaired.
(U) Free from pecuniary imposts-that
is the narrowest meaning of s. \)2."
'fhese six propositions fairly represent the view in
the various judgments of the Australian High Court.
Isaacs, J., in Rex v. Smithers(') had observed:
"In my opinion, the guarantee of inter-State
freedom of transit and access for persons and
prnperty under s. 92 is absolute-that is, it is
an absolute prohibition on the Commonwealth
and States alike to regard State borders as in
th~mselves possible barriers to intercour~c
between Australians."
In 1}fcArtlmr's ca.s' ('), the claim was made against
all Governmental control and the majority also
held that to bo its meaning. The Privy Council
examined the scheme of the Constitution of
Australia and drew the line thus :
"The true criterion seems to be that what
is meant is freedom as at the frontier or, to
use the words of s. 112, in respect of 'goods
passing into or out of the State'. What is
meant by that needs explanation. 'l'he idea
starts with the admitted fact that federation
in Australia was intended (inter alia) to abolish
the frontiers between the different States and
create •me Australia. That conception involved freedom from customs duties, imports,
border prohibitions arnl restrictions of every
(1) [1"11] 16 C. L. R.Y9.
(2i [1920] 28 C. L. R. 533.
•
l S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
581
kind : the people of Australia were to be free
to tra.de with each other, and to pa.s;) to and
fro among the States, without any burden,
hindrances or restrictions based merely on
the fact that they were no members of the
same State."
After referring to some cases in which the burdens
and hindrances took diverse forms and appeared
under various disguises, the Board observed that it
must be a question of fact in every case whether
there was an interference with the freedom of passage, and finally observed :
"As a matter of actual language, freedom
in s. 92 must be somehow limited, and the
only limitation which emerges from the context, and which can logically and realistically
be applied, is freedom at what is the crucial
point in inter-State tradt>, that it is at the
State barrier."
The language of .s. 92, particu]arJy "among tho
States, whether by meaus of internalcarriage or ocean
navigation, shall be absolutely free", taken with the
history to which we have already referred apparently decided the controversy. This was departed
from later in Comnionwealth of Australia v. Bank
of New Sauth Wales ( 1), but after our Constitution
was drafted.
The next question decided was: what was
meant by ''trade and commerce". Again, in
McArtl1,ur's case (2), the meaning given was a very
wide one. It was not confined to the "mere act
of transportation of merchandise over the frontier.''
It was said that "all the commercial arrangements
of which transportation is the direct and necessary
result from part of ''trade an<l commerce''. 111
<I) [1950] A. C. 235.
(2) (1920] 82 C. L. R. 530
196S
.Automobile
Translort
(Rojastlian) Ltd.
v.
Slate of Rajasthan
--
Hida.JafU/la/z J,
582
1111
rAut•mobil1
•.._,
(~a.rlhon) Lti.
v.
Stat, of. R•jastflr.n
Hit91Mla/o J,
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963]
the concept of "trade and commerce" were thua
included"the mutual communings, the negotia.
tions, verbal and by correspondence, the
bargain, the transport and the delivery are
a.II, but not exclusively, parts of that class
of relations between mankind which the
world calls 'trade and commerce'."
In reaching · this conclusion, Knox, C.J., referred
to Bank of India v. Wilson (1) and Oommissianers
of Taxation v. Kirk('), where Lord Davey observed:
"The word 'trade' no doubt primarily
means traffic by way of sale or exchange or
commercial dealing," but also added that
"it may have a large meaning."
The view of Knox, C.J., was expressly disapproved
by a Privy Council in James v. Oommonwe,a/,th of
AUBtralia (') involving, as it did, a conception of
inter-State trade, commerce and intercourse commencing at whatever stage in the State of origin,
and continuing until the moment in the other
State when the operation of inter-State trade could
be said to end, the freedom attaching to every
step in the transaction from beginning to end. It
was said that such a view would lead to an imm·
unity from law of a whole body of acts or dealings
by the mere fa.ct "that they are parts of an inter.
State transaction." The concept of trade and
commerce was thus limited to that movement to
which crosses a State barrier.
As regards "intercourse" also, the earlier
meaning was wide. The question was whether such
"intercourse" must be "commercial". It was held
in ear lier cases that this conferred a persona.I right
on an Australian and "independent of any commercial attributes he may possess, to pass over the
(I) (1817) 3 Ex. D· 10~.
12) (1900] A.C. 588 592.
(3) [1936) A.C 578.
1 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
583
Continent irrespective of any State border as a
reason in itself for interference" (per Isaacs, J,, in
R. v. Smithers Ex Parte Benson (1). This view was
affirmed in Duncan v. 8t,ate. of Quunsl.and (11) and
also in McArthur's case (3 ). Later, it wa.s held
that the concept of "trade, commerce and intercourse'' meant what was held to be included in
the concept of "commerce'' as uuderstood in the
United States: (per Dixon, J., in the Bank case) (4).
With the exact meaning of the word, we are not
presently concerned.
We shall next see how the doctrine of the
freedom of trade, commerce and intercourse was
applied in practice. In this connection, three
oases filed by one J a.mes to question the marketin~
legislation of the States and the Comrnonwea.lth
did much to settle some of the controversies. The
two oases decided by the Privy Council before
our draft Constitution were due to his efforts.
His first case did not reach the Privy Council,
ani is reported in James v. South Australia (6 ), but
it was approved by the Privy Council in James v.
Oowan ('). These oases may be noticed briefly.
.
•.
In James v. South Australia (6 ), State legislation creating a Dried Fruits Board and empowering it to five maximum prices (s. 19) and to
determine where and in what quantities dried fruits
should be marketP.d (s. 20), and to acquire on
behalf of the Minister dried fruits from dealers
(.s. 28), was challenged under e. 92. Section 28
was expressly made subject to s. 92. Section 20
was deol&red invalid by the High Court of Austra·
·lia, but ss. 28 and 29 were held to be valid. In
James v. Cowan('), the question was the compulsory
acquisition of dried fruits in South Australia. by
the Minister of Agriculture through a Boa.rd, after
(19121 16 C. L. R.. 99.
(3) ( 192') 28 C.L.R.. 530.
(5) (1927) 40C.L.R. J.
(1)
(2) (1916) 22 C. L. R.. 568. S73.
(4) (1948) 76 C.L.R. I, 380, 181.
(6) [1932) A.C. 542.
11161
.Automobi/1
Transp,,,.t
(Rajasthan) Ltd.
'"
Stale of Rqjasthan
Hid.:gatullah J.
584
196Z
A.utomobil1
TransfJof'I
(Raja.'than) Lttl.
v.
State o.f Raja thon
Hidayi.lullJh J,
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963]
determination by the Board in its absolute disoretion what quantities should be marketed locally
and fixing quotas for the other States. The
question was whether thi.B affected freedom of
commerce among the States. 'Jhe Privy Council
emphatically answered thnt it did. But it ma.de
remarks which showed that if the primary object
of the legislation was not directed to trade or
commerce but such matters as defence, fa.mine,
disease and the like, the incidental effect on the
trade and commerce waa immaterial. The action
of the Minister was declared ultra vires, and James
was held entitled to succeed in his claim for
damages.
The legislation by the State having been
rlPclared invalid, the Commonwealth ma.de the
Dried Fruits Act (192S-:l5). Under that law, no
person could send dried fruit from one State to
another unle8s he exported his quota outside
Australia. This was challenged by James. When
the case reached the Privy Council, three points
were "onsidered b:v the Privy Council and decided.
The first was that s. 92 bound also the Common. wealth, the second was thttt it created a ban against prohibitions or burdens at the frontier, and
lastly, that it protected commerce in motion and
passing the frontiers of the States. A large number of cases were noticed in which it was decided
that trade and commerce was validly burdened in
the exercise of power to make laws without impairing movement of trade at the borders. These
laws dealt with various subjects like monopolies
price fixation, health regulations, licensing systems:
entry of goods or persons and transport.
The last group consisted of cases in which restrictions applying to motor vehicles as integers
of trade and commerce or their owners were
consider§d. Willard v. Raw8on (1) was concemlld
(!)
(19331 48 C.t.R. 315.
I S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
585
with a. law which required registration of all motor
vehicies on payment of a fee. The. King v.
Vizzard (1) was concerned with the licensing of
motor vehicles acting as common carriers. O'
Gilpin's case (2 ) was concerned with owners of
vehicles carrying their own goods, and Besadl v.
Dayman (3) was concerned with law affecting inter.
State journeys. These laws were declared valid
by the High Court, and special leave to appeal
having been refused, it was understood that the
Privy Council had approved them. In all these
cases, the deoisions were by majority, but Dixon
and Starke, JJ., dissented. In James v. Oomrn<YnJweaUh of Australia (4 ), the Privy Council selected
The King v. Vizzard (1) as t.he best example. In
that case, the question was whether the State
Transport (Co-ordination) Act, 1931 (N.S.W.)
contravened s. 92. Under that Act, no public
motor vehicle could operate in the State unless the
motor vehicle was licensed. Licensing was by a
Boa.rd which had complete discretion, and a. fee
had to be paid. The lorry of the appellant in that
case plying between Melbourne and New South
Wales was unlicensed, and the driver was convicted for br*"ach of the Act. The Australian High
Court held by majority that the Act did not oontravene s. 92. The Privy Council described the
judgment of Evatt, J., as
great importance and
quoted the following passage from it:
of
''Section 92 does not guarantee that, in
ea.oh anrl every part of a transaction which
includes the inter-State carriage of commPdities, the owner of the commodities, together with his servant and agent and each
and every independent contractor co·operating in the delivery and marketing oflthe commodities, and each of his servants a.nd
( 1\ {1933) 50 C L. R. 30.
(3) (1935) 52 C. L. R. 215.
(2) (1935) 52 C.L.R. 189.
(4) [1936] A.C. 578,
1962
A.utomo6il1
Transport
{Rajastbon) Ltd.
v,
Stat• of Rajasthon
Hiday. tullah J.
586
1962
.A.ut,mobile
T'ansport
(Rajos<hon) Ltd.
v.
Sr.i. of liajaaehan
Hid<17•tullah J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963]
agents, possesses, until delivery and marketing are completed, a right to ignore State
transport or marketing regulations, ltlld to
choose how, when and where each of them
will transport and market the commodities."
This was before the decision of Riverina Transport
Pty. Ltd v. Victoria (1), which was decided on the
basis of Rex. v. Vizzard (') though not without some
doubts.
In 1945, the Australian High Court decided
Australian National Airways Pty. Ltd. v. The Oommon1urolth ('). Under
the Airlines Act, 1945,
authority was given to establish State-mana~ed
services to the exclusion of exisiting commercial
lines whose business was to terminate, whenever a
Jin" was effectively started by the Government
Airlines Commission. The validity of the
entire Act was ohallenged by private operators
who stood excluded from field, on the ground
of an infringement of s. 92 of the Commonwealth
of Australia Act. The establishment of the Airlines Commission was upheld, but the creation of
monopoly was held to be invalid. Latham, C.J.,
observed:
"I venture to repeat what I said in the
former case (Milk Board case) ('): 'One
proposition which I regard as established is
tltat simple legislative prohibition (Federal
or Statej, as distinct from regulation, of inter·
State trade and commerce is invalid. Further
a law which is 'directed against' inter-State
trade and commerce is invalid. Such a law
does not regulate such trade, it mePly pre·
vente it. But a law prescribing rules a.a to
(I' (1937) 57 C. L. R. 327.
(3) tl945)71 C. L. R. 29.
12)
(4)
(1933) 50 C. L. R. ,0,
(1939) 62 C. L. R. 116, 127,
1 s.c.n..
SUPREME OOURT REPORTS
587
the manner in which trade (including trans·
port) is to be conducted is not a mere prohibition and may be valid in its application to
inter-State, notwithstanding s. 92."
One other important cllSe was deci<led by the.
High Court of Australia before our draft Constitution was prepared, and to that we next turn. That
case is Bank of New South Wales v. The Oomrrwn·
wealth('). The question wa,s about the c~nstitut
ionality _of the Banking Act, 1947, and alternatively
of some ofits sections. The Act provided for the
acquisition of shares in certain private banks by
the Commonwealth Bank by agreement or compul•
sion and generally for their closure and management by the Commonwealth Bank. Five grounds
were taken in atta.cking the :A.ct. One such ground
was that the acquitiition proviskns, the manage·
ment provisions and the prohibition provisions
were concrary to s. 92 of the Australian Constitu·
tion. Latham, C. J:, after holding that banking
was not trade or commerce, held that banking was
an instrument which was used in inter-State trade
and commerce. He held, thf)refore that since the
overthrow of McArthur's case (2) by the Privy Conn·
oil, the legislative control by the Act did not offend
s. 92, because it was a gen~ral control and not a
control of any inter-State element. l\foTiernan,
J., agreed in this conclusion. The majority, however held otherwise. Riob and 'Villiams, JJ., in
their judgemellt la.id down that the freedom in
s.92 was a. personal right attaching to the individual,
that a banker who carried on business in more than
one State was engaged in trade, commerce and
intercourse among the StBtes, that James v. Oom-·
monwealth (3 ) could not be understoGd to have laid
down tha~ s. 92 protected only the actual passage
of goods or persons from one State to another and
the Act prohibiting such trade, commerce or inter( i)
(19'48) 76 c. L. R. I, mo, 3Pr
(2) (1920) 28 c. L. R. s3o.
{3) {1936) A. C.578.
1962
Aut?mobi/1
Transporl
(Rajuft,on) Ltd.
v.
--
State of Rajasthan
Hi !r.iyatu/lah J.
588
1962
.iuta '· obilt
Tran1p0f't
(Rnj<Jth•n) Lid,
v.
Stal1 cf !loj .st.. att.
1
HidayJtUlluh J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963)
couree offended s. 92. Starke, J., began his judgment on this part by saying "s. 92 of the Constitution prescribes but judicial derisions have mu('h
weakened" the freedom of trade commerce and
.
' the position as
mtercourse.
He then summarised
at that date as follows:
(I) The prohibition of s. 92 was addressed
to the States as well as to Commonwealth
Parliament.
(2) The freedom was from both legislative and executive control.
(3) The freedom was available to the
individual as also to trade and commerce
viewed as a whole.
(4) The individuals were to conduct
t.heir commPrcial ii Palings independently of
State boundaries.
(ii\ Tbe freedom was assured not only to
tangibles but also to intangibles, and the
words of the section "by means of internal
carriage or ocean navigation" in s. 92 could
not be held to mean only tangibles. Starke,
J., himself said that these words "trade,
commerce and intercourse" were wide enough
to include intangibles and took the aid of
some American deciaions which had held that
insurance was within tbe Commerce power.
(6) Though the freedom was at the
frontiers of the States but any restraint put
upon trade, commerce and intercourse even
before some tangible property leaves the
State of origin was also contemplated.
(7) Dixon, J's dictum in O' Gilpin's M3e( 1)
where he observed "It is not, therefore
every regulation of C')mmerce or of movement
(I) (1935) 5'20.L. R.18L
I S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
589
that involves a restriction or burden constituting an impairment of freedom. Traffic
regn1ations affecting the lighting and speed
of vehicles, tolls for the use of a bridge,
prohibition of fraudulent descriptions upon
goods, and provisions for the safe carriage
of dangero·1s things, supply examples of regulatory provisions not stri~tly restrictions
within s. 92.
According to Starke, J., a.1! Transport cases
except Willard v. Rawson (1 ) were wrongly decided.
Willard v. Rawson (2 ), according to t.he learned
Judge was a pure case of traffic regulation, but in
the other ca.ses the burdens imposed directly and
immediately upon the transpo1 t and movement of
passengers and goods whether engag0d in domestic
inter-State or other trade or commc>rr>e, were wrongly held to be merely regulatory <•f the freedom
and not its restriction.
Dixon, J., in dealing with the words ''trade,
commerce and intercourse" stated that the compendious expression was evidently used to "include
all forms and variety of inter·State transactions
whether by way of 'Jommercial dealmg or all personal converse or passage". He also held that intangibles like insurance, banking, ete. were irrcluded
in that concept, and agreed with the view that
though regulation of trade, commerce and intercourse was compatible with freedom of inter-State
passage or converse, anything which restricted the
freedom of such an intercourse was excluded by
s. 92. The analysis of the Banks' case (2 ) in the
High Court in the judgment of Starke, J., represents
adequately the views entertained on the subject of
freedom of trade, commerce and intercourse in
relation to s. 92 of the Commonwealth of Australia
Act before our Constitution was framed.
{I) (1933) 48 G-L.R. 316.
r2) (1943) 76 C.L,R. 11 380, 381.
19G2
Automoiile
Transport
(Rajasthan) Ltd.
v.
State of Rojaslhan
Hidoyatullah J.
590
a4utomobile
Transp,,1
( R<ti41thanl Lid.
.
!. ta II ,.j R•jaJtllan
SUPREME OOURT REPORTS (1963)
We shall now leave the Australian scene for
the time being, but will revert to it to show how
further difficulties arising in Australia from these
settled views were solved, to begin with by the
Privy Council and subsequently thereto, by the
High Court of Australia. We shall also refer to
the labir cases that were decided in reference to
s. 92 of the Australian Commonwealth Act, but which
were not available to the Constituent Assembly in
India when our Constitution was framed. We shall
then be in a position to see how in Australia the
difficulties were surmounted and how in India those
difficulties were envisaged and tried to be met by
proper legislative enactments:
Before we proceed to an examination of the
provisions in the Indian Constitution and their
evolution, we will refer to the provisions on the
subject of freedom of trade and commerce in the
Constitutions of Canada and the United States of
America because they were aleo precedents which
were available. In the British North America Act,
1867 s. 91(2) places "The Regulation of Trade and
Commerce'' in the exclusive power of Parliament.
Section 121 then provides:
"All Article of the Growth, Produce or
Manufacture of any one of the Provinces
shall, from and after the Union, be admitted
free into each of the other Provinces."
Several important decisions were rendered by
the Privy Council and to some of them we find it
necessary to refer. In Citizens Insurance Oo. v.
Parssons (1) and again in Bank of Toronto v. Lamb(')
the Privy Council found it necessary to limit
the general words of No. 2 ofs. 91 'to afford scope
for powers given exclusively to the Provincial Legislatures'. In Oity of Montreal v. MontrtAll Strut
Railway ('), the same was observed again. Lord
(I) (1881) 7 App. cas. 96.
(2) (1887) 12 App. Cas. 575.
(3) (1912) A. C. 333, 344.
1 S.C.R
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
591
Halsbury, L. C., in Attorney.General for Ont,er·io v.
Attorney General for the Dominion ( 1) said that the
words must be given 'a statutory meaning'. There
is, however no definite statement or the limits to
be placed but generally the exercise of regulation
of trade and commerce within the Provinces is
upheld under No. 16 of s. 92, which gives the following power to the Provinces:
190!
A.u1omobi/1
TronspGrl
(Rajas1ha11) Ltd.
v.
Stat1 of Bajasthan
"Generally all matters of a merely local
or private nature in the Province."
And this is even where some prohibitions and
restrictions affect the importation, exportaf;ion,
ma.nufacture, keeping sale, purchase and usu of
commodities and must in some way interfere with
business operations . beyond the Province. In
Bank of Toronto v. Lambe (2 ) at p. 586, the Privy
Council said that if the general power of regulation
given to Parliament could be said to prohibit provincial taxation on the persons or things regulated,
it could only be by straining those general words
to their widest extent. In the Uquor Prohibitwn
Appeal 1895 (2), Lord Watson asked the question
which we may well ask: ''Do you regulate a man
when you tax him?" and Lord Herschell said
thereupon:
"l\fay it not be necessary to. regard it
from thi~ point of view, to find what is within
regulation of trade and commerce, what is the
object and scope of the legislation ? Is it some
public object whioh incidentally involves some
fetter on trade or commerce or is it the dealing
with trade and commerce for the pm·pose of
regulating it ? May it not be that, in the
former case, it is :QOt a rogula~ion of trade and
commerce, while in the latter it is, though in
each case trade and commerce in & sense may
be u.ffected ?''
(I) [1896] A. C. 348
(21 (1817 J 12 App. Cas. 575,
I-=
592
1962
Automobile
TranspnTt
(llajasthon) Ltd.
v,
State of H(,j.Jsth .m
Hidayutull 1h J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963]
Lord Watson then said:
"lt would be difficult to imply from these
words 'the regulation of trade and commerce',
whilst the power of direct taxation is given to
the province-the clauses must be reasonably
read together-it would be difficult to suppose
that regulating commerce meant the passing
of an Act by the Dominion legislature
exempting banks from provincial taxation, for
prr.ctically that is what the argument in that
case" [Banlc of Toronto v. Lambe (1)] had come
to; that nnder the words 'regulating commerce'
was implied a power of exempting a bank
from provincial taxation, 01· the liability to be
taxed by the provincial parliament." (Lefroy,
Canada's Federal System (1913) p. 391).
We do not oonsider it necessary to refer to more
cases but would refer later to the words of Lord
Watson and Lord Herschell, which we have quoted
here.
The law in United States of America need not
detain us long. Article I. s. 8 gives tho commerce
power in the following terse words :
"The Congress shall have power ...... ; .. To
regulate Commerce with foreign NatiCJDR, and
among the several States, and with the Indian
Tribee."
In 1824, in t.he well-known case of Gibbone v.
Ogden ('), this clause w11s considered. Mar~hall, C.J.,
gave the definition of commerce :
«Commerce, undoubtedly, is traffic, but
it is something more; it is intercourse. It
describes the commercial intercourse between
nations, and parts of nations, in all its
branehAs, and is regulated by prescribing rules
for carrying on that intercouree."
[IJ [18~7J 12 App, Cas. 575.
(2) (1824, 9 Wbear I; 6 L. ed. 23.
l S.C.R .
•
SUPREME COUR'r REPORTS
593
The principle of federation as understood in the
United Statea is that sovereign States have surrendered a part of their power to the United States and
barring what has been surrendered and wha.t is
prohibited by the constitution of t.be States, the
residue belongs to the United States. This is brought
out in the Tenth Amendment:
I
I•
"The powers not delegated to the United
~States by the Constitution nor prohibited by
it to the States, are reserverl to the States
respectively, or to the people."
Most of the cases in the American Reports are
concerned with what rights belong to the States
and bow far the Congress can regulate commerce.
That is not a subject with which wo are concerned in
the present enquiry.
We now come to the Indian scene. In M. P. V.
Sundararamier & Oo. v. The State of Andkra
Pradesh ( 1), Venkatarama Aiyar, J., rightly pointed
out tha.t :
"Our Constitution was not written on a
tabula rasa, that a Federal Constitution l1ad
· been established under the Government of
India Act, 1935, and though that has under·
gone considera!Jle change by way of repeal,
modification and addition, it still remains the
framework on which the present Constitution
is built, and that the provisions of the Constitution must accordingly be read in the light of
the provisions of the Government of India
Act {1935).''
The history of India during the last hundred years
was one of continual transition .• From the fuJJy
centralised Government at the Centre and in the
administrative units then called provincrs to partial
responsil>ility in the provinces called Dyarchy, from
(I) [19S!IJ S. C.R. 1422, 147ll.
I
1962
Automobil1
Transport
(Rnjosthon} lt,r.
v.
State of Rojnsthan
H idoyatul ! ah J •
59!
1961
AulomoHle
Tra-:sp01t
(Rajarth.,,) Ltd,
..
State of Rajastlv..n
Hid•J••rdlah J,
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963)
Dyarchy to provincial Autonomy in a federation of
mere administrative units in which the Indian
St&tes were expected to join, and from thence to &
Dominion under the Crown and lastly to a. Republic
of a Union of States are transitions within one's
memory. Earlier still, there was the rule of East
India Company under the Crown through the
Secretary of State for India and the GovornorGeneral.
The transition in India was thus in the converse order. Whereas several independent units
joined together in Australia to form a federation to
evolve a Central Government, in India the transition was from a highly centralised Government to
a foderation of States which were mil.de autonomous
unita. The history of the last hundred years or
more thus saw the emergence of self.governing
States with separate legislatures, executives and
financial resources, albeit controlled by the Centre.
The union of these States makes them members of
a Sovereign Democratic Republic. We shall briefly
notice the steps in this transformation. Our survE1y
must begin somewhat earlier than the Government
of India Act, 11135, but it need only embrace the
degree of independence in the legislative aud financial fields.
Under the East India Company, the notion of
a Central Government did not emerge till the
Charter of the Company was renewed in 1833, and
the Governor-General and his Council in Bengal
began to exercise control over the Pr£sidenci1 s of
Madras and Bomb9y. There was thus a move towards a unita'ry form of government. In view of
the bitter lessons learnt in the days of Warren
Hastings, the Govcrnor-G\Jneral was also authorised
by the Charter Act of 1833 to ovenule his Council,
a power which he continued to exercise down to
1935. There was thus, in truth and reality, only
one Government and the so-called Governments of
1 S.C.R.
SUPH.EME COURT HEPORTS
595
the Presidencies and Provinces were agents of the
Central Government. After 1858, the Government
of the C:)untry \VJ.;;i carried on in the name of the
Queen through her Secretary of State for India.
The general pattern was, however, the same, though
as time passed, democratic institutions in Government slowly emerged.
When the Reforms came in 1919 and iutroducP.d a system of local governments, the process was
not decentralisation but deconcentration, as is
known in France. By stages, the Councils a.t the
Centre and in the Provinces were greatly expanded,
a large number of nominated members being added.
When elections came, they included the representation of some special interests. Legislation was
even then from the Centre in the shape of Regul~
tions Ol" under instructions from tho Centre, unless
it was of a wholly local oharacter.
j
\Ve sha.H. pass over the details of the preparatory periods. When .Parliament began to modify
alt this, the aim was to give to the Provinc3s a
separate existence, though under a strong Centre.
When the Government of India Act. 1915 wa.s
amended, there was a definite break up of the
legista.tive machinery into two.
There emerged
then th~ Legislative Assembly and local Legislatures. In the field of local Legislatures, the first
experiments in Democracy were tried.
To invest separate powers, there was a classification of subjects between the Centre and the
Provinces, and the topics of legislation, taxation
and administration were separated to distinguish
the different spheres. Such provision was to be
ma.de under s. 45A and the rules that were framed,
go under the name of the Devolution Rules and its
Schedules were the precursors of the Lists under
the Government of India Act, 1935 and the present
Constitution. The only difference was that there
1962
Automoiile
Trenspore
( R•jut~1n) LU,
"·
S1e 1 of R.jutlten
Hid91tuil•h J.
596
1968
Au...,.bi/1
Transport
..
( Rojasthan) Ltd
Staie of Rajaslhan
Hidd} tJtu/lah '·
SUPREME COURT REPORTS (19 63]
was no third List, which was hardly necessary, as
the residual power was in the Centre. The powers
of the local Legislatures were, however, not unlimited. Apart from the limitations arising from
the allotment of subjects undn the Devolution
Rules, there was a control of the Centre. Any Act
passed bv the local Legislature could be disallowed
by the Governor-General or the Crown. In certain
circumstances, it could be repealed by the Indian
Legislature. Thus, though the seed of federation
was sowed, there was no semblance of a federation.
We shall now analyse the financial arrangements, including taxation, during the period covered by us already. The finances of India during
the early stages were also centrali~ed. The Provinces were given what was considered to be their
'needs' and L'rovincial taxation as well as Provincial expenditure were ce11trally controlled. The
process of decentralisation in finance, however,
may be said to ha.Ye commenced earlier. The Act
of 1858 by which the rule of the East India Company was terminated also vested the revenues of
India in the Crown with the necessary control in
the Secretary of State. Mr. Wilson, the founder of
the 'Economist' and th'3 ~rst Member for Finance,
advocated that the Provmces should not depend
on "grants" but should have independent resources.
His suggestions bore fruit in Lord Mayo's regime,
when in addition to fixed grants some sources of
revenue were "provincialised". By 1882 there
came to exist a bifurcation which wa.s described in
the phrase "divided heads of revenue"-a phrase
used for years afterwards. The Montagu-Chelmsford Report was the next important landmark and
led to proper provincial enfranchisement. The
Report said:
"Tile existing financial relations between
the Central and Provincial Governments must
•-
l SC.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
597
be changed if the popular principle in Government h1 to have fair play in the Provinces ..... .
... Our first aim has therefore been to find
some means of entirely separating the resources of the Central and Provincial Governments."
Under the Government of India Act, the
Devolution Rules (Rules 2 an<l 14) made the separation of the resources. From this, it is not to be
gathered that the Provinces had a separate fisc. By
R. 16, it was provided that aJl moneys were to be
p11.id into an account in the custody oft.he Governor·
General and he made rules with the tianction oft.he
Secretary of State and issued orders, both general
and special, for payments, withdrawals or disbursements from that account. By far the greater pa.rt
of the Devolution Rules rlealt \vith these matters
and, in addition, there were congeries of rules and
instructions.
Taxation in the Provinces was under Entrv
48 in Part II of the First Schedule of the Devolu-
tion Rules, which read:
"48. Sources of P1ovincial Revenue not
included under previous heads, whether(a) taxes included in the Schedule to
the Scheduled Tax Rules
or
(b) taxes, not included in those schedules, which are imposed by or under provincial
legislation
which
has
received
the previous sanction of the GovernorGeneral."
The Scheduled Tax Rules made by the GovernorGeneral in Council under s. 80A (3)(a) of the
Government of India Act divided the heads of taxes
into two parts. The first part dealt with taxes
1912
Automobilt
Transpo,t
(Rajasth,m) Ltd.
v.
S1ate of Bajasthan
H ida1atull•h J.
598
.A.11torr.obile
Tr•nsptrl
(R11Ja1fan) Lti.
••
Slc'1 oJ Rojut1ia
Hid4lJ<ltol/u J.
SUPRE.ME COURT REPORTS [1963J
which the Legislative Councils could impose without the prnvious sanction of the Governor. General
for the purpo8es of Local Government. The
second part dealt with taxes which the local
Legislatures could impose or authorise the imposition of, without the previous sanction of the Governor-General for purposes of local authority.
The first contained eight heads: six taxes, one
registration fee and one stamp duty. The six taxes
were (a) tax on land put to non-agri<iultural uses,
(b) tax on succession, (c) tax on betting and gambling, (d) tax on advertisements, (e) tax on amusements and (f) tax on specified luxuries. In the
second part were (a) tolls, (b) taxes on vehicles or
boats, (c) octroi, (d) terminal taxes if ootroi was
not levied in that area before a particular date,
(e) taxes on trades, professions or callings, and (f)
tax on private markets. There were also taxes
and fees on certain services which the local authorities render. The six taxes in the second part
were taxes 011 trade and commerce in motion. They
were of course taxes for local authorities, but the
Indian Legislature, the Governor-General and
finally the Crown uould annul any law if not acceptable to them. We shall pa!!S over the Report of
the Committee of Inquiry presided over by Lord
.l\iestan, which recommended the amounts payable
to Local Governments from income-tax etc. We
shall also pass over the Reforms Inquiry Committee
presided over by Sir Alexander Muddiman and that
presided over by Lord Incheape. Under the recommendations of the first and as a result of the retrenchment mad~ by the second, in 1927-28 the contributions by the Provinces ceased. Thus, just
before the establiRhment of the Indian Statutory
Commission in 1927 there was not only Dyarchy
working, but the sources of revenue were divided
botween the Centre and the Provinces.
It was at this stage that the Indian Statutory
1 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
599
Commission (popula.rly known as the Simon Com·
mission) was appointed. The Commission recommended tha.t the Organic Instrument to be framed
should have provisions for its own development;
in other words, that India should have ~ flexible
and not a rigid Constitution, and that a.ny c1evelopment should have regard to India as a whole and
not merely British India. In this, there was the
echo of what the Montagu-CheJmsford Report
said:
''Our conception of the eventual future
of India is a sisterhood of States, self-govrrning in all matters of purely local or provincial
interest ............... In this picture there is a
place for the Native States."
The Commission emphasised one fact more than
any other. They observed:
"Economic forces are such t.hat the States
and British India must stand or fall togetb.er
........... The increasing importance of industry brings problems that must be faced by
both together ............ The States themselves
have their own tariff policies, and there is a
serious possibility that, unless provision can
be made for the reconciliation of divergent
interests.. numbers of tariff wal1s will be perpetuated in au area whero fi~cal · unity
is most desirable."
The Commission also suggested that"the new Constit~tion should provide an
«Jpen door whereby, when it seems good to
them, the Ruling Princes ma.y enter on just
aud reasonable terms."
The Commission, therefore, recommended a. federal
Constitution composed of British India and th6
Indian States. They said:
''We are inclined ourselves to think that
the easier and more speedy approach to the
lHI
~utomobil1
Tr1111sporl
( Rajasthcn) L!d.
v.
Stat1 1J Raj11S.ha11
Hiio.J4tullah J.
600
196i
Automobil 1
Tramport
(Raj.,than) Ltd.
v.
St.11 of liaja.rlhan
HU/ay~tullah J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963]
desired end can be obtained by reorganising
the Constitution of India on a. federal ha.sis
in such a way that individual States or
groups of States may have the opportunity
of entering as soon as they wish to do so.''
When the Gov-irnment of India Act, 1935,
wa.s bein~ fashioned, the Committee was assisted
by a Financial Adviser in Mr. (later, Sir) Walter
Leyton, whose task was to evolve some scheme
under whioh the Provinces could get adequate
revenues. The Indian States, if they were to join
in the Federation, also insisted that their position
be safeguarded. Mr. Leyton then pointed out that
before the Indian States Committee, 1928-29 (commonly known as the Butler Committee) the Indian
States had urged that they must receive a share of
thl'I customs which had by then risen tons much as
Rs. 50 crores, a.nd the Butler Committee had also
suggested that this claim should be examined by a.
panel of experts. When the Round Table Conference met, the question of the shares of the Indian
States in the customs a.nd excise revenues wa.s again
raised. The Federal Structure Committee was
commissiconeil, among other matters, to report on
the powers of Fed'lral Legislature a.nd the Provincial Constitution Committee, to report in the 1a.me
wa.y on the powers of tho Provincial Legislatures.
In the report of the Federal Structure Committee,
the subject of trade nnd taxes on it was dealt with
only from the angle of discrimination, hut emphasis
appears to have been placed only on British trade
and the fiscal conventions. Thns, the discusEions
before the Conference also centred round two
questions: (a.) the protection of Britsh interests a.nd
(b) no commercial discrimination on the ground of
race etc.
When the Joint Parliamentary Committee on
the Indian Constitutional Reforms went into these
questions, and recommended the abolition of
I S. C.R.
SCJP.R.EM:E COURT REf.ORTS
601
Dyarchy in the federating units and the establishment of Provincial Autonomy, the Committee
sensed the dangers of breaking up the unity of
India and sa.id:
" ... in transferring so many of the powers
of Government to the Provinces, and in encouraging them to develop a vigorous and independent political life of their own, we have
been running the inevitable risk of weakening
or even destorying that unity. Provincial AU·
tonomy is, in fact, an inconceivable policy
unless it is accompanied by such an adaptation
of the structure of the Central Legislature as
will bind these autonomous units torrether''.
They also pointed out that the unity of India on
which they had laid so much emphasis was dangerc.usly imperfect so long as the Indian States had no
comtitutioni.l relationship with British India. The
Committee recognised tbe difficulties of economiJ tics
between the Provinces inter se and also Britsh India
as a whole on the one hand, and the Indian States
· on the other, and observed :
''On the one hand, with certain exceptions, the States are free themselves to impose
internal c11st0ms pulides, which cannot but
obstruct the flow of trade. Even at the
maritime portR situated in the States, the administration of the tariffs is imperfectly coordinated with that of the British Indian ports,
while the separate rights of the States in these
respects are safeguarded by long standing treaties or usage acknowledged by the Crown.
On the other hand, tariff policies, in which
every part of India is interested, are laid
down by a Government of India and BritishIndia LPgislature in which no Indian State
has a voice, though the States constitute
196J
Jfutomobi/11
TransPtJT'
(Rojaslhan) Ltd.
v.
Stat11 oj Rajostl.an
R'ida.1atullah J.
602
1961
A.utomob,J1
TrtJ11sP•'
(~srh"") Llt/.
••
S1'tl •/ RajasthtJn
Hii1J•t&illah J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963]
only slightly less than half the area, and onefourth of the populatio.a of India. Even
where the Government of India has adequate
powers to impose internal indirect taxation or
to control economic development, as in the
case of salt and opium, the use of these
powers has caused much friction and hns often
lt•ft behind it, in the States, a sense of in·
justice."
They suggested the means by which internal trade
and commer\Je could be secured some measure of
freedom and their rec<•mmendations must be quoted
in e.xtenso. In para 264 of the Report, they observed:
It is greatly to be desired that States
adhering to the Federation should, like the
Provinces, &.ccept the principle of internal freedom for t1 a.de in India and that the Federal
Government alone should have the power to
impose tariffs and other restrictions on trade.
Many States, however, derive substantial revenues from customs duties levied at the fron·
tiers on goods entering the State from other
parts of India.. These duties are usually refrerred to ae internal cu8toms duties, but
in many of the smaller Sta.tee are often more
akin to octroi and terminal taxe8 than to
onstomP. In some of the larger States the
right to impose them is specifically limited by
treaty. We recognise that it is impossible to
deprive Sta.t<'s of revenue upon which they
depend for balancing their budgets and that
they must be free to alter existing rates of duty
to suit varying conditions. But internal customs
barriers are in principle inconsistent with the
freetlom of interchange of a fully developed
Fe<lera.tiou, and we are strongly of the opinion
that every effort should be made to substi
tute other forms of taxation for these internal"
'
1
1 S.C.R.
SUPREME OOURT REPORTS
603
customs .•• the aooession of & State to the Fede·
ration should imply its acceptance of the principle tha.t it will not set up a barrier to free
interchange so formidable as to constitute a
threat to the future of Federation ..• ''
However, in dealing with commercial discrimination, the Joint Parliamentary Committee was more
concerned with British Imports and the Fiscal Con·
vention which it was anticipated, wouJd lapse on
the new Constitution coming into force. The
Committee, therefore, suggested that the GovernorGcneral and the Governors should be empowered
to withhold their assent to Bills whfoh were discri·
minatory in fact or had that tendency. They also
recommended statutory prohibition against certain
specified kinds of discrimination, and added:
••We nl•ed hardly add that the effect of
our recommendation for the statutory prohibition of certain specified forms of discrimination would lay open to challenge in the Courts
as being ultra vires any legislative enactment
whioh is inconsistent with these prohibitions,
even if the Governor-General or Governor has
assented to it."
With these saggestions in respect of th ~ freedom of
t!'ade .and commerce, a Federal Constitution was
recommended. It was also r JC'Ognised that it would
be the Provinces whieh would carry on the 'nationbuilding activities' and the need for more :finances
for the ProvincPs was acutely recognised. The establishment of self.governingunits and sc>lf-governing
institutions, the orea.tion of deficit P1·ovinoes, the
separation of Burma and the cost of establishment
of a Federation, were m i.tter:1 wh ioh were gone into
by the Federal Finance Committee. 'fhe Federal
Structure · Committee, Sir Walter Liwton, the
D.i.vidson Commit.tee and expPrts Jike Sir Malcolm
Hailey and Sir Otto Niemeyer. The Report
lfft
A.ulom,bi/1
Transport
(R11josthan) Lit/,
v.
Slll1 of R •ja~than
HiJaJalul/ili J.
604
A.uHtnobi/1
TratUPort
(R.jasth.m) Ltd.
y,
Slall of Raj:isthan
Hid~1al•llah J,
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963]
of th.e First Taxation Inquiry Committee (1926)
was also available from which guidance was taken,
and just as the topics of legislation were demarcated between the Centre and the Provinces, so also
the sources of revenue were allocated between the
Centre and the Provinces. The intention was to
create financially stable governments with well.
defined powers of taxation. This was, of course,
absolutely necessary if the autonomous Provinces
were to exist without subventions, which were
necessary to support the deficit Provinces. The
legislative heads were, therefore, completely divided between the Centre and the Provinces -one
List being exclusive to each and a third List was
added by '~hich certain subjects were to be within
their concurrent jurisdiction. The intention was to
avoid the assignment of residual powers to a mini·
mum, and as observed by Gwyer, C. J., in In re
The Central Pro'ltinces and Berar Act No. XIV of
1938 (1), this ''made the Indian Constitution Act
unique among federal Constitutions in the length
and detail of its Legislative Lists." The Government of India Act, l 9;j5, provided by s. 5 that His
M3.jesty was to declare by proclamation that 1111
from a date to be appointed "thero shall be united
in a Federation under the Crown, by name of the
l!'ederation of India,(a) Provinces ......
(b) The Indian States which have
or may thereafter accede to the Federa.
tion ......"
The proclamation never issued.
Tho freedom of tradfl and commerce which
was the'.'subject of such anxious thought received
short treatment in the Government of India Act,
I 935. Chapter III in Part V (Lt•gisla.tive Powers)
(I) [ 19)9] F.C.R. 18, 38,
1 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
605
dealt with discrimination in a series of sections
which Dr. Keith described as "liable to be regarded
as oppressive and unfair.'' Though lip service was
paid to caste, creed, colour etc. the provisions were
really designed to protect British interests. The
freedom of internal trad~ simpliciter was dealt with
in Pa.rt XII (Miscellaneous and General), and s. 297
provided:
·
"297 (I). No Provincial Legislature or
Government shall(a) by virtue of the entry in the Pro·
vincial Legislative List relating to trade
and commerce within the Province, or
the ent.ry in that list relating to the production, supply, and distribution of commodities have power to pass any law
nr tak~ any executive action prohibiting
or restricting the entry into or export from,
the Province of goods of any class or des·
cription:
(b) by virtue of anyt';ing in this Act
have power to impose any tax, cess, toll,
or due which, as between goods manufactured or produced in the Provinces
and similar goods not so manufactured or
pl'Odticed, discriminates in favour of the
former, or, whi0h, in the case of goods
manufactured or produced outside the
Pl'Oviuces, discriminates bf'ltween goods
manufactured or produced in one locality
and similar goodR manufactured or pro·
dured in another locality.
(2) Any law passed in contravention of
thi:; section shall, to the extent of the contra·
vention, be bvalid."
By thh~ SPction, power was <lenied to the
Provincial Legi8la.tures under two Entries in the
1962
Automobi/1
Transport
(Rajaslhan) Ltd.
v.
State of Roja1than
H;doy,tul/d J.
606
1111!
.Au1....bil1
Tro.-1
(R°""'I""") Lid.
v.
llal1 •f Blfiaslh•n
Bil'IJ•t,Uah J,
SUPREME OOURT REPORTS (1963]
Provincial List to impair free entry and export
of goods in the Provinces. The two Entries were
referred to separately and expressly by their
content and were :
"27. Trade a.nd Commerce within the
Province" nnd
29. Production, supply a.nd distribution
of goods."
The word "commodities" was used instead of
••goods" in the White Pa.per, a.nd the change to
"goods" appears to have been lost sight of in
s. 297(1). However, the definition of "goods" took
in commodities, a.nd the words "goods of a.ny class
or description" were wide enough to show wha.t
wa.s mea.nt. The subject of taxation was not
dealt with in cl. (a) but cl. (b), andtha.t provided
that taxation in the Provinces was not to have a
differential basis. In this connection, reference
may also be made to Entries 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24
a.nd 26 of List I and Entries 20 and 32 in Lht III,
which, in some measure, involve regulation of trade,
commerce a.nd intercourse.
The detailed examination of the history lying
a.t the back of the Government of India. Act, 1935,
lays bare some fundamental facts and premises.
It shows that the process through a whole century
was the breakup of a highly centralised Govern.
ment a.nd the creation of autonomous Provinces
with distinct and separate political existence, to be
combined inter se and with the Indian States, at a
later period, in a federation. To achieve this, not
only was there a division of the heads of legislation
but the financial resources were also divided and
separate fiscs for the federation and the Provinces
were established. The fields of taxation were
demarcated, and those for the Provinces were
chosen with special care to make these units selfsupporting as far as possible with enough to spare
I S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
607
196Z
for "nation-building d.ctivities." In this arra.nge- ·
..t•tomobil1
ment, the door was open for the India.n States to
Tran1p11TI
join on the same basis and on terms of equality.
(Rai•s,han) Lil.
The most important fact was that unlike the Side of v.Rajaalf11111
American and the Canadian Constitutions the
commerce power was divided between the Centre HiJayotullah J,
and the Provinces as the Entries quoted by us
clearly show. The commerce powfr of the Provinces was exercisable within t6.e Provinces. The
fetter on the commercial power of the Previnoes
was placed bys. 297. This was in two directions.
Ola.use (a) of sub-s. (1) banned restrictions at the
barriers of the Provinces on the entry and export
or goods, and cl. (b) prohibited discrimination in
taxing goods between goods manufactured and
produced in the Province as against goods not so
manufactured or produced and local discriminations.
-.
When drafting the Constitution of India., the
Constituent Assembly being a.ware of the problems
in various countries where freedom of trade, com·
merce and intercourse has been provided differently
and also the way the Courts of those countries have
viewed the relative provisions, must have attempted
to ev_olve a pattern of such freedom suitable to
Indian conditions.
The Constituent Assembly
realised that the provisions of s. 297 and. the Chapter on Discriminations in the Government of India
Act, 1935, hardly met the case, and were inadequate. They had to decide the following questions :
{a) whether to give the commerce power only
Parliament or to divide it between Parliament and
the State Legis]atures; (b) whether to ensure
freedom of trade, commerce and intercourse inter·
State, that is to 1ay, at the borders of the States or
to ensure .it even intra-States; (o} whether to make
the prohibition against restrictions absolute or
qualified, and if so, in what manner ; (d} if qualified
by whom was the restriction to be imposed and to
608
AultJm,.b i~
Tra•1sp •rt
(Ruj2slhon) Ltd.
'·
~late of Raj· stli·m
Hid'l)'e.tul/"h J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963]
what extent; (e) whether the freedom should be to
the individual or also to trade and commerce as a
whole ; (f) what to do with tbe existing laws in
British India and more so, in the acceding Indian
States ; (g) whether any special provisions were
needed for emergencies ; (h) what should be the
special provisions to enable the States to levy
taxes on sale of goods, which taxes wero to be tbe
main source of income for tl1e States according to
the experts. All-these matters have, in fact, been
covered in Part XIII, and the pitfalls which were
disclosed in the Law Reports of the Countries which
had accepted freedom of trade and commerce have
been attempted to be avoided by choosing language
appropriate for the purpose. In addition to this,
the broad pattern of the political set-up, namely,
a federation of autonomous States was not lost, sight
of. Theee autonomous conditions had strengthened
dAiring the operation of the 1935 Constitution and
led to what Prof. Coupland described as "Provincial patriotism"', for which the reason, according to the Ioarned Professor was :
"In the course of the last few years
the sense of Provincial patriotism has been•
strengthened by the advent of a full Provincial self-government. The peoples took a
new pride in Governments that were now in a
sense theirs." (The Constitutional 1 roblem
in India, part III. p. 40.)
With this historical background of our country and the historical setting in which other Federations have dealt with the problems of trade and
commerce, we now proceed to examine the Constitution to discover the meaning of the various
Articles in Part XIII. We begin by reading Part
XIII here indicating in each Article the changes
made and the relevant dates on which they were
made:
i
s.c.tt.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
·--·-..
- 609
''Part XIII
Trade, Commerce and Intercourse within
the Territory of India.
301. Subject to the other provisions of
this Part, trade, commerce and intercourse
throughout the territory of India sha.11 be
free.
302. Parliament may by law impose
such restrictions on the freedom of. trade,
commerce or intercourse between one State
and another or within any part of the territory of India as may be required in the
public interest.
303. (1) Notwithstanding anything in
article 302, neither Parliament nor the Legislature of a State shall have power to
make any law giving, or authorising
of, any preference to _ one
the giving
State over another, or making or authorising
the making of,· any discrimination between
one 8tate and another, by virtue of any entry
relating to trade 11.nd commerce in any of the
Lists in the Seventh Schedule.
(2) Nothing in clause (I) shalJ prevent
Parliament from making any law giving, or
authorising the giving of, any preference or
making, of authorising the making of, any
discrimination of it ·is declared by such law
that it is necessary to do so for the purpose
of dealing with a situation arising from
scarcity of goods in any pa.rt of the territorl
of India.
'
(In its application to tht! State_of-J:ammu
and Kashmir, in cl. (I) of art. 303, the words
"hy virtue of any entry relating to trade and
commerce in any of the Lists in the Seventh
Schedule'' shall be omitted).
J90J!
' '
A utomobi/s
'.L'rcnsporl .
Rajasthan Lttl.
v.
Stolt of Roiasthan
HidayiJtull® J,
610
-19fl
AtJtomohi/1
Transport
( Roiosthnn) Lli.
v.
Stct1 •J Htljo~lhan
SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1963]
304. Notwithstanding anything in
Art. 301, or Art. 303, the Legislature of a
State may by la.w(a} impose on goods imported from
other States (or the Union territories) any
tax to which similar goods manufactured or
produced in that State are subject, so, however as not to discriminate between goods so
imported and goods so manufactured or
produced, and
(b} impose such reasonable restrictiom1 on the freedom of trade, commerce or
intercourse with or within that State as may
be required in the public interest ;
Provided that no Bill or amendment for
the purposes of clause ( b) shall be introduced
or moved in the Legislature of a State without
the previous sanction of.the .President.
Ins. by the Constitution (Seventh
Amendment) Act, J 956, s. 29 and Sch.)
305. Nothing in articles :':01 and 303
shall affect the provisions of any existing law
except in so far aa the President may by order
otherwise direct, and nothing in article 301
shall affect the operation of any law made
before the commencement of the Constitution
(Fourth Amendment) Act, 1955, in so far as it
relates to, or prevent Parliament or the
Legislature of a State from making any law
relating to any such matter as is referred
to in sub-clause (ii) of clause (6) of article 19 .
•
(This Article was substituted for original
Article which was as follows :
•Nothing in Articles 30 l and 303 shall
affect the provisions of any existing law ex-
!
l S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
611
cept in so far a.s the President may by order
otherwise provide.')
306. Deleted.
(The original Article before its deletion
read:
'Notwithstanding anything in the foregoing provisions of this Pa.rt or in any other
provisions of this Constitution, any State
specified in Part B of the First Schedule
which before the commencement of this Constitution was levying any tax or duty on the
import of goods into the Mate from other
States or on the export of goods from the
State to other States may, if .an agreement
in that behalf has been entered into bet\Teen
the Government vf India and the Government of that State, continue to levy and collect such tax or duty subject to the terms
of such agreement and for such period not
exceeding ten years as may be specified in
the agreement :
Provided that the President may at any
time after the expiration of five years from
such commencement terminate or modify any
such agreement if, after C'onsideration of the
report of, the Finance Commission constituted
under . Article 280, he thinks it necessary to
do so').
307. Parliament may by law appoint
such authority as it considers appropriate
for carrying 9ut the purposes of Articles 301,
:::·02, ;i03 and 304, and confer on the authority
so appointed such powers and suoh du.ties as
it thinks necessary.
Part XIII, unlike some of the Constitutions
which we have considered, contains within itself
196t
A. .t•m.b1/1
Tr11nsp•rl
( Raj41ll1llft)
I"·
v.
Stat, of R.J·•tla11t1
612
1961
A.ut 1m11h;l1
Transport
(R•i4't\on) LI/.
v.
Stall of R"ja.it~a
Hido;atullolt. J'
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963]
and in one place the provisions regarding the freedom of trade, commerce and intercourse. The
commerce power as a head of legislation is divided
in the Constitution, and figures in all the three
Lists. Apa.rt from other Entrie1 uuder which trade
and commerce can be affected and which are to
be found in all the three Lists, there are two Entries in 1he Union List, two in the State List and
one in the Concurrent List, which bear directly upon trade and commerce.
Union List:
41. Trade and commerce with foreign,
countries, import and export across customs
frontiers;
42. Inter-State trade and commerce.
State Lisi:
26. Trade and Commerce within the State
subject to the provisions of entry 3:1 of List
III.
27. Production, supply and distribution
of goods subject to the provisions of entry
:rn of List III.
Concurrenl List :
33. (Trade and Commerce in, and the
production, supply and distribution of: (a)
the products of any industry where tho control of such industry by the Union is declared by Parliamentary law to be expedient
in the public interest) and imported goods of
the same kind as such products ;
(b) food-stuffs, including edible oil-seeds and oils;
(c} cattle fodder, including oilcakes
and other concentrates;
t
..
1 s.c.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
613
(d) raw cotton, whether ginned or
unginned and cotton seed or
(e) raw jute.
' 'rhe words in brackets show the entry as
it was prior to its amendment by the Consti·
tution (Third Amendment) Act, 1954. The
word 'industries' occurred in place of the
word 'industry' there.
By dividing the commerce power and by
enacting the provisions of Part XfII, the problems
which arose in the United St11tts of America arid
Canada have been avoided. In Canada, as we have
shown already, the question wa:-J whether in passing
a law the Provinces were encroaching upon the
commerce power of the Dominion given by No. 2 of
s. 91 and conversely, whether the regulation
of trade by the Dominion meant an encroach~
ment of the pow~rs of the Provinces. In our
Constitution, questions ·of conflict under two rival
Lists may arise, but on the plane of exercise of
commerce power, such questions can hard1y arise.
In the United States, the controversy is between
the powers of the Congress and the powers of the
States. American and Canadian ptecedents were
thus avoided by dividing the commerce power.
The constitution deliberately chose the Australian pattern in Art. 301, but made certain other
provisions, and this was done to avoid the controversy ~l:l it had raged in Australia.. Article 301
states in general words (like s. 92 of the Australian
Constitution) that trade, commerce and .intercourse shall be free. But the opening words
"Subject to the other provisions of this Pa.rt'' serve
, · to direct attention to the provisions next -following.
These words achieve two purposes. They indicate- :
(a) freedom is not absolute but subject
to what is next provided ; and
J96S
Automobile
Transport
(Rajasthan) Lit/.
v.
--
Stal1 of Hlljaseh11n
HidayJtullah J.
614
1962
.AU1cmobi/1
T1nrpo't
(R<J.,lh•n) Lli.
••
St11le •l R•j•st1 on
SUPl\EME COURT REPORTS [1963]
(b) that the curbs on freedom of trade
and commerce are primarily to be found in
.Part XIII.
Next, the words ''throughout the territory of India"
avoid disputes which took place in Australia till
theitBanks' case ( ') was decided by the Privy
Council namely whether freedom is secured only
at the frontiers of the States or also· within the
States. The form of words adopted by our Cons ti·
tution ("throughout the territory") was suggested
Australia as an amendment but was not accepted,
and the Privy Council in James v. Commonwealth \ ') was understood to have endorsed the
view that freedom only at the barriers of the
States was meant. Our Constitution chose the
form which was rejected io Australia thereby anticipating the decision of the Privy Council in the
Banks' case. (1 ) It must be remembered that the
Banks' case \!) was not decide.d by the Privy Conn.
oil when our Constitution was drafted. The freedom in India is inter.State as well as intra-State.
This freedom is addre1sed to Parliament as well as
to the l:ltate Legislatures, &s the next Article clearly show.
Article 302 then makes the first exception to
the freedom. That Article gives power to Parliament to put restrictions on this freedom. This
shows clearly that Parliament is bound by Art. 30I.
Disputes similar to those which took place in
Australia in which it was hotly debated whether
the Commonwealth was bound or not have thus
been avoided. By providing separate releases from
Art. 301 for Parliament and the State Legislatures,
that controversy can never arise. Parliament
which is authorised by Art. 302 can impose restrictions on trade, commerce and intercourse in two
aspects. They are :
(a) between one State and another; or
(I} [19t8] 76 C. L, R. I, 38, 381.
(2) (1936) A:C. 578,
1 S.C.R.
SUPREME OOURT REPORTS
615
(b) within any part of the territory of
India.
By the fir~t is meant trade and commerce in
motion across the frontiers of States. It means
the inter-State character of trade, commerce and
intercourse. By the second, the power is made
more general. Parliament may put restriction in
'any put' of the territory of India. The territory
of India is defined by Art. 1.(3), which says :
"(3) The ·territory of India. shall comprise(a) the territories of States;
(b) the Union territories specified in the
First Schedule ;
(Before the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Aot, 1956 the clause read 'the territories specified in Part D of the First Schedule')
and (c) suoh other territories as may be
acquired."
The words "within any part of the territory of
India" give power to Parliament to, legislate for
'any part' not only generally but also Jooally. This
power is su b)ect to two restrictions. The first is
that this must be done by 'law', which means that
without a valid Jaw t.he power cannot be exercised~
The second is th~t the law must be in the 'public
interest.' Since law is made the prerequisite of
action, mere executive action is out of the question.
This obviates the argument emphatically rejected
by the Privy Council in James v. Oowan (1) that
the executive was not under the fetter of s. 92 of
the Australian Commonwealth Act. The word
'required' limits the restrictions to -the necessities
of the 1itua.tion so that the Article may not be
liberally . construed as a free ohl),rter. The word
(l) il932) A.. c. 541.
--
~ulomdil•
Tr•~s/o'I
•
(Rt1jasllian) Lti.
\',
State of RcJ•,tlla
,,Hiiayatull• J,
616
196!
.Autamobil'
Tranaporl
(Bojaslhan). LU.
••
Slate of Rajaslhon
Bid•}"tulld J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963)
'reasonable' is not included as qualifying 'restrictions' as it does in Art. 304; but it is impossible
that the freedom granted in Art. 301 was to be
•mocked ot' by makin~ 'unreasonable' restrictions
}lf'rmissible at the hands of Parliament. Normally
Parliament is the best judge of public interests, and
a question of policy can hardly arise before the
Courts. But if a question ariaes whether Parliament has under colour of Art. 302 encroached upon
Art. 301, the matter may in exceptionable circumstances be jnsticiable. It will be useless in this
connection to invoke the voice of Parliament.
Next comes Art. 303. It begins with the n<m·
OOstnnte clause "notwitbetanding anything in
Article 302." The effect of these words is to take
away th1> power granted to Parliament to
fotter freedom in t.his prec~ding ArticlA in the
circ•1mstances stated in this Article.
This nonob8lante Clause has been criticised as not being
wholly r<'lated to what follows. 'Ve do not agree.
The answer to the objection will appear from what
we say next. The Article say9 that neither (a)
Parliament nor (b) Legislature of a State shall have
power (il to make any law giving or (ii) to make a
law authorising the giving of(A) any preference to one State over an.
other;
(B) any discrimination between one State
and another,
by virtue of any Entry relating to trade and commerce in anv of the Lists in the Seventh Sehedule.
The main ·idea underlying this Article is to ban
preferen<",e and discrimination between one State
and another in matters of trade, commerce and
intf'rcourse. This principle of uniformity is 10
high that by the nan.ob8t,ante clause the powers of
Parliament under Art. 302 are completely nullified
and along with the powers of Parliament, ali
'
1 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
617
derivative powers of the State Legislatures where
Parliament deola.res by law that a restriction is in
the publio interest and the State Le.si;istature
(legislates -under the shelter of such a declaration,
are also nullified, see Entry 33(a). Entry 35 of the
Concurrent List or Entry 57 of List II read with
Entry 35 of List III, to confine the citation to
Entries, with which we are primarily oonoerned
here. In the Seventh Schedule to the Cc;>nstitution
in addition to Entries 41 and 42 (List I), 26 and 27
(List II) ~nd 33 (List III) there are many other
Entries regulating special trades. In some of them,
the formula 'by law made by Parliament' is again
repeated out of abundant caution. By the words
of Art. 303 'by virtue of any entry relating to trade
and commerce' is meant not thf.'I five Ent·ries last
named by us but otheTs also, e.g., Entry 8 of List
II, Entries 29, 30, 81 of List I, Entry 29, 15 of
List III (to mention only a. few from each List),
Thus is achieved one purpose which is paramount
v:_~., that the exercise of the commerce power,
however derived, . is not to be exercised to create
preferences and ·discrimination between one State
and other whether the action proceeds from Parliament or a State Legislature or both acting in union.
No question of the content of the power or its
source can a.rise in this context, beoa.use the prohibition js absolute. The article makes a ~reat
advance upon s. 297 of the Government of India
Act, 1935. In the section, the inhibition was only
against a Provincial Legislature or Government.
Here the inhibitions embraces not only these but is
also against Parliament and the Central executive.
The executive limb has been made powerless,
because the source of restrictions must be 'law,' and
if a law cannot be made, executive action per se
would be ineffective without more. Future, s. 297
was oonoerned only with goods and their taxation
differentially. The Article takes in its stride not
only the passage of goods or their taxation but all
196!
A11tqmnbi/1
Trnru~art
( R111jast~'lll) Ltd.
y,
s IOllOf Bajastli.r.
Hi<Jayatulleh J.
618
111111
.Automobil1
Tr••sp1rt
(Bi!i•s•hon) Lto
••
Sl•I• •f Bojasth1n
Hid•JOlu//oh J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1968]
other ma.tters inherent in free trade, commerce
a.nd intercourse. The Article ha.a its echo h s. 99
of the Austra.lia.n Constitution, which rea.ds;
"99. Commonwea.lth not to give prefer.
enca.-The Commonwea.lth sha.11 not, by a.ny
la.w or regula.tjon of trade, commerce or revenue, give preferenoa to one State or any pa.rt
thereof over a.nether Sta.te or any pa.rt
thereof."
It is to be read with s. 102, under wl1ich Parlia.ment
can forbid preferences by State.
Article 303,
however, goes much further.
It ema.scula.tes the
total legisla.tive power in the country from achieving a. single preference or discrimina.tion in trade,
comm~rcJ an<! intercourse by a. united or concartecl
a.ction by P<1.rlia.ment and State L,gi~la,ture thu•
ensuring equ'l.!ity to a.11 peoples of Iadia. frorn
whatever p::i.rt they ma.y be dra.wn an<i wherever
they me.y be living.
There is, however, one exception to it, a.nd
that it. is c1>nta.ined in cl. (2). Pceferenca or discrimina.tion may be ma.de in one insta.nce by
Parlia.m mt by la.w. The ambit of that exception
plainly appaara from the words of cl. (2), which are
explicit in th imselves. L'3t us quote thern again :
"Nothing in ola.use (I) shall prevent
Parliament from making any law giving, or
authorising the giving of, any preferenca or
ma.king, or a.utborising the ma.king of. any
discrimin'l.tion if it is decla.red by such law
that it is necassa.ry to do so for the purpose
of dealing with a situation arising from
sca.rcity of goods in any part of the territory
of India.''
The question of famine is primarily in miii.d. and
aeoondatjly the readjustment or even distribution
of goods due to some economic imbalance. Clause
(2) is self-explanatory, and questions such as fixing
1 S. C. R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
619
of quotas of dried fruits or their even distribution
in home and outside markets which agitated the
Australians oan hardly arise, and similar questions
ca.n adequately be dealt with by Parliament tinder
this power.
Next comPs Art. 304. It beings with the
non-obst,ant,e olause "Notwithstanding anything in
artiole 301 or article 303." It is contended that
one oan understand the mention of Art. 301 but
not of Art. 303, and the Article'is thus said to be
inaoourately drafted. We have already shown why
in Art. a03 the Sta.ta Legislatures found a mention,
a.nd unless Art. 303 was also put a.side in Art. 304,
there would a.rise a. question of balancing it against
Art. 304. To avoid this, both Arts. 301 and 303
have bec·n excluded from consideration.
Article 304: is divided into two parts. It
enables the Legislatures of States to pass la.we
which affect trade, cummerce and intercourse.
Clause (a) of the Article enables taxation of good
from other States pari passu taxation of similar
goods in the State but so as not to discriminate
between them. The ban of Art. 301 is lifted but
uniformity is imposed. Compared withs. 297(l)(b)
the Article is narrower in its enabling portion and
shorter in its reach. Section 297 inhibited 'tax,
cess, tolls or due' taking in its reach all kind1,1 of
imposts on movement, but the Article gives permission to impose only taxes ,on goods oli riondifferential basis between Statf' and State, saJing
nothing about other imposts. Further, unlike the
seotion, local areas are not mentioned in the
Artiole trf•nting the purely intra-State matters on a
different footing. Trade, commerce and intercourse generally are next enabled by cl. (b) to be
restricted. They can be restricted on two planesthe first in their inter-State aspect denoted by the
words ''with ...... that State" and second, in their
intra-State aspect denoiied by the words ''within
1962
.Automobile
Transport
(Rojosthan) Ltl
v.
State of Rafaslhar.
--
H idayatullah J.
620
196Z
Aulomo6i/1
TransfJtwt
(Roja11ha•) Lia.
•.
Stat1 of RajOJlhan
Hidayatullah J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963)
that State." Both these aspects are open to
restrictions provided that the restrictions are
"reasonable" and are "required in thfl public
interest." The use of the word "reasonable"
brings in the justicability of the law. It is useless
in this context to invoke the voice of the legislature. The opinion of the legislature as expressed in
the law may of course raise a strong presumption,
and create a heavy burden for one challenging the
law, hut the LXtent of the restriction and whether
it is commensurate with the requirements of the
public interest (though a matter for the legisJa.ture to
decicle in the first instance) may have to be decided
u JtimatP Iv by the Courts. Of cour8f\ laws can be
made without affecting trade, commerce and
intercourse directly without. having to be considered by Courts or processed under the proviso. It is
only a law which directly and immediately affects
trade, commerce and intercourse which will need to
be submitted to the President for
his
sanction, though the sanction of the President
will not save it from being questioned. The Joint
Committee on Indian Constitutional Reform in its
Report (para 367) correctly pointed out:
"We need hardly add that the effect of
our recommendations for the Mtatntory prohibition of certain specified forms of discrimina. tion would lay open to challenge in the Courts
as being ultra vires any legislative enactment
which is inconsistent with these prohibitions,
even if the Governor-General or the Governor
has assented to it."
The same will operate even if the President gives
his sanctfon.
Article 305 saved existing Jaws to start with,
and at the time of the passing of the Constitution
(Fourth Amendment) Act, 1955, room was made for
the operation of laws by which a State or a corporation owned or controlled by the State carries
1 S. C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
621
r.. on any trade, business, industry or service whether
'L as a
monopoly or otherwise. Article 305 does not
apply to the statute here impugned as it was not an
'existing law'.
1962
Aut(;mobi/1
Transport
(Roiasthan) Ltd.
v
State of Raj"slhan
Article 306 was a transitory provision which
enabled certain Part B States to continue levy of
• , existing taxes or to restrict trade, commerce and
• intercourse for a period, notwithstanding the provisions of Part XIII. With that, we are not con·
ct"rned 11.fter 1955 due to the repeal of that Article. Article 307 also is immaterial in this case.
It provides for the appointment of an authority for
carrying out the purposes of Arts. 301.304, and is
a counterpart of s. 10 I of the Australian Constitu ·
" tion.
We shall now notice some cases which were
decided by the High Court of A•1stralia and the
Privy Council, hecause it is these ea8es which have
been cited f o ns in support by f he rival parties.
After the Constitution of India came into force on
January 26 1950, came the df'cisiun of the Privy
'" Council in ,f!ommonwealth of Australia v. Bank of
.:.New South Wales('). In that case, the Privy Council
departed fnm what had b0en understood to
be some of its former opinions. While adhering to
its view that the test was whether an impugned
law not 'remotely or incidentally' but directly and
immediately restricted the inter-State business of
banking at the barriers of the States, the Privy
'-Council observed that such phrases as "freedom at
the frontier ...... in respect of goods passing into or
out of the StatP" and "freedom of what is the
crucial point in inter-State trade, that is at the
State harrier" which it had used in James v. The
Commonwealth (2 ) were to be read secundum sub·
ject,am materiam, and in the context in which they
occurred, and observed:
... -
/
(I) (1950 A.C. 235.
(21 '1936) A.C. 578.
Hidayotu/lah J.
622
11112
Ai.tomohill
Tram/Jori
(Raja•thco) Lid.
v.
S1al1 of Raja1tlum
Hit/1,70lu/lali J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963}
"They cannot be interpreted as a deci·
sion either that it is only the passage of goods
which is protected by s. 92 or that it is only
at the frontier that the stipulated freedom
may be impaired. It is not to be doubted
that a restriction, applied not at the border
but at a prior or subsequent stage of interState trade, commerce or intercourse, may
offend against s. 92. Nor, as their Lordships hold, in accordance with the view long
entertained in Australia, is it in respect of
the passage of goods only that such trade,
commerce and intercourse is protected."
The Privy Council also corrected the view entertained in Australia that a full and unqualified
approval was given to the opinion of Evatt, J., in
The King v. Vizzard (1), bv Lord Wright in .James v.
The Commonwealth ('). The Privy Council oLserved:
"But it does not appl·ar to their Lord·
ships that the whole of the learned Judge's
reasoning received the considered approval of
the Board."
The Pri~y Council next approved of the following
pas~age from the Australian National, Airways case(•)
which has already been quoted by us:
"l venture to repeat what I said in the
former case 1the "Uilk case)('): 'Ono proposition which I regard as established is that
simple legislative prohibition \Federal or
State), as distinct from regulation, of inter.
State trade and commerce is invalid. Fu ther,
a law which is "directed against" inter-.State
trade and commcl'ce is invalid.
Such
a law does not regulate
such trade,
it merely prevents it. But a law prescribing
rules at to the manner in which trade (inc!riding transport) is to be conducted is not a
(l) (1933PO c.r .R. so.
!3) 11945) 71C.L.R,29.
(2) (1936) Ac. 578.
(4) (1939)62,C.L.R. 116, 127.
1 S. C. R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
623
mere prohibition and may be valid in its
application to inter-State trade. notwithstand. s. 92' ." ,
mg
observing:
'•With this statement, which both repeats
the general proposition and precisely states
that simple prohibition is not regulation, their
Lordships' agree."
The Privy Council also made it clear that in some
cases "regulation'' may take the form of prohibition,
thus endorsing the statement of Harrison Moore
that the power of legislation, is not merely a
power to regulate; it ranges from creation to destruction, it may establish as well as prohibit: The
Commonwealth of Australia, 2nd Edn., p. 280.
The Advocates-General of Bombay and the
Punjab and Mr. G. S. PP,thak relied upon many
decisions of the Australian High Court after the
Banks' case. (') Strictly speaking, these decisions
could not have influenced the framing of our Constitution, because by the time they were rendered,
our Constitution had already been framed. The
Banks' case,(') having drawn the distinction between regulation and simple prohibition, the later
Australian cases began to allow a play for regulation of trade and commerce. There being no machinery for achieving restrictions, reasonable in them·
selve1, restrictions to be valid had to be within the
limits of regulation. Indeed, thie way of justifying
legislation, otherwise restrictive; as regulatory was
being adopted even before the Banks' case, (1 ) and
the Transport cases were all examples of justification of many laws as regulatory. In some Transport
cases, taxes which burdened trade •and commerce
were justified as compensatory being, it was said, &
recompense for the wear and tear of roads. We
/
'
(1) (1948) 76 C.L.R. I, 380, 381.
1968
Autumobil~
Tronsport
(Rajasllicn) Ltd.
\I.
State of Rajasth1111
Bida:111tull"h J.
624
Au!omo"ilt-rrn spo"
(R11ja.ftl1ar1J I•·l.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963J
shall notice these cases briefly, since justification
for the sections impugned here was attempted on
the ground that the provisions wete merely
regulatory or compensatory. We shall examine
these cases as representing two different phases:
Jn blcCarter v. Brodie('), whi<'h wa]l a transport case, t.he High Court of Australia was invited
Ln overrule the 'l'ransport cases and to deolartl that
1.he minority judgments throughout had been right.
The Chief Justice basing himself on the B1inks'
C!tSe (') opined that the Privy Council had finally
decided that laws directly operating upon persons
engaging in inter-State trade and commerce were
not infringements of s. 92 if they were what could
fairly be described as •regulation'. If, however,
they were laws which directly dealt with thP. subject-matter of trnde and commerce and exceeded
regulation and passed into prohibition, they were
invalid. Tho law was thus upheld, but Dixon and
.Fullagar, JJ., dissented.
Then came the decision of the Privy Council
in Ilughe,s and Vale Pty. Ltd. v. State of N.S.J.V. (').
By that deciaion, Rex v. Vizzard (') and all 'l'ransport cases following that decision and the majority
judgment in M cGarter v. Brodie (') were ov1>rruled
and the opinions of Dixon and Fullagar, JJ., in the
la.st mentioned case were upheld. The decision of
the Privy Council in Hughes and ValePty. Ltd. v.
State of N. S. W. (") must be examined a little
closely. All the e$rliest Transport cases were decided after the decision of the Privy Council in James
v. Cowan(') but before James v. 'l'he Gomriwnwealth('}
wa.ij decided. The Riverina case (') and the AuB·
trailan National Ai1'Ways caae (') preceded the
Banks' case ('J and McOarter v. Brodie(') followed
. ~
(1) (1950) 80 C.L.R, 432.
(3) (1955) A.C. 241.
(5) ( 1932) A.C. 542.
\7) (1937) 57 C.L.R. 327.
(2) (1948) 76 C.L.R. J, 380, 381,
(41 ( 1933) SO f'.L.R. 30.
(6) ( 1936) A.C. 579.
(8) (1945) 71 C.L.R, 29•
l S. C. R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
625
it, and then came Hughes and Vale Pty. Ltd. v. St,ate
of N.S. W. (1) from which tho appeal went to the
Privy Council. Leave to appeal in McOarter v.
Brodie (2) was refused.
Before we examine the decision of the Privy
Council, let us recall and re-state the main events
in brief. In James v. South Australia (3), what was
struck down by the High Court a.s a contravention
of s. 92 was the executive determination of
where and in what quantities dried fruit were to be
marketed. In .James v. Cowan ('), the action of
the Minister expropriating the surplus dried fruits
was also held to be a contravention. In James v.
·The Commonwealth (0), it was held that s. 92
bound not only the States but also the Commonwealth. The last case was also generally understood
as laying down that by ''free" was meant freedom
at the frontiers. An extract from the judgment of
Evatt, J., in The King v . .Vizzard (8 J was quoted to
show that freedom did not 'attach itself to each and
every part of transaction, and the other parts were
not free from regulation or control. Then came the
Bank'a case, (7) wh~ch laid down that regulation of
trade, commerce and intercourse among the States
was not incompatible with their absolute freedom,
and that there was a breach of s. 92 only when the
legislature or the executive acted to restrict such
trade, commerce or intercourse directly and
immediately as.distinct from creating some indirect
or consequential impediment, which could only be
was
regarded as remote. Thus, regulation
considered as the antithesis of 'simple prohibition'.
The Transport oases involved a.Jmost always:
(i) a licensing system of motor transport
vehicles by a Board;
(I) (195S) A. C. 241.
(!!) (1927) 40 C.L.R 1.
(2) [1950] 80 C.L.R. 432.
C4l (1932) A. C 542.
(5) (1936) A. C. S78.
(6) <1933) 50 C.L.R. SO.
(7} (1948) 76 C.L.R. 1, 380, 381.
..,
(
1962
Automohil•
1 ra11spo1t
(Rajasthan} Lid,
v.
Stale of Ra.jiuChaa
'
626
Automobile
Tranaport
(H.ajastkan) Ltd.
••
State of Rajas1ht1n
Hidoyatulloh J •
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963]
(ii) a discretion to tile Board to grant a
licence or not;
(iii) a payment of a licence fee which had a
maximum limit;
and
(iv) sometimes a mileage charge as in O'
Gilpitt'B case (1 ) •
How were these cases affected by the pronouncement of the Privy Council ? The earlier view that
The King v. Vizzard (') was approved by the Privy
Council in James v. The Commonwealth(') fell to the
ground when the Privy Council in the Bank's
case (') abjured this. There was also the approval
given to the Australian National Airways case ('),
to which we have referred. The implications of this
approval had also to be considered. These questions
arose before the High Court in Mc Carter v.
Brodie ('). In that case, the Transport Regulation
Acts, 1933-47 provided for licensing of commercial
goods vehicles by a Board with discretionary powers
and for payment of a fee. The effect of the Bank'&
case upon the Transport cases was urged, and it was
contended that they must be overruled, but the
majority applying Rex v .Vizzard (') and the Riverina
case ('I held the law to he valid. Dixon and
Fullagar, JJ., however dissented. In describing
what was held by these learned Judges, we shaII
borrow their language, as was also done by the Privy
Council.
According to Dixon, J., the Banks' case (')
had proved wrong three propositions, and they
were:
(1) thats. 92 did not guarantee freedom
of the individual;
(2) 'that' if the same volume of trade
(I) (1935) 52 C.L.R.189.
(3) {1936J A.C. 578.
(S) (194S) 71C.L.R.29.
(2) (1933) 50 C.L.R. 30.
(4) (1948) 76 C'.L.R. I, 380, 381.
(6) (1950) 80 C.L.R. 432.
(7) (1937) 501C.L,R,327.
••
•
••
I
;
I
lS.C.R.
SUPREME COlJRT REPORTS
627
flowed from State to State before as after the
interference with individual trader then the
freedom of trade among the States remained
unimpaired.'
(3) that because a law applied ~like to
inter-State commerce and to domestic commerce of a State, it might escape objection notwithstanding that it prohibited, restricted or
burdened inter-State commerce.
Next, according to him two further points were
settled by the Bank's case: {1 ).
(1) That the object or purpose of an Act
challenged as contrary to s. 92 w~s to be
ascertained from what was enacted and consisted in the necessary leg.1.1 effect of the Jaw
itself and not in its ulterior effect socially or
economica,lly; and
(2) that the doctrine of 'pith and substance' though of help to find out whether it
was nothing but a regulation of a class of
transactions forming part of a trade and commerce was beside the point when the law
amounted ·to a prohibition or the question of
regulation could· not fairly arise.
According to Dixon, J., the Transport cases involved
a pragmatical solution. The main reason of the
error according to him was that trade and commerce
was treated •as a sum of activities' and "the interState commercial activities of the individual, and
his right to engage in them were ignored", and much
importance was attached to absence of discrimination against inter-State trade considered as a whole.
Dixon, J., then added to the five points a sixth, viz.,
''the distinction taken between, on the one hand,
motor vehicles as integers of traffic, and, on th~
other hand, the trade of carrying by motor vehicle
(1)
(1948] 76 C.L.R. I, 380, 381.
Automobile
Transpo't
(R•jasthan) Lid,
v.
Stare rj Rajarthan
Hidayatullah J.
ll28
1962
A.uto-nnhil1
Tnr•up(11t
( R•jaslhan) Ltd,
v.
Statt ofi Rajasl~an
Hidayatullah J.
St'PRE1"1E COURT REPORTS [1963]
as part of commerce." This distinction, aooording
to him, was not valid.
Fullagar, J., in a concurring judgment drew a
good picture of how a regulation by its severity
cvuld become a prohibition. He observed that
though traffic regulationR and even licensing· of
motor vehicles including commercial vehicles could
be said uot to cross the line of regulation but both
had to be reasonable so as not to impair the free·
dom. And the same could be said also about licence
fees, etc. which had to be reasonable and nondiscriminatory, lest they passed from regulation
into what the Privy Council called simple prohibi·
tion. The majority opinion, of course, prevailed
but not for long.
The case of Hughes and Vale Pty. Ltd. v. State
of N. S. W. (')came after McCarter v. Brodie(').
The Hiµh Court followed the earlier decision, but
Dixon, C.J., ob8erved :
" ...... to my mind the distinction appears
both clear and wide between, on the one
hand, such levies and such provisions prohibiting transportation without licence as the
foregoing and on the other hand the regulations and registrations of motor traffic using
the roads and the imposition of registration
fees. In the same way the distinction is wide
between such provisions and the use of a
system of licensing to ensure that motor
vehicles used for the conveyance of passengers
or goods for reward conform with specified
conditions affecting the safety and efficiency
of the service offered and do not injure the
highways by excessive weight or immoderate
use or interfere with the use of the highways
by other traffic. The validity of such laws
must depend upon the question whether t.hey
(I) [1955] A.C. 241.
(2) [1950] 80 C.L.R. 432.
IS.C.R.
'
,I •
.i,. .
SUPREM:E COURT REPORTS
629
impose a real bnrden or restriction upon
inter-State traffic".
When the case reached the Privy Council, it
was contended that where the tax was on the movement itself, the tax could not be regarded as regulatory and the reasons in the judgments of Dixion,
C.J., and Fullagar, J., were urged. This wa accPpted-by the Privy Council. On the other side, it was
contended that the provisions which were State-wide
were regulatory and were impot-< d on all vehicles,
and the effect on inter-State trade or commerce was indirect or consequential. This was not
accepted. Even the other side conceded that :
"the imposition of charges in respect of
vehicles used on inter-State journeys would
infringe section 92 if the charges (a) discriminated against inter-State road transport or
vehicles engaged therein; (b) were imposed at
such a rate as to be prohibitive of inter-State
road transport, whether alone or in common
with all road transport".
The Privy Council pointed out that in the
'l'ransport cases, (1) sufficient weight was not given
to Jarnes v. Cowan (2 ), where determinations of executive in its discretion were said to be invalid. It
accepted the six propositions of Dixon, J., and
followed the unusual practice of quoting in extenso
the opinions of Dixon and Fullagar, JJ., in
M cCarter v. Brodie (3 ) and expreEsed them as their
own. The Board overruled the Transport cases, and
observed:
'•In their opinion it follows that if the
validity of the Transport Act is to be
established in the present case, it can only be
upon the ground that the restrictions contained . therein are 'reguhtory' in the sense in
whwh that word is used in the Bank case."
(!) [1938) 57 C.L.R. 327.
(2) [1932) A.C. 542.
(3) [1950] 80 C.L.R.. 432,
196Z
Autnmobilt
Tra.,sport
(Ryasthan) Ltd.
v.
State of Rajasthan
H idayatullah J.
630
19~2
.A.utomobi/t
Tran porl
(R•jasthan) Ltd.
v.
State of R•Jasthan
Hidayatullah J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963]
We now come to the last phase. The distinction between laws which merely regulate and those
that restrict or prohibit having thus been established at the cost of all the Transport cases except
Willard v. Rawson ('), a new method was adopted
by the Australian Legislatures. Wynes in "Legislative Executive anq Judicial Powers in Australia"
(1956), tells us th11.t the transport legislation was
amended by four of the States and the amended law
was challenged in several cases! We shall not
trouble ourselves with them or with those in which
lawB in bar of claims arising out of the decision of
the Privy Council were considered, but must draw
attention to the difference between "regulation"
and "restriction'' made in Hughe,s and Vale Pty Ltd.
v. The St,ate of New South Wales [No. 2] (').
For the present purpose, however, we borrow the
following summary, inadequate though it is, form
Wynes:
"Speaking of 'regulation', their Honours
said that sec. 92 of course assumed that the
transactions protected would be carried out in
accordance with the general law ; merely
because a transaction was a part of inter-State
trade, commerce or intercourse, the persons
engaging in it were not excluded from the
operation of that law. What was precluded
were restrictions of a rea.J character preventing or obstructing the dealing across the border or the inter-State passage or interchange.
There was !\ clear distinction in conception
between laws interfering with freedom to
carry out the very activity constituting inter·
State trade and Jaws imposing on those
angaged therein rules of proper conduct or
other restraints directed to the due and orderly manner of carrying it out. This distinction
was naturally described as 'regulation', a word
(I) [1933] 48 C.L.R- Sl6.
(2) [1955] 93 C.L.R. 125 159-162.
1 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
631
of anything but fixed legal import which
differed according to the nature of the thing
to which it applied. Perhaps the true solution
in any given case could be found by distinguishing between the features of the activity in
virtue of which it fell within the category of
trado, commerce and intercourse among the
States and those features which, though invariably found to occur in some form or another
in the activity, were not essential to the
conception."
It was pointed out also that under the guise of what
may legitimately be regulation, real burdens and
restrictions could be placed.
There was a divergence of opinion again over
the question of licence charges and registration
fees. The ma_jority was prepitre<l to sustain charges
if imposed "as a real attempt to fix a. reasonable
recompense or c')mpensation for the use of the
highwa:v and for a contribution to the wear and tear
which the vehicle may be expected to make.'' The
minority thought that (except for a fee for a specific
service) no chargAs could be levied. In two cases
viz., Nilson v. The State of South Australia (1) and
Pioneer Tou,rist Coaches Pty. Ltd. v. The State of
Smtth Australi:a (2 ), it was held that a State could
not require commercial motor vehicles to register
and pay a fee exc3eding mere administrative charges.
There i<i vet anot.her line of cases
recently decid~d · in Australia.
The taxing
of commercial vehicles employed in inter-State
or intra-State transport has been
justified
in some cases on th•} ~rn1md that such taxes
are compensatory, and the tax is a recompense for the wear and tear of roads. In Armstrong
v. The State, of Victoria, [No. 2] (3 ), Part II of the
(I) [19551 93 C'.L.R 292.
(2) (1955] 93 C.L.R. 3()7.
(3) [1957199 C.L.R. 2~;
Automr,bil•
T,.m,>011
(Rojastn~n) Ltd.
v.
State of Rajosthan
Hidayatu/lah J,
632
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963)
Commercial Goods Vehicles Act, 1955 (Victoria.) was
challenged.
'l'hat Act required the owner of every
Automol>il1
Trans/lorl
commercial vehicle of load capacity exceeding four
(liaja'1/u.n) Lid.
tons to pay compensation for the wear and tear
S ..t«of Rojullla
ca.nsed to the roads. There was a. schedule under
which th11 payment was determined. Every vehicle
Hidayatulln S.
pa.id one-third of & penny per ton of the sum of-(a)
the tare weight of the vehicle and ( b) forty per cent
Qf the load capacity of the vehicle- per mile of
public highway along which the vehicle travelled
in Victoria. The receipts were paid to the credit
of a special account and applied solely for the
maintenance of the highway. This law was upheld
under s. 92 by a narrow majority of 4 to 3 in its
application to inter-State trade. In the same, case,
R. 3 of the Motor Car Act, 1951 (Viet.), which levied
fees on a motor car used for carrying goods for hire
or in the course of tra.ile according to the powerweight and varyinjl according to the numher of
wheels and types of tyres etc., was upheld by a
majority of 6 to 1. The main reasun given was what
these payments served to maintain roads at a
standard by which inter-State operations of trade,
commerce and intercourse were improved. It was,
however, said that the charge must not be more
than a fair recompense for the actual use of the
road~. l\IcTierman. J., relied on a passage in Adam
Rmith's "The Wealth of Nationals", where public
works as roads, bridges, etc. are discussed al! facilities of commerce.
••
The question was again considered in rom-
monwealth Freighters Pty. LU],. v. Sneddon('), where
the Roar! Maintenance (Contribution) Act, 1958
(N. S. W.) which imposed upon owners of commercial goods vehicles 4 road charge at a rate per mile
was upheld. It will thus appear that tax IE>gislation
in Australia has now to resort to the creation of a
S•'parate fond to which State collections have to go
(I) [1959] l02 C.L.R. 280.
•
•
I S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
633
ear-marked for the maintenance of roads and to
provide elaborate criteria. for determining the
amount payable. On this subject as well as on the
subject of regulations as described by Fullagar, J.,
ia McOarter v. Brodie (l), the law for the time
being seems settled.
H"ving dealt with the historical background
of the Constitution, the possible models which were
consl<lered in the drafting of Part XIII, we procP.ed
to consider the three views expressed in the
Atiabari Tea Company case (2). These views are not
sharply divided. The majority accept!I the view
expressed by the learned Chief Just.ice, but goes
beyond it, while Shah, J., accepts the views of the
majority but goes still further. The main question
that arose then as it has arisen here, is : Do taxation laws come within the reach of Art. 301 ? Now,
it cannot be laid down as a general proposition that
all ta'<es are hit by that Article. We have shown
a.hove that the financial independence of the States
was secured by an elaborate division of heads of
taxation, which were well-thought out to provide
tne Rhtes with the means of independent existR.nce
and the wherewithal of nation-building activities.
There is hardly any tax which tho Stat.es are antho·
rised to colleet which coulu not be said to fall on
traders. Property t·u, sales tax, municipal taxes,
electricity taxes (to mention only a few) are paid
by traders as well ris by non-traders. To say that.
all these taxPs arf\ so many restrictions upon t.he
freedom of t.ran~, commerce and intercourse is to
make the entire Constitutional document subordi·
nate to trade and commerce. Since it is axiomatie
that all taxes which a tradeflman pays must burden
him, any tax which t•Juches him must fall within
Art. 304, if the word ''restriotion" is given such a
wide m~aning. Evel'y such legislation will then be
within the pleasure of the President, and this could
(l)
[19'.iOJ no
c L.R. 432.
(2) [1961] I. S.C.R. :lOC!.
1962
Automobile
Transpcrl
Rajast11 •n Ltd.
v.
~tale of Ril; asthan
Hida;votul/ah J.
-
634
/962
.Automobile
TranBport
(Raiaslhan) Ltd·
v.
State of Rajasthan
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963)
not have been intended. "Restriction" must, there·
fore, mean something more than a mere tax burden.
In our opinion, the issue of taxation cannot be
made justiciable with reference to Art. 301 in those
cases where the tax is a. general tax which a. trader
pays in common with others. We would, therefore,
respectfully disagree with the view of Shah, J.,
when he holds :
"Not merely discriminative tariffs restric·
ting movement of goods a.re included in the
restrictions which are bit by Article 301, but
all taxation on commercial intercourse even
imposed as a measure for collection of revenue
is so hit. Between di~r.riminatory ta.riffs and
trade barriers on the one hand and taxation
for raising revenue on commercial intercourse,
the difference is one of purpose and not of
yuality. Both these forms of burdens on
commercial intercour~e trench upon the free·
<lorn guaranteed by Artinle 301."
That a. tax is a. restriction when it is placed
upon a. trade directly and immediately may be
admitted. But there is difference between a tax
wbieh burdens a. trader in this manner and a tax,
which being general, is paid by tradesmen in
common with others. The first is a levy from the
trade by reason of its being trade, the other is
levied from all, and tradesmen pay it because
every one ha.a to pay it. There is a vital difference
hetwe~n the two, viewed from the angle of freedom
o! trade and commerce. The first is an impost on
trade as sueh, and may be said to restrict it; the
second may burden the trader, but it is not a •restriction' of the trade. To refuse to draw such a distinc.
tion would mean that there is no taxing entry in
Lists I and II which is not subject to Arts. 301 and
304, however general the tax and however nondiscriminatory its imposition. To bring all the taxes
within the reach of Art. 301 and thus to bring them
1 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
635
also within the reach of Art. 304 is to overlook the
concept of a Federation, which allows freedom of
action to the States, subject, however, to the needs
of the unity of India. Just as unity cannot be
allowed to be frittered away by insular aotion,
the existence of separate States is not to be
sacrificed by a
fusion
beyond what the
C,onstitution envi1mges. No doubt, Part XIII ensures economic unity to India and combines the
federating States into the larger State called India.
The Constitulion also permits independent powers
of taxation. What the Constitution does not permit is that trade, commerce and intercourse should
be rendered 'unfree'. Trade and commerce remain
free even when general taxes are paid by tradesmen in common with non-tradesmen. The question
whether a tax offends Part XIII can only arise
when it seeks to tax trade, commerce and intercourse. Support for the contrary proposition is
not to be found in James v. The Commonwealth (1 )
The Privy Council in James v. The Commonwealth ( 1)
did not lay down:
"Every step in the series of operations
which constitutes the particular transaction
is an act of trade, and control under the
State law of a.ny of these steps must be an
interference with its freedom as trade." (p.
629)
The paesage represents the view held in McArthur's
case (1 ). That case wa1:1 disapproved at p. 631.
We have already dealt with this view at some
length.
Thus, taxation laws and taxes must be divided into two kinds. Taxes which, are general and
for revenue purposes which fall on those engaged
in trade, commerce and intercourse in the same
way a!\ they fall on others not so engaged cannot
{l) (1'361 A.C. 578.
(2) (1920) 28 C.L.R. S!JO.
1901
..4.utomobile
Transport
(Rajasthsn) Ltd.
v.
Stat• of .Rajasl'han
636
Jf61
Aui.rirabiu
Transp.rl
(R<fia.s1h,.) Ltd.
••
Stall •f Rajas1h..
Hid4.1a-ullah .T,
SUPREME OOURT REPORTS [1963]
normally be within the reach of Part XIII. A
motor transport owner cannot claim that be will
not pay property tax in respect of his garage buildings or electricity tax for the electricity he consumes in lighting them, or income.tax on his profits.
Part XIII has nothing to do with such taxes even
though they fall upon tradesmen.
But this is not to say that we accept the vie~
that all taxes or taxing laws are outside the reach
of Part XIII. We find ourseives unable to accept
the argument that there must be a discernible
point in the operations of trade, commerce and
intercourse at which the tax becomes a barrier to
the freedom of the movement of trade before it
will offend the freedom guaranteed. This argument
considers the subject of freedom in terms of barriers, tariff walls and imposts, erected in the way
of the free flow of trade, commerce and intercourse.
Of course, if the tax does create b11rriers, tariff
walls and imposts at some discernible point, the
rastriction is easy to detect. But restrictions may
be diverse, subtle and disguised, and a tax may
be a direct and immediate restriction witho~t ap
pearing to be so at a particular point in the move·
ment of trade. A law which prohibits trade, commerce and intercourse and releases them on the
fulfilment of some unreasonable condition including
the payment of an unreasonable or discriminatory
tax will just as much be a restriction offending
the freedom as a tariff wall or any other barrier.
No question of pith and substance in thi11 context
arises, as was pointed out by the Priyy Council
in the Banks' case. The nature of the tax and its
relation to trade, commerce and intercourse are
the mat ten to consider.
In trying to establish that taxation entries
are entirely outside the reach of Part XIII, it is
contended that Part XII, which deals with taxa-
r
I
1 S.C.R.
SUPR.EME COURT REPORTS
637
tion, is a code by itself and taken with the Legislative Lists, lays down the power of taxation which
ca.nnot be ta.ken away by the pr whions of Part
XIII. The power of taxation is, therefore, said
to be not subject to the declaration of freedom in
Art. 301. The imposition of a tax is c0nditionecl
on the existence of a law. Article 265 lays down
that ••no tax shall be levied or collected except
by authority of law". Article 301 is a curb on
the law-ma.king power, because by the unambiguous declaration contained in it, the freedom of
trade, commerce and intercourse is secured. The
prohibition is addressed not only to the Executive
but also to the Legislature, because Arts. 302 and
304 lift the ban which has been imposed in favour
of action by law made by Parliament and the State
Legislatures respectively. Article 301 expressly
mentions the power to impose taxes which must
include at least excise duties and sales tax, and
from this, aleo, it is quite clear that taxation is
within the prohibition contained in Part XIII.
This argument was also rejected by the majority
in Atiabari Tea Oqmpany case (1), and we respectfulJy agree.
Before, however, a tax can 1-:e struck down,
the incidence of the tax and the method of its
collection must be examined, If the tax falls upon
trade, commerce and intercourse as such, irrespective of whether it falls on trade viewed as a
who1e or upon individual traders, and restricts th~
freedom guaranteed, a question will immediately
arise about the legality of the tax. In this C·Onnection, even trade not in motion and more so
trade in mot.ion will be protected unless the law,
if ma.de by Par1iament is in the public interest, and
if made by the Sta.ta Legislature it is reaso:iably in the public interest and the previous sanction of the President has been obtained. What
we have said about taxation and taxes is also
(1) (1961) 1. S.C.R. 809.
'f
1962
.Automobile
Transport
(Raj2Sthon) Lil.
v.
State of Rajasthat1
Hidayatull.1.h J.
638
1962
Auromcbil 1
Trans/nrl
(!iaja~tlznn) Lid.
v.
Stat1 of Rajasrtzan
Hid·J.1U.!u/lall J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1963)
true of other restrictions though not of a pecuniary
character. A restriction from whatever source it
may proceed, must be backed by law made in the
manner indicated and the law must comply equally
with those conditions. It may be stated there
that it is not open under Part XIII to rourts to
devfo<~ their own technique for exempting patent
and palpabh interferences with the freedom of
trade and commerce. In th~ Australian Constitution, there was no machinery for determining
what freedom of trade, commerce and intercourse
meaut; in given circumstances, and the Courts
stepped in with its own interpretation of s. 92 of
the Commonwealth of Australia Act. In our
Constitution, many problems which a.gitated the
Australian High Court have been obviated, and in
so far as restriction of the freedom is concerned,
it can only be achieved by law made in the public
iutncst and in the minner indicated. In so far
as State legislation is concerned, the law must be
reasonably in the public interest, and the sanction
of the President must be obtained. Thus, the
President in the first instance and finally the
courts will be the judges of the reasonableness of
the restriction and the existence of public interest.
Part XIII, which has created the freedom,
has thus also shown the way for restricting the
freedom. Tho Privy Council in the Banh' case (1)
obsen·ed:
"If these two teats are applied : first
whether the effect of the Act is in a particular respect direct or remote; and secondly,
wheth!lr in its true charact·er it is regulatory,
the area of dispute may be considerably
narrower."
This mav be true where the law attempts ti) regulate freedom but not true where the law re.stricts
(I) [1978] 76. C.L.R. T, 3RO, 381,
1 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
639
freedom. 'rhere is a real difference between
regulation and restriction. Traffic rules are
regulations, not restrictions. Trade, commerce
and intercourse are regulated so that they
may flow freely. The rule of the road is
not a restriction of commercial traffic, but
is one <lesigned to make the flow of traffic
smooth. The prescription that cars should have
reliable brakes or lights or a sound device are not
restrictions of trade. These regulations are needed both for ensuring safety for those engaged in
traffic as also for securing that every one engaged
in traffic might equally enjoy that right. The
classification of heavy transport vehicles, the tare
weight, the kinds of tyres they must have, the seating capacity of buses and ·so on a.nd so forth are
not normally restrictions of trade, commerce and
inter<>ourse but are meant for the better and more
effective flow of trade, commerce and intercourse. Such laws can not be viewed as restrictions at all, and do not come within the freedom angle, nor do they require the process under
which freedom can be curtailed. Just as a tax of
a general character payable by all and sundry and
not placed upon a trade directly and immediately
cannot be considered as a restriction of trade even
though it burdens a trader, so also regulations of trade
without hampering it or impairing its freedom cannot
be described as restrictions. A regulation, when it
ceases to be a regulation and becomes a prohibition may require justification as a reasonable restriotion. Fullagar, J., in Mc Oart,er v. Brodie (1)
pointed out that a regulation of speed on the high
ways does not offend the freedom guaranteed, but
a rule that commercial vehicles should travel at one
miles per hour ceases to be regulation and becomes
a restriction. Here, the question is not one of
degree but of the essence of the purpose. The
technique of justifying laws as regulatory was
(I) [1950] 80 C.L.R. 432,
190%
.Auwmobi/1
Transport
(Rajasthan) Ltd.
v.
State of Rajtislhan
Hidoyatult.11 J,
6(0
19&2
Ai.tent oUile
T,atisporl
(Rajasthan) Ltd.
v.
Stale of Rajusthan
HidaytJfullah J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963)
evolved in Australia in view of the intractable
language of s. 92 without Bny indiC'ation
of the circumstances in which the absolute
freedom could be curtailed. The detailed pro·
visions contained in Part XIII render such a
construction of Art. 301 at once unnecessary
and impermissible.
Let us now see whether the validity of taxa·
tion laws directly impinging on trade and com·
merce can be upheld on the ground that they are
- regulatory. Here, a distinction must be made
between fees and taxes. Fees charged as quid pro
quo for services rendered or as representing administrative charges are quite different from taxes,
pure and 3imple. Fees may partake of regulation
when they are demanded to enable Government to
meet the cost of administration. But the tax,
with which we are concerned, is hardly a fee in
that narrow sense. It is a tax for raising revenue.
Of such a tax, Lord Watson asked the question:
"Do you regulate a man when you tax him ?" As
was pointed out by Lord Herschell during the
arguments in the .Uquor Prohibition Appeal 1895 (1)
in a passage which we have quoted earlier, the
matter may be looked at in two ways. Lord
Herschell observed:
"May it not be necessary to regard it
fr(lm this point of view, to find what is within
regulation of trade and commerce, what is
the object and scope of the legislation ? Is
it some public object which incidentally
involves some fetter on trade or commerce
or is it the dealing with trade and commerce
for the purpose of regulating it ? May it not
be that, in the former case, it is not a regulation of trade and commerce, while in the
(I) [1896] A.C. 348.
r
1 S.C.R~
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
641
latter it is, though in tach case trade and
commerce in a sense may be affected?"
'
---!
In our judgment, the first test to apply is
what is the object and scope of the legislation?
A regulation of trade and com?lerce may achieve
some public purpose which affects trade and
commerce incidentally but without impairing the
freedom. Sometimes, however, the regulation itself may amount to a restriction, and if such a
stage is reached, then under our Constitution the
restriction must be reasonably in the public inter·
est, and the Presjdent's prior sanction must be
. obtained, if the law imposing such restriction is
made by the State Legislature. If, however, it
does not reach the stage of restriction of trade and
remains only a regulation incidentally touching
·trade and commerce, the regulation is outside the
operation of Arts. 301 and 304. · It is on this
ground that laws prescribing the rule of the road
and like provisions already referred to as well as
a regulation that the height to which trucks may
be loaded must be such as not to endanger the
overhead bridges or wires, do not h'3.ve to go
before the President, since they do hot affect the
freedom guaranteed. The object of such laws cannot be regarded as a. restriction of trade and commerce. Freedom in Art. 301 does not mean
anarchy. Similarly, a demand for a tax from
traders in common with others is not a restriction
of their right to oarry on trade and commerce. A
system of licensing of motor vehicles is a. regulation,
but does not impair the freedom of trade and
commerce unless the licensing is made to depend
upon arbitrary discretion of the licensing authority. Similarly, a fee for administrative purposes may also be viewed as a pa.rt && regulation.
Such licensing and fees fall outside Art. 301, because
they cannot be viewed as restrictions, and therefore do not need to be processed under Art. 304.
1111
.,{uJomobilf
Transflor&
(Iajasllum) Lltl.
v.
Slal1 of Bajast/lan
Hidaralull.A J •
642 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963]
1962
A.ut<Jmobil1
Transpor~
lR•Jasthan) lt11.
v.
S/fJlt of Rajastli""
H idayatultah .f .
Such regulations are designed to give equal opportunity to everyone, subject to a certain standar<l.
The object being a public object, such regulations
cannot be questioned unless they amount to restrictions. A tax, however, which is made the
condition precedent of the right to enter upon
and carry on businl"ss at all is a very different
matter. It is a restriction on the right to carry
on trade and commerce, and the restriction is
released on the payment of the tax, which is the
price of such release. It is from this point of
view th·it the impugned provisions in this case
must be examined.
We have to examine the precise nature of the
tax imposed, which has to be gathering from the
charging section read with the Schedules, and the
plain question is whether so read, there can be said
to be anything other than a tax on a trader and
on his activity as a trader. The Act consists of
24 sections, and 4 Schedules. Section 4( I) which
imposes the tax is the charging section and has,
on its terms, to be read with each of the Schedules
to the Act. Apa.rt from the usual sections generally found in every taxing measure such as prescribing the time the tax has to be paid, cases in
which refund may be had, declarations which have
to be made, and provisions for recovery of tax,
appeals, etc. there are provisions for penalties and
for compounding. There is one other provision,
to which attention may be drawn and that i1 e. 20,
which reads:
"20. Levy of toll on certain bri.dges.'Notwithetanding anything contained in this
Act it shall be lawful for the Government to
levy tolls on motor vehicles under any law
or usage for the time being in force, such
rates as it may from time to time fix(i) for the use of any bridges, or
,
l S.C.R.
SUPREME COUR'I1 H.EPORTS
643
(ii) on any bridge constructed, recomitru•Jted or rep..1.ired after the commencement
of this Act."
The four Schedules, as their headings amply
show, deal with differe11t subjects. t>chedule I iH
divided into two parts A and B. They deal with
the subjects indicated in tho headings.
"A. Vehicles (other than Transport
Vehicles plying for hire or required) if fitted
solely with pneumatic tyres.
B. If the above motor vehicles arc
fitted with resilient or non-resilient tyre",
extra tax: will be levied at 5% of tho above
rate."
Part A is then divided into three sections dealing
with different classes of vehicles and prescribe
different rates for each such class. We are not
at present concerned with vehicles which are not
used as transport vehicles plying for hire. Schedule
II is also divided into two parts dealiag respectively with vehicles fitted with pneumatic tyres
and vehicles not so fitted. The first part' deals
with two categories marked respectively "A" and
"B". "A" comprises motor vehicles plying for
hire for the conveyance of passengers and light
personal luggage of passengers, while "B" com·
prises goo<ls vehicles plying under .Public Carrier's
Permit. There are further sub-divisions in each
category "A" and ' 1 B'' according to the seating
capacity of the vehicles on the basis of which
different rates of tax are imposed, but it is not
necessary to go into their details.
Schedule III comprises goods vehicles registered outside the State using roads in Rajasthan,
and they are required to pay a tax ca.foulated at a
specified sum per day. Schedule IV is headed:
"Vehicles used for the carriage of goods
1962
Automobile
Transpo•t
( Rajasthun) Lid.
v.
S,ate of Hajastha11
Hidayatu/lah J.
644
J96Z
Aulomobi/1
TrcnJport
(b•iasth,.) Lti
..
St1J1 of R"jasthan
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963]
in connection with a trade or business carried on by the owner of the vehicle under a
Private Carrier's Permit."
These vehicles are again classified according
to the kind of tyres with which they are fitted as
well as by their load capacity and different amounts of tax are payable by each class. Part II of
this Schedule specified the tax payable by dealers
in or manufacturers of motor vehicle, which is
described as a payment "for a general licence"
dependent upon the number of vehicles which
they manufacture or deal in.
From the above analysis, it will be seen that
the tax in Schs.II to IV is laid upon trade and
commerce directly and immediately. It cannot be
described as a property tax. Motor Vehicles employed by a trader for transport of passengers and
goods are integers of trade and commerce. The
tax is not like the property tax which a transport
operator pays on buildings employed by him in
his business. There, the tax is payable also but
not as a condition precedent to the business. The
tax, with which we are concerned, is one directly
and immediately laid on trade and commerce and
also on trade and commerce in movement. In
this connection, Sch. I and Part II of Sch. IV need
not be considered for we are dealing with motor
vehicles used as integers of trade and commerce.
The tax is evidently not a fee for administrative
purposes; therefore, it cannot be justified as representing payment for services. Its object is the
raising of revenue, which distinguishes a tax from a
fep.
We may next consider whether the tax can
be justified as regulatory or compensatory, For
thi11 purpose, some facts mu9t be stated. The
11ppel!ants are three. They owned buses which
were registered in
the former State of
I S.C.R.
•
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
645
Ajmer. They plied on diverse routes. There
was one route. Nasirabad to Deoli, which
lay mainly in Ajmer State, but it crossed narrow
strips of the territory of Rajasthan. Another route,
Ajmer to Kishengarh, was substantially in the
Ajmer State, one-third of which was only in Rajasthan. Kishengarh was, at the material time, a part
of Rajasthan. The appellants were required to
charge fares prescribed by the Ajmer authorities,
and could not change them to cover extra expenditure in the shape of taxes, which they had to bear
in Rajasthan. Formerly, there was an agreement
between the Ajmer State and Kishengarh State,
by which either State did not charge any tax or fees
on vehicle registered in the respective States. Later,
Kishengarh became a part of Rajasthan, and the
tax was demanded from these appellants for the
period, Aprill, 1951, to March 31, 1954. The demand was made by virtue of s. 4, the charging section, under pain of the application of s. 11, which
provides of penalties.
The taxes, which are imposed by tlchs. II, III
and IV(I), operate on trade and commerce directly.
It is not denied that the carriage of passengers and
goods amounts to trade. It was, in fact, so help in
the Transport cases in Australia and also by the
Privy Council. Under the Act, this trade can only
be carried on, if the tax is paid. The Act, therefore,
involves a prohibition against a trade, which prohibition is ruleased on payment of tax. The Schedules
affect motor vehicles for carriage of passengers and
goods on hire in Rajasthan and also similar vehicles
coming from outside. In so far as vehicles coming
from outside are concerned, their entry into the
State is barred unless the tax is paid. The tax is
thus not incidental to trade but is directly on it and
is on its movement. This i1 not tax which the trader
ha1 to bear in common with other!, and the tax is
1962
Automniile
Tr•nsport
(Rojas h•n) Lt«.
y
Stah 1f Roj osthcn
HdoyJtullch J.
646
196Z
"-utomobil6
Transp01'l
(Raj.,thon) Ltd,
v.
Stat1 of Hojasthan
Hidayatultah J.
SUPREME'OOURT REPORTS [1963]
for revenue purposes. This is a case in which if the
tax is not paid, the trade is destroyed.
The charging provisions do not take into account what dis·
tanae a particular veb.icle travels within the State.
A vehicle travelling a hundred miles and another
travelling only one mile have to pay an identical sum
as tax. How then can it be said that it involves a
fair recompense for the wear and tear of roads? To
say that such tax is compensatory and is a recompense for the wear and tear of the roads is to misdescribe it. Section ~O, which we quoted earlier,
may be compensatory for use of a hl'idge and may
even be described a:; regulatory within the decision
of Fullagar, J ., in J.li cGarter v. Brodie (1) but not
the taxing provisions which even in Austmlia would
not be regarded either as compensatory or regulatory. It is impossible, therefore, to turn to the
Australian precedents for help.
l!'urther, the duty of maintaining roads is a
duty of the State, and it performs it not from any
special fund which is created from the receipt of
these taxes but from its gPneral funds. The wear
a:1d tear of the roads is not caused by the transport
vehicles only but other vehicles not employed
in the trade of transport. The tax which is levied
is not based on any theory of recompense, which
has been evolved in Australia. There, the distance
travelled, the load carried are taken into account,
and a charge is payable by each operator according
to the distanc" actually travelled by him in con8onance with the weight c:arried. A further circumstance which goes into the determination of the
amount payable is the kind of tyres and the number
of wheels which the vehicle has. To say that the impugned tax is compensatory without any attempt
to apportion the charge e.ccording to the achual wear
and tear, is to borrow a theory for justification,
which does not apply to the facts here.
(I)
[l9SOJ UO C.L·R. 432.
•
l.S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
64 7
The only other question is whether the Act is,
in its true character, regulatory. There is no provision in the Act which can be regarded ~s regulatory of motor vehicles or their use. The Act plainly
levies a. tax upon the possession or use of motor
vehicles. A tax does not regulate trade ordinarily;
it imposes a charge on trade. The question thus
remains: does the tax burden trade or impair the
free flow of trade and commerce aa contemplated
Art: 301? It is clear that the tax is on trade. It is
also clear that it is on t.he movement of trade. It
is further clear that it creates a barrier between one
State and another, which trade cannot cross except
on a heavy payment. The tax is not truly a fair
recompense for wear and tear of roads even if a
juetification on the doctrine of compensatory taxes
is applied. It is nothing except a restriction, which
Art. 301 forbids. Tbe Rill wliich beeame the Act,
was not submitted to the President for his previous
sanction, nor was it assented to sub1:1equently after
it passed the Legislature. The question, therefore,
whether t,he restriction imposed by the Act is reasonable or not, does not arise.
We are-, therefore, of opinion that s. 4(1) as
read with :-)chs. II, III and Part I of Sch. IV offen·
ds Art. 301 of the Constitution, and as resort to the
procedure prescribed by Art. 30!(b) was not t.aken,
it is ultra vire~ the Constitution. We wish to make
it clear that we pronounce no opinion about the
constitutional valiJity of s. 4( 1) as read with Sch. I
or the . wcoud P<1.rt of Sch. IV. The first raises a
q11estion as to the meaning of the expression ''intercourse" in Part XIII and as tha.t matter is not
relevant for the appr·al before us, and thus no arguments were heard on that point, we refrain from
expressing any opi11ion on it. The second involves
many ot.her questions, which a.re far remote from
the controversy with which we are now concerned,
and therefore need not be considered here.
1962
Aulomobile
TranspOt't
( Rajaslhan) Ltt.
v,
Stat1 of Rajasthan
Hiday tul/ah J.
648
19oi
.A.utomoln'l1
Transport
(RaJJSthan) Ltd.
v.
State of Rajasth1n
Hidayc.tull ih J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963]
We would, therefore, allow the appeals, and
quash the demand made upon the appellants .
• _,.
BY CoURT: In accordance with the opinion of
the majority, these appeals are dismissed with costs
'
one hearing fee.
Appwl dismisaed.
'
-i962
Apil 11,
RADHAKRISHNADAS
ti,
KALURAM
(A. K. SARKAR, K. SuBBA RAo and
J. R. MuDHOLKAR, JJ.)
•
•
Hindu Law-J<in.t f~n,ily p•~plrly-Sale by fatl"r and
minor son-Whel~.er b1.nd111g on ~mo; sor:- ~egal nec'8sily /Jr
part of sale consideration-If alienatwn ,iu.0 tified- Inttrpretic'lt
of sale deed-If transfers cultivatory right• in Sir also-0. P.
Tenancy Act,-1920 (0. P. 1of1920), s. 49 (1).
R and his father executed a sale for Rs. 50,000/· transferring 16 annas in~rrcs~ in two villages belonging to the joint
family "together with sir and khudkashat lands ........ as well
as the cultivated and the uncultivated lands in the village
wilh all the rights and privileges". Subsequently. R filed a
suit to set aside the sale on the grounds that actually he was
a minor when he executed the sale deed and that the legal
necessity was only for Rs. 45,000/-. He further contended
that the cultivatory rights in the sir lands were not transferred
and claimed possession over them.
Held, that the alienation was for leg:>.! necessity and was
valid and binding. The alience was only required to e;tab'i>h
legal necessity for the transaction and it was not necessary for
him to show that every bit of the consideration was applied
for meeting family necessity. The transaction being for leg:>.!
necessity the father was competent to execute the sale deed
binding on the entire family :>.nd the joining of R, even
though he was a minor, did not aff<ct its validity or binding
character.
•
•
' ;
Report an error or ask for masking: grievance@lawgrids.org