MADANLAL FAKIRCHAND DUDHEDIYA versus SHREE CHANGDEO SUGAR MILLS LLD.
Supreme Court of India | Decided 20 March 1962 | [1962] SUPP. 3 S.C.R. 973 | 1962 INSC 104
Key facts
- Decided
- 20 March 1962
- Bench
- P.B. GAJENDRAGADKAR*, A.K. SARKAR, K.N. WANCHOO
- Bench size
- 3
- Case number
- CIVIL APPEAL No. 64/1959
- Disposal
- Dismissed
- Citation
- [1962] SUPP. 3 S.C.R. 973
- Neutral citation
- 1962 INSC 104
Text of the judgment
3 S.C.R.
SUPREME COUH.T REPOH.TS
973
Company and not a sale in the course of business
operations, which alone would had attracted t.ax, if
profit resulted.
>
In the result, the appeiil fail.-i, ancl is dismiss·
ed with costs.
Appeal dismi8sed.
1!162
K.M.S. Reddy,
Commissioner of
Income-tax, Kera/a
v.
The West Co1at
Chemicals tJnd
!ndurtiies l.td
Tiidayat11llah .J,
MADANLAL FAKfRCHAND DUDHEDIYA
1962
March 20.
v.
SHREITI CHANGDEO SUGAR MILLS L'l'D.
(P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, A. K. SARKAR and
K. N. WANCHOO JJ.)
Company-Agreement to pa11 c1Jmmission from profit.o
beyond
specified limi'.t-Validity-Oompa.nie8 Act, .Wi6
(1qf1950), 8, 76(1) & (2).
There was an agreement between the respondent com~
pany, which was incorporated as a Private Limited Company
in 1939, and its promoters, the appeilant and the rest l ) f the
respondent~, that in consideration of the promoters having
each purchased sharers worth 1-1 /2 lakhs of the company, the
company would pay them 12-l/2% of the net profits every yoar.
That agreement was put in art. 3 of the ArticJes of Association
of the company. In 1941 there was a second agreement
between the company, its promoters and a firm, and by it
the said firm was appointed as the managing agent of the
company and the commission payable to the promoters \vas
reduced to 6-1 /4% and art 3 amended accordingly. There was
litigation between the parti's and the consent decrees pcissed
there in left the promoters' commission in tact. Meanwhile the
Companies Act, I 956, came into force and the company served
a notice to the appellant saying that the promoters' commission was no longer lawful and that.art. 3 would be deleted.
The appellant then brought the suit out of which the present
appeal arose, for a declaration that the agreement to pay
cor.-imission was valid and for an injunction rf"Str::iining the
company from deleting the said art. 3. It was urged on behalf
of the companv that s. 76( l) anrl (2) of the '"id Act had made
the agreement invalid and unenforceable. The trial court found
in favour of the company and di~mis~ed the suit. The court
of appeal agreeing, with the trial court dismissed the appeal·
!
•
974
{96t
,\/ odc1da/ Fa~·irchar.d
/)11d~td1ja
v.
SI.,,, ClltJntdto
~ 11rtir Mr/ls J.tr/.
SUPRE~fE COURT REPORTS [l!l62] SCPP.
Section iG of tl:e Cc,mpanits Act, 1956, before it"'"' amrndrd
in 1960, \\'as in i1s ma1crial parts as follo\\·s : -
''(1 ).
A rompany may pay a commission to any
~rson in consideration of
(a) his s11hscrihin~ or agrrr.ing to sub~rrihc,
:vhrthrr abso 111trlY nr condi,r:onally, for any !'har~s
111, or del:cnt11rrs of, the companv. or.
(h) his procuring- or agrec-ing to procure
sub~c1 iption,!:, v.·l~ethrr ab!'olutr. or conditional, for
anv sharrs in, or debentures oC the. con1plny, if t hcfoJJ0,ving conditions arc- fulfillrd, viz.
(i~
the pavmrnt of er n1mission is a11thori·
srci hy the 1rticlt's:
(ii)
the commi!:.si0n paid or agreed to be
paid does not c·xrrrd in the <'a!'e of !'hares, fi\"C
per CC'nt. of the prirf" at \,-hh h the .!)ha1 es a1 r.
ist;ue<l or the amount or rate authorised by the
Art:cJes, ,,·hicht>vrr is Je!'s, and in the cac;.c <Jf
debentures, t\\'O and a half per cent. of the price
;, t '"'hich thr dr.br.nturrs arr. is5.ued or the
;imonnt "'f rate au'horised hy the articles,
\\·h:c-hc\er i~ Jc·!'s:
(iii) the an1ount or rate per rent. of the
<<,rrn1is(;ion paid or agrrc<l to be paid is in the
ta!'c of !-hares or deb<'ntures offered to the public
for s1il'scription, disclosed in the .prospectus; and
~iv) .............................. .
(2) Save a< nforc<aid and save as provided in
srction i9: no con1pany shall allot any of its shares or
dehrntures or apply a,ny of it'." c~pitaI moneys, eitl":er
dirr<:!ly or indireclly, in payment of any c:on11nis~ion,
di~co11nt or a)Jo,,·anrc, to any person in considc·ration of
(a) his suhscrihing- or agref'ing to su~Jscribc,
\vhethrr absohit~ly or ronditionall'.-', ff)r any share<;
in, r,r dthrnt11r('<; of, 1~1c company~ or
(b)
.,., . .,,.,,,,,.,., . ., ........... .
By 1\mcncling Act GS of 1960 the ,,.r,rd ~capital' occt1rring
in thats. 76(2) v.a!' clelr.ted.
'
3 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
975
196?.
Held, (per Gajendragadkar, and Wanchoo, JJ) that
s. 76 of the Act must be co,.<rued by itself, in the light of its Jf adanlt l Fakirchand
own scheme and object and not by reference to what the
Dudhuliya
v.
English law on the point may be. So judged there can be no
Shree Changdao
doubt that s. 76( I) clearly prescribes the payment of
Sugai Mills Lid.
commis'sion, whatever the source from "'·hich it is paid may
be. It is not merely an enabling provision, .but aho prohibits
payment beyond the prescribed ceiling. It is clear th'1t
the section covers commission paid both out of capital.and
profits.
Hilder v. Dexter, (1902) A.C. 472, rxp'ained.
The Ooregum Gold l!fininq Co. of India [td. v. George
Roper and Charles Henry Wallrot/i., (1892) A.C. 125, considered.
I
There can be no repugnancy ·between s. 76( I) thns
construed and s. 76(2). The Legislature was aware that capital
money WflS often applied to payment of commission under the
garb of ostensible lawful pavmen ts. Tn view of the devices adopted to defeat the limit imposed by s.76(1), it is provided bv
s. 76(2) that such devices must also conform to the pre•crihed
limit · The two sub-sections constitute an integrated provision
one of the objects of which was to impose a limit on the
Payment of commission whether for shares ·or for debentures
in order to save the property of the company.
The deletion of the word 'capital' from s. 76(2) by the
Amending Act of 1960 made the intention of the Legislaiure
clear that the Jimit imposed on the payment of commission in
respect of shares and debentures applies as much to commi~~
ions paid out of capi~al as to those paid 0ut of profits.
Per Sarkar, J -There is nothing in s. .76( I) of the Com·
panies Act, 1956, to' sug~est that it intended in any way to
change the pre-:existing law under which a cnmpany was free
to pay any commission it liked out of its profits to an.y person
subscribing for sharrs in it, and the proper way to construe
that sub-section would he to confine its terms to pa vments of
commission out of capital.
'
Hilder v .. Dexler, (1902) A. C. 474, held apolicahle.
Oorequm Gold Min'rl,inq Co. of India Ltd. v. Geor(fl', Roper,
(1892) A.C. 125, referred to.
The words "it shall be lawful" used ins. !05( I) of the
Indian Companies Act, 1913, anrl the word 'mav' usPd ins. 76
(I) of the Companie1 Act, l 9!i6, mean the ;ame thing and
both these sections were enabling provisions that intended to
legalise something which was previously illegal.
·
!liG SUPREME COVRT REPORTS [196'2] SCPP.
C1nL APPELLATE .JuRI~lll.CTJOX: Civil Appeal
!if ad,mfal Fakirrhand
J)udlred1)'a
..
Shrft (.1.01 g1t'J
Su 1-ar A·tilli /Jt(J.
No. 6~ of l!hi!J.
Appeal hy spPcial leave from the judgm.,nt.
and decree dated .July 24, I!):)i, of the Bombay High
Court in Appeal No. 2:! of l!liii.
·
A. V. Vi811:a11alha 8a.slri, .Jasu•rmtlal }rfolh11hlv1·i
and I. N. Sl•.ro.ff, for the appellant .
n.
. C.
Agrirwala, .!. /?, D11rl11d1anji. O. C. :lfoth11r
1tnd Rflrindo· Nara.in, for responclent. Xo. I.
a,;,.,d,.gm/k ·" J.
l!l62. March 20. The ,Judgment of
Gajendragadkar :ind Wanchoo, ,J.J., was d<'livererl
hy GajPndragaclkar, ,J., Sark>tr, J., r],.Jiverwl a separate ,Judgment.
GA,TEJ\flRAOADKAR, .J.-Thc principal quest.ion
which ariRes in t.hiR nppeal relat<i~ to the construction of s. 7o(I) anrl (~) of the Comprv1io• Act, I !J:'il)
(I of l!liifl) (h•m'inaft.er called tlw Act) bnfore tho
amendmrnt, ·of 8ub-s.(2) in I 000. That que>tion
arises in this way. Tlw appellant, !lforlanl:ll
Fnkirchand Dudherliya, and respondent£ Nos. 2
and :land th" father of reopondents :\os. i to IO
were the promoters of the 1st respondent Co.,
Shree Changdeo Su[!ar :\Tills Ltd. The said Co.
was incorporatPd in I !l~O as a Private Limited
Company. Tt. was. however, ~'onverted into a
Public Ltd. Co. in 1!)44. At th<' time of the original incorporation of the Co., 11. Promoter's
A(!rerment. was arrivC'd at whcrel1y the Co. agrned
dming its existPnce to pay a. sum equal to 3-1,'8~~
every year out. 0f its net profits to each of thP.
four promoters. As a re•ult nf this agreement,
the aggrpgate con•ideration payable "very year to
t.he promot.,rs r~'\me to 12-112°;, of t.hfl n<>t profits
of the Co. Article a of the Artic!Ps of Assodation
of tho Co. just.ifierl th,. making of this ngreement.
In l\H I the Co. ca.me into financial difficulties and
•
3 S C.R.
SDPREl\IE CODRT REPORTS
977
1962
in consequence, on the 22nd April, 19il, a tripar·
tite Agreement was arriv_ed at between the Com· Madanlal Fakirchan4
Dud/iediya
pany, Mis. Ardeshir Hormusji Bhiwandiwalla &
Co., and the Promoters. Under this agreement,
Shree Changde()
Sugar Mil,/s Ltd.
it was agreed inter alia, to appoint the said firm
of Bhiwandiwalla & Co. or its nominee as the G11jendragad/oar J.
Managing Agents · of the Co. for 10 . years with
a,n option to the Co. to extend the said period
upon certain terms. At this time, the earlier
agreement as to the payment of the promoters'
commission was modified an:l the sa,id commission
payable to the promoters was reduced to 6-1/4%
and Art. 3 of the Articles of Association was
accordingly amended. Three years later, dispute
arose between the parties and they led to three
snits filed on the original side of the Bombay High
Court. All the said suits were compromised and
decrees hy consent were passed in them. One of the
terms of the compromise was that the promoters'
commission payable to the four promoters which
was· Ks. 1-9-0 to each of them and which came
6:1/4% in the aggregate payable to them under
the agreement entered into between them and the
Managing Agents shall remain in force as in the
Agreement and the promoters' right of commi·
ssion shall continue accordingly. Thus, as a result
of the compromise, the promoters' comm1ss10n
which was payable to them under the earlier
Agreement was saved.
..
After the Act came into force on the 1st of
April, 1956, the appellant received a letter from
respondent No. 1 informing him that respondent
No. 1 had been 'advised that as from the date of
the commencement of the Act, the agreement between the parties as to the payment of the promoters' romrnission had become illegal and void and
t,hat the 1st respondent would not. therefore, pay
any more commissions after April, 1956. In
October, 1956 the appellant received a notiee from
the 1st respondent that an extraordinary general
978 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [19621 SUPP.
1962
meeting of the sharoholders of the !st respondent
Jleddnlal F&ikirch.nd Co. was going to be held,_ inter aUa, for the pur.
DudhttiiJa
pose of amending certain Articles of Association
v.
of the Co. One of tht' amendments proposed to
Sllrtt CluJngdto
Sugar Mills Ltd.
be. put before the said meeting was to delete
O•jtndragadkar .T. Article 3 from the Articles of Association of the
Co. On receipt of this notice, the appellant filed
the present suit on the 13th December 19ii6. By
his plaint, he claimed a declaration that the agree·
ment between tho partieH was \'alid and legal and
he asked for an injunction r('straining respondent
:N'o. I from passing any resolution deleting Article 3
of the Articles of Association of tho respondent Co.
or from taking any action on the basis that
tho said agreement had become illegal and void.
Respondent ~ o. l resisted this suit. It was urged
on its beh1tlf that as a result of the prnvisions of
section 76(1) and (2) of t.he Act, the agreement
in question had become void and could not be en·
forced. Respondents '.Ii os. ·2 to l 0 are the other
beneficiaries under the said agrl'cment and they
supported the appellant. The le1trned .Tudgo who
tried the suit held that the defence raised by respondent No. I was wcll-foundod and that the agreement in question having become void and unenforceable under the relevant prnviBions of the Act,
no declaration could be granted or no injunction
could be issued in favour of the appel11tnt as
claimed by him. In the result, the appellant's
suit was dismissed with costs. The appellant
then prefPrrod an appeal challenging the <'Orrectncss of the decision of the Trial Court. The Court
of Apppeal, howl"ver, agreed with ,the view taken
by the learm•d Trial Judge and dismissed t.he
appeal preferred by the appellant. The appellant.
then applied for ancl obt1tincd a certificate from the
High Court and it is with the said certific1ttc that
he h1ts come to this Court by his present appeal.
That is how the principal point which has been
raised for our decision in the present appeal is
about the construction of secticn 76( I) and (2).
a s.c.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
9i9
1962
1
Mr. Sastri contenrls that in coming to the
conclusion that the appellant's claim to enforce Madanlal Faki"hcnd
•
Dudhediya
the agreement
in question in respect of th e pro f"t
1 s
v.
made by respoudent No. 1 is affected by s. 76, the
Shroe Changdea
Courts below have misconstrued the provisions of Sugar Mill,Dd.
the said section. It is conceded by Mr. Sastri Gai,nd•agadlar J.
that the promoters have so far received .an aggregate amount of over Rs. 5,80,000 which is far in excess of the maximum amount now permissable under
s. 76( I ).But his argument is that the statutory provision imposing the limit in regard to the payment
of commission on which respondent No. I relies
is inapplicable t6 a caRe where the said commission
is claimed not out of capital but out of the profits
of the Company.
Before dealing with this point, however, it
would be convenient to dispose of another objection raised by Mr. Sastri. He contends that the
agreement in question is really outside the purview of s. 76. Section 76 refers, inter alia, to
the commissions payable to any person for his
subscribing or agreeing to subscribe, whether absolutely or conditionally, for any shares of a Co.
That being so, since .the present agreement has
been entered into for consideration other than
those specified in s. 76, its enforcement oannot
. be resisted on the ground that it 'is hit hy
s. 76. The d1Jcision of the question naturally
depends upon the construction of the two
agreements. The first agreement of 1939 provides
that for the help rendered and pains taken by the
prompters and because each of them had agreed to
• purch~se and had purchased shares worth Rs. 1-1/2
lakhs out of the C.o.'s capital, the Co. was entering
into an agreement with them for the payment
of the commission. The agreement provid<>d that
the said commission would be payable as long as the
Co. was in existence. It is thus clear that though
the help rendered by the promoters ar.d pains taken
by them are incidentally 1eferred to, the a.greement
980 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1962] SUPP.
1962
JI. "411lal l"dli.irclumd
D:uUttdiJa
v.
Shrtt Char1gd!J
Sugar Mills l.td.
Gajtntiragaika rJ.
is substantially, if not entirely, based upon the fact
that the promoters hail agreed to purchase and had
purchased shares worth Its. 1-1/2 lakhs and so there
can be no doubt tha,t this agreement clearly falls
within tbe mischi~f of s. 7(). It is, however, urged
that the completion of the first agreement changed
completely when the second agreement was entered
into in 19·11. In this latter agreement which was
entered into betwc·<m the promoters anti the new
Managing Agents, the former agreed to receive 6-1 /4%
an promoters' commission instead of 12-1/2% "as
provided in our respective agreements with the
Company .." That is the su bstanee of the agreement.
However, :\Ir. Sastri reiies on the othm· recitals in the
document in support of his argument that the latter
agreement was not in consideration for the purchase
of shares by the promoters. These recitals refer to the
fact that the promoters had resigned their office and
surrendered and renounced their rights to act as the
i\fanaging Director or :'.lfana.ging Directors of respondent Xo. 1 and it was in consideration of this fact
that the agreement was made. We a.re not impressed by this argument. It iH true that before .this
agreement was ma.de, the new lll•naging Agents
were appointed and that was no doubt the occasion
for the making of the agreement. But the essential
pa.rt of the new ai;rre.,ment waH the reduction made
in the commission payable to the promoters; for
the rest, the earlier agreement continued and so,
in det-0rmining the scope and nature of this latter
agreement, we have inevitably to go hack to the
first agreement. As we have. just pointed out, the
operative clause in the agreement, in terms, refers
to the earlier agreements between the respective
parties a.nd avers that instead of 12-1/2% as provided by the saicl agreement().)/-!% would hereafter
be pa.id. Therefore, we are sati~fied that the payment claimed by the appellant is payment by way
of commission to which s. i6 would apply.
3 S.C.R.
•
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
981
1962
Then it is argued that th~ugh the purchase of
shares by the promoters may partly be the considera- M adanlal Fakirchanp
Dudhediya
tion for the a,greement, the service rendered by them
v.
and the pains taken by them in promoting the Co. Sh"e Changdro
were also set out in the first agreement as forming Sugar Mills Ltd.
part of the consideration and even if the agreement Gajendragadkar J,
as to the payment of commission may fall within
s. 76 part of the agreement which is based on other
considerations would be outside s. 76 and the two
parts being severable, it is necessary to determine
how much the appellant would be entitled to claim
under the part which is valid. In our opinion, this
argument is not open to the appellant at this stage.
It appears th:tt in the· trial Court, an attempt was
made on behalf of the appellant to. lead oral evidence
for the purpose of saying that the two considerations
could be severed and so, the amount payable to the
appellant in respect of that part of the agreement
which was valid, should be determined. The learned Trial Judge did not allow oral evidence to be led
as suggested by the appellant because he found that
the case sought to be made by adducing the said
oral evidence was not made out by any averments
in the plaint nor was any attempt made to raise
any issue in that behalf at the time when the issues
were framed. Indeed, it appears from the judg. ment of the learned Trial Judge that the attempt
made by the appellant in that. behalf was feeble and
half· hearted. Thus, in the Trial Court, the appellant was not allowed to make out this case and
when he went before the court of Appeal, he appa-rently made no grievance about the decision of the
Trial Court; otherwise the Appeal Court would have
dealt with this point. Therefore, we do not think
that the appellant can be permitted to raise this
point before us in this appeal..
'l'hat takes us to the principal point of controversy
between the parties in n gard to the construction of
section 76(1) and (2) of the Act. Mr. Sastri contends that in construing the relevant statutory
982 ~UPREllIE COURT REPORTS [_1962) SUPP.
1962
M oJanlal Fakirchand
Dwlhtdi.JiO
v.
Sf.ru ChanJdto
Sugar JI illt LJd.
Gajtnd1agaJkar J,
proviRions, it would be ne<-essar.v to bear in mind
tha.t the provisions of the Indian Company Law are
substantially based on th" provisions of the English
Company Law and so it would bo necessary to
enquire what the corresponding provision of tho
English Law has been construed to mean. Tho
pattern of the Indian Company Law is set by the
Englieh Company Law and the princip!t·s enunciated by English decisions in dealing with the corresponding provisions of the English Company Law
should be followed when we are interpreting the
provisions of the Indian Company Law. This
argument proceeds on the assumption that the
corresponding provision of the English Company
Law permits the payment of commission for subscribing for shares out of the profits of the Co. with
out any limitation. It is, therefore, necessary to
examine briefly this argument.
The provision in the Company L1tw in regard
to the payment of commission for subscribing for
any shares was introduced in the English Companies Act in the form of an enablin~ provision in 1900
and it became necessary to make the saitl enabling
provision because ·of an earlier decision of the
House of Lords in 'J'he Ooreguin Gold Mininy Co. of
India, Ltd. And Georye Hopet and Charles Henry
Wallroth ('). In that case, the House of Lords had
held that a company limited by shares, form~d and
registered under the Act of 1862, had no power to
issue shares as fully paid up for a money consideration less than their nominal value. It appears that
tho memorandum of association of a company
registered under the Act of 1862 stated that the
capital of the company was £ 125,000 divided into
125,1100 shares of £1 each, and that the shares of which
the original or increased capital might consist might
be divided into difforcnt classes and issued with•such
preference, privilege, or guarantee as the company
might direct. The company being in want of money
(I) (18'l2J A.r..125, 134. 133.
\
3 S.C.R.
·•
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
983
1962
and the original shares being at a great discount,
the directors in accordance with resolutions duly Madanlal flllld1cli11nd
Dudhediya
passed issued preference shares of £1 each with 15s.
'·
credited as paid, leaving a liability of only 5s. per
Shree Changdeo
Sug'lr
Mills
Lld.
share. A contract to this effect was registered
under 'the Companies Act of 1867 s.25. The transacGajendrogadkar, J.
tion was bona fide and for the benefit of the company. In an action by an ordinary shareholder to
test the validity of the issue, it was held that reading the Companies Acts of 1862 and 1867 together,
the issue was beyond the powers of the company,
and that the preference shares so far as the same
were held by original a!lottees were held subject to
the liability of the holder to pay to the company in
cash the full amount unpaid on the shares. In his
speech, Lord Halshury observed that "Twci things
were manifest in s. 25 of the Act of .1867. The
shares to be held subject to the payment, and the
payment is to be in cash. The amount is to be paid
and the whole amount to be paid in cash, and to me
it appears, looking at the latter part of the section
whereby a contract made and filed may qualify and
cut down the form of payment, and that it may be
in goods or in value received in some form, instead
of in cash, it must· nevertheless be payment." He
also added that "the capital is fixed and certain,
and every creditor of the company is entitled to
look to that capital as his security." Thus, as a
result of this decision, it become obvious that no
commission could be paid to any person for his subscribing to the shares of the Company out of the
capital of the Co.
'
· It was as a result of this decision that section
8 was enacted in th@ Act which was passed to amend
the Companies Act, in 1900. 'Section 8(1) !Jrovided
that:
"Upon. any offer of sh1.res to the public
for subscription, it shall be lawful for a
company to pay a commission to any person
984 SUPREME COURT REPORTS.(1962] SUPP.
19'2
Madan/al Fakirchnnd
Dudlµdi;'(J.
,..
Sh1e1 Chon:d~11
Sug"' .\11/ts Ltd
Gojend1ago.dkar J,
in consideration of this subscribing or :1grceing
to subscribe, whether absolutely or conditionally, for any share;; in the eump1wy, or
pror.uring or agreeing to procure subscriptions
whether absolute or condition;i,l, for any
shams in the company, if the payment of the
commission and the amouut or rate per cimt.
of the commission paid or agreed to be paid
are respectively authorised by the articles of
association and disclosed in the prospectus, and
the commission paid or agreed to be paiJ Joeti
exceed tho amount or rate so authorised."
Sub-sec. (2) provided that:
"Save as aforesaid, 110 company "hall
apply for any of its shares or capital money
either directly or iudirectly in payment
of any commission, discount, or 1illowance
to any person in consideration of his
subscribing or
agreeing to subscribe,
whether absolutely or conditionally, for
any shares of the comp;i,ny, or procuring
or agreeing to procure subscriptions, whether
absolute or conditional, for &nv shares in the
company, whether tho shares ~r mo1wy be so
applied by being added to the purchase money
of •LDY property acquired by the company or
to tho contract price of any work lo b1, executed for the company, or the money be paid
out of the nominal purchase money or contmct price, or otherwise."
Sub-sec.(3) added that.=
"But nothing in this section shall affect
the power of uhy company to pay such brokerage as it has heretofore been lawful for a
company to pay."
It would thus be seen that the difficulty cn•1tted by
the decision of the Hmrnc of Lords in the case of
The Oorcgum Gold lllining Co. of India Lt<l. waB
3 S.C.R .
•
SUPREME COURT REPORT.S
985
overcome by this statutory provision and in consequence, it became lawful for the company to pay
commission subject to the conditions specified in
the section. It was because the legal difficulty
created by the· decision of the House of Lords was
intended to be cured that the Legislature enacted
the section by providing that it shall be lawful for
the company to pay commission on the terms specified. 1'hat is the genesis of the expression "it shall
be lawful for a company to pay" with which the
section begins.
Then followed the Consolidating Act of 1908.
S. 89 of this Act dea.lt with the power of the company to pay commission and discounts. This section
is more elaborate than s.t! of the Act of 1900, but,
in substance, the pattern remained the same.
Sec. 43 of the Act of 1929 introduced an important change by making an additioual.provisiou
by which the commission paid or agreed to be paid
was not to exceed 10% of the price at which the
shares are issued or the amount or rate authorised
by the arti-Oles, whichever is the less. In other words,
in Hl29, a ceiling waa placed on the payment of
commission at 10% of the price. After this Act was
passed, commission paid could not exceed Hl% of
the price at which the shares were issued.
The Companies Act, 1948 by s.53 has maintained the same provisions as those contained in s.43
of the earlier Act. That, in brief, is the position
of the corresponding provisions in the English Companies Acts.
Mr. Sastri contends that the relevant provisions of the English Companies Act ·have been
construed to mean that the ceiling on the payment
of commission to which they refer is payment of
commission out of capital and not out of profits. In
othe1· words, the argument is that the payment of
commission out of profits is outside the misohief of
1962
Madanlal Fakircham
DudhediJ1a
v.
Shree Changdeo
Sugar JW £lls Ltd. •
GaJ'endragadkar J,
986 SOPHEME COUB.T HEPOHTS [1962) SUPP.
19G2
1a,ianl'4l Fakircha11d
..
f)!Jd~(diya
• Sh1u Cha111dco
S'flgar ,\/ iil:J Ltd.
the relevant English provisions. In support of this
argument reliauce has been placed on the decision
of the House of Lords in Hilder And Dexkr ( 1).
fo that case, to rniso working capital a company
offered shares at par to tho appellant and some
other persons with an option tu take further shares
at par within a certain time. The appellant subscribed for shares, and the market price having
risen to a premium, desired to take up the further
shures. It was held : "that this was not an application of shares of capital monoy directly or indirectly in payment of commission, discount, or allowance within the meaning of the Companies Act, 1900,
s.8. Sub-s. ~ and (the transaetiun being otherwise
unobjectionable) thnt the appellant was entitled to
exercise the option." It would be nu ti cell that
what the House of Lords was callctl upon to consitler was whether 1'11 application 1nade by the ap1•ellant for further shares offcndod against the provisions of s. 8(2) of the English Act and the Hoi.se of
Lords helu that it did not. It is true that tho
shareholder would have been able to sell his shares
at a premium and thereby obtain <t benefit, but tho
said benefit cannot ba said to have been obtained
by him at the expcnso of the company's ca.pita..:
Thus, the application made by the appellant was
outside the prohibition contained in s. 8(2). In other
words, this decision is directly a decision on the
constrnction of s.8(:!). It has, however, been urged
by i\Ir. Sastri that in dealing with the construction
of s. 8(2), Lortl Davey in his speech had oonsiuered
s. 8( 1) and observed that : "this sub-section permitH
a limited application of the company's capital in
payment of a commission." The whole of the
appellant'H argument is based on this sentence. It
is suggesteu that this sentence amounts to a decision
that the provisions of s. 8(1) have reference to the
payment of commission out of capita.I and, therefore,
have no refern11ee tu the payment of commission
(I) (1901) A.C. 474, 479.
~S.C.R.
.... '
'
...
SUPREME UOURT REPORTS
\)87
out of profits. We a.re not inclined to accept this
Fakirohan~
contention. It is clear that in the case of Hilder, ...~ adanlal
Dudhediya
v.
the House of Lords had np occasion to consider
Shree Ch11ngdeo
whether or not commission could be paid out of Sugar
],fills Ltd.
profits. That point simply did not arise in tha.t.
litigation. The question which arose was whether Gojendrogadkar I.
that was a case of payment ant of capital which
was prohibited by s. 8(2) and it is in that context
and while dealing with the narrow controversy between the parties that an observation has no doubt
been made that section 8(1) permits an application
of the company's capital in payment of a commission in a limited way. This statement cannot be
taken to be an exhaustive interpretation of s. 8(1)
so tha.t it should be possible to hold that by necessary implication it was intended to lay down thHt
payment of commission out of profit was not
within the purview of this section. Therefore, we
are not prepared to accept the assumption made by
the appellant that this decision is a direct authority
on the point that payment of commissfon out of
profits is not covered by s. 8( 1) or by the relevant
provisions in the subsequent English Companies
Acts.
It is then argued that authoritative text-books
on Company Law support the view that payment of
commission out of profits is not prohibited by the
English Companies Law. In the "Hiindbook on
Joint Stock Companies" by Gore-Browne, it is observed : ·'that there is no prohibition against paying
. commission unconditionally 'out of profits', and
this would seem to be lawful unless contrary to any
stipualtion in the Articles." (p. 191). Buckley •On
t~e ~ompa~ies Acts.' o?serves that : '·the prohibit10n 1s agamst apphcat10n of "shares or capital
money," and payment of commission out of a fund
of undistributed profit is not, at all events not
expressly, forbidden by the section." (p. 132). It
is cl"'ar that this statement is somewhat cautious
988 SUPH.EME COUHT ItEPOl{TS [1962] SUPP.
1962
lfada11lal FaJ.ircliand
Vudludi;-a
v.
Shru Changdeo
Su:a' :\1/l{j Ltd.
Gaj1nd1ogadkcr J.
and not as unqualified as the statement in GoreBrowne's Handbook. In Palmer's Company Prcccclents it is observed that the provisions of s. 5:1(2)
of the Act of HJ48 "leave a company at liberty to
apply any of its 'profit' in paying commissions in
·a ccordonne with tht· practice above referred to ab
existing before the Act of HJOO." (p. li9). In
Palmer's Company Law, however, the position is
stated wmewhat differently. lleferring to section
5;~(:1). it is observed that : "if the words used are
intended to restrict sub-sec.( l) so as to make it only
lawful tu pay commission uut of the newly issued
shares or capital money received for them, tho
payment of commission out of profits would appear
to be prohibited bys. :i4 which prohibits a company
to give any financial assistance in connection with,
inter alia, the subscription of its own shares. If,
un the other hand, sub-seo. (2) docs not intend tu
restrict sub-sec.(l) but contains a separate and independent provision, the application of profit of the
company within the limits of sub-section (l)(b) of
s.53 would be permissible. It is thought that the
latter interprut11tion is correct and that thu words
in sub·sec.(:!J of s.5:! are intended to make it clear
th1it the former practice may be continued under
whwh a company could use its profits for the payment of commission within the permitted limits."
(p. 200). It would tbus appear that tho last observation seems to support the view that the prohibition couta.ined in s.5:!(1) applies as much to payments made uut of capital as to payments made
out of profits.
It is thus clear tha.t the vicwti expressed by
the different writers on Company Law disclose a
differenco of approach and do not appear to be
based on any judicial decision. In fact, though
:\Ir. Sa~tri conceded that there was no direct decision on this point, be contended that the.absence of
any judicial Llecision shows that the point was
neve1· disputed. On the other hand, Mr. Aggarwala
3 S.O.R.
-
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
989
contends that the absence · of any judicial decision
speaks for the fact that nobody ever thought that
payment of commission could be made out of profits beyond the limits prescribed by the relevant
statutory provision. However that may be, in
view of the material placed before us, we do not
think it wou Id be safe for us to assume that the
position under the English Law is established either
one way or the other and for obvious reasons, we
would be reluctant to embark upon an enquiry on
that point by seeking to interpret the relevant English provisions ourselves.
Let ns, however, assume that the true legal
position under the relevant provision of the English
statute is as the appellant contends. Does it follow
therefrom that we should approach the problem of
construing s. 76 with the pre-conceived notion that
s.. 76 provides exactly for the same position ? In
our opinion, the answer to this question has to be
against the appellant. Let us first read s. 105 of
the Indian Companies Act of 1913 and s. 76 of
the Act of 1956 Aide bv side. Section 105 rea<ls
thus:·
"Power to pay certain commissions and
prohibition of payment of all other commissions, discounts, etc.
.,
( l) It shall be lawful for a company to
pay a commission to any person in consideratio~ of bis subscribing or , agreeing to subsrribe, whether absolutely or conditionally,
for any shares in the company, or procuring
or agreeing to procure subscriptions, whether
absolute or conditional, for any shares in the
company, if the paymer>t of the commission
is authorised by the articles and the commission paid or agreed to be paid does not exceed
the amount or rate so authorised and if the
1962
Maianlal Fakircha1
Dudhediya
v.
Shree Chan~deo
Sugar 1.\1. ills Lrrl.
Gaj:;ndragadkar J-
9!JO SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1962] SC'PP.
l
AJadatilal Fakfr:hand
amount or rate per cent. of the commission
paid or agreed to be paid is-
JJudl.tdiy4
v.
Shrtt Criangd10
Sugor ,\1 ills Ltd,
(Jojrndragailka1 .J
(a) in the rase of shams offered to
t.hc public for subscription, cliscloecd in
the pr~spectns ; or
(h) in the cases of share not offered to the public for snhscription,disclos<'<l
in the statement in liPu of prospectuR, or
in a statement. in the prescribed form
signed in like manner as a stateml'nt. in
Iieu of prosnectus and filed with the Registrar and, where a circular or notice,
not hein!l a prospectus inviting su hecription for the shares ie issued, also disclosed
in that circular or notice.
(Z) Rave as nforcRaid and save as provided ins. I05A, no company shall apply any of
its shares nr captial money either directly. or
indirectly in payment of any commission,
discount. or nllowancP, t-0 any person in consicleration of hie subscribing or Bl!reP.ing to
FU hsrribe, whether nhsolut<:ly ·or conditionallv,
for any shares of the company, or procuring
or agreeing to procure subcriptions, whether
absolute or conditional. for any shares in the
compan.v. wh.:re the shares or money be so
applied by being added to the purchaee
money of any property acquired by the company or to the Mntract price of any work to
he exPrutP<l for the company, or .the money
he paid out . of the nominal purchase-mon11.v
or contract price, or otherwise."
Section i6( I) an<l (:2) reads thus :
"fl) A company m~y pity a commission
to any person in consideration of
(a) his >uhscrihing or agreeing to
subscribe, whether ahRolutely tJr conditionally, for any shares in, or debenture,
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 991
3 S.C.R.
,
(b)
of, the company, or
•
his procuring or agreeing to procur? ~ubscriptions, whether absolute or cond1t10nal
for any shares in, or debentures of, the
company,
.
if the following conditions are fulfilled,
iz.-
·l 1
• •
(i) the payment of the commission is authorised by the artinles ;
(ii) the commission paid or
agreed to be paid does not exceed
in the case of shares, five per cent of
the price at which the shares are
issued or the amount or rate authorised by the articles, whichever is
less, and in the case of debentures,
two and a half per cent of the price
at which the debentures are issued or
the amount of the rate authorised
by the articles, whichever is less ;
(iii) the amount of rate per cent.
of the commission paid or agreed to
be paid is-in the case of shares or
debentures offered to the public for
subscription, disclosed in the prospectus : and
in the case of shares or debentures not offered to the public for
subscription, disclosed in the statement in lieu of prospectus, or in a
statement in the prescribed form
signed in like manner as a statement
in lieu of prospectus and filed before
the payment of the commiBsion with
the Registrar and, where a circular
or notice, not being a prospectus in·
viting subscription for the shares or
debentures, is issued, also disclosed
in that circular or notice ; and
(iv) the number of shares or
1962
Madanlal Fal irclani
Dudhedi)·a
v.
Shree lhangd~o
Sugar Mills Ltd.
Gajendragadkar J.
992 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1962] SUPP.
1962
:lJadanlaJ. F.. kircl1a11d
IJ11dlu~: i;·a
v.
Shrte Cflan£dt·J
Su::rar M 1/ls I.Id.
Gajn;d•a[TadJ.:.11r .J.
debentures which persoIJB have agreed for a commission to subscribe
absolutely or conditiomtlly is discloRed in the manm·r aforesaid.
(2) Save as aforesaid and save as providPd in SPction 7fl, no company shall allot
any of its sh11,res or debentures or apply any
of its capital mr>JH'y~. either directly or indiroctly, in payment of any c0mmission, discount or allnw:mce, to any pr~rson in consi<lerntion of(a) his subscribing or a!lreeing to
sulscrihf', whether ahsolut.elv or conditionally, for any shnr<'s in, or .. debentures
of, the company or,
(h) his prom1rin (( or a!!reeing to
procurf' subscriptions, whether absolute
or conditional, for an~· shams in, or cl1ihentnres of, the company,
wlicthPr the shares, cleh<mtures or monev bo
so allotted or appliccl hy being nd<lecl to· the
Purchase monev of 1rny property acquired
by the company or to the contract price of
any work to b.- execntod for the company,
or the money be pnid out. of the nominal
purchase monPy or cont.met price, or othP-rwise.
• o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o' o o o o o o o o o' o o o Io o o o o o o o o o o o
..
A .comparison of the ~wo AP.ctions will show that
s. 76 has m:ulc thrl)e cll'p~rtures from s. 105 ; firnt
it. hf'gins bv saving th:1t "a. company mav pay a
commi•sion" ancl thiA expr.-ssion has s11bstituted
the en.rliPr expression "it shall he lawful for n com_
pa.ny to pay commis•ion". It is true that this
change is not very significant; hut it cannot be
treated as of no eignificnnce at all and it may be
3 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
-,
993
1962
that by adopting the present expression, the Legilature wanted to indicate that s. 76 unlike its pre- M 1danlal Fafcirchand!
Dudludiya
decessor s. 105, was not intended to be merely an
v.
enabling provision. Then it would be noticed that
Shree C.~anddto
the substantial part of s. 105( 1) has now been put Sugar Mills Ltd.
more oategorioally and definitely in the form of Gajendragarlkar J.
conditions in s. 76 and that may suggest that what
s. 76( 1) purports to do is to authorise the payment
of commissi'm but subject only to the limitations
prescribed by it. In other words, it is a ·section
which enables payment to be made and prohibits
payment being made beyond the limit prescribed.
The third change which is very material is that
debenture are included within its purview. It is
common ground that so far as commission payable
on debentures is concerned, there never was any
prohibition in the English Law or in the Indian
Law ; and so, ifs. 76( 1) was intended merely to be
an enabling provision, it was hardly necessary to
include debentures within its scope. The inclusion
of debenture marks an important departure from
the position under s. 105 of the earlier Act as well
as from the position under the corresponding provisions of the English statute. Therefore, having regard to the scheme of the present s. 7fi( 1),
it would, we think, not be legitimate to attempt
the task of construing the said provision with
a pre-conceived notion as suggested by the appel-·
!ant; for it may well be that the object intended to
be achieved by this sub·section is different from the
object intended to be achiev!'d by the corresponding
provision in the English Law.
Besides, it would be relevant to recall that one
of the objects of the Act clearly was to impose stringent restrictions. upon payments out of profits of
the company to the Managing Agents, Directors,
Managing Directors, and others concerned with the
management of the affairs of the company. This
·obje0t has been expressly achieved by several provisions in the Act, such as sections 348, 352 and
9D4 SUPREh-IE COUR.T REPORTS [1962] SUPP.
1962
38i. The anxiety of tho Legislature to save the
profits
made by the company and to prevent extratM adaolol Fakirchand
Dudlitdi)·a
vagant, payment.R being made out of thi>m which
v.
is a distinguishing feature of tho Act, also shows
Sh1tt ChanJ!dtn
Sut•r i'\f ills LCti.
that it would no~t be· safe to aBBume that s.i6(1)
must havo intended to :tchieve exactly what t.he
Ga,imdragadkar J.
corresponding provision in the En!!'lish statut-0
intended to achievfl. Therefore, we do not think
it would be right to assume at th11 vory out~ct that
the payment of commisshn out of profits is outside
the provisions of s. i6 becua;ic it is not included
in the corresponcling provision in the English law.
After all, the question which has been raised h<'fore
us in the present appeal must be determine by us
on a, fair and reasonable construction of s.76(1)
and (2) antl it is to that problem that we must now
turn.
In construing section 76(1) and (2), it would
be necessary to hear in mind the relevant rules of
construction. The first rule of construction which
ia elementary, .is that the words used in the section
must be given their plain grammatica 1 meaning.
Since we are dealing with two sub-sections of s. i6,
it is necessary that the said two sub.sections must
be construed as a whole "each portion throwing
light, if need he, on the rest.'' The two sub sections
must be read as parts of an intPgral whole and as
being inter-dependent; an attempt should bo made
in construing them to reconcile them if it is reasonably possible to <lo so, and to avoid repu~:incy. If
r1,pugnancy cannot possihl.v be avoided, then :i
queHtion may arise as to which of the two should
prevail. But t.hat question can arise only if repugnancy cannot he avoided.
The important part in s. 76( I) with which we
are rlircctly concerned is the one that provides that
the commission paid or agreed to he paid does not
exceed the limit therein prescribed. One of the
conditions whirh has tote fatiHfi~cl in the matter
3· S.C.R.
SUPRE'1E COURT REPORTS
995
1962.
of payment of commission to a pNson subscribing
Fakirch.~nd
for any shares is that the said commission shall M adanlul
DudhediJ•a
not exceed 5% of the price at which the share@ are
v.
Shrte Cluingdto
issued or the amount. or rate authorised by the Sugar
Mills Ltd.
articles, whichever is less. It is significant that this
. provision seeks to place an absolute ceiling on the Gt>jendragadkar J.
payment of commission and in doing so, it refers to
the commission generally as such and does not refer
to the commission paid either out of capital or out
of profits, so that s. 76( l) read by itself unambiguouslv and clearly prescribes a ceiling on the pay·
ment of commission what ever may be the source from
which the said commission may be paid. We have
already seen that s. 76( I) cannot be treated merely
as an enaHing section. This position has been
conceded by the appellant before us, and so ·there
·can be no doubt that the ceiling placed on the
payment of commission is intended to act as a
prohibition against the payment of any commission
beyond the said ceiling. Therefore, s. 76(1 )(i)(ii)
leaves no doubt that it covers commissi.on paid
either out of capital or out of profits.
Section 76(1 )(b )(i) prescribBs another condition
that the payment of commission is authorised bv the
articales. Since the payment of commission which is re·
ferred to in this clause is commission payable either for
the shares or for the debentures, it may be relevant to
consider whether the commission here rPferred to can
be commission only out of capital. Ordinarily, commission paid for debentures would be commission
out of debenture monev or profits though, of course
it is conceivable that the commission on debenture
may also be paid out of capital. But if commission
on debentures can be paid out of profits. then it
would not be unreasonable to assume that the Raid
provision refers to commission payable not only out
of capital but out of profits as well. The inclusion
of rlebentmes withfo the scopP of s. 76 suggests that
the commission mentioned by 76( I) (c )(i) would not
996 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1962] SUPP .
1962
on a rP-aaonahle comt.mction be confined to a. com.
M tuf~lal Fal.:irchand mission payable out of capital alone.
Dw!htdiya
v.
Shrt1 Ch1ngdeo
Sugn Mil/. Ltd.
Gaj111drt1g• dkar J,
Clause ('iii)° of s. 76 (l)(bl seems to suggest the eamc
conclusion. Under this clause, the condition impo.
s~d is that the amount or rate per cent of the
commission paid or agrPcd to be paid iH in the case
of shares or debentures not offered to the public for
subscription, disclosed in the statement in lieu of
prospectus, or in a statemont in the prescribed form
~igned in like mannl'r as a statement in lieu of pros- ·
pectus and filed before the payment of the commision with the Registrar. In construing this clausl,,
it may ho useful to refer to section III of the Act of
1913. l'nder that section, particulars in case of
eommis.iion on debentures hnd to be filed and it cannot be disputed that the said particulars wou Id also
refer to particulars of commission paid out of profits.
Now th:i.t debentures have been brought under s. 76,
woulil it be unreasonable to assume that under the
particulars required to be filed under condition (iii),
particulars in regard to commission pn.yable out of
profits are also required to he filed? In other words,
the word "commission" used in el. (i) and (iii) seems
to refer to commission paid not only out of capital
but also out of profits in r·elation to dobcnturcs. That
incidentally supportR the construction that the word
"commission" used in clause (ii) cannot he confincil
only to the commission payable out of capital.
Indeed, if s. 76(1) is read by itself, there can be no
doubt or difficulty in coming to the conclusion that
commission tlwre contemplated is commission pa)·
able both out of capital us well as profits.
The argument, however, is that if this construction is accept-0cl, there would be repugnancy
betwMn the two sub-clauses of s. 76. It is therefore,
necessary to examine s. 76(2) because as we have
already seen, before determining the true scope and
effect of s: 76(1) and (2) we must read them together
as parts of an integral whole. Now what does
3 S..C.R.
•
-
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
997
s. 76(2) provide? It provides that no co~pany shall
allot. any of its shares or debentures or apply any of
its capital moneys, either directly or indirectly, in
payment of any commission,_ discount or allowance,
to any person in consideration of the objects therein specified, savll as aforesaid and as provided in
s. 79. In other words, what is prohibited by sub-s. 2
is save as aforesaid in s. 76( l) just as it is save as
provided in s. 79. That means that prohibition
enacted bys. 76(2) has to be worked out in the light
of s. 76(1) and s. 79. The prohibition imposed by
s. 76(1) is in general terms and it includes payments
from any source or fund. The Legislature knew
that payment of commission may be made by adopting several devices. and what sub-s. (2) intends to
achieve is to prohibit the adoption ~f such devices by
m;i.king it clear that whatever be tlie nature of the
device adopted, if the object of the device is to pay
commission, then it must conform to the limit prescribed bys. 76(1 ). It is well.known that sometimes
shares or debentures are allotted or capital money
is applied in payment of commission. 8imilarly,
under the garb of what may
ostensibly
be lawful payments, for instance, in respect of purchase money of any property acquired by the
company or the contract price of any work to be
executed for the company, commission may be paid;
the purchase price of any property or the contract
price of any work may be fixed so as to include
something more than its real ya]ue, the difference
being intended to. be paid as commission. It was
in view of these devices which the Legislature knew
were being adopted for the payment of commission
that s. 76(2) has been inserted in the form which it
has taken. As has been observed by Craies 'On
Statute Law', provisos are often inserted "to allay
fears" or to remove misa.pprehensions. Just ·as
s.. 76(2) has to be read in the light of s. 79 and
subject to its provision, so it has to be read in the
light of s. 76(1) and subject to its provision. In
1962
Madanlal Fakirchand
Budhedi.)ia
v•
Shree ChantdtfJ
Sugar Mills Ltd,
Gajendragadkar J.
998 SUPREME OOURT REPORTS [1962] SUPP.
J/ adarz[,[ Fakirc/1411d
DuJhldiyo
v.
Shrte Cha11gd10
Sugar Mills Ltd.
other words, in order to clarify the position in
regard to the devices which may l>o adoptnd to
defeat the limit imposed by s. i6 (I), the L~gis·
lature has provided by s. 76 (2) that these
devices are also subject to s. i6( l) and paymnnts
ea.n b~ made under those garbs or devices, provided
they do not exceed the limit prescribed by s. 7ti( Ii:
In our opinion, therefore, far from there boing any
conflict or repugnancy between s. 7!i( I) and s. 7li(2),
they constitnt-0 one integrated provision, 0110 of the
objects of which is to impose a limit on the payment of commission either in respect of shares or
in respect of debentures. The anxiety to save the
profits of the company is as much in evidence in
s. 76(1) as it is in other sections to which we have
already referred.
'
!\Ir. Sastri however,
contends that the proper
way to roads. 76(1) and (2) would be totreM s.7!il2)
as the main provisi1m and s. 7!i( I) as a proviso to it.
ilis argument was thats. 76(2) puts a blanket ban
on the allotment of any shares or debentures or the
application of any capital moneys and s.76( I )relaxes
the ban by allowing the payment to be made within
tho limits prescribed and subject to the c011ditio11s
therein specified. The ban imposed by s. iG(2)
is in respect of capital and not in respect of profits
and so the relaxation from the ban prescribed
by s. 76(1) must likewise be confined to
capital and cannot be extended to profits.
In our opinion, this is &n argument of desperation.
What we are asktd to do by :lfr. Sastri iii in substance, to re-write the two sub-section of s. 76 and
that we cannot legitimately do, particularly when on
the alternati vc construction it is found that there i~
no repu"nance between the two sub-sections. On
the ap;llant's view, we have to ignore the opening
words ins. 76(2) and substitute the said words in
s. 7ti( l ). That clearly is the function of the Legiebture which enacts laws and not of the Court which
interprets them. Therefore, in our opinion, the
learned Judges of the High Court were right when
:; .C.R.
•
.
SUPRl£1\'1E COURT REPOH.TS
999
1902
they held that a claim for commission out of the
profits of the company which the appellant seeks to Madanlal Fakirch•
Dudhdiya
make in the present suit is hit bys. 76(1) and canv.
not be entertained.
Shree Chanzdeo
Sugar 1llills Ltd.
In this connection, there are two other points
which have .been urged before us by Mr. Aggarwala. G-ijendrng1,dkor J
He contents that ifs. 76(1) and (2) are read as confined to the payment of commission from otit of the
capital, there would be uo provision for payment of
commission out of profits at all and so, the plaintiff's claim would have to be dismissed on that
ground. The argument is that the Act is a Consolidating Act and as such, it would be legitimate to
assume that the relevant provisions of s. 76 deal
exhaustively with the topic of the payment of commissi.on in respect of shares and debentures. If that
be so, whatever is not provided for by s. 76 could
not be claimed after the passing of the Consolida•
ting Act. Similarly, it is urged that if commission
payable out of profits in respect of dividends was
intended to be saved, a provision would have been
made in s. 76 corresponding to the provision made
by s. 76(3) in regard to brokerage. s. 76(3) provides that nothing in this section shall affect the
power of any company to pay such brokerage as it
. has heretofore been lawful for a company to pay.
There is no such provision in respect of payment of
commission out of profits iu relaticin to debentures.
There may be some force in these contentions.
'•
Before we part with this subject, it would be
relevant to state that in 1960, s. 76(2) has been
amended by s. 22 of the Amending Act (No. 65 of
1960) and as a result of this amendment, the word
'capital' has' been deleted. It is common ground
that after this amendment was effected,· s. 76(1) and
(2) both refer to payment of commission out of profits as well as out of capital. As we have a.lready
seen, the whole of the argument urged by the appellant on the constrqction of s. 76(2) was substantjally based on the use of the expretision "any of its
1000 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1962) SUPP.
ad1Jnlol Fakircl1011d
Dudhedi_ya
v.
~·hree Ghttn'}dto
ugor M1lh Ltd.
ajttufr1godlcar J •
capital moneys". The word "capital'' having been
deletetl, the provision of s. 76( 2) is wide enough to
include profits. Therefore, there ean be no <foubt
that after 1000, tbo limit imposetl 011 tbe payment.
of commission in respect of shares and deb<'nlures
applies as much to commissions out of capital as to
those which are pa.id out of profits. It may be pHmissible to assume that by the amentlment made i11
l9ti0, the Legislature has attempted to remove
doubt that may have arisen owing to the nse of the
word "capital" in s. 76(:.!) and has now made its intentions clear beyond any doubt. This amcndm1•nt
1dong with several others which wore made in HHiO
was presumably the result of the rec:ommencfotion
of the Committee appointed in that behalf. In its
report, the Committee observed that "in order to
remove any doubt, we would reeomme.ntl the deletion of the word "capital" from s. 76(2)", Thuf, it
is clear that the point raised in th1' present appeal
cannot arise under tho amended provisions of s. io.
That leaves one minor point still to be considered, It was urged in the Courts below that the
provisions of s. /() cannot be invoked against the
appellant because tho agreement on which the
appellant rests his claim was ma<le prior to the 1st
April, 1956 when the Act came into force. The
contention appears to have been that in invoking
the provisions ofs. ill, respondent No. l was seeking
to make tho said provision retrospective which it is
not. In our opinion, there is no substaw'e in this
argument. Sect.ion 9 of the Act is a. clear answer
to this contention. Under s. 9(a) any agreement
executed by the company cannot prevail if it is inconsistent with the provisions of the Act and
under s. 9(b) the articles shall likewise not prevail
if they am inconsistent with the provisions of tho
Aot. Section 645 leads to the same conclusion.
The result is, the appeal fails and is dismissed
with costs.
1
3 S.C.R.
SUPREME COUR'f REPORTS
10[)1
1962
SARKAR, J.-The respondent Shri Changdeo
Sugar Mills Ltd. was incorporated as a private Madanlal Fo.kirchand
Dudhediya
company on September l, l9J9. The appellant, the
v.
respondents Nos. z and 3 and one Kaoitnrchand Shree Changdeo
Srikrishan, since deceased, h~d promoted its forma- Suiar Mills lLtd.
tion. On December 18, 19:19, the respondent comSarkir J.
pany entered in to separate agreements with the
promoters providing that "In consideration of the
help given .and tronole taken by you promoters and
in considera~ion of each of you having agreed to
take shares of the value of one and half Jae of
rupees in the capital of the company and having
talrnn the sdid shares, the company enters into an
agreement with yon as well as with other three promoters as follows: (l) The company ............... will
............ pay a sum equal to 3- 1/8 per cent out of
the n~t profits of the company to each of yon pro·
moters or his heirs and representatives, e:x;ecntors,
administrators or assigns". The promoters duly
took the shares mentioned in the agreements and
became entitled to receive, taken all tegether, 12-1/:l
per cent of the profits of the respondent compmny.
Article 3 of the Articles of Association of the respondent company provided that it would enter into
the aforesaid agreements with the promoters.
•'
In 1941, the respondent company was involved
in financial difficulties and on April 22, 1941, a tripartite agreement was made between it and a firm
ualled Ardeshir Harmusji Bhiwa.ndiwalla and Co.
and the promoters under which it was provided that
the firm or its nominee would become the managing
agent of the respondent company and the promoters
all together would receive "6-1/4 per cent as promoters' commission instead of 12-1/2 per oent as provi·
<led in our respective agreements with the company"
that is to say, the agreements of December 18, 1939.
In terms of this agreement article 3 of the Articles
of Association of the company was duly ·amended.
An agreement was also specifically entered into by
•
••
1002 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1962] SUPP.
l!JG2
fl[ udanJaJ Fa~irchan11
..
f)udhrdi;·a
Shitc Clia1i_~,/tQ
Su~ar ,I/ i /IJ Ltd.
'-"arkar J.
the respondent company with each of the promoters.
In HH4, the respondent company waa cunvertt:d into a public limited company. On .June JO,
10!4, 1C.t8turchand Srikrishan clied and hi8 interest
under the agreements is now represe1ited by respondents ~os. 7 tu 10. Presumably respondent Xo. 3
had taken the shares and entered into the agreements as representing a joint family, for it is nut i.J1
diopute that un a partition bctwuen respondent No.
3 and hid co·sharern, respondents Xos. 4 to 6 becam" entitled to participate in the interest uf rm;pundent No. :; untler the agreements and in the
bharc8.
In September 19H, three suits were pending
in the High Court at Bombay between the respondent company, thn beneficiaries under the agreements and the ;;aid · Bhiwandiwall& & Co. to the
d"tails of which it is unnecessary to refer for the
said suits were however eompromised. The terms
of settlement providecl th1<t (a) all the suits would
be iiutually withdrawn; and (b) "The promoters
commission payable tu us four which is l~s. 1-9-0
to euch of us and which comes to 6-1/4 percent in the
aggn•gate p<:tya.ble to us four under the agreement
shall remain in foree as in the agreement <:tnd our
ri~ht of commission shall continue aoconlingly".
The word 'us' in the terms of settlement means the
beneficiaries under the agreements.
The respondent company paid the commisRion
at the said rat~ of 6-1/4 percent to tho beneficiaries
under the agreements upto September 30, 195;). On
October 1, 1956, the respondent company informed
the a ppcllant and the other beneficiaries that as
from April l, Hliiti, when the Companies Act, 1956,
hatl come into force, the agreements had become
ille.,al and void. It was said that s. 'ifi of the Com" . Act, 1966, prohibited all payment of commispanics
sion for subscribing for Bha.rcs in excess of 5 per
a s.c.u.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1003
1962
cent of the price at which the shares were issued. It
is not in dispute that what the appellant and the Matfanlal Fakirch(
Dudhediya
other beneficiaries had been paid as commission
v.
Shrec Chan;.deo
exceeded five per cent of the price at which the
shares had been issued. The respondent company Sugar M illB Lta
Sarkar J.
therefore contended that the appellant and the
other beneficiaries were not entitled to any further
commission.
The appellant disputed the contention of
the respondent company and filed a suit in the
High Court at Bombay against it in which th~
other beneficiarieo were also made defendants
for a declaration that the agreements of
modified on April,
December 19, 11139, as
<:2, 1941, were valid and for an injunction
restraining the respondent ·company from passing
a resolution deleting article 3 of its Articles of
Association as it proposed to do and from acting on
the footing as if the said agreements were illegal.
The appellt1.i1t contended that s. 76 of the Companies
Act of 1956 prohibited payment of commission for
subscribing for shares beyond the limit specified out
of capital only and as the agreements provided for
payment of the commission out of profits, they were
not affected by that section at all.
-'
The suit was contested by the respondent
company but the other defendant supported the
appellant's case. The respondent company contended that the section applied to payment of commission both out of capital as well as out of profits.
The suit was heard in the first instance by S. T.
Desai, J, . anr.l was dismissed. An appeal to an
appellate Bench of the High Court was also dismissed. The present appeal is against the judgment of
the Appellate Bench by speoial leave granted by
this Court.
I shall have presently to refor to the pro1 think it neces·
sary to refer to the previous state of the law. In
vi~ions of s. 76 but before doing so
'
1004 SUPREME COURT REPORTS'[l962] SUPP.
da11loi Fa~ irchand
Dudf.e,/iya
v.
·hr~c Ch1m~de:
gor ,\/ il/J ·ua.
Sarkc;r J,
England, prior to the Companies Act of 1000, there
was no statutory provision concerning payment of
commission for subscribing for shares ar:d such a
provision was first unacted by s. 8 of that Companies Act. Even before the Act of 1900, howen·r,
the law was that anybody subscribing for shares in
a company had to pay the amount of the shares in
full. That was considered to bo one of the fundalllento.I principles of Company law. Ooregum Uold
Jtinniny Co. of India Ltd, \', Ueorge Roper (1) was a
cast: which turned on the law as it stood before 1\JOO.
There a company had issued shares of£ 1 each with
l5s credited as paid up leaving a liability of only
5s per share. A shareholder brought an action
tu test tho validity of the issue. It was held that
the issuu was invalid. Lord Halsbury observed (p.)
J;;:;, "ft seems to me that the system thus created
by which the sharoholder's liability is to ho limited
by the amount unpaid upon his sharos, rondcrs it
impossiblu for the com p~ny to depart from that
requirement, and by any expedient to arrange with
their shareholders that they shall not be liable for
the amount unpaid on the shares, although the
amount of those shares has been, in accordance
with the Act of PH.rliament, fixed at a certain sum
of morniy. It is manifest that if the company could
do so the provision in question would operate
nothing". The pr:ivision referrod to by Lord Halsbury was the section which required the memorandum of H.Ssociation to state the amount of the com·
panies eapilal as divided into shares of a certain
J:ixed amount. Such a provision of course occurs in
our Companies Act too.
This det:isiun made it impossible for a com·
pany to pay out of its capital any commission to
any person for sub~cribing for its shares. It was
felt that this cn•;1tecl some inconvenionce to:~ company in the mu.uagement of its affairs and therefore
s. 8 was incurpora tod in the Com panics Act, 1900
(1)
(1892) A.C. 125, 133.
,
-
3 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
10:"J5
1962
with the intention of granting some relief against
that inconvenience. Sub-section ( 1) of this section Madan{ al Falcirc1Dudhediya
provided that it would be lawful for a company to
v.
pay commission to a person in consideration of his
Shree Chongdeo
subscribing for any shares in the company if the Sugar ~fills Lt1
amonnt or rate of it were respectively anthorised by
Sarkar J.
the Articles of Association and disclosed in the
prospectus .and the commission paid, did not exceed
the amount or rate so authorised. Sub-section (2\
provided that save as aforesaid no company could
apply any of its capital money, either directly or
indirectly, in payment of any commission to any
person in consideration of his subscribing for any
shares in the company. This provision came up for
consideration before the House of Lords in Hilder v.
Dexter (1 ). There a company had in consideration
of person taking up some of its shares entered into
an agreement with him that he would have an
option to take further shares at par within a certain
time. A little later the price of the shares went up
and the person then exercised his option. An
action was thereupon brought by a shareholder to
test the validity of this agreement, and it was held
by the House of Lords that the agreement was
valid. Lord Davey observerl, "In this case the
question is as to the powers of the company itself,
and not as to the due exercise of the directors'
powers. I have come to the conclusion from a
consideration of the.language of s. 8, sub-s. 2, that
the prohibition therein contained extends only to
the application, direct or indirect, of the ·company's
capital in payment of a commission by the company,
and the transaction impeached in this case is not
within it. It is satisfactory to find that the conclusion to which I have come will not have the effect
of extending the prohibition to transaction which
were legitim>tte before the Act, and not, so far as I
am aware, open to objection on any other !!round."
He also said referring to sub-s. 1 of s. 8, "This
sub-section, therefore, permits a limited application
(1)
(1902), A.C. 474,481,479.
1006 SUPREME C01JRT REPORTS [1962] Sl'PP.
1~62
Jdanlal !•di itrht nd
/)odhe,liya
'.
-;h,rt Chun.1;dt.J
:1go1 Mi/ls I.rd.
sa~k~r ·'·
of the company's capital in payment of a commisRion".
Xow there is no doubt to the Act of 1900 there
was nothing to prevent the payment of commisRinn
for subscrihing for Rhares out of a company's profits.
The decision in the Oor€11111n Gold Jlfinir1f/ Company
Ca-•r: (1) only laid down that thP amount c,f the shares
must be paid in foll. It would not be so.paicl if
the capital was utilised for payment of commission
for subscribing for shares. [t was, therefore, the
legitimacy of transactions providing for paymP1:t of
the commission out of profits that Lord DaYey wnB
happy to frel tb~t his decision wonlrl not affor.t. Tt.
is hence, plain t.hat the HrmsP. 'lf Lorrls "·as of the
oninion in Hildr.r v. Dexl.et (') thats. 8, 8Uh-s. 2 of
the Act uf 1900 was not conc,erned with pa~·m<'nt of
commission out of profits. That is how that case
has been understood in England: seP P11lmer's
Company Precedent~, 11th ed; vol. I p, I i!l,
Palmcr"s Cornµany Law, 20th ed. p. ~on. See also
Sarkar & Sen's fnrlian Companies Act, 1913, p. 302.
It seems to me that no other view is possible.
ThPre is nothing in any Compani0s Act, except wlH'ro
it expressly does so, t.o reAtrict in any way the
power of a cornpan.v to deal with its profits. A
compan~· is, therefore, free to enter int.n any agreement <'ntitling any person to a part of it.A profit.A in
consideration of his subHcribing for sha1·cs in it..
That waR the law nR it exist1icl bcforP. t.he Act of
.1900. Tlw view taken in flilder v. !Je,rter (') waa
that t.here wa' nothing in s. 8 of that Act which
P-ffected a. chitn!:(e in the pre-existing law. In spite
therefore of that Act, a company retained fully itR
powers to pa~· out of its profits commission for
subscribing for 8hurt>s in it. I think it right to
remind here that we are clt>aling with the powers of
a company anri not c1f its directors
Section 8 of the Act I flOO wa• rPp]accd by
a. 8fl oft.he Engli~h Companit'H Act of I!Hl8 and this
(I) (1892) A.C. 125, Jl3.
(2J ·(1902) A.C. 474, 481, 479.
'
-
r
....
·,.
-
"
3 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1007
1962
in its turn was substituted by s. 43 of the English
Companies Act of 1929 and the corresponding provi- Mudanl1d Fakirchand
Dudhediya
sion is now contained ins. 53 of the English Com·
••
panies Act of 19±8. Substantially the provision in this
Shree Changdev
regard has remained the same in England through- Sugar Mi!ls Ltd.
out from 1900 except the.t in 1929 a further restricSark'l.r .1,
tion was put on the right to pay commission for
subscribing for shares by providing that the
commission paid shall not exceed 10 per cent of the
price for which the shares were issued or the amount
or re.te authorised by the articles whichever was
less. That restriction could not have effected e.
change in the law as it previously existed in England
in regard to payment of commission out of profits.
Now in our countrys. 105 ofthe Companies Act
of 1913 for the first time introduced the provision
corresponding to that contained in s. 8 of the English
Act of 1900. Both, therefore, on the general
principles underlying Company law, under which a
company, except in cases where an express provision
to the contrary is made, is free to deal with its
profits in such manner as it likes and on the
authority of Bilder v. Dexter (') which in my view
would be fully applicable to our Companies Act of
1913, a company in our country could enter into ·a
valid agreement to pay any commission it liked out
of its profits to any person for subscribing for
share~ in it. I may here add that s. 10.5 of the
Companies Act, 1913 was in terms substantially the
same as s. 8 of the English Companies Act of 1900.
It contained no provision restrieting the amount of
the commission to be paid.
I now turn to s. 76 of our Companies Act 1956.
'It provides by sub-s. (I) that "a company may pay
a commission to any person in consideration of his
subscribing ......... for any shares in or debentures of
the company ... ; ..... if the following conditions are
fultilled." These. conditions are,
-··
(I) (IO 02) A.C. 475, 481, 479.
1008 SUPF.EME COURT REPORTS [1962] SUPP.
198t
.,! adaftlal Fal:irchtlnd
Du.flit ii'..r11
Shr11 ••
'()1antdt·1
Sut:ar .~fill1. Ltd.
S11kar .T.
(il the payment of the commission is authorised by t.he articles;
(ii) the commi~sion paid does not exceed in
L
the case of sharea, ii per r,ent of the price at which
thA shares are i•sued or the amount or r>tte aut.horis<'d bv the articlrs, whichever is less, and in the case
of debl'ntures, 2-1/2 per crnt 0ftho price at which tlw
dehent.urM are issued or the amount or rate auth0rised hy the articles, whichever is less;
(iii) the amount. or rate of the commission pairl
...... is, in the case of shares or debentures offered to
the public for suh•crint.ion, di•closcd in the prospec·
tus. in th" ca.sP nf shares or c!ehrntures not offered
to the public for suhscription. disclosed in the state·
ment in lieu of prosoP-dns. or in a statement in tho
prescrihorl form and dulv "igned and filed bcfor11 the
payment of the commission with t.he Registrar anc!,
\vhcre a circula.r or not.ice, not hcinl! :i prosp<•ctuA
inviting subscription for the shares or debentures is
issu0.d, also diRcloserl in that drcular or notice.
Now, the q1111stion that ariRes is whether t.his
sub-section haR made n.ny alteration in th<> law
which previously PXiRted 11.nrl which, for the rea,;ons
earlier stated, I think permitterl commission to bo
paid freely out of prrifits. In other wnrds, does
this sub-section, as it. st.ands. nrevent a 1•ompan~·
from paying any commission it likrs out of its profits to anv p~rson for s11 hscribinl? for sh>ires in' it? I
find nothing in it to indieat~ thnt a ehange in !ho
law was intended. It is said that the pcrmis,ion
granted bv suh-s. (I) is not expressly confined to
paymP.nt, ofr:nmmissinn out of capital only. NPi·
ther, however, cloes it say th:it thA enabling provision containP<l in it is to he 11.pplierl to payment of
c0mmission out. of profits also. How then is this
sub-section to be construed? ~ow one of the est:iblished rules of construction of statutes is that it is to
be presumed •ithat the le1?islature does not intend to
make any substantial alteration in the law beyond
.•
r
3 S.C.R.
•
,
'
..
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1009
what it explicitly declares, either in express terms
1962
or by clear implications, or, in other words, beyond
-Fakirchan4
. . d'1at e scope
. an. d ob'iect o f th e st a t u t e. I n Madan/al
t h e 1mme
Dudhdiya
all general matters outside those limits the law rev.
· un d 1stur
•
bed· . I t IS
• m
· t h e last d egree 1mpro·
Skree ChangdeD
mams
Sugar Mills ud,
bable that the legislature would overthrow fundaSarko1.I.
mental principles, infringe rights, of depart from the
general system of law, without expressing its intention with irresistible clearness, and to give any such
effect to general words, simply because they have a
meaning that would lead thereto when used in
either their widest; their usual, or their natural
sense, would be to give them a meaning other than
that which was actually intended. General words
and phrases, therefore, however with and compre·
hensive they may be in their literal sense, must,
usually, be construed as being limited to the actual
objects of the Act." (Maxwell on Interpretation of
Statutes, 10th ed., p. 81-82).
I have earlier stated that undor tho Act of
1913 a company was free to pay any commission
out of its profits it liked to persons .subscribing for
shares in it. I find nothing in sub-s. ( l) of s. 76 to
indicate that that rule of law which is based on the
fundamental principles of Company law, was intended to be affected by it. The only substantial departure made in s. 76 (I) of the Act of 1956 from
the provisions in s. 105 of the Act of J 913, except
another to which I will later refer, is the imposition
of a restriction on the amount of commission that
can be paid. That cannot., to my mind, furnish any
reason for holding that the pre-existing law giving
full liberty to a company to pay commi%ion out of
profits was intended to be changed. That restriction
will have full scope if applied to payment out of
capital and does not itself indicate any source out
of which the restricted commission is to be paid.
· Therefore, it seems to me that the proper way of
reading sub-a. ( 1) of s. 76 is to restrict its general
words so as not to affect the pre existing law. So
1010 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1962] SUPP.
196%
JI u•nl•I F<kirch,.i
Dut/Judiya '.
••
Shm Ch.,,r.o ·
Sut<' JI ills Ltd.
S.,kar J,
read the terms contained in it has to be confined to
payment of commission out of the capit'd moneys
of the companies .
Again, ins. 105(1) of our Companies Act of
1013 it was said, "It ~hall bo lawful for a company
to pay a commi;sion to any person in consideration
of hiH suhscrihing" for shares in it. The words "it
shall be lawful" are enabling words. They arc used
in a statute when it is intended to permit something
to be done which previously could not legally be
done. In Craie;; on Statute Law, 5th ed. at p. 263,
it has been said, '·Statutes paRscd for the purpese of
enabling something to be done are usually expressed in pe1·missive language, that is to say, it is enacted that "it shall ho hwful", etc., or that 'such and
such a thing may be done". In Jwi11.s v. Bi-shop of
Oxford (1) it was said, "The word8 'it shall be lawful' ar<' not equivocal. They are plain and unambiguous. They are words merely making that h·gal
and possihle which there would othcrwiHe be no
right or authority to <lo. They confer a faculty or
power, and they do not of themselves do more than
cvnfer a faculty or power." It would follow from
tho use of the words it "shall he lawful" in s. 105(1)
of the Act of mm that the legislature intended to make that payment of commission for subscribing for shares legal, which was not so bcfor<•.
The legislature, therefore, intended to permit and
make legal the payment of commission out of capital to a person on his subscribing for shares in a
company which payment was previously illegal.
Payment of Huch commission out of profits had ·
always heon legal and there was no necessity for
any statutory provision to make such payment
legal or pass an enabling enactment in regard to it.
It would follow thats. I 05 was not concerned with
putting any restriction on a company's power to
pay commission out of profits.
(I) (1880) S A.C. 214, 222.
-
3 s.c.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1011
1962
Now sub-s (1) of s. 76 of our Companies Act
of 1956 uses instead of the words "it shall be law- Madanlal Fakirchand
Dudhediya
ful" the ·word "may". That however makes no
v.
difference. As has been stated in the passage in
"Shrte Chongdeo
Craies which I have earlier read, both mean the Suztir Mills Ltd.
same thing. They are both used in a statute to
Sarkar J.
indicate that something may be done which prior to
it could not be done. It would follow thats. 76(1)
of the Act of 1956 was intended to have the ·same
effect ass. 105(1) of the Act of 1913, namely, the
legalising of a payment of commission out of uapital
which before the Act of 1913 was illegal ::>nd which
became illegal on the repeal of that Act by the Act
of 1956. That would be another reason for saying
that s. 76 (I) of the Act of 1956 was not concerned
with any payment of commission out of profits.
I pass on now to sub-s. (2) of s. 76 of the Act
of 1956. That sub-section says: --
,
_
_.
-
...
"Save as aforesaid and save as provided
in section 79, no comp.my shall allot any of
its shares or debentures or apply any of its
capital moneys, either directly or indirectly,
in payment of any commission, discount or
allowance, to any person in consideration of.(a) his subscribing or agreeing to suhb
cribe, whether absolutely or conditionally, for
any shares in or debentures of, the company,
or
( b) his procuring of agreeing to procure
Rubsoriptions, ~hether absolute or conditional,
for any shares m or, debentures of the company,
whether the shares, debentures or money
be so allotted or applied by being added t"O
the purchase money of any property acquired
by the company, or to the contract price of
any work to be executed for the company, or
IOI::! SlJ.PHEME COUKl' REPORTS (1962] SUPl'.
1962
M :Jdanlal Fokirclza11d
the money be paid out ')f the nominal purchase money or contract price, or otherwise."
Dudhediy~
••
Shree Chont<ko
Sugar ,\1 ill1 Ltd.
Sarkar J.
This sub-section strongly suggeBts th.at subs. (l} is to be read as confined 011ly to payment of
collllllission out of capital, for it says that save to
the extent provided by sub s. \I) no commission
shall be paid out of Liw capital moneys of the company. If sub-s. ( l) were exhaustive of the powern
of a company to pay commission both out of its
capital and its profit;; so that nothmg could be paid'
as commission either out of capita.I, or out of profits
or out of any other money~ of the company except
as therein provided, as the respondent company is
contention is then sub-s. (:!)would be wholly redundant; the prohibition cont,liued in it would in that
case be totaliy unnecessary. It was said that sub-s.
(2) is used only to make sure that the limits prescribed by sub-s. \ l l would not be Jeparted from by
indirect method. But surely it was not noceBllary
to make any provision for thttt purpose only. What
could not bu done directly cuuld also not be done
indirectly. Furthermore; if it was necessary to
provide, as sub-s. t2} is said to do, that tho capital
moneys of tho company Bhould not be used indirectly
for payment of commission, why was it not provided that the profits should not also be used for the
same purpose indirectly. Thlli clearly, fur the same
reason, should havu been done if sub-s. (1) dealt
with payment of commitlllion out of profit£ also. The
reason suggested on behalf of the respondent
company fur the enactment of &ub-s. \2) does not
therefore seem to mo to be woll founded.
Furthermore, tho two sub-sectim1s must bo
read together. Sub-section (2) contains a general
prohibition of payment of commission out of capital
and an exception to it is provided in sub·s. (1). That
seems to be the inevitable result of tl:\e words
"save as aforesaid", that is, save as provided in
aub-s. (1), with which sub-s. (2) opens. It necessarily
:i s.c.R.
,
1013
follows that sub-s. (1) contains an exception to the
general prohibition of payment of commission out
of the capital. It, therefore, has nothing to do
with payment of commission out of profits.
'
I
__,
·~·
•
•
SUPREME COURT REPOB.TS
111e2
M ad•n1.,1 /1a(·1•chand
Dudhediya
-'Mu vChanydeo
Suoar
J.fills ltd.
0
The other substantial feature in which s. 76 of
·
the Act of 1956 has departed from tho provisions of
Sa•k.,.1.
s. 105 of the Act of 1913, is by inclusion in the
former of a Provision for the payment of commission for subscribing for debentures. While s. 105
dealt only with payment of commission for subscribing for shares, s. 76 deals with payment of
commission both for subscribing for shares as well
as debentures. An argument was based on this
innovation made in s. 76. It was pointed out that
in regard to debentures & company was before the
Act of 1956 free to pay any commission it liked for
subscribing for them, either out of its capital or out
of its profits and only certain particulars had to be
filed as required bys. 111 of the Act. of 1913. It
has, therefore, been contended that the inclusion of
debentures in s. 76 of the Act of 1956 would show
that the power to pay commission whether out of
capital or profits for subscribing for shares as well
as debentures was exhaustively contained in sub·
s. (1) of that section. I am unable to accept this
argument.
If I am right in my view that sub-s. 11) of s.76
of the Act of 1956 is only an exception to the general
prohibition contained in sub-s. (2), it would follow
that the restriction imposed by sub-s. (1) is confined
to payment of commission for subscribing for
debentures out of capital only. It is true that so
road there would after the Act of 1956 be no power
in a company to pay out of its capital any oommission for subsoribhig for its debentures, except as
provided in s. 76 (1) of that Act. The law would no
doubt thereby have been changed but it would have
been so changed because the Act of 1956 made that
change in express words by the prohibition contain·
ed in sub-s. (2) of s. 76. But suppose sub-s. (1) is
•
1.
1014 SUPREME COURT REPORT5 [1962] SUPP.
J9Gt
exhaustive as regards a company's power to pay
commission for subscribing for debentures whether
~! '.1do11la/ F11k1·fha11d
out of capital or profits, then also the sub.section
/Judhtd1)0
v.
would clearly Lo altering tho prc·existing law; it
,<.,'J,rct Cho1;;;dr..()
would then be putting a restriction on the power to
S14gar ,\111/s ltd .•
pay commission for subscribing for debentures out
Sarkar J.
of profits which power was previously free of all
restrictions. ff it were not so, then suh·s. (I) in so
far as it relates to payment of commission for
subscribing for debentures out of profits would
become infructuous. Therefore, it would have in
that case to be read as altering thP pre-existing law
Ly a necessary implication. It is of some interest
to point out here that s.111 of the Act of l!ll3
provided that an omission tc, file the particulars as
required by it would not affect the validity of the
debentures issued &nd, therefore, perhaps, the
validity of the a;;rccment to pay commission on
them.
Cumiug Lack now to the point under comideration I find it impossible to say that a necessary
implication!of sub-s. (I) of s. iG of the Act of 195<i
is to alter the previous law which permitted payment
of commission for subscribing for shares freely out
of profits. In regard to payment of commission
out of capital for subscribing for shares, it was only
an enabling· section and not a restrictive one, though
in regard to payment of eommission for subscribing
for debentures whether out of capital or out of
profits, on the assumption that we have made, it
would be a restrictive and exhaustive provision with
no power to pay such commission except in accordence with its terms. In regard to payment of
commission out of capital for subscribing for sharlll!,
the Hection being only an enabling provision, it
cannot affect the pre-existing power to pay out of
profits a commission for subscribing for shares. The
fact that in regard to payment of commission for
subscribing for debentures the section may have to
be read as restrictive, that is, as containing
'
.•
l
~
~
Reprint
3 S.C.R. SUPREME GOUR T REPORTS
1015
1962
exhaustively the power in regard thereto, is no reason
for saying that it has the same effect in regard to
payment of commission for subscribing for shares.
The considerations applicable to the two cases are
entirely different and the effect therefore, of the
section on them has to be different.
'
For these reasons, in my opinion, s. 76 of the
Act of 1956 does not affect a company's right to pay
out of its profits any commission it likes for subscribing for shares in it. I therefore think that the
agreements for payment of commission for subscribing
for shares in the respondent company out of its profits with which this appeal is concerned were not
affected by s. 76 (1) of the Act of 1956. They remained perfectly valid after the coming into force of
the Act of 1956.
~-.
I would, therefore, allow the appel.
BY CouRT : In accordance with the opinion of
the majority, the appeal fails and is dismissed with
costs.
Matlanlal FaA.irc~and
Dudhetfiya
v.
Shre1 Gh'lngdea
Sugar Milts Ltd.
Sarkar J.
Report an error or ask for masking: grievance@lawgrids.org