IZHAR AHMAD KHAN versus UNION OF INDIA
Supreme Court of India | Decided 16 February 1962 | [1962] SUPP. 3 S.C.R. 235 | 1962 INSC 58
Key facts
- Decided
- 16 February 1962
- Bench
- P.B. GAJENDRAGADKAR*, A.K. SARKAR, K.N. WANCHOO, K.C. DAS GUPTA, N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR
- Bench size
- 5
- Case number
- WRIT TO PETITION (CIVIL)... No. 136/1959
- Disposal
- Disposed off
- Citation
- [1962] SUPP. 3 S.C.R. 235
- Neutral citation
- 1962 INSC 58
Text of the judgment
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3 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
235
explain the case made against hiin and that state·
ment can be taken into consideration in judging
the innocence or guilt of the person so accused.
Therefore if the courts below have accepted this
explanation it must be held that the respondent has
discharged the onus which was placed on him by
s. 65(2) of the Act.
The appeal is therefore dismissed.
Appeal dismissed.
UNION OF INDIA
(P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, A. K. SARKAR, K. N.
WANCHOO, K. C. DAS GUPTA and N. RAJAGOPALA
AYYANGAR, JJ.)
-
Stat1 of Mahorasher a
••
Luman J airam
KapurJ.
IZHAR AHMAD KHAN
v.
-
198%
Citizenship, Termination of-Determination by Central
Government-Rule rnaking obtaining of passport from another
country conclusive evidence-Validity-Citizenship Act, 1955( 57
of 1955), s. 9(2)-Citizenship Rules, 1956, Sch. Ill, r 3.
The petitioners claiming to be Indian Citizens sought to
enforce their fundamental rights under Art. 19 (1) (e) of the
Constitution. The crucial question was \Vhethcr they \Vere
citizens of India.
While the petitions were pending the
Government of India under s. 9(2) of the citizenship Act, 1955
determined that they had voluntarily acquired the citizenship
of Pakistan by the application of r. 3 of Sch. III of the
Citizenship Rules, 1956, framed by the Central Government
under s. 18 of the Act. Section 9 of the Citizenship Act,
1955, provides as follows:"( I) Any citizen of India who by naturalisation, regist·
ration or otherwise voluntarily acquires, or has at any time
between the 26th January, 1950, and the commencement of
this Act voluntarily acquired, the citizenship of another
country, shall, upon such acquisition or, as the case may be,
such commencement, cease to be a citizen of India .
(2} If any question arises as to whether, when or how
any person has acquired the citizenship of another country,
jl Jlla!! be detertnil)ed by such ~uthority! in s.uGh i;nanqer 1 alj~
19•1
236 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1062]"SUPP.
1962
lzhar Ahmod Khan
v.
llnion nf Trltli•
having regard to such rules of evidence, as mav be prescribed
in 1his behalf."
,
Rule 30 of the Rules which made the Central Government the authoricy for the purpose of s.9 (2) provided that for
a determination under that section the Central
Govern·
ment should have due regard to the rules of evidence specified
in Sch. II I of the Rules.
Ruic 3 of the said schedule was as follows.
«The fart that a citizen of India has obtained on any
date a passport from the Government of any olhcr country
shall be conclusive proof of his having volunlarily acquired
the citizenship of the country before that date.'.'
After such determination by the Central Government the
petitioners challenged the constitulional validity of s. <J (2)
of the Citizenship Act, 1955, as also of r. 3 of Sch. II I of the
Citizenship Rules, 1956. Their case was that (I) r. 3 of Sch.
Ill of the Rules was not a rule of evidence but a rule of
substantive Ja\v and ao;
such
outside the · purvic\\' of the
delegated authority conferred by s. 9 (2) as also the general
rule making power under s. 18 of the Act, and that (2) s. 9 (2)
itself \\'as u1trrr. i·irr-~ as it affected the :::tatl1s of citizenship
and deprived the petitioners of their fundamental rights
under Art. 19 (I) (e) of the Constitution.
Held, (per Gajendragadkar, Wanchoo and Ayyangar,
.JJ.) that the contentions raised by the peti1ioners must fail.
It was not correct to say that r. 3 of Sr.h III of the
Citizenship Rules, 1956, which made it obligatory on the
authority to infer the acquisition of foreign cilizenship
from the fact of obtaining a passport from a foreign country
\\•as not a rule of evidence but a rule of substantive la\\'.
Like the n!le of rebuttablc presumption, \vh;ch was
undoubtedly a rule of evidence, The function of an irrcbuttable
presumption was also to help the judicial mind in appreciating the existence of facts with this differenr.e that while the
former was open to rebuttal, the latter v.·as placed beyond
rebuttal. So considered a rule of irrcbuttable presumption
could not be said to fall outside the law of evidcnc.c.
D. fl. Heiner v . .lo/,n. II. ])on11r111, (1932) 76 Law Ed.
772, referred to.
That such a rule ruight in son1e cases lead to hardship
and injustice was not a relevant consideration in judging its
constitutional validity.
The real test whether a rule of irrebuttablc preswnption
was one of evidence was inherent relevancy, If the fact fro!ll
-
3 s.c.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
',.
237
the proof of which the presumpti~n w.as required to be draw~
was inherently relevant in proving it, the rule was one of
evidence, no matter whether the presumption prescribed was
a rebuttable or irrebuttable.
There could be no doubt that a passport obtained from
Pakistan was relevant in deciding whether or not the
citizenship of Pakistan had been voluntarily acquired and
any argument to the contrary would be clearly
erroneous.
R. v. Brailsford, (1905) 2 K. B. 730 and Joyce Gase,
[1946] A. C. 347, referred to.
Domingo Urteliqwi v, John N.D'arcy, Henry Didier and
DomingoD' Arble (1835) 9 Law. Ed. 690 and In re GOHN,
(1945) Ch. D. 5, held inapplicable.
It was clear that under the law of Pakistan only a citizen
of that country could apply for and obtain passport. The
impugned rule, therefore, was not a rule of substantive la\V
·and was within the purview of s. 9 (2) of the Citizenship Act
and its validity could not be challenged.
The expression 'rules of evidence' in s. 9 (2) must be
construed in the light of its legislature history. Ever since the
passing of the Evidence Act a conclusive presumption has been
·a part of the law of evidence. It was well settled . that i .the
·scope of the power to legislate on a topic, had to be determined by the denotation of that topic obtaining in legislative
practice.
-
.
.
Croft. v. Dunphy, 1933 A.C. 156 and The Central Provinces andBerarAct,No. XIV of 1938, (1939) ~'.C.R. 18, referred
to.
Status of citizenship was not a fundamental right under
the Constitution and the Parliament had clearly the power
under Art. I I of the Constitution to regulate the right of
citizenship by law. The challenge to s. 9(2) of the Act,
therefore, on the ground that enabled the rule-making
authority to deprive the petitioners of their rights of citizen-- ship could not be sustained.
The scheme of the Act and principles it enunciated clearly
showed that the Legislature in enacting s. 9(2) had not abdicated its essential legislative function in favour of the rule making
- authority. There would be no doubt therefore that the section
was valid.
Per Sarkar and Das Gupta, JJ .-Whether a particular
rule was one of substantive Jaw or of evidence had to be judged
by what it sought to do. Did it create or extinguish or modify
a right or liability or its sole concern was with the adjective
1961
lzha< Ahmod Khan
"·
Union of India
..
-.~
• • ...,
__
1:~~·
.•
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:
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238 SUPREME OOURT REPORTS [1962] SUPP.
1161
(diaf' Alm..,/ Khan
v.
Union of India
function of reaching a conclusion as to what had taken place
under the substantive law ? If the first, it would be a rule
of substantive law, otherwise it would be a rule of evidence.
If a rule, purporting to be one of evidence, in effect said what
must be the ri!-{ht or liability on the happening of a par:icular
fact. it \vent beyond the scope of the law of evidence and
trenched on the do1nain of sul;stantivc law.
A rule of conc]usive prcsurnption made with a viC\Y to
affect a specified subs!antivc right was a rule of substantive
law and did not cease to be so because it \Vas rested on a fact
which was relevant to it. The test \Vas not one of relcvancv
but v.rhcther it \vas intended to affect a specified substantivC
right or provide a method of proof.
So judged, when ohtaining of a passport from another
country was 1nade conclusive proof of voluntarily acquiring
the citizenship of that country, in the context of s. 9 of the
Act, a substantive right was directly affected and the rule
could not obviously be one of evidence and must be. one of
substantive law. It might so happen that when one voluntari·
ly acquired the passport of a country he might not have to
acquire the citizenship of that country.
Mohd. Khan v. Govt. of..!ndhrn Pradesh, A.l·R· 1957 And.
Pra. 1047 and Sh<Lrafat Ali Khan v. State ~r U./'., A.l.R. 1960
All, 637, approved
.lluhowe<l U.rnum V· Stutc of Jladras, A.J.R. 1961 Mad
129 and Ghoural llusan v. State of Raja.•lhun, A.I.R. 1958 Raj•
173, disapproved.
In vie\'v of '"\rt, 11 of the Constitution it was not co1Tect
to say that the rir~ht of citizenship was a fundamental right
or that the po1>cr conferred by s. 9(2) of the Act was an
unguided power. That sub-section gave enough guidance to
the C·entral Government to fran1e rules of evidence.
'l'he question \vhethcr the petitioners had acquired
foreign natio11ality must, 1hcrcforc he detfrminrd by the
Government leaving r. 3 of Sch. I II of the Citizenship RGles,
1956, out of account.
OnrnINAL Ji:nismcTION :
Pctiti0ns Nos. IOI
and 136 of 1959 and 88 of 1961.
Petitions Under Art. !32 of the Constitution of
India for enforcement of Fundamental Rights.
The Judgment of (:l6jendragadkar, Wanchoo and
Ayyangar, JJ., was deli1•cred by Gajendragadkar, J.
3 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
23!!
•
The Judgment of Sarkar and Das Gupta, JJ.,
was delivered by Das Gupta, J.
GAJENDRAGADll:AR, J.-These three Writ Petitions are filed by the three respective petitioners
under Art. 32 of the Constitution for the enforcement of their fundamental right under Article 19(1)
(e). They were heard separately but it would be
convenient to deal with them by one common judgment because they raise for our decision the same
constitutional questions. In all the petitions, the
constitutional validity of section 9(2) of the Citizenship Act, 1955, (Act LVII of 1955) (hereinafter called the Act) and of rule 3 in Schedule III of the
Citizenship Rules, 1956, is challenged. It would
also be convenient to set out briefly at the outset
material facts on which the three petitions are
based.
-
Izbar Ahmad Khan, the petitioner in Writ
Petition No. 101 of 1959, claims to be a citizen of
India and was a resident of Bhopal. He was enrolled as a voter in the Parliamentary as well as State
Legislative Assembly Electoral Roll. On the 20th
August, 1952, he was taken into custody by the
police from the restaurant which he used to run at
Bhopal and was told that he had been arrested under
an order from the then Bhopal Government under
section 7 of the Influx from Pakistan (Central) Act.
He was the;n removed by train the very next day
and left at the Pakistan border and was asked to
go to Pakistan despite his protests. Thereafter,
his elder brother, Iqbal Ahmad moved the Court
of the Judical Commissioner, Bhopal, under Art.226
of the Constitution for the issue of a writ in the
nature of Habeas Gorp·us. In February, 1953, . the
learned Judicial Commissioner pronounced hie
judgment in the said writ petition. He found in
favour of the petitioner that he was born in India
and was a citizen of India.' Even on the question
of migration, the Judicial Commissioner made a
1962
Izhar J.hmad Khan
••
Union of India
Gojendragadkar J,
240
1962
ldrar Ahmad Khan
v.
U11icm of liuiia
Gajtndragatlkm J.
SUPREME COURT REi;>oRTS [1962] S~PP.
finding in his favour. He, however, observed that
the petitioner was in Pakistan in l\Iay an<l
.Tune, 1952, and he cam(• to the conclusion that
since he hu,d contravened the provi:;ions of section 3 of the Influx from Pakistan (Central) Act,
he was liable to be remove<l phy:;ically from India
under seotion i of the said Act.
Having gone to Pakistan much against
his
will, the petitioner tried to obtain
the help of the High Commissioner of India
for returning of India but he failed and so he
had to sign nn application form in order to secure
a passport to come to India. With the passport
thus obtained he came back to India on the 13th
August, 1953. Soon after his return to India, he
applied for permi::sion to 8tay in India permanently
and his visa for stay in India was accordingly
extended from time t.o time pending the final decision of his application for leave to stay in India
pcrmam·nt.ly. llfoamthile, on the 15th February,
l!JiH, section 7 of t.hc Influx Act was declared void
by this Court. In consequence, the petitioner began
to press his application for permanent settlement
in India and a lrmg term visa was granted to him
by the Government of India pending the decision
of hiR application. Thereafter, the Act was passed
in l!J55 and under advice, the petitioner applied
for registration as 1L eitizcn. The said application
was, however, rejecku and his application for leavo
to stay in India permanently met with the samo
fate. 'rhe petiti01H'r wM then directed by the
District Superintcn1icnt of Police, Bhopal, to leave
India within seven days by an order dated the
lUth June, 1959, Hervcd on the petitioner.· This
order was passed under section 3(2)(c) of the
Foreigners Act, 1946 (Xo. XXXI of 1946). It was
against this order that the petitioner came to thi8
Court by his present, writ petition on August 13,
l!J59. In the petition orginally filed by him, the
petitioner's contention was that h" was not a
I
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I
or-
3 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
241
foreigner within the meanin~ of the Foreigners Act
aad he ch 1.l\enged the validity of the relevant oper·
tive sections of the said Act.
After notice was served on the Union of India,
the Sta.~e of Madhya Pradesh and the District
Superintendent of. Police, Bhopal, who were
impleaded as respondents I, 2 & 3 to the petition,
the matter' came on for heari°:g before this Court on
J anua.ry 22, 1960. After hearing counsel for some
time, tha Court delivered an interlocutory judgment
in which it pointed out that the crucial question
which falls to be considered in the writ petition is
whether the petitioner is a citizen of India or not.
This question can be decided only under section 9(2)
of the Aot. Therefore, this Court observed that an
enquiry sho·1ld be made by an appropriate authority
in that behalf and the result of the enquiry intimated to this Court as early as possible. On receipt of
the result of the enquiry by this Court, the petition
will be listed for final hearing. Meanwhile, stay of
deportation of the petitioner was continued.
In accordance with this interlocutory judgment, an enquiry was held under s.9(2) after serving
a notice about the said enquiry on the petitioner.
On September 11, 1961, the Central Government
recorded its conclusion that the petitioner had
voluntarily acquired the citizenship of Pakistan
after January 26, 1950; and before July 29, 19.53.
This conclusion was reached substantially by the
application of the impugned R. No. 3.
After the enquiry had thus terminated and its
result communicated to this Court, the petitioner
applied for permission to take additional grounds
and am•mgst th3 i:rrounds which he thus wanted to
raise, are the two questions which we have already
indic:i,ted. 'J'hat. in brief, is the background of facts
in Petition No. IOI of 1959.
Syed Abrarul Hassan, the petitioner in· petition No. 136 of 1959, claims to be a citizen of India
1962
lzhar Ahmad Kha,.
••
Union of India
Gajendragadkar J.
212
1962
lz;hat Ahn11d AA!um
v.
Union of India
Goj1ndragadkar J,
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1962] SUPP.
and was a resident of Bhopal. In 1951, his family
received the news from Paki~ta.n that his cider
brother Syed Hassan was seriously ill. That is
why the petitioner with his mother and younge,r
sisters and one younger brother went to Pakistan.
Thereafter, the petitioner stayed there for some
years. Thon they triod to come back to India. and
with that object applied fur a Pakistan passport
to travel to India and after the passport was thus
obtained, he returned to India in May, 1954. After
he came to India., ho applied to tho Government
of India for permiBBion to settle down in India permanently and pending the said application, be was
granted long term visas. In 1959, however, the Dis·
trict Superintendent of Police, Bhopal, served an
order on him directing him to leave India. by the
22nd August, 1959. This order was issued under section 3(2)(c) of the Foreigners Act. Like petition No.
IOI of 195!J, this petition also was originally filed to
challenge the validity of the said order and to impugn
the validity of tho relevant provisions of the Foreigners Act on the ground that the petitioner was
not a foreigner and that the relevant provisions
could not be invoked against him.
Subsequently, this petition as well as Petition
:No. IOI of 1959 were heard together on January,
22, I 960, and the course of events in this petition
was similar to that in the earlier petition. Tha
result was that after an enquiry was held under
s. 9(2) of the Act and the petitioner was informed
that the Central Government had come to the conclusion that the petitioner had voluntarily acquired
the cit.izenship of Pakistan after January 26, 1950,
and before November 20, 19.52, he applied for leave
to take additional grounds, including the two
grounds to which we have already referred. Thus,
th~ material facts in thnse two petitions 11re
sub~tantiallv similar,
'
3 s.c.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
243
Habib Hidayatullah, the petitioner in petition No.
88 of 1961, claims to be a citizen of India and complains that his fundamental rights nuder Art. 19 of the
Constitution are being infringed because he is about
to be deported out of India on the ground that he
has acquired the citizenship of Pakistan. It appears
that the petitioner sailed from Bombay for Basra
(Iraq) in April, 1950,and stayed there for three yea.rs
in connection with business. Then he accompanied
hii! brother to Karachi in May, 1963, for his treatment.
On arrival at Karachi, the Pakistan authorities
took away his Indian travel documents. Then
he tried to obtain the assistance of Indian High
Commission for returning to India but failed and
so he applied for and obtained a Pakistani passport on December 14, 1957. According to him,
he obtained his passport with a view to return to
India. On returning to India with this passport,
the petitioner made several representations to the
Indian authorities for his recognition as a citizen
of India and even tried to obtain registration as
such. His efforts in that direction, however, failed
and so he stood the risk of being deported from
India. That is how the petitioner filed the present
petition on February 20, 1961. By his petition,
he claimed a direction against the respondents the
Union of India and the State of Maharashtra
restraining them from taking any steps to deport
him from India.
While admitting the petition, this Court passed
an order stating that it would be open to the petitioner to move the Government under section 9(2)
of the Citizenship Act or the Government to act
suo motu in that behalf. After the petition was thus
admitted, the respondents entered appearance and
opposed grant of stay on the ground that the petitioner had ceased to be a citizen of India. The Government of India then took action under section 9(2) of
the Act and has held that the petitioner has voluntarily acquired the citizenship of Pakistan after
1961
lzkar Ahmad Kliao
v,
Union of India
Gajtndragodkar J,
244
1962
l.tMr A::mad Khan
v.
Union oj India
G,.jtndragadkaf' J.
S'L'PRE:IIE COURT REPORTS [1962] SUPP.
26th January, 1950, ancl before t.h., 14th December,
195i. After this order was communicated to the
petitioner, he took additional grounds and amongst
them, are the two points which have Leen already
indicated. It is in the br.ckground of these respcc·
tive facts that the three petitioners resist· their
deportation from India on the grounds that section
9(2) of the Act is uUm vires :rnd that Rule 3 in
Schedule III of the Citizenship Rules, I 95G, is also
constitutionally invalid.
Before den ling with the points thus rai•ed by
tht' three petitions, it would be useful to refn
briefly to thi; relevant constitution anrl statutory
provisions. Part II c;if the Constitution, consisting
of Arts. 5 to 11, deals with citizenship. Article 5
provides that ev.,r:v prrson specified in cl. (a), (b)
and (c) shall he a citizen of India. Article 6 lays
down that not.withstamlin~ :rnything container] in
Art. 5, a porson who has iuigr;1tcd t;> the tcrrit.ory
of India from the territory now induclt•d in l'aki·
stan shall be deemed to he a ritizcn of India at the
commencement of the Constitution if he satisfies
the tests prescribed by clau~cs (a) and ( b). Under
Art. 7, a person who has after the first day of
March, 19·17, migrated from thP. territory of India to
the territory now included in Pakistan shall not be
deemed to b0 a citizen of fnrlia, notwithstanding
anything contained in ArtH. fl and fi. This
Article is ~ubjc.·ct to tho proviso to which it is
unnocessafy to rcfor. Art. 8 deals with the right."
of citizenship of :t person who or either of whoso
parents or any of whosn grand-parents were
born in India as defined in the Government of ln<lia
Act, I !l3ii, and who ordinarily resirles in any
country outsi<k India as so defined. The next
thren article~ are importa1.t. Art. !l provicks that
no person shall b" a citizen of India by virtue of
Art. ti, or Le deemed to he a citizen of India by
virtue of Art. 6 or Art. IS, if he hns "n!untarily
acquired the citizenship of any foreign Stace. In
3 S.C.R.
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SUPREME dotrRT REPORTS
245
other words, if prior to the commencement of the
Constitution, a person had voluntarily acquired the
citizenship of any Foreign State, he is not entitled
to claim the citizenship of India by virtue of Art. 5
or Art. 6 or Art. 8. This article thus deals with
cases where citizenship of a foreign State had been
acquired by an Indian citizen prior to the comm·
encement of the Constitution. Article 10 guarantees the continuance of the rights of ciitizenship
and provides that every person who is ors deemed
to be a citizen of India under any of the foregoing·
provisions of Part II shall continue to be such citizen; but this guarantee is subject to the important
condition that it would be governed by the provisions of any law that may be made by Parliament.
The Proviso introduced by Art. 10, therefore, makes
it clear that any law made by Parliament may
affect the continuance of the rights of citizenship
subject to its terms. That takes us to Art. 11 which
empowers Lhe Parliament to regulate the right of
citizenship by law. It provides that nothing in
the foregoing provisions of Part II shall derogate
from the power of Parliament to make any provi·
sion with respect to the acquisition and termination
of citizenship and all other matters relating to citizenship. It would thus be noticed that while ranking provisions for recognising the right of citizenship in the individuals as indicated by the respective articles, and while guaranteeing the continu·
ance of tha said rights of citizenship as specified by
Art. 10, Art. 11 confers and recognises the power
of the Parliament to make any provision with
respect tci not only acquisition but also the termination of citizenship as well as all matters relating
to citizenship. Thus, it would be open to the parliament to affec~ the rights of citizenship and the
provisions made by the Parliamentary statute in
that behalf cannot be impeached on the ground
that they are inconsistent with the provisions contained in Art. 5 to 10 of Part II. In this connection
•
1962
l•har Ahmad Khan
v.
Union of India
Gajendtagad~ ,,, J,
~46 SUPRE)!E COURT REPORTS ll962l SUPl-.
J962
hJrar Ahmad Kh""
v.
' Union oj India
Gajtndragadltor J ·
it is important tu hear in mind that Art. 11 has
been included in Part JI in order to make it clear
that the sovereign right of the Parliament to <lea!
with citizenship and all questions connected with
it is not impaired by the rest of the provisions of
the said Part. Therefore, the sovereign legislative
competence of the Parliament tu <lea! with the
topic of citizenship which is a part of Entry 17
in List I of the Seventh Schedule ill very wide and
not fettered by the provisions of Articles G to 10
of Part II of the Constitution. This aspect of the
matter may have relevance in dealing with the
contention raised Ly the petitioners that their
rights under Article HJ arc affected by the impugned provisions ot suction !!(2) of the Act.
In exercise of its legislative <mthority conferred by Entry 17 and in the ·pursuance of the
provisions of the Art. 11 of Part JI, the Parliament
passed the Act which came into force on December,
:JO, 1955. As its preamble Rhows, it has been
passed to provide for the .acquisition and termination of the Indian citizenship. Acquisition
of citizenship iR provided for by ss. 3 to
7. Section :~ deals with acquisition of citizenship by birth, section 4 with acquisition by
descent, s. 5 with acquisition by registration,
s. 6 with acquisition by naturalisation and
s. 7 with acquisition by i11corporation of territory. Having dealt with the acquisition of
citizenship by these five sections, termination of
citizenship is dealt with by ss. 8, 9 and IO. Section
8 deals with r1munciation of citizenship, s. 9 with
tho termination of citizenship and s. 10 with its
deprivation. We are concerned with s. 9 which
deals with the termination of citizenship. This
section provides :
"(l) Any citizen of Jndia who by naturalisation, registration or otherwise volunta.rily
acquiriis, or has at any time between the 26th
J anu11ry, 1950 and the commencement of this
3 s.c.it.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
247
Act voluntarily acquired, the citizenship of
another country, shall, upon such acquisition
or, as the case may be, such commencement,
cease to be a citizen of India :
·
Provided· that nothing in this sub-section
shall apply to a citizen of India who, during
any war in which India may be engaged, voluntarily acquires the citizenship of another.
country, until the Central Government otherwise directs.
(2) If any question arises as to whether,
when or how any person has acquired the
citizenship of another country, it shall be
determined by such authority, in such manner ·
and having regard to such rules of evidence as
may be prescribed in _this beha)f."
There is no ambiguity about the effect of this section. It is clear that the voluntary acquisition by
an Indian citizen of the citizenship of another country terminates his citi~enship of India, provided the
said voluntary acquisition has taken place between
the 26th January, 1950 and the commencement of
the Act, or takes place thereafter. It would thus be
seen that whereas Art. 9 of the Constitution dealt
with the acquisition of citizenship of a foreign State
which had taken place prior to the commencement of
the Constitution, s; 9 of the Act deals with acquisition
of foreign citizenship subsequent to the commencement of the Constitution. There is, therefore, no doubt
that the Constitution does not favour plural or dual
citizenship and just as in regard to the period prior
to the Constitution, Art. 9 prevents a person who
had voluntarily acquired the citizenship of foreign
country from claiming the status of an Indian citizen,
so does s.9(1) make a similar provision in regard to
the period subsequent to the commencement of the
Constitution. Section 9 provides that the acquisition of foreign citizenship can be the result either
of naturalisation or registration or any other method
1962
Izhar Ahmad Kl1an
·-
Union r,f.fndia
Goje11drogodkc.•· J.
248 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1962] SUPP.
1962
..
lz!UJr Ahmad Khan
Union of !wiia
Gaje11d.agndkar J,
of voluntarily acquiring such citizenship. Just as
the citizenship of India can LB acquired Ly naturalisation or registration, or registration, so can the
citizenship of a foregin country Le similarly acquired
by naturalisation or registration. If it is shown that
the person has acquired foreign citizenship either by
naturalisation or registration, there can be no dou Lt
that he ceases to be a citizen of Tndia. in consequence ·of such naturalisation or registration. These
two classes of foreign citizenship present no difficulty. It is only in regard to the last category of
cases where foreign citizenship is acquired otherwise than by naturalis:ttion or registration that
difficult.y may arise, But tlw position in respect
of the last cawgory of cases is also not in doubt
and that is that if it is shown that Ly some other
procedure foreign citizenship has been voluntnrily
acquired. Indian citizenship immediately comes to
an end. The proviso to sub-sectimi (I) need not
detain us bccaust> we are not concerned with the
eases falling under that proviso.
That takes us to sub cl.(:.?) of s.!J. This clause
provides that if any question arises as to the acquisition by an Indian citizen of foreign citizenship,
it shall be dotcrmiucd by such authority, in such
manner, and having regard to snch 1 ules of evidence
as may be prescribed in this behalf. In other words
if any dispute arises 11<1 to whether foreign eitizenship has be<·n acquired voluntarily by an Indian
citizen, or if it has been so acquired, when or how the
power to decide th id. question has been del1:gatcd to
the authority as may be prescribed in that behalf.
Likewi8e, the manner in which the euquiry should
be held and the rules subject to which the enquiry
should be held have also to he prescribed in that
b"half. The result of this sub-section is th:1t rules
arc to he framed prescribing the authority by which
the said questions should be tried, the manner
in which they should be tried and the rules of
evidence subject to which they should be tried.
•
3 $.C.R.
SUPREME COUB,T REPORTS
249
1962
Section 18 ( l) provides that the said power to
make rules may be exercised to carry out the pur-· I zhar Ahmad' Khan
v.
poses of the Act, and sub-section (2) provides that in
Union of India
particular and without prejudice to the generality
of the foregoing power, the rules may provide Gajendragadkar J.
for the t.opics covered by els. (a) to ( k) of the said
sub-section. Section 18(3) authorises the Central
Government to provide that a breach of any rule
shall be punishable with fine which may extend to
one thousand rupees ands. 18(4) requires that all
the rules made under the said section shall, as soon
as may be after they are made, be laid for not less
than 14 days before both Houses of Parliament and
shall be subject to such modifications as Parliament
may make during the' session in which they
are so laid; This rule is intended to enable the
Parliament to exerciseZcontrol over the rules made
by the Central Government in pursuance of its
delegated authority.
In 1956, the Central Government purported to
make Rules in exercise of the powers conferred upon
it by section 18 of the Act. We are concerned with
Rule 30 in the present case. It prescribes the
authority to determine acquisition of citizenship of
another country. 30( 1) provides that if any question arises as to whether, when or how any person
has acquired the citizenship of another country, the
authority, to determine such question shall, for the
purposes of s. 9(2), be the Central Government.
Sub-rule· (2) provides that the Central Govern' ·
ment shall in determining any suoh question have
due regard to the rules of evidence Hpecified in
Schedule III.
· That takes us to Schedule III which prescribes
the rules of evidence under which the enquiry under
section 9(2) would be held. Under Rule I, it is provided that if it appears to the Central Government
that a citizen of India has voluntarily acquired the
citizenship of any other country, it may require proof
~50 SUPRE~tE COURT REPORTS (1962] SUPP.
.J:Mr Ahmad Khan
••
Unio11 of lnJia
within the specified time that he has not so acquired
the citizenship of that country, and tho burden
of proving this shall be upon him. Under r. 2, the
Central Government iR empowered to make a
r<'fcrcncc in respect of any quei;tion, whith it. has to
decide in the .:nguiry, to its Em lmssy in the country
concerned or to the Government of the said country
and it authorii;cH th.: Central Governmcut to act on
any report or information reC'eived in pursuance of
such refercuce. Then follows r. 3 the \•alidity of
whieh 1s challenged before us. Th is rule reads
thus:
"The fac;t that a citizen of India has obtained on any date a passport from the
Government of any other country Rhall be
conclusive proof of his having voluntarily
acquired th1• citizenship of the country before
that date."
'l'o the rnst of the rules it is unnecessary to refer.
The scope and effect of r. :i arc absolutely clear. If
it iR sho\1 n that a citi;;:cn of India has obtained a
pa8sport from a foreign Government on any ditte,
then under rule 3 an inference has to be drawn that
by obtaining the said passport hn has \'Oluntarily
acquired the citiZP1Jol1ip of that country before the
date of tho passport. [n other words, the proof of
the fact that a passport from a foreign country has
been obtained on a certain date, conclusively determines the other fact that before that dat(l, he has
voluntarily acquired the citizenship of that country.
Th" qnestion which arises for decision is whether
this rule is constitutionally valid and if it is,
whether s. 9(2) under which the power to hold r;he
enquiry subject to the relevant rules, has hcen
delegated to th.e Central Government is itself constitutionally valid.
We will first deal with the challenge to the
validity of r. :l. The principal ground on which the
validity of r. 3 is challenged is that whereas s. !l(2)
-
-
3 s.c.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
•
2~1
1962
authorises the Central Government to prescribe rules
of evidence subject to which the relevant enquiry lzhar Ahmad Khan
v.
should be held, what the Central Government has
Union of India
purported to do in framing rule 3 is to prescribe a
rule of substantive law. The argument is that when Gajendragarikar J.
s. 9(2} refers to rules· of evidence, it refers obviously
to rules of evidence, properly so-called and since
the impugned rule is in substance, not a rule of
evidence but a rule of substantive law, it is outside
the purview of the delegated authority conferred by
s. 9(2) and as such, is invalid. It.is_ true thats. 18
(1) confers on the Central Government power to
make rules to carry out the purposes of the said
Act, but this general power to make rules will
not taken within its scope the power to make a rule
of substantive law and so if the impugned rule is a
rule of substantive law and if the expression "rules
of evidence" in s. 9(2) does not include such a rule,
then clearly the challenge to the validity of the
rule will have to be upheld.
In appreciating the merits of this argument it is
.essential to bear in mind the genesis of the Law of
Evidence and the function which its enactment is
intended to discharge. The division of law into
two broad catagories of substantive law and' procedural law is well-known. Broadly stated, whereas substantive law defines and provides for rights,
duties, liabilities, it is the function of the procedural
law to deal with the application of substantive law to
particular cases and it goes without saying 1hat
the law of Evidence is apart of the law of procedure.
The law of the evidence deals with the question as
to what facts may, and what may not, be proved,
what sort of evidence may C!r may not be given
and by whom and in what manner such evidence
may or may not be given. Consistently, with the
broad functions of the law of evidence, the Indian
Evidence Act also deals with the topics that usually
fall within the purview of such law. It prescribes
the rules. of relevance, it provides for the exclusion
252 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1962) SUPI
1962
I•har Ahmad Khan
v.
Union oj India
Gaj111dragadkt11 J.
of some eviden~e, as for instance, exclusion of
hearsay evidence or of parole evidence in some
cases ; it deals with onus of proof, with the corn.
pctence of witnesses, with documentary evidence
and its proof, with presumptions and with estoppel.
"Evidence", observes Best(') "has been well <lefowd
as any matter of fact, the effect, tendency, •Jr design
of which is to produce in the mind a persuasion,
affirmative or disaffirmative of the existence of some
other matter of fact." Judicial evidence with
which the Evidence Act deals is a species of the
genus "evidence", and, according to Best, is for the
most part nothing more than natural evidence, res·
trained or modified by rules of positive law. The
statutory provisions contained in tho Law of Evidence may be said to be based on the doctrine that
that system of law is best which leaves least to the
Judges' discretion. That is why ·'th£ laws of every
well-governed State havo established rules regulating the quality, and occasionally the quantity, of
the evidence necessary to form the basis of jndicial
decision." It is in its attempt to regulate the production of and proof by evidence in a judicial enquiry that the rules of vidence refer to certain presumptions either rebutt-able or irrcbuttable. Tho
term "presumption" in its largest and moat comprehensive signification, may be defined to he an
mferencc, affirmative or disaffirmative of the truth
or fa.isehood of a doubtful fact or proposition drawn
by a process of probaulc reasoning from something
prov11d or taken for granted. Thus, according to
·nest, when the rules of ovidenoo provide for tho
raising of a rebuttable or irrcbuttahlo presumption,
they a.re merely attempting to assist the judicial
mind in the matter of weighing the probative or
persuasive force of certain facts proved in relation
to other facts presumed or inferred. The whole
scheme of the Evidence Act is thus intended to serve
the objective of regulating the proof of facts by
(I)
The Principles of the law of E\·idcnce Twelfth Edi lion Pages
6, 23, 25 and 267.
...
3 S.C.R.
•
-
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
253
196!
subjecting the production of evidence to the rules
prescribed in that behalf. It is in the light of this Izha, Ahmad Kh••
v.
function and objective of the Evidence Act that
Union of India
the argument of tho petitioners has to be judged.
It has been strenuously urged before us that Gajendragadkar J.
when the impugned rule makes it obligatory on the
enquiring authority to infer the acquisition of citizenship of foreign country from the fact that the
passport of foreign country has been obtained by
an Indian citizen, it is really not a rule of evidence properly so called but is a part of the rule of
substantive law in relation to the acquisition or
termination of citizenship. In support of this
argument, opinions of jurists have been pressed
into service. We must, therefore, briefly refer to
the said opinions and decide whether they lead to
the conclusion for which the petitioners contend.
Holdsworth observes that "the difficulty bf proving the fac~s needed to establish legal liability
under the older modes of trial, the slow growth of
our modern mode of trial, the same difficulties even
under our modern procedure, and sometimes the
wish to modify an inconvenient law, have all at
different periods led both legislators and courts to
adopt the expedient of inventing a presumption
of law which is some times rebuttable and sometimes irrebuttable. These rebuttable presumptions of law no doubt belong primarily to those
particular branches of the substantive law with
which they are concerned; but they are all connected with that part of the adjective law which is .concerned with evidence; for they direct the court to
deduce particular inferences from particular facts
till the contrary is proved. Irrebuttable presumptions of law, on the other hand belong at the present
day more properly to the substantive law than to
the law of evidence(')." Holdsworth then draws
a distinction between estoppel which is a rule of
(2) Holds,vorth on 'A History of English Law'• 1926 Vol. IX, Pages
143-144.
2.14 SUPREllIE OOURT REPORTS [1962] SUPP.
H62
/.::har Ahmad KhGn
v.
Union nf 1ndia
Goj111dr 1gadkar J.
evidence and irrebuttable presumption by observing that "while an irrebuttable · presumption is in
effect a rulo of substantive law, to the effect that
when certain facts exist a particu Jar inference shall
be drawn an cstoppel is a rule of evidence that
when, as between two parties to a litigation, certain
facts are proved, no evidence to combat those
facts can be received." Thus, according to Holds·
worth, irrebuttable presumptions arc always a mat·
ter of substantive law, not so rebuttable presumptions, and estoppel is a rule of evidence and not 11
rulo of substantive law.
Wigmoro expresses the same opnuon about ·
the character of irrebuttahle presumptions, for he
savs that "wherever from one fact another is said
to' be conclusively presumed, in the sense that the
opponent is absolutely precluded from sbowing by
any evidence that the second fact does not exist,
the rule is really providing that, where the first
fact is shown to exist, the second facts existence
is wholly immaterial for the purpoqe of the propo·
nent's case; and to provide this is to make a rule of
substantive Jaw, and not a rule apportioning the
burden of persuading as to certain proposilions or
varying the duty of coming forward with eviclcnce(')"
V\7 ith rpspcct, it is doubtful whether it is
correct to say that in drawing a eonclusi,·o presumption from one fact proved abot1t the existen~e
of another fact, the rule rend('rs the second fact's
existence wholly immaterial. What. the rule provides is that the probative or perHua.sive valuo of
the proved fact in relation to the fa.ct not proved
is so great that.the fact not proved should alway~
be taken to be proved once the otber fact is proved. In any case, t.he opinion of Wigmore is m
favour of the contentions raised by tho petitioners.
Phipson puts the proposition in somewhat
guarded and qualified terms. "In many CILses"
~I)
\\'ign1orc on Evidence IX Edition J>. 292, Para. 2192.
255
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
3 S.C.R.
he observes, "these so called conclusive presump·
tions are rules which belong properly speaking, to
the various branches of substantive ·law and not
to the Jaw of evidence, such as the presumption
that an infant under seven is incapable of committing a felony or that all men know the law (i. e., that
ignorance of.the law is no excuse for crime)." (1).
It would thus be noticed that according to Phipson,
it is not true as a general inflexible rule that all
conclusive presumptions pertain to the branch of
substantive Jaw and he has illustrated his statement
by taking two instances of conclusive presumptions
to show that the said presumptions are really
matters of substantive law. Therefore, if the test
laid down by Phipson is reliable then the question
as to whether a conclusive presumption in a given
case is a part of the substantive law or forms a part
of the rule of evidence, properly so called. Will
have to be decided in the light of the content of the
rule and its implications.
Stephen also has considered this problem.
"Conclusive presumptions". he says, "appear to me
to belong to different branches of the Substantive
Law, and to be unintelligible except in connection
with them. Take for instance the presumption
that every one knows the law. This rule cannot be
properly appreciated if it is treated as a part of
the Law of Evidence. It belongs to the Criminal
Law. In the same way, numerous presumptions
as to rights of property (in particular easements
and incorporal hereditaments) belong not to the
Law of Evidence but to the Law of Real Property'.
Having said so, the learned author adds that '·the
only presumptions which, in my opinion, ought to
find a place in the Law of Evidence, arc those
which relate to facts merely as facts and apart
from the part.icular rights which thuy constitute(').
That is how in his Digest, he has included certain
(l) Phipson on Evidence. JX Edition P. 698.
~2)
Stephens Digest of the Law of Evidence, page ~vii.
'
'
,
.
I
1962
I:::liar .fhmarl Khan
v.
Union of India
Gajendragadkar .1.
I
256 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [19112) SUPP.
1962
I tlurr Ahmad Khan
••
Uniort of lridia
Gajt11draga,lkar J.
presumptions under Arts. 98 to 10;). These are
respectively, presumption of legitimacy, presumption of death from seven years' absence, presump·
t.ion of loRt gmnt, presumption of reimlarit_v and of
deeds to completfl title estoppel by conrluet, estoppel of tenant and licenRee, estoppel of acceptor of
bill of exchange and estoppel of bailee, agent and
license('. It would thus be sei>n that ostoppel of
the four kinrl• j1rnt indicat.od constitutes a branch
of rule of evidence, _according to Stephen.
Dicey seems to take the view that even for
domestic Jaw, irrebuttahle presumptions
purposes
of law are rules of substance, ancl he adds that "rebut table presumptirms of law mtrnt. for th.- present
purpose, be further suh-dividerl. First, there are
those which only apply in certain contexts, such as
the presumptfons of arlv•rncPment., eatisfact.ion and
ademption. It. is Huhmitfod that the~e are so closely
connected with the Pxistence of suhstantivf> rightH
that they ought to be classified aR rnlPs of substm1ce. Serondly, there are those which apply
(though not always in prPeiscly the same way) to
all types of cases, such as the presumptions of
legitimacy, marria!!e and death. It is uncertain
wh!'t her such presumptions are rules of sn hstance or
ru]Ps of procedure.'" ( 1) According to Dir.e.v, for the
purpoHes of English dompstic law, eHtoppcl is
generally treated as a ruin of evidence. In dealing
with this topic, Dicey has observed that : "in order
t<i determine whet.her presumptions are rules of
substance or rulPs of pro~.edurn, it is necessary to
distinguish between three kinds of presumption,". (')
Then he refors tn presumptions
of fact, rehnttabln presumptions of law and
irrcbuttabln presumptions of law. As to pr1>sumptions of facts. he t.hinks t!Htt, st.ri!'.tly speaking.
tht\Y h;n-P 110 legal effect at, all; they are merely
common inferences an<l, as such, will ho applied
alike to casc:i goYerned by English and foreign law.
of
\
(I} D ict".,'S conflict ofl.aws. ~Cvf'nth Edition. pa~c J09R.
(2) Th:iycr's •A Prcrliminary Tre~tisc on Evidence at lhe CC'mrron Law•
page 314.
3 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 257
It is no doubt true that in dealing with the
question about the character of the rule prescribing
irrebuttable presumptions, we must attach due
importance to the opinions expressed by jurists.
But, as we have just seen, the views expressed by
jurists on this topic do not disclose an identity of
approach and their conclusions show different
shades of opinion. That is why, bearing in mind
the juristic opinion to which we have just referred,
we will proceed to examine the merits of the
argument that the rule of irrebuttable presumption
prescribed by the impugned rule is a part of the
substantive law and does not form part of the law
of evidence properly so-called.
It is conceded, and we think, rightly, that a
rule prescribing a rebuttable presumption is a rule
of evidence. It is necessary to analyse what the
rule about the rebuttable presumption really
means. A fact A which has relevance in the proof
of fact B and inherently has some degree of probative or persuasive value in th;it behalf may be
weighed by a judicial mind after it is proved and
before a conclusion is reached as to whether ±"act B
is proved or not. When the law of evidence makes
a rule providing for a rebuttable presumption that
on proof of fact A, fact B shall be deemerl to be
proved unless the contrary is established, what the
rule purports to do is to regulate the judicial process of appreciating evidence and to provide that
the said appreciation will draw the inference from
the proof of fact A that fact B has also been proved
unless the contrary is established. In other words,
thA rule takes away judicial di~cretion either to
attach the due probative value to fact A or not and
requires prima Jacie the due probative value to be
attached in the m:itter of the inference as to the
existence of fact B, subject, of course. to the said
presumption being rebutted by proof to the contrary. As Thayer has observed : "presumptions
are aids to reasoning argumentation, which assume
the trut.h of certain matters for the purpose of some
given inquiry. The exact scope and operation of
1962
l zhar Ahmad Khan
v.
Union of 1ndia
Gajendragadkar J,
258 SUPRE:IIE COURT REPORTS [196'.2] SUPP.
1962
Ir.liar Al.mad Khan
v.
Unio11 of lndi J
Oajen1ragadk:Jr .J.
these prima facio a8sumptions aro to cast upon the
party against whom they operate, th<> rluty of going·
forward, in argument or evi<l<'llC<', on thP particular point to which thB,V rPlate. They are thus
clos~ly rel:iterl to th<' suhjrct of judicial notice ; for
they furnish the basis of many of those spontaneous
rccog-nitions of part.icnlar facts or conditions which
make up thnt d<Jctrine". (1) Acconling to the Ramo
author, ]pg!}] preRumptions of tho rebuttaLle kind
are d~finitions of tho quantity of evidence or tho
state of facts sufficient to make out a prima .facie
caee ; in other wordR, of the circumstnnces under
which the burdPn of prnof lies on the opposite party.
Thus, the rule of robuttnble preRumption adds
statutory force to the natural and inherent prohati\0(' Yalue of faet A in relation to thfJ proof of
the exist<·nce of fact B and in nrlding this Rtatutory
value to the probative force of fa<:t A, the rule, it
is conceded, makes a provision within the scope
and functi0n of the law of evidence. If that is RO,
how does it make a <lifl'er<'ne:e in principle if the' rule
a•lds conclusive Ht.rength to tho prnbative ,-al11e of
thn said fact A in relation to th' proof of the exi-;.
trnco of fact B ? In rngnrd to the category of facts
in respect of which an irrehuttaLle presumption is
prescribed by a rule of evidence, the position is
th..t the inherent probative value of fact A in that
behalf is very great and it is \'C'ry likely that when
it is proved in a judicial proceeding, the judicial
mind wonld nornmlly attach great importance to i1
in relation to the proof of fact B. The rulo steps
in with n'ganl to such fa<ots and provides that. the.·
jurlicial mind should attach to th<' said fact •·onclusivcncRs in tho matter of it.s probat.ivc value. It
wculrl he not iced that as in tlw cas1' of a rchnttahl11
presumption, HO in the e,a,.<o 0f an irrebuttable presumption, the rulo purports to assist the judicial
mind in :ipprcciating the existence of facts. ln
one c<tRC tho probative Yahrn is Rtatutorily strengthened hut yet left op<•n to rebuttal, in the other
(\)Thayer's ·A Preliminary Treatise on Evidence at !be Common
Law, page 314.
.
If
•
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38.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
259
case, it is statutorily strengthened and placed
beyond the pale of rebuttal.
Considered
from this point of view, it seems rather difficult to
accept the theory that whereas a rebuttable presumption is within the domain nf the law of evidenee, irrebuttable presumptio_n is outside the domain of that law and forms part of the substantive
law.
In D. B. Heiner v. John H. Doni,an( 1), the Supreme Court of the United States of America.had
occasion to consider the validity of the provision
of a Federal statute imposing a death transfer tax
in respect to transfers at the time of or in contemplation of death, that any transfer made within two
years prior to the death of decendent shall be deemed to. have been made in contemplation of death
within the meaning of the statute and it was held
that the said provision violated the clue process
clause of the 5th Amendment. The argumrnt partly
turned upon the question as to whether the irrebuttable presumpt.ion authorised to be drawn by the
impugned section of statute was a part nf the law of
evidence or of the substantive law. In support of the
statute, it was urged that the conclusive presumption created by the statute was a rule of substantive
law. The Court, however, rejected the plea and
held that the rule was a rule of evidence and as
such violated the constitutional guarantee provided by the 5th Amendment. In rejecting the plea
urged by the State that the rule was a rule of substantive law, Mr. Justice Sutherland observed that
a rcbuttable presumption clearly is a rule of 0vidence whioh has the effect of shifting the burden
of proof and in ~upport of this conclusion, he referretl to the earlier decisions of the Court. The Learned Judge then added that "it is hard to see how
a statutory rebuttable presumption is turned from
a rule of evidence into a rule of substantive law as
the result of a later statute making it conclusive.
-
(!) (1932) 76, aw. Ed. 772, 730
19~2
/z~ar Ahmad Khan
v.
Union of Indio
Gajendr'J:adkar j.
200 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1962] SUPP.
1962
lzhar Ahmad f\hG11
v.
U11ion of l11clia
Gojtndragadkor J.
In both cascR it is a subRtitute for proof; in the one
open to challenge. and disproof a.ml in th~ other
conclnsiYe." \V(') ought to add that the learned
,Judge made it clen.r that "whether the presumption
be treat.rd a.!'! a rule of OYidence or of suhsta.ntivo
law, it constitut,<>a an attempt, by legislatirn fiat,
to enact int0 existonce a. fact which here does not,
and cannot he made to, exist in n.ctua.Iity, 11.nd the
rc1.mlt. is th1~ same, unleRs we a.re rrady to O'rnr·rule
the Schlesin!!er r,a,se. as we a.re not.; for tha.t ca~rn
dealt with a.·-conclusivc presumption and the Court
held it: invalid without regard to tho ciuestion of its
t.echnieal ch'lracterization." ThuR, the observa.
tiomi madn hy Mr. Justice S11thnland in regard to
the cha.racter of the rule of irrehutta.ble presutnp·
t.ion afford nssistance to the contention raised
hdoro U'3 on behalf of the Union of India.
But it is i:;a.id t.}rnt a conclusive presumption preYcnts the party against wh<>m it is drawn
from disproving the inference about the exist~!nc:e
of fact B whirh is required to he drawn from
f.he proc)f of fact A. Thi~ circumstancP, however,
does not ~tffect the character of the rnlo a.s
falling within th~ domain of the law of e\•i<fonce.
'fak 1.! t.he caRe of estoppel \l"hich is admitted to be
a part of tlw law of edclence. In the cn.~c of estoppcl where the essential ingredient.~ of the rule are
sa.ti;::fied, a party is preclu<led from denying the
t.n1th oft.ho thing covcrl'rl by his declarn.t.ion, act or
omission. In otlwr words, wher'e estoppel is pleaded aga.inst a party on thP- stren~th of hiFi declarntio11, act or omission, wher,•hy he intent iona.lly
C<lusccl or permitted anoth1~r person to bclicv(~ a
thing to lw true, t.hat party is not permitted to say
t.hat the thing itfwlf was not true and yet the rule
which t>Ult; this bar ag,tinst tlw party and precludes
him frwn prodng t.hat the thing in q1wstion is
untrue, is treated as a. ru lo of e,·idencc. Therl'for<>,
the fa.ct that a. ha.r is created prevont.ing a pnrty from
.
-
-
3 s.c.a.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
261
proving the truth or falsity of a thing the existence of which is inferred, does not show that the
rule itself is a part of the substantive law.
-
-
Then it is argued that the conclusive rule in
the present case extinguishes the status of citizenship and as such", is a part of the rule of substantive law. We are not impressed by this argument
either. What the rule really provides is that
when one fact in established, another fact shall
be deemed . to have been established. The fact
established is that an Indian citizen has obtained a
passport from a foreign Government on a certain
date. From this fact, an irrebutta ble presumption is required to be drawn that the obtaining of
the passport from the foreign Government establishes the acquisition of the citizenship of the said
foreign State. This is a case where from the proof
of fact A an inference as to the existence of
fact B is required to be drawn. As to the inherent
probative and persuasive value of fact A in relation to the existence of fact B in this context,
we will have occasion to discuss it later on. The
argument that the application of. the ·rule may in
some hypothetical cases conceivably lead to hardship and injusti••e, is not relevant or material in
dealing with the constitutional validity of the rule.
In deciding the question as to whether a
rule about irrebuttable presumption is a rule of
evidence or not, it seems to us that the proper
approach to adopt would be to consider whether
fact A from the proof of which a presumption is
required to be drawn about the existence of fact
B, is inherently relevant in the matter of proving
fact B and has inhe.rently any probative or persuasive value in that behalf or not. If fact A is
inherently relevant in proving the existence of
fact B and to any rational mind it would bear a
probative or persuasive value in the matter of
1962
Jzhar Ahmad Khan
v.
Union of India
Gajendragadkar J,
262 SUPREME COURT HEPOitTS [1962] SUI P.
19G2
J;:har Ahma'l Kh1111
v.
Ur:ion._of lndic
Oajer.Ur,giadJ.:4: J.
proving the existence of fact B, then a rnle pre8cribing either a. rebuttablc presumption or 1>11 irrebuttable presumption iu that behalf would be a
rule of evidenoe. On the other hand, if fr1ct A is
inherently not relevant in proving the existence
of fact H or has no probative value in that behrilf
and yet a rule is made prescribing af a rebuttablc
or an irrebuttable presumption in that connection
that rule would be <L rule of substantive law and
not a rule of evidonue. Therefore, in dealing with
the question as to whethor <I given rule prescribing a conclusive presumption is a rule of evidence
or not, we cannot adopt the view that all rules
prescribing irrebuttable presumptions arc rules of
substantive law. Wn can answer tho question only
after examining the rulo and its impact on tho
proof of faets A and B. If this is the proper test,
it would become necessary to enquire whether
obtaining a passport from a foreign Govcmment
is or is not inherently rel.,vant in proving the voluntary acquisition of the citizenship of that foreign
State.
It has bceu fairly conceded beforn us that a
passport obtained by the petitioners from the
Pakistan Government would undoubtedly by relevant in deciding the qucs ti on as to whether
by obtainiug the 8aid passport they h1wo or havo
not acquired the citizenship of l'akista11. Sometimes the argument appears to have been urged and
aCO(~pted that a passport in question would not
ho relevant to the enquiry as to whether citizenship
of Pakistan ha> been acquired or not. That ·dew,
in our opinion, is clearly erroneous.
The definition of a passport given by Lord
Alverstono, C. J., in R. v. Bruii~ford (')has been
adopted by the House of Lords in the joyce case ( ')
and it is of some assistance in dealing with the
point with which wo are concerned. "It is a document", says Lord Alvcrstone, "issued in the name of
(I) ll905J 2 K.11. 730.
(2) ll946] A.C. 3~7.
-
-
263
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
3 S.C.R.
the Sovereign on the responsibility of a Minister
of the Crown to a named individual, intended to
be presented to the Governments of foreign nations
and to be used for that individual's protection as a
British subject in foreign countries". As P. Weis
observes: "a passport is considered in Great Britain
and the United States to be prima facie evidence
of the national status of the holder, but it is not
conclusive evidence". He adds that "the United
States has on many occasions insisted that foreign
authorities were not entitled to ignore an American
passport, i.e., to refuse to regard it as sufficient
proof of the holder's nationality"(').
It appears that in support of the viaw that a
passport is not relevant in an enquiry as to the
citizenship of a person holding a passport, reliamJe is
sometimes placed on the observations made by Mr.
Justice Thompson in Domingo Urtetiqui v. John N.
D'arcy, Henry Didier and Domingo D'Arbel: (2) "Upon
the general and abstract question," observes Thompson J., in delivering the decision of the Supreme
Court
of
the
United States,
"whether
the passport per se, was legal and competent evidence of the fact of citizenship, we are of the opinion
that it was not." It would, however, be seen on
looking at the whole of the judgment that the learned Judge made it parfectly clear during the course
of the latter portion of his judgment that on that
issue, the court· was divided in opinion, and the point
was of course undecided. So, the general observation
made in the earlier part of the judgment is really
of no a ssistance in the matter. That case shows
that the plaintiff had produced a passport granted
by the Secretary of States of the United States, in
order to show that he was the citizen of the State
of Maryland. The defendant, on the other hand,
offered in evidence the record of the District Court
of the United States for the District of Louisiana
which contained proceedings in a suit which had
{I) P. Weis on 'Nationality and Statelessness in International I aw'
P. 225-226
(2) (1835) 9 Law. Ed., 692.
1962
Jzhar Ahmad Khan
v.
Union of India
Gajendrag11akar J.
J
264
1962
,.
Jr.har ..fl1111ad K hon
U11iv11 of India
GtJ}rwlracadkar J. ·
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1962] SUPP.
beon originally instituted against the plaintiff to the
effect that he wM an alien and it appears that of
the two pieces of evidence, the latter was held to
be more reliable. Therefore, in our opinion, tho
loarned counsel for the petitioners were quite right
in conceding that the passports obtained by the
petitioners were relevant in the enquiry as to the
question whether they had acquired the oitizenship
of Pakistan or not.. If that be so, applying the test
which, we think, is appropriate in such cases, it
must be held that the impugned rulo of evidence
and not a rule of substantive hw. The fact of
obtaining the passport from Pakist:rn on which a.
conclusive presumption is drawn as to the voluntary acquisition of the citizenship of Pakistan is
relevant and tho rule merely make> its probative
value conclusive. Therefore, we are not disposed
to uphold tho objection raised by the petitioners
that the impugned rule is a rule of substantive law
and as 8UCb, falls outside tho purview of SOC·
tion 9(2). If it is a rule of evidence properly so.
called, it would be within tho scope of the :Luthority
conferred on the Central Government by s. !l(2) and
its validity cannot be successfully challenged.
There is oue decision to which we ought to
refer before we part with this topic. The petitioner8
in support of their argument th<it impugned rule is
& rule of substantive law, have placed reliance on
the decision in Jn re J(QJJN ('). In that ease, a
mother and a daughter, who were German nationals
and at all times domiciled in Germany, wero killed
in an air raid in London as a result of the same
explosion, and it could not be proved which of
them had died earlier. The daughter was entitled
to movable property under her mother's will, if she
survived her mothor. On thc,>Sc facts, it was held
that the question of survivorship depended on tho
provision of the German Civil Code under which
(I) [1945] Ch. D.S.
3 S.C.B.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
265
the deaths were presumed to have taken place simul·
taneously and so she .was not a person living ~t
the timl' when the succession to her mothers
estate opened and, therefore, was not entitled to
the property. The provision contained in section
184 of the English Law of Property Act, 1925,
however, was to the contrary. It provided that
where two or more persons have died circumstances
rendering it uncertain which of them survived the
other or others, such deaths shall, (subject· to any
order of the Court) for all purposes affecting the
title to the property, be presumed to have occurred
in order of seniority, and accordingly the younger
shall be deemed to have survived the elder. It
was held that the two releva.nt statutory provisions
both of English and German Law were rules of
substantive law. In fact, the relevant English section occurred in the Law of Property Act and its
setting and context import that it was a rule of
substantive law. So was the rule contained in
Article 20 of the Civil Code of Germany treated as
a rule of substantive law. The main reason given
in support of the conclusion that the two rules
were rules of substantive law appears to be that
each one directed a certain presumption to be made
in all cases affecting the title to property. It would
be noticed that the scope, purport and effect of the
two rules is substantially different from the scope,
purport and effect of the rule with which we are
concerned. In the rules with which the court was
concerned in re-Cohn, there is no question about
the probative value of one fact being judged or
appreciated under statutory rule in regard to the
proof of the existence of anothe.r fact. Like the rule
that ignorance of la,w is no excuse, the rules with
which the court was concerned were clearly rules of
substantive law. Therefore, in our opinion, not
much assistance can be drawn from the judgment of
Uthwatt, J., in the case of re-Cohn. It is clear
that the simultaneous deaths of two persons is
196t
lzhar Ahmad Khan
v.
Union of India
Gajendragodkar J.
•
26(3 SL'PRE.ME CCl'RT REPORTS [1!162) SUPP.
19G2
..
Iz/,ar Ahmad Khan
Unfon cf ltidia
Gajtndrogodkar J.
neither rationally or inhen•ntly rcle'l'ant to, nor hail
it any inherent probati\'e value in, the proof of the
question as to the sequence of the two cleaths and,
therefore, the provisions in the t\\'O sections being
purely arbitrary, wern rightly held to be matters of
substantive law.
In dealing with this q1H'st.ion, it may also be
rcleva.ilt to considl'r the practical aspect of the rule;
and that takes us to the pro0<•rl11rc whi<h has to be
followed in Pakistan in obtaining a passport from
the Government of that country for travel to India.
One of the objects which the Act was incidentally
intended to achieve was to meet the prncrgency
which arose as a result of the partition of the country
into India and Pakistan, and the rclcva11t rnles are
also primarily applicable to Indian nationals who
on going to Pakistan obtained passport from the
Government of that country. ~ow, it is not disputed
that according to the laws prevailing in Pakistan,
a person is not entitled to apply for or obtain a
passport unless he is u citizen of Pakistan under
its Citizenship Act. Besides, the prescribed form
of the application requires that the applicant
should make a declaration to the effect that ho is a
citizen of Pakistan and the said declaration hus to
be accepted by the Pakistan authorities bt•fore a
passport is issued. In the course of the enquiry as
to tho citizenship of the Applicant, declaration by
officials of Pakistan about tho tmth of the statement
of the applicant are also required to be filed. Thus,
tho procedure prescribed by tht> relevant Pakistan
laws makes it abundantly clear that the application
for the passport has to be made by a citizen of
Pakistan, it has to contain a declaration to that
effect and the truth of tho declaration has to he
established to the satisfaction of the Pakistan
officials before a passport iH granted. When a
passport is obtained under these "circumstances, so
far as the Pakistan Government is concerned, there
oan be no doubt that it would be entitled to claim
-
-
-
3 S.C.R.
SUPREME 00\JRT REPORTS
267
the applicant as its own citizen. The citizen would
be estopped from claiming against the Pakistan
Government that the statement made by him about
his statuR was untrue. In such a case, if the
impugned rule prescribes that the obtaining of a
passport from the Pakistan Governme,nt by an
Indian national, (which norm'tlly would be the
result of the prescribed application voluntarily
made by him) conclusively proves the voluntary
acquisition of Pakistani citizenship, it would be
difficult to hold that the rule is not a rule of evidence. In our opinion, it would be pedantic and
wholly unrealistic to contend that the rule in question does not purport to assess the probative value
of fact A in the matter of proving fact B but
imports considerations whieh are relevant to substantive law. Our conclusion, therefore, is that the
impugned rule of evidence and falls within the scope
prescribed by s. 9 (2). The challenge to its validity
on the ground that it is rule of substantive law
must, therefore, fail.
But quite apart from this theoretical or jurisprudential aspect of the matter, there is another
independent consideration which supports the same
conclusion. The question raised before us is one of
construing the words "rules of evidence" used in
s. 9 (2) of the Act, and in construing the said words,
it would obviously be necessary to bear in mind
the legislative history of the content of the words
"rules of evidence" in India. The Evidence Act
(Act No. I of 1872) was passed as early as 1872 and
by section 4 it recognised as rules of evidence the
rules which prescribe for a presumption which may
be drawn, for a presumption which shall be drawn
subject to rebuttal and for a presumption which
shall be conclusively drawn. Sections 41, 112 and
113 are illustrations of conclusive presumptions.
It will be recalled that similar provisions were
included by Stephe:q in his draft of the Law of
Evidence after expressing the opinion that the said
W62
[~har Ahmad Khe
v.
Union of India
GaJendr.:igadkar ~
268 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1962] SUPP.
ar Almud K!um
v.
·nion of India
.jmd•ogadkarJ.
-
presumptions form part of the Law of Evidence,
Therefore, from 18i2 onwards, it has been accepted
in India that a conclusive presumption is a part of
the law of evidence .
Bearing this fact in mind, we have to consider
what the denotation of the expression "evidence''
would be in the relevant entries to the Seventh
Schedule in the Government of India Act of I 935
as well as the Constitution. Entry 5 in List III of
the Seventh Scheclule of the earlier Act was :
"Evidence and oaths ; recognition of laws, public
acts and records and judicial proceedings." Similarly
Entry 12 in the concurrent List of the 7th Schedule
to the Constitution reads in the same way. It is
well settled that "when a power is conferred to
legislate on a particular topic, it is important in
determining the scope of the power to have regard
to what is ordinarily treated as embraced within
that topic in legislative practice and particularly
in the le!!islative practice of the State which has
conferred the power(') (Croft Dunphy). A relevant
instance in point of this rule of construction is
afforded by the decision of the Federal Court in '1.'he
Central Provinces and Baar -'.ct No. XIV 1938 (')
Tualing with the content of the expression "exciso",
Gwyer, C. J., observed :
·
"Parliament must surely be presumed to
have had Indian legislative practice in mind
and, unless the context otherwise clearly
requires, not to Lave conferred a legislative
power int<mded to bo interpreted in a sense
not understood by those to whom the Act was
to apply."
There can, therefore, be no doubt that the expression
'·rules of evidence" constmed in the light of the
Indian legal and legislative history . would !nclu~e
some rules of conclusive proof and 1f that is so, 1t
\I) [1933) A. C. 156, 165.
(2) [1939j f. C.R. 18, 3,
•
-
3 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
26'l
would be idle to contenrl that the impugned rule is a
part of the sub<itantive law merely bocause it prescribes a concluRive presumption. If that be the true
position, we do not think we would be justified in
contruing the words "rules of evidence" to adopt
the academic or pedantic approach suggested by
the petitioners. The expression "rules of evidence"
would certainly include a rule as to Mnclusive
presumption like the one with which we are cancer·
ned in the present petitions. Therefore, on this
construction of s. 9(2), the impugned rule must be
held to be intra vires.
The question about the validit.v of this rule
has been considered by some of the High Courts in
India. The Andhra Pradesh 11 ' and Allahabad
High Courts (')have held that the rule is invalid,
whereas the Bombay, (') the Rajasthan (') and
the Madras High Courts(•) have held that the rule
is valid.
The .next point to consider is about the validity
of s. 9(2) itself. It is argued that this rule is ultra
vires because it affects the status of citizenship conferred on the petitioners and recognised by the relevant Articles of the Constitution, and it is urged
that by depriving the ·petitioners of the status of
citizenship, their fundamental rights under Art. 19
generally and particularly the right guaranteed by
Art.19( I)( e) are affected. It is not easy to appreciate
this argument. As we have alreitdy observed, the
scheme of the relevant Articl~s of Part II which deals
with citizenship clearly suggests that the status of
citizenship can be adversely affected by a statute
made by the Parliam.ent in exercise of its legislative powers. It may prema facie sound somewhat
surprising, but it is never the less true, that though
the citizens of India are guaranteed the fundamental
rights specified in Art. 19 of the Constitution, the
(!)A. I.R. 1957 Andh. !OH.
(2) A. I. R. 1960 All. 637.
(4) A. I. R. 1958 Raj. 172.
(3) A. T. R. 1958 Born. 1422.
(5) A. I. R. I~! Mad. 129.
1962
lzhir .4.hmad j.
v.
Union of Inc
, ajendragadka
270 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1962] SUPP.
196Z
J,J,., A km ad Khan
v.
[,"nilJn of India
Oajtnd,1JgadJ.i;1 J,
status of citizenship on which the exigtenoe or continuance of the said rights rests is itself not one of the
fundamental rights guaranteed to anyone. If a law
is properly passed by the Parliament affecting the
status of citizenship of tLny citizens in tho country,
it can be no challenge to the validit.v of the said
law that it affects the fundamental rights of those
whose citizenship is thereby terminated. Art.icle
l!l proceeds on the assumption that tho person who
claims the rights guaranteed by it is a citizen of
India. If the ba~ic stat.us of citizenship is validly
terminat{!d by a Padiamontary statute, tho person
whose citizenship is U:rminated has no right to
rlaim the fundamental rights under Art. 19. Therefore, in our opinion, the challenge to s. 9(2) on the
gronnrl that it enables the rule-ma.king authority to
malw a rnle to deprivn the citizenship rights of the
petitioners cannot be sustained.
That leaves only one point t'l he considered in
th" pditioncrn' attack against the validity of s.!J(2).
It. io urged that s.0(2) confers on ·th•.• Central
Government uncanaliseJ aud arbitrary power to
make rules without any guidance and aH such it
amounts to ()XCc.-sirn delegati"n. In our opinion,
there is no substauce in this argument. Sec•tion
D( I) has itself provided that if 1111 Indian citizen
applies for naturalisation in a foreign State and
obtains such !laturnlisation, ho will be deemed to
have lost the citizenship of India. The ~ame provi~ion is mad" in r(·garcl to mgistration. The Legislalun• kne1v that the acquisition of the citizenship of
a foreign Str,to may br' made voluntaril.v even otherwisP than b;• 11aturnli~ation or registration and ~o it
has pro1•icled for the third category of acquisition of
foroign cit,iz0nship under the last clause "othc,rwise
voluntarily acquires" ~o that rule.making had to be
cnnfined primarily to this last category of acquisition
of foreign cit.iz,,nship. The basic principle on whkh
i he Act pro~ceds and which has been rccognis"d by
Art.!l oft.he Constitution itself is that no Indian
3 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
271
1962
citizen can claim a dual or plural citizenship. The
acquisition of foreign citizenship can be made by Izhar Ahmad Khan
naturalisation or registration and as soon as it is so
••
Unian of India
made, the prior Indian citizenship is terminated. It is
in the light of these principles which are writ large on Gajendragadkar J.
the provisions of the Act that the rule making power
had to make rules about the class of cases falling
under the last category of acquisition of f0reign
citizenship, and the rules show how the task has
been attempted. We have already referred tor. 1
to 3. Rules 4 and 5 whioh deal with cases other
then those where passport has been obtained by an
Indian citizen, prescribe the relevant factors which
have to be considered in each case before deciding
whether foreign citizenship has been acquired by
an Indian or not and the impugned r. 3 itself proceeds on the basis that the conditions prescribed by
the Pakistan Law for obtaining a passport from the
Pakiotan Government take the case of the obtaining of the passport very near to the case of registration or naturalisation. Therefore, having regard
to the scheme of the Act and the principles enunciated in its relevant sections, we do not think that it
can be held that in enacting section 9(2), the
Legislature has abdicated its essential legislative
function in favour of the rule making authority.
That is why our conclusion is that section !l(2) is
valid.
Jn the result, the petitions fail and are 'dismissed, there would be no order as to costs.
DAS GUPTA, J.-These three petitions raise
Dos ,1,
common questions of law and have therefore been
heard together. As the . questions that arise are of
law and the facts are not in dispute and substantially the same, it would be convenient to deal with
the facts of one of those petitions only. We propose ·to take for this purpose W. P. No. 88 of
1961.
The petitioner Habib Hidayatullah claims to
ba a citizen of India and h'Ls filed this petition for
272
1962
It.' ar Al: med Khan
'.
1/nicn of India
Dos J.
StTRE;\IE COURT REPORTS [1962] SUPP.
protRction of his fundamental right under Act 19 of
the Con~titution which he says is threatened bv the
action of the Union of Tnrlia an<l the Stat-e of Maha·
raRhtra. It iA not disputerl that the petitioner was
on .January 26, 1950. a citi7.en of India anrl obtained a Raj pasAport for nil1rrimage in that cnpacity.
According to him he sailed from Romh1w for BaAra
(Iraq) on April 5, Hl50. and stayed there for three
yearR in connection with som" busine-;.q ancl then
'.went tn Kamchi on !\fay 2. l!l53, with his brother
for the latter's treatment. On hiR arrival at Karachi
the Pakistan authoritiPs t,ook away hiR Tndia.n travel nocnment8. During the yeaTR.l!lii4, 1955, 1956
and I !lii7 he made sevna.1 attempts to obtain faoiliticA from t.hc Indian High Commission at Karachi
for his return to India. Rut h1J.ving failed to get any
assistance t.here he ohta.ined a Pakistan passport and
travt'Jled t.o India on the basis of thA same. This
was ohtained on DPcember 14, 1957 and t.he petitioner's case is that he obtained it as this was the
onlv po~sible way for him to return home to India
with his ailing biothPr and without any inkntfon to
n•nmrnre his Indian citizenship or to acquir<' Pakistan citizenship. AftPT' his return to India the petitioner made SPveral rcpn S<mtntions to the Indian
authoriti!'R aoking them "to rec:-ignizo him as a citizen of Imlian aud/or to register him as such and/or
to ncrmit him t.o stny premanently in India." 'But
ultimat.!'ly the Indian authorities refused to recognise him n,s a citizen of India and/or to pPrmit him
to stay permanently in India.
- - Faced now with t.he riHk of bl'ing rlepnrted
from Inclia the petit.iorwr haR approached t:his Court
· for an ord"r <lirecting- the re~pomknts, the Fnion of
Inrlia and the Rtat{' of Maharn~htre, to refrain from
taking :iny st.cps to deport or remove him from
Inrlia ann to recognise him as a citizPn of India by
birth under Art. 5(l)(a) of the Constitution.
When admitting his writ petition after the
-
3 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
273
preliminary hearing this Court made an order stat·
ing that it would be open to the petitioner to move
the Government under s. 9(2) of the Citizenship Act
or the Government suo motu to take action under
it.
Thereafter both the respondents have entered
appearance and oppose the petition for stay on the
grounrl that the petitioner has ceased to be a citizen
of India. The Government of India then took
action under s. 9(2) of the Citizenship Act and has
determined that the petitioner has voluntarily acquired the citizenship of Pakistan after January 26,
1950, and before December 14, 1957..
The order made by the Government of India
shows that in reaching the above conclusions it took
into consideration, among other things, the fact
that "the petitioner by declaring himself to be a
citizen of Pakistan before the Pakistan authorities
............ obtained a passport on the 14th December
1957."
Section 9 of the Citizenship Act runs thus:- .
"Any citizen of India who by naturaliza·
tion registration or otherwise voluntarily acq·
uires, or has at any such time between the
26th January, 1950 and the commencement of
this Act voluntarily acquired the citizenship of
another country shall, upon such acquisition
or, as the case may be, such commencement,
cease to be a citizen of India:
Provided that nothing in this sub-section
shall apply to a citizen of India who during
any war in which India may be engaged,
voluntarily acquires the citizenship of another
country, until the Central Government otherwise directs,
(2) If any question arises as to whether
when or how any person has acquired the
1962
Izhar Ahmad Khan
v.
Um:on af India
DasJ.
2i4 SUPREJIE COURT REPORTS (1962] SUPP.
1962
rflhar Ahmad Khan
v,
Union of India
IJa.r J.
ci1 izenship of another nnuntry, it shall be
dt:terminPd by such authority, in such mannt>r
and having regard to such rules of evicknce,
as may be pn·"('ribcd in this tiohalf."
Rule 30 of the Citizenship Rules 1956, framed
by the Central Govornm~nt und'Cr Section 18 of the
Citiz<>nship Act, Hl55, (Act, No. 57 of 195ii) prnvides:
(I} that if any question arises as to whether, when
or now any perAon ha;; acquired the cit iz('nsh ip of
another count.ry, t.hc authority to determine such
question shall, for the purposes of s. 9(:!) he the
Central Covef·nmcnt ; and (2) the Central Government shall in detPTmining any such question have
clue regard to the rules of evidence specifkd in Sch.
III. Schedule III cont1iins five rules of which r. 3
runs thus:"Tho fact that. a citizen of India bas
obtained on any· date a pasRpor~ from the
Governmeut of anv other country shall ho
conclusive proof c;f his having .:oluntarily
acquired the citizon<hip of that country befom
· that date."
Them can be no dis put~ that if the order of the
c~ntral Government determining that the petitioner
has voluntarily acquired the citizenship of Pa.kisthan
after the 26th January, 1950, b a valid order in
accordance with s. 9(~) the petitioner has under the
pro\'isions of 9(1) of the Citizenship Act coascd to be
a citizen of India and his petition must accordingly
fail. It has been urged b~forc us howovor that this
determination of the Government has no legal force
inasmuch as it was ma.de on the basis of Rule a of
Sch. III of the Citizenship Rules, which Huie it;;clf
is invalid.
Tho principal question canvassed before us is
aR regards the v1tlidity of t.his rule: Th<l main attack ae:ainst the rule is that while~. 9(2) empowers
the Government to prescribe rules of evidence,
•
-
3 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
275
Rule 3 is not a rule of evidence but a rule of substantive law and is therefore beyond the limits of
the powers which were delegated to the rulemaking authority by the legislature.
1962
Izhar Ahmad Khar
'· .
Union of India
J)as J.
•
•
The contention on behalf of the petitioner
is that a distinction must be drawn between a
rule of evidence, properly so called and a rule
which though called a rule of evidence lays down
ai rule of substantive law ; and that if that dist nction is borne in mind it becomes Clear that
r· 3 is not a rule of evidence. The other argument
js that when any fact is stated by a rule to 1:-e
conclusive proof of another fact, the rule is in
effect laying down that the happening of the
first fact will be equivalent in law to the happening of the other fact and so a party interested to
prove the falsity of such other fact is being prevented from giving relevant evidence.
Every law has something to do with the
function of the State in securing rights to and
imposing liabilities on. its people. · While however some of the laws deal primarily with the
creation, modification or extinguishment of rights
or liabilities, other laws deal with the further task
that then becomes necessary-of ascertaining how
far in any particular case, such rights or liabilities
have come into existence, or have become, destroyed. For clarity of thought, and convenience
of discussion, the laws falling in the former class
are called substantive laws while those in the se'bond
class are called adjective laws. Adjective laws
again have two branches, one dealing with the
procf,dure of the court; and the other (which,is
also in the strict sense "procedure") rule of evi. dence. The distinction between &ubstantive law
adjective law is well understood in jurisprudence,
thought some amount of confusion has occasionally been caused by some writers losing sight
of the distinction. As early as the beginning of
2i6 SUPREl\fE COURT REPORTS [1962) SUPP.
1962
· Ahm•d Khan
v.
lion of India
DasJ.
the nineteenth ccnturv Bentham criticised in his
Rationale of Ju<licial Evidence the tfln<lPncv of
many writers to present rules of civil law ·and
criminal law as rules of evidence. "What. therefore. the lawyers give us, unrler thfJ appellation
"law of evidence," savs Bentham, "is reallv, in a
great part of it, ci;il and p<'nal law." ·Since
Bent.ham's time much progress has been marle
in this matter and many jurists of eminence have
emphasised the di;tinction between rules of evi·
dence properly so call<'d ancl rules which in the
guise of rules of evidence are really rules of substantive law. Mr ..Justice Holmr.s in this Common
L11.w says-"If the Court should rnle that certain
acts or omission8 coupled wit.h damage w<·re conclusive evidence of negligence unless explained,
it would, in suhstance and in truth; rnlP that
such act-~ or omissions were a ground of liability
or prevent•~d a recovery, aR tho casP might be."
"ft is then fundamental", s:1ys Profossnr Thayer,
in his Preliminary Trcatirn on El'i<lence," that
not all det-0rminations admitting or excluding
evidence arc rcfrrabl<l to the law of evid•mce.
Far the larger part of them are not." "Permit.ting
a fact'', say" Professor Wigmore in his Trra1 iso on
Evidence, "to bPcome a propositio'n is not an
evidPntiary procesR", and givPs the following
example : "An action of battery upon a plea
of not guilty, the defondant offers evidenc" to
prove that the plaintiff used insulting words tn
the deft~ndent hefore the iittaek, and this is rejectPd; hero the ruling is in truth that insults constitute no excuHe or no ground for mitigation of
damages, a rule of ~uh•tantive law; or perhaps,
that such a dt1fonce is not available upon a plea
traversing the battery-a rule of plPading. It
is certainly not a ruling upon a quest.ion of evidence ; it is a ruling that the proposition <lesireci
to be proved is either not tenable, by the S•1bstantive law, or not issuahh-, by the law <>f plrad.
. "
mg.
•
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
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This reasoning is obviously at the basis of
Wigmore's view in s. 2492, Vol. IX of th~ same
treatise that rules laying down conclusive presumptions are really rules substantive law. "In strictness," says he, "there cannot be such a thing as a
"conclusive presumption." Wherever ' from one
fact another is said to be conclusively presumed
in the sense that the opponent is absolutely
precluded from showing by any evidence .that
the second fact does not exist, the rule is really
providing that, where the first fact is shown to
iixist, the second facts existence is wholly imma·
terial for the purpose of the proponent's case ;
and to provide this is to make a substantive law
and not a rule apportioning the burden of persuading as to certain propositions or varying the duty
of coming forward with evidence."
The same view has been expressed by Prof.
Holdsworth in his History of English Law. At
page 139, Vol. IX, of this history, he, after tracing
how presumptions have been evolved by the Courts
or the legislature, proceeds to says: ~"In this way
the law as to presumptions of different kinds
comes to contain a confused and heterogeneous
mass of rules, relating to many different legal
topics. In so far as the courts or the legislature
treat these presumptions as conclusive, they
cannot at the present day be regarded as parts
of the law of evidence." They are rather rules
of substantive law." Again at· page 143, the
learned author after stating that rebuttable presumptions of law though belonging primarily to
those particular branches of the substantive law
with which they are concerned, are all connected
with that part of the adjective law which is concerned with evidence, observes: "Irrebuttable
presumptions of law, on the other hand, belong
at a present day more properly to the substantive
law than to the law of evidence. But they are
1962
lzhar Ahmad K
v.
Union of Indi,
Das J.
278
/;,h~r Ahmad Khan
v.
Uni-J11 of lr.dio
Das J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [rn62) SUPP.
rules of substantive law which borrow tho terminology and adopt the guise of that branch of
the law of evidence which is conc(•Jncd with p1esumptions; and, historically, they vriginate in the
period whou the law, not having arrived at thl:
conception of a trial by tho- examination of tho
evidence produced by the contending parties,'
aimed at obtaining a conclu:iive proof which cotzld
settle the controversy. It might therefore be said
that these irrebuttable presumptions have never
been part of the law of evidence, in the sense
which wo give to the term "law of evidence" in
modern systems of t.Lw."
While both Wigmore and Holdsworth seem
to regard all conclusive presumptions as rules of
Rubstantive law, Pbips·m in his Law of E1•id1mce
says, more guardedly, that many of s11ch conclusive presumptions are rules of substantive law. At
page 6!18 of his hook the learned author says :"In many cases these so-called conclusive presumptions are rule~ which belong, properly speaking, to
the \'arious brnnelwR of substantive law and not to
the law of evidence, such as the presumption that
an infant under seven is incap1tble of committing
a felouy, or that all men know the law (i.e., th:>t
ignoranco of the law is no excuse for crime)." Hn
then gives several instances of matters which are
conclusive presumptions or amount to conclusive
evidence. either by statut-0 or common law. But
unliko Wigmore and Holdsworth, he does not say
that :>II rules of conch1sive presumptions are rules
of snbstantivo.
The ma.tter has been critically considered
again by Sir James Stephen in his Digest of the Law
of evidence. After stating first {p.xiii) that all law
may be divided into substantive law, by which
ri"hts, duties and liabilities are defined, and the law
of procedure, by which the substantive law is applied to particular cases. Stephen says that tho law
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
279
of evidence is that part of the law of procedure,
which, with a view to ascertain individual rights
and liaiblities in particular cases, decides : (1) what
facts may and what may not be proved in such
cases; (ii) what sort of evidence must be given of a
fact which may be proved and (iii) ):>y whom and
in what manner the evidence must be produced by
which any fact is to be proved." Speaking of presumptions, he says at p.xvii: "Again, I have dealt
very shortly with the whole subject of presumptions. My reason is that they also appear to
me to· belong to different branches of'the substantive· law, and to be unintelligible, except in
connection with them. Take for instance the
presumption that every one knows the law. The
real meaning of this is that, speaking generally,
ignorance of the law is not taken as an excuse
for breaking it. This rule cannot be properly
appreciated if it is treated as a part of the law of·
evidence. It belongs to the Criminal Law. In
the same way numerous presumptions as to rights
of property (in parti0ular easements and incorporeal here ditament) belong not to the law of
evidence but to the law of R~al Property."
After saying this, the learned author proceeds to
distinguish certain conclusive presumptions which
in this opinion, may rightly be considered to form
part of the law of evidence and observes:"The only presumptions, which in my opinion,
ought to find a place in the law of evidence, are
those which relate to facts merely as facts, and
apart from the particular rights which they
constitute. Thus the rule, that a man not
heard of for seven years is presumed to be dead,
might be equally applicable to a dispute as to the
validity of the marriage, an action of ejectment by a
reversioner against a tenant pur autre vie, the
admissibility of a declaration against interest, and
many other subjects. After careful consideration,
I have put a few presumptions of this kind into
a Chapter on the subject, and have passed over the
1962
Izhar A'im<J' Kht
y,
Union of India
DasJ.
280 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1962) SUPP.
196t
I~h.r Ahmad Klinn
v,
Unio11 of !nditJ
D11.•J.
rest as belonging to different branches of the Anbstantive law." Huks of conclusive presumptions
as regards fact which may help to constitute rightll
in diff.,rent branches of substantive law may thus,
according to Stephen, be considored as rulos of
evidence. It is unnecessary for us tu decide for
the purposes of the present case whether every
rule that one fd.''t is cunclu~ive proof of another is
a ruifl of 8Ub3t<rntivo law. It is clear however that
whenever question a.rises to whether a particular
rule is one of substantive law, or of ovidencn, we
havo to ask ouroolves,do~s it Heek to create, or
extinguish or modify a right or liability or docs it
concern itself with the adjective function of reaching a conclusion as to what has taken place under
the substantive law ? In tho firat case, the rulo is
a rulo of substantive law; in the other case, it is a
rulo of evidence.
For, a. rule of evidencf', can be concerned only
with the manner and extf'nt of presentation of facts,
for the purpose of persuading the mind of the Judge
or jury or other Tribunal of the existence or nonexistence of facts on which substantive rights or
liabilities, civil or criminal arise. It has nothing
to do with giving an answer to the question :-What
is the right Gr a liability which arises on the happening of a fact ? If a rule, purporting to be a rule of
ovidence docs in effect give such an answor, it has
gone beyond the scup~ of the law of evidence and
has trenched on the domain of substantive law.
On behalf of the respondent it was contended
that even though a rule laying down that
one fact will be conclusive proof of another might
be said to be a rule of substantive law if the former
faot was wholly irrelevant in persuading a rational
human mind about the existence of the other, the
position is different when the former fact is
"relevant" in tho sense of having some persuasive
value OD the mind according to ordinary prOCe8S of
-
3s.c.R.
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
281
J9fi~
reasoning. All that happens, it is urged, when such
a "relevant" fact is laid down by a rule to be I~har Ahmad Khan
v.
conclusive proof of the fact to be proved is that its
Union of India
persuasive value is stated by· law to be hundred
Das J,
per cent. though otherwise it would have been of a ·
lower percentage. Such a rule according to the
respondents ought to be regarded as a rule of
evidence just as a rule stating merely that a fact is
relevant, i.e., it has some persuasive value, is
always regarded as a rule of evidence. The argument appears to us to be wholly misconceived.
Indeed, it appears to be based on a misunderstanding of what the law of evidence does. It does not
instruct the Judge as to what value an item has or
ought to have. Its task is, apart from saying on
whom the burden of proof would lie and the mode
in which documents and oral evidence will be
allowed to be presented to. the Tribunal, to select
some of the innumerable facts which according to
the ordinary process of reasoning have-some
more, some less-an effect on the human mind in
persuading it of the existence of other facts, which
tend to create, extinguish or modify a right or a
liability-as matters of which evidence will be
allowed to be given. When a rule says that a fact
is relevant for proving a fact in issue, it is merely
saying that the Court will allow evidence to be
given of it. When however the rule goes further
and says that this relevant fact will be conclusive
'proof of a fact in -issue. so that a specified right or
liability may arise from it, what is being done is
to directly affect substantive right or liability and
·is not providing for evidence only. A rule of conclusiv peresumption made with a view to affect a
specified substantive right is a rule of substantive
law as it is intended to affect substantive right and
does not cease to be so because the conP,lusive
presumption, that is, conclusive proof of the existence of another fact, is rested on a fact which is
relevant to it. The point is not relevancy but
!:82 SUPHEME COURT REl'OR'H5 [l!J62] SU ll.
19G2
/z}w.r Ahmad Kha11
v.
Union of lnJla
Das J.
whether the rule is intended to affect a ~pecified
substantive rigbt or to provide a method of proof.
Where the purpose of a rule of conelusive presumption is that tho Judge should on that basis hold that
a specified right or liability exist8, or does not
exist, the rule is really saying that this particular
relevant fact will create, or extinguish or modify
the right or liability. The substance of the matter
then is that a rule of conclusive presumption as to
the existence of a certain fact only for establishing
or disestablishing a specified substantive right
results in affecting that right and ceases to be a
rule of proof.
It was also said that estoppel, which is really
a rule· of conclusive presumption, has invariably
been treated as a branch of the law of evidence.
Suppose this is so. Does that prove that all rules
of conclusive presumption aro rules of ev idcnce ?
We have already said that some may be. Estuppcls
may belong tu that class. "Thero is said to he an
estoppel where a party is not allowed to say that
a certain statement ol fact is untrue, whether in
roality it is true or not": Halsbury's Laws of
England, 3rd Edition Vol. XV, p. 168. It therefore
is concerned with a statement of fact ; it is not
directed to affect any particular right though no
doubt ultimately all estoppels du affect some rights
a.a all rules of evidence do. In so far as estoppels.
whether treated as rules of conclusive presumption
or not, a.re not intended to affect substantive rights,
they are rules of evidence. Therefore it seems to
us that the contention that estoppel is a rule of
evidence doC8 not establish that all rules of conclu~ive presumption are rules of evidence.
Let us come now to the impugned rule. It
lays down that the fa.ct that a citizen of India has
obtained on any date a paBBport from tho Government of another country shall be conclusive proof
of his having voluntarily acquired the citizentihip
3 S.C.R.
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
283
1962
of that country before that date. Section 9 of the
Citizenship Act (Act No. 57 of 1955) provides that Jz.har Ahmad Khan
v.
any citizen of India . who by naturalisation regisUnion of India
tration or otherwise voluntarily acquires or has at
Das J.
any time between the 26th January, 1950, and the
commencement of the Act voluntarily acquired the
citizenship of another country shall upon such
acquisition or as the case may be, such commencement cease to be a citizen of India. This provision
in section 9 is undoubtedly a substantive law laying down inter alia that the fact of voluntary
acquisition of citizenship of another co.untry by a
citizen of India will extinguish his right of citizenship of India. Under sub section 2 of section 9 the
question whether a person has acquired citizenship
of another country shall be determined, by a prescribed authority which shall have regard to prescribed rules of evidence. Ordinarily such rules of
evidence would, as already indicated above, be ·
dealing with the question of the burden of proof, ·
as to the mode of presentation of evidence, as to
the rights of examination and cross-examination
and would also select some of the facts which may
have a persuasive value as facts of which evidence
can be given. In dealing with the question of
burden of proof the rules may also legitimately raise
a rebuttable presumption, from certain facts, of
this fact 'of voluntary acquisition of citizenship of
another country. A rule raising a rebuttab!e presumption isclearly a rule of evidence for its only effect
is to shift the onus of proof and it is not intended to
affect nor does it affect any particular substantive
right. In determining the question the prescribed
authority would then have to consider the facts
which tend to persuade the mind that the person
has voluntarily acquired the citizenship of another
country and also facts which tend to show the
other way, provided the pres~ntation of these is not
barred by the prescribed rules of evidence. What
happens when the rule"making authority steps in
with the rule that the obtaining of a passport of
284 SUPREME COURT HEPORTS [1962] SUPP.
1962
l>har Ahmad Khan
••
Union of l•1i•
Das J.
another country will be conclusive proof of the fact
of voluntary acquisition of citizenship of another
country ? Under B, 9 the fact of voluntary acquisi·
tion of citizcnRhip of another country results in the
extinction of his right as an Indian citizen. The
rule therefore directly affects a subtantive right
and, in the context of s. !.!, must be taken to have
beon intended to do so. Such a rulfl cannot
obviously be a rule of evidence; it is clearly a
rule of substantive law.
Under the law as laid down in the impugned •
rule tho fact of obtain'-ng a foreign passport will
have this result, even though it may very well he
that though he has voluntarily acquired such a
passport he has not thereby, or for that purpose
acquired the citizenship of another country. This
may happen for instance, when a person who is a
citizen. of India by reason of descent, but is at the
same time a citizen of another country, says, France
by birth, obtains a passport from the French
authorities. Again, each country is of course free
to make its own laws. Supposu a foreign country
makes a law under which it can issue :i passport to
one who is not its national. 'If an Indian takes
such a passport, he does not under the law of
that country become its national but under
the rule now being considered, he is to be taken as
a foreign national. The obtaining of such a passport in either case cannot under the ordinary process of reasoning have any value whatsoever to
show that he ha.i< voluntarily acquired foreign citizenship. Yet, under tlw impugned rule a passport
so obtained by an Indian ni~tional will extinguish
his right of citizenship of India. Clearly, therefore,
the impugned rule is a rule subatantive law as
distinct from a rule of evidence.
As a last attempt to save thn rule it was
argued on behalf of the respondent that it is not
really a rule of irrebuttable presumption. It is
pointed out that r.30(2) lays down that the Central -
3 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
285
196S'
Government shall· in determining the question
whether, when or how a person has acquired the [4har Ahmad Khan
v.
citizenship of another country "have due regard to"
Union of India
the rules of evidence specified in Scheduled III.
DasJ.
The effect of the words "shall have due regard to",
it is urged, is that the Central Government would
have normally to take these rules into account but
was not strictly bound to do so. Reliance was placed
for this contention on the observations of Viscount
Simon in Ryots of Garabandho v. Zamindar of Parl.akimadi(1). T.hat authority appears to U3 to be of no
• avail for the interpretation of the words "shall have
due regard to" in the present case. The effect of
. the words "shall have due regard to" will necessarily be defferent in different contexts. The
present context is that the deciding authority is
directed to ha.ve due regard to a rule that one fact
will be conclusive proof of another. It is idle to
contend that in this context the deciding authority
will or can disregard the rule and in the face of the
fact which is said to be conclusive proof of another
hold the other fact not to have been proved.
It is really unnecessary however to consider
the effect. of the words "shall have due regard to",
for as soon as it is held that the Rule is void
because of its being outside the powers of the
rule-making authority any decision in which
any regard has been paid to the rule beeomes
""'void.
The question of validit.y of Rule 3 of Schedule
III of the Citizenship Act came up for consideration
before several High Courts in India. The High Com:t
of Madras in Mohomed Usman v. State of Madras(')
and the Rajasthan High Court in Ghaural Hasan v.
Stare of Rajasthan (') held the Rule to be valid ;
while the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Mohd.
Khan v. Govt. Andhra Praaesh (')and the Allahabad
High Court in Sharafat Ali Khan v. State of U.P.(')
=-
(I) (1943) L.ll. 70 I.A. 129, 168.
(3) A.LR. (1951) Raj. 173,
(2! A.LR. (1961) Mad. 129.
(4) A.J.R. [1957] Andh. 1047.
(5) A.J.R. (1960] All. 637.
•
286 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1962] SCPP.
J9Gt
[{l11r A~mad Kha11
v.
L'nion r.f India
held the Rule to be void. For the reasons mentioned earlier we are of opinion that the ·dew taken
by .the Andhra High Court and the Allahabad High
Court is correct.
DasJ.
The necessary
consequence
of our conclu-
s10n that r.3, Sch. III of tho Citizenship Rules is
void is that the dot-0rmination of the Central
Go,·ernment that the petitioner has voluntarily
<tequired the citizenship of Pakistan after the 26th
.January, 19ii0 and before thP 14th Deccmb~r, 1957,
ha.~ no legal validity.
Two other contentions have now to be noticed.
First, it is said that s.9 itself offends the Constitution as it takes away rights of citizenship. It is
sufficient to dispose of this point to say that, if
citizenship is a fundamental right, . as to which
clou bts may legitimately be entertained, Art. 11
authorises Parliament to make any provision with
regard to acquisition and tffm ination of citizenship.
Section 9 is thus cleary within this Article. It was
next. said that s.9(2) gives unguided power to the
Government and is therefore bad as it really amounts to an abdication of Parliament's power of
legislation under Art. 11. \Ve are unablo to see
that s.9(2) gives any unguided power. It first
gives the Government the power to provide an
authority to decide the question whether a person
has acquiri'd foreign eitizenship .. ThiR gives really
no pown of subordinate legislation but only empowers the Government to constitute an authority
for deciding a question which the section itself
ri>qnires, should be decided. So far aH the subsection gives power to frame rules of evidence, we
think there iR enough guidance provided. All that
the Government is empowered to do is to frame
rn le• of evidence. 'Whatevo~ difficulty there may be
in deciding whether a particular rule is of evidence
or not, there is no vagueness about the power given.
It is clear cut and limited, for the power is to make
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3 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
287
rules of evidence and nothing else. If that power
is exceeded then, as in our view has happened in
this case, the exercise of the power becomes bad.
The difficulty, if any, in deciding what is a rule of
evidence, cannot make a power to frame rules of
evidence vague or too wide.
For the disposal of the present petitions in
the view that we have taken however, it is necessary
that the question whether the petitioners have
acquired foreign nationality should he considered
and determined by the Central Government in accordance with law. We would therefore direct the
Central Government to decide the question whether
the petitioners have voluntarily acquired the citizenship of Pakistan after the 26th January, 1950,
in accordance with law, leaving out of account r.3
of Sch. III of the Citizenship Rules, 1956, and
on receipt of the result to the enquiry we would
proceed with the further hearing of these petitions.
BY COURT. In accordance with the decision of
the majority, the petitions fail and are dismissed.
There will be no Order as to costs.
1968
Izhar Ahmad Khan
v.
Union of India
Das J,
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