MOHAMMADBHAI KHUDABUX CHHIPA AND ANOTHER versus THE STATE OF. GUJARAT AND ANOTHER(AND CONNECTED. PETITIONS)
Supreme Court of India | Decided 15 March 1962 | [1962] SUPP. 3 S.C.R. 875 | 1962 INSC 98
Key facts
- Decided
- 15 March 1962
- Bench
- P.B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, A.K. SARKAR, K.N. WANCHOO, K.C. DAS GUPTA, N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR
- Bench size
- 5
- Case number
- WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) No. 226/1961
- Disposal
- Dismissed
- Citation
- [1962] SUPP. 3 S.C.R. 875
- Neutral citation
- 1962 INSC 98
Text of the judgment
3 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
875
1962
have been smuggled. The story subsequently men•
tioned by the appellant about his journey to Tata- ,
Pukhraj .
y,
nagar which has been disbelieved brings into bold
D. R;Kohli
belief the purpose which the appellant had in mind
in travelling without a ticket. After-all, when we Qajendtagadkar J
are dealing with a question as to whether the belief
in the mind of the officer who effected the seizure
was reasonable or not, we are not sitting in appeal
over the decision of the said officer. All that we
can consider is whether there is ground which prima
facie justifies the said reasonable belief. That being
so, we do not think there is any substance in the
argument that the seizure was effected without a
reasonable belief and so is outside section l 78A.
In the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed'
with costs. ·
Appeal di8missed.
MOHAMMADBHAI KHUDABUX CHHIPA
AND ANOTHER
1!.
THE STATE OF. GU,TARAT AND ANOTHER
(And connected. petitions)
(P. B. GA.JENDRAGADKAR, A. K. SARKAR, K. N.
WANCHoo, K. C. DAS GuPI'A and N. RA.TAGOPALA AYYANGAR, JJ.)
Agricu.lturaf Produc'! ]Jfarkets-Market committees-Levy
of fees-Notijication-Validzt1;-A clas8 and B class traderslicences-Discrimination-Ruz;s. declared invalid-S1tbsequent
amendments to ena_ctment-Validzty of rules-Doctrine of eclipse
. -Saurashtra .Ag~icultural Produce Mai·kets (Gujarat Amendment and Va~1dating Provisions) Ordinance, 1961 (1of1961)Bombay Agricultural Produce Market.s Ar;t, 7939 (Bam, 22 of
.793.'J),_ a.~ am,ended, 8s.5A, 11, 2.<J.B, rr. 58, Ct/, 65; G6, fJ7Constitutwn of India, Art.,.u, (.11)(1), 2G5,
Consequent on the decision in Gula.m Mohammad v, The
Jtate ~!Bombay, (1962] 2 S.C.R. 659, by 'l'hich rr. 53, 65, 611
1062
March 15.
876 SUPREME COURT REPORT5 [1982] SUPP.
and 67, f~amed under the Bombay Agricultural Produce
Markets Act, 1939, were held to he ultra. 11irr.s the provisions of
JI oh""'1!14d6ha;
ss. 6A and 11 of the Act, the State nf Gnjarat amended r.5'.l
Irhud•bwt Ohhipa
by a notification dated June 23, 1%1, and also promulgated
v.
Tht Stott of Gujorol an Ordinance on June 26, 1901, by which amendments were
made in certain sections of the Act and a ne\v s 29 B was
inserted in the Act \'aJidating certain acts or things <lone
prior to the promulgation of the
Ordinance. The
petitioners, some of v.rhom \Vf!re \vholcsale dealers and the re.::t
retail dralr.rs, filed petitions under Art. 32 of thr. Constit11tion
of India for certain reliefs on the ground, (I) that the notifica·
tion dated June 23, 1961, was discriminatory and thus offended
Art. 14 because under it a rnarkct r.on1mittec could Jcvy fee.s
on agricultnral produce by different modes, (2) that s. 29-Jl
was insufficient to validate the defects noticed in the earlier
decision of the Supreme Court inasmuch a'i the rclevcnt provisions of the Act and the Rules \Yerc not retrospectively
amended, (3) that undr.r the bye-laws .\class traders '''ere
charged much higher fees than n class traders an<l,
further, B class traders , ..·ere allo\ved to sell to consumers
any,. .·hcre in the market area ,,·hercas 1\ class trader~ wrre not
so al1ov.·ed, and this amonntecl to dic;crimination, (4) that the
main provisions of tho Act had been amende<l by the Ordinancr. and, ther~forc, the basis on ,,•hich the Suprr.mc Court
upheld the Act no lon!(er existed, (o) that rr. 65, 6G and fi7
which had been declared to be ultra vin• had neither been
rc·framcd no validated hy the Ordinance and, therefore, it \.\.·ac;;
not open to the market committr.e to issue licences 1111dt;r those
rules, and (6) thats. 29-ll was had in so far as it prevented
refund of her.nee fees collrcted before the Ordinance camr.
into force in view of Art.31 (I) of the Constitution.
1962
Held, that: (I) the notification dated .June 23, 1961, by
itself could not Uc said to .Ue discriminatory because imposi.
tion of the f('C,; WiLS made only lJy the bye-Ja.vs framed by the
market committee under the power conferred on it by s. 11
subject to thr. maxima prescribed in the notification; if a bycla\Y prescrihcd rates of fees in two modes in such a \\'ay as to
result in discrirnination then such a byc·la\Y ,,·ould have to
be struck down.
(2) the fact that un<ler r.5'.{ the rnarket com1nittr.e might
levy fees by one metho<l on one agricuhural produce and liy
another method on another agricultural produce, \\'Ould not
be a grouud of discrin1ination 1 beca11se each co1nn1odity must
be treated as a class by itself.
(3) s. 29-ll was sufficient to cure the defects pointed out
~!1 the earlier judgrnent of the Supreme Court and to validate
ii s.c.R.
SUPREME COURT REPOH.TS
~
877
the actions taken and the things done before the promulga•
tion of the Ordinance dated June 26, 1961.
1962 .
M ohammadllhai
· K/1udcbux Chhipa
( 4) the1e was a basis for classification of traders into A
••
class and B class, and the restrictions placed Ly the Act, The State •/Gtdoral
llules and Bye-laws were reasonable restrictions in the interests
of the general public.
(5) the purpose of the licence granted to B Class traders
was to permit them to buy in the market yard and thus control
their activity in connection with whole-sale trade, and not
to control retail dealers. Consequently, the market committees
were acting within their powers under Act.
( 6) though s.5A had been amended, the said section
read with the Rules did not involve any radical departure from
the scheme of the Act as it was before the amendment. ·
(7) rr. 65 and 67, which were valid when they were
originally framed but became bad on the insertion of 5A in
the Act in 1953, became valid again after the amendment of
the section by the ordinance, by the application of the
doctrine of eclipse.
Dhikaji NarBin Dhakr<UJ v. The State of Madhya Pradesh,
(1955) 2 S. C.R. 589 and Deep Chand v. The State of Uttar
Pradesh ( 1959) Supp. 2 S.C.R.8. applied.
(8) s. 29-B having validated the levy and collection of
licence fees, Art. 31 (l) was not applicable to the case, since
fees were included within the taxing power of the legislature
which had also power to legislate retrospectively.
....,.__,
M. 1'. V. Sundararamier J, Co. v. The State of Andhra
Pradesh, (1958) S.C.R. 1422, relied on.
OmGINAL JuRISDIC'.l'ION :
Petitions Nos. 226
tu 229 and 233 of 1961.
Petitions under Art. 32 of the Constitution of
India for the enforcement of fundamental rights.
A. S. R. Chari, J.B. Dadachanji, 0. 0. Mathur
and Ravinder Narain, for the petitioners (in Petns.
Nos. 226 to 229 of 61).
l. N. Shroff, for tu.i petitioners (in Petn.
No. 233 of 61).
A. V. Viswanatha Sastri, N. S. Bindra and
878 SUPRE:ME COtJHT REPORTs tl962] SUPP.
WGZ
MDhmnmadbhai
Khudobux Chliipa
v.
Th< Siok of Oujaral
Wonthoo J ·
R. H. Dhebar, for respondent No. I (in all the
petitions.)
1962. :\larch 15. The Judgment of the
Court was deli vercd by
.T.-- These fl ve pt,titions
umfor
Art. 32 of tbe constitution, which am connected and
will be dealt with together, raise questions a.A to
the constitutionality of the Bombay Agricultural
Produce Markets Act, Bombay Act No.XXII of 1939,
(hereinafter referred to as the Act), as amended
. by the Bombay and SauraBhtra Agricultural Produce Markets (Gujarat amendment and validating
Provisions) Ordinance, No. I of l!l61 (hereinafter
referred to as the Ordinance), arid the Rules and
the bye-laws framed thereunder. They are a sequal
to the judgment of this Court in Gulam Moliamined
v. The State of Bombay ('), which was delivered on
May 2, 1961. One of petitioners before us in these
petitions was also a party in that petition, which
was with respect to a market estabJished in Ahmedabad. In that petition the challenge to the constitutionality of the main provisions of the Act
failed but the provisions of certain Rules, namely
rr. 53, 65, 66 and 67 wore held to.be ultra. vires
the provisions of s. 11 and s. 5A of the Act. In
consequence, a direction was issued prohibiting tho
respondents in that petition from enforcing the
provisions of the Act, Rules and Bye-laws agaill!!t
the petit-ioners in that petition till a market
was established in law for that area under s.5AA
and from levying any fe,, under e. 11 till the
maximum wru; prescribed under the Rulce. Consequent on that decision, the State of Gujarat amended r. 53 by notification dated June 23, 1961.
Further the Ordinance wae promulgated on J unc
26, 1961, Ly which certain amendments were made
in certain sections of the a.ct and a news. 2!!-13
was inserted in the Act validating certain acts or
things done prior 'to the promulgation of the
WANCHOO,
(I) [11162] 2 S.C.R. 6511,
I
3 S.C.R.
ordinance.
after.
. .
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
879
The present petitions were filed there·
1962
J.1 ohamrn•dbhai
Khudabu:c Chhipa
Four of tho petitions (namely, Nos. 226 to
v.
229) are with respect to Abmedabad while the The Stole ofGujora
fifth petition (No. 233) is with respect to Nadiad.
Wanchoo J.
Two of the petitioners of Ahmedahad are wholesale
dealers while the other two claim to be retail
dealers. 1'he contentions on behalf of the Ahmedabad petitioners are that the notification amended
r. 53, offends Art. 14 of the Constitution and is
therefore bad. It is further contended that though
s. 5AA has been amended, the amendment is prospective ; therefore the infirmity noticed in the
earlier judgment of this Court still remains .and
s. 29-B whioh has been inserted in the Act is insufficient to validate what had been done before the
Ordinance came into force. It is further contended
that the bye-law under which the market committee issues licences to A Class and B class dealers
isdiscriminatory and imposes unreasonable restrictions on the fundamental right to carry on trade
and business and is therefore bii.d. Lastly it is
contended that the market committee insists on
issuing licences for retail trade and this it. cannot
do for control of retail trade is not within the
provisions of the Act as held by this Court in the
earlier judgment, and further in consequence the
market committee is using r. 64 in a manner in
which it was not intended to be used and therefore
that rule though it was upheld in the earlier judgment should be declared ultra vires.
The majority of the petitioners in the Nadiad
case are wholesale dealers but a few of them claim
to be retail de&lers. These petitioners further
challenge the constitutionality of the Act after its
amendment by the Ordinance, and their contention
is that the Ordinance makes radical changes in the
main provisions of the Act and the basis on which
these main provisions .were upheld by this Court
~so
1161
JI ohammadhhai
Kh11dalmx Chhipa
v.
The Stal< ojGujarot
Wanclioo I.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1962] SUPP.
earlier, no longer applies, and therefore the Act as
it now stands after the amendment is violative of
the, fundamental right to carry on trarle and business guaranteed under Art. I U( I )(g) of the constit.ution as the restrictions placed by it on the said
right are unreasonable. Further it is contended
that rr. 65, 66 and 67 were struck down by th is
Court in the earlier judgment as beyond the power
conferred on the State under s. 26 of the Act.
These rules therefore cannot be htold to be a part of
the Rules in force now and in consequence it was
not open to the markot committee to Act as pro·
vided in these Ru leM. Lastly it is urged on behalf
of one of the petitioners that he had paid licencefoe 'to the market, committ~e and was entitled to a
refund of that after the earlier judgment of this
Court; but s. 29-B newly inserted in the Act which
in effect deprives this petitioner of getting l·efund
is invalid and illegal as it is against the provisions
of Art. 31( I) .. Some other points have also been
raised by tho Na.diad petitioners ; but as they arc
not pressed, we shall not refer to them.
The petitions have been opposed on behalf of
the State and it has traversed a.II the points raised
on behalf of the petitioners. It is not necessary to
set out the grounds on which it is urged on behalf
of the rcspondcntB that the contentions of the petitioners have no force. These grounds will appear
when we deal with t.he contentions raised on behalf
of the petitioners one by one. Nor do we think
it uccessary to set out the provious history as to
the establishment of the market in Ahmeda.bad
118 that will be found in the earlier judgment ; nor
is it necessary to set out the previous history as
to the establishment of the market in Jl\adiad, for
it is not in dispute that that history is similar to
the history in the case of the Ahmedabad market.
We shall therefore proceed to indicate the points
which alone have been prnssed on behalf of the
petitioners and then consider them one by one.
l
I.
•
•\
'
3 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPOR'rS
881
Some of the points are, not common; but as they
have been raised in one petition or the other and
these petitions have been dealt with together 3nd
the decision on any point will effect even other
petitions in which it has not been raised, we shall
proceed on the basis that all the points have .been
raised in all the petitions particularly as the learned counsel appearing in the various petitions adopted the arguments of one another during the hearing.
The points therefore ·which call for decision are as
below( I) Is the notification dated June 23, 1961
fixing the maximum fee to be charged hit by Art.14
of the Constitution ?
( 2) Does the insertion of s. 29-B in the Act
suffice to validate acts or things done before the
promulgation of the Ordinance?
(3) Are the by-laws by which the market
committee issues licences to A class and B class
dealers discriminatory and thus offend Art. 14-, and
do they amount to an unreasonable restriction on
the fundamental right to carry on trade and busi·
ness under Art. 19(l}(g)?
(4) Is the market committee acting beyond
its power under the Act in requiring retail dealers
to take out licences and is r. 64 bad on account of
the manner. in which it is being enforced by the
market committee?
(5) Are the main provisions. of the Act after
its amendment by the Ordinance liable to be struck
down as an unreasonable restriction on the fundamental right to carry on trade and business under
Art. 19( l )(g)?
(6) 'Vas it necessary to re-frame rr. 65,66
and 67 under power conferred on the State Government under s. 26; if so, what is thA effect of its not
having been done?
1962
Mohammadhh(li
Khudabux Chhipa
...
The State of Gujarat
W onchoo J,
8s2 SUPREME OOURT REPoRTs (1962] SUPP.
1962
Moha1nm1d;hai
•.
ICA.e.bux Chhipa
.
~he Staie of Gujara&
w""'hoo J.
(7) Is s. 21!-ll bad in view of Art. 31(1) of the
Constitution insofar as it prevents refuud of Jiooncefee collected before the Ordinance ca.mo into
force?
Re (1).
The 'notification is iu these terms:" So. Ai'!U/061J/i!Oi07-E-In the exercise
of the powers conferred by section 26 of the
Bombay Agricultural Prm111cc .Jiarket Act,
ID39 {Boru. XXII of l!Ji!9J, the Government
of Gujarat hereby amends the Bombay Agricultural l:'roductJ .Jlarkct ltulcs 19·11 as follows
namtJ!y:"ln the said rules in ruic 5:!, for sub-rule
(I) ex co pt in w:plaruition thereto tho following
shall be su bstitutcd, namely:(I) "fbe Market Committee shall levy
and collect fees on agricultural produce
bought and sold m the market area at such
rates as may be specified in the by-Jaws, subject to the following maximums, namoly:(1) Rate when levied according to cart
Joad shall not exceed 40 naya paise per ca.rt
load.
(2) Rate when levied ad vuwrem shall
not exceed 40 naya paise per Hs. 100.
(3) Rate when. levied according to
weight shall not exceed.
(l} per quintal
15 naya pa.ise
{ 2) per Bengali Maund
-
-
5 naya pa.ise
(4) Rate when levied .a~cording to. ~he
number of containers contammg the agr1cultural produce shall not exceed,
(a) per bale of cotton
'
40 naya. paise
•'
(b) per gunny bag or 5 naya pa1se
any other container,
(5) Rate when levied in respect of cattle,
sheep and goat shall and exceed per animal
Rs.2.'
By order.and in the name of Governor
of Gujarat."
-
-
M ohammadbhai
Khud®u• Chhipo
v.
The Stall of Gujara
1Vanchoo J.
The contention on behalf of• the petitioners is that
the notification is discriminatory in two ways: in
the first place; because it allowll foes to be collected
by different modes, i.e., by cart load, by value, by
weight and by containers. It is urged that it Is
open to the market committee to levy fees on certain agricultural produce by (say) cart load and on
certain other agricultural produce by (say) weight;
and this is very likely to result in disorimina ti on.
In the second p.lace, it is urged that the notification
gives power to the committee to · Jevy fees on the
same commodity by even two of the methods men·
tioned therein. For example, it is urged that the
same commodity, say, potatoes may be charged
under the notification by the market committee
both by weight and by cart .load depending upon
whether they are brought into the market area in a
oart, or for example, in a basket. It is said that
there is nothing in the rule which prevents the
market committee from doing so, and this may
result in discrimination.
We may however point out that the notification by itself does not impose any fee on any commodity. What it does is to carry out the terms of
s. 11 which require the maxima to be prescribed
subject to which the market committee can levy
fees on Agricultural produce. The imposition of
the fees still remains to be made by the market
committee under the power conferred on it by s. 11
subject to the maxima prescribed in the notification
and therefqre the notification by itself cannot be
ea id to be IU&orimin&tory.
·
•
884 SUPREME COUitT REPORTS [l962j SUPP.
1962
]tf ohemmadbhai
Khudabu:c Chhipa
v.
Tlir. Stoic ojGujorol
WancAoo J.
Let us, however, examine the two contentions
raised on behalf of tho petitioners on the basis that
though the notification may not actun lly impose
fees on any commodity, it still allows discrimination to be practised by the market <'Ommittee, when
it proceeds under s. 11 to levy fees within tho
maxima preserihed by the notification. Taking the
first contention, it may ho that by using one
method in the caso of one agricul~ural produce and
another method in the case of another agricultural
produce, there may be some differenoo in tho incidence of the fees charged, if one wern to judge that
incidence on the ha.sis of only one of the modes prescribed in the notification. But th1Lt in our opinion
cannot be said to result in discrimination for each
produc<' must for this purpose be treated to be a.
class by itself. Therefore, so long as the market
committee uses one method of levying fee with
respect to one kind of agricultural produce, it cannot be said that it is discriminating if it uses
another method· for levying fee on another kind of
Agricultural produce. It is well known even in
svstems of taxation that taxes arc levied with diff.
e~cnt incidence dependi11g upon the nature of the
article taxed, and a fee levied und!'r s. I I is only
. the exercise of the power of taxation using that
word in its widc3t sense. Therefore, the fact that
und<>r this rule, the markot committee may levy fees
by one method on one agricultural produce and
by another method on another agricultural produce
will not ho a ground of discrimination, for each
commodity must bo treated as a class by itself.
Turning now to the second contention, it is
true that there is nothing in the rule expressly to
prevent the market committee from using two of
the modos prescribed therein for the purpose of
levying fees on thv s·1me agricultural produce. It
must be rcmem bercd however that the rule is a.
gt•neral provision for levying fees within the
-
a s.c.R.
-
SUPREME COURT ·REPORTS 885
1962
maxima prescribed on the.agricultural produce by
market committees in the market areas all over the Mohamm odbhai
State. Various methods of levying fees have been KhudabU< Chbipo
included in the rule, for we assume that the rule The Stat'••of Guj•rat
making authority kriew that there wore various
Wanchoo J.
ways in which things are brought into various
market areas. The rule is meant to apply to .all
situations that may arise in tho State and there
. m;i.y be different ways in which things may be
brought to the market areas in difforent parts of
~he State. That is why the rule has a wide sweep
and allows the market committee to levy fees
either by cart load, or by value, or by weight or by
containers. It may be that if for the same agricultural producii fees are levied subject to the maxima
two different modes, the rates fixed may result
in discrimination. It would however not be improin r to assume that in framing the bye-laws in whioh
pee rates for any particular agricultural produce
.thll be fixed the market committee shall pay due
wigard to the prohibition against discrimination
rentained in Art. 14 of the Constitution. The praccocal consequence of this is likely to be that for one
tigricultural produce the market committee will fix
ane rate only in one of the four modes: If that is
oone no discrimination can be said to arise. It will
dot also in our opinion be unreasonable to think
nhat in issuing the notificathn the Government
tproceeded on the assumption that for any particular
agricultural produce one mode of fixing feeswhether according to cart load or according to
value or according to weight or according to the
number of containers-will be adopted. Nor would
it be difficult if the rate is fixed in one of the
modes, say according to cart load, to calculate
the fees to be levied where the produce is brought
in aey other manner, say in baskets, for then the
proportional fee can bo charged on each basket on
the basis of so many basket-fuls being equal to
QIJ.e ca.rt loa.q. Si~ilarl~ wqere t4e b,Ye-lii.w fi~e~
886 SUPREMECOURT REPORTS (1962] SUPP.
1962
MoMmtnodbhoi
..
Kllld.tux Chhipa
1hf: Stal1 of Gujarat
W1nchon J,
the fees according to containers and a dealer brings
the produce in cart load, it will be possible to calculate the fco due on the basis of containers, by
calculating how many containers would be equal to
one cart load. Where the fee is fixed by weight
or value there w<1uld he no difliculty in any case.
Therefore one may reasonably conclude that
the market committee when acting under
s. l l read with the notification will levy the fees on
a single commodity in one only of the permitted
modes. If that happens in actual practice there
will be no question of any discrimination.
But assume that a market committee chooses
to adopt two modes for levying fees on tho same
agricultural produce, sny one according to cart load
and another according to weight, In such a case a
question may arise whether there is discrimination
in the incidence of fees. That question may have
to be considered if and when it arises and whether
discrimination actually arises in such a case will
depend upon the rates fixed by the market committee for levying of foes on the same agricultural
produce in the two modes that it might choose. If
the rates are RO fixed that the incidence is substantially the same whether the fees arc !•~vied on the
basiR of cart load or on the basis of weight, there
will be no discrimination. On the other hand if
the rates are so fixer! that the incidence works out
substantially differently there will bo a case of discrimination and in such a ease it is the bye· law
that will have to il<l struck down as being discriminatory for the act.ual imposition of fees will be
made by tho bye-law fra.mecl hy the committee and
not by the impugnod notification. Tho chances
howevor of fixing two modes for the levy of fees
even on the same agricultural produce in such a
way as to result in discrimination are in our opini on
so remote that the notification cannot be struck
clown on that account as discriminator>'. In sqc!J
-
3 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
887
a case it is not the notification which will have to
be struck down but the actual bye-law if it prescribes rates of fees in two modes in such a way as to
result in discrimination.
Turning now to the facts of the present case
we find that the bye-laws framed by the market
committees have fixed only one mode of levying
fees in these cages for one kind of produce. It is
not the petitioners' case that the market committees with which we are concerned in the present
cases have used more than one mode for levying
fees on the same agricultural produce. There is
therefore no case for discrimination made out on
the basis of the actual bye-laws which have been framed by the market committees under the power
conferred on them under s.ll read with the notifi·
cation. Iu these circumstances, the attack on
the notiffoation on the ground of discrimination
must fail.
Re. (2).
Sub-section ( 1) of s.29'.B provides that in the
case of a market area declared before the commencement of the Ordinance, a market for such market area shall be deemed always to have been established for the purposes of the Act. with effect from
the date on which a market yard for such market
area was declared for the first time under the R.u!es
or the Act and such market shall include and shall
be deemed always to have inc>luded the said market
yard. By this provision the defect that was pointed out in the .earlier judgm\)nt with respect to the
establishment of a market is intended to be validated. The sub -section further provides that any
action taken or anything done by a market committee or any other authority after the establishment of a market therein as aforesaid but before
the commencement of tbe Ordinance, which but for
the provisions of this clause would have been
i~valid, shall be and shall be deemed alwa,YS to
1968
M Dhammadbhai
Khudabwr Chhipa
••
'/he State ofQujaral
Wanchoo J.
888 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1962] SUPP.
19GZ
.«11hommadhhai
Khudahux Chl,ip•
- v.
Th, Stott of GujGral
JfON(ht>O J •
have been valid ann shall not bo called in question
merely on the ground that no market w11s established for such market arna when ~uch action was
taken or thing done. 8uh-scction (:!) then provides
that any fees leviocl and r:nlle0t~d on agricultural
produc~ hought :ind sold in 11 market area before
the commencement- of the Ordinance by a market
committee at the rates spc.cificd in its bye-laws shall
be deemed to have been validly levied and collectod
and such levy and collection shidl not ho called in
question merely on the ground that at the time of
such levy and collection no maxima were prescribed
as required by s. l I. The intention of this provision
is to cure the defoct which was noticed in the
earlier judgment inll.Smuch as no maxima h~d been
prescribed under s.11 by the State Government.
Sub-seotion (3) finally provides that all licences
issued to operate in a market area or any part
thereof and fees charged therefor before the commencement of the Ordinance hy a market committee
under the Hules and bye-laws and any action taken
or thing done relating to li"ensing of personR, or
obtaining of a licence, to operate in the market area
or any part thereof, taken or done hy a market
committc" or any other authority or p1~raon nndor
the Hules and bye-laws before t.ho commencement of
the Ordinance ~hall be• and 11hall be deemed always
to have been \-alid and the validity thereof shall not
be called in question merely on th~ ground that
when such action wa11 taken or thing done, the power
rio-ht or obligation therefor was not duly conferred
o; imposed by the Act on such market committee,
authority or person. This provision is intended to
cure the defect arising from rr.(i!i and fi7 being
declare<! 1dtm vire.s by thio Court in its earlier
judgment.
The contention on hohalf of the petitionerR is
that these provisions are iJlsutTiciont to validate
-
3 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
889
196~
the defects which were noticed in the earlier judgment of this Court itrnsmnch as the relevant proviMohammadbhai
sions of tho Act and the Rules have not been Khudabux Chh;;pa
v.
retrospectively amended. We s~c no force in this
The State of G1yarat
argument, for the provisions as they stand certainly
Wanchoo J.
validate the defects pointed out in the earlier
judgment of this Court. It is true that the relevant
sections and the Rules have not been retrospectively amended by the Ordinance, but this in our
opinion was unnecessary. Retrospective amendmant may be necessary when it is desired to change
the law; but it seems that so far as s.11 is concern.
ea, the legislature did not intend that the control of
the State Government over levy of fees should be
done awity with for the future also. Therefore, all
that was necessary in that respect was to validate
t):te past actions and this is specifically provided for
by snb-ss.(2) and (3) of s.29-B. As for the establishment of market committees, an amendment has
been made in s.5.AA of the Act deleting the provision by which a market could be established.only if
so required by the State GovPrnment. This amendment is prospective. It could have been made
retroepective also and in that case sub-s. ( 1) of
s.29-B may not havo been necessary. The legislature, however, adopted the method of amending
s.5-AA prospectively and .making a separate provision for validating the establishment of markets in
sub-s. (1) of s.211-B. We see no reason why it
should be held that the validation made by sub-s.(l)
is not sufficient because the legislature has adopted
one method rather tha,n the other for carrying out
its purpose. We are therefore of opinion that
s.29-B is sufficient to cure the defects pointed out in
the earlier judgment of the Court and to validate ·
actions taken and things done before the promulgation of the Ordinance '.vhich would otherwise have
been invalid in view of the earlier judgment of
this Court. The contention on this head must
ii.Jso be rejected.
·
· ·.
890 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1962) SUPP.
196t
M,,._modbhai
1171""4!ia Chippa
Re. (3).
Gnder the bye-laws as they now stand two
classes
of traders are mentioned. namely A class
••
TM Blatt of Guj4rat traders and B class traders.
A class traders are
those
who
hold
licences
to
buy
and/or
sell agriculWonchoo J.
tural produce in quantities not below 10 lbs. in
the market yard, and tho liconce-fee which they have
to piiy per year is Rs. 75. B olass traders are those
who have licences to buy agricultural produce
in quantities not below 10 lbs. in the market yard
and to sell in retail to consumers anywhere
in tho market area. They have been divided into
three classes, namely, (a) shop-keepers, (b) /,ari
holders, and (cl Toplawala (hawkers), with a
licence-fee of Rs. 12, Its. 6 and Rs. 3 respectively.
It is urged that th,is amounts to discrilllination between A class an<l B class traders inasmuch as A
class traders are chari;e<l much higher fees than
the B class traders. It is however clear that there
is a basis for clruisification between the two classes
of traders. A class traders are those who can both
buy and sell agricultural produce in the market
yard while B class traders can only buy iii the
markc•t yard but cannot sell there. It is submitted
on behalf of the Sui.tc Government that H class
traders arc those perHons \yho generally sell in retail
to consumers after buying wholesale in t.he market
yard from A class traders or· producers. The reason
why B class traders have been permitted to buy in
the market yard is to allow for competition,
as otherwise there woulcl have been a monrpoly
of the few A class traders who operate
in a particular market yard. This classification in
our opinion is reasonable. A cla 0 s traders are
wholesale traders who are permitted both to buy
an<l sell in the market yar<l and arc thus charged a
higher licence-fee. R class traders are ordinary rotailers who in order to carry on their retail tmcln
are permitted to buy in the 'market yarcl but they are
~ot permitteq to sell there. They are small traders
3 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
891
196S
and are therefore charged lower licence fees. It
appears to us that in order to avoid the monopoly Mohammad61lai
Cliliipa
of A class traders, who are a few in number, with Khutlabux
v.
the result that prices might be depressed by such Tht St.te of Gujarat
traders, B class traders are permitted only to buy
Wanehaa J.
in the market yard on payment of a small licence
fee in.order that the producer who brings his produce in the market yard may have a fair price. We
see no reason therefore to hold that there is any
discrimination in creating the two classes of traders,
for there is a fair basis of .classification of traders
into A class and B class. Nor can this restriction be
deemed to be an unreasonable restriction on the right
to carry on trade and business, for such regulation
is obviously envisaged by the Act in order to carry
out its purposes and this Court has already held·
in the earlier judgment that the Act is a valid piece
of legislation. It is unnecessary to repeat the reason
given in the earlier judgment, where it was held
that the restrictions placed by the Act, Rules and
Bye-laws framed thereunder are reas..,nable restrictions in the interest of general public.
•
It is however urged that B olass traders are
allowed to sell to consumers anywhere in the market area whereas A class traders ar.e not so allowed.
It has already been held in the earlier judgment
that retail trade iH not controlled under the Act .
.Therefore, the fact that the bye-law has added the
words "to sell in retail to consumers anywhere in
the market area" in the case of B class traders is
of no consequence, for B class trader8, ns they are
retailers, would be entitled in any case, without being controlled under the Act, to sell to consumers
anywhere they like. It is not the addition of these
words which gives that right to B class traders, for
that right of theirs is not controlled by the Act and
they would be entitled to exercise it without the
addition of these words, which we consider ns surplusage in tJie circumstances .. As for A class traders
892 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1962] SUPP.
1962
Mohommadbhai
KAudabwr ChiPP•
•..
Tht Stal• of Guj•lfol
WanchoO J.
they are admittedly wholesalers and there is no
queAtio11 of their selling in retail. We aro therefore
of opinion that tho addition of the words mentioned
above wit.h respect to B class trader• iH a more ~ur
plusago and makeR no difference to tho basis of
classification. There is no forco therefore in the
contention under thi8 head and it must be rejected.
Re. (4) .
. It is next urged .that the market committee is
attempting to control retail dealt1rs and requires
them also to takn out' licences, and thiH it is not
authorised to do, as this Court has already held in
the earlier judgment that retail trade is not within
the ambit of the Act. This argument is based on
the use of the words "to sell in retail to consumers
anywhere in the market area" in connection with B
class traders. It is said that in this way the market.
committee i.'l controlling ret'lil trade also under the
Act which it 011.nnot do. We are of opinion that this
cont{lntion )11\s no force. 13 class traders are required to take out licencrs in order to buy agricultural
produce in quantities not below 10 lbs. in the market
yard. The licence in our opinion is not. meant to
permit thorn to carry on retail sale anywhere in the
market area. AA we h1tve said already these wordR
are a mere surplnsage and the r<ial purpose of the
liccncP grankd to 13 class tradcrR is to prrmit them
to buy in t.hc market vard and thus control their
activity in connection with. wholesale trade. It. iR
urgf'd, 'however, that no provision haR bcon made
under s.2(ix a) of the Act to define the limit of
retail sale under any bye-law. It is true that no
Bpccific provision for that purpose has been made
but whP-n the limit of 10 lbs. is fixed below which no
transaction can take place in the market yard it is
some indication of what is tho limit of retail s;ile.
In any case the bye· laws which provide for A class
and 13 class traders, indicat<> the limit below which
t)1ey cannot trade in the market yard and this c)Qarly
:s.c.:R.
SUPREME CoURT REPORTS
8!i3
shows that the intention of the market committee
was not to control retail trade by the issue of licence to traders for the large proportion of retail trade
may well be below 10 lbs. for each transaction. We
cannot therefore accept the contention of the· petitioners that thti bye-laws by providing for A class
and B class traders are really providing for control
of retail trade. It is clear that B class traders can
only buy in the market yard but cannot sell there
and as for sale, they will be entitled to sdl in
retail wherever they like, for the Act does not control retail trade.
As for r. 64, it inerely provides for incidental
powers ;n connection with the regulation of market
yards and it has already been held valid in the earlier judgment. We see no reason to hold that that
rule is invalid on the ground that the market committee is using that rule to control retail trade. We
have already pointed out that the market committee
cannot be said to control retail trade by providing
for A and B class licences and there is no question
therefore of r. 64 being used in a manner not intended thereunder.
_,
Lastly, it seems that there is some dispute by
some petitioners in Petitions Nos. 228 and 229 as to
whether they hold certain shops in the market yard
from the municipal committee or must be deemed
to hold them from the market committee and what
rights the market committee has over those petitioners in that connection. It appears that there
have been suits in courts with respect to that dispute. That is a matter which in our opinion has
to be decided by the courts where the suits are said
to be pending and cannot be the subject of adjudication in a petition under Art. 32. In any case r. 64
cannot be declared bad because of any dispute between the mnrket committee, the municipal committee and stall holders as to their respective rights
196Z
M ohammadbhai
Khudabux Chhipa
v.
The State of Guja,0 1
WanchooJ.
8114
1962
Mo"4mmdbhai
Kludobtu CllMH•
••
Th4 State of <lujorat
W-.looJ,
SUPREME COlJRT REPORTS (1962] SUPP.
over the stalls in the market yard. There is therefore no force in this contention either and it must
be rejected.
Re. (5).
The main coutention under this head ii that
the main provisicns of tho Act havt' been so amended by the Ordinance that the ha.sis on which this
Court upheld the provisions as constitutional no
longer exists and therefore the Act as it now stands
aftRr its amendment by the Ordinance is an unreasonable restriction on the right to carry on trade>.
This cont<·ntion requires a .consideration of the provisions of the Act as they stand after tho amendment by the Ordinance nnd it will have to be seen
whether there has been any radiral rfoparture from
the scheme of the Act as it was before the amenrlment. If there has been no radica,l departure after
the amendment and the control envisaged by the
Act as amended is still the same, as it was before
the amendment, the basis on which tho earlier judgment of this Court upheld the main provisions of
the Act would still apply, and the Act as amended
would ho constitutional. Let us therefore see if
there has been any radical departure from the main
provisions of the Act as they stood before the
amendment. The Act still deals with the regulation
of purchase and sale of agricultural produce and
establishment of markets for such produce. Section
3 stands unamended and provideR for the eonstitu-.
tion of market areas and market committees and
gives power to the Commissioner by notification to
declare his intention of regulating the purchase and
sale of such agricultural produce and in such area
a.s m1Ly be specified in the notification. Section 4( I)
is also unamended and gives power to tho Commiesioner after holding such inquiry as may be necessary
and eonsirlering the objections and suggestions if
any made after the notification under s. 3 to declare
.3s.d.R.
\
SuPREME COUBT REPORTS
s95
111J2
a particular area as a market area for the purposes
of the Act. There has been some amendment in
ftl ohammedbhai
s: 4(2) but it is not of a radical character and does Khudabux Chhipa
not make any difference to the main provisions of The Stall••of {}ujaraf
the Act. Section 4-A has also been amended by proWanchaaJ.
viding for declaration of a market proper and consequential changes necessary due to such provision.
This amendment only brings into the Act what was
formerly in r. 51. This amendment also therefore
makes no radical change in the Act. Section 5-AA
has also been amended and the, provision which
made it necessary for the State Government to
require a market committee to establish a marke thas
been deleted. Section 5-AA as it now stands makes
it the duty of the market committee to enforce the
provisions of the Act etc. and when a market is
established thereunder to provide for such facilities
in the market as tho State Government may from
time to time direct in connection with the purchase
and sale of agricultural produce with which it is
concerned. The change in s. 5-AA therefore is also
of an incid,ental character and does not in any way
affect the· scheme of the Act as it was before the
amendment. Section 5A has also been amended and
it now reads as follows:-
"Where a market is established under
section 4A, the market committee may issue
licences in accordance with the rules to traders, commission agents, brokers, weighmen,
measurer~, surveyors, warehousemen and other
persons to operate in the market area or any
part thereof."
.
The main argument of the petitioners is based on thi~
amendment. It is urged that under the unamended
Act after a market was established the market com·
mittee had to issue licences for operation in the
market so that the business of sale and purcha,se of
agricultural produce was concentrated in the market
which consisted of a principal market. yard and
896 SUPREl'lfE COURT REPORTS fl962) SUPP.
1962
ilt uhammufflhoi
Khud .bux Cl1hipa
v.
The Slot! o/Gujnrat
IV am/Joo J,
0·1·~ )'."
mrJre 811\J-markct yards with the conSllquent a<lva.ntage to the. agricultural producer
that they had a place or places where they could
find a large number of buyers for their produce
and could thus secure fair prices under regulated
conditions.
Now, however, it is urged that
under s. 5A it is open to the market committee,
after tho market is established under s. 4A to
give licences to traders and othor to operate in
the market area or any part thereof with the
result that it would not be necessary to have a
principal market yard or sub-market yR.rds. Tber"
would be some for"e in this argument if we were
to ignorn tho rules fmmud under the Act. Ilut the
rules which were framed by the State Government
are still the same. Huie 51 provides for the declaration of market yards and market proper by the
State Government. Rule 60 provides that all
agricultural produce brought into the market
shall pass through the principal market yard
or sub-market yards and Rhall not subject to the
provisions of Rub-r.(2), be sold a.t any place outside
such yards. The only exception to this is sub-r.(2),
which providcA that proceed agricultural produce
may be sold either in the principal market yard,
or sub-market yard, or in the market proper, or
in the market area in accordance with the
provisions of the bye-laws. The reason for this
distinction is clear, for where produce is to be processed, as for example, ginned cotton, it bas to
be taken to a ginning factory in which case it would
be most inconvenient to bring the produce to the
market yard for sale and that may also add to the
price by further transport charges. Heading s. 5A
therefor!" a.long with the Rules, it is clear that the
present provisions are materially the same as tho
agricultural produce (except that which is processed)
shall have to 1mss through the principal market
yard or suh-Jllarket yards and be sold there. Tho
only difference that the amendment has mad0
3 8.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
89,
/Y62
is that whereas formerly under s. 5A traders could
only operate in the market by virtue of the pro-· M ohammad61rai
visions o( the Act, now they will op~rate in the Khudabuxv. Chhipo
market by virtue of the provisions of the Act read The State of Oujatal
with the Rules. The rules, however, are still the
Wonchoo J,
same and therefore in effect t,he provisions of the
Act and the Rules read together still provide
for the same kind of regulation which was intended
under the unamended Act. It is urged that it will
be open in ·the future for the. market committee
to do away with the necessity of having market
yards and sub-market yards and concentrating
wholesale trade only in market yards and submarket yards in view of the provisions in the amended s.5A, for the market committee would be
entitled to issue licences in accordance with the
Rules in case they are changed to traders etc. to
trade in the market area or any part thereof..
It will be seen however that the power to change
the Rules is not in the ma<ket committee and
until the Rules are changed the position as it was
under the unamended Act would remain the same.
We have no reason to suppose that the State Government intends to change the Rules as they are
now and to permit the market committee to grant
licences under s. 5A for trade anywhere in the
market indiscriminately. It is true that such a
possibility can arise . if the State Government
changes the Rules as t]Jey exist at present. But
there is no reason to suppose that such a change
is in tended. So long therefore as the Rules stand
as they are, there is no radical departure from the
scheme of the Act as it was before its amendment
and the reasons which impelled this Court t.o uphold the Act and the Rules framed thereunder
would still hold good. If and when the Rules are
so changed as to make a radical departure from
the present position, a question may well arise
whether the scheme of control envisaged under the
•
898 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1962] SUPP.
Act has failed in its purpose. It may then be nece. esary to <l<'cidc whether the Act and the ru !es
framed thereuuder are urwonstitutional; hut so
v.
Tiu Slolt of ~ojorol long as the rules st.ind aR they arc, we have to read
s.5A along wit.h the Hules, for licences are issued
ll'411choo J.
under that section in accordauce with the Rules, and
readings. 5A and tbe present Rules together it must
be held that there has been no radical drparture
from the scheme of the act ail it was before the
amendment and therefore the reaRcms which impelled
this court to uphold the Act, Rules and bye-laws
framed under it in the earlier judgment still stand.
Hesi<l<~ this main argument certain subsidiary
contentions am also urged on hch11lf of the petitioners
to challenge the co11stiWtionality of thci act, and
the Rules framed thereunder on the ground that it
was an unreasonable restrict.ion on the funda.mentnl
right to carry on trade or business. It is urged that
a trade1: who has busineHs all over the St.ate may
have to take 80 or morn licences to trade in tlift'crent market area.; and that will mean a heavy burdon
on b_im resulting in increase in price of agricultural
produce. This in our opinion is a theoretical con·
sitleration and in any case if a tr;tder is so big as to
carry on trade in all the 80 or more market areas
establishetl in the State we see no reason why he
should not take licence in each market area. He
will be in a position to bear the burden and it need
not necessarily affect tho price of agricultural produce seriously. Then it is urged that the Aet
affects transaction8 between traders outside the
market areA. We have not been able to understand what exactly is weant by this. It is only
when the sale takes place within the market area
that tlie produce has tu pass through the principal
market yard 01· sub-market yard, but if a trader
gets something from ou t"ide the market area and
the sale takes plal'e on t ,;jd,, the market area and
the thing is brought in to the market 1~rea by the
trader after the purchase, such trllill suction will not
}JohGmmadblloi
Kliulabux Chliipa
\
L
..
3 s.d.R;
-.
, I
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
s99
be subject to any fees, for fees have only to be
charged on agricultural produce bought and sold in
the market area under r. 53 read with ·s. 11. But
where the sale takes place outside the market area
1md the commodity is merely brought into the
market area by· the wholesale trader, the.re will be
no question of any fee being charged on that transaction; of course, if there is a further sale in the
market area or in the market yards by the wholesale
trader to some one locally that may be liable to foe.
We do not see how iii the circumstances tt can be
said that this is a case of unreasonable restriction
011 the right to carry on trade and business.
1VG2
M ohammadbhai
Khudaiwc Chhipa
v.
..
The Stole of Gujarat
Next it is urged that the provisions in the Act
also affect transaction between traders .and traders,
and also affect produce not grown within the
market area if it is sold in the market area. That
is undoubtedly so. But if control has to be effective
in the interest of the agricultural producer siich
incidental control of produce grown outside the
market area and brought into the market yard for
sale is necessary as otherwise the provisions of the
Act would be evaded by alleging that the particular
produce sold in the market yard was not grown in
the market area. For the same reasons transactions
between traders and traders have to be controlled,
if the control in the interest of agricultural producers and the general public has to be effective.
We are therefore of opinion that the Act and the
Rules and Bye-laws thereunder cannot be struck
down on this ground. The. contention uuder this
head therefore must fail.
Re. (6).
The next contention is that rr. 65, 66 and 67 •
were struck down by this Court in the earlier judgment and have neither been reframed nor validated
by the Ordinance. Therefore, these rules do not
exist. Consequence of this, it is alleged, is that it
Wanchoo J.
OOo SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1962) SUPP.
1962
is not open to the market committee to issue
licences which were provided by these rules. Rules
Moltamm•dhhai
n·hudabux CJihipa
65 provides tba.t no person shall do business as a
v.
trader
or. a gener·il commission agent in agricultural
1/u Stal< ojGuja•ol
produce m any market area except und1fr a licence
If anchoo J.
granted by the market committee under this rule.
Huie 67 prov id~s that no person shall do business as a
trader, oommissiou a.gent, broker, weighmen, measurer:, surveyor, warnhouse-man or operate in any other
manner in any m11rkct area except und·er licence
granted by. the market com"litl.ee. It is urged that
licences aro granted under these rules read with
s.5A, which now provides that where a market is
ustablished the market committee may issue licences
in aceordanco with rules to traders, commission
agentll, brokers ete. to operate in the market area
or any pint thereof. Sc<,tion 5A, it is urged, is a
mere enabling provision and becomes effective when
the ruleE are framed and that licences under the
enabling provisions of s. <iA are to issue in accordance with the rules; and if there arc no rules as to
issue of licences the enabling provisions of s. 5A
cannot be availed of by the market committee
to require the taking out of liocnces. It is rr. 65
and 67 wbich prohibit business in the market area.
without taking licences anrl provide for the manner
in which applications for licence shall b,. made, the
period for which tlie licence shall remain valid and
other incidental m;itters. It is urged that as these
rules were struck down by this Court and ha vo neither been re-framed nor validat«d under the Ordinance there is no power in the market committee
to require traders to take out. licences merely because s. 5A enables it to issue licences. The. argument on behalf of the State is that even though these
;r. 65 and ()7 were struck down because they were inconsistent withs. 5A as it 8tu1)d before the amendment, now that s. 5A has hc<'n amended these
rules must be held to have reviv'cd and reliance in
this connection is placed on certain decisions of
._
I
I
3 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
.
901
this Court where it w:1s held that an Act ·which was
valid when it was passed before the Constitution
came into force and some provisions of which became invalid for certain purposes in view of the
provisions in the Constitution relating . to fundamental rights and Art. 13 thereof, became wholly
effective again when the Constitution was amended
and the inconsistency with the fundamental rights
removed. This principle was laid down by this
Court in Bhilmji Narain Dhakras v. The State of
Madhya Pradesh ('), in these words:
"The true effect of Art. 13(1) is to render
an Act inconsistent with the fundamental
right inoperative to the extent· of the inconsistency. It is over-shadowed by the fundamental right and remains dormant but is not dead.
With the amendment made in clause (6) of
Art. 19 by the First Amendment Act, the provisions of the impugned Act .were no longer
inconsistent therewith and the result was that
the inpugned Act. began to operate once again
from the date -0f such amendment with this
difference that, nnlike amended clause (2) of
Art.19 which was expressly made retrospective, no right~ and obligations could be founded
on the provisions of the impugned Act from
the date of the commencement of the constitusion till the date of the amendment."
...
This matter was further considered in De,ep
Ohnnd v. The State of Uttar _Pradesh(') and it was
held by majority that "there was a clear distinction
bet~een the two clauses of A.rt. 13. Under cl. (I),
pre-Constitution law subsisted·e~cept to the extent
of its inconsistency with the provisions or Part III
whereas under cl. (2) any post Constitution• Jaw
contravening those provisions was a nullity from its
inception to the extent of such contravention," and
(I)
(1955) 2 s.c.R. 589.
(21
(1955) Suppl. 2 s.C.R, 8, .
19GB
Mohommadbhai
Khud•bux Chhipo
••
The State of Gt1jllfat
Wonchoo J,
902 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1962] SUPP.
19~1
Mo"4mmwlb/uJi
KJmddux CMipa
v.
T"' State of a,.Ja"u
lY1n~hoo J.
therefore a. law which was bad ab initio under
Art. 13 (~) either wholly or to the extent of the contravention could not be revived by tho application of
the doctrine of eclipse and the doctrine could only
apply in the case of a law that was valid when made
but was rendered invalid for certain purposes by a
supervening constitutional inconsiotency. The argument on behalf of the State is that if rr. 65 and 07
were valid when they were first framed and became
invalid on the introduction of s. ;)A in the Act, they
became cffecti ve again when s. 5A was amended by
the Ordinance.
·
It has not been disputed in this case that the
doctrine of eclipse applies to cases of rules. The
. only dispute was whether rr. 65 and 67 in the preBent form were in existence before 1953 when s. 5A
was inserted in the Aet and if so whethn they were
valid in that form before l 9ii3. Time was taken by
tho parties to trace the history of the Act and theBe
two rules and the form in which the Act and these
rules stood beforo 1953. Investigation in this matter
shows that rules were frame<! for the first time in
1941 after the Act came on the statute book. Rule
65 (1) was in the same form as it existerl when it
was struck rlown by the earlier judgment. Rule 67
(1) was also substantially in the same form except
that it did not originally include a trader or a commission agent or warehouseman as it did at tho time
when it was struck down. The addition or tho words
"tho trnders and commission agents" in r. 67(1) is
however not material, ,for these classes were already
covered by r.65( I). As for the werrhousemen which
were adrlerl sometime later to I'. 67( I), that addition
need not detain us because we arc not concerned in
these petitions with warehousemen. So it seems that
r. 6ii (I) and r. fi7 (1) were practically the same
when they were first framed in Hl4 l as they existed
when they wem struck down. The Act as originally
passed in 1939 dirl not. ()Olltain a section like s.5A.
'J.'4e scheme of the ;\ct the11 was tllat qnder e. 4 (2 ) ,
3 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT. REPORTS
903
the Government alone could grant licences for setti 9as
ing up any place for the purchase and sale of agricul- Moha=adbhoi
ture produce notified under the Act and thereafter
Khudabux Chhipa
under s. 5 it was the duty of the market committee · The State Guja,.1
established under the Act for every market area to
-enforce the provisions of the Act afld the conditions
Wanclioo J. ·
of the licence granted by the Government setting
up a place as above and to establish a market therein, if so, required by the Government. Section 26
gave power to the Government to frame rules for
the purposes of carrying out the provisions of the
Act. Sub-section (2)(e) and (f) were as below:-
:j
"(2) In particular and without prejudice
to the generality of the foregoing provisions
such rules may provide for or regulate:-
..............................................................
(e) the maximum fees which may be
levied by the market committee in respect of
licences granted to traders and on the agricultural produce bougFit and sold in the market
area and the rerovery of such fees;
(f) the issue of licences to brokers ,weighmen measures and surveyors the form in which
and. the conditions subject to which such
licences shall be issued or renewed and the conditions subject to which the licences shall carry
on their business and the fees to be charged
therefor."
1
It will be seen that these provisions by whichc
rules could be framed for grant of licences did not
confer power for issuing licences only for the market
established under s.5 ris it originally Rtood. These
powers were general in terms and the Government
could frame rules empowering the market committee to issue: licences for carrying on business throughout the market area. Rules 65 (I) and 67 (I} therefore would be within the power granted to the
~tate GovernlJlent unqer s. 26 w4en the;r were
904 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1962] SUPP.
}962
Jlohammadbhai
lrhuda/Jux Chhippa
v.
7 ht Stale of Gujarat.
IY
"'-"°"
J•
originally framed in l!l4 l and would thus be valid
then.
Then we come to tlw amendment of the Act
in I !M8. By this aruenrlment, clauses (e) and (f) of
s. 26(2) wnc combined in one and were numbered
as sub-s. (2)(f), which runs as follows:(2) Tn particular and without prejudice
to the generality of tho foregoing provision
such rules may provide for or regulate:-
................................ .......................... .
'
( f) the isAue of licences to traders, eommiHsion agents, warohousemf'n and other personR operating in the market, brokers, weighmen, measurers and surveyors, the form in
which, and the conditions subject to which
such licences shall be issued or renewed and
the fees to be charged thnefor;".
It will be seen that tJiough the words "market
area" do not appear in this provision, it is still of a
gt1neral nnture nnd does not restrict the.operation
nf the licence only to the market.'I So rr. li5 and Gi
won Id not he incnnsistent with it.
Then we eome to the amen<lmPnt. of 1953
which introduced s.5A · ( ftR it was lwforc th" amendment hy the Or<linnnrn) in the Act and that provided that "whcrn a market is established uncfor s.5,
the market commit.tee may issue licences in accord1mce with the rules to traders, commission agents,
broktirs, wcighmen, mea.surers, surveyors, warehous1·mcn and other persons t.o operate in tho
market." This section was ~onsidered in the earlier
judgment and it was held thore on the bnsis of this
Rection that rr. (j,; and 67 when they gavo power to
the committee to issue licences for operation in the
mark1•t arPa. as distinguished from the market
were bad after the enactment of s. 5A.
J
3 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
905
'It is howaver clear from the above narration
of facts th1.t r.fi5(1) and r.67 (I) were valid when
they were originally framed and remained valid till
s. 5A was en 1cte:l. in 195:1 and became bad on the
insertion of s. 5A in the Act. Now that s. 5A has
been amended by the Ordinance, rr. 65 and 67 are
obviously in conformity with it, r. 66 being merely
oonsequential. Therefore
they will
revive
by the application of the doctrine of eclipse as they
are no longer overshadowed by s. 5A as it was
before the Ordinance. The contention under this
head ~ust therefore fail.
196!
Mohammadbh•i
Khudab"" Chhipa
Y,
Tiu Stat, oJ Guj.,al
WanchaoJ.
Re. ( 7).
The argument under this head is that subs.(3) of s. 29-B which validates the collection of
licence-fees by market committees "is bad inasmuch
as it makes it impossible for refund to be made of
licence-fees collected at the time when the market
committee had no power to collect it. We h'1ve
not been able to understand this contention, for it
is not disputed that the legisl1tture has power to
legislate retrospectively even with respect to taxation (see M. P. V. 81mdararam.ier cG Go. v. The 8tat,e
of Andhra Pradesh (1), where Sales Tax Laws Validation Act, 1956, was held consititutionally valid.
Fees are also included within the taxing power of
the legislature in the broadest sense. Article 31 (l)
therefore has no application in the present case and
we have to look to Art. 265 which says that "no tax
shall be levied or collected exc.ept by authority of
law". Sub-section (3) of s. 29-B is the law which
retrospectively·authorises the levy of licence-fees
collected in this case. Retrospective power of the
legislature to make a law being there even in the
case of taxation, we fail to see how the provisions
of sub-s. (3) of s. 29-B which validate the levy and
collection of licence-fees can be held to be invalid
(1) [1958) S.C.R. 1422·
•
906 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1962) SUPP.
1161
Mohamm<dbh.i
Khudob..x Cll/tipa
••
Tira Blall of<Jujarol
WancAH ,1.
undor Ar_t. 31(1). \Ve may add that the same will
apply to fecH collcctecl 11nder 8. I I ancl validated by
sub-s. (2) of s. 29.R. Thcre iR therefore no force
this contention. It iR hcrc:by rejected.
in
In the result, the petitions are dismissed
with cost;i, One set of hearing fee.
Petilfon.y dismissed.
1961
Morch JG.
MADAN GOPAL RU~GTA
v.
SECRETAH.YTO THE OOVERNMENTOF
ORISSA
(B. P. SINHA, ·p, B. GA.mNDRAGADKAR, K. ~
WANCHOO, N. RA.JAOOPALA AYYANOAH, and
T. L. VENKATARA)[A AIYAR, JJ.)
Writ-Iliyh Court-If can i.<.1uc writs beyond its territorial juristliclion-Mi11eral Conce..;sion /l1de.~, 194.9, 6,57 !J.'J
00-Constilution of India Ari. 226.
' '
The Stace Government of Orissa rejected the application of the appellant who had applied f()r grant of a mining least: in Decr.rnher 1957 on the ground that the State
Government proposed to arrangr. for lhe exploitation of the
area in the public si:ctor. The appellant rnadr. an application
for review to the Central Govern1nent under r. 57 of the
rules of Mineral Concession Rub, 1949. This application
was rejected by the Central Government in June 1959.
Thereupon the appellant filed a petition under Art. 226 of
the Constitution in the High Court of Oris'ia. This petition
was dismhsed by th~ 1-ligh Court on the ground that it had
no j11risdiction to dc;1l \vi th the matter under l\rt. 226 a'i
the final order in the case \\'a." passed by the Central Government, \vhich ,.,·as located beyond the territorial jurisdiction
of the High Court. The appellant came up by special leave
to appeal to the Supren1e Court. The 1nain question is as
to the limit of the jurisdiction of the Iiigli Court under Art.
226. The appellant contended that as the Central Go,·ern!JlCnt had rq.crely dismissed the rev~cw petition, the effective
•
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