R.R. CHARI versus STATE OF U. P.
Supreme Court of India | Decided 28 March 1962 | [1963] 1 S.C.R. 121 | 1962 INSC 113
Key facts
- Decided
- 28 March 1962
- Bench
- P.B. GAJENDRAGADKAR*, K.N. WANCHOO
- Bench size
- 2
- Case number
- CRIMINAL APPEAL No. 46/1958
- Disposal
- Appeal(s) allowed
- Citation
- [1963] 1 S.C.R. 121
- Neutral citation
- 1962 INSC 113
Text of the judgment
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1s.c.R. ·
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
121
R.R. CHARI
v.
STATE OF U. P.
(P. B. G.AJENDRAGADKAR and K. N. WANCHOO, JJ.)
Oriminal Trial-Bribery and forgery-P'lll>Uc Servant,
tried by Sessions Jurlge-Legality of trial-Accused permanent
servant of Assam Government loaned to Central· GovernmentSanction by Central Government, validity of-CrimiMl Law
Amendment Act, 1952 (46 of 1952), ss. 7, 10-Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1898 (Act of 1898), ss. 197, 213-Prevention of
Oorruption Act 1947 (2 of 1947) s. 6.
•
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The appellant was in the permanent service of the
Assam Government but his services were lent to 'the Central
Government. At the relevant time, ie., December 1945 to
September 1946, he was posted at Kanpur as Deputy Iron
& Steel Controller. In connection with the granting of
permits to certain persons charges under ss. 120B, 161, 165 .
and 467 Indian Penal Code, and under r. 473(3) read with
r.472, Defence of India Rules were levelled against him.
Sanction for his prosecution was granted by the Central
Government on January 31, 1949, and a charge sheet was
submitted against him. On March I, 1952, the appellant
was committed to the Court of Sessions for trial. The trial
commenced on May, 7, 1953, and the Sessions Judge convicted the appellant of all the charges. On appeal the High
Court upheld the conviction under ss. \6'1 and 467 Indian
Penal Code and set aside the conviction on the other charges.
The appellant contended (i) that the trial by the Sessions
Judge was illegal as after the coming into force of the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 195'2, on July 28, 1952, he
~ould only be tried by a Special Judge, and (ii) that the
sanction granted by the Central Government was invalid
and of no avail as sanction for the prosecution of the appellant could only be granted by the Assam Government in
whose permanent employment the appellant was.
Held, that the Sessions Judge had jurisdiction to hold
the trial and it was not required that the appellant -should
have been tried by a special Judge. Though s.7 of the
Criminal Law Amendment required all offences under ss.161
and 165 Indian Penal Code to be tried by a Specialjudge,
the section was only prospective and did not provide for
ttansfe!r of all pending cases. Under s.IO ofthe Act only
such cases triable by a Special Judge under s.7 as were actually pendjng before any Magistrate immediatelv befor~
122
1962
R.R, Chqri
v,
Stat16f UP.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1963]
the commencemcn t of the Act could be transferred to the
Special Judge. The case against the appellant having
already bc~:1 co1nmi tted to the Sessions was no longer pend·
ing- beft>re the Magistrate. The mere fact that the Magis·
trate still had power, under s.216 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, to surnn1on witnesses for the defence and bind
them to clppcar before the Court of Sessions, did not imply
that his jurisdiction to deal wh:h the merits of the case
continued.
Held, further that thougl:i the sanction granted by the
Central Government was a good sa11ction under s. 197 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure it was not a valid sanction under
s.6 of the Ptevention of Corruption Act. At the time when
the sanction vvas granted the appellant was in the permanent
employment of the Assam Government but he was en1ployed
in the nffairs of the Federation. Under s.197,. in cases of
persons einployed in connection with the affairs of the
FederatiCJl; the Governor·General was the authority to grant
the sanction and in cases of persons employed in connection
with 1lie affairs of the States it \vas the Governot. Under
· s.6 of the Corruption .Act the position was different. ClausCs
(a) and (b) of the section dealt with persons permanently
employed in connection with the affairs of the Federation or
of the Provinces and in regard to them, the appropriate
authoritie::. were the c:entral Government and the Provincial
Government. The word "employed" in cls.(a) and (b)
referred
to employment of a permanent character. The
case of a public servant "·hose services were loaned· by one
Governinent to another fell under cl.(c) under which sanction
could be granted by the authority competent to remove him
from his service. The authority competent to remove the
appellant fron1 his service was the Assam Government and
that Government alone co~1Id have granted a valid sancti'Jn
for the prosecution of the appellant. Accordingly the trial of
the appellant for
offences under ss. 161 and 165 was
without jurisdiction.
Held, further that the convinction of the appellant
for the offence under s.467 could not stand as it was based
entirely upon the uncorroborated testimony of accomplices.
CRIMINAi,
APl'ELLATE
JURISDICTION:
Cri-
minal Appeal No. 46 of 1958.
Appeal from the judgment a.nd order dated
March 17, J 958, of the Allahabad High C9urt i.~
Criminal Appeal No, Hl35 of 1953,
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1 s.c.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
123
A. 8. R. Chari, 8.Picka·i and 8. Venkatakrisknan,
for the appellant.
lln
R.R. Chari
Vo
Sarjoo Prasad, G.C.Mathur and G.P.Lal, for
the respondent.
81a110JU.P.
1962. March 28. The Judgement of the Court
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was delivered by
GAJENDRAGADKAR, J.-The appellant~.R. Chari
was a permanent employee in a gazetted post under
the Government of Assam. In 1941, his services
were lerit fo the Government of India. The first
appointment which the appellant held. under the
government of India was that of the Deputy Director of Metals in the Munitions Production Department at Calcutta. Then he came to Delhi on similar
work in the office of the Master-General of Ordnance which was the Steel Priority Authority
during the War period. He was subsequently transferred to ~anpur as Assiatant Iron a Steel Controller
in 1945. Sometime thereafter, he become the
Deputy Iron & Steel Controller, Kanpur Circle;
which post he held for one month in September,
1945. From January, 1946, he was appointed to the
said post and he held that post until September 20,
1946. The period covered by the charges whfoh
were eventually formed against the appellant and
others is from January 1, 1946 to September 20,
1946. On the latter date, the appellant proceeded
on leave for four months and did not return to
service either under the Government of India or
under the Assam Government.
It appears that while the appellant had
proceeded on leave the Government of India wrote
to the .Assam Government on February 8, 1947,
intimating that it had desided to replace the services
of the appellant at . the disposal of the Assam
Government on the expiry of the leave granted to
him with effect fro~ September,- 21, 1946. The
Qov~m.ment of lll.dia a.lso added that .the exact
<lajendri:1adkar J •
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124
196~
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R.R. Chari
••
State of U. P.
Gajendragadkar J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1963]
period of the leave granted to the appellant would
be intimated to the Assam Government later. On
April 28, 1947, leave granted to the appellant wa,s
gazetted with effect from September 21, 1946 for
a period of four months. A subsequent notification
issued by the Central Government extended the
leave up to May 13, 1947. On this latter date, ·
the Central Government suspended the arpellant,
and on a warrant issued by the District Magistrate,· Kanpur, he was arrested on the October 28,
1947. Subsequently, he was released on bail. Thereafter, the Government of India accorded sanction
for the prosecution of the appellant under s. 197 of
the Criminal Procedure Code on the January 31,
1949. A Charge-sheet was submitted by the prosecution alleging that the appellant along with three
of his former assistants had committed various acts
of compiracy, corruption and forgery during the
period 1. l.1946 to 20-9-1946 The other persons who
were alleged to be co-conspirators with the appellant, were vaish, a clerk in charge of licensing under •
the appellant, Rizwi and Rawat who were also
working as clerks under the appellant. Rizwi absconded to Pakistan and Rawat died In the result,
the case instituted on the said charge sheet proceeded against the appellant and Mr. Vaish.
Broadly stated the prosecution case was that
during the period December HJ45 to September
20, 1946, the appellant and Vaish and other entered
into a criminal compiracy to do illegal acts, such as
the commission of offences under ss. 161, 165. 467.
Indian Penal Code or in the alternative, offenc<s
such as were prescribed by r. 47 (3) read with
r. 47 (2) of the Defence of India Rules, 1939 and
abetment in the acquisition and sale of Iron and
steel, in con,travention of the Iron and Steel
(Control of Distribution) Order 1941 ; and that in
pursuance of the said conspiracy, they did com it the
aforesaid illegal acts from time to time and thus ren,.
qred t!iernselves liable to be vunished un4er s.l20-:t3
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i S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
of the Indian Pena.I Code.
of the first charge.
125
That was the substance
The Second Charge was in regard to the commission of the offence under s. 161 and it set out in
detail the bribes accepted by the appellant from 14'
specified persons. In the alternative, it was alleged
that by virtue of the faot that the appellant aooepted valuable things fi;om the persons specified, he had
committed as offence under s. 165 Indian Pena.I
Code.
The third charge was under s. 467 Indian
Penal Uode or in the alterhative, under r. 4 7(3) read
with r. 47(2) (a) of the Defence of India Rules. The
substance of this charge was that in furtherance of
the conspiracy, the appellant fraudulently or dishonestly made, signed or executed fourteen ducuments
specified in clauses (a) to (n) in the charge. Amongst·
these documents were included the orders prepared
in the names of several qealers and licences issued
in their favour.
The fourth charge was that the appellant had
abetted the firms specified in clauses (a) to (k) in
the commission 'of the offence under!· 81(2) of the
Defence of India Rules. That, in brief, is the nature
of the prosecution case against the appellant as set
out in the several charges.
At the initial stage of the trial, the appellant
took a prelimhiary objection that the sanction
accorded by the Government of India to the prosecution of appellant under s. 197 Code of Criminal
Procedure wa:s invalid. This objection was considered by Harish Chandra J. of the Allahabad
IDgh Court and
was rejected
on the.
July, 18th 1949. The lea.med Judge directed that
since he found no substance in the preJiminary
contention raised by the appellant, the record shoul<l
be sent back to the trial Court without delay so
that it may proceed with the trial gf the case. On
1962
R.R. Chllri
v.
Stoll ~j U.P.
Gajend,.got!Ur J.
l26
1962
R.R Chari
••
S!ateofU.P.
GojendrogJdkar J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS (i963j
May 7 1953, the appellant alone with Vaish _._
was tried by the Additional District and Sessions
Judge at Kanpur. The charge under s. 120-B was
tried by the learned Judge with the aid of assessors,
whereas the remaining charges were tried by him
with the aid of tho jury. Agreeing with the opinion
of the assessors·and the unanimous verdict of the
jury, the learned Judge convicted the appellant
under s. 120 Band ~entenced him to two years' rigor·
ous imprisonment. He also convictpd him under section·s. 161 and sentenced him to two years' l:tigorous
imprisonment and a fine of Rs, ~5,000/-. in default to
suffer further rigorous imprisonment for six months.
For the offence under s. 467 Indian Penal Code of
which the appellant was convicted, the learned
Judge sentenced him to four years' rigorous imprisonment. He was also convicted under r. 81 (4)
read with r. 121 and els. 4,5, llb (3) and 12 of the
Iron and Steel Order of 1941 and sentenced to two
years' rigorous imprisonments. All the sentences thus
imposed on the appellant were to run concurrently.
Vaish who was also tried along with the appellant
was similarly convicted and sentenced to different
terms of imprisonment.
The appellant and Vaish then appealed to the
High Court against the said order 0f convictions and
sentence. It was urged on their behalf before the
High Court that the charge delivered by the Judge
to the jury suffered from grave misdirections and
non-directions amounting to misdirections. 'lhis
plea was accepted by the High Court and so, the
High Court examine<J. tho evidence for itself. In the
main, the High Court considered the ten instances
adduced by the prosecution for showing that the
appellant had accepted illegal gratification and had
committed the other offences charged, and came to
the conolusion that the prosecution evidence in respect of eight instan<'es could not be acted upon,
whereas the said evidence in respect of two instances could be safely acted upon. These two instances
i S.O.:R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
127
were deposed to by Lala Sheo Karan Das and other
witnesses and by Sher Singh Arora and other witnesses. In the result, the High Court confirmed the
appellant's conviction under ss. 161 and 467 and
the sentences imposed by the trial Court in that
behalf. His conviction under s. 120-B Indian Penal
Code, and under r. 81(4) read with r. 121 Defence
of India Rules was set aside and he was acquitted
.of t¥ said offences. The High Court directed that
the lsentences imposed on the appellant under
ss. UH and 467 should run concurrently. The appeal
preferred by Vaish was allowed and the order of
conviction and sentence passed against him by the
trial Court in respect of all the charges was set
aside. This order was passed on March 17th, 1958. The
appellant then applied for and obtained a certificate from the High Court and it is with that certificate that he bas come to this Court in appeal.
At this stage, it would be useful to
indicate briefly the main findings recorded
by the High Court agaimit the appellant.
As we have just indicated, there are only
.two instances out of ten on which the
High Court has made a :finding against the appellant.
The first is the case of Lala Sheo· Karan Das.
According to the prosecution case, as a motive or
reward for issuing written orders and expediting
supply of iron by the stock-holders' Association
Kanpur to Lala Sheo Karan Das, the appellaq_t
accepted from him Rs. 4,000/- on 31.3.1946,
Rs. 2,000/- on 9.4.1946; Rs. 1,000/- on 11.4.1946 and
Rs. 1,000/-on 12.5.1946 as illegal gratifioa.tion. That
is the basis of the charge under section 161. The
prosecution case further is . that in regard to the
supply of iron to Lala Sheo Kara.n Das, certain
documents were forged and it is alleged tb.at the
written orders issued in that behalf Exhibits P 341
and P 342 were ante-dated and the licences issued
in that behalf were similarly ante-dated. In
support of this case, oral evidence was given by
1901
RR. Chari
"·
State of U.P.
Gajend. agodkar J.
i2s
Ji.R Chot1
y.
St•le of U. P.
Goja.drouadkdt' J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963)
Lala Sheo Karan Das himself, his son Bhola Nath •
and Parshotam Das, his nephew who is a partner
with him. This oral evidence was sought to be
corroborated by relevant entries in kachhi rokar'
books. These entries indicated that the several
amounts had been paid by the firm to the appellant.
The High Court considered the oral evidence and
held that the said evidence was corroborated by
entries in the account-books. The argument that
dacca rokar books had not been produced did not
appear to the High Court to minimise the value of
the kachhi rokar books which were actually produed, and the contention that the books of Account
kept by accomplices themselves could not, in law,
corroborate their oral evidence, did not appeal to
the High Court as sound. It held that even though
flheo Karan Das, his son and his nephew may be
black-marketeers, it did not necessarily follow that
they were liars. Besides, the High Court took the
view that there were certain pieces of circumstantial evidence which lent support to the oral testimony of the accomplices. The ante-dating of the
orders, and the supply of a large quantity of iron,
were two of these circumstances. It is on these ')
grounds that the High Court accepted the prosecution case against the appellant under s. 161 Indian
Penal Cude. Tho High Court then examined the
evidence in support of the charge under s. 467 and
it held that the manner in which the dates in the
quota register had been tampered with supported
the oral testimony of the witnesses that the applications made by Sheo Karan Das had been delibera-1
telyhand fradudtuhlen_tly ant~-datedd and orders hpass~dd .
e 1icences issue pursuant to t e sa1
on t em.. an
orders-all were fraudulent documents which proved
the charg!J under s. 467 as well as under r. 47 (3)
read with 47(2)(a). On these grounds, the appell;
ant's conviction under s. 467 was also confirmed.
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As to the prosecution case in respect of the ,
bribes offered by i:iher Singh Arora, the High Court
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
129
was not satisfied with the evidence adduced in respect of the actual offer of money, but it held that
the evidence adduced by the prosecution in respect
of the offer and acceptance of certain valuabJethings was satisfactory. These·valuable things were
a three-piece sofa sAt, a centre piece, two stools and
a revolving chair (Exts. 16 to 21). These were offered on behalf of Sher Singh Arm a and accepted• by
the appellant in January, 1916. TD. dealing with
this part of the prosecution case, the High Court
considered the statements made by the appellant
and ultimately concluded that the charge under s.16 l
had been proved in respect of the said articles.
In regard to the charge under s. 467, the High
Court adopted the same reasons as it had done in
dealing with the said charge in respect of Sheo
Karan Das's transactions and held that the said
charge had been proved. The licences which are
alleged to have been ante-dated are Exts. P 535
and P 536. The application which is alleged to have
been ante-dated is Ext. P 194, and the High Court
thought" that the relevant entries in the quota register showed that the dates had been tampered with.·
In the result, the uharge under s. 467 in respect of
this transaction was held to be established. An alternative charge was ~lso proved against the appellant under r. 47(:{) read with r. 47( 2)(c) Defence of
India Rules.
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The first point which Mr. Charihas raised before us i8 that the Addl. District & Sessions Judge
had no jurisdiction to try this case, because at the
relevant time, the Criminal Law Amendment Act,
1952, ( 46 of 1952) had come into operation and the
case against the appellant could have been tried
only by a Special Judge appointed under the said
Act. This argument ha.a been rejected by the High
Court and Mr. Chari contends that the decision of
the High Court in erroneous in Jaw. In order to
de~l with the merits of this point, it is necessary to
1963
B.R. Chtrri
v.
St•te 1/ CJ P •
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SDPREME COURT REPORTS (1963]
1901
RR Chri
v.
Stale of U.P.
(hjmdt•gadlw I.
refer to some dates. The order of commitment was
passed in the present proceedings on March 1, 1952.
lt appears that thereafter a list of defence witnesses
was filed by the appellant before the committing
Magistrate on July 24, 1952. On July 28, 1952, the
Criminal Law Amendment Act came into force. On
August 14, l 952, Vaish filed a list of witnesses before the committing Magistrate and 'requested that
one of the prosecution witnesses should be recalled
for cross-examination. On September 18, 1952, the
District & Sessions Judge at Kanpur was appointed
a Special Judge under the Act. On December Hi,
1952, the case was taken up before the Special
Judge and the question as to where the case should
be trfrd was argued. The Special Judge held that
the question had been considered by the Madras
High Court in the case of P. K. Swamy and it had
been held that the Special Judge had no jurisdiction
to hear the case because the order of commitment
had been passed prior to the passing of the Criminal
Law Amendment Act. Since the order of commitment in the present case had also been passed before July ::8, 1952, the Special Judge held that the
case against the appellant must be tried under the
provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code and not
under the provisions of the Criminal Law Amendment Act; and so, an ol'der was passed that the
trial should be held by the Additional District &
Sessions Judge at Kanpur. After the case was thus
transferred to the Add!. Sessions Judge at Kanpur,
it was actually taken up before him on May 7,
1953, when the charge was read out to the accused
persons and the jury was empanelled. It is in the
light of these facts that the question about the
jurisdictions of the trial Judge has to be determined.
Two provisions of the Criminal Law Amendment Act fall to be considered in this connection.
Section 7 provides that notwithstanding anything
<:ontained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, or in
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I S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPDRTS
131
any other law, the offences specified in sub-section
(1) of s. 6 shall be triable by a Special Judge onJy,
Offences under ss. 161 and 155 Indian Panal Code
are amongst the offences specified bys. 6( l). Section
7(2)(b) provides that when trying any case, a Special
Judge may also try any offence other than an offence
a.pacified in s. 6 with which the accused may,
under the Code of Criminal Procedure be charged at
the same time. Therefore, if the offence under
s. 161 falls under s. 7( 1) and has to be tried by a
Special Judge, the other offences charged would also
have to be tried by the same Special Judge as a
result of s. 7(2)(b). It is clear that the provisions
of s. 7 are prospective. This position is not disputed.
But it would be noticed that s. 7 does not provide
for the transfer of pending cases to the special
Judge and so, unless foe appellant's case falls under
the provisions of s. 10 which provides for transfer,
it would be tried under the ordinary law in spite of
the fact that the main offence charged against the
appellant falls under s. 6(1) of the Criminal Law
Amendment Act.
That takes us to s. 10 which deals with the
transfer of certain pending cases. This section provides that all cases triable by a special Judge under
s. 7 which immediately b~fore the commencement of
the Act, were pending before any }fagistrate shall,
on such commencement, be forwarded· for 'trial to
the special .Judge having jurisdiction over such
cases. It is thus clear that of the cases made triable
by a special Judge bys. 7, it is only such pending
cases as a.re covered by s.10 that would be tried by
the special Judge. In other words, it is only cases
triable by a special Judge under s. 7 which were
pending before any Magistrate immediately before
the commencement of this Act that would be transferred to the special Judge and thereafter tried by
him. So, the question to consider is whether the
appella.nt's case oould be said to have been pending
1168
R.R. Chari
v.
State o/U P.
G 11jendra,(ldkar· •
i32
1981
R.R. Chari
••
SW. of U.P.
Gaj1,.J,agadlcar J,
SU:i>REME COURT REPORTS (1963J
before any Magistrate immediately before the commencement of the Act. This po11ition also is not in
dispute .
The dispute centres round the question as to
whether the appellant's case can be said to ha vc
been pending before a magistrate at the relevant
time, and this dispute has to be decided in the
light of the provisions contained in s. 219 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure. This section occurs
in Chapter l 8 which deals with the enquiry into
cases triable by the Court of Sessions or High Court.
We have already seen that on March 1,1952, an order
of commitment had been passed in the present ca.~e
and that means that the jurisdiction of the committing Court had been exercised by the said Court
under s. 213 of the Code. Mr Chari contends that
though the order of commitment had been passed,
that does not mean that the case had ceased to be
pending before the committing Magistrate. It is
not disputed that once an order of commitment is
made, the committing Magistrate has no jurisdiction
to dee.I with the said matter ; he cannot either
change. the order or set it aside. So far as the
order of commitment is concerned, the jurisdiction
of the Magistrate has come to an end. The said
order can be quashed only by the High Court and
that too on a point of law. That is the effect of s. 215
of the Code. It is, however, urged thats. 216 confers
jurisdiction on the committing magistrate to summon
witnesses for defence as did not appear before the
said Magistrate and to direct that they should appear
before the Court to which the accused had been committed. Similarly, before the said Magistrate, bonds
of complainants and witnesses can he executed
as prescribed bys. 217. Section 219 confers power
on the committing Magistrate to summon and
examine supplementary witnesses after tt.e commitment and bnfore the commencement of the trial,
and to bind them over in manner hue in before
provided to appear and give evidence. It is on the
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SUPREME OOURT REPORTS
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prov1s1ons of this section that the appellant's
case rests.
The argument is that sin~e the
committing magistrate is given power to summon
supplementary witnesses even after an order of
commitment has been passed, that shows that
the committing magistrate stilJ hold jurisdiction
over the case and in that sense, the case must be
deemed to be pending before him. We are not
impressed by this argument. The power to summon
supp1ementary witnesses and take their evidence is
merely a supplementary -power for · recording
evidence and no more. This supplementary power
does not postulate the continuance of jurisdiction
in the committing magistrate to deal with the case.
It is signifi~ant that this power can be exercised
even by a Magistrate other than the committing
magistrate, provided he is empowered by or 1Jnder
s. 206 and clearly, the case covered by the commitment order passed by one magistrate cannot be
said to be pending before a.not.her magistrate who
may be empowered to s11mmon supplementary witnesses. When s. 10 of the Criminal law Amend:
ment Act refer to cases pending before any magistrate, it o~viously refers to cases pending. before
magistrates who can deal with t,bem on the merits
in accordance with law and this requiremflnt is
plainly not satisfied in regard t,o any case in which
a commitment order had been passed by the committing m::tgistrate. After the order of commitment
is passed, the case cannot be said to be pending
before the committing magistrate within the
meaning of s. 10. Therefore, we are satisfied that
the High Court wil.s right in coming to the conclusion that s. 10 did not apply to the present case and
so, the Addi. Sessions Judge hed jurisdiction to try
the case in accordance with the provisions of tho
Code of Criminal Procedure. It is true that in
deo.ling with tllis point, the High Court has pro·
cieeded on the c:msideration that the a.ppeJla.nt's
trial had actually commenced befere
tJ:w
1962
R.R. Chati
v.
Stale of U.P.
Oajend ogodkor J •
134
1962
RR. Ch•ri
5,,,, •}v. up.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963]
Addi. Sessions .Judge even prior to Jul.v 28, 1952.
In fact,)t is on that basis alone that the High Court
has rejected the appellant's contention as to absence
of jurisdiction in the trial Judge. We do not think
that the reason given by the High Court in support
of this conclusion is right, because the trial of the
appellant could not be said to have commenced
before May 7, 1953. However, it is unnecessary to
pursue this point any further because we are·
inclined to take the view that the appellant's case
does not fall under s. 10 of the Criminal Law
Amendment Act and that is enough to reject the
contention of the appellent on this point.
The next argument raised is in regard to the
validity of the sanction given by the Government
of India to the prosecution of the appellant. This
ea.notion Ext. P-550 purports to have been granted
by the Governor-General of India. under s. 197 of
the Code for the institution of criminal proceedings
against the appellant. It has been signed by Mr.
S. Boothalingam, Joint Secretary to the Government of India. on J anuarv 31, 1949. The sanction
sets out with meticulous "care all the details of the
prosecution case on which the prosecution rested
their charges against the appellant and so, it would
not be right to contend that the sanction has been
granted as a. mere matter of formality. The
several details set out in the sanction indicate that
prima f acie, the whole case had been considered
before the sanction was accorded. Mr. Chari, however, attempted to argue that on the face of it, the
sanction does not show that the Governor-General
granted the sanction. after exercising his individual
judgment. Section 197 of the code at the relevant
time required that sanction for the prosecution of
the appellant should have been iriven by the
Governor-General exercising his individual Judgment, and since, in terms, it does not say that the·
(}overnor-Gene1al in exercise of his individual
1 8.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
135
judgment had accorded sanction, the requirement
of s. 197 is not satisfied. That is the substance
of the contention. In support of this contention,
reliance is sought to be placed on certain statements
ma.de by Mr. Boothalingam in his evidence. Mr.
Boothalingam stated that sanction of the GovernorGeneral was conveyed by him as Joint Secretary to
the Government of India. He also added that
authorities of the Government of India competent
to act in this behelf accorded the sanction and he
conveyed it. His evidence also showed that the
matter had been considered by the competent
authorities and that he was one of those authorities.
Mr. Chari argues. that Mr. Boothalingam has not
expressly stated that the Governor-General applied
his individual inind to the problem and exercising
his individual Judgment, came to the conclusion
that the sanction should be accorded. This contention had not been raised at any stage before and the
point had not been put to Mr. Boothalingam who
gave evidence to prove the sanction. If the point
had been expressly put to l\fr. Boothalingam he
would have either given evidence himself on that
point or would have adduced other evidence to show
that the Governor-General had exercised his indi·
vidual judgment in dealing with the matter. Therefore, we do not think that this plea can be allowed
to be raised for the first time in this Court.
The next ground of attach against the validity of
the sanction is based on the assumption that at the
time when the sanctions was given, the appellant had
ceased to be in the employment of the Government
of India and had reverted to the Assam Government.
If it is established that at the relevant time, the
appellant was a person employed in connection with
.the affairs of the Assam .State, then of course, it
is the Assam Government that would be competent
to give the sanction. The High Court has found that
~t the relevant time, the appellant continued to be
1962
B.B. C1-I
••
Slat.of U.P •
GqjendJagadl:ar J.
136
196t
R.R. Chari
••
St•t•iJU.P.
Oaj1nirat1.Jtlkar J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1963]
in the employment of the affairs of the Federation
and had not reverted to the Assam Government ;
and in our opinion, this finding of the High Court
is right. We have already referred to the course of
events that led to the granting of the leave to the
appellant hy the Government of India; to the
extension of the leave by the said Government and
to his subsequent suspension. The appellant's argument is that after he went on leave, he mo\·ed the
Assam Government for extension of his leave and
was, in fact, asked by the Assam Government to
appear before a medical board appointed by it. We
do not think that these facts are enough to prove
that the appellant had reverted to the service of the
Assam Gevernment. In fact, it is clear that the
Government of India had intimated to the Assam
Government that the appellant continued to be
under its employment and that the Assam Government had expressly told the Government of India.
that it had no desire that the appellant should
revert to its service until the criminal proceedings
instituted against him were over. The Assam Government also pointed out that the appellant himself
did not wish to rejoin in his post of Superintendent
of the Assam Government's Press but had only
asked for Leave Preparatory to Retirement following medical advice. It is thus clear that though the
Government of India had originall:y thought of replacing the appellant's services with the Assam Government at the end of the leave which was proposed
to be granted to him, subsequent events which Jed
to an investigation against the appellant and his
suspension caused a change in the attitude of the
Government of India and it decided to continue
him in its employment in order that he should face
a trial on the charges which were then the subjectmatt,er of investigation. There is no order revertinl?
him to the Assam Government passed by the Govt. of
India ~.nd there is no order passed by the Assam
Government at all on this subject. Therefore,
--
...
.......
..
>
•
,..
•
•
I
1 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
137
there can be no doubt that at the relevant time, the
appeJlant continued to be employed in the affairs of
the Federation.
It was then sought to be argued that the effect
of SR 215 was thn.t the reversion of the appellant
to the Assam Government should be deemed to
have taken effect from .the date when the leave was
granted to him by the Government of India. In
our opinion, there is no substance in this argument.
The portion on which the appellant relies is merely
a.n administrative direction under t¥e Rule and it
cannot possibly over-ride the specific orders issued
by the Government of India in respeet of the appe·
llant's leave and reversion. Besides, even the
requirements of the said Rule are not satisfied in
the present case. Therefore, the conclusion is
inescapable that the a.ppella.nt was employed in the
affairs of the F~deration at the time when the
sanction was accorded.
That takes us to the q11estion as to whether the
Government of India was competent to grant the
sanction even if the appellant was at the relevant
time a person emploved in connection with the affairs
of the Federation. Mr. Chari contends that in the case
of the appellant whose services had been loaned by
the Assam Government to the Government of India,
it co11ld not be said th'1t he was a person permana.ntly employed in connection with the affairs of the
Federation and so, cl. (a) of s. 197 (1) would not
apply to him at all. He was a person permanently
employed in connection with the affairs of a State
and that took the case under cl. (b) which means
that it is the Governor of Assam exercising
his individual judgment who could have a1~corded
valid sanction to the appellant's prosecution. We
a.re not impressed by this argument. It is clear
that the first part of s.197 ( 1) provides a special protection, inter alia, to public servants who are not
removable
from their offices save. by or with. th~
.
I
190
R.R • .Chcri
v.
'
State of U;P~
<Jtijt1Nl1 agOdk'at ·. J~
138
J981
R.R. Chon
v•
Sl•te of U.P.
Qajetd rogadkar J.
SUPREME COURT REPORT5 (I9Cl3J
eanotion of the State Government or the Central
Government where they are charged with having
committed offences while acting or purporting to act
in the discharge of their official duties; and the
form which this protection has taken is that before
a criminal court can take cognizance of any offence
alleged to have been committed by such public
servants, a sanction should have been accorded to
the said prosecution by the appropriate lluthorities.
In other words, the appropriate authorities must be
satisfied that there is a prima facie case for starting the prosecution and this prima jacie satisfaction
has been interposed as a safeguard before the actual
prosecution commences. The object of s. 197(1)
clearly is to save public servants from frivolous prosecution, VideAfzelur Rahman v. The King Emperar(').
That being the object of the section, it is clear that
if persons happened to be employed. in connection
with the affairs of the "Federation, it was the Governer-General who gave sanction and if persons
happened to b9 employed in connection with the
affairs of the State, it was the Governor. What is
relevant for the purpose of deciding as to who
should give the sanction, is to ask the question;
where is the public servant employed at the relevant time ? If he is emp],)yed in the affairs of
the Federation, it must· be the Governor-General in
spite of the fact that such employment may be
temporary and may be the result nf the fact that
the services of the public servant have Leen loaned
by the State Government to the Government of
India. 'fherefore, having regard to the fact that
at the relevant time the appellant. was employed in
connection with the affairs of the :Federation, it was
the Govcrnor·Genernl alone who was competent to
accord sanction. Therefore, our conclusion is that
the sanction granted by the Governor-General for
the prosecution of tho :..ppellant is valid.
That still leaves the validity of the sanction to be tested in the light of the provisions of
(l)
(1943) F.C R. 7, 12.
..
1 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
139
s. (6) of the prevention of the Corruption Act,
1947. At the relevant time, section 6 read thus:
"No court shall take cognizance of an
offence · punishable under section 161 or
section 165 of the Indian Penal Code (X1V of
J86t:) or under sub-section (2) of section 5
of this Act, alleged to have been committed
by a public servant, except with the previous
sanction:
(a.) In the ca.se - of a person who is
employed in connection with the affairs of
the Federation and is not removeable from
his office save by or with the sanction of the
Central Government or some higher authority,
Central Government.
(b) In the case of a person who is
employed in connection with ,the affairs of .a
province and is not removeable from his office
save by or with the sanction of the .Provincial
Government or soine higher authority, Provin<>ial Government:
(c) in the case of any other person, of
the authority competent to remc1ve him from
his service".
·
It would. be noticed that the scheme of this section
is different from that of s. 197 ·of the Code of
Criminal Procedure. The requirement of the first
part of s. 197 (1) which constitutes a sort of
preamble to the provisions of s. 197(l)(a) & (b}
respectively, has been introduced by s.6 severally
in c]s. (a) and (b ). In other words, under els. (a)
and (b) of s. 197(1) the authority competent to grant
the sanction is determined only by reference to o..ie
test and that is the test provided b_y ''the affairs in
connection with which the public servant is employed"; .if the said affairs are the affairs of the Federation, the Governor General grants the sanction ; if
the said affairs are t~e affa.iTs of a Province, t4o
J96S
R.R. Ollari
v.
SM10JU.P.
Gqjendragadkot J.
140
1962
...
RR. Chari
St•I• of U.P.
--
Gojendrogadkai J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963]
Governor grants the sanction. That is the position
under s. 197(1) as it then stood. The position under
s. 6 of the Prevention of Corruption Aet is substantially different. Clauses (a) & (b) of this ~ection
deal with persons permanently employed in connection with the affairs of the Federation or in
connection with the affairs of the Province re:spectively, and in regard to them, the a.ppropriates
authorities are the Centrnl Government and the
Provincial Government. The case of a public
servant whose services are loaned by one Government to the other, does not fall either under cl. (a)
or under cl.(b), but it falls under cl. (c). Having
regard to the scheme of the three clauses of s. 6,
it is difficult to construe the word "employed" in
els. (a} & ( b) as meaning "employed for the time
being". The said words, in the context, must mean
"permanently em ployed". It is not disputed that
if the services of a public servant permanently
employed by a Provincial Government are loaned
to the Central Govt., the authority to remove such
public servant from office would not b.3 the borrowing Government but the loaning Government which
is the Provincial Government, and so, there can be
no doubt that the employment referred to in els. (a}
& (b) must mean the employment of a permanent
character and would not include the ad hoc or
temporary emplo:yment of an officer whose services
have been loaned by one Government to the other.
Therefore, the appellant's case for the purpose of
sanction under s. 6 will fall under cl. (c] and that
inevitably means that it is only the Provincial
Government of Assam which could have given
a valid sanction under s. 6. At the relevant time,
s. 6 had come into operation, and s. 6 expressly
bars the cognizance of offences under s.161 unless a
valid sanction had been obtained as required by it.
Therefore, in the absence of a valid sanction, the
charge against the appellant under s. 161 and s. 163
could not have been tried and that renders the
1 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
141
proceedings against the appellant in respect of those
two charges without jurisdictipn.
R.R. Chari
v.
The result.is that the contention of the appellant that the sanction required for his prosecution
under section 161 and section 165 is invalid, suc·
ceeds and his trail in respect of those two offences
must, therefore, be held to be invalid and without
jurisdiction. That being so, it .is unnecessary to
consider whether too finding of the· High Court in
respect of the charge under s. 161 is justified or not.
So, we do not propose to consider the evidence led
by the prosecution in respect of the said charge in
relation to the two cases of Lala Sheo Karan Das
and Sher 8ingh Arora.
The charge under s~ctiou 467 or the alternative charge under Defence of India Rules still
remains to be considered, because the said offences
are outside the scope of s. 6 of the . Prevention of
Corruption Act and the sanction accorded by the
Governor-General in respect of the appellant's
prosecution for the said offences is valid under s. 197
of the Code of Criminal Procedure. What, then,
are the material facts on which. the conclusion of
the High Court is based? The first point on which
stress has been laid both by Mr. Chari and Mr.
Sarjoo Prasad relates to the background of the case.
.Mr. Chari contends that the prosecution of the
appellant is, in substance, th3 result of the
attempts successfully made by the back-marketeers
in Kanpur
to involve the
appellant
in
false
charges
and in support
of his
plea, Mr. Chari has very strongly relied on the
evidence of Mr. Kanhaiya Singh. This witness
was, at the relevant time, an .Inspecting Assistant
Commissioner .of Income-tax at. Kanpur and his
evidence seems to 1:1how that unlike his predecesso~
Mr. Talwar, the appellant gave whole-hearted
co-operation to the witness in discovering the
illegal dealings of black-marketeers in Kanpur in
Stat~ of U.P.
Gajtndrogadkiir J
142
1962
R.R. CharJ
v.
St1u of U.P.
~--
Gajendrcgodkar J.
SUPREME COUR'l' REPORTS (1963)
iron. According to the witness, the black-marketeers came to know about the cooperation
between him an<l the appellant and that disturbed
them very mdely, Some lists wero prepared by
the appellant giving the witness detailed information about the activities of the black-marketeers
and the witness sug~eHted that in order to destroy
the papers thus supplied to him by the appellant,
a burgulary was arranged in his house in May or
June, 1916. A similar burgulary took place in the
appellant's house. There was also a fire in the
appellant's house. The witness was asked whether
any of the persons who have given evidence against
the appellant in the present case, were included
in the list supplied by the appellant to him, and
the witness refused to answer the said question and
claimed protection under s. ;A of the Income Tax
Act. Mr Chari's argument is that the activities of
the appellant in cooperation with Mr. Kanhaiya
Singh frightened the black-marketeers and so, they
organised the present plot to involve the appellant
in a false case. In that connection, Mr. Chari also
relies on the fact that out of the ten instances, the
story deposed to in respect of eight has been
rejected by the High Court.
On the other hand, Mr. Sarjoo Prasad has
argued that as soon as the appellant took r.harge
from Mr. Talwar, he evolved a very clever scheme
of establishing personal contacts with the blackmarketeers; dispensed with the enquiry which used
to be held prior to the granting of licences to them
and thus introduced a practice of direct dealings
with the black-marketeers which facil,tated the
commission of the offence• charged against him.
He has also referred us to the evidence given by Mr.
Sen which tends to show that the appellant was
frightened by the prospect of investi~ation and so,
suddenly left Kanpur under the pretext of illness.
In other words, Mr. Sarjoo Prass.d's argument is
that the appellant deliberately adopted a very clever
1 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
14~
modus operandi in discharging his duties as a public
servant and has, in fact, committed the several
offences charged against him. We do not think
that the ultimate decision of the narrow point
with which we are concerned in the present appea~
can be determined either on the basis that the
appellant is more sinned against than a sinner or
that he is a cold-blooded offender. Ultimately,
we will have to examine the evidence specifically
connected with the commission of the offence and
decide · whether that evidence can legitimately
sus~airt the cha1ge under s. 467.
Let us take the case as disclosed , by the
evidence of Sheo Karan Das in respect of the
charge under s. 467. According to Shao Karan Das,
the twg applications Exts. a5 and 36 were giVP.ll by
him in the office of the appellant on the 29th or 30th
March, 1946, but thP appellant asked the witness to
get other applications in which the date should be
prior to 23rd of March: Accordingly, the witneBB
put the date 22nd March on his applications. On
the 29th or 30th March when the witness met the
appellant, he asked for 130 tons and the appellant
told him that he could give him more than that,
provided, of course, the appellant got his profit.
Accordingly, after these applications were antedated, the appellant passed orders and licences
were issued. Thus, it would be seen that the prosecution case is that the applications which were
presented by Sheo Karan Das on the 29th or
30th of March, were deliberately ante-dated in
order that the orders subsequently passed by the
appellant and the licences issued thereunder
should also appear to have been issued prior to
the 23rd of March a.ad that, in substance, is
the essence of the charge under s. 467.
When this case was put to the appellant, he
made a somewhat elaborate statement which it is
necessary to consider. ~ccording to this statement,
1962
R.R. Chari
v.
State of UP.
Gojendragcc:Aor J.
144
1951
R.R. CAari
••
Slate of U.P.
SUPHEA1E COURT REPORTS [1963]
the appellant left Kanpur on March 23, 1946, for
a meeting with Mr. Spooner who was the Iron
Steel Controller at Caloutta. Mr. Spooner told
him in confidence that there would be no more need
to issue licences after March 31, on account of
decontrol.
He also expressly desired that no
further licences need be issued by any Regional Dy.
Iron & Steel Controller after March 26, Hl46. The
appellant returned to Kanpur on March 28, and
.attended office on ~he 2~th. He then found that
the office had placed on his table a num her of
licences for which he had already issued orders
before he left Kanpur on the 23rd. Some new
applications had also come thereafter and these
included applications from Government bodies and
other public institutions. These were also placed on
his table. The appellant urged that statutorily he
had the power to issue licences until Maroh 31,
even so, in order to comply with the desire express·
ed by Mr. Spooner, he ordered that all licences
should be issued as on March 2:~. The appellant
emphasised that even if he had dated the licences
and his own orders as on the 30th or 31st March,
that would have introduced no invalidity in the
orders or licences respectively, and so, he contended
that even though in form, the orders and the
licences can be said to have been ante-dated, the
ante-dating did not introduce any criminal element
at all. It appears that after his return to Kanpur
on the 28th, a large number of licences were issued
in this way. This statement of the appellant thus
shows that even on applications admittedly received
after the 23rd, licences were iBBued as on the 23rd
and orders had been passed by the appellant in
support of the issue of such licences. This antedating of the licences is a circumstance on which the
prosecution strongly relies in support of the charge
'under s. 467.
It is, however, significant that besidea the
testimony of the accomplices, there is no other
1 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
145
evidence on the record to show that the applications
given by Sheo Karan Das had been brought to the
office of the appellant for the first time on the
29th or 30th of March as deposed to by him. No
register had been produced from the office showing
the date of the receipt of the said applications.
It is true that in the quota register, dates had
been tampered with, but there is no evidence to
show who tampered with those dates and so, the fact
that dates had been tampered with will not afford
any legal evidence in support of the case that the
applications presented by Sheo Karan Das had,
in fact, been presented for the first time on the
29th of March and had not been filed on the 22nd
of March as pleaded by the appellant. The
ante-dating of the applications is a very important
fact and of this fact there is no other evidence at
all. Therefore, in our opinion, the crucial fact
on which the charge under s. 467 is based is
deposed to only by accomplice witnesses and their
statements are not corroborated by any other
evidence on tbe record. The admission .made by
the appellant does not necessarily show that the
applications had been ante-dated. Indeed, it is
very curious that the appellant should have passed
necessary orders and should have directed the issue
of licences as on the 23rd of March even in regard
to the applicatiuns received by him subsequent to
the 23rd March and this bas been done in· respect of
applications reci:lived from Government bodies and
public institutions. This fact lends some support
to the appellant's theory that he did not want to
appear to have contravened the desire expressed
by Mr. Spooner that no licence should be issued
subsequent to the 26th March. There is no doubt
that the appeJlant was competPnt, to issue licences
until the 31st of l\faroh and so, it is not as if it
was essential for him to ante-date his orders or
to ante-date thP- Jicences issued in accordance with
them. Then as to the orders passed by the
appellant on the applicati:ms presented by
1962
R.R. Chari
v.
State of U.P.
Gajmdragadkar J.
146
1962
R.R. Chari
v.
SM10,fU.P.
Gajentlr«gatiltar J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963]
Sheo Karan Das, there is no date put by the appellant below his signature, though th<i date 22nd March
appears at the top of the document. But it may
be assumed that the order was passed on the 29th.
That, however, does not show that the applications
were made on the 29th and without proving by
satisfactory evidence that the applications were
made on the 29th, the prosecution cannot establish
its charge against the appellant under s. 467. In
our opinion, the High Court appears to have
misjudged the effect of the admissions alleged to
have been made by the appellant when it came to
the conclusion that the said admissions corroborated
the accomplice's case that the application~ had been
presented by him for the :first time on the 29th
March. The fact that there is no evidence offered
by any of the prosecution witnesses examined from
the appellant's office to show the dates when the
applications were received, has not been considered
by the High Court at all. Therefore, the finding
of the High Court on the essential part of the
prosecution story in respect of the charge under
s. 467 really rests on the evidence of the accomplice
uncorroborated by any other evidence. That being
so, we must hold that the High Court erred in law
in making a finding against the appellant in respect
of the charge under s. 467 as well as the alternative
charge under the relevant Defence of India Rules.
What we have said about this charge in respect
of the licences issued to Sheo Karan Das applies
with the same force to the said charge in respect of
the licences issued to Sher Singh Arora. In respect
of those licences also, there iJ no evidence to show
that the applications made by Sher Singh Arora
had been ante-dated, and ao, the charge in Fespect
of the said licences also cannot be held to have
been established.
The result is, the finding of the High Court
in respect of the charge against the appellant under
s. 467 or the alterria tive charge under the relevant
Defence of India Rules· must be reversed,· his
)
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I
I
1.
1 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
147
conviction for the said offences set aside and be
should be ordered to be acquitted and discharged
in respect of those offences.
That raises the question as to whether we
should order a retrial of the appellant for the offence
under s. 161. Mr. Sa.rjoo Prasad has argued that
the interests of justice require that the appellant
should be asked to face a new trial in respect of
the 0harge under s. 161, Indian Penal Code if and
after a valid sanction is obtained for his prosecution
for the same. We are not inclined to accept this
argument. Two facts have weighed in our minds
in coming to the conclusion that a retrial need
not be ordered in this ease. The first consideration
is that the accused has had to face a long and
protracted criminal trial and the sword bas been
hanging over his head for over 14 years. The accused was suspended in 194:7 and Eiince then these
prooeedings have gone on all the time, The second
factor which has weighed in our minds is that
though the prosecution began with a charge of a
comprehensive collEtpiracy supported by several
instances of bribery, on the finding of the High
Court it is reduced to a case of bribery offered by
two persons; and then again, the substantial
evidence is the evidence of accomplices supported
by what the High Court thought to be corroborating
circumstances. It is true that offences of this kind
should not be allowed · to go unpunished, but
having regard to all the facts to which our attention
has been drawn in the present case, we are not
inclined to take the view that the ends of justice
reqnire that. the accused should be ordered to face
a fresh trial. The result is that the conviction of
the appellant under section 161 is set aside on the
ground that his trial for the said' offence was
without jurisdiction since his prosecution in that
behalf was commenced without a valid sanction as
required by s.6 of the preve11tion of Corruption Act.
Appeal allowed.
1961
R.R. Chari
Y.
State of U.P.
Gajendragadlcar J,
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