HOSHIAR SINGH versus GURBACHAN SINGH
Supreme Court of India | Decided 8 February 1962 | [1962] SUPP. 3 S.C.R. 127 | 1962 INSC 51
Key facts
- Decided
- 8 February 1962
- Bench
- S.K. DAS*, K. SUBBA RAO, RAGHUBAR DAYAL
- Bench size
- 3
- Case number
- CRIMINAL APPEAL No. 187/1959
- Disposal
- Dismissed
- Citation
- [1962] SUPP. 3 S.C.R. 127
- Neutral citation
- 1962 INSC 51
Text of the judgment
-
3 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
127
HOSHIAR SINGH
1962
v.
Februa'} 8.
GURBACHAN SINGH
(S. K. DAS,
K. SUBBA RAO and RAGHUBAR
DAYAL, JJ.)
Contempt of Court-Issue of prohibitory order-Knowledge
aliunde-Disobedience-Absence of official communication, if a
proper defence-Senttnce.
The appellants,· one a Sub-Divisional Officer and the
other a Naib Tehsildar, were entrusted with the duty
of allotting land to displaced persons. The first respondent
forcibly occupied the land allotted to B. On May 9, 1958,
the first appellant ordered that B and other allottees
similarly situated would be given possession of lands allotted
to them on May 20, 1958. On May 16, 1958, the first
respondent and others threatened with dispossession filed
petitions in the High Court under Art. 226 of the constitution and obtained interim ~tay of delivery of possession till
May 19, 1958, when the petitions would come· up before
the Division Benc;h for admission. On May 19, 1958, the
Division Bench extended the operation of the stay order
until May 23, 1958. The notice of the first stay order reached
the appellants on May 19, 1958, but no notice of the second
order was officially communicated to them till May 21, 1958.
It was alleged that on May 20, 1958, the appellants, although
informed of the second stay order by certain interested
persons and the Advocate for orie of the parties, form:illy
dispossessed_ the respondent in disob~dience of the Court's
order and handed over possession of the land to B. On the
complaint of the respondent the High C0urt held that the
appellants were guilty of contempt of court and·,· instead of
committing them for contempt, administrated a warning as
the appellants honestly believed that they were not bound to
stay delivery of possession in absence of an official communi~
cation. The appellants appealed by special leave.
Held, (per Das and Subba Rao, .JJ.)that in a case.pf con·
tempt for disobedience of a prohibitive order, as distinguished
from an order of affirmative nature, it was not necessary to
show that notice of the prohibitory order was served upon
the party against whom it was granted. It would be sufficient
if it was proved that the party had notice of it aliunde.
N. Baksi v. C. K. Ghosh, A. T. R. (1957) Patn. 528,
referred to.
128 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1962) SUPP.
1962
H()shiar Singh
v.
Gurbacha1, Si11:h
There may Le circumstances where officials entrusted
•
\\'ith the carryinR" out of a Jcgal order mighr have valid reasons
~o dru ht 1lic aut.hf'nticity of. the order con\'cycd to them hy
1nl<>rested part1e~.
But 1n the present cast' there could
hardly he any such rt·ason!'.. The appellants had really no
justification for doubting the authenticitv of an ordr.r
cornmunica ted to them hy- an A<lvocatc.
'
.
H"Ti/, furthr-r.
t}1at
in a m;i;tter reJating to contempt of
co11rt, thrre cannot he hoth j11stification and apology.
M. Y. S/.ni.,f v. 'J'he Tfon'lil, .TurlgPS of the Tligh Court of
l\'ngr.ur. [lg'"l I~- C'. R. 757, referred to.
Althm1~h thr appellants mi~ht hav• hnn.,.tly believed
tl-<lt 1hr\ \\·rrl" not l-ounrl to hoJ<l thf'ir hand
in absence of an
offcial rrimm11nirati0n. that wo111(1 be no defence to the
rl 1 tlr_!"'r nf r0nt<'mpt of ~011rt, hut only a relevant consideration
in a\\·arding- the 5Pntenrr.
0
p,,,r Da\'al. J.-Contr.mpt proct-erlin.vs are c:riminal
or Olltlsi <'riminal in naturt" and it i" essential that he.fore
any artinn ran he tal.:fn thr accusation must ht- specified in
rhar::ictcr. Tn thf inc:tant rasc, the rc,.pondent rlirl not state
that he ,.•,:as fnrmally Oispossfsc:rd. Thi'.". would he for some
reason if actu<ll pnc:-.~ssion had hf'<'n delivered. He could not
l--t- saicl to ht\\'{' c:omr to rourt with cl"an hands. Further, the
fiPrlinl! nf tl~e Jlie'h C011rt that the appellants delivered
no<::session l·onrstl,· hrlic\'in(! that tht-y \\'ere not hound not to
do -.o in the ahc:rnc:r oi 11,~ nffir-ial r-omm11nic:ation meant that
there: ,.,•as no rlrfiancr of thr l-fit"h f'.nurt's order. There conlrl
he no \\'ilful cHsohedienc~ sinc:t:> th,.re \vac; no helicf in the
cxic;ff'nc:e of the ordrr.
It mav nnt he ncc:es<:.arv that the party against l\·hom a
p'"ohihitorv order ,.,·a<:. m:v1f" must he sr.r\'c<l "·ith the order, but
it sl·oulO Pa''(' noticr nf the nrdt"r tr.for,. it could be cxpt'Ctf"rl
to nl·t"Y . Such noticr mn~t h,- from sourct-o; connected v.:ith
the court p;i~<;inrr thr ordr:r. The allege.cl knn\vJeclge of thr:
party cannot he ,,..,anf' lo (1rprncl on the ,·eracily of the
v•itnessr:s rx:imin~rt hv tht" party praying fnr ac.tion.
In re Bruant L.R. ( l 8i6) 4 Ch.D. 98. In Ex Parle
La.11glcy, E.;:parlf' Smith. In re !Ji~lwp LR. ( 1879)
13 Ch. D. 110 and The Seraylio. L. R. (1885) IO
P. D. 120, discuss<'<L
C1tD!l:S-Ar. APPELLATE Jr:HJSDICTJON: Criminal
Appeal Xo. 18i of 19:39.
•
3 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
129
Appeal by special leave from the judgment
and order dated August 18, 1958, . of the Punjab
High Court in Criminal Original No. 20 of 1958.
Gopal Singh and P. D. Men(ff!, for the
appellants. R. S. Gheba, for respondent No. 1.
1962. February 8. The Judgment of Das and
Subba Rao, JJ., was delivered by Das, J., Dayal, J.
delivered a sepa.rate judgment.
S. K DAS, J.-'This is an appeal by special
leave from the judgment and order of the Punjab
High Court dated August 18, 1958 by which the said
Court found the two appellants guilty of contempt of
court and instead of committing them for such contempt, administered a warning to them and directed
them to pay Rs. 50/- each as costs of the respondent.
Gurbachan Singh.
The two appellants before us bear the same
name. One of them was the Sub Divisional Officer,
Sirsa, District Hisear and the\other Naib Tehsildarcum:Managing Officer, Sirs<i, same district at the
relevant time. In this judgment we shall call the
Sub Divisional Officer as the first appellant and the
Naib Tehsildar as the second appellant. The facts
alleged against the appellants were these.. One
Budh Singh, a displaced person, was allotted some
land in village Jagmalera, Tehsil Sirsa, District
Hissar. The land allotted• to Budh Singh was, it
was stated by the appellants, forcibly occupied by
the respondent Gurbachan Singh. The respondent
:was not a legitimate allottee and the appellants,
who were concerned in their official capaoity with
the allotment and management of land for displaced
persons, were naturally anxious to oust the respondent and deliver possession to Budh Singh of the
land allott.ed to him. On May 9, 1958 appellant
No. l made an order that Budh Singh and other
allottees like him would be given possession of the
land, allotted to them. The date fixed for such
196!
Hoshiar Singh
v.
Gurbachan Singh
130 SUPREME COURT REPORT5 [1962) SUPP.
1961
Hoa/iiar Singh
"·
Gurbac.~an Singh
Das J
delivery of possession was l\fay 20, I !J58. On l\fay
16, 1958 Gurhaehan Singh and a. number of other
persons who were similarlv threatened with <lisposHeesion filPd petitions to· the High Court under
Art. 226 of the Constitution challenging the l<'gality
of the aDtion threatened against them. These
petitions were put up befor0 the learned Chief
Justice on that very day, namely, !\fay Hi, l 9i:S,
when he issued an order staying delivery ofpclHsession
till May l!l, I 9;)8, when the petitions were to come
up for admission before a Division Bench, On
May 19, 1958, the Division Rench extended the
operation of the stay order until May 2:{, 1958. In
tho- High Court the appellants did not dispute that
the first order staying dclivNy of possession up to
llfay l!J, I !JfiS was communicated to them on May
l!J, 1958 on which date the notice from the High
Court reached Sirsa._ It appears that a notice of
the second order extending the st11y of delivery
possc~sion till llfay 23, 1958, was not officially
communicated
the appellants till llfay 21, l!l:'iS.
The allegation on bohalf of the respondent was
that on May 20, I!Jii8, which was the rdevant date,
the two a·ppellants wi>re informed by certain interested personR, t-o whom we shall prt•scnt.]y rofor,
that a.n exten~ion of the stay ordn up to :\lay 2:J,
I!J;i8, had been granted by the Higli Court. In
spite of thiR information, however, the second
appellant, in consultation with am] undN instruction, of the first. nppcllant, formally dispossess<'d
the respondent- and handed ovn possession of
the land t.o Rudh Singh.
In these circumstances the allegation on lwhalf
of tb" respondent wa• that the two appellants hnd
committed cont<>mpt of court hv di"ob<'ying the orckr
of tho High Court stnying deli~cry of possession ~ i II
Ma:v 23, 19:'58. The respondent made an applica~1on
to the High Cnurt for taking Rnitahle action ag,rn1st
the two appellants. Thi" application was mad" on
llfay 27, 1958. On this application the High Court
to
•
3S.C.R.
'
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
131
issued notice and after hearing the parties, Falshaw,
J. (as he then was) who dealt with the application
came to the conclusion that the two appellants
were aware of the order of the High Court extend. ing the operation of the stay order and yet they
disobeyed the said order by dispossessing the respondent and handing over possession to Budh
Singh. He held them guilty of contempt of court,
but at the same time expressed the opinion that the
appellants honestly believed that they were not
bound to hold their hands in the absence of an
official communication of the High Court's order
extending the operation of the stay order. In this
view of the matter, the learned .Judge instead of
committing the two appellants for contempt of
court merely administered a warning to them and
directed them to pay the costs of the respondent.
On behalf of the appellants several points
have been urged in support of their contention that
they were not guilty of contempt of court. Firstly,
it has be1m contended that on the materials on the
record, the High Court was wrong in proceeding on
the footing that the two appellants were informed
by the interested parties that an extension of the
stay order up to May 23, 1958, had been granted
in the case of the respondent. It has been argued
before us th'1t on May 20, 1958, the appellants
did not know that the stav order had been
extended till May 23, 1958, iri ·the writ petition filed
on behalf of the respondent Gurbachan Singh,
though in another case of Didar Sin1th relating
to allotted land in the same village, the
appellants were informed by an ad vacate that the
stay order had been extended till May 23, 1958.
It has been contended before us that in the a,bsence
of positive evidence fixing the two appellants with
knowledge of the extension of the stay order in the
particular case of the respondent, the High Court
was wrong in finding that the two appellants had
wilfully disobeyed the order of the High Court.
1962
Horhiar S in:h
••
Gubrachan Sing~
DasJ.
132 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [l!J62] SUPP.
196t
Hoshiar Singh
v.
Gurbochan Singh
IJa1.J.
In order to appreciate this argument urged on
behalf of the appellants it is necefisary to state
some more facts. In para. 17 of the applir.'1tion which
the respondent made to the High Court for taking
neceliSary action against the appellants for alleged
contempt of court, it was stated that at f).30 a.m.
on May 20, 19:;,;, two persons named Bir Singh and
Avtar Singh WPnt personally to the house of
appellant No. 2 and told him that the stay order
had been extcn<le<l by the High Court and that they
had b<lcn informed by the advocate on telephone.
This allegation was supported by an affidavit made
on behalf of the respondent. Appella.nt l'\o. 2,
however, denied this allegation in hiR counteraffidavit.. In paraH. 18, 19 an<l 20 of his petition
the respondent Htakd that at about 7-40 a.m. on
Ma.v ~O. I O.i8 a written application was filed bcforo
appellant No. :! in which it was stated that the High
Court harl. stayed delivny of possession till }fay
2:l, l!J58; this application was drafted by an advocate named Ganga Bishan, who acted on behalf of
Didar Singh. The applieation was presented to
appellant !\o. 2 in preserrno of two other pcraons
named ~Ia.stan Singh and Teja Singh. Thereafter,
an aflida.vit wa.R also made on behalf of Didar
Sinl?h. This affidavit was presented to appellant
Xo. 2 at about 8-1 ii a.m. Thereafter, appellant
No. 2 went in a. 'joep' to appellant No. l in order
to consult the latter. Appelhtnt No. 2 Raw
appellant ~o. I in the latter's court room.
Ho e1tme out within a. few minutes, and told
Gangit BiRhan that the affidavit Rhould he
presenled to appellant No. I. Thereupon, another
·application was written 011 behalf of Didar
~ingh and this was presented to appellant No. l
supported by the affidavit already made on behalf
of Didar Singh. Appellant ~o. I did not, howt·ver, pass n~ccssary orders on tho application till
about 10 a.m., when he mado an endorsement to
the effect that the Tchsil<lar, Sirsa, should take
3 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
133
necessary action. When the application was taken
to the Tehsildar, he noted on it that the Naib
Tehsildar, namely, appellant No. 2 had already left
for the village to deliver possession. Thereupon
Avtar Singh, Bir Singh, Didar Singh and Mastan
Singh went to village Jagmalera where the lands
lay and again met appellant No. 2. The application made to appellant No. 1 with his orders thereon was shown to appellant No. 2. It was alleged
that appellant No. 2 was also shown the wording
of the stay order as received by the party through
a special messenger. Appellant No. 2, however,
replied that he had been ordered to dispossess the
respondent and insisted on his proceeding with the
dispossession.
In his counter-affidavit appellant No. 2 admit. ted .that on May 20, 1958 an application was presented to him by Didar Singh at about 7-40 a.m.
He further admitted that an affidavit in support
of the application was also presented to him.
Appellant No. 2 then made the following significant statements.
"On receipt of these documents I told
Shri Didar Singh that I could not act on the
application and suspend the proceedings for
dispossession unless I was shown the order of
stay alleged to have been made by the High
Court."
Appellant No. 2 explained his conduct by referring
to the background of quarrel and enmity between
the parties which had led to several criminal cases
between them. Appellant No. 2 said in his counteraffidavit that with this background of enmity he
felt that though Didar Singh was an intereste Ii
party, it would not be safe to accept the statements
of facts contained in the application or affidavit
made on behalf of Didar Singh at their face value.
Appellant No. 2 also admitted that he consulted
appellant No. 1, who also advised that it would not
1962
Hoshiar Singh.
. v.
Gwbachan Singh
Das J.
134 SUPREME COUltT REPORTS [1962) SUPP.
1962
lloshiar Singh
V,
·, urbach·;11 Sinth
DasJ.
be safe to aet on the statements made in the application or affidnvit. Appellant ~o. 2 also admitted
that Ganga Bishan Advocate, presented the applications to him. He al8o admitted that the appli·
cation which was filed by Ganga Bishan to appellant Xo. I was received back with the orders of
appellant No. I thereon at a.bout 6 p.m. on :\Ia.y 20,
l\158, while appellant No. 2 was returning from the
village. Appellant No. ~denied that he was shown
the wording of the stay order of the High Court. He
admitted, however, that he was asked uot to proceed with delivery of possession on account of the
High Court. Appellant No. I. also made similar
statements in his counter-affidavit. He admitted
that at about 9 a. m. on llfav 20, 1958
an a.pplillation oupported
by iiffidavit wus
ma.do to him on behalf of Didar Singh imd he then
endorsed the application to the Tehsilda.r for
necessary action.
Unfortunately, the applications which were
made to appell!Lnts I and 2 have not been filed and
we do not know tho precise eontents of the two
applications. We have, howt:>ver, afTidavits made
on behalf of Dida.r Singh. Teja Singh, Ganga Bishan
and Avta.r Singh. The learned Advocate for the
parties have taken.us through those affidavits. The
a.Jgument presented on behalf of the appellants is
that though thoy knew of thc extension of the stay
order in Didar Singh's case by reason of the
application and affidavit filed on his behalf before
thom, they did not know that a similar extensiou of
the stay order had been granted by the High
Court in the other ca;ies as well. This argument
has been pressed before us with some vehemence
and we proceed now to consider it. It is worthy
of note that such an argument which goes to the
very root of tho matter was not presented to the
High Court. It is not disputed that "disobedience
of a. judgmcn t or order requiring a porson to do
a.ny a.ct other than tho payment of money, or to
3 S.C.R. SUPREME COUH,'f REPORTS
135
abstain from doing anything i~ a cont.empt of court
punishable by attachment or committ,al" ; but
disobedience, it is argued, if it is to be punishable
as a contempt, must be wilful ; in other words, the
party against whom a proceeding by way of contempt is taken must know t:ii.e order before it can
be said that he has disobeyed it. It is somewhat
surprising that if the stand of the appellants
know
of the
was that they did not
order made by the High Court on May 19,
1958, in the respondent's case, such a point was
not urged in the High Court. Falshaw, J., (as he
then was) said in his judgement that it was not in
dispute before him that 011 the morning of May 20,
1958, both the appellants were informed that an
extension of the stay order upto May, 23, 1958,
had been granted by the High Court. This statement of the learned Judge must have reference to
tho case of the respondent which he was considering.
Apart, however, from the point that such an argument on behalf of the two appellants was not presented in the High Court, it appears to us that on
the affidavits made available to the Court, the only
reasonable infer~nce is that though the application
and the affidavit were made on behalf of Didar
Singh, both the appellants were informed that the
High Court had granted an extension of the stay
order in all the cases. It is admitted on both 8ides
that there were three cases in which deli very of
possession had to be given of lands in village Jagmalera. It is also not seriously in dispute that on
May 9, 1958, appellant No. 1 made an order directing that delivery of possession should be given to
the allottees of their respective areas and persons
in unauthorised occupation would be dispossessed.
On May 16, 1958 three writ petitions were made
which were placed before the Chief Justice who
made an interim order of stay lasting for three days.
On May 19, 1958 the writ petitions were placed before a Division Bench for admission and that Bench
t962
Hoshiar Singh
v.
Gurbachan Singh
Dat J,
136 SUPREME COURT REPOI~TS (1962J SUPP.
1961
HoJhiar Singh
••
Ourbachan Singh
j),,, J.
extended the stay order till May !!3, 1958. These
are the admitted facts. It is also admitted that
the respondent Gurbachan Singh did not appear
before the appellants on May 20, 19ii8, a fact which
has been emphasised by the learned Advocate for
the appellants. Let us, however, seo what the
affidavits filed in the case show. Teja Singh said
in his affiJavit that Harbans Singh Gujral, who
was the advocate acting on behalf of the petitioners
in all the cases, told him on the telephone on
May 19, 1958 that the High Court had extended
the stay order in all the cases upto May 23, 1958.
Teja ~ingh iiccompa.nied Didar Singh, Ganga
Biahan, Mastan Singh and others to the village on
.illay 20, HJ68, and he said that au application was
mado to appelle.nt No. 2 in which it was stated that
the stay order had been extonded by the High Court.
The affidavit of Ganga llishan is very eignificant in
this connection. He said that on May ~O, 1958,
ho drafted the application which was later ma.de
to appellant No. 2. Ganga Bishan said that it was
stated to appellant No. 2 th:it the stay ordor made
by the High Court related to all tho cases of village
Ja.gmalera. He further said that appellant ~o. 2
was informed that stay of delivery of possession
had been extended by the High Court upto May 23,
1958 ; appellant No. 2, ho,vever, wanted to be
shown the order of the lI igh Court ; thereupon an
affidavit of Didar Singh to the effect that tho stay
order had been extended by the High Court upto
:May 23, 1958, was filed. Ganga Bishan also said
that appellant No. I was also informed that the
High Court had i.xtended the stay order upto May
23, 1958. The affidavits made on behalf of Didar
Singh and A vtar Singh were also to the same effect.
·In view of theso affidavits we find • it very
difficult to hold that the appellants knew of the
stay order only in Didar Singh's
case but
did not know of the stay order in the other
cases.
It is worthy of note here that
3 S.C.R.
-
•
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
137
in the counter-affidavits filed on behalf of the appellants the Doint that was made on their behalf was
that they. considered it unsafe to rely on the applications and affidavits made, in view ot the background
of enmity between the parties. The two appellants
did not say in their counter-affidavits that they came
to know of the stay order only in one case and not
in the others. .:Such a point does not appear to have
been specifiqally made on behalf of the appellants
at any stage of the proceedings in the High Court.
Therefore, we have come to the conclusion that the
appellants knew of the order of the High Court
in all the cases and it is not correct to say that the
appellants knew of the order of the High Court
only in one case and not in the others. We find it
difficult to believe that Ganga Bishan would not
tell the appellants that the High Court had extended the stay order in all the three cases of the village
Ganga Bishan says in his affidavit that he did tell
the appellants of the extension of the stay
order in all the three cases and there was no counter-affidavits on behalf of the appellants traversing the statements made by Ganga Bishan. We
must, therefore, overrule the first point urged on
behalf of the appellants.
The second point which has been urged on
behalf of the appellants is that in the absence of
an official communication of the order, they were
justified in not acting on what they came to
know from interested parties and their advocate.
The learned Advocate for the appellants has
submitted that in a case of this nature, before
wilful disobedience of the order of the High Court
could . be imputed against the appellants, it
was legally essential that the order should be
officially communicated or served on the appellants and in the absence of such communioation
or service, the proceeding for contempt must fail.
We are unable to accept this contention as correct.
1962
lioshiar Sinqh
••
Gurbacf1an Singh
Das J.
138 SUPREl\IE COURT HEPORTS [1962] SUPP.
1962
H oshiar Sfr1vh
Tho legal position ha.~ been very succinctly put
by Oswald:
.
v.
Owbachan Singh
Das J,
"The judgment or order should be served
on the party personally, except in the following cases: (I) prohibitive orders, the drawing
up of which ii! not completed; (2) orders embodying an undertaking to do an act by a
named day; (3) orders to answer interrogatories or for discovery or inspection of
documents: (4) where an order for substituted
service has been ma.de; (ii) where the res·
pondent has evaded service of the order ......
In order to justify committal for breach
of a prohibitive order it is not. necessary
that the order should havo been served upon
the party against whom it has been granted,
if it bo proved that he had notice of the
order aliunde, as hy telegram, or rtewspaper
report, or otherwise, and knew that it was
intended to be enforced, or if ho consented
to the order, or if he was present iii Court
when the order was pronounced, or when
the motion was made, although he loft
before tho order was pronounced."
(Oswald's Contempt of Court, 3rd Edn. pp. 199 and
:!03). The order in the present case was a
prohibitory
order and if thn
appellants
knew that the High Court had prohibited
delivery of possession till May 23, 1958, it
was undoubtedly the duty of the appellants
to carry out that order. Wo <lo not think that
the appellants can take up the plea that as the
order had not been officially communicated to
them, they were a.t liberty to ignore it. The appellants were officers whoso duty it was to uphold the law and if they 'knew that a valid order
had been ma.de by the High Court staying delivery
of possession, they disobeyed that order at their
peril. There may be circumstances where officials
-
3 s.c.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
139
entrusted with the duty of carrying out a legal
order may have valid reasons to doubt the authenticity of the order conveyed to them by interested
parties and in those circumstances it may be said
that there was no wilful disobedience of the order
made. We do not, however, think that the appel·
!ants in the present case had any real justification
for doubting the authenticity of the order made
by the High Court, even though the order had
not been officially communicated to them. The
appellants knew that an interim order of stay had
been made by the High Court on May 16, 1958;
that order was in force till May 19, 1958. Thereafter the appellants were informed not merely by
interested parties but by an Advocate, who was
an officer of the Court, that the High Court had
extended the stay order npto May 23, 1958. A
formal application supported by an affidavit was
made to that effect. Despite the reason alleged
by the appellants that there was a background of
enmity between the parties, we do not think that
the appellants have given any good reasons on
which they were entitled to doubt the authenticity
of the order communicated to them by Ganga
Bishan, an Advocate acting on behalf of Didar
Singh. It is worthy of note that the appellants
did not deliver possession in Didar Singh's case.
They were content with delivering possession in
the case of the respondent only. Taking into
considerations all these circumstances we are satisfied that there was in this case in the eye of the law,
a wilful disobedience of the order of the High
Court staying delivery of possession, even though
the appellants might have wrongly but honestly
believed that it was not safe to act on the information given to them by Ganga Bishan.
The learned Advocate for the appellants has
referred us to a num her of decisions, English
and Indian, relating to mandatory orders, or
1962
Ho$hiar Singh
Y.
G-urbachan Singh
Das ;T.
140 SUPREi\IE COGH.T REPORTS [1962] SUPP.
191iZ
..
Hoshia• 8in:h
111rhf'fcha11 Si11:h
DaJ J.
orders for the payment of money, 'or orders
which require under the rules of the Court
tu be served in particular manner. In re: Holt '
(wi lnfm11)( 1); Ex-parte Linvley ('); In re: Tuck
ilfurch v. £oosemore ("); Dwijendra Krishan Datta v.
Surendra Nath :\'ay Choudhury ('): and Gordon v.
Gordon('). In those docisions it was held that
it was necessary to havo the order properly served
before charging a person with disobcrlioncc of it.
We do nut think th&t those decisions are in point,
because we are dealing with a prohibitory order
and in tho matter of a prohibitory order it is
well-settled that it is not neces.-iary that the order
should have been served upon the piuty against
whom it has been granted in order to justify
committal for breach of such an order, provided
it is proYed that the person complained against
had notice of the order aliunde. The distinction
between prohibitory orders and orders of an atlirma.tive nature wus adverted to in N. Baksi v. 0. /(_
Ghosh(') and a largo number of decisions were
referred to in support of the rule that in respect
of a prohibitory order, service of the order was
not essential for founding an action in contempt.
We do not think that any useful purpose will be
served by examining thoRe decisions over a.gain.
We are content to adopt for tho purposes of this
case the rule as succinctly put by Oswald and
quoted earlier -in this judgment.
Lastly, our attention has been drawn to tho
statements made by the respondent in para. 22
of his petition to tho effect that though appellant
No. 2 ma.de a report about delivery of possession
in respect of the land of the respondent, no actual
dispossession could be made because cotton · crop
was standing on the land a.nd a. large number
of pJJrsons had gathered there. The argument
before us is that if, according to the respondent
(1) (1879) 11 Ch. D. 168.
(3) (1906! 1 Ch. b92.
(5) (1946) 1 All B.R. Zo\6.
(21 (1879) 13 Cb. D. 110.
(4) A.1.R. 1927 Calculta 548.
(6) A.1.R. 1957 Patna 528.
3 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
141
himself, no actual dispossession took place then
this is not a fit case in which action for contempt
should be taken against the appellants. It bas
been submitted on behalf of the appellants that
contempt proceedings are of an extraordinary
nature and the Court should be reluctant to
exercise its extraordinary power if the action complained of is of a slight or trifling nat11re and
does not cause any substantial loss or prejudice to
the complainant. It has been argued that if the
respondent himself said that he ha.cl not been actually dispossessed, then there was no reason for
proceeding against the appellants for contempt of
court. Secondly, it is pointed out that the appellants offered an apology in case the High Court
held that they should have taken action on the
information given to them by Ganga Bishan. As
to the second submission, it is enough to point
out that in a matter relatin~ to contempt of court,
there cannot be both justification and apology.
(See M. Y. Shareef v. The Hon'ble Judges of the
High Court of Nagpu.r ( 1). As to the first submission we may draw attention. to the statements
of appellant No. 2 in para. 21 of his affidavit in
which he said that so far as the respondent's land
was concerned, possession was delivered to B11dh
Singh. This statement of appellant N"o. 2 clearly
shows that the two appellants took the very
action which was prohibited by the High Court
by its order dated ·May 19, I !158. We are, therefore, unable to accept the submission that there
was no foundation for taking action against the
appellants for contPmpt of court. This disposes
of all the points urged -0n behalf of the appellants.
As to the punishment imposed, the l(larned
Judge took into consideration that the appellants
wrongly but honestly might have believed that
thev were not bound 1o hold their hands in the
absence of an official communi~tlon of the order
(ll [1955] l S.C.R. 757.
1962
Hoshiar Singlp
••
Gurbachan 8 ing
Dai J,
142 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1962) SUPP.
1962
Hoshiar S1'ngh
V,
Gurbachan Singh
DasJ.
Rathuhar Dayal,],
of the High Court. That belief a1forded no defence to the chl\rge of contempt of court, bnt. was
a consideration relevant to the sentf>nce. Jn our
opinion, there are no ground~ for interference
with the order of the High Court. 'l'he appC'al
accordingly fails and is dismissed.
J.-I have had the previlcge of perusing thP ,Judgment of my learned
brother S. K. Das, J., bnt regret. my inability to
hold that tho appellants committed contempt of
Court.
RAOHQ!AR
DAYA!.,
I need not repeat the fact.I' set out in the majority judgment.
No conviction for committing contempt of
Court r.an be based on the finding of the High
Court that the appellants delivered poeses~ion believing that they were not bound to hold their
bands in the absenr.e of the official communication
of the High Court's orckr. The finding mrans that
they dPlivered po~SPesion not in defiance of the High
Court's ordN, but bPcause they honestly thought.
that in the absence of the official communication of
the order, they could uot act on the supposition
that the original stay ordn. whieh was to be effective up to !\fay rn, 1958, continued to he effective.
If in their honest opinion no stay order existed at
the time, their conduct cannot be said t<i amount to
\\ ilful disobedience of the High Court's 01 der extending the st.ay order up to :\fay 23, 1958. No
question of wilful disobedience can arise when the
very existeneo of the <'rdcr is not believed. The
question of obedience or disobediPnce arises only
after the party knows of the order and if tho
party docs not know the order, 110 such question can
arise.
The allegations in the petition by the first
responcknr, filed in t.he High Court, did not make
out that the appellants delivered po~session, tho
3 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
143
delivery of which had been stayed upto May 23,
1958, by the High Court by its order dated May
l!J, 1958. TbiA is clear fro'll the statements in
paragraphs 21 and 22 of the petition. They are:
1962
Hoshit1r Sinrh
v.
Gurbachan Singh
R.i:hubar Dayal J,
-·
"21. However, when actually he attempted to start the work of dispossession, he found
that a large number of people were collected
at the spot and apprehending that the police
force already taken to the spot might not be
sufficient to cope up with the situation if
some trouble arose, he withdrew from the
spot.
22. That although in the land possessed·
by the petitioner in Jag Malera, cotton crop
was standing in some of the fields and no
proceedings for dispossession of the petitioner
could be taken by respondent .No. 2 on
account of the presence of a large number of
persons at the spot, respondent No. 2,
however, made som<' report later on that the
petitioner had been actualy dispossessed of his
lands and the same was given over to Budh
Singh at the spot. In the other cases,
however, he made a report that he could not
deliver possession on account of the presence
of a mob at the spot and that the police force
with him being too small, was not sure to cope
up with the situation."
These paragraphs can only mean that appellant No. 2 attempted to start the work of dispossession, but did not proceed further, and withdrew
from the spot iu view of an apprehension of breach '
of peace and that be made some report of a fictitious kind to the effect that the petitioner had been
actmclly dispossessed of his land and possession had
been given over to Budh Singh at the spot.
It was om phasized that actual possession could not
have been delivered on account of the standing
cotton crop. It follows that even on the statements
144 SUPREME OOURT REPORTS [1962] SUPP.
1962
Hoshiaf' Singh
v,
(;urba,han S£r.gh
Rag}_ubar Da;al J.
of the first respondent in his petition for action
against the appellant~ for contempt of Court, there
waR no assertion that they had disobeyed tho stay
order by <.lelivering possession to Budh Singh. In
the absence of such an assertion, no itction could
have been taken or ought to have been taken against
the appelbnta.1
Contempt procei>dings are criminal or quasicriminal procPedin11s. It is essential that the nccusation made against the opposite part.v by the peti- ·
tionPr for taking action against him should be
preeiRe and Rhould dearly make ont that the
oppositr partv had, by some specific act, committod
contempt of Court. The conviction of the opposite
party must rest on the facts nlh~ged and proved by.
tho petitioner. A conviction mny also rest on the
sole admisgion of the allPged contemner if that
eRtnblishcR his commit.ting contempt of Court, but,
in that <·ase, his admission should be taken aR a
whole and not thnt its incriminating part be taken
out of the contP:i:t. and mado the baRis for conviction.
It is immaterial that appellant ~o. 2 st:tted in
his reply that actual nosRPssion oft.ho land in the
unnuthr;rised possession of thP first reRpondent was
delivered to Budh Singh and that at the time no
cotton crop waA Rtandin!!'. and that the respondent
was adopting a contradictory position.
The High Court did not give any finding on this
question. Tt. simply ~aid in its judgment, d1w t-0
the misr<',ailing of the allegations in the petition.
"fn spite of thiR fact it is nllegcd that in
the village the ~aib Tehsildar formally disposseRscd the present petitiouer and handed
ovpr hiR Janel to one Bndh Singh .. .''
The respondent made no stritP.mcnt about the
Naib Tehsil<lar formall.v dispo~scssing him and
handing over thl' land to Bndh Singh.
•
3 S.C.R.
~
,.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
145
1962
A clear.cut finding on the disputed fact
whether actual p'.lsiession h'!.d been delivered or not
Hoshiar Singh
v.
is not to be given in s11mm,1ry proceedings for con- Gurbaehan
Sim1h
tempt of Court.
Raghuhar DaJal J.
If actual possession had been delivered to
Budh Singh, there must have been some good
reason for the respondent not to admit it in his petition and that can only be that in any future dispute
where the question of possession of the respondent or
of the Budh Singh be in question, the respondent be
not confronted with his own admission in his petition .
and affidavit accompanying it. 'It may be mention-·
ed that identical statements where made in paragaraphs 21 and 22 of the affidavit. There might be
some other reason for the respondent not to admit
the delivery of possession, but it is clear thnt the
respondent did not come to Court with clean hands
and, in the circumstances, proceedings for contempt
of Court on his application was wrong exercise of
discretion. However, the mlj.in fact remains that
no allegation was made in the petition that the
respondents had delivered possession.
The appellant~ were not served, by the time ·
the delivery of possesion may be ~upposed to have
taken place, with the order of the High Court
extending the stay order up to May 23, 1958. The
telegram sent by the counsel of Gurbachan Singh
from Chandigarh, recached the first appellant, the
Sub Divisional Offieer, at 1-30 p.m., on .May
10, 1958, and any order of his on it did not reach
appellant No. 2 till 6 p.m., by which time, according
. to him,, possession had been delivered. The
formal stay order from the High Court reached
much later.
It may not be necessary to serve prohibitive
order on the party against whom it is granted, but
that party must have notice of the order before it
can be expected to obey it can be committed for
contempt of Court for disobeying it. This is what
146
SuPREME COURT REPORTS [1962) SUPP.
1962
o~wald states at pago 203 of his book on 'Contempt
lfoshiar Singh
of Court', III Edition. He says:
·
"In order to justify committal for brrad1
of a pohibitivc order it lli not nccc~sary
that tho order should have been 8Cl'P'cl
upon the party against whom it has been
granted, if it be proved that ho had notice of
the order aliunde, kl! by tcfogram, or nnw8paper report, or otherwiso, .... "
It would appear from the later part of the observation that it was 8ufficient that the party coneenH·u
· gets notice of the prohibitive order by any mc~ns,
specially by tdegram or 11ews1nper report. This
is however not what was held in tho cases referred
to by Oswald in support of his statement. Xotic<>
to the party concern.,<l, of the prohibitive order. in
those cases was communieat.Cd by the Court
through it.s regular procedure or by a Solicitor of
the Court.
In In re Bryant (1) the parties conc<~rned wern
informed by the solicitor of the judgn1ent-debtor
that the debtor h:id filed a liquidation petition in
the London Bankrnptc:y Court and that applicat.ion
would he made at the next 8itting of the Court to
restrain further p1occcdings under the execution.
The auctione:er cunccrncd received a telcirram fr<,111
Bryant's solicitors referring to the parties to t lw
case and stating that injunction staying sale nlld
further pro<~'cdings had been granted that morning
and· that the order would be served as soon as possi.
ble. The auctioneer, however, proceeded with th•.'
sale. It was in tlwse circumstances th:i.t tbo part i<·s
concerned wtrc held to have disobeyed t lw
order of the Court and to have committed its
contempt. The ~olicitor was an officer of the
Court.
This case i~ no authority for the propositiu 11
that information conveyed to the party concnrnc d
v.
Gut6cchan Sinyh
Rathubar Do; al J.
(I) 1..R. (137G) 4 Ch. D. 93.
3S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
· 147
by telegram from a person who is not an officer of
the Court would amount to the requisite
notice . of the prohibitive order by the party con·
cerned;
,•
In Ex parte Langley, Ex parte Smith, In re
Bishop (1) the facts were as follows. Bishop filed a
liquidation petition in the London Bankruptcy Court
on August 6, 1879. The same day the Court passed
an order restraining until the 8th of September,
further proceedings in several actions whieh had
been commenced against the debtor and, iriter alia,
restraining the sheriff of Kent, his officers and
servants, from taking any further proceedings in an
action which had been brought against the debtor
by Messrs. Wade and Thurston. The sheriff had
fixed the sale of the attached furniture of the debtor
on the 6th of August, having adjourned it from the
5th in order to afford an opportunity to the debtor
to pay the debt. Smith was the sheriff's officer who
was in charge of the sale. His assistant, Emmerson
and Langle~y, an rmctioneer, were to carry out the
sale. Emmerson had directions to,start the sale at
11 o'clock and not a moment later. Langley,
however, postponed the same to 12 o'clock, on his
own responsibility, clue to paucity of persons present.
Langley received a telegram from one Matthews,
the manager of the hotel in which the debtor was
carrying on business as a licensed victualler, saying:
.
"Smith gone to Canterbury. You had
better stop sale on your own account, as I know
it is all right."
The auctioneer was also informerl by the debtor's
son and another person between 11 and 12 o'clock
that the debtor would come down by the mid-day
train from London with the money to pay the execution debt. The sale was again put off to 1 o'clock
when it did start. After a few lots had been sold,
Emmerson received a telegram purporting to bl)
{I) L.R. (1979J 13;ca. D.
l!O
1962
Hosloiar Sirigh
v.
Gur6ocllon Sinth
Rag/IU6ar Doyal J,
148 SUPREME COUHT HEPORTS (1Vli2] SUPP.
1962
HQl/iiar Sirith
v,
Gur6acl,lln,, Sin(1h
_,
~
'
-~
R•ghubor Da)'dl J,
Irom Learyod & Co., Solicitors, London, to the
sheriff's officer in possession stating:
"Take notiee, the London Court. of Bankruptcy has marle an order rcstrl\ining you from
selling or taking any further proccedin.gs in the
action against Bishop".
,
The telegram was shown to Langley who thought it
to ho a ruqe on the part of the debt0r but was
propared to stop the sale temporarily till instructions from Smith. Emmerson sent a telegram to
Smith saying:
"Langley just received telegram to stop
sale. Shall we proceed? People are waiting
your rep Iy. "
Smith's reply was:
"If telegrnm to Langley drws not state
Defenrlant filrd petition or morn'y paid, sell
at. on en."
The sale then•aftnr proceeded. L'.tngle_v and Smith
were CCJmmitted fur contempt. hy B<Leon CJ. But
on appeal they were <Lcquitted. ,James, L.• T., said at
pago 116:
"With regard to the sheriff's officer, he
does not ~e.eni to have hecn a pa.rty to the
alleged contempt :it all, bcc<l.U'e I do not think
the mere fact CJf tlw t.clcgram is sufficient to
bring home to him any parti<,ipatio11 in the
suppose<l con l l'Dl}l t . "
He further ~aid at p:Lge 117, in C'llH<irlcring the C<l.~"
of tho auctioneer.
"It appears to me that he might have
t;Lkcn some st<'ps (though I do not kno\\' what
steps I should IHwe taken if I had been i11 his
position) to ascertain whether an 01dtir harl
really been made by the Court. Perhaps some
auctione.ern would ha.rn dont• so. But he has
tak•m upon himself to swear positively (and he
3 S.C.R.
•
SUPREllffi COURT REPORTS
149
has not been cross-examined) that which Lord
Eldon, in Kimpton v. Eve (1813 2 V. & B. 349=
35 E.R. 352), held to be sufficient. He swears
that he did not believe that there had been
any proceedings whatever in the Bankruptcy
Court, or that.any such order had been made.
A person in such a position, and a sheriff's
officer is placed in great difficulty upon receiving a telegram of this kind, knowing nothing
at all of the person who may have gone to the
post office and sent it, a telegram which might
just as well have been sent by the debtor or
by Matthews, or any one else .on behalf of the
debtor, in the name of Messrs. Learoyd. I
am very far from saying that notice of an
order cannot be given by telegram. But it is
very difficult to commit for contempt where a
man says that which the auctioneer does here,
under circumstances which certainly give
colour to his assertion, and there is some
amount of probability that he may, having
regard to what had already taken place that
day, not have belived that any order had been
made by the Court, and have had no suspicion
whatever that he was disobeying any order
of the Court when he continued the sale."
Thesinger, L. J., said at p. ll9:
" ... I in no way dissent from the proposi- .
tion laid down by hirn(Bacon, C.J.) in this case
and also in In re Bryant (supra), that, under
certain circumstances, a telegram may constitute such a notice of an order of a Court as to
make a person who disregards the notice and
acts in contravention of the order, liable for
the consequences of a contempt of Court...... .
But the question in each case, and depending
upon the particular circumstances of the case
must be, was there or was there not such a
notice given to the person who is charged with
1962
Hoihiar Singh ·
v. ,·,
Gurbachan Sinih- ,
RajhUb•rlDay«.l 3:,,.,,·,:
150 SUPREME COURT REPOHTS [1962] SUPP.
Hosliiar Sint•
v.
0UT6odr411 Sin1A
R.,lu.Hr D•_;.i J,
contempt of Court that you can infer from tho
facts that he had notico in fact of tl1c order
which had be;;n made• Aud, in a matter of
this kind, bcarirg in miml that the liberty of
the subject is to be afTcctcd, I think that those
who assert that there was such a uotice ought
to prove it beyond reasonalilc doubt..''
He further stated at page 121:
"But, on the other hand, he has positively sworn that, coupling what had happened
before with tho telegram, hl' bmw. fide believed
that he was not hound to act upon the telegram which he had received, and that (.here
had been no proceedings which would justify
him in stopping tho sale. He has not been
cro11-examined, and nothing has bcc11 proved
to show that his affidavit. is 11ot true. Under
such circumstances the obscrrntions of Loni
Eldon, in K implmi v. l~i:e (supra) seem to me
pertinent and material, and I may add that in
a case like tho perscnt the hcnPfit of any doubt
ought to be given to the person charged with
contempt."
'fhe further remarks of .James L. J., at page I ~2
point out the proper way of communicating a notiC'c
about injunction orders to tlw parties concerned by
the solicitor of the party obtaining tho order from
the Court. He says:
"I wish to add this, that when parties who
obtain an injunction wish to cornmunicato it
by telegram, there is a very obvious mo<lc by
which thoy can prevent difficulties like this.
If tho solicitor, instead of tc]('gmphing to the
sheriff's officer, were to telegraph to some
solicitor a.s his agent at the place, and tell him
to go and give notice of the order, then the
person affoctod would have tho responsibility
3 S.C.R.
151
of an officer of the Court for what he was
doing."
This case well illustrates the difficulties of the
parties against whom a prohibitive order is made
when they are informeJ by a telegram ab:mt these
orders having been made by the Uourt even when
the telegram was from a solicitor of the Court. The
diffioulties would be still greater if the telegram was
one from a person who is not a solicitor and therefore _an officer of the Court.
In The Seraglio(') notice of the issue of warrant
which was subsequently disobeyed was sent by telegram by the marshal to the custom-house officer at
.Plymouth who went on board the ::leraglio to inform those in charge of the ship. The master of
the Seraglio, however by the owner's order, left
Plymouth with the custom-house officer on. board.
The warrant was served on him subsequently. Sir
Jamea Hannen said at page 121:
"It must be understood that a litigar. t
cannot be disregard a notice sent to him by
telegraph by an officer of the Court."
In none of the cases referred to, a pMty is
said to have received information of the Court's
injuuction order through any source having no
connection with the Court passing the order. I
would not like an extension of this practice of holding a person guilty of contempt even though he is
not served with the order, to cases in which his
alleged know ledge of the order is dependent 011 the
veracity of the witnesses examined by a party
praying for action against the other. Conviction
for contempt of Court must depend on unimpeachable evidence of the knowledge of the alleged
contemner about the order said to have been disobeyed.
In support of the note th11t it could be proved
that the party proceeded again~ had notfre of the
(I) L.R. (1885) 10 P.D. 120.
1962
Ho1hiar Single
v.
Gurbachan Sin1h
Raghuhar Doyal J.
152 SUPREME COURT REPORT.::; [Hiuc] SUPP.
JJ62
IJ1shi<r Sin:h
v.
Qurbacha11 Sinth
l!qhobar D•ylll ./.
order by newspaper report or otherwise, Oswald
has rcforred to Daniell's Chancery Practice, Vol. I.
Edition 7, page 1368. That edition is not available, but in the 8th edition of that book, Vol. II,
at page 1413, is noted the practice in urgent cases
thus:
'"In such (urgent) caaes, the practice is to
serve the party enjoined personally with
notice in writing that the injunction has been
granwd, and that the order will be drawn up
and served as soon as it can bo paased through
tho offices ; or else to procure 11. transcript of
the minutes of the order signed by the Registrar, and to serve the same porsonally by
delivering a oopy of it, showing at the same
time the original transcript su signed ; and
either the
notice or the copy of tho
minutes will be sufficient to render the defendant ur other person enjoined guilty of a
con tern pt, if he acta in opposition to the injunction."
I do not find any reference that knowledge of the
party proceeded against through a newspaper report
or otherwise, and not through Court, has bet1n considered sufficient for contempt proceedings.
Again, at page 14HI, have been mentioned
certain other means through which tho party pro·
ceedod against could have been informed of the
injunction order. They are practically those summarized in Oswald's noto.
In the appeal before us, I am not satisfied that
tho appellants had been informed that the High
Court had passed an order staying the delivery
of possession in proceedings on the writ petition
filed by respondent Gurbachan Singh. The communication made to tb'3 appellants about the stay
order of the High Court is said to be through the
applications and affid:1vit presented by Didar Singh
to tho appellants on May 20, 1958, and through a
3 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT l~EPOBTS
153
chit said to have come from the advocate of the
High Court regarding the injunction order.
Didar Singh had put in another writ petition
against his threatened dispossession by appellant
No. 1 through appellant No. 2. There is said to
have been a third writ petition by another person
praying for similar relief. All these petitions were
separately dealt with by the High Court.
Separate stay orders were passed on them. These
five affidavits, in view of their contents, are not
sufficient to prove that the appellants had been
informed through these documents that the High
Court had extended the stay orders in all the three
cases, viz., the cases on the writ applications of
Gurbachan Singh, Didar Singh aRd another third
person. No statement is made in any of the affidavits that the applications and .affidavits presented
to the appellants mentioned that the High Court
had stayed the delivery of possession in all the
three cases. It is not stated by Didar Singh and
Mastan Singh what was written on the chit sent
by the advocate of the High Court and whether
that chit related to the order in the case of Didar
Singh alone or referred to the orders in all the
cases.
As Didar Singh claimed a receipt for the
presentation of the application and affidavit to
appellant No. 2, the latter, after consulting the
prosecuting inspector, went to appellant No. l for
consultation and was advised to return the application to Didar Singh if he insisted Qn getting a
receipt. The application and the affidavit were
therefore then returned to one Ganga Bishan.
The chit alleged to have been sent by the
High Court advocate has not been produced. The
application presented to appellant No. 2 in the
village and returned by him in the Sub-Divisional
Officer's Court, though presumably in possession·
of Didar Singh, has not been filed. They would
have indicated wl\_at their contents were. That
Hoshiar Sinzh.
·v. ,,,
Gurhtuhan 'Sin:h
Raghubat. Dayal J.
i54 Sl.JPREME COUHT REPORTS (llH>iJ SUPP.
1962
Hoahiar ~ingh
••
01r1botlun Singh
ll•gl.uhar Dayal J,
woulcl have Leen the best evidence of what was
conveyed lo appellants Noa. I and 2. Ganga
Bishan's statement that he hacl drafted the uppJi .
cation addressed L.1 appellant No. 2 to the off< ct
that the st:1y order i;;suerl by the High Court in Jag
1\lalera Namdhari cases had bcim extended, is not
the best evidence of what the application (a fair
copy presumably). aetm1lly contained, an application which is in the possession of Didar Singh. Of
courso, the application and aflidavit presented to
the Sub-Di\"isional Officer, are in the possession of
the State. No att{)mpt was made by thn respondent to summon them or to file c!'rt-iJied copies of
those documentll in these proct'cdings. In the aboence of the best evidence, the documents, I am
not prepared to hold that the application and aflidavit filed by Didar Singh must have referred to
all tho cases. !'\ ormally, he had no business to
refer to the Rtav urders in the other cases and to
make prayc·r fpr thu stay of ddivory of possession
in all th<' c·aoes. H" had to restrict his application
am! affidavit to his own case.
Further, what.r·ver was st<tlNl in the •1pplication and the affidavit-, in the natme of things, was
not on thl' ba~is of pt·rsonal Jrnowlerlg<' o(Didar
Singh .. Didar ~ingh himself <lid not even have the
telephonic comrn11nic1.tion with hi8 cu1111sel at
Chandigarh. The telephonic communication was
between Teja Singh and that counsel. Appellant
No. 2 states-and I see no reason to. doubt that
statement-that in the background of the faets
about the possession over the Janel hC' clid not consider it n.dvisable n.ncl safe to ac<'ept the statement
of facts containccl in tlw n.pplication or affidavit
on its face value.
Lastly, the presence of Ganga. Bisl.1an, A<lv~
cate, on the occasions of the prescntmg of the apph.
cation and afiidavit to appellants Nos. l and 2, is
3 s.c.:R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
155
stated in a!J the affidavits. But it is only in paragraph 5 of Didar Singh's affidavit that it is stated
that Balm Ganga Bishan, Advocate, prrsrnted the
application and the affidavit to 1he Sub-Divisional
Officer. Ganga Bishan himself does not state so.
It is not stated anywhere that Ganga BiHhan had
been engaged ·as counsel by Didar Singh. It would
appear a bit unusual that in the presence of a
duly appointed advocate, applications and affidavits be presented by Didar Singh personally and
not through his counsel. On the basis of the state·
mrnts and the affidavits, I am not prepared to hold
that Gangr• 13ishan was the duly appointed counsel
for Didar Singh. He may be accompanying Didar
Singh like other persons on account of his in lerest
in the matter.
\t
\
I
I
\
I
I
i!
Fmther, any request by him to the Sub-Divisional Officer for pas~ing the necessary ordcis.on
the application of Didar Singh, as stated by him in
paragraph 3 of his affidavit, cannot lead to the conclusion that he profrssi0nally represented Didar
Singh, as similar requests were made, according to
his own affidavit, by the other persons also, who
had accompanied Didar Singh to the Sub-Divisional
Officer's Court. The Sub-Divisional Officer, therefore, could not have treated his request to be a
statement of fact about the High Court's extending
the stay order up to May 23, 1958.
Ganga Bishan does not state that he told the
Court that the High Court had extended the duration of the stay order or that he requested the
Sub-Divioional Officer, who is also the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, to stay the delivery of possession
in view of the application filed by Didar Singh. He
Bimply states:
"Several requests were made to the
Sub-Divisional Magistrate by us that necessary orders on the application presented . to
1962
Hoshiar S1ngh
••
Gurhachan Singh
Raghubar Dayal J,
156 SCPHE!IJ}:; ·couHT REl'ORTii (l!J62] SUPP.
1!16~
Ho•hiar Si 11:11
••
Gurbochon S-i11gh
Ratf1ubar Doyal J.
him he made and the Munaging Officer be
called back."
Ev~n if Ganga Bishan had st1itcd that the
High Court had extended the order, his st1itcment
too, had no better value when he could not speak
about that order on tho basis of person~] knowledge
or on the basis of any communication to him by
the Advocate of the High Court. Ho has not sta·
ted in his affidavit that he was present whe11 the
order wa;i passed or that he had received 1rny communication from the High Court Advocate. I am
therefore of opinion that his merely accompanying
Didar Singh and others did not invest any greater
weight to the correctness of the statements made in
the application aud the afiidavit.
The public officers are not to blame if they do
not take at face value what is contained iu deliberatley prepared applications and affidavits. I have
already mentioned of tho way in which the crucial
basic fact to be mentioned in tho petition for contempt proceedings against the appellants had not
been mentioned and statements were made in a way
which at. first sight could lead to the impression
that the delivery of possession had been made in
defiance of the order of the High Court.
I am therefore of opinion that it is not established the respondents did not rely on the statements in tho application and the a.flidavit ma/,a firk
because they were bent upon delivering possession
in defiance of the orrlors of the High Court.
I find in this ease that on May 16, orders of
the High Court were obtained for serving the stay
order upon the appellants through the petitionerreapoudent, but no such <Jrdcr was obtained for
· serving the order dated May 19. In view of the
urgency of the matter, the respondent and others
who had obtained extension of the stay orders on
'
3 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS .
157
the 19th could have and should have obtained
similar orders of the High Court for serving them.
If that precaution had been taken again on
May 19, 1958, probably what happened snbsequently
ou the spot and th'3r'3after, would not have taken
place.
I am therefore of opinion that the appellants
committed no contempt of Court, and would allow
their appeal.
1962
Hoshiar Singh
v.
Gurbachan Singh
Raghr,bar Daya/_ J,
BY COURT : In accordance with the opinion
of the majority, the appeal fails and is dismissed.
Appe,al dismissed.
THE NATIONAL UNION OF COMMERCIAL
EMPLOYEES AND ANOTHER
\
}
I
v.
M. R. MERER, INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL,
BOMBAY AND OTHERS
(P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, A. K. SARKAR and
K. N. WANCHOO, JJ.)
.Industrial Dispute-Solicitor's profession-Work of solicitor, if an industry-Dispute with employee-Reference to Tribunal-Oompetence-IndustrialDisputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947),
•. 2 (j).
The respondents were a firm carrying on the work of
solicitors in Bombay. For the years 1956 and 1957 a claim
for bonus was made against them by their employees. Before
the Industrial Tribunal to .which the dispute was referred by
the State Government for adjudication under the provisions
of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, the respondents contended that the profession followed by them was not an industry
within the meaning of s. 2(j) of the Act, that the dispute
raised against them was not an industrial dispute· under the
Act, and that, therefore, the reference made by the Government was incompetent.
Held, that the work of solicitors is not an industry within
the meaning of s. 2(j) of the Industrial Disputes Act, T947
and that, therefore, any dispute raised by the employees of
1962
:l'ebruary 13.
Report an error or ask for masking: grievance@lawgrids.org