BHAU RAM versus B. BAIJNATH SINGH
Supreme Court of India | Decided 7 March 1962 | [1962] SUPP. 3 S.C.R. 724 | 1962 INSC 89
Key facts
- Decided
- 7 March 1962
- Bench
- P.B. GAJENDRAGADKAR*, A.K. SARKAR, K.N. WANCHOO, K.C. DAS GUPTA, N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR
- Bench size
- 5
- Case number
- CIVIL APPEAL No. 270/1955
- Disposal
- Dismissed
- Citation
- [1962] SUPP. 3 S.C.R. 724
- Neutral citation
- 1962 INSC 89
Text of the judgment
724 SUPREME COURT REPORTs [l96ZJ SUPP.
1962
Bochliit14r Sfogh
v.
Tru Stak of Punjab
.M udholkat J.
would then be the action of the Government. Horo
one of the Under Secretaries to the Government
of Punjab informed the appellant by his letter dated
!\fay, 1, 1957 that his representation '•had been
considered 1tnd rejected", evidently by the State
Government. Thh; would show that appropriate
action had been taken under the relevant rule.
Tho appeal is thus without substance and is
dismissed. In view of the fact that the appellant
is a displaced person with heavy responsibilities
and with limited or possibly hardly any means we
diroct that the costs shall be borntl by the parties
concerned.
1962
BHAURAY
March 7.
v.
B. BAIJNATH SINGH
(P. B.
GAJB!'!DltAGADKAR, A. K. SARKAR, K. N.
WANCHOO, K. C. DAS GUP'l'A and N. RAJA·
GOl'ALA AYYANGAR, JJ.)
Pre-eniption-Stalt1tes entitling neighbours, co-sharera et.c.
to pre-empt-C<msti!utionality of-If offend right to properlyWhethtr discriminatory-Rewa Stale Pre-emption Act, JY4G,
s, 10-l'unjab Pre-emption Act, 1913(Punj. 1 of 1913), •· !GBerar Land Revenue Code, 192S, Ch. X/V-Conatitution of
/ndia,Art...14, 19(1)(!), 19(5).
Section IO of the Rewa State !'re-emption Act, 1946,
conferred the right of pre-emption on the ground, inter alia
of vicinage. The proviso to s. 10 provided that among preemptors of the same class the nearer in relationship t<:> . the
vendor will exclude the more remote. There were prov1s1ons
in the Act for giving notice of an intended sale . to .persons
having a right of pre.emption, for the loss of die ~1ght of
pie-emption in case no action \vas taken on the notice and
for fixation of a fair price by the Courl. It was contended
38.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
725
thats. IO offended Art. 19(1)(f) of the Constitution and was
void.
Section 16 of the Punjab Pre•emption Act, 1913, as
applied to Delhi, provided for pre-emption on six grounds, the
first, third, fourth and sixth grounds being in favour of co.
sharers, owners of common staircases, owners of common
entrance from a street and owners of contiguous property.
By s. 7 the operation of the Act was limited to localities where
the custom of pre-emption was prevalent.
There were provisions in the Act for giving of notice etc. as in lhe Rewa Act.
Section 5 exempted agricultural property, shops, serai, katra,
dhar~msala, moaque and other similar building from the
purview of the Act. It was contended that s. 16 offended
Art. 19(1)(f) and that the Act contravened Art. 14.
Chapter 14 of the Berar Land Revenue Code, 1928,
created a right of pre-emption in the holder of an interest in a
survey-number when any person having an interest in any land
in that survey-number sold it to a stranger provided that the
interest sold was in unalienated land held for agricultural
purposes. It was contended that this law of pre-emption was
inconsistent with Art. 19(I)(f).
..-,z
Held, (per Gajendragadkar, Wanchoo and Ayyangar,JJ.,
Sarkar and Das Gupta,JJ., Contra) that s. IO of the Rewa
Act which provided for pre-emption on the ground of vicinage
imposed unreasonable restrictions on the right to acquire, hold
or dispose of property guaranteed by Art.19(1) (f) of the Constitution and was void. It placed restrictions on the right of the
vendor to sell his property to a purcha~er of his choice at a
price settled between them ; it exposed the purchaser to
litigation even after the requisite notices had been given
by the vendor. There was no advantage to the general public
from such a law. The real reason behind a Jaw of pre·
emption on the basis of vicinage was to prevent strangers i.e.
people belonging to different religion, race or caste, from
, acquiring property in any area populated by a particular
fraternity or class of people. This could not be considered
reasonable in view of the prohibition under Art. 15 of the
C0nstitution of discrimination only on grounds of religion,
race, caste, etc.
Shri Audh Behari Singh v. Gajadltar Jaipuria, (1955)
I. S.C.R. 70; Ibrahim Saib v. Muni Mir Udim Saib, (1870)
6 Mad. H.C.R. 26and1ffohomed Beg Amin v. Narayan Meghaji
Patil, ( 1916) I.L.R. 40 Born. 358, referred to.
Per
Sarkar
and
Das
Gupta, JJ.
Section
10 of the Rew'
i
.
.
.
.
.
•
.
.
1161
Bhau·Ram
••
B. Baijnoth Singh
726 SUPREME OOURT REPORTS [1962] SUPP.
19GZ
Act did not offend Art. 19(l)(f) and was valid.
The right
of pre-en1ption was not frequently exerci!>ed and the restric..
BhauRam
v.
B. BlliJn•lh SU.,A
tions imposed by it did not affect many persons.
Jn a
la~ge
part of the country there \Vas customary !aw of pre-emption
which had been found to be reasonable before the Constitution
came into force ; nothing had happened since to make it
unreasonable. The provisions regarding notice etc. relaxed
the severity of the restriction. The law imposed two restrictions on the vendor-first that he may be prevented from
selling property at any price he liked and secondly, that he
could not sell it to anyone of his choice. ~fhe first restriction
was clearly reasonable a• it prevented the vendor from selling
at exorbitant prices and the rich from amassing property·
The second was not a great deprivation. The law placed the
restriction on the purchaser that he could not acquire a parti-
cular property if the adjoining owner wanted it.
In view of
the Indian \\"ay of life to live in compact communities this was
a reasonable restriction. It would also avoid disputes that
may arise if a stranger were allO\\'ed to come in. The reasons
for upholding pre-emption on the ground of being co-sharers
were equally applicable to pre-emption on the ground of
vicinage. The proviso to s. IO which laid down that a person
nearer in relationship to the vendor shall have a preferential
right was not bad ; it did not create a right of pre-emption
but it merely solved a problem arising out of a valid right of
pre-emption arising in favour bf more then one person.
Sardha Ram v. Haji Abdul, A.IR. (1960) Punj. lll5 and'
Ramc/1andrn Kri,,hnaji Dhaga/e v. Janardan Krishna7>pa
Jfancrir, A.I.R. (1955) Nag. 225, approved.
Punch Gujar Gaur Brahmins v. Amarsingh, A.J.R. (1954)
Raj. 100, Babula/ v. Gowardhandas, A.J.R. (1956) M.B.J.
i'!Pu:al<tl Ghansham v. Param Lalanju, A.LR. (1956) V.P. 9
and Moti Bai v. Kand Kari Channaya, A.LR. (1954) Hyd.
161, disapproved.
Shri Aud/I Rehari Singh v. Gajad.har ./ aipuria, ( 1955')
I S.C.R. 70 and Tyson'" Smith, (1938) 9 Ad. & E.P. 406,
referred to.
lleld, further, that the first, third and fourth grounds of
pre-emption ins. 16 of the Punjah Act as applied to Delhi
did not offend Arts. 19(I)(f) and 14 and were valid.
The
lav:, under the firc;t ground ins. 16, providing for pre-emption
by co-sharers imposed reasonahle restrictions in the interest of
the general public on the right under Art. 19(1 )(f). If an
outsider v.•as in trocluccd as a co-sharer in a property it would
make common management extremely difficult and destroy
!l•c benefits of ownership in common.
The advanta~e of
3 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
727.
excluding a stranger in the case of a residential house was all
the greater as it would avoid all kinds of disputes. The third
ground ins. 16, which applied in a case where the property
sold had a staircase common with other properties stood
practically on the same footing as that of co-sharers.
The
fourth ground ins. 16 which applied where the property sold
had a common entrance from the street with other properties
was similar to the first and the third ground. Further, there
was no discrimination in s. 16 because of the exclusion of
certain properties from its operation by s. 5. So far as agri·
cultural property was concerned it formed a distinct class by
itself and there was no question of discrimination on that
account. With respect to the other premises exempted by
s. 5 they formed one class, namely, those to which the public
resorted v.,1hich were distinct from residential property meant
for private resident. There was no question of excluding
strangers frOrri such premises.
Uttam Singh v. Kartar Singh AJ.R. 1954 Pun. 55 and
Sardha Ram v. Haji Abdul Majid Mohd. Amir Khan, A.I.R.
1960, Pun. 196, approved.
.
Per Gajendri'gadkar, Wanchoo and Ayyangar, JJ. The
Sixth ground in s. 16 which provided for pre-emption on the
ground of vicinage was invalid for the same reasons as s. 1O
of the Rewa Act was invalid.
Per Sarkar and Das Gupta, JJ, The sixth ground of
pre-emption in s. 16 was also valid for the same reason as
s. IO of the Rewa Act was valid.
Ilelrl, further, that the law or" pre-emption contained in
14 of the Berar Code was valid. It applied to those who were
co-sh~rers or were_ akin to. co-sharers;
Such a right of pree1npt1on wo.uld result i:n c?nsoli~ation of holdings in a survey
number which wou!J be in the mterest of the general public.
Rarnchandra v.Janardan, A.LR. 1955 Nag. 225, approved.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal
No. 270 of 1955.
·
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and
decree.d~ted ~arch 21, 19~2, of the former Judicial
Comm1ss10ner s Court, Vmdhya Pradesh in ]' A
· ·
No. 16 of 1952.
WITH
Civil Appeal No. 430 of 1958.
196t
BhauRam
••
B. Ba&·nath Singh
728
1968
Bh"" Ram
v.
B. B.;jnoth Bintla
SUPREME OOUR'f REPORTS [1962] SUPP.
Appeal from the judgment and decree dated
April l 2, 1956, of the former Nagpur High Court in
L.P.A. No. I Ill of 5f>.
AND
Civil Appeal No. 59:i of 1960.
Appeal from the judgment and order dated
October 29, 1957, of the Punjab High Court in Civil
Revision Application No. 518 D of 1956.
L,K. Jha. R. Patnaik and A.D. Mathur, for the
appellant (in C.A. No. 270 of 1955).
D. N. Mukherjee, for respondent No. I.
S. K: Kapur and P. D. Menmi, for the Inter·
vener.
A. V. Viswanatha Sastri and A. G, Ratnaparkhi,
for th!l appellants in (C.A. No. 430 of 1958).
dent{!,
S. A. Sohoni and Ganpat Rai. 'for the respon·
·
R. S. N1trnla, for the appellant (in C. A. No.
595/fiO).
S. K. Kap11r and Ganpat Rai, for the respon·
dent.
Wanchoo J.
1962. March 7. The Judgment of Gajendra·
gadkar, Wanchoo aud Ayyanga.r JJ., was delivered
by W:mchoo .J. The ,Judgment of Sarkar and Das
Gupta, ,J,J., was delivered by Sarkar, J.
WA:>CHOO, J.-These three· appeals which
have been heard together raise the constitutionality
of cort'1in provisions of the pre-emption laws pre·
vailing in tho States of Madhya Pradesh (Rewa-3tate
area), l'elhi and Maharashtra (Berar-aroa). Three
suits for pre.emption wore brought by· pre-emptors
which were decreed, and the present appeals are by
purcha{!ers. Though the appeals were heard together
J'S some of the points involved wore common, i~
..
.
3 S.C.R.
SUPREME <;JOURT REPORTS
729
would be convenient to deal with each appeal
separately because the Jaw involved in each case is
different.
We shall begin with C.A. 207 of 1955. This
is eoncerned with the Rewa State Pre-emption Act,
l\J46 (hereinafter called the Rewa Act), and particularly with s.10 thereof, which is in these terms:"Classes of pre-emptors :-Persons of the
following classes shall have a right of preemption:-( 1) Any person who is a co-sharer or partner
in the property sold and foreclosed.•:.
~
(2) Any person who. owns arty immovable
property adjoining the property sold or
foreclosed or in case of transfer of tenancy
rights, the land which is the subject
of such rights.
Provided that among the above mentioned classes the first in order will exclude the
second and among persons of the same class,
the nearer in relationship to the person whose
property is sold or foreclosed will exclude the
more remote."
We are in the present case concerned with the
second clause by which a person owning immovable
property adjoining the property sold or foreclosed ·
is entitled to pre-empt subject to the order provided in the proviso. In this case, both the purchaser
and the pre-emptors hold property adjoining the.
· property sold, but as the pre-emptors were· related
to the vendor, while the purchaser was not, the suit
was decreed irt favour of the pre-emptors in view of
the proviso.
The question therefore that arises is whether
a right of pre-emption by vicinage offends
4rt. I9(l)(f). There has beeµ divergence of opinion
1962
Bhau Ram
v.
B. Baijnath Singh
Wanchoo J.
730 SUPREME COUR'I'. REPORTS [l!lu2] SUPP.
1962
v.
B. Baijnath Singh
W11nchoo J.
between various High Courts on this qm'stion. The
High Courts of lfajasthan, Madhya Bharat and
Hyderabad and the Judicial Commissioner, Vindhya
Pradesh have taken the view that such a right of
pre-emption offends Art. 19( l)(f) whilo the High
Court of Punjab has held otherwise. Before, h"owever, we deal with the main points urged in this case
we may notice the argument based on the decision
of this Court in Shri Audh Behari Singh \". Ga_jad!tar
Jaipuria, where it was held that the law of preemption creates a right which attaches to the property and on that footing only it can be enforced
against the purchaser~ The argument is that since
the righ.t of pro-emption attaches to the property
sold it ls an incident of property, and thernfore
cannot be held to be a restriction on the right to
acquin', hold and dispose of property. On the
other hand it is urged that if the law of pro-empt.ion
creates a right which is an incident of lJroperty,
even so it would bP- a restriction ereatcd by law on
the fundamental right guarnnteed undor Art. I !J( I)( f)
of the Constitution. We are of opinion that even if
the law of pre-emption creates a right which att11ches to property it would be creating a restriction
so far as the acquiring, holding or disposing of
property is concerned which was not them before
the law of pre-empt.ion was enacted. Therefore,
even if the liability attaches to the property, it will
still amount to a restriction on the right guaranteed
by Art. 19(1 )(f), when it attaches to the property
by the law of pre-emption.
Article 19 (i) (f) gives a fundamental right to
a citizen to acquire, hold and dispose of property
and cl. (5) of that Article permits reasonable restrictions to be imposed by law on thio right in t.bo
interests of thr gcmmil public. There can hen~ r]oubt
that a law of pre-empt.ion docs impose restriction
~n the fundamental right guara!lteed -qnder :Art. ~ !J
3 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
731
(i) (f) and the question is whether the restriction
imposed in the ttewa case is reasonable and in the
interests of the general public. Section 1(1 of the
Rewa Act applies to all kinds of property, whether
urban or rural, and whether agricultural land or
houee property, and it is in that context that its
reasonableness will have to be judged. There is
nothing to show in this case that there was any preexisting custom of a similar nature prevalent in any
·part of the area to which the Rewa Act applies;
and even if any custom was prevalent in any area,
there is nothing to show what precisely that custom
was. In any case evsn if any custom was prevalent
in this area before the Rewa Act came into force
and it· was held reasonable by courts, that would
not in our opinion be a decisive factor in considering whether the restrictions imposed by the Rewa
Act are reasonable or not. We have to judge the
reasonableness of the law in the context of the
fundamental rights which were for the first time
conferred by the Constitution on the people of this
country and which were not there when the courts
might have considered the reasonableness of the
custom, if any, in the context of things then prevalent. Nc.r do we think that the fact that the right
of pre·emption may not be actually exercised in the
case of even a large number of sales can have any
bearing on the question whether the law imposing
the restriction is reasonable or not.
Let us therefore see what the Rewa Act provides. Section 10, as we have pointed out, gives a
right of pre-emption first to co-sharers and secondly
to owners of adjoining property to which we shall
refer hereafter as pre·emption by vicinage. We are
not concermid in the present appeal with the case
of co-sharers, with which we shall deal in a later
part of the judgment. Ordinarily, if there was no
Jaw of pre.emption a vendor would be entitled to
sell his property to anybody for any price that may
pe 11ettled between him and the purchaser, '.!'hi~
'· f•
1962
Bhau Rom
v.
B. Baijnath Singh
Wanehoo J.
732 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1962) SUPP.
1962
Rhau Ram
v.
B. Ra1j1Jath Singh
JY111uhoo J,
right is clearly restricted by the law of pre-emption
which may in many ca.sos result in a depression of
the price which the vendor may otherwise be ablo
to ge~ for his property. Further the Act provides
that if the vendor and the vendee desire that there
may be no suit for pre-empt.ion tho vendor can give
notice to possible pre-omptors of the price at which
the vendor is rilling to sell such property. This
notice is given through the court within the local
limits of whose jurisdiction the property is situate.
On such notices being given to possible pre-emptors.
the pre-emptor will lose the right of pre-emption
unless with.in one month frodl the date of service of
such notice, he or his agent pays or tenders the
price to the vendor: see · ss. 12 and I 3. Further.
s. 15 shows that even where such a notice has been
given and the pr:ice has not been paid or tendered,
a suit for pre-emption can be filed after tho sale
in spite of s.13 on the ground that the price stated
in the notice was not fixed in good faith. The court
then decides whether tho price stated in the notice
id the proper price, and if it comes to tho concln~ion
that it is not it has the power to fix such price as
11ppears to it to be the fair market price of the
property sold. Clearly, therefore, th ore is a restriction on tho right of the vendor to sell the property
at any price to which the purchaser has agreed and
a suit for pre-emption can be filed even where a preemptor ·is not prepared to pay the agreed price and
can have it reduced. The notice therefore providfd
in s. 12 and the failure of the pre-emptor to comply
with it under s, 13 are really of not such value, for thl•
pre-emptor can always get over the provisions of
s.13 by alleging that t-he price entered in thn notice
was not fixed in gooJ faith. In effect, therefore,
"very sale will be open to pre-emption and the law
Qf pro-emption thus provides a crop of litigation for
the vendor and the vendce. This is the first result
of tho law of pm-emption. Furt}\er we "All !19
'1
I
c·
3s.c.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 733
reason to think· that the law of pre-emption prevents the sale of property at an unconscionable
price for if a vendor is demanding an unconscionable price he will not be able to find a vendee. In
any case the price is always settled by agreement
between the vendor and the vendee and there is no
reason to hold that such an agreed price would b;;
an unconscionable price. Nor do we think that the
la.w of pre-emption in intended to provide for fixation of reasonable price by courts ; therefore that
can hardly be a reason to hold that it is a reasonable restriction in the interests of the general public
on the right of the vendor under Art. 19 ( 1 )(f).
We do not think that the restrictions placed by the
law of pre-emption in .a case based on vicinage
have any effect on prices being reasonably fixed,
and the main effect we can see is that the law may
give rise to a crop of litigation. We cannot therefore see any advantage to the general public by
such a law of pre-emption and in any case the dis,
advantage certainly overweighs the advantage that
may result to a small section of the public.
Now let us look at the matter from the point
of view of the vendee. He comes to an agreement
with the vendor to purchase the property at a cerbin agreed price. Let us also assume that the
vendor has given notice under s.12 and no action
has been taken by the pre-emptor under s.13. Ther.eafter the vendee purchases the property and would
be entitled to hope that as the price was not paid
or tendered under s.13, he would be able to hold and
enjoy the property without any further trouble,
But as we have pointed out already even though
ss.12 and 13 are there it is always open to a preemptor to file a suit for pre-emption after having failed to. take action under s.13 by merely alleging that
the price stated in the notice given to him was not
fixed in good faith. So the vendee who may have
purchased ~he property after action being taken
under ss.12 and 13 is forced into litigation on the
1962
Bhau Ram
v.
B. Baijnath Singh
Wanchoo J.
734 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1962] SUPP.
11161
Bll•ciRam
••
B, Baijnath Singh
WacAooJ.
ground that th(l price agreed is presumably too
high. Thus there is clearly a rostl'iction on his
right to hold propert.v, and even though the vende(l
may eventually succeed on the footmg that the
price :tgroed is not above the market value he is
compelled to go through litigtition in order to hold
the property. Such a restriction would thus appear
to be unreasonablo for it allows the pre-emptor to
go to court evcm after ss.12 and 13 have beon complied with.
Let us further look to the broader aspects of
the provisions rel:iting to pre-emption by vi<:inage.
It .may be stated that the right. of pre-emption was
not recognised under the Hindu law and is not
enforced in large parts of this <'ountry to tho south
of the Vindhyas. It Cl'me to be enforced after the
advent of i\Iohomedan rule as based on custom
which was accepted by courts, particularly in
~orthern India. While in )/orthern India the courts
enforced the right of pre-emption based on custom,
even where there was no statutory law of preemption holding that it wa,s in accordance with
justice, equity and good conscience, in Southern
India the view taken was that it was opposed to
principles of justice, equity and good conse~cnce:
(see Ibrahim Saib v. 11funi Mir Udin Saib and (1)
Mohmned Beg Amin Bert v. Narayan Me,ghaji Patil)(').
The reasonableness of a custom is, however, not a.
co.nstant factor and what is reasonable at one
stage of tho progress of society may not be so at
l\nothcr stage. It is in this context that we have
to judge the law of pre-emption as it was later put
into various statutes. Before the Constitution came
into force, the statutes if they were passed by competent authority, eould not be challenged; but we
have now to judge the reason ablene88 of these statutes in the light of the fundamental rights guaranteed
to the citizens of this country by the Constitution. In
(I) (1870' 6. Mad. H.C.R. 26.
(2) (1916) I.L.R. 40 Bom. 358.
. .. , ..
~
s.c.R. StrPR:FlME COURT REPORTS
1962
a society where certain classes were privileged and
preferred to live in groups and there were discrimiBhau Ram
nations, on grounds of religion, race and caste, there
. v.
may have been some utility in allowing persons to B. Baijnath Siugh
Wanchoo J,
'prevent a stranger :f'rom acquiring property in an
area which had been populated by a particular
fraternity of class of people and in those tirµes a
right of pre·emption which would oust a stranger
from the neighbourhood may have been tolerable
or reasonable, But the Constitution now prohibits
dis.criminatiou <1gainst any citizen on grounds only
of religion, r .ce, caste, sex, place of birth or any of
them under Art. 15 and guarantees a right to every
citizen to acquire, hold and dispose of property,
subject only to restrictions which may be reasonable and in the interests of the general public.
Though therefore the ostensible reason for preemption may be vicinage, the real reason behind the law was to prevent a stranger from acquiring property in any area which had been populated
by a particular fraternity or class of people. In
effect, therefore, the law of pre.emption based on
vicinage was really meant to prevent strangers i.e.
peo]Jle belonging to different religion, race or caste,
from acquiring property. Such division of society
now into groups and exclusion of strangers fro,'
any locality cannot be considered reasonable, and
the main reason therefore which sustained the law
of pre.emption based on vicinage in previous times
can have no force now and the law must be held to
impose an unreasonable.restriction on the right to
acquire, hold and dispose of property as now guranteed under Art. 19(l)(f), for it is impossible to see
such restrictions as reasonable and in the interests
of the general public in the st!lte of society m the
present day.•
It is urged, however, that at any rate, in the
case of agricultural properties, pre-emption by vicinage results in consolidation of agricultural lands,
and that at any rate is an advantage. How far the
~
~.16 SUPREME COURT REPoRTS (1962] SUPP.
1962
Bhau Ram
v.
B. Baijnalh Singh
rv a"'hoo J.
'
argument of consolidation can be availed of now
when we find that in most :Statos laws are being
pa~sed which are putting ceilings on agricultural
holdings is a matter which it is unnece!lB&ry to consider in the prrs~nt emm, for the Rewa Act applies
not only to agricultural holdings but also to burn
property including house property. There is no
quostii>n of any advantage arising out of consolidation whore one is dealing with urban property or
house property. The matter of consolidation might
have had some hearing if the RewaAct was appli<;able to agricultural lando only. But as it applies to
urban lands as woll as house property where
no quostion of consolidation of holdinf;ls arises,
the impugned provision cannot be held to be
a. reasonable re8trietion in the interests of the
general public on the ground that it lead·s to
eo!lsolidation of agricultural holdings. There is
no way of severing the application of the law
so far as it relates to agricultural holdings
from its application to urban or house property and
therefore the entire provision as to vicinage must
fall, even if somet.hing could be said in it.a favour
with respect to agricult1Jre holding on the ground
of consolidation. We are therefore of opinion that
the second clause of s. IO imposes an W1reaeonable
restriction on the right to acquire, hold or dispose
of property guaranteed under Art. 19(1) (f) of the
Constitution and must be struck down. So far as
the proviso is concerned it applies both to the first
. and the second clause and it will survive for the
purp<>Bo uf tho firHt clause only, which is not in dispute Lefore us.
In this view of the matter C. A. 270 of 1955
must suc.ceed.
We next come to C.A. 595 of 1960. This
relates the Punjab Pre-emption Act, l9l 3(Punj. I
of 1913), (hereinafter referred to as the Punjab
Act), as applied to tho city of old Delhi. W ~ are
..
3 s.c.R.
(-
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
concerned with s. 16 of the Punjab Act, which
deals with urban immovable property and is in
these terms :"The right of pre-emption in respect of
· urban immovable property shall vest, •
··
1961
Bhau Ram
•••
B. Baijhc.th 8ingA
Wanchoo J.
firstly, in the co-shares in such property,
if any;
secondly, where the sale is of the site
of the building or other structure, in the
owners of such building or structure ;
thirdly, where the sale is of a property
having a staircase common to other properties, in the owners of such properties ;
"fourthly, where the sale is of a property
having a common entrance from the street
with other properties, in the owners of such
properties ;
fifthly, where the sale ia of a servient,
property in the owners of the dominant property, and vice versa ;
sixthly, in the persons who own immovable property contiguous to the property
sold."
The suit was brought by Nanak Singh respondent
who claimed pre-emption with respect to a sale in
favour of the appellant of a house and was rested
on the first, third, fourth and sixth grounds in the ·
section. The question whether s. 16 of the Punjab
Act was ultra vires the Constitution was tried as a
preliminary issue. The subordinate judge held in
favour of the respondent. Thereupon the appellant went in revision to the High Court. The
High Court held that the. first, third and fourth
grounds in s.16 did not offend Art. 19 (ll (f); it·
further held that the sixth ground offended
•
73s SUPREME cobklr REPOI~i·s (1962] sui>:P.
Art. 19 (l) (f). Thia IRl!t view was apparently in conflict with the earli~r Full Bouch decision of that
Bh<tU Rom
· Court in UUam Singh v. Kartar Singh (I). Lator
v.
R. Bai)noth Sinth
tho High Court held in Sardlia Ram v. Haji Abdul
Maji,d
Mohd. Amir Kltan {') by a five-Judgo Bench
Ww~Ji.. J.
that the provisions contained in clause "sixthly"
of s. 16 were not ultm vire.s the provisions of the
Constitution inasmuch as the restrictions imposed
were not unreasonable. The appellant thereupon
came to this Court on a. certificate granted by the
High Court challenging the view of the High Court
that the first, third and fourth grounds were Cons-·
titutional. Further, in view of the five-Judge
decision in 1960 which has shaken the view taken
in the judgment under appeal on the sixth grounds,
the appellant has urged that that decision is correct.
J96Z
•
It may be noted that under e. 7 of the Punjab
Act, s. 16 only applies to a. town sub-division of a.
town when a custom of pre-emption is proved to
have been in existence in such town or sub-division
at the time of the commencement of the Aot and
not otherwise. [tis not disputed thats. 16 applies
to that area of old Delhi in '\\' hich the property is
situate. The fa.ct however that such a custom was
prevalent in this area. before 1!113 when the Punjab
Act ca.me into force is not a decisive factor in
holding that the provisions of s. 16 of the Punjab
Act a.re necessarily reasonable. We have already
dealt with this aspect of the matter when dealing
with the Rowa Act, and need not add anything
more. We have also doalt with the question a.s to
the right of pre-emption based on vicinago when
doaling with the ltewa Act, and for the reasons
given ea..rlier we hold that pre:e~ption based. on
vicinage 1s an unreasonable restnct10n on the right
to hold, acquire or dispose of property conferred by
Art. l\J (l) (f). Wo may however briefly notice the
grounds on which the two Punjab cases of l!l54 and
(I) A,l.R. 1954 Pun. 55.
(2) A.l.R. I 96 0 P"n. I Sf•
3
.· · .·
S.C.R.
'
1960 have held otherwise. In the 1954 case both
ss. 15 and 16 of the Punjab Act were dealt with
together. We ·are not here concerned with s. 15
and express no opinion with respect to it. As to
s.16, the reasons which impelled the learp.ed Judges
to hold that the provisions of s. 16 were constitutional were "to reduce the changes of litigation
and friction and to promote public order and
domestic comfort, and to promote private and
public decency and convenience". We are not
able to understand how providing pre-emption on
the ground of vicinage would carry out these
objects, assuming their promotion is in the
interests of the ge11eral public. Perhaps the
reasons why these grounds were given in the
1954 case may be that the learned Judges were
considering not merely pre-emption. by vicinage
but also with other grounds provided in s. 16.
Whatever may be said about these' reasons so
far as other grounds, of pre-emption contained
in s. 16 are concerned, these reasons have in our
opinion no validity so far as pre-emption by
vicinage is concerned. Turning now to the case of
Sardha Ram, (') we may note that the learned Judges
observed that "pre-emption imposes restrictions on
the right of the vendee to acquire and hold property
and the right of the vendor to dispose of property.
It limits the power of the vendor to sell his
property to whomsoever he may please or prevents
him from showing preference to anyone to whom
he may wish to sell ........ .it is a clog on the freedom
on sale and tends to diminish the market .value of
the property." They were also conscious of the
trials and tribulations of a vendor whose property
is governed by the law of pre-emption. But they
seem to have upheld the constitutionality of the
sixth ground main\y for two reasons, namely (i) that
it had already been upheld in Uttam Singh's case (')
and (ii) that "what is reasonable in any particular
(1/ A.J.R. 1960 Pun. 196.
(2) A.I.R. 1954 Pun. 55.
1962
Bhau Rom
v.
B. Baijnath Singh
W1,1r.choo J.
740 SUPREME COURT REPoRTS [1!)62] SUPP.
19GZ
Bh .. Rom
v.
B. Baijnath Singh
Wanekoo .·'.
case is difficult of ascertainment;" that the choioo of
measures is for the legislature, that the legislatures
a.re presumed to have investigatod the subject and
to havo acted with reason, that an Act of the legislature should be sustained unless it violates constitutional limitations beyond roasonable question".
The last Punjab case therefore does not add any
further roaaon is support of the reasonableness of
the restriction placed by the law of pre-emption
relating to viclnage, and if anything, the observations mentioned earlier show how unreasonable the
restriction can be, and in the circumstances we must
hold that the sixth ground in 11. 16 is unconstitutional for reasons already indicated when dealing with
the Rewa Act.
This brings us to the consideration of the first
ground which gives a right of pre-emption to a cosharcr in the property sold. The question as to tho
conRt,itutionality of a law of pre-emption in favour
of a co-sharer has been considered by a number of
High Courts and the constitutionality hllll been uniformly upheld. We have no doubt that a law giving
such a right imposes a reasonable restriction which
is in the interest o( the general public. If an outsider is introduced is a co-sharer in a property it will
make common management oxtremoly difficult and
destroy the .benefits of ownership in common. The
result of the law of pre-emption in favour of a cosharer is that if sales take place the proporty may
eventually come into the hands of one co-sharer as
full owner and that would naturally be a great advantage the advantage is a.II the greater in the case
of a residential house and s. 16 is concerned with
urban property; for tho introduction of an outsider
in a residential house would lead to all kinds of
complications. The advantages arising from such
a law of pre-emption are clea1· .,,nd in our opinion
outweigh the disadvantages which the vendor may
3 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
741
suffer on account of his inability to sell the property
to whomsoever he pleases. The vendee also cannot
be said to suffer much by .such a law because he
is merely deprived of the right of owning an
undivided share of the property. On the whole it
seems to us that a right of pre-emption based on
oo-sharership is a reasonable restriction on the
right to acquire, hold and dispose of property and
is in the interests of the general public.
The same reasoning in our opil)iiln will apply
to the third ground, ~'where the sale is of a property
having a staircase common to other properties, in
the owners of such properties". This ground stands
on the same footing practically as the . first ground
relating to co-sharers, and for the same reason
we hold that it is a reasonable restriction, and is
in the interest of general public.
Turning now to the fourth ground, "where
the sale is of a property having a common entrance
from the street with other properties, in the owners
of such properties", this ground is in our opinion
similar to the third ground, the only difference
being that in one case there is a common staircase
while in the other case there is a common private
passage from the street. The idea behind this
ground seems to be that the buildings are in a
common compound and perhaps were originally
put up by members of one family or one group
with a common priv11te passage from the public
street. In such a case the ownew of the buildings
would stand more or less in the position of co.
sharers, though actually there may be no cosharership in the house sold. But .as we have
said this case would approximate to cases of a
common staircase and co-sharer; thereforo, for
reasons given in the case of co-sharers we uphold
the right of pre-emption covered by the fourth
15round in s. 16. The ease falling under the fourth
19611
Bhau Ram
••
B. Ba.ijnath. Singh
W.anchoo J.
742
1951
8"4u R..,,
••
R. B<ijulh SU.,h
w-11ooJ.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1962) SUPP.
ground must be distinguished from lcatras which
are exempt from the provisions of the Act in s. 5:
(see Karim Ahmad v. Rahmat Elahi) ( 1 ) •
A contcetion was also revised that s. I 6
offends Art. 14 of the Constitution. This was
based on s. ,3 of the Punjab Act which gives exemptions to certain properties from the application
of the Act and also on the ground that it did not
apply to agricultural property. So far as agricultural properties are concerned, they form a distinct
class by themselves and therefore there can be
no question of discrimination on that account.
With regard to exemptions contained in s. 5. with
respect to shop, serai, katra, dharmsala, mosque
or other similar building, these arc obviously
distinguishable, for they are generally places to
which public re9ort. In particular strees was laid
on the exemption of katra. A katra is not defined
in the Act; but it appears that the primary meaning
of the word "katra" is enclosure and tho secondary
meaning is market; see Karim Ahmad v. Rahmat
Elahi. Generally, therefore, a katra. would be a
business locality though there might bu purely
residential katrM. However, even purely residential katras would coneist of a large number of
houses to which a large number of people will
resort. In the circumstances, the premises exempted under s. 5 are practically of one class,
namely, those to which the public has to resort
and it is this class which is distinct from the rest
of residential property meant for pri vato residence
of individuals which has been exempted. In the
circumstances we do not think that s. 16 can be
said to violate Art. 14 of the Constitution in the
light of s. 5 of the Punjab Act. In the result,
the appeal foils 1md is hereby dismiBSed. The
case will now go back for disposal according to law
and we trust its decision will he expedited.
(1) AJ.R. J946 Lab,432.
-
3 S.C.R.
SUPRE!\IE COURT REPORTS
743
This brings us to C,A. 430 of 1958. In this
case a pre·emption suit was brought by r,he respondents under Chap. XIV of the Berar Land
Revenue Code, 1928 (hereinafte·r called the Code)
with respect to snrvey No. 285, sub-division I.
The pre-emptors hold sub-division 2 of survey
No. 285 and based their claim on s. 174 of the
Cod'<· Section 17 4 -lays down t~at the right of
pre-emption thereunder shall arise only for unalienated lands held for agricultural purposes in
favour of occupants in a survey number in respect
of transfers of interests is that survey number. An
"occupant in a survey number" has been d,efined
in s. 173 to mean a person having the right of
an .occupant; whether in his sole right or jointly
with others, in that survey number, or in any
portion of it. But the right of pre-emption does
not arise even on a transfer of a part of a survey
number when the transfer is in favour of another
occupant in that survey number or when the
transfer is made with consent of all the occupants
in the survey number. The only point which has
been raisecd before us is whether the right of preemption given by s. 174 of the Code is an unreasonable restriction on the right to acquire,
hold or dispose of property guaranteed under
Art. 19 (1) (f). It may be mentioned that the
suit was . decreed and on appeal to the High Court
tb e decree of the tri<i,l court was confirmed. The
appellant had contended befoie the High Court
that the law of pre-emption had been rendered
void as it was inconsistent with Art. 19 (1) (f} of
the Constitution. But this contention was negatived
on the basis of .. nearlier judgment of the Nagpur
High Court in Ramchandra v. Janardan (1) by which
the right of pre-emption contained in Chap. XIV
of . the Code was held constitutional. The present
appeal challenges the correctness of the view takeii
in that case.
{Jl A.J.R. 1955 Na~. n~:
1968
Bhau Rom
v.
B. Bai}nath Sin:h
Wanchoo J.
744 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1962) SUPP.
J96Z
Blan lam
••
Jl, Bsijndh Sin1A
w""'1loo J.
Now it will be seen that the right of pr~mp
tion granted by _Chap. XIV is of a very limited
nature. In the first place it is confined to [occupants in a survey -number. A "survoy number"
means a portion of land formed into, or recognised
as, a survey number at the last preceding revenuesurvey 'or subsoquently r<1cognised as such by the
Deputy Commissioner, in respect of which the
area and the land· revenue paya.bl A are separately
entered under an indicative number in the land
records. "Sub.division of a survey number" is
defined to mean a portion of a survey numhPr in
rospect of which the area and the land revenue
payable are separately entered in the land records
under an indicative number subordinate to that of
the survey number of which it is a portion. It
appears that generally survey numbers are the
units of assessment at the time of r.evenue settlement and are formed under B. 86 of thci Code and
no new numbers can be formed under the Rules
after the settlement except in special cases, e. g.,
whore land is takon up for public purposes for public buildings, threshing floors etc., or waste land is
given out for cultivation, or survey numbers exeee·
ding 30 acres are divided into two or more survey
numbers to reduce the area; in all other cases only
sub-divisions of a survey number take place. sub·
divisions are formed under s. 88 read with the
rules framod thereunder, and it is open to amalgamate two or more adjoining sub-divisions in a survey number when th"Y are held hy tho same occupants under the same tenuro. On sulKlivision,
the assessment of a survey number is distributed
over its sub-divisions as agreed between the occupants. It is clear therefore that the assessment of
a survey number is one and under s. 132 where
there are more than one occupant of a survey number, all Ruch occupants are jointly and severally
liable to the payment of the land-revenue assessed
oµ it. To be¥in with t~erefore the holders of~
--
3 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
745
19~2
survey number are really co-sharers. For one
reason or the other, if during the currency of the
Bhau Ram
settlement co-sharers decide to sub-divide the numv.,
8. Bajj,.aih Sin:h
ber, the assessment is distributed amongst the subdivisions and each sub-divisions then becomes a
Wanc%oo J·.
holding on being thus separateiy assessed to landrevenue. The right of pre-emption under Chap.
XIV is confined only to the survey number which
as we have pointed out earlier is one unit of assessment, the occupants of which are co-sharers and
are jointly and severally responsible for the payment of land revenue. In effect, therefore where
a survey number is sub-divided during the currency
of a settlement and sub-divisions are formed with
separate assessment of ]and-revenue on such subdivisions, the holders of various sub-divisions,
though they are not strictly co-sharers, are very
much akin to co-sharers. The pre-emption therefore as prov:idcd in r. 174 of Chap. XIV is really
pre-emption in favour of co-sharers strictly so-called
before there is any sub-division of a survey number
and after such sub-division between persons who
though not strictly co-sharers are still akin to
co-sharers. It also appears from the Rules that
a separate survey number is generally expected to
be about 30 acres, though in particular cases it
may he larger. Therefore, the law of pre-emption
in s. 174 of the Code applies to those who are cosharers or akin to co-sharers and results in consolidation of holdings generally upto about thirty acres,
this being the general extent of a survey number.
The right of pre-emption is further restricted under
s. 184 which provides that no right of pre-emption
would arise on an exchange of land with the occupant of another survey number. Jn effect therefore the Code creates a ri.!!ht of pre-emption in the
holder of an interest in a survey number only ·
when an occupant having an interest in that survey
number se.lls it or there is foreclosure or a'usufructury mortgage, or a lease exceeding
fifteen years
js
.
.
746 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1962) SUPP.
1962
B/Jau Rom
"'
B Baijnalh Sinth
W-.;..J.
created in favour of a stranger subject to the land
being unalienated land held for agricultural purposes. Considering therefore the. nature of the
right created under the Code, we have no hesitation in coming to the conclusion that th is right
is ia reality in favour of a co-sharer strictly so.
called or some one who is akin to a co-sharer, and
the reasons which we have already indicated when
dealing with the Punjab Act relating to co-sharers
will apply with full force to the right created
under t.he Code with this addition that this being
agricultural land there will be further advantag.i
inasmuch as the right of pre-emption would result
in consolidation of holdings within a survey number
wh!ch as we have said is generally of an extent of
thirty acres. \V'e are therefore of opinion th t the
view taken in Ramcliandra v. .Janardan (1) to the
effect that tho law of pro-emption provided in
Chap. XIV of the Code does not infriuge Art. Hl
(l) (f), is correct. This being t.he only point urged
before us in the appoal, we are of opinion th1it the
appeal must fail.
We therefore allow C. A. 2i0 of l!l5:3 with
costs and dismiss the suit for pre-emption. No order
as to costs in this appeal C. A. 59'1 of I 9fi0 and
C. A. 430 of 1958 are hereby dismissed with costs.
SARKAH, J.-These three appeals arise out of
suits for pre-emption of properties. Broadly put,
the question in each appeal is whether the law creating the right of pre-emption with which it is concerned, is void as offending Art. 19(1 )(f) of the
Constitution. One of the appeals involves also tho
question whether the · 111.w is invalid a~ offending .
Art. 14 of the Constitution.
The right of pre-emption challenged is in
each case based on a statute. So there aro three
different ~tatutes to deal with. Though some of
the features of these statu~ are subst&ntially(ll AJ.R. 1954
N.,.
~·
.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
3 S.C.R.
747
oommon, there are some others which are not so.
Each appeal has therefore to be considered independently in r<Jference to its own statute. It may
however be observed here that these statutes are
all pre-Constitution laws but the sale on which the
right of pre-emption was claimed had taken place
in each case after the Constitution had· come into
force.
We shall first take Civil Appeal No. 270 of
1955. That is concerned with the Rewa State Preemption Act, 1946. We shall b11 concerned with
s. 10 of the Act which is in these terms:
S. lO Persons of the following classes shall
have a right of pre-emption:(1)
Any person who is a co;sharer or
partner in the property sold or
foreclosed:
· (2)
Any person who owns any immove1tble property adjoining the property
sold or foreclosed or in case of transfer of tenancy rights, the land which
is the subject of such rights.
Provided that among the above mentioned classes the first in order will exclude
the second and among persons of the same
class, the nearer in relationship to the person
whose property is sold or foreclosed will exclude the more remote.
In this case, pre-emptiop. was decreed on the
ground of ownership of adjoining property but as
both ·the purchaser and the pre-emptor held lands
adjoining the property sold, the pre-emption decree
was passed in favour of the pre-emptor under the
proviso to s.10 as he was related to the vendor
·
~qile the purchaser was not so related 1
1.02
Bhau Ram
••
B. BtJijnath Singh
Sarkar J.
748 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1962] SUPP.
1962
Bhau Ram
v.
B. B.ij..ih Singh
Sa.U.J.
The question that ariseR in this case is
whether a right of pre-emption based on vicinage
offends Art.. I\!( I l(f). On this question there has
been a divergence of opinion in the High Courts.
It would not b!l profitable to discuss these decisions
in detail because in what follows we shall deal with
the various points considered in them. It may
however be stated that th" High Courts of
Hajasthan Madhya Bharat .. Vindhya Pradesh and
Hyderabad have ta.ken the view that such a right
of pre-emption offends Art. I !l: see Panclt G"ujar
Gaur Brnhmins v. Amar8ingh('), Ba/mlal v. Gou·Mdltan
das ('), Sewalal Gh~118hyam v. Param La/({'njn ('),(this
dealt with the Act with which we are dPaling), a11d
llloti Bai v. Kand Kari Channay" ('). On the other
hand the High Court of Punjab has held that the
right of pre-emption based on vicinage does not
offencd Art. I 9( l)(f): see Sardlta Ham v. l!aji Abifol(').
It may perhaps b" said that the High Court of
Nagpur has also ta.ken the same view as the High
Court of Punjab: seo Ramcltandm K rislmaji DluJg11k
v . .Janardan Kn'.slmn.ppa Marwar(').
One arg•Jment advanced on behalf of the pre·
emptor, which applies to all the appr'als, may bo
noticed here. Our attention was drawn to Shri
Audh Belv1ri Singh v. Ua.jadhar .laipuria(') whPre it
is stated that "In our opinion the law of preemption create8 a right which attaches to tlw property and on that footing only it can bo enforced
against the purchaser''. It was said that since the
right of pre·emption is attach"d to property it is an
incident on which property is held and therefore it
is not a restriction on the- right to hold property.
On behalf of the purchaser it was said tllat eve11 so
it would bo a restriction because a right to hold
property existed independently of the law of pre·
emption and this law ~ff.. cted adversely the right to
{I) A.t.R. (1954) Raj, 100
(3J A.I.R. (19'•6) V.J'. 9.
t5l A.f,R. (1960) Punj 196
(2, A.I.R. (19;G) M II I
(4) A.IR. (!9S4) Hyd. 11,1,
(6) A.I.R. (195S) Nag. 225,
(7) (19$5) I S.C.R. 70, 80.
· 3 s.c.:R.
SUPREME COURT REPOR'rs
property. As at present advised, we are unable to
say that the contention of the purchaser is entirely
without foundation. In the view however that we
have taken of these cases, we think it unnece3sary
to pronounce finally on the point so raised. We
shall proceed on the basis that even if the law of
pre-emption creates a right which attached to property, it may amount to a restriction on thC' right
guaranteed by Art. 19(l){f).
Article 19 (I) (f) of the Constitution states that
every citizen shall ha.ve the right "to acquire, hold
and dispose of property". Clause (5) of this Article
says that reasonable restrictions on this right may
be imposed by law in the interests of the general ·
public. There is no doubt that a law of pre-emption does impose a restriction on the rights mentioned in Art. l9 (1) (f). The extent· of the restriction
will be considered by us in more detail later. The
question is whether the restriction is reasonable and
in the interests of the general public. In deciding
the question of reasonableness, we think, we have
to balance the disadvantage to the person injuriously affected by the law and the advantage conferred
.by it· on the community in general. If we find that
the advantage outweighs the disadvantage, then
we would be justified in holding the restriction imposed by the law to be reasonable. In considering
the question of reasonableness, we do not conceive
it any part of our duty as a Court to go into questions of policy, or to ask whether if it was for us to
make the law how we would have made it. Once we
find that the restriction imposed by the law is reasonable, we think, we are bound .to uphold it.
The first thing that we wish to observe is that
the result of'a law of pre-emption is not that every
sale is likely to be pre-empted. One does not
exercise the rigbt of pre-emption for the fun of it
nor does so out of perversity. One has to have
1962
..
BhauR'am
.,
B. BaijtuJth-S{ngh
Sarkar J.
750 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1962] SUPP.
1962
Bha11 &m
v.
B. Baijnath SingJ1
money to ho able to exercise that right. It can be
presumed that given the money the right will be
exercised vnly when it would be decidedly advantageous to d.o so. We think that it may therefore
be fairly said that the right of pre-emption will not
be exercised in a very largo number of cases. The
restriction imposed by it will not therefore affect
many. This we think is a. legitimat(, consideration
in judging the reasonableness of a restriction
imposed by the law of pre-emption.
There is one other general consideration t-0
which we propose now to refer. In large parts of
this country there has been for a long time a customary right of pre-emption including a right to preempt on the ground of vicinage. Before the Constitution that custom bad been upheld by courts of
law. In Audh BehariSitl{lh's case (•i, this court itself upheld a custom giving a right of pre·cmption
on the ground of vicinage. The Courts could not
have upheld the customary right of pre· emption unless they held the custom to be reasonable. It is
well known that "A custom must be reaaonablc. If
it is against reason it has no force in law.": see
Halsbury's Laws of England, 3rd ed. vol. 11 p. 162.
In Tyson v. Smith, (')Tindal, C.J., observed "Nor is
a. custom unreasonable because it is prejudicial to
the interests of a private man, if it be for the benefit
of the commonwealth". These words, it will ho
noticed, are very near to the words used in cl. (5)
of Art. 19. We then come to this: before the Constitution various courts in India held the customary
right of pre-emption on the ground of vicinage to
be a reasonable custom, that is, in the opinion of
the courts the restriction impo~ed by it was a rear
sonable restriction. \Ve are unable to discover why
after the Constitution, the law imposing a similar
restriction, customary or otherwise, should be held
to be unreasonable. There has not been any such
c11[J955J1 s.c.R., 10, so.
(2) [1958) 9 Ad. & l!d-, 40IS, 42 t.
3 s.d.R. ' sU:PREME cou&T REPORTS
7ifr
vast change in the socia,l or economic structure of
the country which would justify the view that a
restriction which was reasonable before January 26,
1950, has since then become unreasonable. It is
true that courts in Madras refused to apply the
Mahomedan Law of pre-emption as a matter of
justice, equity and good conscience. But we are
not concerned with Mahomedan Law or with justice,
equity and good-conscience. Even in Madras a
local custom giving a right of pre-emption ha!i been
upheld: see Tulla's Mahomedan Law, 15th ed. p.
202.
The restriction imposed by the law of preemption has different aspects when considered from
the point of view of a vender and a vendee. We
will first take up the case of a vendor. We think it
will not be worng to say that the reports show that
a vendor has rarely come to court complaining that
the law of pre-emption has cast an unreasonable
burden on his right to dispose of property.
Now the Rewa Act provides bys. 12 that when
a person proposes to sell immovable property he
niay give notice of his intention to do so to the person or persons having theright of pre-emption under
the Act in reRpect of the sale and of the price at
which he is willing to sell. Section 13 provides
that any person having the right of pre-emption
shall lose such right unless within one month of the
notice he pays or tenders the price mentioned in it
to the vendor. The result of these provisions is
that the vendor can unless perhaps where he was
selling for an unreasonably high price, ·ascertain
before hand whether any person entitled to pre-empt
is likely to exercise his right. If .he finds that such
persons do n<Jt insist on their right, then he can sell
it to anyone he likes and at any price. It may
reasonably be expected that there will be many cases
in which this will happen. To a person having a right
1962
Bh1u Ram
v.
B. Bajjnath Singh
Sarkar J,
752 SUPREME COUBT REPORTS [i962] SUPP.
195Z
Bli•u R•n•
v.
B. BeiinatA Singh
Sarkar J.
of pre-emption, he will be compelled to sell at a
reasonable price.
Thus the Rewa law of pre-emption imposes
on a vendor two restrictions .. The first is that he
may he prevented .from selling property at any
price he likes, and th(• second is that he cannot
sell it to anyone of his choice.
Now tho
first restriction is clearly a reasonable restriction. One cannot complain if he is made to
accept a fair market price for the property he is
willing to sell and is deprived of the chance of
oxtractin~ an unconscionable price. Such a measure won Id control prices and check speculation in
land. It would help to stabilize the economy of
the country. It would prevent a wealthy man with
his resources in money from outbidding a poorer
man in respect of a property which is of grca,t advantage to the poorer man to have by reason of its
vicinage with propnty he holds and which may not
have that value for the richer man. It was contended that the law of pre-emption had the effect of
amassing wealth in one ownership. For the reasons just mentioned, we think it really prevents the
richer man from acquiring properties when it is to
the advantage of a poorer man to have the same.
In so far as the law prevents a vendor from selling
his property at an exorbitant price it cannot, in our
view, be said to impose an unreasonable restriction
on him.
Then, as we have said, the law of pre-emption
prevents a vendor from selling his property to anyone he likes. We cannot imagine this to ho a great
deprivation. Really, the freedom to sell to anyone
has perhaps no more value than a sentimental one.
As ag!linst this the advantag(i accruing to the neighbouring owner is that he is able to enlarize the property previously held by him. We think that
balancing the two sides the scalo dips much in
favour of the pre-emptor. Thero are"also other
reasons for this view whioh we shall present!) state.
I
•
I
,,
I
3 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPOR'i'S
It is said that one of the disadvantages of the
law of pre-emption i.s that it gives rise to a lot of
litigation. We do not think that this is a legitimate
· argument. The law does not necessarily gives rise
to litigntion. Litigation arises because through
cupidity people want to evade the law. In that
way, a number of other laws may be thought of
which cause litigation. But the defect is not in law
but in human nature. We are therefore unable to
agree that the fact that litigation may be caused
either because the law of pre-emption is sought to
be enforced or to be evaded, can be a reason to say
that the restriction imposed by it is unreasonable.
We also think that in deciding whether a law imposes unreasonable restrictions, the fact that it easily
gives rise to litigation is a wholly irrelevant consideration. Assuming that the law imposes a
restriction if it did not, no question of the reasonableness of the restriction would of course arise-that
restriction would not become unreasonable if it was
not otherwise so because the law caused a great
deal of litigation.
Now we come to the case of a purchaser. It
is well understood that the right of pre-emption is
a right to be substituted in place of the purchaser.
That is the view that was accepted in Audh Bihari
Singh's case(I). So far as the Rewa Act is concerned,
s. 4(i) expressly provides that the right of preemption is a right to be substituted in the place of
the purchaser. It would, therefore, follow that the
only restriction put on the purchaser is on his right
to acquire a particular property. The law of preemption does not restrict his right to hold property.
If he has acquired property in compliance with the
law of pre-emption, then there is nothing to
prevent him from holding it for as long as he
likes.
The question then is whether the restriction
11J (1~55J s.c.R. 10, so.
1962
BhauRom
v.
B. Baijnath Singh
Sarka1 J.
;54 SUPRE~IE COURT REPORTS (1962] suPi>.
1962
JJhau Ram
v.
B. Bai.j1kJth SJ"nch
Sarkar 1°
on tho right to acquire property ii! unreasonable. Is
it unreasonablo to say that one ahall not acquire a
particular propert1 if the adjoining owner wants it?
It is not as if the purchaser is prevented from acquiring any property. There must be many other properties more or less equally good which he is free
to acquire. As we have earlier pointed out, there
woul<l not be many cases in which the right of preemption would be exercised with the consequent
restriction on a stranger's right to purchase. Now
if the property is agricultrual land there is no doubt
that the right of pre-emption on grounds of vicinage will help consolidation of holdings. We think
that balancing the advantages of the consolidation
of holdings with the disadvantages resulting to a
stranger by the restriction imposed on his right of
acquiring that property, there is no doubt that the
disadvantages are of small consequence. The advantages arising from the consolidation of agricultural
holdings will be discuased in the last case that we
will consider and which comes from Berar.
Tho Rewa Act however is not confinod to
agricultural !:ind. It creates a right of pre-emption
in other property also. Let us consider the case
of house property in a town or village. In a
town or village the Indian way of life has been
to live in compact communities.
There is no
doubt that such living has great advantages.
It is true that due to C;Conomic reasons it is not
always possible nowadays for many to have the
comfort of living in compact communities. But the
fact that economic conditions a.re breaking up compact comnunities does not show that living in such
communities has not its advantages. It seems to
us that such li>ing would help to maintain the
homogeneity, eomfort and peace of the people. It
is common human experience that property leads to
disputes concerning boundaries, easement and concerning divers other rights connected with it. .Also
disrutrs ari1c llcause Gf diffe1ent ways of Jiving.
3 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
Now most of these disputes would be with the adjoining owners. The right of pre-emption based on t~e
ground of vicinage would help to itvoid these disputes coming into existence. Again, it wo?-1'.1 be a
great discomfort for a number of people hvmg together for years to have to accept among themselves
an outsider who may not be able to fit himself into
that community or may even be an undesirable
person. Furthermore, if a person is given preference in acquiring neighbouring property it would help
him better to manage his properties. Privacy of
the home would be better maintained. Against all
these advantages the only disadvantage that the
purchaser suffers is that he cannot acquire a parti·
cular property. It will often be possible for him to
get another equally good property. It cannot be
said that if between to such competing persons the
law favour one who owns neighbouring property,
the law is putting unreasonable restriction on the
other person.
In none. of the reported cases has it yet been
held that the right of pre-emption given to a cosharer imposes an unreable restriction on the purchaser. It seems to us that it would be impossible
to take that view. A co-sharer increases his holding if he is given the preference to buy the land.
He of course also prevants an outsider being thrust
into joint ownership with him and this is the only
difference between his case and the case of an adjoining owner. The difference is not such as would
in principle lead to different conclusions as to the
reasonableness of the restriction in the two cases. A
co-sharer ii he does not like his new co-sharer can
always separate his share. It has not however been
held that for this reason a law giving a co-sharer a
right of pre-emption puts an unreasonable restriction on an other persons right to acquire property.
We think, therefore, on the same principle it has to
be held that a law giving a right of pre-emption on .
J962
BhouRam
v.
B. Baijnath ~ingh
Sarkar _J.
756 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1962) SUi>P.
1962
Bhau Ram
••
B. Baij11a1h Singh
Barkaf' J.
the ground of vicinage also imposes a restriction
whir.h is reasonable.
One of the advantages of the law of pre·
emption based on vioinage earlier noticed is the preservation of the privacy of homeR. In regard to
this, it was said that purdah system has disappeared
and therefore there is no need to protect it. It may
be that purdah has disappeared but it cannot be
said that the privacy of the home is a thing which
is of no value nowadays. It is this that the 1!1w of
pre.emption will protect and therefore be of advantage to.the community. We think it wrong to imagine that privacy of a home is of value only to the
people observing purdah.
Then it is said that living in compact communities has also disappeared and people now live in
flats. But wo do not think that it can be suggested
that living in communities has not its advantages or
living in flats is an ideal system. There are
therefore no arguments against the view that living
in compact and homogeneous communities is still
desirable and has still its advantages which perhaps
will always remain.
It is also said that the restriction imposed by
the law of pre-emption is unreasonable because it
encourages discrimination on the ground of religion,
race and caste and this is what Art. 15 of the Constitution forbids. We do not think that it is a reasonable reading of. the Constitution to say that it
forbids people of one race, religion or caste from
living together. Furthermore, compact communities are not always of the same race, religion or
caste. The advantage is not due to identity of
caste etc. but to the identity of thought and way of
living and tics generated by long familiarity with
each other and the families of each other. For all
these reasons a restriction imposed by the law of
pre-emption based on vicinagc is, in our view, a
3 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
757
reasonable restriction on the right to acquire and
dispose of property.
Then it was argued that when a property is
purchased in exercise of the right of pre-emption, it
will often happen that that property will be let out
to a stranger and so the objective of living in compact communities will not be attained in many
cases. This may be so in some cases but the landlord when the occasion arises, can choose that
stranger. He further has some· control over the
tenant. He will have no property dispute with
the tena~1t except such as might arise out oftenancy·
laws. If the tenant is found to be undesirable, he
can be removed. All that this contention comes to
is that the law of pre-emption may not completely
guarantee the advantages which it is designed to
create, but there is no doubt that it does guarantee
a very large part of it and it would be incorrect . to
say that it guarantees none.
A further question remains in this case. It is
said that s. 10 of the Rewa Act is bad in that it
gives a preferential right to pre-empt on the basis
of relationship. This however does not seem to us
to be a correct way of reading the statue. What it
aims at is to give a right of pre-emption on the
ground of vicinage and the other ground. mentioned
in the section. But then it is unavoidable that
there may be various persons entitled as co-owners
or owners of adjoining properties to the right of
pre-emption under the section. It has to be remembered that we are now proceeding on the basis that
the right imposes a reasonable restriction. In order
therefore that a statute legally made giving the
right of pre-emption may not be rendered infructuous in certain circumstances, an order of prefrrence
among the would be pre-emptors has to be devised.
l'his is done by the proviso to s-. IO of the Eewll
/
.
.
'
.
196t
BhauRam
v.
B.·Baijnalh 'Sin:·
Sarkaf'J.
..
758
1961
.
Bh .. R""'
B. Baij11a11' Sfnth
•
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1962] SUPP.
Act by laying down that a person nearer in relationship to the vendor will have a preferential right of
pre-emption over others. The proviso does not
purport to create a right of pre-emption only on the
ground of relationship. It solves a problem arising
out of a right of pre-emption legitimately granted
on the ground of co-ownership or vicinago. It is
a corollary to the main right. If the main right is
good, a provision enacted to prevent its being
'
defeated would equally be good.
The result is thats. IO of the Rewa Act whioh
gives the right" of pre-emption on the ground of
vicinage must be declared to be a perfectly valid
statutory provision which docs not offend Art.
I 9( I )(f) of tho Constitution and so is the proviso to
that section which is really a pa.rt of it.
That
disposes of Civil Appeal No. 270 of 1955. We W<:uld
theroforc dismiss the appeal.
We next come to Civil Appeal No. 595 of 1960
which concerns tho Punjab Pre-emption Act of 1913.
The property involved in this case is a house situated in the city of Old Delhi. Section i6 of the
Punjab Act which govorns the property in dispute,
is in these terms :
S 16. The· right of pre-emption in respect o'f urban immovable property shall vest,firstly, in the co-sharers in such property,
if any;
secondly; where tho sale is of the site of
tho building or other structure, in the owners
of such building or structure ;
thirdly, where the sale is of a property
having a staircase common to other properties, in the owners of such properties ;
fourthly, where the sale is of property
common entrance from t)lo $~reet
~avin~ a
3S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
759
with other properties, in the owners of such
properties ;
1962
fifthly, where the sa]e is of a servient
property, in the owners of the dominant property, and vice versa ;
B.Baijnath Singh
sixthly, in the persons who own immovable property contiguous to the property
sold.
The Punjab Act, like the Rewa Act, contains
provisions for giving notice of an intended sale to
the person having a right of pre-emption, for loss
of right of pre-emption when action is not taken to
purchase in terms of the notice and for fixation of
a fair price by the court : see ss. 19, 20, 22, 25 and
27 of the Punjab Pre-emption Act. As we have
said in the Rewa case, provisions of this kind help
to relax the severity of the restriction imposed on
the seller.
The pre-emptor in this case based his claim on
the first, third, fourth and sixth grounds mentioned
in the section. The High Court held that the section
did not offend Art. l9(l)(f) with regard to the first,
third and fourth grounds but did so with reg-ard to
the sixth ground. The judgment of the High Court
is reported in A.LR. (1958) Punj. 44. The view
there taken in so far as it concerns the sixth ground
in the section is against the Full Bench decision of
the same High Court in Uttam Singh v. Kartar
Singh (l) and Sardharam v. Haji Abdul (2) the latter
of which expressly overruled that view ..
It is interesting to note that under s. 7 of the
Punjab Act a right of pre-emption in respect of
urban immovable property in any town, that is, the
right contemplated bys. 16, shall exist if a custom
of pre-emption had existed in such town at the
commencement of the Act and not otherwise.
(1)
A.I.It. (1~54) Punj.. 55..
v.
Sarkar J.
760 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1962] SUPP.
1962
Bhau Rom
v.
R. B aljnalh Singh
Sarkar J.
It ia plain that in the city of Delhi the custom of
pre-emption had so prevailed; if it had not, then of
course the point would h:we boen ta.ken and the
case thereupon decided against the pre-emptor.
Custom is a question of fa.ct and on the state of the
records in this case we must proceed on the ha.sis
that a custom of pre-emption had existed in Delhi.
Now that custom, if it had prevailed must have
done so because it was considered to be a reasonable rule inspite of the restriction that it imposed on
the vendor or the purchaser. We have earlier s:i.id
that tho existence of a customary right of pre-emption indicates that the restriction imposed by it is
reasonable. That view itpplies moro strongly to
the pres:mt case becausi; here in the very areit with
which we are concerned that custom did exist.
The right of pre·emption based on vicinage
mentioned in the sixth ground in e. 16 has itlrea.dy
been doalt with by us in the Rewa case. l<'or tho
reasons stated, there, we hold this provision in
s. 16 to be a valid piece of le>gislation.
We hitvo now to dea.l with the other grounds
in s. lfi referred to earlier. Tho first confers a. right
of pre.emption on a co-sharer in it property. Wo
feel no doubt that a law giving such a right imposes
a reasonable restriction on the right conferred by
Art. 19( I )(f). If an outsider is introduced a.R a
co·sharer in a property, that is likely to ma.ke com·
mon management inconvenient and thereby destroy
the bcnPfits of ownership of the property to a large
extent. Property cannot be managed profitably
unJegs one policy is followed. If there arc more
than one owner of a propnrty, it is nssential for the
profitable enjoyment of it that they should be a~lc
to work in •mison. ThArefore if by tho op1ira.t10n
of the law of prc-omption based on co-ownership
the property eventually comes to mi vested in a
single hand that would be a grea.t advantage to the
ownor. Such a law being for the benofit of ~11
3 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
761
owners would surely !:;e in the interest.s of the
general public. Till the property comes to be vested in one owner it would have remained in the
hands of two or more people who have been owning
it for years and have been getting on with each
other smoothly, for otherwise they would have
partitioned it. In such a case if one of the joint
owners goes out and in his place the remaining joint
owner or owners have to accept a·stranger, a good
deal of irritation and mismarnigement may be reasonably apprehended. If the property owned is a
residential house-and s.16 will be largely concerned
with such properties-the introduction of a stranger
into it would lead to an undesirable situation and
often and in disaster. These are the advantages
arising from a law of pre-emption based on coownership. The disadvantages are that the selling
co-owner cannot sell it to anyone he likes or for an
extortionate price, and the purchaser is deprived of
owning an undivided share in property. Neither of
these seems to us to be a great deprivation. In
neither case is the disadvantage suffered great as
compared to the advantage accruing to the remaining joint owner. Therefore, it seems to us that
the restriction imposed on the right to dispose of or
acquire properties imposed by the first ground
under s. 16 of thc> Punjab Act is a ·reasonable restriction.
The right based on the third and fourth
grounds mentioned. in the section also seems to ns
unobjectionable. The third ground gives to the
owner of property a right of pre-emption when
another property having a common staircase with
his is sold. If a number of properties have a common staircase and one is sold, it would be most inconvenient and greatly disadTantageous to the
owners of the unsold properties if they cannot prevent a 8tranger from acquiring the portion sold and
thereby obtaining a right to the common user of
tqe ~tairoase with
them.
'fhat would in a lar~e
.
.
~
I9•t
Bhau Ram
v.
B. Ba,jn-,th Singh
Sarkar J.
762 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1962] SUPP.
IY6t
Bhau Ram
v.
B. Batjnalh Singh
Sorkar J.
number of cases be more or less admitting a Rtran.
ger into their houses. The disadvantage arising
from such & state of affairs is clearly much more
than the advantage that would arise to the purchaser by the acquisition of the property. The fourth
ground gives a right of pre-emption when one of
several properties having a common entrance from
the street is sold. 'Jhe street is of course the public
street which is common to all. In order that this
ground may apply, there has to be a common entrance from such a street to a numbN of properties.
This ground apparently contemplates a rase of a
passage leading from a public street which is common to all the owners of properticH sitnate on th1it
passage. This ground therefore deals with owners
of properties who have to share a common passage.
People living in these hl'USPS would naturally from
a very compact community. Indeed very often
they would be living like relatives or members of a
family. A law which ~ives them a right to buy one
of these properties when it is sold to a etranger cannot be said to impose an unreasonable restriction
on anyone. AH in the last case, the atfrantago
accruing from such a law to the porson desiring to
pre-empt would far outweigh the disad1·antage
occasioned either to tlw vendor or the purchaser.
The learned counsel for the appellant referred
to various Acts which have gradually abolished the
right of pre-emption. He pointer:! out that by Act
X of 1960 of the Punjab Legislature s. !(l has in
faet been repealed as a whole anrl has bP-en substituted by a provision creating a right only in a
tenant to pre-empt the property held by him when
the landlord desires to sell it. Punjab Act X of
1960 however has not been extended to Delhi rind
here the Punjab Prc·emption Act of 1913, the Act
with which we arc ooncerned, still applies. All that
these subsequent pieces of legislation show is that
the Legislature has thought it fit to abolish ccrtai11
ri~hts of rro-emption ill various cases. But ~
3 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
763
oannot be used as an argument to contend that the
Legislature considers that the . la~ of pre-em1_>tion
imposes an. unreasonable restriot~on on the r1gh~s
mentioned in Art. 19(l)(f). lf it were so, then 1t
has to be said that in so far as the Legislature has
not thought it fit to repeal the law of pre-emption
as it exists in Delhi, it does not consider that law to
impose an unreasonable restriction. Arguments of
this kind do not lead us anywhere. Furthermore,
we have to decide the question of the reasonableness of the restriction for ourselves and whatever
opinion a legislature expresses on the matter is not
of much relevance for this purpose.
Lastly, we have to deal with the point that
s. 16 of the Act offends Art. 14 of the Constitution.
It was said that it offended that article because
there was no right of pre-emption in regard to
agriculture land and the law was not available outside urban areas of Delhi and that it exempted
from its operation shops and katras. Now with
regard €o agricultural land, it clearly forms a distinct class by itself and so do properties outside
urban areas. Properties in urban areas have
their own pPculiar problems. Futhermore, there
is not likely to be much agricultural land within the
Union territories of Delhi. With regard to shops
and katras, no doubts. 5 of the Act exempts them
from its operation. But these also form a class
by themselves different from other properties. A
shop of course is essentially a. bussines premises.
What a katra is, in not defined in the Act, But it
would appear that the primary meaning of katra
is an enclosure and the secondary meaning is
market: see Karim Ahmed v. Rehmat Alahi (').
It would therefore be safe to proceed on the basis
that a katra is principally a business premises within an enclosure though no dou bt,it also contains residential accommodation. It can be assumed that tpe
(IJ A. I. R. (1946) Lall. 433.
.
1962
Bhau Ram
v.
B. Boijnath Sinth
Sarkar J.
764 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1962] SUPP.
1961
Bhau 84111
v.
8, Daijnolla Singh
Sark1.TJ.
s.,u, J.
residential accommodation provided is for persons
working in the shops in thn katra. Now clearly
in business one h~s to work and mix with strangers.
One has to welcom1• :md associate with, romple.
tely unknown persons who d0 not live with the
persons doing the business. In order that business
premises may cater to tho needs of the community
for which they <•xist, t.hey havo to he open to all.
To such premises no que~tion of any advantage
flowing from community living arises. They are
genPrally properties of great value. It. seems to
us that they ran therefore he put in 11 ~epnratc
class. They do not rn'ed the protection of the law
of pre-emption in the same way as other properties
w0uld do. For these rcwons we clo not think that
s. 16 can be said to viohtte Art. 14 of tho Consti.
tution.
In the result we hold that the first, third, fourth an<l sixth grounclH, on which a right of pre-emp·
tion is basAd by s. f6 of th" Punjab Act, am valid
pieces of legislation. We would therefore dismiss
this appeal with costs.
We come now to the last appeal, that iH,
Civil Appeal Xo. 430 of 1958. It eonccrns th"
Ilerar L1rnd Revenue Code of I !lt8. ChaptPr 14
of this Code creates cortain rights of pre-emption
to one of which we sh:1ll presently refer. 'fhat
chapt.er ccm8ists of ss. 173 to 187. This chaptrr
in the Code, like the two Acts WA have alreacly
dealt with, contains provisions :i.l.Jout notice of an
intended salfl, Jµss of right to pre.om pt in case tho
notice is not acted upon and fix<ltion of a fair
price. These :i.re contained in ss. 176, 180 and
182. As we have earlier stated, these provi,ions
very largely romove the rigour of the restriction
imposed by tho right of pre-emption 011 vendors
of properties. The right is confined to unalienated
lands held for agricultural purposes:[~. 174(2)).
·Jt a.ris<•s in the caeo of a s:i.le when one ocoupar1t,
3 s.c.k.
SUPREME COURT REi>OR'i'S
765
in a Survey Number proposes to sell the whole or
any portion of his interest to a stranger and the
right is given to other occupants in the same
Survey.Number: s. 176 ands. 18::. Now a SurveyNumber is defined as a portion of land recognised
as such at the revenue survey in respect of which
the area and land revenue payable are separately
entered under an indicative number in the land
records : s. 2 ( 13). Sub-division of a surveynumber means portion of a survey-number in
respect of which the area and the land revenue
payably are separately entered in the land records
under an indicative number subordinate to that of
the survey-number of which it is the portion :
s.2(12). Section 184 provides that when an occupant
in a survey-number exchanges his interest in it
for land elsewhere, then this exch~nge would not
create any right of pre-emption in favour of the
other persons interested in the survey-number,
part of or interest in, which· is exchanged. The
substance of the matter therefore is that the
Berar Code creates a right of pre-emption in the
holder of interest in a survey-number only when
anybody having an interests in ·any land in that
survey-number sells it for a money consideration
to a stranger provided that the interest sold is in
unalienated land· held for agriculture purpose.
lb62
Bhau Ram
v.
8. Baijnath Sir1th,
Sarkar J,
In the present case, the vendor owned subdivision No. 1 in survey-number 285 and the respondents jointly owned sub-division No. 2 in the
same survey-number and in that right claimed to
pre-empt the sale by the vendor. There is further
no controvery that the lands were unalienated
land held for agriculture purpose.
. Mr. Sovani appearing for the respondents
said that under the Berar Code of 1928 and under
the previous land laws which it replaced, an occupant is one who obtains land from the Government
on the terms mentioned in the Code and that it is
•
'6~
1962
Bhau Ram
v.
B. Raijnotlt Singh
S.rkarJ.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1962) SUPP.
only against such an occupant that a right of preemption is created by that Code. He therefore
contended that the right to property being created
on the term that it would be liable to pre-emption,
it was not a case of restriction but one of the nature of the property itself and therefore no question of infringement of Art.. 19( I )(f) arises by the
exercise of that right. As in our opinion the
respondents should succeed in this appeal for the
reasons to be presently discussed, we think it
unnecessary to pronounce on this contention of
Mr. Sovani. We have besides no materials to
show as to when the right of ownership in tho
proP,Crty im•olvcd in this case was first creat€d.
It may have been created under a law. other than
the Code or its predeccssorn. In that case ;\Jr.
Sovani's argument would lose its principle force.
Further we have not all the earlier land laws of
Berar before us. Jt would not be right on the
materials now before. us to investigate and pronounce on the question raised by Mr. Sovani.
It is clear from what we have earlier stated
that the lands included in one survey-number arc
contiguous. It is only when an interest in such
lands is sold that under the Berar Code a right of
pre-emption arises. It would follow inevitably
that the result of the exercise of this right would he
to effect a consolidation of holdings. Such
11,
consolidation would undoubtedly be of
a great
benefit to the agriculturist and
to the oommunit.y as a whole. The evils of
fregmentation of agricultural holdings in our country are too well known to need detailed discussion.
Shortly put it would help an agriculturist greatly
if he could extend his holdings thereby making
agricultural operation economical and more productive with the resultant benefit to the country. A
law which therefore tends towards consolidation
has groat advantages.
3 8.C.R.
SUPREME cotJ:R'i' REPORTS
761
. Ramvhandra Krishnaji Dhagale v. Janardhan
K rishrw.ppa llfarwar(l) was a case concerning preemption under the Berar Code and was heard by a
Full Bench of the Nagpur High Court. The Bench
presided over by the present Chief Justice of this
Court found no difficulty in upholding thB validity
of the provisions in that Code creating the right of
pre-emption. With regard to the question of consolidation, Kaushalendra Rao J. observed at p. 232.
"It is not without significance that while
in a part of the State· the Central Provincesspecial legislation had to be undertaken for
checking the evil of fragmentation by enacting
a measure like the Central Provinces Consolidation of the Holdings Act (Act VIII. 1928)
no such necessity has so far been felt in Berar
presumably because of the operation of the
law of pre-empt.ion.''
This observation undoubtedly is of gre'lt authority
coming from a Judge of eminence familiar with the
conditions in Berar. It has not even been suggested that the observation was not justified. But it
was said that the present tendency of legisla~on is
fix ll. ceiling as to land that can be held by a person
and that this shows that consolidation of holdings
is no longer considered desirable. We are entirely
unable to agree with this view. The idea behind
fixing a ceiling for holding of land is to make an
equit.-ible distribution of the available land possible.
But this is subject to the idea that each holding
should be economical. In other words, the law as
to ceiling does not discourage consolidation of holdings but is intended only to prevent undue grabbing
of lands by persons with the necessary means to do
the same. Section 184 by providing that no right
of pre· emption wonld arise on the exchange of lands
clearly indicates that the object of the Berar Cod
(1) A.I.R. (1955) Nag 225.
1962
BhouRam
••
B, Baijnoth Singh
Sa'r/eor J.
•
768 SUPREME COURT REPoRTS [1962] SUPP.
19H
Bliau Ram
v.
B .. Baijnalh Singit
Sa'1<0r J,
in providing for the right of prc-omption is to achieve consolidation of holdings. W c foci no dou ht
that the benefits to :irise out of consolid:ition far
outweigh the disadvantages caused by the restriction
put by it on the right to property guaranteed by
Art. 19( l )(f).
We, therefore, come to tho conclusion that the
provisions in Chapter 14 of the Herar Land Revenue Code creating a right of pre-emption on the sale
of land :ire valid and fully within the Constitution.
This appeal therefore must also foil and we would
dismiRs it with coHts.
BY Comrr : In accord:incc with the opinion
of the majority Civil Appeal No. 270 of 1955 is allowed ; no order as to costs.
C. A. No. 27 of 1955 ullou:P.d. C. A. No. 430 of
1958 and C. A. No. 595 of 1960 dismissed .
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