JOSEPH KURUVILLA VELLUKUNNEL versus THE RESERVE BANK OF INDIA AND OTHERS
Supreme Court of India | Decided 7 March 1962 | [1962] SUPP. 3 S.C.R. 632 | 1962 INSC 87
Key facts
- Decided
- 7 March 1962
- Bench
- BHUVNESHWAR PRASAD SINHA*, J.L. KAPUR, M. HIDAYATULLAH, J.C. SHAH, J.R. MUDHOLKAR
- Bench size
- 5
- Case number
- CIVIL APPEAL No. 487/1961
- Disposal
- Dismissed
- Citation
- [1962] SUPP. 3 S.C.R. 632
- Neutral citation
- 1962 INSC 87
Text of the judgment
..
632 Sl)'PREl\lE COURT RE;E'ORTS [1962]
I96Z
s1;dr;J;;;rd
M tnU}aeturing Co.
. v.
"G'obind
v,;;:;~J;
SUPP.
This being the only'poin~ on whioh the labour
court had refu~ed to give approval, the appeal m~st
suc'ceed. We therefore allow the appeal, .set.aside
the order of the labour court and approve the
action taken by· 'the appellant. In the circumstances we pass na order as to costs.
~
I
{l.ppool allowed.
1962
JOSEPH KURUVILLA •VELLUKUNNEL
March 7.
v.
THE RESERVE BANK OF INDIA AND OTHERS
(With connected petition)
Banking Companies-Winding up-Enactment providing
for an order for winding up by High Court on the basis of
Reser11e Bank's opinion-Constitutional validity-Banking
Companies Act, 1949 (10 of 1949), ss. 2, 35, 35A, 36, 38-Reserve Bank of India Act, 1934 (2 of 1934), ss. 7, 8, 38Companies Act, 1956 (I of 1956), ss. 433, 450(2)-Constitution
of Inaia, Arts. U, 19(1)( f) and (g), 301, 302.
·
Sub·section (l) of s. 38 of the Banking Companies
Act, 1949, provided : ' 1Notwithstanding anything contained
in ss. 391, 392, 433 and 583 of the Companies Act, 1956 ....
the High Court shall order the win'ding 'up for a banking
company . ... if an application for its winding up has been
made by the Reserve Bank under s. 47 of this .section."
Under s. 38(b)(iii) of the Act .''the Reserve Ban'k may make
an application under this section for the winding up of a
banking company• if in the opinion of the Reserve Bank the
continuance of the banking company is prejudicjal to the
interests of its depositors."
· ·rn exercise of, the p9wers vested in it by the Banking
companies Act, 1949, as w'ell -as the Reserve Bank of India
Act, 1934, the Reserve Bank had been inspecting the Palai
Central Bank Ltd., periodically, and had been warning the
Bank that its business was being .conducted in a manner
detrimental to the .interest of its depositoi-s. In June 1960,
there was ·a run on several branches of the Bank. The
R·eserve Bank was of the opnion that the Palai Bank was not
jn a positipn to fay its depositors in f'lll and ~h11t
lhr
~
. ·1
3 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
633
continuance
of the
Bank was
prejudicial to the
interest of the depositors. On August 8, 1960 the Reserve
Bank made an application in the High Court of Kerala
under s. 38(3)(b)(iii) of the Banking Companies Act, 1949,
read with the Companies Act, 1956, for the winding up of
the Palai Central Bank Ltd. After hearing the Reserve
Bank, the Palai Bank and the creditors, the High Court
passed an order allowing the application of the Reserve
Bank, and directing the winding up of the Palai Bank. It
was contended for those who opposed the application that
ss. 38(1) and 3(b) (iii) of the Banking Companies Act
contravened Arts. 14 and 19 (!) (f) and (g) of the Constitution of India and, therefore were void because (a) they
permitted discrimination between a banking company and
any other company by prescribing different laws for their
respective winding up, (b) they created an unreasonable
restriction upon the right lo carry on banking and ( c) the
whole procedure was denial of the principles of natural
justice chiefly by denying an ac~ess to courts, inasmuch
as under s. 433 of the Compames Act, 1956, when an
application was made to wind up a company, the High Court
had to be satisfied after a fair trial that an order to
wind up the company was called for, and the Judge was
free to reach a decision after the company had sho\vn
cause, and there was a right of appeal against the decision
if adverse to the company, while under the procedure
laid down in s. 38 of the Banking Companies Act, 1939,
the Reserve Bank was made the sole judge to decide whether
the affairs of a banking company were being so conducted
as to be prejudicial to the interests of the depositors,
and the court had no option but to _an order winding
up the bankh:;g company, when the.application was made. It
was also contended that ss. 38(1) and 3(b)(iii) were ultra
vires being in conflict with Art. 301 of the Constitutipn.
Held, (Kapur and Shah, JJ;, dissenting), that ss. 38(1)
and (3) (b)(iii) of the Banking Companies Act, 1939, did not
offend of Arts. 19( I) (f)' and (g) of the Constitution of India
and were valid.
In view of the history of the establishment of the Reserve
Bank as a C~ntral Bank for India, its position as a Banker·s
Bank, its control over banking companies and banking· in
India, its position as the issuing -bank, its power to license
banking companies and cancel thei~ licences and the numerous
powers, a law which empowered the Reserve Bank to come to
a decision to wind up a tottering or unsafe banking company
fo the interest of the depositors could not be challenged '\S
'
19o2
Joseph Kuruvilla
VeUukwmet
v.
The Rese1ve Bank
oj· lndia
634 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1962) SUPP.
1961
Jouph Kt"i;f.ti[l,,
Y elluAunne(
v
·r1ie Uenerue B,;nk
vf Jndia
unreasonable, because even if the court were called upon to
take in_in_iediate action it would almost always be guided by
the op1n1on of the Reserve Bank. 1\ law may, with reason,
leave the detcrminati')n of an iss11e to an expert body and
such law is justified 011 the ground of expediency arising fro;n
the respective opportunities for action.
The exclusion of
courts is however not to be lightly inferred or conceded.
Held, further (per Sinha, C.J., Hidayatullah and Mudholkar, JJ.), that : ( 1) while ordinary companies dealt with the
money of the stock holders, banking companies were in a
different class as they dealt with the money of the depositors
and had to be regulated differently ; and the Reserve Bank
having been given by the Banking Companies Act the power
and invested with the duty of watching the affairs, of every
hanking cornpany with a vievi to ensuring the safety of the
depositors' money, there "'as a valid clas.c;ification ; consequently ss. 38(1) and (3)(b)(iii) of the Banking Companies Act did
not offend Art. 14 of the Comtitution.
(2) ss. 38(1) and (3)(b)(iii) did n~t amount lo a convcr~io11 of a
judicial procc5s into an executh-·e action.
The
sections only made the court ~uide itself frorn the decision or
an outside agency and the judicial process cornn1cnced thereafter.
(3) ss. 38( 1) and (3) :h)(iii) were not in breach of Art.
301 of the Constitution as they \\'ere in public interest and
were protected by Art. 302.
Per Kapur and Shah, JJ.-Sr.ction 3H of the llanki1,g
Cornpanies Act, 1949, \Vas an unreasonable restriction on the
right of a hanking company to carry on its business and was,
thcre£ore, unconstitutional.
The \'ice of the impugned
pro,·ision Jay in (a) the power \'este<l in the R~scrvc Rank to
apply to the 1-Iigh Court for an order \Vin<ling up a bank
cxerci!able solely on its subjccti\'e satisfaction as to the existence of conditions prescribed by the sccti·Jn, and (b) the
ohfigation irnpo~ed by la\v upo11 the High Court to n1ak~ the
ordrr of winding up \vithout at any ti111r. enquiring \\'hcthcr
the conditions on which the application \\·as founded did in
truth exist. A proYision of la\\" providing for the in1position
of restriction!\ on a citizen's fnndamcntal right pursu;int
to rhc subjccti\'c satisfaction of the Reserv~ Rank even
though it is an expr.rc ho<ly, as to the existence of a statt: of
affairs. and thereby permanently depriving the citizen of his
right Or property, i~ "·holly unreasonahlc.
A. K. Go7J/Jlan v. Sia.le, (1950) S.C.R. ll8, Stale of ~fadras
y. V.G. Rao, (1952) S.C.R. 597, The Commi•sioner of Hind'!
3 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
635
Religious Endowment•, Madras v. Sri Lakshmindra Tirtha
Swamiar of Sri Shirur Muth, (1954) S.C.R. 1005, · Mahant Sri
Jagannath Ramanuj Das v. State of Orissa, (1954) S.C.R. 1046
and Virendra v. State of Punjab, (1958) S.C.R. 308, considered.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal
No. 487 of 1961.
Appeal by special leave from the judgment
and order dated December 5, 1960. of the Kerala
High Court in Baking Companies Petition No. 11 of
1960.
WITH
Petition No. 167 of 1961
Petition under Art. 32 of the Constitution of
India for the enforcement of Fundamental Rights.
M.K. Namhiyar, J.B. Dadachanji, 0.0. Mathur
and Ravinder Narain, for the appellant and the
petitioner.
M.O. Set.alvad, Attorney-General of lndia, H.N.
Sanyal, Additional 8olicitor-General of India, R.
Ganapathy Iyer and R. H, Dhebar, for respondents
No. 1 in C.A. No. 487of1961.
G. S. Pathak and K. R. Ohoudhuri, for respondents Nos. 4-6 in C. A. No. 487 of 1961.
M. 0. Setalvad, Attorney-General for India, H.N.
Sanyal, Additional Solicitor-General of India, R. Ganapathy Iyer, R. If. Dhebar and T. M. Sen for respondents Nos. 2 and 3 in Petition No. 167 ofl961.
19G2, March 7. The Judgmer,t of B. P. Sinha,
C.J., M. Hidayatulh1h and J.R. Mudholkar, JJ., was
delivered. by Hidayatullah, J. The Judgment of J.L.
Kapur and J. C. Shah, JJ., was delivered by
Kapur, J.
HIDAYATULLAH, J.-On August 8, 1960, the
Reserve Bank of India made an application in
the High Court of Kerala under s. 38 of the Banking Companies Act, 1949 (IO of 19'19) read with
the Companies Act, 1956 (1 of 1956), for the windirig up of the Palai Central Bank, Ltd. (having jts
•
1962
Joseph Kuruvilla
Vellukunnel
v
The Rererve Bank
of India
Hidayatullah J,
636
lft6!
.louph Kurur.illa
V rl/1,Kutm.tl
'·
Tht Rtstttt Bank
of lruiia
Hidayatullah J.
SUPREME OOURT REPORTS [1962] SUPP.
registered office at Palai in the State of Kerala),
for the appointment of the Official Liquidator of
the High Court as the J.iquidator with all tho powers under the eaid Acts and for the appointment
of the Official Liquidator as the Provisional Liquidator during the pendcnoy of the application.
This application \\·as allowt,d on Decem her 5, 1960,
and the present appeal with special Ieavo, has
boen filed against the order.
The Palai Centml Bank, Ltd. (herein referred
to as the Palai Ba.nk or tho Bank) was incorporated
in January, I !l27 under the Trava11core Companies
Hegulations. Till Hl36, it was known as "The
Central Bank, Ltd.", when the name was changed.
Jn March l!l37, the Pala! .Bank was included in tho
Second Schedule to the Res•:rvo Bank of India Act,
J!)3± (2 of 1934). According to the balance sheet
of the Pahi Bank for the year ending December 31,
195LI, the paid-up capital was Rs. 24,8ll,ti39.5:3.
The nominal ca pi t:il tJf the Palai Bank was Rs. 40
lakhs divided i11to l,6P,000 equity shares of Hs.2G/.
each. The Palai Bank seems to have greatly
extended its business a~ time passed. Jn 1921', tho
deposits were a mere IIs .. 77,000/-, hut by I ~160,
they had become almost Rs. JO crorcs. It had,
during the yeare, 1.ieeornn the foremo•t Bank in
Kenda State, and its place was I !ith in the whole of
India. It had :!ii brancheR in :incl outsiclo the
State of Kerala.
When Kerala became a Part B State, the
RcservP Bank of India Act was extended to that
area, and th<' Palai Bank came under the supervision of the Rcsnve Bank, which, in exercise of
the powers vested in it by the Ranking Compani<.'s
Act as wt>II as the R<.'serve Bank of India Act,
prriodically inspected the Palai Bank. These insP"ctionH were ruade in J!li)J, July l!l53, February)1arch ]!)56, Mar<"h 1958 and January-February,
l 9(i0. Every time, the Reserve Bank found itre.
3 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTci.
637
gularities which were pointed out to the Bank, and
special directions were iHsued. The· main defects
were that the advances made by the Palai Bank
were not sound that the bulk of the advances
were either irrecoverable or "sticky" (which means,
not easily recoverable), that the income taken into
account represented to a great extent unrealised
interest on these advances, that large advances
were made to the Directors, their relations and
Companies, in which they were interested, on
· no security or inadequate security, and that
the Bank was declaring dividends on the basis
of profits which were computed without making
provision for bad and doubtful debt and by using
up the reserves at an alarming rate, while the
deposits were going down. In the beginning, the
Reserve Bank contended itself, by prohibiting further advances to Directors, their relations and
individuals, firms or companies, in which the Directors were interested, advising the Palai Bank to
reduce clean advances and to regularise others,
warning the Bank that the Reserve Bank considered that the business of the Bank was being
conducted in the manner detrimental to the interests of its depositors, and that if the directions
were not carried out, action under the first proviso
to sub-s. (2) of s. 22 of the Banking Companies
Act would be ta.ken by issuing a notice that a
licence could not be granted to the Bank.
From theoorrespondence which has been filed
in this case, it does appear that the l{eserve Bank
was not satisfied at each following inspection that
. the position had improved; rather it apprehended
that it h'1d worsened, and that the directions had
not been carried out. This was denied on behalf
of the Bank, but nothing depends upon who is
right and who is wrong, because no charge of nwla
fide conduct is now made against the Reserve
.Bank. As a result of the inspection in FebruaryMarch, 1956, the Reserve Bank avers, it was found
196!
/oseph Kuruvilla
Vellukunnel
v.
The Reserve Bank
of India
Hidavatu/lah J
fi38
J962
J oseplr J{'u1ut1lla
VeJlukWU1rl
v.
Tht! Resen-t Bank
of India
H kl ayatuU oh J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTs [1962] SUPi>.
that on December 31, 1955, the .advances stood at
Ha, 355·02 lakha, of which llti. 171 ·"27 lakha were
irrncoverable, and that the deposits of tho Bank
had been impairer:! by Rs. l:)!J·I3 lakhs. The
Roservo Bank also avers that the Bank did not
satisfy the requirements of the Banking Companies
Act, particularly s. 11, about the minimum paidup capital and reserve6, and ss. 22(3) (a) and (b)
about the ability of tho Bank to pay its depositors,
present and future, in full or conducting its affair
in a manner not detrimental to tho interesta of
the d"positors, and did not satisfy the require·
ment<i of ss. 42(6)(a) (i) aud (ii) of the Reserve
Bank of India Act. The Reserve Bank at this stage
deputed an observer, and issued further directions
and thrPaten~d to remove the name of the Palai
Bank from the Second Schedule to the Reaerve
Bank of India Act, if the directions were not
faithfully and punctually carried out. All this
time, thti Reserve Bank was requiring the
Palai Bank to submit statements and returns. In
the inspection which was made in !1-farch-May, 1958,
the position as on February 28, l 95S, was found to
be even worse. Though the d1~posits had gone up,
the advances had raisen to &. 421.56 lakhs, of
which Rs. 208·05 lakhs were said to be irrecoverable, and in the opinion of tho lWl!erve Bank, after
writing off tho paid-up capital, reserves etc. of the·
value of l~s. 41·l7 lakhs, deposits to the extent of
&. 177·24 lakhs were impaired. More direotiona
in the aamo key followed, and the .Bank was warned
that it was conducting its affairs in a way which
was detrimental to the interests of the depositors.
In the scmtiny in January-February, 1960, the
position as on December 31, 1959, was said to be
that out of the advances of Rs. 529 lakha,
Rs. 218·51 lakhs were irrecoverable, Rs. 17·71 lakha
were doubtful, and Rs. ll l ·57 lakbs were frozen or
sticky.
3 S.C.R. SUPREME COURt REPORTS
639
On July 2,1, 1960, the Reserve Bank issued a
letter containing the warnings to which the Palai
Bank appeared to have become indurated, and
further ga.ve the Bank 12 month's time to improve
matters and 30 days to reply to the inspection
report. An Officer of the t:ltate Bank of India
(Mr. Sivaraman) had already been deputed as the
General Manager of the Palai Bank, and had taken
_charge on July 1, 1960. On June 23, 1960, the
balance sheet of the Bank was published showing
the position as on December 31, 1959. The balance
sheet showed a loss of Rs. 14-1/2 lakhs. The
Reserve Bank alleges that even in previous years
there were losses, but were hidden. In June 1960,
there was a run on several branches of the Palai
Bank. Whether this was due to the publication of
the balanoe sheet showing a loss, or whether it was
due to the appointment of Mr. Sivaraman, it is
hardly possible now to say. Betweon June 24,
1960 (deposits, Rs. 9'82 crores) and July 22, 1960
(deposits, Rs. 9·32 crores) there was a withdrawal
of Rs. 50 lakhs. By August 3, 1960 (deposits, 8'50
crores) there was a withdrawal of Rs. 82 lakhs in
12 days. To meet this run, the Bank had to
borrow against Government securities with the result
that all its Government securities except those
worth Rs. 25 lakhs were pledged. The deposits,
(Rs. 8·50 crores) consisted of Rs. 4 crores in fixed
deposits, Rs. 2•25 crores in current accounts and
Rs. 2·25 crores in savings deposits. Against these,
the l{eserve Bank found that the Palai Bank had
cash to the extent of Rs. 50 lakhs and a capacity to
borrow Rs. 1 crore against its securities. The
appeHant, however, urged before us that in the
report of the General Manager dated November
8, 1960, the cash in hand was shown to be Rs. 42·18
lakhs and at Banks, Rs. 83·68 lakhs, the marketable
securities, Rs. 22·98 lakhs and the estimated surplus
from assets speoifically pledged, Rs. 142•63 lakhs.
These figures do not, of course, show that all this
1962
HidaJatul!
i
640 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1962] SuPP.
1962
Joseph Kuru1.Ji/(a
Vcl/uJ;unn11l
money would have been available immediately to
stem the run. It is thus evident that if the run
continu<:d longer them was a likelihood that these
d"positors who were able to withdraw their money
would obtain payment in foll, leaving the others
with nothing or next to nothing. The Bank alleges
in its a!Rdavits in reply that the run was Rubsiding,
while the Reserve B'tnk maintains that it was going
on unabated. Whether it was abating or continuing, the reputation and security of tho Bank had
been considerably shaken. The learned Company
Judge, in his judgment under appeal, estimated
that Rs. lii8 lakhs (about one-sixth of the deposits)
represented the sudden wit.hdrawals. The Directors
of the Palai Bank sent Mr. Sivamman on August
3, 1960, to Bombay for urgent consultations, and
Mr. Si varaman on his return, announced on the 8th
that an application for the winding up of the Bank
had Leen marle that day. and a provisional Liquidator had been appointed. He accordingly, issued
orders to the Branches to stop business and close
the doors. The Hesnrve Bank was of the opinion
that the Palai Bank was not in a position to pay
its dopoi;itors in full, and that the continuance of
the Bank was prejudicial to the interests of the
deposit-Ors.
The application, as already stated, was made
on August 8, I !J60. It was heard by l~aman Kayar,
J. He dispensed "·ith notice under s. 450\2) of the
Coznpanie11 Act before passing the order appointing
tho provisi011al Liquidator. He, however, _issued
notice of the main application, and heard the
H.e~erve Bank, the Palai Bank, the creditors supporting the petition and the creditors opposing it,
and read several affidavits filed by the parties. On
December 5, 1960, he accepted tho application of
the Reserve Bank, and ordered that the Palai
Bank be wc.und 11p. He was moved for a certificate
unucr Art. 13c( I) of the Constitution by the present
appellant (Mr. Joseph Kuruvilla Vellukunnei), a
ii
'1
;jlj
-
3 S.C.R.
,'. 1 •,.
'
_,
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
64i
former Director of the Palai Bank and also a contributory, but he declined to certify the case. The
appellant then obtained special leave of this Court,
and filed this appeal. Some others applied to intervene in the appeal. and were allowed to be heard.
One Mr. D. Chacko Kappon (a contributory and also
a depositor) filed a petition under Art. 32 of the
Constitution. That petition was heard along with this
appeal. This judgment will dispose of the appeal as
well as the writ petition.
In the High Court, the application of the
Reserve Bank was opposed on two grounds. The
first was that the action of the Reserve Bank in
making the appl.ication for the winding up· of the
Palai Bank was mala fide. This ground appears to
have been given up in the High Court itself, and has
not been raised before us. The second ground was
thats. 38(3)(b)(iii) of the Banking Companies Act,
1949, was void, inasmuch as it offends against
Arts. 14 and 19 of the Constitution.· In the hearing·
before us; Art. 301 was also invoked. The deoision
of the High Court was against the Bank and other
answering respondents, and this ground alone has
been urged before us.
4
'
Though the facts cease to play an important
part in the decision of the question of law which
survives, those narrated above were referred to by
the learned Attorney-General as showing the background of the action taken by the Reserve Bank.
The appellant, in his reply, referred to some other
facts in explanation to avoid a p0ssible prejudice to
his case, if the facts as presented by the Reserve
Bank only wer<' considered. While we are not
required to express any opinion upon the correctness or otherwise of the allegations and counterallegations, we think it necessary to set out in brief
some of the facts, to which our attention was drawn
by the appellant, to show that we have borne in
1!6! .•
'7.k~"" ~..:~-~'
Joseph· Pruv1ll•
VellukuMel
' ."!1;• .,.,, ;._
The Retef'vt Btink.
of lnditi,
Hidayatu//ah J,
642
1962
J•uj}a Kuruuilla
Y1llui-1
••
1111 RtstrN B11nl.:
of India
HiU.)<lu/loh , .
SUPREME COURT REPORTs [1962] SUPP.
mind the rival contentions in
validity of tho section.
determining the
The appellant contended that enquiries by the
1•efierve Bank in the past wcr.o not thorough; but in
the application for winding up, the Reserve Bank
had given specific details of the advances and their
realisability. In this connectiou, we were referred
to a reply made by the Reserve Bauk in answer to
four schemes of compromise betwetn the Bank and
its creditors suggest€d by the Palai .Bank. In that
reply, the Reserve Bank said that no definite
opinion could be expressed on the schemes except
"after a detailed examination of the Bank's books
of account with a view to assessing tho realisability
of its assets and the probable pace. of recovery of
the realisable assets." This, in our opinion, was a
proper attitude to take, because by then, the condition of the Bank had mat{'rially altered, and all
the past data had become out of date. Tho reply
did not show that the R·eserve Bank's inspection
was not thorough. N'ext., it was argued that the
Reserve Bank's estimate of cash and realisable
assets W!lS wrong, if one. reads tho report of the
Provisional Liquidator and the General Manager,
dated November 8, 1960. We have already referred
in an earlier part of this judgment to the amounts
which, in their opinion, constitute<l the available
assets, and have also shown why the Reserve Bank
cannot be said to have made mistake. It was then
contended that the run was under control, and our
attention was drawn to certain statements in which
the withdrawals during the months of July and
August are shown in a tabular form. The run on
the Bank did not follow a uniform course. Sometimes, it was more, an<l sometimes it was less, but
continue, it <lid; and that is the main point of the
matter. It was >Jaid that tho Reserve Bank itself
thought well of the Palai Bank, because in tho year
19!i4, it allowed the opening of a new Branch at
Madurai, and evc·n in itH last letter of July 21, 1960,
-"'
3 s.c.R.
SUPREME COuRT REPORTS
643
it gave the Palai Bank one yea.r to improve matters,
and 30 days to show cause against the inspection
reports, but took a hasty action before even the
30 days had expired. The action of the Reserve
Bank was undoubtedly taken during the period of
grace; but after July 21, the situation had altered
so radically that delay might have defeated the
very purpose of the law, under which action was
taken.
·
'
Finally, it was contended that the Palai Bank
began by being a rural Bank, which was
making advances on the security of land, and
such security, though "sticky" was capable of
being realised. Reference was made to the
Report of the Travancore Cochin Banking Enquiry
Commission, which was appointed in 1956, where, in
making a survey of banking in Travancore-Cochin
State, it was pointed out that the Banks were
"spread out into the rural interior of the State", and
the main business of these banks was "to finance the
rural people engaged in a small business-crop raising, produce processing, transporting, vending, etc."
It was argued that to a rural Bank of this kind the
standards of a commercial bank could not be applied
and that the Reserve Bank should have made
allowances in respect of the realisability of the
advances, the worse of which belonged to a period
prior to the extension of the Reserve Bank of India
Act to this area. These advances given time, could
have been cleared, and an attempt was, in fact, being earnestly made with the assistance of Mr. J. A.
Frost, a retired senior grade Officer of the Imperial
Bank of India, who was appointed an adviser. It
was pointed out that 3 accounts were closed, 26 were
sued upon, and in 13, substantial remittances were
received. All this. may be true; but it is useless
for us to speculate as to_ what would have
happened if the depositors did not take a
hand in the affairs by making a run; and
the a?tion of the Reserve Bank was precipitated
1962 .
J osejh KwuvUlo ~..,, _.,.
Vellutunnel . ··
'· Bank
The Reserve
oj India
Hitiayatu/lall J.
64! SUPREME COUHT REPORTS [1962] SUPP.
1961.
...
Thi -R•Jer11 Bak
Of lndiJ' I
hy the exigencies of the situation, which had arisen.
Those who wade a run for their money, were not
going to wait till the Bank acquired sufficient funds
to pay them afLer recovcrin~ its advance. Those
advances, as conceded, could not so easily be realised as tho advance made by a commercial bank on
security other than that of land. If this rural bank
began to arrange its business like a commercial bank
it must necessarily be judged by the same standard,
and the affairs of the Palai Bank, in our opinion,
had long left behind the rural character, and had
emerged into those of a modern commercial bank.
What we have said above is sufficient to show
that then.> was not e110ugh material on which the
action of the Heservc Bank could strictly be charactcri8tld as mc1lu fide. Indeed, the forbearance with
which the Reservo Bank acted (and it proved unwise)
has completely demonstrated the futility of granting
time, and we are not surprised that the answering
respondents in the High Court and tho appellant in
this Court have not chosen to raise any iBBue about
the honesty of the action.
We are thus concerned with the contention
that ss. 38(1) and (:i)(b)(iii) arc void, being a breach
of Arts. 14 and 19 of the Constitution, and uUra vires
being in conflict with Art. 30 I. Tho arguments anent
Arts. 14 and 19 are based on tho same reasoning,
but that under Art. 19 takes a few more facts into
account. Shortly stated, the argument is that ss.38
(l) and (3)(b)(iii) make the Reserve Bank the sole
judge to decide whether the affairs or a banking.
company are being so conducted as to be prejudicial ·
to the interests of the depositors, and the Court has
no option but to pass an order winding up the .
banking company, when the application is ma.de
Section 38 lays down : .
"38(1 ), Xot.withsta.nding anything contained in
sectfon 391, section '192, section 433 1md section
..
•
SUPREME COUR'r REPOl\TS
3 S.C.R.
645
583 of the Companies Act, 1956, but without
prejudice to its powers under sub-section(l) of
section 37 of this Act, the High Court shall
order the 'Yinding up of a banking company-(a) if the banking company is unable
to pay its debts ; or
(b) if an application for its winding
up has been made by the Reserve Bank
under section 37 or this section.
(2) The Reserve Bank shall make an
application under tbis section for the winding
up of a banking company if it is directed so to
do by an order under clause (b) of sub-section ·
( 4) of section 35.
(3) The Reserve Bank may make an
application under this section for the winding
up pf a banking company-
*
*
*
(b) if in the opinion of the Reserve
Bank-
*
*
the continuance of the banking
company is prejudicial to the interests of
its depositors.
It is said that the word "shall" in the first sub-section is mandatory, and compels the High Court to
pass an order winding up a banking company when
ever the Reserve Bank chooses to make an
application. It is further pointed out that these
powers exclude the operation of s. 433 of the Companies Act, under which companies are wound up.
(iii)
The power conferred ou the Reserve Bank by
the section is said to be bad under .".rt. 14, because
it enables a discrimination between a banking company and any other company by prescribing different laws for their respective winding up,
. and is.
.
;
'c"«1/16B
Juaep~ Irunwilla
· VetlUkunn.1
v~
The Ri'Urff Bani:
of_ltitfia
646 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [ 1962] SUPP.
196t
' ./~stph Kruuvilla
Vt//ukunnel
••
'Tiu ReJtrDt Bank
·Of lndia
Hkl•Jalul/:th ./,
bad under Arts. 19(1 )(f} and (g} aa amounting to an
unreasonable restriction on the holding of-property
and the right to carry on business ns a banking company. To amplify the first, it is_argued thats. 4:~a
of the CompaniPs Act, when an application is made
to wind up a company, the High Court has to be
satisfied after n fair trial that an order to wind up
the company is called for, and tho ,Tuduc, who is
indcpcnde:•t of executive control, is completely free
to rPach a decision after the Company has shown
cause, and there is a right of appeal against the•·
derision, if adverse to tho company. But under the
procedure laid down in s. :is of the Banking Companies Act, the banking company proceeded against
has no opportunity to show cause either before or
after the winding up order, the Reserve Bank
records no rea~ons in writing or communicates
them, there is no access to Court aud no hearing
b"fore the Court to dct<-nnino whether the proposed
action is justified, and 110 rrdress if a mistake wero
made. Under the exercise oi that power, it is said,
any hanking company can be supprc"sed by thn
Hcscrve lfank or by the Central Government and
the Courts are powerless, since the opinion of the
Hcserve Bank and/or the central Government is not
justiciable and there is no appeal against tho decision of thn Rcsen•e Bank or of the Court acting on
the application oft he Reserve Bank.
It. is said that the umeasonablenel!s of the law
arises further from the fact that t.he Reser\'o Bank
is not an independent or impartial judg<>, the members of the .Central and Local Boards whereof, being
all nominees of Govnnment with no security of
tenure, such as is enjoyed by the High Court Judges.
The Res••rve Bank is subject to directions from tho
Central Government, and even if the Reserve Bank
be of a contrary opinion, it has to filo an application
(or the winding up of a banking company, if directed
to do so bv the Central Government. It is further
argued that. this drastic power under a law which is
3 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
647
J96f
characterised as 'Draoonic' is 'uncanalised', 'uncontrolled' and 'despotic', and in its exercise, every prin- J ..eph Kumill•
ciple of natural justice is set at nought, and the very · V1ttukrumt1
fundamental conception of it, namely, resort to Court The Re.;:;., 8 ..11:
is completely absent. Such a law, it is said, is so '
of lntlia
patently, unreasonable as to be a gross violation of Hidayatu/lah J.
all fundamental rights. Lastly, it is contended that in
giving the Reserve Bank the power to elect to pro·
ceed under the Companies Act or under the Banking
Companies Act, there is fort.her room for discrimina.., tion. It is thus contended thats. 38(1) of the Banking Companies Act cannot be upheld as a valid law
on any principle.
The learned Attorney-General appearing for
the answering respondents contends that the action
of the Reserve Bank was fully supported and justified by the facts. According to him, the Palai Bank
was inspected frequently for ten . years and the
reports of the inspecting officers were made available to the Palai Bank not only for information but
also for explanation and compliance. The action,
says he, drastic though ·it may seem, was taken
after numerous opportunities to the Palai -'Bank to
mend matters, that even as late as 1960 the Reserve
Bank gave a year's time for improvement, but
immediate action had to be taken in view of the
loss of confidence a.mong the depositors, a large
number of whom made a run for their money. The
learned Attorney-General thus says that there were
many person who were of the opinion that the
Reserve Bank should have acted earlier and that
perhaps the Reserve Bank could be blamed for
delaying the action but not for taking a precipitat(;
action. He urgues that the Reserve Bank and not
the Court was in a position to take prompt action bc9ause the Reserve Bank already possessed all the
necessary information. He contends that the position
of the Reserve Bank and its statue as a responsible
body make it the proper authority to make such an
important decision requiring immediate action an<l
(
.
-
.
'.
•
648 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1962] SUPP
196t
J ostf'li KunniJJo
Vtltukunntl
,-:-:... .'
1'.
Tlk IUU'CI Bonk
.•f India
,,-.,---
•
that unloss tho Re>crv~ Ba.nk could be charged with
dbhonest.v (which is n')t the case) the aotion of tho
Reserve Bank not only eannot he questionod,
hut should not bo open to doulit. Accordincr to
him, banking companies are in a class by th~m
selve8, and special law dealing with their winding
up cannot be descrihod as discriminatory. He contends !.hat the law is noithor discriminatory nor unreasonable, and that a prior judicial determination
of :in issue of this kind is not a condition precedent
to the making of a winding up order against a
hank. He therefore, says that the appeal and the
petition should be dismiSBed.
Before we consider the arguments of the two
sides in detail, we wish to say a fow words about
the po~ition of tho lkserve Bank in the financial
affairs· of India and also about its place in the
scheme of tho law. The Reserve Bank of India
was establibhed on April I, 1935, by the Reserve
Bank of India Act, UJ34. Even before the establishment of the Reserve Bank, suggestions were
made that there should be a cent.ral bank in India,
and the Royal Commission on Indian Currency
and Fi1iance had recommended in 1926 that the
eurrcncy and credit of ~he country could only be
put on a firm foundation, if a contra! bank was
ostablished. The first Bill introduerd in Hl27 by
Sir Basil Blaekett was dropped. The Indian Central Banking Inquiiy Committee, however, reported
in rn:n that thcro was a need for a contra.I banking
institution in India "for s<.>curing the de1•elopment
of tho Indian banking and credit system on a sound
and proper basis." The Committeo pointed out
that Homo of the Provincial Committoes had also
RUl!gested the eRtahlishmcnt of the Rernrve Hank.
The Committ<'e ended by saying :
"Wri accordingly consider it to be a
p1<1tt,,r of supreme importance from the point
3 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT B.EPORTS
_649
of view of the development of banking facilities in India, and of her economic advancement generally, that a Central or Heserve
Bank should be created at the earliest possi,ble
date. The establishment of such a bai1k
would by mobilization of the banking and
currency reserves of India in one hand tend
to increase the volume of eredit available for
trade, industry and agriculture and to mitigate the evils of fluctuating and high charges
for the use of such credit caused by seasonal
stringency." (Vol. I, Part I. Chap. XXII,
para, 605)
·
The White Paper on Indian Constitutional Reforms
also recommended the establishment of a Reserve
Bank 'free from political influence'. As a result of
these findings, when a fresh Bill was introduced by
Sit' George Schuster on September 8, 1933, it was
ac:i::pted and received the assent of the GovernorGewral on March 6, 1934.
The functions of the Reserve Ba.nk were generally indicated in the preamble as the regulation
of the issue of the Bank notes and the keeping
the re3erl'es with a view to securing monetary
stability in India and generally to operate 'the
currency and credit systf'm of the country
to its nd vantage. But to enable the Reserve
Bank to function in this manner, it had to be given
other powers, so that it may function effectively as
.a C3utrnl bank. To this end, the Reserve Bank
was
given the right to hold the
cash
balances of important comm<rcial banks, a right to
transgct Government business in India which was
nlso its obligation, and to enter into agreements
with State Governments to transact their business.
In addition to these, th.e Reserve Bank could require all Banks included in the Second Schedule to
the Act to maintain with the Resorvo Bank a balance not less then 5 per cent, of their demand liabili~ies and 2 per cent. of their time liabilities. T~e
/962
J o~P'f. ~~uuilla
'"·Villul<tm"'I
,' v.
The R,,,,.. Ballk
•\iflril!N
'HidtlllatwUah J.
650 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1962] SUPP.
1962
Jouplt Kr11nd//a
Vtll11kunrul
·.
"·
1"' Ru"ot Bank
of lndia
BU/oyatulld J.
Reserve Bank also performed tlrn normal functions
of a central bank as well as an ordinary bank,
though the latter functions arc not as <letai led as
those of un ordinary bank.
But the most imp.)rtant funct.ion of the Re3erve
Bank is to regulate the banking systr-m generally.
The Reserve Bank has been described as a Bankern'
Bank. Under the RcsPrve Bank of India Act, tho
scheduled banks m1iintain certain balances and the
Reserve Bank can lend assistance to those banks
"a1 a lender of the last resort". The l:cserve Bank
has also beon given certain advisory and n•gulatory
fnnctiollB. But its position as a central b:1nk, it
acts as an agency for collecting financial information and statiAtics. It advises Government and
ot.her banks on financial and banking matters, and
for this purpose, it keeps itself informed of the
activities and monetary position of scheduled and
other hanks and inspects the hcolrn and accounts of
scheduled bank and advises Government after
inspection whether a particular bank should he in·
eluded in the Second Schedule <•I' 11ot. Every 'cbeduled bank is required to send to t.hc Resen;, Bank
and to the Central Government a weekly return of
its position in :i. form, which is prcseribcd. Sometime, however, the Ht•sorve Bank allows 11 particular
bank to send its returns once a month instc·11d of
every week. From thesi. returns, the Reserve Bank
prepares and publishes consolidated statements
showing thn monetary pooition in the country. The
inclusion of a bank in the Second Schedule is the
function of the Reserve Bank, ancl under ss. 12(!i)(a)
(iii) and (b)(ii) it satisfies itfelf int;;r alill that tht>
affairs of thH particular bank am not being conducted
in a manner detrimental to the int.,rests of its depositors. The Reserve Bank has further the power to
prohibit any scheduled bank from rec:civing, after
~ week, any fresh deposits.
3 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
651
The above analysis of some of the provisions
of the Reserve Bank of India Act show that the
Reserve Bank of India has been created as a cen·
tral bank with powers of supervision, ad vice and
inspection, over banks, particularly those desiring
that they be included in the Second Schedule or
those scheduled already. The Reserve Bank thus
safoguards the economy aud the financial stability
of the country. No doubt, the Board is composed
of nominated members ; but from the nature of
things, it could not be otherwise. Neither election
nor competitive examinations can effectively take
the place of nominations, if the Board is to be com·
posed of men of proved worth and standing, and
there is no other method which can even be contemplated. No doubt, the members of the Board are
subject to removal, but neither integrity nor efficie·
ncy is secured only by such guarantee, and we have
no reason to think that the Reserve Bank acted in
this case, or acts in other cases under pressnre or
from oblique motives. As was pointed out in
another connection by this Court in All lnflia Bmik
Employee.<' Association v. National Industrial Tribu·
nal (').
"If it was not the Reserve Bank of India,
the only other authorit.} that could be entrusted with the function would be the Finance
Ministry of the Government of India and that
department would necessarily be guided by
the Reserve Bank having regard to the intimate knowledge which .the Reserve Bank
has of the banking structure of the count! y as
a whole and of the affairs of each ba,nk in
particular."
The position of the Reserve Bank being such
as we have stated from the Reserve Bank of India
Act, the next thing to enqnire is its powers under
(1) [1962] 3 S.C.R. 269, 299,
1962
Joseph Kuruvilla
Vellukurinel ,
.v.
The R""" B•k
of In4io
Hidaya/u/1"11 J.
652 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1962] SUPP.
196B
J os•Ph K111ul!ill•
·~vtu u trvtn, /
' .
v
Tit, Bean~r Bank
... ..;..•! lridi•
··~
the Banking Companies Act. The Banking Companies Act, in its present form, is the product of
many legislative enactrnents. The Banks' Liquidation Proceedings Committee ( l\Jfl:!) correctly described it as "m:J.dc up of shred• and patche~." We
wore taken through the entire evolutionary process
by th~ le.i.rnd Att.irney.GinDr.i.I; but we d'J not
consider it necessary to trace the various st<ips. We
shall
con tent oursel vos
with a reference
to the salient landmarks. fu the Indian Companies Act, 1913, there was no special procedure
for banking comp:rnies, particularly rolating to
their winding up. Special provisions wore introduced in that Act by tho Indian Companies (Amendment) Act, 1936. Part X-A, which was then
introduced, merely oi1aoted certain regulatory ,provisions, but of winding up of banking companies, it
said nothing. The amendment hardly met the purpose and the Reserve Bank of India framed a draft
bill as far back as !039 .from which has been fashioned the present Banking Companies Act.
During the War years, tbe Indian Companies
Act was amended several times to meet some special
exigencies, with which we are not concerned. But
by ,July, 1946, it was rc1ilised that i:ert.ain undesirable features in banking had come to exist. Banks
were then getting control of non-banking companies
and by the interlocking of shares, t.he banking companies were able to manipulate the finances at
their disposal. The main foature8 were "the. grant
of Joans to persons connected with the management
of banks without adequate .security cxten~ive
window-dressing at t.he time of preparing balanccshects, and, in gcnPral, a tendency to utilise the
bank'~ fnnrlR to the cletriment of the int<:>rests of
the depositors." It must not he forgotten that the
Indian Companies Act, 1913, was concerned primarily with safeguarding the interes!s of the stoC'khoMers, whereas in a hanking company, thr· in1;erests of the depositors are invariably many times
3s.c.R.
•
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
'1
653
those of the stockholders, if those interests can be
said tu be represented by the monies invested
respectively. In 1946, an Ordinance was promulgated consisting of only six: sections, of which the
operative sections were the last four. Section 3
enabled the Central Government to direct the
Reserve Bank to cause an inspection to be made
of any banking company and its books and accounts and to make a report to the Central Government; Section 4 provided the machinery and the
procedure to implements. 3. i:iection 5 empowered
Government to prohibit a bank from receiving
fresh deposits or to direct the Reserve Bank not
to include a particular bank in the Second Schedule,
or to exclude it_, if already included. Sub-section
(2) provided for certain penalties, and s. 6 authorised the Central Government to publish, after
reasonable notice to the banking company'
concerned, any report or parts thereof. This was
an attempt to ensure the depositors a certain measure of safety in regard to their money.
This Ordinance was followed by the .Banking
Companies (Restriction of Branches) Act, 1946,
which, as its name shows, put, a curb on the indiscriminate opening of branches by some banks.
The 'evil of indiscriminate advances and loans was
then sought to be met by an Ordinance promulgated in 1948 intituled "The Banking Companies
Control Ordinance" (XXV of 194~). In that
Ordinance, it was provided that the Court shall
appoint the Reserve Bank as the Official Liquidator of a banking company on the application
of the Reserve Bank in that behalf. The Reserv"l
Bank of India Act was also amended to enable
the 'Reserve Bank to give a loan or loans to a
banking company with a first charge on the assets,
if wound up. A large number of banking companies had failed during the years, 1947, 1.948 and
1949.' Between 1926 and 1937, 23 Banks had
suspended payment. In 1938 and 1939, 46 Banks':
•
1982
Joseph KurU;iua
Velluk~nmri.;\'.
·,
The Beservi _Bank
of indi4·' ·
Hid•.Y~tu/lah J,
·
654
1962
Jost!J~ KutWil/a
V1t1ukunntl
••
Thi Rtstr~ BW
•! l•dio
Bid•Jolulleh J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1962) SUPP.
failed, from 1940 to 1946, 93 B1mks were involved.
But, in 194 7, lll48 and l!l49 there were as many
as 123 failures involving outside liabilities of Rs. 82
crorcB ! The largest number was in Calcutta. with
83 Ranks. In the winding up proceeding
that
followed, many unsat.isfactory features
were notioed. It was noticed that the realisations
were insignificant, while the costs were great,
and enormous expenditure of time took place.
The winding up of any company, be it a banking
company or any other, requir&s an investigation
of the affairs, the recovery and realisation of
assets and distribution of what is realised. While
these mattors can, of course, bt> carried on without
undue hurry, the decision whether there should
be a winding up or not, cannot be unduly deferred
in the case of a banking company, if the interests
of tho depositors are to be safeguarded. To
achieve solidarity in banking operations and also
to preserve the rights of the depositors while a
bank continues and more so when it cannot, the
Banking Companies Act was the logical, and indeed, the only answers.
We have seen that the Heserve Bank was
already functioning as a central bank with a certain me~ure of control over the other banks,
aoheduled or unscheduled. This control was
tightened in the Hanking Companies Act by making provisions which were intended to protect the
interests of the depositors. Differences notices hie
between the Banking Companies Act, on the one
hand and tho Companies Act, on the other, which
have been characterised as discriminatory, are
thus explainable on the basis of the object to be
achieved. We aha.II soon illustrate this by a reference to the sections them6elves. For the present
we only wish to emphasise that banking companiea cannot be compared with other companies.
The ordinary companies deal with the money of
the stockholders, who own a share in the assets,
3 s.c.k. suP:REME cotJR± REPokrs
655
who appoint their own Directors, for better or
for worse, and whose liability is also limited. The
banking companies are in an entirely different
class, as they deal with the money of the depositors, who have no security except the solvency of
the banking company and its sound dealings with
their money. Ex facie, the bankinir companies
must he regulated somewhat differentls, and the
.interests of the depositors must be paramount and
the winding up of such companies depends upon
other considerations, chief among which is the desire to pay off the creditors as far as possible in
full or at least equitably. The action is thus
dictated not from any abrstract consideration of a
long-range view of the future ability of a bank
to pay its creditors but its ability to pay them at
any given time. In this connection, the Reserve
Bank has been given by the Banking Companies
Act the power and inves~ed with the duty of
watching the affairs of every banking company
with a view to ensuring the safety of the depositors' money. There is thus, at the very start, a
reasonable classification, which is also a very
just, and practical classification, to achieve the
avowed purpose.
It is hardly necessary to examine each and
every provision of the Banking Companies Act.
When the Banking Companies Act was originally
enacted, the main objects were to prescrible minimum capital standards, to prohibits the non-banking companies to accept deposits repayable on
demand and to limit dividends payable. But included in the Act was a comprehensive scheme fur
licensing of banks and a conferral on the Reserve
Bank of power to call for periodical returns and
balance sheets and to inspect books and accounts
of banking companies. · The Act also empowered
the Central Government to take action ·against
banks conducting their affairs in a manner detrimental to the interests of the depositors, a.nd
1961
Jos.ph K.,..;111
Vtllukurwl
.
.,v •.
The Reser1J1 Bani:
of Indi4
Hii1y1tull•h J,
fJ5tl SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1962] 8rP
1962
--··-
J
•f'.,~!n""':f'"
•
,"1 v.
'
The Rtserui JJ...
of rrldto
Hid1JG1idlolz J.
provided for a quicker procedure for winding up
banking companies.
When the Banking Companies Act was pas~e<l
in 194\J, it was explained in the note on cl. 37, whieh
corresponded to s. ;{8, that the provi~ions of the
Indian Companies Act in respect of liquidation of
companies did not seem to be suitable for banking
companies, that a bank ·s business being of an
over-the-counter kind, the bank has to meet
immediately its liability and a provi~ion for winding up of the banking company when it refuses to
meet a lawful demand within a stated time, WlJ-S
neces~ary. It was also stated that the Reserve
Bank was given authority to apply for the liquidation of the hanking company, if its affairs were
oonductcd tu the dotriment of the interests of the
depobitm·s. An examination of the Banking
Companies Act reveals two things prominently.
The first is that the wnole intend and purpose of
that Act is to secure tho interests of the depositors.
The second is that the Reserve Bank is the instrumentality by which this intend is to be achieved.
The Act, at every turn, makes tho Reserve Bank
the authority to sanction, permits, certify, in8pect,
report, advise, control, direct, license and prohibit.
There is hardly any provision where the Reserve
Bank's judgment is not made final vis·a-vis a
banking company except raroly where an appeal
to the Central Government can lie. No useful
purpose will be served in referring to these sections in detail.
Nor do the powers of the Reserve Rank end
there. The Reserve Bank not only ha.s powers
over banking companies while they am functioning, but it has al8o powers when tho banking
companies wish or a.re forced to cease to funr.tion.
If a banking company wants to suspend its business a.nd applies to the High Court for a moratorium, the applioa.tion is not ma.intaina.ble, unleBB
..
'
3 S.C.R.
.
'
.
..
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
657
it is accompanied by a report of the Reserve Bank
indicating that in the opinion of the Reserve Bank
the banking company will be able to pay its debts.
When the High Court grants the . relief without
such report, it has to c<J.11 for a report from the
Reserve Bank. The High Court is also required
to have regard to the interests of the depositors,
and even during the period of moratorium granted
by the High Court, the Reserve Bank can apply
for the winding up of the banking company. Sections 39 and 41-A give special powers to the
Reserve Bank in winding up proceedings. Even
in voluntary winding up of a banking company,
the Reserve Bank has to certify. that the banking
company is able to pay in full all its debts to its
creditors,\ as they accrue. In amalgamation of
banking companies, the scheme has to be approved
by the Reserve Bank. Similarly, in compromises or
arrangements between the banking company and
its creditors, the Reserve Bank has to be satisfied.
In all these matters, the satisfaction inter alia,
must be as to the interests of the depositors. In
reconstruction of banking company after an application by the Reserve Bank for an order moratorium, the Reserve Bank has to satisfy itself and
prepare a scheme, which, inter alia, must be in the
interests of the depositors.
This brief survey of some of the other provisions of the Banking Companies Act, in addition
to the general provisions earlier noticed, makes it
plain that the legislature considers that consistent
with its position as a central bank and more so
with its duties and obligations, the Reserve Bank
must have a decisive voice in certain matters. It
is in this context and setting that the provisions of
ss. 38(1} and (3}(b}(iii} of the Banking Companies
Act must be viewed. It must not be overlooked
that the legislature, in view of the sad experiences
of the past, was anxious to devise a machinery for
the supervision, inspeotion and effective functioning
1962
Joseph Kat:u.~illa
Velluk"!"'el
Oi
The Reserve.Bartk
of lnd~a
·
Hidtryatullah J.
U5S SUPRE!IIE COUltT REPORTS [l962j SUPP.
I9G!
Jos.ph Kiuuvil/a
Y1Udunntl
•.
T/t, llmri., Batik
of India
Hi<f4Jolulla1' J.
of banking companies in the country. Associated
with this was the ~peer;y closure of banking
companies,
which
were
harmful
to the
interests of the depositors. The legislature achieved
both theso objectives through the Reserve Bank,
which, because of its special powers and advantages,
was in a position to act promptly and effectively.
To aid the Reserve Bank, the Courts were required
by law to be guided in certain mi1tters by the
opinion and judgment of the Reserve Bank, and in
the matter of their disposal of winding up cases
relating to banking companies, a special prooedure
was enacted in Part IIIA of the Banking Companies
Act.
We are now in a position to deal with the
argument that ss. :~8(1) and (3)(b)(iii) or'the Banking Companies· Act are void ·-firstly because they
permit discrimination between banking companies
on the one hand, and non-banking companies on
the other, and also between banking companies
inter se, and secondly because they create an unreasonable restriction upon the right to carry 011
banking, and lastly, because the who!<~ procedure
is a denial of the principles of natural justice,
chiefly by denying an access to Courts. Though
the arguments in this appeal have for their immediate object the dec!iLration that ss. 38( 1) and
(3)(b) (iii) of the Banking Companies Act are void,
they have ranged over a very wide fiold. In support
of the first limb of the argument, Art. 14 is invoked,
and in support of tho second and third, Arts.
19(l)(f) and (g); and the argument proceeds along
lines so well-known now as to need hardly any
further amplification. There being no direct ruling
either of this Court or of ~ny High Court, assistance
is 80ught to be deri\'Cd from observations in
previous decisions of this Court relating to other
Jaws. In reply, tho learned Attorney-General ha<1
rdied upon th" provisions of certain banking law~
in America and Japan and decisions of the
I
3 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
659
American Courts, where such American laws were
tested under the 'due process' clause. We shall
refer to those laws and briefly rulings in the sequel.
As regards the first point, viz., discrimination
between banking companies and non-bankin{l:
companies, we have already sufficiently indicated
the wide difference· that exists between these two
types and the need for special laws dealing with
banking companies. We have also pointed out, the
mischief that was sought to be remedied and how
the present law has be(ln evolved after considerable
deliberation. A special Cornmittee called the
Banks' Liquidation Proceeding Committee was
appointed in J 952, ·and the findings and recommen·
dations of the Committee were implemented,
amending the Banking Companies Act and incor·
porating changes, of which the impugned section
in its present form is one. There being a very
clear-cut and valid classification, the different
procedure cannot be said to be discriminatory,
because it is based on differences which are related
to the end sought to be achieved. Further, we do
not think that the possibility that the procedure
under ss. 38(1) and (3)(b)(iii) may be invoked in
some cases and the procedure of the Companies Act
in others, makes any difference, because the different
procedures will be invoked to suit defferent
said
that
situations, and it cannot be
the Reserve Bank would
act
arbitrarily
from case to case. . The Reserve Bank, apart from
its being a reasonable body, is answerable to the
Central . Government, and the public opinion is
certainly strong and vocal enough for it to heed.
If the Reserve Bank were to act mala fide, the
Central Government and in the .last resort, the
· Courts, will be there to intervene. In our judgment, the provisions of ss. 38(1) and (3 )(b)(iii)
cannot be said to be a breach of Art. 14 of the
Constitution.
1962
J.o'sef;IJ .Kuruvilla
· P1//uJ;unn1/
' . v.
TM 'Reserve Bonk
of Indio
Hidayatullah J,
660 SuPRE:ME COURT REPORTs [1962] SUPP.
1162
Jo,q,h _l(u,t1tilla
Vellukunnd
. • Yo
TM&ww Ronk
of /nJ;a
Hi,U pluiloh .I.
That leaves over the second and third arguments, which proceed upon the same materials. In
this connection, tho main grounds of attack have
already been set out in this judgment. Before we
deal with the central point, we shall deal· with
certain others which proceed, so to speak, from the
side lines. The objection that the Reserve Bank
gives no hearing, records no reasons in writing and
does not communicate them is met at least in this
case by the admitted facts. The numerous inspection reports and directions issued by the Reserve
Bank over a period of nearly nine yea.rs, together
with the application filed in this case, prove amply
that there was enough hearing of and enough
communication of the grounds of action to, the
Pa.lai Bank. The Bank had also sufficient time and
opportunity to establish its own point of view
before the Reserve Bank. It \\'as impossible that
the Reserve Bank, with the run on the Bank, woulcl
sit down to decide after bearing whethE>r to take
action or not, while withdrawals were being made
at the rate of Iis. 7 lakhs per day. The emergency
of the situations which may arise, is itself the
justification for the procedure open under the Act
and taken in this case. In our opinion, these
grounds cannot be entertained. It is difficult to
imagine that the Reserve Bank would a.ct
differently in another case.
The ma.in ground of attack is the way ss. 38( I )
and (3)(b)(iii) make it mand"tory for the High
Court to pass <\D ordar winding up a banking
company whenever the· Reserve Bank under its
powers or under an order of the Central Government makes an application for ihc winding up of a
banking company. It is argued that suoh a power
to the Reserve Bank is an uncontrolled and despotic
power and to crown all, access to Courts is not
poRSible because the Court itself must pass an order
without deciding whether the affairs of the banking
·,
3 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
661
-
1962
company are being conducted in a manner detrimental to the interests of the depositors-a fact capable Joseph Euruiiilla
Vi //rllr.u,...I ·
of being proved like any other fact. It is argued as a
v.
matter of principle that any law which bars a The Re1'r~ Bank of
/ndfa
decision by the Court is itself unreasonable without
more. Mr. Pathak, in supplementing the above H iday•lul/ph J.
contentions of Mr. Nambiar, also contends that by
the law in question a judicial process has been
converted into an executive action, and subjective
determination has taken the place of judicial determination. He also contends that the Reserve
Bank accuses a banking company, and then tries
the issue to the complete exclusion of Courts.
It must not be overlooked that the winding
up of a banking company takes place before the
High Court and under the process of law. The
judicial process is excluded only in respect of the
momentous decision whether a winding up order
should be made or not. This opinion is left to the
.Reserve Bank, and the Court merely passes an
order according to the Reserve Bank's opinion, and
then proceeds to wind up the banking company
according to law. The narrow question is whether
in leaving this decision to the Reserve Bank the
law offends the principles of natural justice, and
becomes so unreasonable, viewed in the light of
Art. l~, as to become void. This is the point on which
the respective parties joined issue and had much to
say, and this is the crucial point in this case.
In support of this contention, reliance on behalf of the appellant is placed upon certain cases of
this Court, anci we shall begin by noticing them in
brief. The first case relied upon is A. K. Gopa/,an
v. The State('). In that case, the validity of ss. 3,
7, !0-14 of the Preventive Detention Act, 1950,
was challenged on a petition under Art. 32 of the
Constitution for a writ of habeas corpns. Certain
observations of Kania, C.J., and Faz! Ali, J., were
(IJ [1950J s.c.R. aa.
'
..
662 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1962] SUPP.
196!
relied upon to show that the right to be heard and
tried
is tho very basis of tho rule of law. :Paz! Ali,J.,
.latt/J~ Kurur;illo -:
i·,aukwmel
observed that there is a fundn,montal principle
v.
that a person whose rights are affected must be
1e Rt'"°' Ba~ of~
1nii•
heard. '.rbc learned Judge referred to several
cases in which the maxim, rw<li ri/IR.ram parlR.m, has
beenlinvoked and applied particularly the observations of Lord .'.lfacnaghten in La.pointe v. L' Asso·
· ciation etc., de Jfontrr'tl ( 1}, who condemned a
procedure which requirer! no bearing as being
"contrary to rules of society and above all contra~y
to the elementary principles of justiP,e."
It cannot reasonably he said tha. t there would
he no hearing in cases of this type. While we agreo ·
that it is obnoxious to the rule of law as it exists
among civilized nations, that a person should hr
condemned, unheard, we cannot say that in this
case the Palai Rank wn,s not heard, and this case
is really typical of those casc8 in which such a
powff would be invoked. The karncd AttorneyGeneral was justified in saying that there was
plenty of hearing before the appli<:~tion wos filed.
The gist. of the objection must thus be taken to
ho that the P~ lai Rank was not beard in the High
Court before the making of the impugned order.
If a valid law could he made leaving to the determination of the Resr,rvc Bank whether a banking
company should he wound up and the Court to
implement t.hat decision, then this petition must
fail ; hut if it cannot be made, then it must succeed.
We have thus to sec whether there is any inviolable rule that every determination must always
he made by the Court and by no other authority.
In dealing with the rulings of this Court
cited to us, of which wo have already mentioned
one, we shall enquire whet.her such a widn proposition can he said to have been established
(1) [1906] A.C. 535,
3 3.C.R.
SUPREME l.JOURT REPORTS
663
before. In A. K. Gopalan's case(l), s.14 of the Preventive Detention Act was held void as contravening
Art. 22(5) of the Constitution in so far as it prohibited a person who was detained from disclosing
even to the Court the grounds of his detention and
the representation made by him. It was said that
the right to move an appropriate Court for a writ
of habeas corpus and therein to show that the detention was improper, was undeniable and it was
held that s. 14, which stood in the way of this
right, was void .. No general proposition that the
Court must decide whether the person should be
detained or not was laid down in that case. The
law which allowed a subjective determination of
the executive was in fact, upheld, and there are
passages in the judgments of the majority to show
that a judicial trial in cases of preventive detention
was not considered necessary.
In State of Madras v. V. G. Row (2 ), ss. 15(2)(b} and 16 of the Indian Criminal Law Amendment
Act, 1908' [as amended by the Indian Criminal Law
Amendment (Madras) Act, 1950], were called in
question, inter alia, on the ground that thE:y em·
powered the State to declare associations illegal
by a notification without a provision for judicial
enquiry. It was held by this Court that the conferral of authority on the executive Government to
impose restrictions on the right of association without allowing the grounds of such imposition both
in their factual and fogal a8pects to be duly tested
in a judicial enquiry was a strong element to be
taken into account in judging the reasonableness of
the restriction. It was also added :
'f'fhe formula of subje'ctive satisfaction
of the Government or of its officers, with an
Advi8ory Board thrown into review the
materials on which the Government seeks to
override a basic freedom guaranteed to tht:
(I) [I950J s.c.R. as.
c21 f1952J s.c.R ..\97.
IU61
J 01eph KrrruvilJo
Vel lukunnel
v.
The Reserve .Btmk of .
Indio
H idayatul/a/i J,
66'1
J.JJtPh Iiuru'l'iJla
v,.uukrmntl
v.
Tiu R,s•oe, Bank of
l114i4
SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1962] SUPP.
citizen, mn.y br; i·iewed as reasonn.ble only m
very exceptional, circumstances ...... ".
Earlier, in the ~amc judgment it was said :
" ... the te~t of reasonableness, wherever
prescribed, should be applied to each indivi·
dual statute impugned, 1ind no abstract standard, or general pattern, of reasonableness
can be laid down as applicable to all cases."
V. G. Row·s case (l) shows that laws allowing subjective determination by the executive are not to
be struck down out of hand, but that their reasonableness must be judged according to the standards
appropriat-0 to the circumstances. It may, howe\·er, be meutioned that in V. G. Row r,ase ( 1) a
distinction was mado between a law requiring
J.nticipatory action particularly on grounds of
suspicion, and a law which authority action based
on the fai:tual exi8tence of curtain grounds. A. K.
Gopalan's rase 1') and Dr. N. B. Khare v. The
Stat.c of Ddhi (') wt,re distinguished on this narrow
ground which appears to havu bt,en conceded then
by thu learned Attorney General. The factual
existence of grounds-amenable to an objcetivo determination by the Court in the present case, namely
prcj11dice to t.he interests of the depositors was said
to place thi8 case within the rule in V. G. Row's
crtse (I). But cases of dntentinu and associations
declared unlawful are not in the same class as a
banking company on which then· is a run by the
depositors and whose affairs, on inspf•ction, aro
found to be mismanaged and conducted in such a
way that it is unable to pay all lawful demands
upon it. Tim factlml background will not be one
of suspicion, and action will be basl·d on concrete
facts, which will normally be checked and rechecked before the final decision, and, in our
opinion, it iR impossible to equate such a case with
either A. K. r:opalan\ case(') or V. G. Row's mse(').
(I)
[19521 SCR. 597.
(2) [1950) S.C.R.118.
(3) i 19501 S.C.R. 5l'l.
3 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
665
1962
The next case to which reference was made
KuruviU.
is Tkakur RagkulJir Singh v. The Cm;,rt of wards, J4se{lh.
Velluk;nml' ·
.4jrnb ('). In that case, s. 112 of the Agra Tenv.
•J
ancy and Land Records Act (42 of 1950) was The Rtse'vt.SCl!k
India- '
declared void. That section .allowed the Court
of Wards to take over the property of a landlord
under the Ajmer Government Wards Reg11lation
(l of 1888) if the landlord habitually infringed
the rights of tenants. Such a landlord was under
s. 112 deemed to be "disqualified to manage his
property." The reason for striking down the section was that it completely negatived the fundamental right under Art. 19(l)(f)by making the
enjoyment of the· right to depend .on the mere
discretion of the executive. The absence of any
provision which would enable the landlord held to
be a habitual infringer of the rights of his tenants,
to have recourse to a Civil Court to test the
correr.tness of the determination against him was
held to oreate the invalidity. It is t-0 be noticed
that the learned Attorney-General in that case
Mnceded the point, but the refl.son behind the
rule appears to be that the law there prescribed a
punishment or penalt,y for the bad behaviour of
the landlord, and no person should be punished
without having an opportunity to show cause.
The question, therefore, is, can the ruling be made
applicable ? It does not Jay down . any general
princiJlle applicable to all cases beyond the one we
have m;intioned. The action to wind up a banking
company cannot be S!bid to be a punishment for
mismanagement but action designed to presence
the rights of the depositors, and the two situations
are hardly similar.
The next two cases relied upon were The
. Commissioner, Hiru/,1t Religiaus Endowments, Madras
v. Sri Lakshmindra Ttrtha Swamiar of Sri Shirur
Mutt(') and Mahant Sri .Tagannath Ramanuj Das v.
TlUl Smte of OriBSa ('). Tn these case, it was
(I) (1953] s.a.R. 1049.
(2) [1954] S.C.R. HlO~' ·
{al [19MJ s.c.a. 1046.
,
666 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1962] SUPP.
conceded by the counsel for the State that certain
of the .Madras Religious and Charitable
Vrl/ukun"l.
Endowments Act ( xrx of 195 l) and of the Orissa
Tia, Rm;~,,B.,,k of, Hindu Religious En<lowm0nts Act, 1939 (as amen/•d..
<led in 1952), were ultm 1~ires Art<1. l!l(l)(f), 25 and
Hi<laJalu//ah J,
26 of the Constitution. This Court also found in
· · ' · the former caso that the provisions were extremely
drastio in their character and the worst feature
was that there was no access to Courts. The Act
in question was considered dra;itic because under it
a religious institution could he notified and taken
over and ve~ted in an executive officer merely by
stating that the Hoare] "was satisfied that in the
interests of proper nd!llinistration of the Math and
its endowments, the settlement of a scheme was
necessary.'' In the latter r~'lse, it was observed
as follows :
JD6Z
.Toreph K•ro~illo
. sections
"Sections 38 and 39 relate to the framing
of a scheme. A scheme can certainly be
settled to ensure due administration of the
endowed property but the objection seems to
be that the Act provides for the framing of
a scheme not by a civil court or under its
supervision but by a Commissioner who is
a more administrative or executive officer.
There is also no provision for a.ppeal againsts
his order to the court."
Aftor commenting upon the amendment of stth·s.
(4) of s. 39, which took away the right of suit and
made the order of the Commissioner final and conclusive, this Court concluded :
"We think that t,bc settling of a scheme
in regard to a religiolli! insti~ution by an
executive officer without the mtorvent1011 of
any judicial tribunal amounts to an unreasonable restriction upon the right of property of the superior of. the. reli~ious ins~itu
~jon whioh is blendeq with his off1oe. Seot1o~s
3S.c.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
667
1962
38 and 39 of the Act must, therefore,
be held to be invalid."
Josep/1 Kuruvilla
Ve/Jukunnel
These words would seem to show that the 'intervenv.
.
tion' of a 'judicial tribunal' is the sine qua non of reason- The Reserv1 Bank of
India
able determination of any issue. But these cases must
be read with the case reported iu Sri Sadasib Prakash
Hiday.i1ul1Qh J.
Brahmachari v. The St,ate of Orissa (1). After the
judgment of this Court in the case froin Orissa, the
Orissa Legislature passed Orissa Act XVII of 1954
purporting to amend not the Act of 1939 but Orissa
Act II of 1952 which had been passed but not
brought into force. The Orissa Act XVIII of 19.54.
on receiving the· assent of the President came into
force at once, and Act II of 1952 became amended
and modified. The 1952 Act was then brought into
force from January l, 1955, by a notification.
By the new Act, which provided for the same
subject-matter as the Act of 1939, the right of snit
still remained taken away, but a right of appeal
direct to the High Court was provided. It was contended again that the Act continued to be bad for
the reasons given in the earlier case of 1954. This
Court then observed :
"It is further urged that the initial decision
in a scheme-proceeding is still on the basis of
an executive enquiry by an executive officer
and that in any case a direct appeal
to the High Court as against the
. Commissioner's order cannot ·be as adequate
a safeguard regarding the .rights of Mahants,
as a suit and a right of' appeal therefrom in
the ordinary course to the higher courts would
be. It is undoubtedly true that from a litigant's point of view an appeal to the High
Court from the Commissioner's order is not
the saine as, an independent right of suit and
an appeal to the higher courts from the
reHult of that suit. But in order to jud~e
(l) [I956J s.c.R. 43.
668
__
_,lSU
...
Joseph Kururilla
Vtiluk111111el
Tk Rest'"' Bank of
l Mia
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1962] SUPP.
whether the provisions in the present Act oporate by way of unreasonable restriction for
constitutional purposes wh;it is to he seen is
whether the pnrson affected getH a reasonable
chance of presenting his <'ntir" case bPfore the
original tribunal which has to determine
judicially the questions raised and whether he
has a regular appeal to the ordinarily constituted t'Durt or courts to correct the errors, if
any, of the tribunal of first instance. For that
purpose it is relevant. to m'tice that in the
present Act, the Commissioner of Endowments
has, hy virtue of section 4 thereof. to be a
member of the Judicial Service (of the State)
not being below the rank of a ~ubordinate
,Judge, while undor section 7 of Act IV of 1939,
Commissioner of Endowment.s could be a person
of either the judicial or the executive servico
and that <'ven whBre a member of the judicial
service is appointee! he may be 1i person
below the ra11k of a Subordinate Judge. Another important difference has also to be
noticeu, viz., that while under section 38 of
the previous Act the enquiry has to be co11ducted •in such manner as may bo prescribed'
which means as preseribl'd by the Provinl'ial
Government bv rules made under the Act and
hence changea.ble by the Go\·crnment., under
the pres<mt Act, section ~ :2( 1)lb) specifically
enjoins that the 'Commissioner ohall hold
an enquiry in the manner prescribed and·so far
as may be in accordauce with the provisions
of the Code of Civil Prnccclure rebting to the
trial of suits",
This Court, therefore, held that the scheme framed
was not unrensonab le. At p. fi!l of the l{eport, a
summary of the· four steps which mado for rea 011l'blcness was given as follows :"( 1) The scheme is to be framed b;'
0
ii s.C.R.
sbi>ii:EM:E COURT REPORTS
669
llfJZ
a Commissioner, .who is, by appointment a
judicial officer.
Joseph ¥ uruttilla
(2) The· procedure is, as far as may
be, the same as that in the trial of suits.
The Reserve Bank of
India
There is a preliminary enquiry
by the Assistant Commissioner.
( il)
(4) There is an appeal to the High
Court."
·
. This was a departure·from the insistence on
the intervention of a judicial tribunal. It was considered enough if the person was a judicial officer
and the procedure was that of the trial of suits, as
laid down in the Civil Procedure Code. The Court
still went further when it dealt with the earlier
schemes which might have been framed by (a) an
executive officer and (b) in pursuance of procedure
prescribed by the Executive Government. The Court
said that "this was merely a theoretical possibility".
The absence of a preliminary enquiry in No. (3) was
not considered a serious point. The order of the
executive officer in No. (1) was held.not of importance, as the.Commissioner was a Subordinate Judge
of the Orissa Judicial Service. The question of
procedure (No: 2) was also not considered important, because the procedure prescribed by rules
resembled that of trial of suits. As regards the
right of appeal, s. 79A gave a right in all decided
cases, and that was considered enough; but whether
it was invoked or not in all cases does not appear
to have been ascertained.
·
It would appear from the'se three decisions
that the gist of reasonableness was held to be not
so much in the label of the officer as in a judicial
approach to the question to be decided according to a
procedure which gave an adequate hearing. That
the Commissioner was a judicial officer of the rank of
Volinkuitn.t
••
HidoyatuZlah J,
670 SUPRElIE COURT REPORTS [1962) SiJi>P.
19/HI
J oie/JA Kwutoilla
Villu.!wvu I
••
· .:- The Rt11rve Bank
of Indio
Hiioy1llvllah J.
a Subordinate Judge was considered enough for up·
holding his adion as reasonable. That every decision should be by the Court was thus not the proposition laid down. In fact, the case showH that it is
not the sine qw1 n<m so long as a person trained to
the task of deciding controversies does it according
to a procedure in which parties can be said to have
been heard fully.
We need not consider in detail the case of
Ebrahim Vazir ilfavat v. 'l'he State of Bombay ('1, in
which s. 7 of the Influx from Pakistan (Control)
Act, 1949, was held void. Section 7 authorised the
Central Government to remove from India, any
person "who has committed or against whom· a
reasonable suspicion exists that he has committed,
an offence under this Act •.. " In dealing with the
section, this Court said ;
" .. :... section 7 imposes the penalty of
removal uot only upon a conviction under
sectiC1n ii but goes further and brings about
the same result even where there is a reasonable suspicion entertained by the Central
Government that such an offence has been
committed. 'fhe question whether an offence
has been committed is left l'ntirely to the eubjective determination of Government."
'fhis Court pointed out that there was no opportunity to the offender to clear his conduct, and hold
that this was "uothiI!g short of a travesty of the
right of citizenship". The case is explainable on
the ground that au Indian citizen has a fundamental right to stay in India and if h" is to be removed for eommitting an offence or under suspicion
that he has committed an offence, the removal is a
penalty which cannot be inflicted without an opportunity to the offonder to clear his conduct. Aij pointed out by llll already, while dealing with Thalcur
Raghuhir Singh's case('), there is no question of a
(I)
[1954) S.C.R. 933.
(2)
[l9S3J S,C.R. 1049.
'
3 s.d.R.
·SuPREME COURT REPORTS
6~1
Ii>62
punishment here, and there is, in fact, a hearing,
though not before a Court. There is nothing in the Joieph'/Curuoil/o
· Vellukunnel
Influx from Pakistan (Control) Act to show that the
v.
opportunity to clear his conduct of the alleged Tlie•Reserve.Bank
India
offence must be by resort to the Court.
The appellant also relied upon K. T. Moopil · 1 Hid/Jyalultah J.
Nair v. State of Kerala (1), where a taxing statute
was struck down on the ground that it provided no
procedure for assessment of the tax, Abdul Hakim
v. State of Bihar'(') and State of Madhya Pradesh
v. Baldeo Prasad ('), but they do not deal with the
point now raised, and were decided on facts which
were entirely different. It will thus be seen that the
wide proposition; that every determination affecting
liberty, rights or property must always be made by
. a judicial tribunal and none else, does not find
support from the cases above considered. It is enough to say that the Reserve Bank in its dealings
with banking companies does not act on suspicion
but on proved facts. These facts are statutorily
required to be submitted to the Reserve Bank, and
the Reserve Bank further inspects the banking
companies. It licenses such banking companies· as
conduct their affairs in the interests of the depositors, and can withdraw the licence if they do not.
With such a statutory access to the affairs of a
banking company, there is sufficient guidance in the
words 'detrimental to the interests of the depositors'
to show to the Reserve Bank when and how the
power is to be exercised. Indeed, in this case itself,
the Reserve Bank has given an easily understand·
able view of the monetary position of the Palai
Bank. By comparing the total demand and time
liabilities of the Palai Bank with the liquid assets,
borrowing power aud realisable advances, the Reserve Bank has shown the inability of the Palai
Bank to meet lawful demands, and a state of affairs
is disclosed, which is certainly not beneficial to the
(I) [1961] 3 S.C.R. 77.
.
(3) [196111s.c.R.1910.
(2) [1961] 2 S.C.R, 610.
672 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1962] SUPP.
1962
J o,.plt K"""1illa
VdlaNlnrl
••
Tli1·R•s1tf11·Bo11k. of
liidi•
lribyolwlloh J.
interest of those unfortunate depositors, whose
money is still involved. Tho Ueserv-e Bank has not
y•it told ns all that it has found. It will all ho
found in the winding up proceedings. But this
seems certain that the action would not be taken
without scrutinising all the evidence and checking
and rechecking all the findings. It is impossible
to say that observations in tho cases discussod
above ean apply to the facts here.
The learned Attorney.-General, on the other
side, drew our attention to Virendra v. 1'he State of
Pm1jab (1), where it has boon pointed out that in
judiring the reasonableness of any· particular law
"the surrounding circumstances in which the impugned law came to be enacted, tlw underlying purpose
of the enactment and the extent and urgenoy of tho
evil sought to be remedied" must also be considerr.d. That case concerned the freedom of speech
and its alleged curtailment by the Punjab Special
Powers (Press) Act, 1956. In judging the reasonableness of the law from the angle o°f the exclusion
of Courts, this Court observed:
"Legislature had to ask itself the question : who will be the appropriate authority
to determine at any given point of time as to
whether the prevailing circumstances roquire
some restriction to be placed on the right to
freedom of speech and expression and the
right to cany on any occupation, trade or
bussiness and to what extent ? The answer
waa obvious, namely, that as the State Government was oharged with the preservation of
law an order in the State, as it alone was in
possession of all material facts it would be the
best authority to investigate the circumstances
and a88088 the urgency of the situation that
might arise and to make up its mind whether
any and, if so, what anticipatory action must
(I) [1958] S.C.R. 308.
'
I
. '
3 ·S.C.lt.
,.
)
'
.,
~\
.
·'
_'
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
673
b~ taken for the prevention of the threatened
or anticipated breach of the peace.
The•court
is wholly unsuited to gauge the seriousness of
the situation, for it cannot be in possession of
materiafa which are available· only to the
executive Government. Therefore, the determination of the time when and· the extent to
which restrictions should be imposed on the
Press· must of necessity be left to the· judg-'
ment and discretion of the State Government
and that is exactly what the legislature did
by passing the statute ... ; ..... Quick decision
and swift and effective action must be· of the
essence of these powers and the exercise of it
must, therefore, be left to the subjective
satisfaction
of the
Government...... To
make
the exercise of these
powers
justiciable and subject to the judicial scruti;
ny will defeat the very purpose of the enactment.'.'
These observations lay down clearly that there
may be occasions and situations in which the legislature may, with reason, think that the determination of an issue may be left to an expert executive
like the Reserve Bank ratheu than to Courts without
incurring the penalty of having the law declared
void. The law thus made is justified on the ground.
of expediency arising from the respective opportunities for action. Of course, the exclusion of Courts
is not lightly to be inferred nor lightly to be conceded. The reasonableness of such a law in the
total circumstances will, if challenged, have to be
made out to the ultimate satisfaction of this Court,
and it is only when this Court considers that it is
reasonable in the individual circumstance that the
law will be upheld.
In the present case, in view of the history of
the establishment of the Reserve Bank as a central
b~nk ~or;India, it~ position as a Banker's Bank, its
1962
JOseph Kuffl'l'illa
VellukuiiMI
v.
The ReserVe Ba•k
of India
Hidayatullah J.
674
1962
Jo#pla Kllf'tmU/a
YelMrmnel
v.
T/i, R,,....,. Bank
of IN/ia
Hldq, at•llah J.
SUPREME COuRT HEPORTS (1962] SUPP.
control over banking companies and banking in
India., its position as the issuing bank, its power to
license ba.nking companies and cancel their licences
and the numerous other powers, it is unanswerable
that between the Court and the Reserve Bank, the
momentous decision to wind up a tottering or un·
safe banking cow pa.ny in the inti)rests of the deposi ·
tors, may reasonably be left to the Reserve Bank. No
doubt, the Court can a)so, given the time, perform
this task. But the decision haA to be taken without delay, 11nd the Reserve Bank already knows
intimately the affairs of banking companies and has
had access to their books and accounts. If the
Court wore oallod upon to take immediate action,
it would almo~t always be guided by the opinion of
tho Reserve Bank. It would be impossible for the
Court to reach a conclusion unguided by the Re·
eerve Bank if immediate action was demanded.
But the law which gives the same position to the
opinion of the l~eeerve Bank is challenj?ed as
unreasonable. In our opinion, such a challenge
has no force. The situation that a.rose in this case
is typical of the occasions on which this extraordi·
nary power would normally be exercised, and, aA
we have said alrea.dy, if the power is abused by tho
Reserve Bank, what will ho struck down would be
the action of the Heserve Bank but not the law.
An appeal against the Reserve Bank's action or a.
provision for an ex post facw finding by the Court is
hardly necessary. An appeal to the Central Govern·
mcnt will be only an a.ppeid from Caesar to Caesar,
because th'e Reserve Bank would hardly act without
the concu.rrence of the Central Government and
the finding by the Court would mean, to borrow
the macabre phrase of Raman Nayar, J., a. postmortem examination of the corpse of the banking
company.
It io a matter of not a little interest that a.
procedure for winding up other banks and institu·
tions to the exclusion of the Companies Act is to be
•
..
'
'
3s.c.R.
~75
found in other statutes. The co-operative Societies, the State Financial Corporations, the State
Bank of lndia, the Industrial Finance Corporation,
the Life Insurance Corporation and finally, the
Reserve Bank itself are to be liquidated under
special laws to the excl~sion of the Companies Act,
under the statutes creatmg them.
In view of what we have said above, it is not
necessary to refer to American and Japanese precedents. However, if these laws are examined, they
show that even in the United States of America
and Japan, the closure of bai;iks an~ also their liquidation proceed_ from executive action. Under the
Banking Law of Japan( Law No. 21, March 30,1929),
Arts. 22, 23, 24 and 27 provide that the competent
Minister would decide such issues. Article 22 mey
be read in this connection :
"If the competent Minister finds it necesBa!iJ}'. so to do in view of the affairs of a bank
or the conditions of its property, he may order
it to suspend business, deposit property with
official depository, or issue any such order as
may be necessary." (Japanese Laws Rela·
ting to Banks·Eibun-Horei-Sha, Inc. Tokyo
Japan, p. VI (BA 4).
It is also interesting to note that Arts. 22 and 29 of
the Japanese Constitution guarantee to the people
the freedom to own property and choose occupa·
tions, much as has been done under our Constitution.
In the United States of America, Banks are
regarded as proper subject of legislative regulation
under the police power (Corpus Juris Secundum,
Vol. IX. paras 4 and 5, p. 32), and this power is
not subject to the limitations arising from the Fourteenth Amendment, except that it must be reasol).ably exercised. The Ba11-ks in the United States being
1962
Jostph KUruvil/a
Vellufr.uunet
v.
The Reserve Bank
of India
Hida_J·r,tullah J.
676 SUPREME CoURT REPoRTs [1962] SUPP.
•
1962
either National or State Banks, different laws have
Jouph Xutuflillo
been framed to deal with· the winding up of insolVellnkutmtl
Banks. In almost all the States statutes
•• Bank of vent
provide spacial proceedings for the 'affairs of
'I1I< Rmne
India
insolvent State Banks, and the National Bank Act
HiUJoJullaA J. · also makes special provision in respect of National
:fi'!'
Banks. The closing of the doors of a National
Bank by the Comptroller of Currency on account of
its insolvency and the appointment of a receiver do
not amount to a breach of the due process clause.
As stated in Corpus Juris Secundum, Vol. IX, para
419, p. 835 :
· "The courts have generally upheld the
validity of statutes providing for the liquidati'ltn of state banks, including tho control
• and administration .of the assets by state
officials or by receivers or liquidators appointed by them, the determination of the bank's
solvency, claims against the bank ... ".
The power is thus conferred on the Comptroller of Currency by the l'iational Bank Act and
by the State law upon the superintendents of Bauks.
Under somo statutes of the States, banking officials
have no power to liquidate iusolvent Banks independently of the judiciary. But in others, this
power is specifically conferred. These propositions
were cited to us from American Jurisprudence
Vol. 7, Vols. IX, XIII and XVIA of Corpus Juris
Socundum and from tho Law Reports, particularly
Title Guaranty and S·urety Co. v. Idaho Ex Rel.
Allen ('), Bushnell v. Leland (), Ex parte. Chetwood (') and some others.
Mr. Nambiar, however, joined issue on the ueo
of the American precedents on the grounds that
banking in Amcr~ca is. by gra?o. of legisl~ture, and
is either a francb1so or a pr1v1legc, which has no
place in our Constitution. He added that the
'
. (l)(l!ll6l240)'C.S.130:60L. cd.!'166.
(2) (1697 16' U.S. 684, 41L.ed.598.
(3) (1897) lfS U.S.443,41L. ed. 782.
a s.c.R.
-
677
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1962
•
carrying on of business is not one of the provisions
of the American Bill of Rights, nor a fundamental . J ..eph Kld'uvill•
Vellukunne/
right, as we understand it, though by judicial con•• Bank
struction the individual right has been brought The Reseroe
of India
within the Fourteenth Amendment. He, therefore,
contended that American cases and American laws
Hidayatu/lab I.
should not be used. In our opinion, no useful
purpose will be served by trying to establish the
similarities or discrepancies between the American
Constitution and b:tnking laws, on the one hand,
and our Constitution and our banking laws, on
the other, and we do not wish to rest our decision
on the American and Japanese analogies.
We do not also agree that the impugned section amounts to an encroachment on the judicial power by the legislature. The statute book
is full of instances in which the Courts of Civil
Judicature guide themselves by the decision of an
outside agency.. The Arbikation Act itself affords
a readily available instance. Under that Act the
Court passes its.decree on an award of almost any
one the parties may choose. Nor is the posibility
ofa mistake by the Reserve Bank of such vital
consequence. If the Reserve Bank acts in good
fa.ith and with circumspection, there is as· 'much or
as little chance of error as before a Court of law.
Lastly, we do not think that this was a case in
whi~h some lesser acti?n like moratorium or amalgamat10n or reconstruct10n would have been feasible
The difficulty of the Palai Bank was the nature of it~
advances, which were either not recoverable or not
easily recoverable. A moratorium v. ith the limitation
of ~ime involved in it would not have been an adequate mPasure, and amalgamation and reconstruction
were out of question at the stage which had been
reached.
We are thus satisfied that ss. 38(1) and
(3)(b )(iii) of the Banking Companies Act
. are neither
.. '
-
-
678 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1962] SUPP.
1962
Joseph Kur""iUa
Vtllukunnel
v.
Tiit R1sttVt Bank of
Indio
Hido)"aJull o/a J.
discriminatory nor unreasonable, and cannot be
declared void und11r Arts. 14 and 19 of the Constitution. Since the provisions are manifestly in
the public interest, they cannot also be declared
ultra vires under Art. 30 I, because they are protec.
ted by Art. 30l of the Constitution.
The appeal and the petition thus fail, and
arc dismissed with costs one set only.
Kt1pur .!.
KAruR, J.-Thc facts of this•case have been set.
out in the judgment of our learned brother Hidayatullah, J., and it is not necessary to restate
them.
The main question for decision is whether the
provisions of s. 38(3)(b)(iii) of the Banking Companies Act (Act X of 1948) are 1dtm vires of the
Constitution as being unreasonable restriction
which infringe the petitioners' right under Art. 14
and Art. 19 ( l)(f) and (g) of the Constitution.
Under s. 38(3)(b)(iii) of the Banking Companies Act
the winding up petition was filed •by the Reserve
Bank of India against the Palai Bank Ltd., in the
Kerala High Court on August 8, 1960. On the same day
an application for the appointment of a Provisional
Liquidator was also made and a Provisional Liquidator was appointed. On behalf of the Directors
an objection was taken in the High Court that
s. 38(3) (b) (iii) was invalid and unconstitutio1ml
because it contravenes Arts. 14 and 19 of the Constitution and that the petition was mala fide.
After the appointment of the liquidator four
scheme of arrangement under s. 44B of the .Banking Companies Act were presented to the Court. On
October 6, 1960, the Court ordered the Reserve
Bank to examine the work ability and effinaey of
the schemes. l'he Reservo Bank of India filed its
report on October 22, l!lGO, to the effect that prim.£1
f acie the schemes wer<i not workable. Th" order
3 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
679
of winding up was then passed on December 5,
1960. The plea of mala fides was not pressed and
the High Court held that there was no infringement
of the petitioners' right under Arts. 14 and 19. The
Court also held that although according to the
language used in the impugned provision the
Reserve Bank of India need not have disclosed the
material on which it arrived at the conclusion that
the continuance of the Palai Bank was prejudicial
to the interest of the depositors, it had chosen to
place all the materials before the Court which
showed that ever since 1952 the Reserve Bank of
India was drawing the attention of the Palai Bank
to the grave defects in its working and had given
it opportunities to explain the defects or to remedy
them. The Palai Bank chose to do neither and
"the Reserve Bank far from having acted without
material or in a hasty and ill-considered manner,
had, doubtless alive to grave responsibility placed
upon it to preserve the banking structure of the
country, acted with a degree of care and circumspection which has drawn to it adverse criticism from
those who do not share its responsibility. Faced
with the run it would.have failed in its duty by the
depositors had it not acted as it did."
.
-
The history of the Banking Companies Act
and how it came to be enacted is this. The Government of India appointed the Indian Central Banking Enquiry Committee which made its report on
June 2, 1931. In para. 674 it. pointed out the
principal causes of failures of Banks. By Act
2 of 1936 Part XA was introduced into
the Indian Companies Act of 1913 and that part
dealt with B1tnking Companies but no separate and
special provision was made for the winding up of
banking co.mpanies. ' In 1934 the Reserve Bank
of India Act (Act JI of 1934) was enacted. There
were minor amendments in the Indian Companies
Act in regard to Banking Companies by Acts 2l
1962
Joseph Kurnvilla
Velluktmnel
••
The Reserve Bank
of India
Kapur J,
680 SUPREME OOURT REPORTS [196~] SUPP.
1962
J osqh Eur..,illa
Vrlluk.,,,,,I
••
Th~ Rtse•vt Btmk oj
. l•dia
Kapur J.
?f 1942 and 4 of 1944.
On January I 5, 194.6 Bank·
mg Companies Ordinance (4 of l!J46) was promulgated which enabled the Central Government to
direct the lfoservo Bank to cause inspection to be
made of any hanking company and its books
and accounts. It empowered the Central. Government, on the receipt of a report that the affairs of
a banking comp11ny were being conducted· to the
detriment of the interest of the depositors, to
prohibit the banking company from receiving fresh
deposits or to refuse it to be placed in the schedule
of the Reserve Bank of India Act or to de-schedule
it. On March IO, 1949, tho Banking Companies Act
(Act X of Hl49) was passed. On December 31,
1952, the Banks' Liquidation Proceedings Committee of 1952 mado its report. According to that
report the number of bank which. suspended payments during the year l!l26 to 1952 was 351. The
total liabilitieR of these banks wi:re Hs. 96·86 lakhs.
Of these banks 12:~ were in Travancore-Cochin
which were the most numerous. Then it was stated
how many banks. failed during different periods
and it was pointed out that the slow progress of
liquidation proceedings was due to the facts that
the advances w~ro mostly unsecured and recovery
involved litigation, so much so that thore were
not enough ·funds to take logal proceedings ;
many claims were barred by limitation : contribut-0ries could not be traced and the unpaid capit&l
could not be recovered. In cases of small 'banks
advances were small and legal expenses for realisation were ont of proportion to the amounts involved and the claims had therefore to be given
up and the Directors invariably delayed the submission of their statements under s. 177A of tho
· Companies Act and this hampered the progress of
the liquidation proceedings. The Ba.nking C?mpanies Act wa<i then amended from time to time
and b~' s. 26 of Act ~3 of 195!) the present s. 38
3 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURtT :kEPORTS 681
providing for winding up was substituted in·place
of the old. s. 38.
In order to determine the constitutionality of
the impugned provision it will be helpful to examine
the scheme of the Reserve Bank of India Act and
of the Banking Companies Act. The preamble of
·the Reserve Bank of India Act is that it has been
constituted with a view to ensure monetary stability
in India and to operate the currency and. credit
system of the country. By s.3 'the Reserve Bank
has been established for the purpose of taking over
the management of the currency from the Central
Government and of carrying on the business of
banking in accordance with the provisions of the
Reserve Bank Act. Section 7 deals with management and it gives to the Central Government,the
power to give such directions to the Bank after· consultation with the Governor of the Bank which are
considered necessary in the public interest. The
Central Board. of the Bank is constituted under s. 8
and it consists of the Governor four Directors
nominated by the Central Government from amongst the local Boards, six Directors nominated by
the Central Government and one Government official to be nominated by the Central Government.
In other words all the Directors are nominees of
the Central Government. By s. 11 the Central
Government has the power of removing the Gover·
nor or any Director and casual vacancies are also. to
be filled by the Central Government under s. 1!.
Section 17 de'lls with the business which the. bank
may transact and Chapter III relates to Central
banking functions. Under s. 30 the Central Go.vern.
ment has the power to supersede the Central Board
·and to entrust it to such agency as it may determine.
It will thus be seen that the Reserve Bank is an
institution established for the purpose of carrying
011 central banking functions and its management
is entirely in the hands of the Central Government
· or·itsonominees;·
· · ·
1962
Joseph Kuruvilla
Vel/ukunrul
v.
The Reserve Bank
of·,l~~ia
Kopur J.
682 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1962] SUPP.
/962
J o~tpla /(111uvilla
V1llukunntl
v.
7'/ie lltstrt11 Banlc
India
IropurJ,
Section 2 of the Banking Companies Act provides that the provisions of that Act are in addition
to and not, unless expressly so prodded, in derogation of the Companies Act., Hi5tl, and any other law
for the time being in force. Section 4 gives the
Central Government the power to suspend the
operation of the Act on the representation of tho
Reserve Bank. Section 5 is the iuterpretation
clause. Part H deals with '·Business of the Banking Companies". Section 11 in that Pa7t deals with
requirement as tu minimum paid up Capital and
reserve of banking companies. Section 22 empowers
the Reserve Bank to give licences to banking companies, and prohibits the carrying on of hanking
b1JSiuess without a licence issued by thu H~sorve
BAnk which may be issued subject to &uch conditions
as thP Reserve Bank thinks fit. Every hanking
company in existence at the commencement of this
Act had to upply for surh 11 licence .within six
months of the c·ommcncement of the Act and every
other company had to apply before commencing
hanking business but com panics which were in
existence could continue t.heir hanking business
until the licence was granted or it was rc61serl. Hut
it could not be refused before the expiry of threo
ye1us refcrn~d to in sub-s. (I) of"· 11 Sub-section (:l)
of that section entitles th(l Hesen-o Bank to inspect
hooks of the Banking company to satisfy itself in
regard to matters contained in that sub-section.
Undor sub:s. · (4) the Reserve Bank can c~ncel :i
licence granted to a banking company provided that
before cancelling the licence it gives an opportunity
to tho Banking Company to show cause why its
licence should not ho cancelled. U!Hlor sub-s. (ii)
auy banking company av.urieved by the order of
I.be Reserve Bauk cancelling its lic·mr.u can appen.l
to the CenLrnl Government whnsc de,,i,ion is final.
Cnder s. 24 every banking company bas to
maintain a percentage of its asi;ets iu cash, gold or
3 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
683
unencumbered approved securities and an amount
which is not less than 20% of the total of its time
and demand liabilities and return to that has to be
furnished periodically to the Re$erve Bank. Section
25 deals with assets of every banking company in
India, s.27 with the making of monthly returns by
the banking companies to the Reserve Bank and
s. 30 with audit. The Reserve Bank under s. 35
may at any time and on being directed by the Central Government shall cause an inspection to be
made of any banking company. Sub-section (4) of
that seetion reads:"The Reserve Bank shall, if it has been
directed by the Central Government to cause
inspection to be made, and may, in any other
case report to the Central Government on any
inspection made under this section, and the
Central Government, if it is of opinion after
considering
the report that the affairs
of
the
banking Company are being
to
the
detriment of the
conducted
interests of its depositors may, after giving
such opportunity to the banking company to
make a representation in connection with the
report as, in the opinion of the Central
Government, seems reasonable by order in
writing.
(a) prohibit the banking company
from receiving fresh deposits;
(b) direct the Reserve Bank to apply
under section 38 for the winding up of
the banking company:
Provided that the Central Government
may defer, for such period as it may think fit,
the passing of an order under this sub-section,
or cancel or modify any such order, upon
such terms and conditions as it may think fit
to impose."
'
1962
· Joseph Kuruvill"
Ve/Julcunnel
v.
The Re1erve Bank o
·
India
Kapur .J.
684· SUPhEME COURT REPORTS (!962] SUPP.
1&111
.lostph Knnwillo
Under s. 35A power is given to the Reserve Bank to
give directions. When quoted it reads:
Y1Jlulcun111l
Y.
-ht BtstTOt BaU of
lrtJia
Kapur J,
S. 3:iA( I) "Where the Hoserve Bank is
~atisfied that-
(a) in tha public interest; or
(b) to prevent the affairs of any
banking company being conducted in a
manner detrimental to the inkrests of
the depositors or in a manner prejudicial
to the interests of tho banking company;
or
(c) to secure the proper management
of any banking company generally;
it is necessary to issue directions to banking
companies generally or to any banking company in particular, it may, from time to time
issue such din·ctiom as it deems fit., and the
banking companirs or tho banking company,
as tho case may be, shall be bound to comply
with such directions.
(2) The RcHerve Hank m>iy on representation nmde to it or on its own motion, modify
or cancel any direction issm'd under subsection(!) and in so modifying or cancelling
any direction may imposo such conditions as
it thinks fit,.subj.,ct to which th" modification
or canccllntion shall ha\'C offec·t."
Section 36 defines further powern and functions of
the Reservo Ua.nk. It has power t.o caution or to
prohibit a banking company from entering into any
particular transact,ion or class of tran8aetions, to
assist any proposal for amalgllmation of compani<lS,
to give loans to banking companies, to requirn banking companies ~o <'all a meeting of the directors for
the purpose bf considering a.ny mat tcr re la ting to
or arising out of tho affairs ot the banking company
.
'
3 s.c.R. sbi>REME cotJRT REPORTS
.685.
to depute one or more of its officers, to watch proceedings at any meeting of the board of directors,
to appoint one or more of its officers to observe the
manner in which the affairs of the banking company
are conducted or to require the banking company to
make such changes in the management as Reserve
bank may consider necessary.
Part III deals with suspension of business and
winding up of banking companies. Section 37 provides that on the application of a banking company
the High Court may stay commencement or continuance of all actions against a banking company
and may impose a moratorium; but the application
is not maintainable unless it is accompanied by a
report of the Reserve Bank indicating that in the
opinion of tbe Reserve Bank the banking company will be able to pay its debts if the application
is granted, provided that the High Court may for
sufficient reason grant relief under this section even
if the application is not accompanied by such report.
In that case the High Court shall call for a report
from t~ Reserve Bank on the affairs of the
banking company and pass such order as may
be proper in the circumstances. Under sub-section
3 the High Court can appoint a special offi\ler to
take into custody or control all assets, boo)l:s
and documents of the banking company and shall
exercise such other powers as it thinks fit having
regard to the interests of the depositors of the
banking company. Under sub-s. 4 if the Reserve
Bank is satisfied that a banking company in
respect of which an order has been so made
conducts its affairs in a manner detrimental to the
interests of its depositors it can make an application
to the High Court for the winding up of the company and where such an application is made the
High Court shall not make" any order extending the
1962
J01eph KuYuvilla.
Vel/ukwmel
' v.
The Reserve Bank
of India
KapurJ.
686 SUPREME COURT REPoRTS [1962] SUPP.
1962
Jost~h KuruVilla
Yellukunntl ·
v.
•e !l,snce Bank of
Indio
Kapw J.
period. The impugned provision of section 38
which deals with winding up reads : S. 38 (l) "Notwithstanding anything
contained in section 391, section 392, Rection
433 and section 583 of tho Companies Act,
1956 but without prejudice tu its powers under
sub· sect ion ( l) of section 3i of this Act the
High Court shall order the winding up of a
banking company (a) if the banking company is unable
to pay its debts ; or
(b) if an application for its winding
up has been made by the Reserve Rank
under section 37 or this section.
(2) The Heserve Rank shall make an
application under this section for tho winding
up of a banking company if it is directed so
to do by an order under clause (b) of sub· sec.
tion (4) of section 35.
(3) The Reserve Bank may ~ke an
application under this section for the winding
up of a banking company (a) if the banking company -
(i) has failed to comply with
the requirC>ments specified in section
11 ; or
(ii) has by reason of the provisions of section 22 become disentitled tt> carry on banking business "in
India; or
(iii) has been prohibited from
receiving fresh deposits by an order
under clause (1) of sub-section (4)
of section 35 or under clause (b) of
sub-section :l(A) of section 42 of the
Heserve Bank of India Aot, I 934 or;
Ii
3 S.C.R.
SUPRME COURT REPJRTS
(iv) having failed to comply
with any requirement of this Act
other than the requirements laid down
in section 11, has continued such
failure, or having contravened any
provision of this Act has continued
such contravention beyond such period
or periods as may be specified in that
behalf by the Reserve Bank from time
to time after notice in writing of such
failure or contravention has been con·
veyed to the banking company ; or
(b) if in the opinion of the Reserve
Bank(i) a compromise or arrange·
ment sanctioned by a Court in res·
pect of the banking company cannot
be worked satisfactorily with or with·
out modifications ;or
. (ii) the returns, statements or
information furnished to it under or
in pursuance of the provisions of this
Act disclose that the banking com·
pany is unable. to pay its debts ; or
(iii) the continuance of the
banking company is prejudicial to the
interests of its depositors.
(4) Without prejudice to the provisions
contained in section 434 of the Companies Act
1956, a banking company shall be deemed to
be unable to pay its debts if it has refused to
meet any lawful demand made at any of its
offices or branches within two working days
if such demand is made at a place where there
is an office, branch or agency of the Reserve
Bank or within five working days, if such
demand is made elsewhere, and if the Reserve
1902
Jos'e/ih K'U1'Uvilla
Vellukunrul
..
The Reserve Bank ·'
of lndfr;
Kapur J,
•
••
~
,
.
'
,
688 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1962] SGPP.
1961
Jouph Kurutilla·.
Vtllu.lww I
v.
Tiu R~,,lit Bank:.
nj India
Bank certifies in writing that the banking
company is unable to pay its debts.
(5) A copy of every application made
by the Reserve Bank under su b-suotion (l)
shall be sent by the Iteserve Bank to the
registrar."
Section 44A lays down the procedure for amalgamation of banking com panics and s. 44 B for restriction on tho powers of the High Court to sanction
compromise or arrangement between a banking
company and its creditors unless compromise or
arrangement is certified by the H.escrve Bank as
being capable of being worked as not being detrimental to the interest of tho depositors. Section
45 giv1~s to the Reserve Bank the power to apply to
the Central Government for an order of moratorium
in respect of banking company which the Central
Government may order and it also gives to the
Reserve Bank the power to· prepare a scheme for
reconstitution or amalgamation. Sub-section (I) and
(2) of s. 45 are as follows :S. 45( I) "Notwithstauding anything contained in the forngoing provisions of this Part
or in any other law or any agreement or other
instrument for the time being in force, where
it apprars to the Hcserve Bank that there is
good reason so to do the Reserve Bank may
apply to the Central Government for an order
of moratorium in respect of a banking com·
pany.
(2) The Central Government, after consider~ng tho application made by tho Reserve
Bank under sub-section (I) may make an order
of moiatorium staying the commencement or
eontinuance of all action and proceedings
against the company., for a fixed period of
time on such terms and conditions as it think
fit and proper' and may from .time to time
3 S.C.R.
sbPR~ME COURT REPORTS
6s9
extend the period so however that the total
period of moratorium shall not exceed six
months."
It will thus be seen that the Banking Companies
Act gives very extensive powers to the Reserve
Bank in regard to hanking companies. It gives to
the Reserve Bank the power to license existing
banking companies or the banking companies, which
want to commence business, and for that purpose it
can inspect the books of the banking company in
order to determine whether it is or will be able to
p11.y its depositors. It can cancel a licence in certain circumstances but after giving to the hanking
company, an opportunity to be heard. A banking
companies is required to keep a portion of its assets
in a liquid form the Reserve Bank can order inspection of any banking company at any time it thinks
proper and Central Government can order the
Reserve Bank to make an inspection of any banking
company and on that report drastic steps against
the <:>ompany may follow. The Reserve Bank
can give directions as to how the business of a
banking company shall be conducted. It can appoint
observers and give directions to the directors of a
banking company as to what they should do or should
not do. Moratorium can be imposed by the High
Court at the instance of a banking company but
the Reserve Bank may have that order varied and
set aside if the order is not in the interest of the
depositors and if the Reserve Bank thinks that
the continuance of a banking company is not in the
interest of the depositors it may apply to the High
Court for winding up of the banking company. In
regard to amalgamation of banking companies
through scheme of compromise and arrangement
the Reserve Bank has a great deal of control and
power. The Reserve Bank may apply to the
Government to impose a moratorium on any banking company and if an application is so made the
1962
Joseph Kuruvilla
VellukUnn•I
••
The Reserve Battle
Of india
!fopur J.
690
19~2
Jos1ph Kurouil a
Vellulrunntl
••
Tiu H1sert>e Bartk
o/ l•tUa
Ka/I"' J.
SUPREMR CotJRT REroRTs [1962] SUPP.
Covernment may make such an order. But who.it comes to winding up prnvisions tho Reserve Ban'.
has pre·cmptory powers, in that if it applies fm·
the winding up of a banking company the Court
is bound to order winding up because the words
used are "the High Court shall" order the winding
up. Moreover the Government can direct the
Reserve Bank to make such an application so that the
Executive Government can take any banking company into liquidation. The power given in su'b-s.
(3}(b}(iii) of s. 38 is still more drastic because if the
Heserve Bank is of the opinion that the continuance
of a banking company is prejudicial to the interest
of tho depositors it may apply for winding· up; in
other words on its subjective satisfaction it
may apply and if it docs so the High Court has no
option but to order the winding up it is t.his
provision to which strong objection has been
taken by the appellant and is assailed by him.
This provision was sought to be supported on
behalf of the Iteserve Bank by tho learned Attorney-General· who first drew our attention to the
facts of the present case and to the various opportunities which were given to the Palai Bank since 1952 to
carry out certain directions and on different occasions the Palai Bank had made representations an<l
its Directors ha<l interviewed the officers of the
Reserve Bank and had given explanations till
ultimately on July 21, UJ60, the Roserve Bank
called upon thl• Palai Bank to carry out
certain directions which were onclosc<l with the
letter. The Reserve Bank there wrote as follows :
"The bank should therefore, in the interest of its depositors remedy within a period
of 12 months the features observed in its
working."
It was also stated therein that if the l'alai Bank
desired to make any ropre~entfltion in r1,gard to
contents of the iuspection report it could 1aake its
3s.c.:k.
SUPREME
COURT REPoRTS G9i
representation within 30 days of the receipt of the
letter and the complaint of the appellant is that
before these thirty days were over winding up application was made on August 8. 1960, which the Re.
serve Bank submits was for very good reasons, the
protection of the interest of the depositors.
The test of reasonableness has to be applied to
each individual statute and no abstract standard or
general pattern can be laid down which will be
applicable to all cases: l'atanjali Sastri, C.J., in
State of Madras v. V. G. Row (I) observed:
1
"The formula of subjective satisfactfon of
the Government or of its officers, which an
advisory Board thrown in to rev,iew the materials on which the Government seeks to override a basic freedom guaranteed to the citizen,
may be viewed as reasonable only in very
exceptional circumstances and within the narrowest limits, and cannot receive judicial approval as a general pattern of reasonable restrictions on fundamental rights."
See also Abdul Hakim v. State of Bihar (') Although
the legislature is the best judge of what is good for
the community ; State of Bihar v. Kameshwar Singh(')
the ultimate
responsibility for determining
the validity of the law must. rest with the Court and
the Court must not shirk that final duty cast on it
by the Constitution. Abdul Halcim's case (2 ).
It was submitted by the learned Attorney-General that ( 1) reasonableness of the impugned legislation has to be judged in its own setting and not on
any abstract test and (2) that the absence of judicial scrutiny is not an inviolable rule. It can be
dispensed within certain circumstances as being
unsuitable or defeating the purpose for which an
.1\ ct is passed. In support of the former he relied
upon the observations of Patanjali Sastri, C. J., in
(!) [1952) S.C.R. 597,607,603.
<2) [1961) 2 S.C.R. 610.
(3) [1952) S.C.R. 88~.
1962
Joseph ·Kuruvilla
Vellukunnel
v.
The R eseroe Bank
of India
---·
Kapur J.
g92
J9GJ
Joseph KutUViUa
Vtll1J;•mtttl
v.
Tht Rt.J1"" Bont
•! l•dia
KapurJ.
SUPREME OOURT REPORTs [1962] SUPP.
SfAJIR, of Madras v. V. G. Row (1) where the learned
Chief Justice observed :
'•The nature of the right alleged to havo been
infringed, the underlying purpose of the restrictions imposed, the extent and urgency of
the evil sought to be remedied thereby, the
disproportion of the imposition, the prevailing conditions at the time, should all enter
into the judicial verdict."
and also to the following observation at p. 608 :
"As pointed out by Kania, C. J., at
p. 121 quoting Lord Finlay in Re:.c v.
Halliday (1917) A. C. 260, 269. the court was
the least appropriate tribunal to investigate
into circumstances of suspicion on which such
anticipatory action must be largely based."
But in that very case tho learned Chief Justice
pointed out that the formula of subjective satisfaction of the Government with an Advisory Board
thrown in to review the materials on which the
Government seeks to override a basic guaranteed
freedom can be viewed as reasonable only in vory
exceptional circumstances and within the narrowest
limits and cannot receive judicial approval as a
general pattern of reaaonablo restriction. In that
caae the court did not find any reasonableness in
the claim of the Government to shut out judicial
enquiry into the underlying facts.
In support of the second submission reference
was made to Virendra v. 'l'he Slaw of Punjab (')
whore the constitutional validity of a Puujab
Act which prohibited the publication by the
Editor and Printer of any matter relatin11 to tho
"Save Hindi" agitation was challenged. 'The question raisod there was, are the restrictions imposed
ilJ [1952J s.c.R .• 597, G07, b08.
(2) [1958] S.C.R. 308.
3 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
693
reasonable in view of all the surrounding circumstances. In other words were they reasonably necessary in the interest of public order under Art. 19(2)
or in the interest of general public under Art. 19(6).
Das, C.J., there observed that the legislature had
to ask itself the question as to who would be the
proper authority to determine at any given time as
to whether the prevailing circumstances required
some restrictions on the right to freedom of speech
and expression and the answer was obvious that
the State Government was charged with the preservation of law and order ; it alone had in possession
all the material facts and it would be the best
authority, to investigate the circumstances and
assess the urgency of the situation and make up
its minde as to what anticipatory action must be
taken for prevention of the threatened or anticipated breach of peace :
"The court is wholly unsuited to gauge
the seriousness of the situation, for it cannot
be in possession of material which are available only to the executive Government. Therefore, the determination of the time when
and the extent to which restrictions should be
imposed on the Press must of necessity be
left to the judgment and discretion of the
State Government and that is exactly what
the Legislature did by passing the statute."
This passage from the judgment of Das, C.J., and
the passa~e fron the judgment of Patanjali Sastri,
C.J., in State of Madras v. V.G. Row (1) where reference was made to the observations of Kania, C.J..
were strongly relied upon by the Attorney-General
in support of his contention that the power given
to the Reserve Bank in regard to winding up and
the mandatory provision for the order for winding
up by the court were reasonable restrictions; because
the judge of the urgency and of the measures to meet
the urgency could be the Reserve Bank or t~e ooilrti
11) (19521 s.c.R. 597~ 607~ ~oa.
1968
Joseph .Eunroilla
V.flukunnel
••
The Reserve Bank
of India
KapurJ.
694 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1962] SUPP.
1962
Joseph Ku,,1oilla
Vtl lukunnel
v.
:r .i, Rejt''' Bank
of lndii
Ka/iur .f.
and the legislature had rightly given the power to
the Jteserve Bank, because it was in possession of all
the materi11.I facts and was the best authority to
invest.igate the circumotances and assess the urgen·
cy of the situation. The analogy between Virendm's
case(') and the present case is, in our oi;inion, wholly
in apt. In Virendra's case(') there was an agitation
by a section of the Punjab public which Wfll! likely
to have serious consequences on the public order
and the tranquility of the state. It required quick
measures to rontrol it. The order wa.s to meet an emergency, the order could at the most remain applieaMe for two months and tli ere was a provision for
making a reprosontation to the Government. In
the ca.so of a banking company, assuming that an
urgency like that which exi"ted in Virendra's case(')
arioes and a propor caso is made out tho Court will
act with promptitude make such interim orders as
the facts of the case may require e.g. the appointment of a provisional liquidator. Thoro is omi
esHential difforence between V. G. Row's ca.!€{') and
Virendm's case (')and the one before us. In the
former two cases executive action of State Government \vas challenged. The Court there had not to
give a judicial vordict in accordance with the
opinions of the exeeutivo but had to determine tho
constitutionality of action already t.1.kcn. It did
not pass an order, judgment or decrco in acc:ordanco
with the subjective determination of the Executive
but expressed the opinion that in the circumstances
there was no infringement of constitutional rights.
In the presont case the Court is debarred from
deciding the adequacy of tho actb of mismanagemen't and the parlous state of it8 finances alleged
against the Palai Hank. Besides tho complaint before
us is not that tho Reserve Bank should not have
filed an application hut that tho court could not
order liquidation till after it had heard the Palai
(I) t19l8] s.c.R. JOS.
(2) [l9l2:S.CR. 597, 607,GOB.
~ S.C.R.
SUPREME UOURT REPORTS
695
Bank in its defenoe and had afforded it an opportunity of meeting the allegations in the winding up
petition. In other words a law which authorises a
banking company to be condemned unheard merely
on the subjective satisfaction of one of the suitors
even though it was the Reserve Bank is unconsti.
tutional.
It was next contended that the provision of
s.38 of the Banking Companies Act were not so
unusual and that in other countries in similar circumstances much wider powers had been given in
regard to the winding up of banking companies.
Reference was made to the National Bank Act in.
the United States Code, s.191 of which deals with
general grounds for appointment of receivers. It
provides inter alia that whenever the Comptroller
snail be satisfied of the insolvency of a national .
banking association, he may, after due examination
of its affairs appoint a receiver who shall proceed
to close up suoh association and enforce the personal
liability of the shareholder. It also empowers the
Comptrol~er to appoint
receivers for insolvent
national banks and to make rateable assessments
upon the stookholders but do not vest judicial power
in him in violation.of the Constitution. The power
·of the Comptroller is exolusive and not subject to
review of all matters properly within his discretion.
A national bank in America is a banking corporation organised by private persons and operated for
private gain, the power and duties of which are defin.
ed and limited by Acts of Congress, providing for
creation and liquidation of such institutions and being established to aid or promote governmental purpose and to provio0 national cul'rency they are often
regarded as public or quasi-public institutions.
Reference was next made to 92 American
L.R, (Annotated), pp.1257-58, which deals with the
constitutionalit,Y of the power given under tqe
1961
Joseph Kuruvill4
VeUukunnel
v.
The Res11ve Bank
of India
Kapur J.
696 SUPREME OOURT REPOR~ [1962] SUPP·
1962
Josep1; K"wu11illa
YtlJukunMl
v.
Th• Ruerre Bank
' of lndia
K"'PUT J.
statute conferring authority upon the Ba.nk Commissioner to wind up the affairs of the Bank. It is
there stated that the fact of insolvency having
been discovered t.he statute directs the Bank Commissioner's course and the designation by him of a
person to wind up the affairs of tho Bank which is
no more a judicial a.ct than his ord'3r to the Board
of Directors to remove a dishonest cashier. "His
powers are purely administrative, and in no way
infringe upon the ancient authority of courts dotermine ri!lhts of porson a.nd property in specific controversies pending before them."
Hoference was also made to Corpus Juris
Secundum, Vol. IX, p.844, para 425, whore it is
stated tha.t under some statutes banking officials
liquidating a Bank are not subject to the directions
of a court.
Again reference was made to Corpus Juris
Seeundum, Vol. l6A, pp.1219-1220, para. 711,
where similar statement is made in regard to the
same statutes. But the following passage from
that paragraph is significant:
•'Legislation is in contravention of the
guaranty where it takes away one's property
and leaves him no remedy whatever by which
he can regain it or obtain redress.''
In Corpus Juris Secundum, Vol. 16, p.506,
para. I 17, it is stated that appointment of a
receiY.er, in certain instances, does not porforce
violate constitutional provisions with. regard to
separation of legislative and judicial powers. So
the appointment of a receivor hv the legislature to
settle the affairs of an insolvent bank has been held
not to be a judicial act but where the came is properly before a court the appointment of a receiver
const.itut~s a judicial function witho-qt the scope of
legislative control.
·
3 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
697
1962
It was then submitted that in America closing the
doors of a bank without awaiting court's orders is
Joseph K'uruDil/a
Vel/t1kunn
not. a violation of due process of law. See Title
v.
Guaranty & Surety Company of Scranwn v. State of Th,. Re.'trve Bank of
Inditt
Idaho(') where it was held that the State's power to
put upon a Bank Commissioner the duty of closing
K,zpur J .
the doors of State Bank if, on examination, it is
found to be in sol vent without a waiting judicial proceedings is not a violation of the due process of law,
but it appears that the proposition that such a
power was a violation of the 14th Amendment had
not been 1trgued in the State Court. The following
observations of Mr. Chief Justice White at p.569
are significant.
"We say this because, in its opinion, the
court observed that if that was the contention, it was irrelevant, as the statute did not
authorise liquidation except as a result of
judicial proceedings although they did impose
upon the bank commissioner the duty, after
he found a bank to be insolvent, to close its
doors and prevent the further transaction of
business until, in the orderly course of pro·
cedure, a judicial liquidation might be accomplished."
The only question there was whether the State
could empower the Commissioner to close the doors
of a bank It was not a case where the statute
authorised any liquidation except as a result of
judicial proceedings. Therefore it was not a case
of liquidation being ordered by an authority other
than a court.
Another case relied upon was Bushnell v.
Leland(') where the aseessment made upon stockholder of a national bank by the Comptroller of
Currency was held to be .evidence in an action
brought by the receiver of a bank against a stockholder to enforce payment of double liability imposed
(I) (1916) 240 U.S. 136. 60 L. Ed. 566.
(2) (1897) 164 U.S. 684. 41 L. Ed 598.
698 SUPREME COU.RT REPORTS [1962] SUPP·
1962
.IoStph Km UDillo
Vrllul;unnel
" Bank of
1 he Restrl;6
JndU.
Kapur J.
by law. It was also hold that the giving of authority to tho Comptroller etnp:)1ve:ing him to make a
rate:ible call upon stockholder was not t:mtamount
to vesting that officer with judicial powc~r. In Bx
parte J o!un Chelwood (1) it was held that the receiV(Jr of a national bank appointed by the Comptroller of Currency is not an officer of any court but
agent and officer of the United States.
The aid of Amerimn concopts, laws a11d precedcnU! in thl' interpretation of our laws is not
always without its dangers and they have tlwrefore
to Le rnlied upon with some caution if not with
hesitation beca1rnc of the difference in the naturo of
those hws :tnd of the institutions t.o which they
apply. Mr. Nambiyar rolied upon these different
concepts and submitted that in U.S.A. the right to
carry on business is not a fundamental right but is a
"franchise", though, it has hy legal intcrprctntion,
been brought within the fourteenth amendment and
the doctrine of "franchise" has no place in the
Indian Constitution : C.S.S. Motor Ser•.•ice v. State
of Madm.s (') approved in Sarthfr Ahmad v. Sfitte of
U.P. ('). Similarly the right to form a corporation
is in C.S.A. a "franc:hise" or a "privilege" which
can be withdrawn. To apply the analogy of Banks
in U.S.A. to thoso in Inclia or the mode of exercise
by and extent of the powers of a Coritrollcr of
Currency or some similar authority will moro likely
than not lead to erroneous conclusions.
To support the submission that this procedure
for winding up in t:ho case of bankin~ companies
was not unreasonable, it was fmbmittPd that there
arc many other corporations and socict ics which arc
not wouncl uncfor the Companies Ac·t but under a
clitTnent procedure- ·by the orders of the Central
Governrncnt-e.g. the Life Insurance Corporation,
the ~tat<' Finanee Corporation, the State Bank of
(II (1897) 165\..:.S.4·13 41 L.Ed.7112
(2) J.L.R. [1953] Mad. 304.
(3) (1955] 1 s.c.R, 707, 718,
3 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
699
W6Z
India and some others. They are all owned by
Joseph K ;.iruvil/o
the Central Government and ave therefore not comVellukunnel
parable with the respondent company. Besides
v.
merely because some other corporations or societ- The Reserve Bank of
India
ies of a different kind can be wound up in a different
Kapur J,
manner or under a special procedure is hardly a
ground for holding in favour of the constitutionality
of the imi:mgned provision. To further support the
reasonableness of the impugned provision it was
argued that because of the special knowledge of
financial matters possessed by the Reserve Bank and
to protect financial structure of the country special
powers have been conferred on the Reserve Bank
and the learned Attorney-General relied on the
observations of Rajagopala Ayyangar, J., All India
Bank Employees' Association v. National Industrial
Tribunal (I) :
"From what we have stated earlier as the
genesis of the legislation now impugned it
would b.e apparent that Government bad to
effect a reconciliation between two conflicting interests ; one was the need to preserve
and maintain the delicate fabric of the credit.
structure of the country by strengthening the
real as well as the apparent credit-worthiness
of banks operating in the country."
But that was in a different context. That was a
matter in regard to the provisions s.34A of the
Banking Companies Act, sub-s. (1) of which gives
immunity under certain circumstances to books
and accounts of a banking company against
production and inspection in a proceeding
before the Industrial Tribunal· and sub-section (2)
of which provides that if in any proceedings in relation to any company other than the
Reserve Bank any question arises whether the
amount of reserves should be taken into account
by the authority before which snob proceeding is
pending the authority may refer the questio~ to
(I) [1962] 3 $.C.R. 269, 298.
700 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1962] SUPP.
1162
J or1pli KllfZlVilla
l'11lu!urwl
v.
Tlrt RoJerot Bank
•f 1.m.
KopurJ.
the Resorvo Bank and the Reserve Bank shall, after
taking into account. the principle of sound banking and other circumstances furnish to tho authority
a certificate, Mtating th>J.t tbo authority shall not
take into account any amount as such reserve and
such certificate shall be final. All that this case laid
down was that such a provisi"On balanced t.he interests of the parties and the delicate fabric of the
credit structure of the country. RC8ides that provision relates to production and inspection of documents and relates to what facts can be taken into
consideration by an Industrial Tribunal or whether
a eertifir.at.e by the bank is proof of a particular
fact or not. Again what is applicable to a quasijudioial authority like an Industrial Tribunal
adjudicating upon industrial disputes seeking to do .
soci~l justice may be inapplicable to Courts of law
adjudicating upon the rights of a citizen to carry
on his trade and avocation or not.
Next case cited was Sajjan Rank v. Reserve
Bank (1). That was a case whero the· validity of
s. 22 of the Banking Compani11s Act was chall('nged
on the ground of Art. 19( I) of the Constitution and
it was held not to be 11/tra m'.res on the ground that
power of licensing is not vested with a mere officer of
the bank and the standard for exercise of power ha8
been laid down in the section itself and the power
granted to the Reserve Bank is not an arbitrary
one.
The vital question for decision is whether a
law which requires th6 High Court to ordnr winding
up because the Reserve Rank is of th" opinion
that a banking company should be wound up is
constitutional. In other words can a st'.1tute which
takes away the power of tho Court to proceed in a normal judicial manner t.o determine a
question submitt<.>d to it for its deeision on tho
(I} [1959] 2 M L ..I. 455.
3 s.o.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
.
7oi
1962
materials proved before it anrl requires it to decide
it merely in accordance with the subjective satisfacJoseph Kuruvilla
Vellukunnel
tion of one party to the dispute and without giving
v.
the other party the right to be heard at any stage 'The ReseT'!Je
Bank of
lnriia
of the proceeding 11-nd prove its defence be called
a reasonable restriction under Art. 19( 1)(f) and (g)
Kapur J.
of the Constitution. Will the law which excludes the .
application of the judicial process, and compels the
Court to merely carry out the behests of one of
the :r;iarties by giving effect to that party's subjective satisfaction and thus to abdicate its judgment
to the opii:J.ion of a suitor be valid. Dealing with
emergence of judicial power Griffith, C. J., in
Waterside Workers' Federation of Australia v. J. W.
Alexander Ltd. (1) said that as soon as man emerged
from the savage state and formed settled commu• nities it became necessary to have rules to regulate
conduct for the enforcement of which provision was
made and this power vested in some person or
authority representing the community. Hence
arose law givers and Judges and as civilisation
advanced distinction began to be drawn between
the diverse functions of the community and these
functions were called "the judicial power" as distinguished from the legislative and executive powers.
The lea.rped Chief Justice then defined what "Judicial power" is. He said :
"Without attempting an exhaustive
definition of the term "judicial power," it
may be said that it includes the power to
compel the appearance of person before the
tribunal in which it is vested, to adjudicate
between adverse parties as to legal claims,
rights, and obligations whether their origin,
and to order right to be done in the matter."
Lord Macnaghten in Lapointe v. L' Association de
Bienfaisance et de Retraite de la Police de Montrial (')
condemned in the
case of persons, other
than, judges performing
judicial functions,
(1) (1918) 25 C.L.R. 434, 442.
(2) (1906) A.C. 535, 539.
'702 SUPRE~IE COURT REPORTs [1962] SUP!'.
1962
J ostph Kuruvilla
Vrllukwmtl
v.
The Rtstrvt Bonk
of India
Kapur J.
following a procedure "contrary to t.he rules of the
society and ,iiwv(' all contrary "to the clcmenta.ry
principles of justices,"
The importance of tlw judicial proCl'AlB was
emphasised bv Patanjali SaRtri,.C. ,J. in Rmn Pra.m<l
Narain 8ahi v. The Stat.e of Bihar (I), a case
where th<' dispute was between tho i:ltate of Hihar
and a private individual about the settlement of
lands belonging to Rottiah Raj :
"This is purely a dispute between -private
parties <md a matter for determination by
duly constituted courts to which is entrusted,
in every free and civilistid society, the important function of adjudicating on disputed
legal rights after observing the well
procedural safeguards wh icb
established
include the rights to be heard, the right
to produce witness and so forth. This is the
protection which the law guarantees equally
to all pcrsons, and our Constitutiou prohibits
by Article 14 every State from denying such
protection to anyone."
No doubt there the question was raised uncler
Art. 14 ; but it iF the importance of the judicial
process in disputns between the State and a private
individual that waH emphasised. At p. 1133 the
learned Chief Justiel' point.ed out the dangers
inherent in special enaetmcntH in a syst<·m of
Government by political parties depriving particular named persons of their liberty or property.
Ia Jfahanl Sri .fagannalh Ramanuj Das v.
'l'he Stat.e of Ori.,sa ('j, objection was taken
to certain provisions in the Orissa aindu
Religious Endowments Aet which related to the
framing of a sch<,me. Under those provisions a
scheme could be settled to ensure due administration of the endowed properties but the objection
(l) ~1955] S.C.R. 1129, 1134.
(2) [1954] s.c.R. 1046, 1052.
3S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPoRTS
fog
1962
was .that the Act provided for the framing of a
scheme not by the Civil Courts nor under provisionu
Joseph 'Ku1uvilla
of the Civil Procedure Code but by a Commissioner
Vellukunuel
v.
who was merely an administrative officer. There
Bunk of
was no provision for appeal against his order. The Rt$etr.;e
india
Mukherjea, J. (as he then was), said at p. 105:! as
KapurJ.
follows :
"We think tl).at the settling of .a scheme
in regard to a religious institution by an
executive officer without intervention of any
judicial tribunal amounts to an unreasonable
restriction upon the right of property of the
superior of the religious institution which is
blended with his office. Sections 38 and 39
of Act must, therefore, be held to be invalid." '
See also 'l'he Commissioner of Hindu Religious
Endowments v. SriLakshmindra ('). In Sri Sadasib
Prakash Brahmachari v. 'l'he State of Orissa (2)
which was a decision in regard to the same Act
after its amendment after ss. :18 and 39 had been
declared to unconstitutional. Bv the amendment
although the scheme was to be prepared by the
Commissioner a right of appeal direct to the High
Court was given against the determination of the
Commissioner settling the scheme.· It was held
that although from the litigant's point of view an
appeal to the High Court from the Commissioner's
order is not the same as an independent right of
suit and an appeal to the higher court but in order
. to judge whether the operation of the provision
was or was not an unreasonable restriction what
had to be seen was whether the person affected
got a reasonable chance of presenting his entire
case before the original tribunal which has to determine judicially the question raised and whether he
. has a right to regular appeal to the ordinary con·
stitution court or courts to correct the errors if
any of the tribunal of first instance. It was also
{I) [1954] S.C.R. 1005, 1037.
(2) [I956J s.c.R. 43.
704 SUPREME COURT REPORTs (1962] sUPP.
1961
I os.ph K""'vii la
•.
V1u.bnnel
TJ,. R.,.... Bank
of llldh
Kopur J.
emphasised in that case that the Commissioner had to
be a member of the judicial service and the enquiry
before the Commissioner was assimilated to and
was governed by the provisions relating to the
trial of suits by enjoining that as far as it might be
it was to be in accordance with the provisions of
the Code of Civil Procedure relating to trial of
suits. The framing of a scheme in th\11 manner
was held not to be an unreasonable restriction on
the rights of the Mahant under Art. 19(l)(f). It is
important to notico that there the right of appeal
was in very wide and general terms both on facts
and on law and it could relate not merely to the
merits of the scheme but also to all basic matters
the determination of which was implicit in the
very framing of the scheme.
'fhe importance of the judicial power was
pointed out by the Priv:v Council in Attorne:y-General,
for Austral,ia v. The Queen and the Boilermakers'
Society of Australia (1) where it was held
that the function of an industrial arbitrator is
completely outside the realms of judicial power and
is of a different order. At p. 315 Viscount Simonds
observed as follows : "On the other hand, in a federal system
the absolute independence of the judiciary is
tho bulwark of the constitution againRt encroachment whether by the legislature or by
tho executive. To vest in the same body executive and judicial power is to remove a
vital constitutional safeguard".
A great deal of emphasis was la.id by the learned
Attorney-General on the fact that tho Reserve Bank
is a body of expert bankerij which could more appropl'iately determine as to when the continuance of a
banking company is prejudicial to the interests o
(1) (1957) A.C. 288.
I
3S.C.R.
"I
strPREM:E oouRT REPoR±s
705
the depositors than a judicial tri~11nal., 1This.. argument is in our opinion fallacious because the liquidation of banking companies in this country as of any
other company is a judicial function and therefore
within the jurisdiction of Courts and it has never
been seriously suggested that the Courts have found
or will in future find any difficulty in adjudicating
on any technical matter dealing with the peculiar
nature of banking companies. It cannot with any
justification be argued that in dealing with such
matters the exercise of jurisdiction by Courts is less
desirable than any other matters which are litigated before them. Indeed it would be a negation of
the rule of law if the citizen were to be denied to
have his rights adjudicated by an independent tribunal like a Court of law and it will not subserve
the interests of the Rule of Law in a free democratic
society, if adjudication of the question of the solvency of banking houses was left to the subjective
opinion of an executive body like the Reserve
Bank even though it may be expert in banking.
The following observations of Lord Morton of
Henryton iu Baldwin & Francis LUl. v. Patents
Appeal Trilninal (') which was a case relating to
patents are very relevant : "It would, indeed, be regrettable in pre·
sent times, when certiorari lies to so many
tribunals dealing with scientific matters, if the
courts were precluded from considering whether there was an errors of law on the face
of the record because they did not know the
meaning of certain technical terms."
In an American case Ohio Valley Water Company v.
Ben Avon Borough ('), it was held that withholding
from courts power to determine question of confiscation according to their own independent judgment
must be deemed to dflny due process of law.
(1) [1959] A.C 663, 679.
(2)
(1920) 253 U.S. 287, 64 L Ed. 908. ·
Joseph Kuruvilla
Vellukunntl
v.
The ReserlJt Bank
of lndia
KopurJ.
706 SUPRE.\fE COURT REPORTS [1962J SUPP.
196Z
Joseph Ku~l4uiJla
Vellukunrul
v.
Tire ll-J1ru< Bank
of !Mia
Kapiu J.
In Halsbury'e Laws of England, Vol. 7,
(Simonds Edition), Rt p. 198 it has been stated that
it is the right of a subject to have any dispute affec·
ting him brought before a judicial tribunal and tritd
in accordance with the principles of natural justice
and that no party ought to be condemned unheard
or to have a decision given against him unless he
has been given a reasonable opportunity of putting
forward his <:asc.
It was further submitted by the appellant that
the Hescrve Bank is entirely an executive body,
and therefore a mandatory provision like s. 38\1)
and 38(:l) ( b)(iii) practically leaves the question of
liquidation of banking companies in the hands of
the Executive. By s. 7 of the Reserve Bank Act
the Reserve Bank is required to act according to
tho orders of the Govt'rnment. The directors of
the Reserve Bank, according to s. 8 are all nominated by the Government. Under s. 38(2) the Reserve
Bank is enjoined to apply for the liquidation of a
bank if it is so directed by the Central Gu\·ernment
and therefore any opinion formed by the Reserve
Bank in regard to the insolvency or otherwise of <'
bank must necel!Barily be the determination of an
important branch of the Executive and when s.:~8(1)
requires the court to order the winding up of a
banking company if an application in that behalf is
made by the Heserve Bank then it is the substitution of executive power in place of judicial determination and judicial decision is one of the main
features of the rule of law. To quot-e from Stephen's
Commentaries on the Laws of England, VuL III,
p. 565:
"The importance of the judicial element
in our Constitution can hardly be exaggerated,
for it rests with the Courts to ensure the conformity of Government with law ................. .
The 'Rulo of Law' which Dicey held to be a
leading principle of our Constitution, does not
t'
.
3 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
involve the decision of every dispute by
Courts of law. But it does imply that all
authorities in the State act under the eye of
the Courts, and are liable to have the legality
of their conduct inquired into."
,
What thf'n is the position in the present case. It is
claimed on behalf of the Reserve Bank that the
position of the Palai Bank was very precarious and
that its assets were not sufficient for the purpose . of
the payment to its depositors in full or to me et its
liabiliti s. ·n was also alleged that on several occasions directions had been given to the Palai Bank
to conduct its affairs in the manner required by the
Reserve Bank and that many opportunities had
been given to it to give its explanation as to the
defects and irregularities in its working and to
carry out the directions of the Reserve Bank and it
had failed to comply with them. The a!fegation that
the bank was iu a precarious position, unable to
meet its demands and it had no liquid assets to pay
off its depositors, has been challenged by the appellant. The High Court would have adjudicated upon
that question if it had been competent to do into it.
That is exactly what is required in a judicial determination and that is what the Palai Bank, has been
deprived of and it is that which affects the constitutionality of the impugned statute. The position
under s. 38 of the Banking Companies Act is that
if the Reserve Bank is of the opinion that the continuation of a banking company is deterimental to
the interests of the depositors and it makes an
application for winding up, the Court is bound to
order winding up irrespective of whether the banking company has or has not a good defence. Therefore the Court has to put its judicial seal on the
opinion of another which is absolute negation of the
exercise of the judicial process. It was argued that
the Reserve Bank, before it takes action, inspects,
gives instructions, takes explanations and hears the
b&Bking company but it is not bound to .do so.
0
19a2
Joseph f(uruvilla
Ve/lukunnel
v.
The Re.re1 ve Bank
oj 1ndia
Kapur Jr
7os SUPREME COURT REPOH.1~ (1962] SUPP.
116~
J 1s1ph Irw1.1uilla
Vtlh,..;,,,,I
y,
The RUero1 Rank
•f India
KQ/#WJ.
The vice of the impugned provision lies in (a)
the power vested in the Reserve Bank to apply to
the High Court for an order winding up a bank
exercisable solely on its subjective satisfaction as to
the existence of conditions prescrib(ld by s. 38, and
(b) th~ obligation imposed by law upon the High
Court to make the order of winding up without at
any time enquiring whether the conditions on which
the application is founded do in truth exist. In adjudging the reas.:inableness of the restriotion impo~ed
by a statute tho Court has to consider its purpose,
tlte ovil it intends to remedy and it tries to strike a
balanco between tho interest of tho aggrieved citizen
and the larger public interest sought to be served
by the sta tutc ; the Court in each casn considers
whether the restriction imposed is appropriate, fair
and roasonable. The Court will not uphold a restriction whicb. is not necessary for achieving tho
purpose of ihe statute or is a arbitrary. Are tho
circumstances 80 compelling in the present ease that
w1less the provision requiring a Court to order
winding up of a banking company because the
l~eservo Bank feels Aa.tisfied that it should be wound
up to protect the interests of tho depositors is up·
held the interests of the public cannot be safeguar.
dcd ? In considering this question it may be legiti·
mate to enquire whether the High Court which normally exercises jurisdiction in the matter of ordering
winding up of companies is incompetent or its proce.
dure inadoquate to examine the charges againBt a
banking company. The credit of a banking institution is undoubtedly very sensitive. It thrives upon
tho confidence of thl.'I public in tho honcot.y of its
management, and its reputation of solvency. There
is however nothing peculiar in the business of a
banking company that it must be ordered to be
wound up on the subjoctivo satisfaction of the
Reserve Bank.
The Reserve Bank is undoubtedly an expert
body with vast facilities for making enquiries into
3 S.C.R.
SUPREME COuRT'REPORTS
'
709
the aft'airs of banking companiAs in India. But on
that account it cannot be presumed that the view
of the Reserve Bank that any bankinig institution
should be liquidated must always be correct. It cannot be said that' the Reserve Bank can never act
mistakenly or even negligently. The Reserve .Bank
may even be directed by the Central Goveenment
for reasons of its own to apply for liquidation
of a Bank. Under the Constitution the Courts
are the custodians of the fundamental rights of
citizens ; but by this extra-ordinary piece of
legislation these very custodians are made the instruments of the Reserve Bank for imposing an order
which prima facie is destructive of a guaranteed
fundamental freedom. Under our Constitution the
legislative and executive actions are subject to judicial review within certain well defined limits. But
by s. 38(1 )(b) read with cl. (iii) the Court is not
only deprived of its Constitutional func.tions but
is commanded to lend its aid in defeating a fundamental freedom of banking companies. Theimpugned provision makes the Reserve Bank the
complainant and Judge in its own cause ; it authori·
ses the Reserve Bank on it subjective satisfaction as to the existence of a state of affairs
prescribed by the statute even without an enquiry
if it deems fit, to demand that the High Court
shall order liquidation of a banking company without making any enquiry as to the sufficiency or
even the existence of the material on which its
satisfaction depends. The· provision making a
litigant the Judge in his own cause is an absolute
negation of the rule of law. It is the foundation
of the edifice of our ju,dicial system that no one
shall be .condemned unheard, however strong the
circumstances against him may appear to be. He
is entitled to be told, if the freedom of citizen is
to have any reality, what he has done to merit
punishment or penalty, he must be afforded an
opportunity to deny the correctness of the char~e
1962
Joseph Kw•Villa·
VelluA:unnel ·
'·
.v~
The Reserve Bank
of India ·
KapurJ.
710 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1962] SUPP.
1962
Jo•tph Kuruuil/u
Vdlul:utvul
••
Thi &aert1 Bank
of India
Kapur J.
and to set up his plea in denial or extenuation,
a11d also be afforded an opportunity to persuade
the authority imposing penalty or punishment
that the appropriate order is not the one proposed
against him. But by a stroke of the legislative
pen all thrsc protections which arc th() foundation
of the rule of law are destroyed and the satisfaction of the Reserve Bank is marlo conclusive for
entering a verdict for determination of the right
of a banking company to continue to exist.
In our view it would be a tragedy if by this
and similar legislation citizens are to be convicted
of offcncrs, penalties are to be imposed upon theni,
their property sequestered, and their rights trampled upon without enquiry by the courts by the
simple e.xpedient of requiring the courts to lend
their aid in imposing their authority an<l thereby
creating a judicial facado to what is in truth
exercise of purely executive authority. It is a
matter of no moment thnt the executive a.uthority
invested with the power to call upon the court to
lend its nid, is an expert body which performs an
important function directly or indirectly in the
governance of tho State. Howevn august th(l body
so set up may be, a provision of law providing for
imposition of restrictions on a citizen's fundamental right pursuant to its subjective satisfaction
as to the existnnqe of a state of affairs, and thereby permanently depriving the citizen of his right
or property is in our judgment wholly unreasonable.
Tbc plea of constitutionality of a statute
infringing a funclamental right cannot be negatived
on the as~umption that the autocratic power of
impoRini; penalty or punishment is entrusted to the
executive authority which will exorcise it only in
proper cases and there will bo no ab use of power.
In the larger interest, onr ConRtitution makers
have been averse to oonferml of auto cratic power
3 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
711 ·
and have tried to protect the citizen against the
exercise of snch power by guaranteeing him the
fundamental freedoms and have also provided
protection against infringement or those freedoms
by legislative or executive action,
We are prepared to assume, though counsel
for the Palai Bank very vehemently challenged
the truth of the case of the Reserve Bank, that the
affairs of the Palai Bank were mismanaged and
that there was a mounting run on the bank and it
was practically · in an insolvent condition. The
validity of a statute is not to be judged in the
1
light of the propriety or otherwise of executivjl
action, or its beneficient effects, in a given case':'"'.
The in validity of this statute arises because of the
exclusion of any opportunity of judicial investigation into the fairness, propriety and rearnnableness of executive action involving deprivation of
a fundamental rights. It is unnecessary to consider
the steps which it is claimed the Reserve Bank
had taken from time to time to obtain information
and to give advice and direction and also the 1
allegation that the application to wind up was
submitted because the condition of the Bank was
deteriorating as each day passed. These are it
must be observed, matters in dispute. Normally,
it is the function of the judicial power to investigate whether a banking company should continue
to function or should be liquidated. By the im·
pugned provision the exercise of that judicial power
is excluded. That exclusion is, in our opinion,
not based on any inappropriateness of exercise of
. the judicial power, or existence of other compelling circumstances in the public interest, and is
invalid because the statute, examined in the light
of its repercussion on the fundamental right of the
citizen is unreasonable.
As we have shown above, under t.he Constitqtion the coqrts are t4e bqlwark.for the protection
196!
Joseph Kuruvilla
V.IMunnel
••
The 'Reserve Ban~
of India
KapurJ,
712 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1962) SUPP.
J96't'
J ,.,,ii /f1118"ill•
1'11/.t-1
••
The &sm>l'.lllM
•f Intli<i
K•~-,,; J.
of tho right of the citizens and they are a check on
the vagaries, negligence and mistakes of the executive or on the high.handedness of ono party before
it a!!'ainst another. This Court has emphasised
that the deprivation of the right to resort to court
is an unreasonable restriction. It is true that
in the present 0ase an appoal to this Court has not
been taken away hut what is left is a wholly
ineffective right of appeal because if tho law is
constitution then all that a court can do is to act
according to the opinion of tho Reserve Bank and
abdicate its judicial function in favour of the
opinion of an executive body.
We are therefore of the opinion that s. 38 is
an unreasonable restriction on the right of the '
Palai Bank to carry on its business and is therefore wiconstitutional. We need express no opinion
on the question of hostile discrimination by the
adoption of the proccduro prescribed but the
statute, if it be found unreasonable, is liable to be
declared invalid. For those reasons the appeal
must be allowed and tho order of the High Court
set aside.
BY CouRT-In accordance with the opinion of
the majority, the appeal and the writ petition fail
and are dismissed with costs, one set only.
'
Appeal and petition dism1$sed.
-
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