KEDAR NATH SINGH versus STATE OF BIHAR
Supreme Court of India | Decided 20 January 1962 | [1962] SUPP. 2 S.C.R. 769 | 1962 INSC 17
Key facts
- Decided
- 20 January 1962
- Bench
- BHUVNESHWAR PRASAD SINHA, S.K. DAS, A.K. SARKAR, N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR, J.R. MUDHOLKAR
- Bench size
- 5
- Case number
- CRIMINAL APPEAL No. 169/1957
- Disposal
- Dismissed
- Citation
- [1962] SUPP. 2 S.C.R. 769
- Neutral citation
- 1962 INSC 17
Text of the judgment
~ S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
769
I96t
framed thereunder which required licences to be
taken out for storage of tobacco and for payment of A. lie ,j/)tfuJhdlr
licence fee in respect thereof and to that extent the Tiu 8tat1v.of Kerola
provisions imposing an obligation to take out
Blah J.
licences and to pay licence fees under the Tobacco
Acts of Travancore and the Cochin States were
superseded and the State of Travancore-Cochin had
no authority to promulgate rules 14, 15 and 16
under the Notification issued in the TravancoreCochin Government Gazett.e dated January 25, 1951,
and to levy licence fee for storage of tobacco.
It is unnecessary to ·consider whether the
remaining provisions of the Travancore and the
Cochin Tobacco Acts and th~ Rules framed thereunder were law correspondirrg with the Central
Excises and Salt Act, 1944.
For these reasons I agree that the appeals be
allowed, and the order passed by the High Court be
set aside. In each petition a writ will issue declaring that the levy of licence fee undPr the Notification dated January 25, 1951, is without authority
of law, and that the State of Travanc.1re-Cochin
do forbear from levying and collecting the licence
fee.
Appeals allowed.
KEDAR NATH SINGH
v.
STATE OF BIHAR
(B. P. SINHA, C,J., s. K. DAS, A. K. SARKAR,
N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGARand J.R. MunHOLKAR, JJ.)
Sedition-Content of-Siatute pa11aliai11g lfeditian and
statement• e-0nduci11g to public mischief-Constitutio11alit11 ofWhetkerinfringesfreedom cf apeech--lndian l'e•al Code, 1860
(Act XLV of 1860), ss. 12!A, 50j-Constitution of India,
Art6. (19)(l}(a}, 19(2).
Secdon 124:\ of the Indian Penal Code which makes
sedition an offence is· constitutionally valid. Though the
section imposes restrictions on the fundam,ntal freedom of
770
1~1
..
li•ti•r N•tA Sin1h
Slldl •f BWir
SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1962) SUPP.
speech and expression, the restrictions are in the interest of
public order and are within the ambit of permissiblr. legislati\'e intrrferrnce with the fundamental right. Th<re is a
confli.ct on the <juestion of the ambit of s. 124A between
decision of the Federal Court and of the Privy Council. The
Federal Court has hdd that words, deeds or writings constitutrd an offence nuder s. 12-!A only when they had the intention
or tendency to disturb public tranquility. to create public
disturbance or to promote disorder; whilst the Privy Council
has taken the view that it was not an essential ingredient of
the offence of sedition under s. 124A that the words etc,
should be intended to or be likely to incite public disorder.
Either view can he taken and supported on good reasonss. If
the view taken by the Federal Court was accepted s. 124A
\vould be use constitutional but if the view of the Privy Council
'''as accepted it would he unconstitutional. It is well settled
that if c~rtain provisions of law construed in one way \\·ould
n1ake then1 cr1nsiste-nt \\·ith the constitution, and another
i11terpretatirin \vould render them unconstitutional, the Court
v.·otild Jean in favour of the former construction. Keeping in
mind the ""'ons for the introduction of•· 124A and the history
of sedirion the ~cction must be so construed as to limit its
application to acts involving intention or tendency to crcat
disorder, or disturbance of law and order; or incitement to
violence.
Niharrndu Dult Majumcla.r v. King Emptror, (1942)
F. C. R. 38, followed.
King Rmptror v. Sada.hivNarayan Bha/erao, (1947) L.R.
74 I.A. 89 and WaUaa Johnson '" The King (1940) A. C. 231,
not followed.
Romes/, T!.apar v. The Stale of Madras. (1050) S. C R.
594. Rrij mu.•han v. Ti.e State of Ddhi. (1950) S. C.R. 605
and R,,mji lo/ Modi v. Th• State U. l'. (1957) S. C.R. 860,
f('ferred to.
,.
The l}:w~aUmmunit11 Company Limited v. The State of
J,•hur, (10.1:1;. S. C R. (,1)3 and R. M. D. Cl,amar6a11gu-a/.a v.
'/'/,., t•,,;,,,, rf India, [1957] S. C.R. 936 applied.
Each one of the c:on<.tituent elements of the offence
of 1~akin.g, pu.blbhi~g or circulating: !ltatements conducing to
public: much 1ef. pur11sh~tble under s . .505 of the Indian Pchal
Code, ~ad reference. tn, ~rid a dirt~ct efrer:t ~n_. the security
of the State nr pulilir; c1r<.1-r. 1-len<:c the provhtons of s. 505
wt-rr clearly s:lvcd by .i\rt. I 111 ~}.
f;nun".u. ArrEJ.L\T1·: .T1•1:1~11w1 ,.,.._ :- f;rimiual
Appeal No. Hill of l!Jli7.
2 s.c.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
771
Appeal by special leave from the judgment
and order dated the April II, 195tS, of the Patna
High Court in Cr. A. No. 445 of 1955.
WITH
Criminal Appeals Nos. 124 to 126of1958.
Appeals from the judgment and order dated
May 16, 1958, of the Allahabad High Court in
Criminal Appeals Nos. 76 and 108 of 1955 and Cr.
M. Writ No. :!~71 of 1955.
Janar<lan Sharma for appellant in Criminal
Appeal No. 169 of 1957 :-The appellant has been
convicted under ss, l 24A and 50.5 Indian Penal
Corle. Both these sections are ultra vires as they
contrayene the provisions of Art. 19(l)(a) of the
Constitution. A speech may disturb public order
or it may not, but both are made punishable under
section 124A. The section hits speeches of both
varieties-permissible speeche.s and impermissible
speeches. The explanation to section 124A do not
affect the interpretation of the main section. In a
democratic set up a citizen is entitled to criticise
the Government with a view to change it. Two
questions arises in the case, namely (i) does s. 124A
enact a law which is in the interest of public ordAr
and (ii) does this section impose reasonable restrictions in the interest of public order. The decision
in I. L. K (1958) !! All. !l4 which has declared
s. 124A to be ultra i·ires takes the correct law.
R. C. Prasad, for respondent in Criminal
Appeal No. 169 of 1957 :-Hefer.red to the decision
in Ramji Lal'ilfodi v. State of U.P. [1957] S.C.R. 860.
Stated that he would adopt the submissions to be
made by Shri C. B. Agarwala.
0. B. Agaru-aln for the appellant in Criminal
Appeals Nos. 124 to 126 of 1958 :-The correct
meaning of the provisions of s. 124A in the context
1962
Kida• Nati Binp
••
Slol1 of Biho
772 SUPREME OOURT REPORTS (19fi2] SUPP.
11181
K«iar Nat!i SU.,4
Y.
Sia/• of Bi.6"'
of tha present set up and the Constitution is that
giv11n b.v the Federal Court in Niharendu Dutt's ca~e.
1942 F. C. R. 38 and not the meaniniz l(iven to
them by the Privy Council in Bhalerao'~ caae 74
I. A. 89. Intepretation by Courts of words of
stPtutes to a particular set of facts has been changing with the change in tho social and political
e~ructure of societ.y and the opinion of its reasonnble
members. Section I ~4A is in a. chapter which deals
with offonces against the State. Therefore, it is
not a. case of libel against a.ny officer but of an
offence &!!ainst tho .State. Words in tho i<}nglish
law relating to sedition are the same as in s. I 24A
vide Stophen's COmmentary on the law of England,
Vol. 4, page 141, Halshury's Law of England 3rd
Edition, Vol. IO, page 169, Jowitt's Dictionary of
f'~nglish law, page 1605, Stephen's History of Criminal La.w, Vol. 2, page 2!)8 and 301 Chapter 24.
Under English La.w a tendency to create tumult or
disorder is an eseentia.l elAment of sedition. Kussel
on Crimes, Vol. I, p. 22!), R. v. Collins, 173 E . .H.
910. R. v. Sullivan, 11 Cox. 44. Section 124A
has been taken from the English Law (see 22
Bom. 15:!). Section 124A must, therefore, be interpreted in the same manner as sedition is interpreted
in England and it must be held that a. tendency to
disturb public order is an essential element of the
offence under s. 124A. Articles 1:13 and 133A of
the Canadian Criminal Codo which dee.I with
sedition have been given the samo interpretation,
1931, Canadian .S. C. R. 265. The view taken in
Tilak's caAe 22 Bom. ll 12, in Bhalerao's caso 74
I.A. 89 and in Wallice Johnsons CME' (1910] A.C. 231
that inritement to violpnce or a tendency to di~turh
public ardor wa.a not n necessary ingredient of
s. l24A, is not the correct view. 194~ F. C. R. 3?!
takes tho correct view a.nd Jays down that the
tendency to disturb public order is a. ne(){'ssary
ingredient of the offence under s. 12-lA. Devi
Sara.n's cast' 32 Pat. 1124 also t~k<'s tho ~am<' vit·w.
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
773
1962
There are two interpretations of s. l24A before the
Court, one taken b:v the Federal Court and tho Kttlar N' th Sinih
v.
other taken by the Privy Council. This Court
Stal• ef .aiMr
should acce11t the interpretation given by the
Federal Court, as that interpretation would make
the section constitutional. Even if the interpretation put by the Privy Council be accepted ad correct
one, section 124A will still be valid. The section
certainly contemplates cases where the speech is
likely to disturb public order and as such the section
in the interest of public order as contemplated in
Art. 11!(2) and the mere fact that some cases in
which the public order is not likely to be disturbed
are also included therein, eannot invalidate
the section. This court took a similar view in
Ramjilal Modi's case [1957J S. C. H.. 860 and in
Virendra's case [1958) 8. C. R. il08, the decision in
Lohia's case [1960) 2 ::;. C. R. 821 does not affect
this case, as in that case it was found that the
provisions curtailing freedom of speech were not in
the interest of public order as the connection between the provisions and disturbance of public order
was too remove. Even if the section be held
according to the Privy Council view to include
cases whieh threaten public order and those which
do not, the section can be held valid with respect
to cases where public order is threatened as the two
types of cases are severable. [1957) S. C.R. 930,
A. I. R. (1941] F. C. 72 [1951] S. C. R. 682, [1953]
S. C. R. 1059 and 65 L. Ed, 1139.
S. P. Verma for the AttornE'y-General of
India :-Article 374(2) of the Constitution provides
that decision of the Federal Court shall have the
same effect as the decision of the Supreme Court.
The decision of the Federal Court in 1942 F.C.R. 38
should be deemed to be a decision of this Court and
should be held binding. A tendency to disturb
public order is inherent in s. 124A itself.
Gopal Bihari for respondent in Criminal Appeal
No. 124 of 1958 :-The interpretation of s. 124A by
0
774 SUPH.EME OOURT REPORTS [1962] SUPP.
JHt
~- N.U. Bi.,A
...
SW.of Bu
the Privy Council has been accepted by tho High
Court. Even in English Law sedition does not
neoessarily include an intention to disturb publio
order, 79 C. L. R. IOI. Explanations (2) .and (3)
would be redund~nt if section l 24A is interpreted
to incorporate the English view of sc dition. The
Allahabad High Court as well as other High Courts
have given the same interpretation of s. l24A as the
Privy Council has. See 1941 All. 156, 1930 Lah. 309,
56 Cal. 1085 and IO Luck. 712. The decision in
Lohia's case [1960] 2 S.C.R. 821 governs the present
case also Section l24A punishes such speeches also
as have no tendency to disturb public order and
oontravenes Art. 19( l)\a.). · It is not saved by Art.
19(2) as placing of restriction on such speechos is
not in the interest of public order. It is not open to
the Court to rewrite the section by removing from
its purview such speeches as have no tendency to
disturb public order and to confine it to such
speeches as have a tendency to disturb public
order. The whole section must fail; it cannot
be dissected.
C. B. Agarwala in reply :-In English law it
is a necessary ingredient of seditious intention that
it mWlt have a tendency to cause tumult or disorder
R. v. Aldred, 22 Cox. C. C. l, R. v. Burdott, 106 E. R.
873; R. v. O'Brien, 6 St. Tr. (N. S.) 571. The Privy
Council has only said that actual incitement to
violence was not a necessary ingredient of s. l 24A.
It has not gone further and has not laid down that
tendency to disturb public order was not a neceseary
ingredient of s. 124A. Even though public disorder
is not an ingrodient of the offence under s. 124A,
there is a tendency to disturb public order in
speeches or writings which bring or attempt to
bring into hatered or contempt or excite or attempt
to excite dissatisfaction towards the Government
established by law.
1962. January 20. The Judgment of the court
was delivered by
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
775
SINHA, C. J,-In these appeals the main question in controversy is whether ss. 124A and 505
of the Indian Penal Code have become void in view
of the provisions of Art. l!l(l)(a) of the Constitution.
The constitutionality of the provhions of s. 124A,
which was mainly canvassed before us, is common
to all the appeals, the facts of which may shortly
be stated separately.
In Criminal Appeal 169 of 1957, the appellant
is one Kedar Nath Singh, ·who was prosecuted before a Magistrate, 1st Class, at Begusarai, in the
district of Monghyr, in Bihar. He framed the following charges against the accused person, which are
set out in extenso in order to bring out the gravamen of the charge against him.
•'First.-That you on 26th day of May,
1953 at village Barauni, P. S. Taghra
(Monghyr) by speaking the words, to wit, (a}
To-day the dogs of the C. I. D. are loitering
round Barauni. Many official dogs are sitting
even in this meeting. The people of India
drove out the Britishers from this country
and elected these Congress goondas to the gaddi
and seated them on it. To-day these Congress
goondas are sitting on the gaddi due to mistake
of the people. When we drove out the Britishers, we shall strike and turn· out these
Congress goondaa as well. These official dogs
will also be liquidated along with these Congress goondas. These Congress goondas are
banking upon the American dollars and
imposing various kinds of taxes on the
people to-day. The blood of our hrothersmazdoors and Kishans is being sucked. The
capitalists and the zamindars of this country
help these Congress goondas. These zamindars
and capitalists will also have to be brought
before the people's court along with these
Congress goondas.
1968
K1dar N •lh Singh
••
Slate of Bihar
Sinha C. J.
776 SUPRE;\IE COURT llEPORTS [1962) SUPP.
1162
Xtd"' lt•U Si"IA
••
Stot, •J Bii<'
sw..c. J,
(b} On th1> strength of the organisation
and unity of Kisans and mazdoors the Forward Communists Party will expose the black
deeds of the Congress goondas, who are just
like the Britishers. Only tho colour of the
body has changed. They have to·d,_y established a rule of la.this and bullets in the country, The Britishers had to go away from this
land. They had aeroplanes, guns, bombs and
other weapons with them.
(c) The Forward Communist Party does
not believe in the doctrine of vote itself. The
party had always beon believing in revolution
and does so evon at present. We believe in
that revolution, which will come and in the
flames of which the capitalists, za.mindars and
tho Congreas leaders of India, who have ma.de
it their profession to loot the country, will be
rnduced to ashes and on their a.shes '\\'ill be
established a Government of the poor and tho
downtrodden people of India.
(d) It will boa mhltake to o:i:pect any·
thing from the Congrell8 rclers. They (Cullgress rulers) have set up V. Bhavc in tho
midst of the people by causing him w·..~· a
laugoti iu order to divert the people's att<>ntion from their mistakts. Tu-day Vmova is
playing a •:rama on the stage uf Indian politics. Cvnfw.ion is being crt>ated among the
peopk. I \fant to tell Vinova and advice his
agents, "you should understand it that the
people cannot be deceived by this Yojna,
illusion and fraud of Vi nova". l shall advise
Vinova not to become a puppet in tho hands
of the CongrBBll men. These persons, who
understand the Yojna of Vinova, realise that
Vinov<l. is an agent of tho Congress Govern·
ment.
(c) I tt.JI you that th.ib CongreBS Government will do no good to you.
2 s.c.R.
SUPREME COUR'r REPORTS
777
(f) I want to tell the last word even to
the Congress Tyrants, "you play with the
people and ruin them by entangling them in
the mesh of bribery, black-marketing and
corruption. To-day the children of the poor
are hankering for food and you Congress men
are assuming the attitude of N awabs sitting
on the chairs ... "
Brought or attempted to bring into
hatred or contempt or excited or attempted
to exc'te disaffection towards the Government
established by law in the Indian Union and
thereby committed an offence punishable
under section 124A of the Indian Penal Code
and within my cognizance.
Secondly.-That you on the 26th day of
May, 1953 at village Barauni, P. S. 1'egra
(Monghyr) made the statement, to wit,
(a) To-day the dogs of the U. I. D. are
loitering round Barnuni. Many official dogs
are sitting even in this meeting. The people
of India drove out the Britishers from this
count.ry, and elected these Congress Goondas
to the gaddi and seated them on it. To-day
these Congress Goondas are sitting on the
gaddi due to the mistake of the people. When
we have driven out the Britishers, we shall
strike and turn out these Congress Goondas
as well. These official dogs will also be liquidated along with these Congress Goondas.
These Congress Goondas are banking upon
the American dollars and impoHing various
kinds of taxes on the people to-day. The
blood of our brothers l\!Iazdoors an"d Kisans
is being sucked. Th'3 capitalists and the
zamindars of this country help these Congress
Goondas.
These zamindars and capitalists
will also have to be brought before the people's Court along with those Congress
Goondas.
1962
Kedar NGth Sing~
v.
Stat4 of Bihar 1
tJinha C J.
778 Sl'.PRE:ME C'OtRT REI ORTS [1962) SUPP.
JHJ
K• Noa SllWA
v.
8W.•JBW.
SW.. C. J.
(b) On the strength of organisation and
unity of kisans and mazdoors the Forward
Communist Party will expose the black-deeds
of the Congrr88 Goondas, who are just like
the Briti8hern. Only the colour of tho body
has changed. They have, to-day, established
a rule of lathis and bullets jn the country.
The Britishers had to go a.way from this land.
Tht>y had aeroplanes, guns, bombs, a.nd othor
reasons with them.
(c) The Forward Communist party docs
not believe in the doctrine of voteA itself.
The party had always been bl•lieving in
revolution a.nd does eo even at present. We
believe in that revolution, which will come
a.nd in the flames of which the capitalists,
zamindars and the CongreBB leaders of India,
who have made it their profession to loot the
country, will be reduced to ashes, and on
their aahes will be established a Government
of the poor and the downtrodden people of
India.
(d) It will be a mistake to expect anything frem the Congress rulers. They
(Congress rulers) ha,·e set up V. Bhav11 in the
mid8t of the people by causing him wear a.
langoti in order to divert the attention of the
people from their mistakes. To-day Vinoba
is playing a drama on the stage of Indian
politics. Confusi011 is being created among
the people. I want to tell Vinova and advise
his agents, "You should understand it that
the people cannot be deceived by this Yojna,
illusion and fraud of Vinova. I shall advise
Vinova not to become a puppet in the hande
of the Congress men. Those persons who
understand the Yojna of Vin ova, realise that
Vinova is an agent of Congress Government.
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
779
(e) I tell you that no good will be done
to you by this Congress Government.
(f) I want to teJI the last word even to
Congress tyrants "you play with tho people
and ruin them by entangling them in the mesh
of bribery, black-marketing and corruption.
To-day the children of the poor are hankering
for food and you {Congress men) are assuming
the attitude of Nawabs sitting on the
chairs" .......
with intent to cause or which was likely
to cause fear or alarm to the public whereby
any persons might be induce to commit an
offence against the State of Bihar and against
the public tranquility, and thereby committed
an offence punishable under section 505(b) of
the Indian Penal Code and within my
cognizance.''
After recording a substantial volume of oral
evidence, the learned Trial Magistrate convicted the
accused person both under ss. l24A and 505(b) of
the Indian Penal Code, and sentenced him to undergo rigorous imprisonment for one year. No separate
sentence was passed in respect of the conviction
under the latter section.
The convicted person preferred an appeal to the
High Court of Judicature at Patna, which was heard
by the late Mr. Justice Naqui lm'.ctm, sitting singly.
By his judgment and order dated April 9, 1956, he
upheld the convictions and the sentence and dismissed the appeal. In the course of his Judgment, the
learned Judge observed that the subject matter of the
charge against the appellant was nothing but a
vilification of the Government ; that it was full of
incitements to revolution and that the speech taken
as a whole was certainly seditious. It is not a speech
criticising any particular policy of the Government
or criticising any of its measures. He held that the
offences both under ss. l24A and 505(b) of the
Indian Penal Code had been made out.
J96B
Kedar N •IA Singh
v.
Slala of Bihar
Sinlra C J,
780 SUPREME COURT P.EFORTS [I 9f.2] SUPP.
1H2
Irr/or N •lh Hn&h
Y.
StMt e/ Bihar
SiaAa c. J.
The convicted person moved this Court and
obtained special leave to appeal. It will be noticed
that the constitutionality of tho provisions of the
aections under which tho appellant was convicted
had not bet•n oonvassed before the High Court. But
in the petition for Rpecial leav11, to this Court, the
ground was ta.ken that ss. 124A and 505 of the
Indian Penal Code "are inconsistent with Art .. 19(1)
(a) of tho Constitution". The appeal was heard in
this Court, in tho first instance, by a Division Bench
on ~fay 5, l!l59. The Banch, finding that the learned coun8el for the appellant had raised the consti·
tutional issue as to the validity of S&. I24A and 505
of the Indian Penal Code, directed that the appeal
be plaeed for hearing by a Constitution Bench. The
case was then placed before a Constitution Bench,
on November 4, 1960, when that Bench directed
notice to issue to the Attorney General of India
under r. I, 0.41 of the Supreme Court Rules. Tho
matter was once again placed before a constitution
Bench on February 9, 1961, when it waii adjourned
for two months in order to enable the State Govern·
ments concerned with this appeal, as also with the
connected Criminal Appeals Nos. 124-126 of 1958
(in which the Government of Uttar Pradesh is the
appellant) to make up their minds in respect of the
prosecutions, as also in view of the report that the
Law Commission was considering the quf.'stion of
amending the law of sedition in view of the new
set-up. As tho States concerned have instructed
their counsel to press the appeals, the matter has
finally come before us.
In Criminal Appeals 124·126 of 1958, the
State of Uttar Pradesh is the appellant, though the
reapondents are diff'erent. In Criminal Appeal 124
of 1958, the accused person is one Mohd. Ishaq Ilmi.
He was prosecuted for having delivered a speech at
Aligarh as Chairman of the Reception Committee
of the All India Muslim Convention on October 30,
•
2$.C.R.
SUPREME COudT REPORTS
781
-\95:l. His speech on that occasion, was thought to ·be
seditious. Aft ir the necessary sanction, the l\fagistrate held an enquiry, and finding a prima fucie case
m "'de out against the accused, commi_tted him to the
Court of Session. The learned St'ssions Ju Ige, by
his Judgment dated January R, 1955, acq11itted him
of the charge under s. 153A, but convicted him of
the other charge under s. 124A, of the Indian Penal
CJde, and sentenced him to rig.>rous imprisonment
for one year. The c0nvicted purson preferred an
appeal to the High Court.. In the Hiuh Court the
constitutionality of s. l:HA of the Indian Penal
Code was challenged.
In Criminal Appeal No. 125 of 1958, the facts
are that on M'l.y 29, l9:i4, a meeting of the Bolshovik Party was organised in village Hanumang~nj,
in the District of Basti, in Uttar Pradesh. On that
occasion, the respondent Hama Nand was found to
have delivered an objectionable speech in so far as
he advoc&ted the use of violence for overthrowing
the Government est,iblished by law. After the
sanction of the Governnient to the prosecution had
been obtained, the learned Magistrate held an
enquiry and ultimately committed him to
take his trial b9fore the Court of Sessinn•.
In dne course, the learned Sessions ,Judge c 11wi.-ted
the accused person under s. 124A of t ht· Indian
Penal Code and sentenced him to ri'.~orc111• imprisonment for three years. He hel1l tl1.it the accused
person had committed the 1r.·~nce by inciting the
audience to an open violent rebellion against the
Government established by law, b.v the use of arms.
Against the aforesaid order of conviction and
sentence, .the ac0used person preferred an appeal
to the High Court of Allahabad.
In Criminal Appeal I ~6 of 1958, the respondent is one Pa.rasnath Tripathi. Hfl is alleged to
have delivered a speech in villag~ l\fansapur,
P.S. Akbarpur, in the district of Faizabad, on
September 26, 1955, in which he is said to have
Kedar Natll Sintli
••
si.11 of Bi,,.,
Sinh• C. J,
782
J...
X• N-11 BU.,h
v.
si.i. •I /liMI
Sio"4 C. J.
SUPREME OOURT REPOR'l'!I! [19Cl2] SUPP.
exhortrd the audience to organise a volunteer army
and re,ist the Governmeut and its servants by
violent means. He is also sa.id to have excited
the 1mdicnoe with intent to create feelings
of hatred and enmity against the Government.
When he was placed on trial for an offence under
s. 124A of the Indian Penal Code, the accused
person applied for a writ of Habeas r'orpus in the
High Court of Judicature at Allahabad on the
ground that his de!l'ntion was illegal inasmuch a.s
the provisions s. 124A of tho India11 Penal Crde
were void as being in contranntion of his fundamental 1 ights of free specl'h aud <'Xpression under
Art. I !li l )(a) of the C1rnstitution. This matter,
along with the appeals which havt· givPn rise to
appeals Xos. 1:!4 and 125, as afon•said, were ultimately placc>d before a Full Bench, consisting of
Dtsai, Gurtu and Beg, JJ. The learned judges,
iii separate but concurring judgmcnls, tut k the view
that s. I 24A of the Iurlian Penal Code was ultra
tires Art. Hl(l)(a) of the Constitution. In that view
of the matltr, they acquittocl the accussed persons,
eonvictL>d as afor~sa.id in the two appea.11 Xos. 124
and I 2:"i, and granted the writ petition of the
accu8ed in Criminal Appeal No. J 20. In a.II these
cases the High Court gr.rnted the necessary
ccrtifi<":ctc that the ease involved important
questions of law relating tn the int~rpretation
of the Constitution. That is how these appeals aro
before us on a ccrtificatt' uf fitne.>8 granted by the
High Court.
f'hri C.B. Ag.1rwala, wh'> apJ><';IJ'f'<l on behalf
of the ~tate of Vttar l'rnd1·sh in ,;11pport uf tho
nppeiil,; a!!'ainst th'• ordnr,; of •~··•1'1ittal passed by
the Hic:h Court. 1·oi1tw1d··cl th11t th,1 j•ulgmont of
the High Court (n"w l'"J'"ltPd in fl,,,,, .\'a!lrfon \'.
Sltlt~ ( ') ) in whi..J1 it. ll'ils laid du\\'n hy the Full
n..neh thats. 12-IA ,,,. tlw Indian Pt•nal Coile WI~~
ultm i·ires Art. I !I( I)( a) of the (~on~t it.ut.ion and,
•
(I) J.L.R. (19;8) 2 All. Bi.
;. '
28.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
783
therefore, void for the reason that it was not in the
interest of public order and that the rPstrictions
imposed thereby were not reasonable restrictions on
the freedom of speech and expression, was
erroneous. He further contended that the section
impugned came within the saving ol. (2) of
Art. 19, and that the reasons given by
the High Court to the contrary were erroneous.
He relied upon the observations of the Federal
Court in Niharendu Dutt Majumdar v. The King
Emperor ('). He also relied on ~tephen's Commentaries on the La.wa of Enghnd, Volume IV,
21st Edition, page 141, and the Statement of the
Law in Halsbury's Laws of. England, 3rd Edition,
volume 10, page 569, and the cases referred to in
those volumes. Mr. Gopal Behari, appearing on
behalf of the respondents in the Allahabad cases has
entirely relied upon the full Bench decision of the
Allahabad High Court in his favour. Shri Sharma
appearing on behalf of the appdlant in the appeal
from the Patna High Court has similarly relied
upon the decision aforesaid of the Allahabad
High Court.
Before dealing with the contentions raised
on behalf of the parties, it is convenient to set out
the history of the law, the amendments it has
undergone and t.he interpretations placed upon
the provisions of s. I 24A by the Courts in India,
and by their Lordships of the judicial Committee
of the Privy Council. The section corrPsponding
to s. 124A was originally s. 113 of Macauhy's
Draft Penal Code of 1837-39, but the section was
omitted from the Indian Penal Code as it was enacted in 1860. The reason for the omission from the
Code as enacted is not clear, but perhaps the legislative body did not foe! sure above its authority
to enact such a provision in the Code. B~ that
as it may, s. 1:!4A was not placed on the Statute
Book until 1870, by Act Xx:vrr of 1870. There
(I) [1943) F.C.R. 38.
lHB
Kdar Nalh Slo,A
••
St"" of Bilw
BW.oC.J.
Sl!l REiliE COURT REPORTS [l!l62] SUPP.
i84
19G2
K,dar J..."'ath Singh
v.
Stal1 ~f Riha;
'Sinha C. J.
was a considerable amount of discussion at the
time the amendment was introduced by Sir James,
Ktephen, but what he said while introducing the
·b1tl in the .legislature may not be relevant for our
present purposes. The section as then enacted
ran as follo~s :'
'!]24A. Exciting DisaffectionWhoever by words, either spoken or
intend. d to be read, or by signs, or by visible
;cprC'Hentation, or otherwise, exci~s, or
'n.tfem pts to excite, feelings of disaffection to
the Government established by law in
Britifh India, shall be punished with transportati<m for life or for a.ny term, to which
fine may· be added, or with imprisonment
for a term which may extend to three years,
to which fine may be added, or with fine.
0
Explanation-Such a disapprobation of
the measures of the Government as is compatible with a disposition to render obedience
to the lawful nuthority of the Government
and to support the lawful authority of the
Governmenb again~t nn lawful attempts to
rn hN•rt or resist that 1!-Uthority, is not disaffection. Then·fore, the making of CO!lJments
on the. measures of the Government, with
the intention of PXciting only this species
of disapprobation, is not an offence within
this clauBr."
The firHt case in India that arose under the
srction ia wh\)-t is known as the Bangobasi case
(Quen,-!','111.j.i·e.('.S v, Jogendra Chiinrler
Bose ('))
which wns triQ-0 by a ,Jury before Ri!' Comer Pethernni, C .1. while charging the jury, the learned
Chief Jwiti•'e explained the Jaw to the jury in these
(p1·ms:
(1)-(1892) LL. R- 19 CaL 35,
t,
·1
I
I
2. S.C.R.
-
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
785
"Disaffection means a feeling contrary
to affection, in other words, dislike or hatred.
Disapprobation means simply disapproval.
It is quite possible to disapprove of a men's
sentiments or action and yet to like him.
The meaning of the two words is so distinct
that I feel it hardly necessary to tell you
that the contention of Mr. Jackson cannot
be sustained. If a person uses either spoken
or written words calculated to create in the
minds of the persons to whom they are
addressed a disposition not to obey the
lawful authority of the Government,, or to
subvert or resist that authority, if and when
occasion should arise, and if he does so with
the intention of creating such a dii;position
in his bearers or readers, he will be guilty
of the offence of attempting to excite disaffection within the meaning of the section
though no disturbance is brought about by
his words or any feeling of disaffection, in
fact, produced by them. It is sufficient for
the purposes of the section that the words
used are calculated to excite feelings of ill·
will against the Government and to hold it
up to the hatred and contempt of the people,
and that they were used with the intention to
create such feeling."
The next case is the celebrated case of
Queen-Empress v. Balqanq_addhar Tilak (1) which
came before the Bombay High Court. '.l'he ca8e
was tried by a jury bofore Strachey, J. The learned
judge, in the course of his charge to the jury, explain the law to them in these terms :
"The offence as defined by the first
clause is exciting or attempting to excite
feelings of disaffection to the Government.
What are "feelings of disaffection" ? I
agree with Sir Comer Petheram in the Bangobasi ease tha.t disaffection means simply the
(1) (1898) l.L.R. 22 Born. 112.
1962
Kedar Neth Sin1,h
v.
State of Bt'liat
ifinh.a 0. J.
786 SUPREME COURT REPOR~ [1962) SUPP.
19'1
K1w Not.'/I. Sillgh
v,
SW.o/BN
sw..c.J.
absence of affection. It means hatred, enmitv
dislike, hostility, contempt and every from of
ill-will to the Government. "Disloyalty" is
perhaps the best general term, comprehending
every p088ible form of bad feeling to the
Government. That is what the law means
by the disaffection whith a. man must not
excite or attempt to excite ; he must not
make or try to make others feel enmity of
any kind towards the Government. You will
observe that the amount or intensity of the
disaffection is absolutely immaterial except
perhaps in dee.ling with the question Qf punishment: if a man excites or a.twmpts to excite
feelings of disaffection, great or small, he is
guilty under the section, In the uoxt place, it
is absolutely immaterial whether any feelings
of disaffection have been excited or not by the
publication in question. It is true that there
ia before you a. charge against each prisoner
that he has actually excited feelings of disaffection to the Government. If you are
satisfied that he has done so, you will, of
course, find him guilty. But if you should
hold that that charge is not made out, and
that no one is proved to have been excited to
entertain feelings of disaffection to the
Government by reading these articles, still
that alone would not justify you in acquitting the prisoners. For each of them is
nharged not only with exoiting feelings of
disaffection, but also with attempting to
excite such feelings. You will observe that tho
section places on absolutely the same footing
the successful exciting of feelings of disaffection and the unsuccessful attempt to excite
them, so that, if you find that either of the
prisonere has tried to excite such feeling in
others, you must convict him even if there is
nothing to show that he sucooded. Again, it is
•
''
2 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT HEPOHTS
787
;962
important that you should fully rPalise anothn
point. The offence consists in exciting or Kedu NaJh SingA
·v..
attempting to excite in others certain bad feelStaie of Bil.or
ing towards the Government. It is not the excitSinlw C. J.
ing or attempting to excite mutiny or rebellion, or any sort of actual disturbance, great
or small. Whether any disturbance or outbreak was caused by these articlea, is absolutely immaterial. If the accused intended by
the articles to excite rebellion or disturbance,
his act would doubtless fall within section
124A, and would probably fall within other
sections of the Penal Code. But even if he
neither excited nor intended to excite any
rebellion or outbreak or forcible resistance to
the authority of the Government, still if he
tried to excite feelings of enmity to the Government, that is sufficient to make him guilty
under the section. I am aware that some distinguished persons have thought that there
can be no offence against the srntion unless
the aecused either counsels or suggests rebellion or forcible resistance to the Government.
In my O!Jinion, that view is absolutely opposed to the express words of the section itself,
which as plainly as possible makrs the £ xciting or attempting to excite certain feelings,
and not tile inducing or attempting to induce
to any course of action such as rebellion or
forcible resistance, the test of guilt. I can
only account for such a view by attributing
it to a complete misreading of the explanation attached to the section, and to a misa,pplication of the explanation beyond its true
scope."
The long quotation has become necessary in view
of what followed later, namely, that this statement of the law by the learned judge came in
for a great deal of comment and judicial notice.
We have omitted the charge to the jury relating
788 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (11162) SUi>P
1'6Z
/C.W
N•tA Siofh
v.
Slo#•fBiW
SW. C. J,
to the explanation to s. 124A because that
explanation has now yielded place to three
separate explanations in view of judicial opinions
expre11Se<l later. The jury, by a majority of six
to three, found Shri Balgangadhar Tilak guilty.
Subsequently, he, 'on ccnviction, applied under
cl. 41 c,f the Letters .Patent for leave to appeal
to the Privy Council. The application was heard
by a Full Bench consisting of Farran, C. J.,
Candy and Strachey, JJ. It was contended before
the High Court at the leave stage, inter alia, that
the sanotion givon by the Government was not
sufficient in law in that it had not set out tho
particulars of the offending articles, and, secondly,
that the judge misdirected the jury as to the meaning of the word "disaffection" insofar as he said
that it might be equivalent to "absence of affection". With regard to the second point, which is
only relevant point before us; tho Full Bench
expressed itself to the following effect :
"The other ground upon which Mr.
Russell has asked as to certify that this is a
fit case to be sent to Her Majesty in Council,
is that there has been a misdirection, and
he based his argument on one major and two
minor grotmds. The major ground was that
the section oannot be 'laid to have been contravened unlcBB there is a direct incitement
to stir up disorder or rebellion. That appears
to us to be going muoh beyond the words of
the seotion, and we need not say more uvon
that ground. The first of the minor points
is that Mr. J ustiee Strachey in summing up the
case to the jury stated that disaffection meant
tho "absence of affection". But although if
that phrase had stood alone it might have
misled the jury, yet taken in connection with
the context we think it is impossible that
the jury could have been misled by it. That
expression was used in connection with the
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
789
law as led down by Sir Comer Petheram,
in Calcutta in the Bangobashi case. There
the Chief Justice instead of using the words
"absence of affection" used the words
· "contrary to affection". If the words "con·
trary to affection"
had been used
instead of "absence of affection" in this
case there can ·be no doubt that the summ·
ing up would have been absolutely correct
in this particular. But taken in connection
with the context it is clear that by the words
"absence of affection" the learned Judge
did not mean the 11egation of affection
but some active sentiment on the other side.
Therefore on that point we consider that we
cannot certify that this is a fit case for
appeal."
In this connection it must be remember·
ed that it is not alleged that there has been
a miscarriage of Justice."
After making those
observations, the Full
Bench refused the application for leave. The case
was then taken to Her Majesty in Council, by way
of application for special leave to appeal to the
,T udicial Committee. Before their Lordships of
the Privy Council, Asquith, Q. C., assisted by
counsel of gn1at experience and eminence like
Mayne, W. C. Bonnerjee and others, contended
that there was a misdirection as to the meaning of
section 124A of the Penal Code in that the offence
had been defin"d in terms to wide to the effect that
"disidfeotion" meant simply "absence of affection"
and that it comprehended every possible form of
bad feeling to the Government. In this connection
reference was made to the observations of Petheram, C.J. in Qiteen-TiJmpres8 v . .!ogender Bose (1). It
was n.lso contended that the appellant'B comments
(I) (1892) I. L. R. 19. Cal. 35.
1962
Kedar Nath Siagh
v.
State of Bih"'
Sinha C. J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1962) SUPP.
790
1962
Kedar Nath Sirigh
v.
8tal1 of Bihar
Rinha O. J.
had not exceeded what in England would be considered within the functions of a Public journalist.
and that tb:e misdirection complained of was .of the
greatest importance .not merely' to the affected person hllt to the whole of the Indian Press and also to
all ,her Majesty's subjects ; ~nd that it injuriously
affected the- liberty of the press and the right to
free speech in public meetings.. But in spite of the
strong appeal made on behalf of the petitione• for
special leave, "the Lord Chancellor, del,ivering the
opinion of the Judicial Committee, while dismissing
the application, observed that takiljlg a view of the
whole of the summing up they did hot see any.reason to dissent from it, and that keeping in view the
rules which Their Lordships observed in the matter
of granting leave to appeal in criminal cases, they
did not think that the case raised questions which
deserve further consideration by the Privy Council.
'(vide Gangadhar Tilak v. Queen Empress) (').
Before noticing the further changes in the
Statute, it is nec<'ssary to refer to the Full Bench
decision of the Allahabad High Court in Queen
Empress v. Amba Prasad('). In that case, Edge, C.J.,
who delivered the judgment of the Court, niade copious quotations from the juclgments of the Co lcutta and
the Bombay High Courts in the cases above referred
to. While generally adopting the reasons for the decisions in the afore~aid two cases, the learned Chief
Justice observed. that ~ man may be guilty of the
offence defined in s. l24A of attempting ~o excite
feelings of disAffection against the Government
esti_tblished by law in British India, although in a
particular article or apeech he may ·insist upon the
'desirability or !'Xpediency of obeying and supporting the Government. He also made reference to
the decision of the Bombay High Court in the
Sata1;a (') case. In that case a Full Bench, consisting of Farran, C.J., and Parsons and Rana.de, JJ,
I
(I) (IB97) L. R. 25 J. A. I.
(2) (1898) I. L. R. All 55,
(3) (1898) r. L.R.nRom.452.
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
791
had laid it down that the word "disaffection" in the
section is used in a special sense as meaning
political alienation or discontent or disloyalty to the
Government or existing authority. They also held
that the meaning of word "disaffection" in the
main portion of the section was not varied
by the explanation. Parsons, J., held that the
word "disaffection" could not be construed as meaning 'absence of or <rontrary of affection or love'.
Ranade J., interpreted the word "disaffection" not
as meaning mere absence or negation oflove or good
will but a positive feeling of aversion, which is akin
to ill will, a definite insubordination of authority or
seeking to alienate the people and weaken the bond
of allegiance, a fo,ling which tends to bring the
Government into hatred and discontent, by imputing base and corrupt motives to it. The learned
Chief Justice of the Allahabad High Court observed
that if those remarks were meant to be in any sense
different from the construction placed upon the
section by Strachey, J., which was approved, as
aforesaid, by the Judicial Committee of the Privy
Council, the later observations of the Bombay High
Court could not be treated as authoritative. As the
accused in the Allahabad case had pleaded guiJt,y
and the appeal was more or less on the question of
sentence, it was not necessary for their Lordships
to examine in detail the implications of the section,
though they expressed their general agreement with
the view of the Calcutta and the Bombay High
Courts in tho first two cases, referred to above.
The section was amended by the Indian Penal
Code Amendment Act (IV of 1898). As a result of
the amendment, the single explanation to the section
was replaced by three separate explanations as they
stand now. The se~tion, as ·it now stands in its
present form, is the result of the several A.O.s of
1937, 1948 and 1950, as a result of the constitutional
changes, by the Government of India Act, 1935,
by the Independence Act of 1947 and by the Indian
lllfl
l(etJ.r N'alh Singh
••
Stall of Bihar
Sinha C. J.
792 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1962) SUPP.
JH2
X1/..r N•<h 8;.,,gh
••
61a. .f8ilw
Sinh. C. J.
Constitution of 1950. Section 124A, as it has emerged afwr suciJes;ive amendments by way of adapta·
tions as aforeaaid, reads as follows :
"Whoever by words, either spoken or
written, or by signs or by visible representation, or otherwi'!e, brings or attempts to
bring into hatred or contempt, or excites or
attempts to excite disaffection towards the
Government r·stablished by law in India shall
be punished with transportation for life ot
any shorter term to which fine may he added
or with imprisonment which may extend to
three years, to which fine may he added, or
with fine.
Explanation I. The expreSBion "disaffection" includes disloyalty and all feelings of
enmity.
Explanation 2. Comments expressing
disapprobation of tho measuros of tho Government with a view to obt:~in their alteration by
lawful means, without exciting or attempting
to excite h:\tred, con~< mpt or disaffection do
not constitute an offence under this section.
Explanation 3. Comments expressing
<Ii~approbation of the administrative of other
action of the Government without exciting or
attempting to excite hatred, contempt or dis.
affection, do not constituto an offence under
th is section."
Thia offence, which is gonemlly known a.a the
offence of Sedition, occurs in Chapter VI of the
Indian Penal Code, headed 'Of offences against the
State'. This speeios of offence against the State
was not an invention of tho British Government in
India, but has been known in England for centuries.
Every State, whatevM its form of Governmeut, has
to bo armed with tho powe1· to puniHh those who, by
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
793
their coriduct, jeopardise the safety and stability of
the State, or dis>emin:tte such fo3Jings of disloyalty
as have the tendency to lead to the disruption of the
State or to public disorder. In England, the crime
has thus been described by Stephen in his Commen·
taries on the Laws of England, :21st Edition, volume IV, at pages 141-142, in these words.
"Section IX. Sedition and Inciting to
Disaffection-We are now concerned with l'Onduet which, on the one hand, fall short of
treason, ancf on the other does not involve the
use of force or violence. 'l'he, law h.i,s here to
reconcile the right of private britici:;m with t.he
necessity of securing thn safety an<l stability of
the State. Sedition may be rlefined as conduct
which bas, either as its object or as its natural
consequence, the unlawful di~pby of dissatis·
faction with the Governmmt or with the
existing order of society.
The seditious conduct mn v be hv words,
Fivc> · epecific heads
of sedition may be enumerated ncconling to
the object of the accused. This may be
either
1. to excite disaffection against the King,
Government, or Constitution, or against Parliament or the administration of justice ;
2. to promote, by nnlawfol means, any
alteration in Chureh or State ;
3. to incite a distnrbimce of the p('ace ;
4. to raise diseonknt among the King's
subjects ;
5. to excite class hatred.
It must. be ohser·\'ecl that criticism on
political matters is not, of itsulf scditiorrn. The
test is the manm'l' in whit>h it is marlc. Candid and honest discussion is permitted. The law
by deed, or by writing.
1962
Ktdo1 Nath Si111h
v.
State of Bi/uir
Siriha C. J.
,.
794 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1962] SUPP.
" 2
1'""' Nella Si•tlt
v.
Blalao/BiAM
SW.. C. ./'.
only interferes when the discussion passes tJie
bounds of fair critioiam. More especially will
this be tho CMtl when the natural consequence
of the prisoner's cowluct is to promok public
disorder."
This atatemnnt of the law is derived mainly
from tho address to the Jury by Fitzerald, J.,
in the case of Re.g \"'. Alexander Martin Sullivan{l).
In the course of his address to the Jury the learned
Judge observed as follows:
"Sedition is a crime against society, near:
ly allied to that of treason, and it frequently
precedes treason by a short interval. Sedition
in iteelf is· a comprehonsive term, and it embraces all those practices, whether by word,
deed or writing, whioh are calculated to
disturb the tranquility of the State, and lead
ignorant persons to endeavour to au bvert the
Go"ernment and the laws of the empir<'. The
obj~cte of se<lition generally are to induce disconu·nt. and insnrrcction and stir up opposition
to the Government, and bring the administration of justice into conteqipt; and the very
tP.ndenc.v of sedition is to inoite the peop!P. to
insurrection and rebellion. Sodition has been
described as disloyalty in action and tbe IMv
considers as sedition all those prnctioee which
have for their tibject to excite discontent or
dissatisfaction, to create public disturbance, or
to. lead to civil war; to bring into hatred or
contempt the Sovereign or the Government,
the laws or constitution of the realm, and
generally all endeavours to promote public
disorder."
That thc> law has not changed during the
course of the centuries is also apparent from the
following statement of the law by Coleridge, ,J., in
the course of hie summing up to the Jury in the oaRC
of Rex. v. Aldred(') :
(I! (181i8! ll Cox's Criminal Law Cases, H. 45.
(2 (1909 22 Cox's Crimioal Law Cues, I, 3.
-------------------------------------
!
~
I
r
2 S C,..J;t.
SUPREME COURT REPOP.TS
795
"Nothing is clearer than the !'aw on this head
- namely, that whoever by language, either
written or spoken incites or epcourages other
to use physical force or violence in some
public matter connected with the State, is
guilty of pnbli8hing a seditious libel. The
word "sedition" in its ordinary natural si;;nification denotes a tum1ilt, an insurrection, a
popular co.rnmotion, or an uproar; it implies
in sorrie
form ...... "
violence or lawlessness
.
,
I
In that case, the learned Jucl~e was charging the
Jury in respect of the inrlictment. whinh contained
the charge .of seditious libel hy a pnblica.tion by
the defendant.
While de .. Jing with a case arising under Rule
34(6) ( e) of the Defence of India Rules under
the Defence of India Act (XXXV of 1939)
bir Maurice Gwyer, C.J., speaking for the Federal
Cuurt, made the following obsrn:rntions in the case of
Nilwrendu Dutt Mujumd·g v. '!'he King Emperor(');
and hasp Jinted 011t that the bnguri~e of s. 124A
of the Indian Penal Code, which wr,s in pai·i mrtte·ria
with that of the Rule in question, had been adopted
from the English Law, and referred with appi·oval
to the ob3ervations of Fitr.orald, ,J., in the case
quoted above ; and m'l.do the following observations
which are quite apposit.e :
"·'.generally speaking, we think that the
passage accura,1e)y states t.he law as it is to· be
gathered from an examination of a great
number of judicial pronou11cements.
The first and most fundamental duty of
e'very Go,v~rnm<·nt is tho
preservation
of order, sinec order
is tho condition precedent t.o ,dl ;;i1·ilisation and the
advance of hmpan h:1ppi11es>. This dnt,y has
no doubt been somc,Lim<'•' Jl"rformerl i11 such
I
(I)
(1942) F. C. R< 38.
I
196Z
Kedar Nath Singh
Y.
State Of Bihar
Sinha
C. i.
796 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1962] ·SUPP.
IIMS
...
lrtdu N•lh S i•i•
si.I. of Bilvr
SW.o C.J.
a way as t-0 make the remedy worse than the
disease ; but it does not cease to be a matter
of obligation because some on whom tho duty
It is to this
rests have performed it ill.
aspect of the func•tions of government tbat in
our opinion the offence of sedition stands
related. It is the answer of the Stat~ to
those who, for the purpose of attacking or
subverting it, seek (to borrow from the passage
cited a.bov<>) to disturb its tranquillity, to
create public disturbance and to promote
disorder, or who incite others to do so.
Word~, deeds or writings constitute sedition,
if they haTe this intention or this tendency;
and it is easy to see why they ma.y
also constitute sedition, if they seek, as
the phrase is, to bring Government into
contempt. This is not made an offence in orler
to minister to the wounded vanity of Government, but because where Governr.uent and tho
law cease to be obeyed because no respect is
felt any longer for them, only anarchy can
follow. Public disorder, or the reasonable
anticipation or likelihood of public disorder,
is thus the gist of the offence. The acts
or words complained of must either incite to
disorder or must be such as to satisfy reasonable men that that is their intention or
tendency."
This statement of the law was not approved
by their Lordships of the Judicial Committee of the
Privy Council in the case of JI. ing-Emperor v.
Sada.shiv Narayan Bhaler<W {1).
The Priv;i.
Cour.cil, after quoting the observations of the
learned Chief Justice in Nilwrendu'& c.a&e ('), while
disapproving of the dociaion of thE'! Federal Court,
ohscrvorl that there was no statutory definition of
"Sedition" in England, and the meaning and content
of the crime had to be gathered from any decisions.
(1) {1947)' L. R. 74 J. A. 89.
(2) (1942) F. C. R. SS.
,...
·•
.2 S.C.R.
Sl.JPREME COURT REPORTS
797
But those were not relevant considerations when
one had to construe the statutory definition of
'Sedition' as in the Code. The Privy Council held
that the language of s. I 24A, ·or of the Rule aforesaid, under the Government of India Act, did not
justify the statement of the law as made by the
learned Chief Justice in Niharendu's case( 1) they also
held that the expression "excite disaffection" did
not include "excite disorder", and that, therefore,
the decision of the Federal Court in Niharendu' s case(')
proceeded ou a wrong construction of s. 124A of the
Penal Code, and of sub-para (e), sub-rule (6} of
Rule 34 of the Defence of India Hules. Their
Lordships approved of the dicta in the case of Bal
Gangadhm Tilak ('), and in the case of Annie Basant
v. Advocate General of Madrn8 ('), which was a case
under s. 4 of the Indian Pre~s Act. (I of 1910),
which was closely similar in language to s. 124A of
the Penal Code.
The Privy Council also referred to their
previous decision in WaUace-Johnson v. The Kinq(')
which was a case under sub·s. 8 of s. 320 of the
Criminal Code of the Gold Coast, which defined "seditious intention" in terms similar to the words of
s.124A of the Penal Code. In that case, their Lordships
had laid down that incitement to violence was not a
necessary ingredient of the Crime of sedition as
defined in that law,
Thus, there is a direct conflict between the
decision of the Federitl Court in Niharendu's case (')
and of the Privy Council in a number of tases from
India and the Gold Coast, referred to above. It is
also clear that either view can be ta.k"n and can be
supported on good reasons. The Federal Court
decision takes into consideration, as in<lic1ted above,
the pre-existing Common Law of England in respect
of sedition. It does not appear from the report of
(1)
(3)
(1942) F.C.R. 38.
(1919) L,R, 16, J.A. 176.
12) (1898) l.L R. 22 Bom.112.
'14) [1940] A.C. 231.
11162
K,dar Nath Sitlgh
v.
8ta'6 ,,J ·'llihar
Sinha C. J.
.,
798 ::il.J.PREM1: COl'llT HEPOiiTS [1962] SUPP.
l~I
Jr""' Nv,•th s;., h
Si.II of BiA"'
sw..c. .1.
tho Federal Cutil t decision that the rulings aforesaid uf the Pril'y C. .urcil had b<'Oll brought to the
not ic" d dicu L . nishi J•S uf th<' .Federal Court.
~o for as thi~ ('u111t 'io "Oll(;{'rned, the question
din·ctly ;uis;ng for d"termination in this batch of
cases hi>s not f1;1 mc·d the mbjcct m!ltter of decision
previously. But certain observations made by this
Court in some raB<'s, to LC' presently noticed, with
reft.rcncc to the interrelation between freedom of
speech and seditious writing or speaking have been
made ii: the Ycry tirbt year of the coming into for.:>e
of the Constitution. Two case~ involving consideration of the fundamental right of freedom of speech
an<l expression and certain laws enacted by some of
the Stat•·s imposing restrictions on that right came
up for cousidera.ticm before this Court. Those cases,
rt>portl'd in Romes!, Tl11tpp1r v. Tlte State of Madraa( 1)
and Bn) Bhuslim ,-, Tlw St'llc of DPlhi (') were
heard b.v l\.'1nia C..J , Paz! Ali, Patanja.li ShllBtri, Mehr
Chand :\fahajan, llfokherjea and Das, JJ, and judgments were deliver< ,J on th'l same day (May 26,
1930) In Rumeslt 'l'l1appar's case('), the majority
of the, Court c~eclared s. 0( 1-A) of the Madras Maintenance of Public Order Act (Mad. XXXIII of
1940), which had authorised imposition of restrictions on th(> fundamental right of freedom of
speech, to be in excess of cl. (2) of Art. 19 of the
Constitution authorising such restrictions, and,
therefore, void and unconstitutional.
In Brij
lihuB!u:su '.• case ('), the same majority struck down
s. 7( l )(c) of the Ea.st Punjab Public Safety Act,
194!1, as extended to the Province of Delhi, authorising the imposition of restrictions on the freedom
of speech and expression for preventing or combating any activity prejudicial to the public lla.fety or
Ill (lq5()] S.c.R. 5'1·1.
(2)
11950] S.C'.R. G05.
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME. COURT REPORTS
799
the maintenance of public order. The Court held
those provisions to be in excess of the powers
conferred on the Legislature by cl. (2) of Art. 19 of
the Constitution. Mr. Justice Patanjali Sastri,
speaking for the majority of the Comt in Rome,.sh
Thappar's case (')made the following observations
with reference to the decisions of the .Federal Court
and the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council as
to what the law of Sedition in India wae
"It is also worthy of note that the word
"sedition" which occurred in article 13(2) of
the Draft Constitution prepared \_Jy the Drafting
Committee was deleted before the article was
finally passed as article l!l(2). In this ronnection it may be recalled that the Federal Court
had, in defining sedition in N iharendu Dutt
Majumdar v. The King /!Jmperor (2 ) held that
"the acts or words complained of must either
incite to disorder or must be such as to satisfy
reasonable men that that is their intention
or tendency", but the Privy Council overruled
that decision and emphatically reaffirmed the
view expressed in Tilak's case to the effect
that "the offence consisted in exciting or
attempting to excite in others certain bad
feelings towards the Government and not in
exciting or attempting to excite mutiny or
rebellion, or any sort of actual disturbance;
great or small" --King Emperor v. Sadashiv
Narayan Bhalerao.
Deletion of the word
"sedition" from the draft article 13(2), therefore, shows that criticism of Government
exciting disaffection or bad feelings towards
it is not to be regarded as a justifying ground
for restricting the freedom of expression and of
the press, unless it is such as to undermine
the security of or tend to overthrow the State.
It is also significant that the corresponding
(I)
[1950] s.c.R 594.
(2)
(1912) F. c. R. 38.
J96B
K,darNatA Siagl
y,
S1<1111:oJ Bi/tor
Sinha C, J,
800. SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1962) SUPP.
196!
Irish formula of "undermining the public
order or the authority of the State" (article
40(<i)(i) of th<> Constitution of Fire, I!l3'i) did
11ot app1m·ntly find favour with the framers
of the Jndia11 c.institution.
Thus, very
narrow and stringent limits have been set to
permitl!lible legislative abridgement of the
right of free speech and expression, and 11his
was doubth:ss due to the realisation that
freedom of speech and of the press lay at the
foundation of all democratic organisations,
for without fn·c political discussion no public
education, so es~ential for the proper functioning of the processes of popular government,
is poHSible, fre..,'C!om of such amplitude might
involve risks of abuse. But the framers of
the Constitution may well have reflected, with
Madison who was "the leading spirit in the
preparation of the First Amendment of the
Federal Constitution" that "it is better to
leave a few pf its noxious branches to their
luxuria1?t growth, than, by prunning them
away to injnrP the vigour of those yielding
the prop<'r fruits" : (quoted in Ne.<ir v. Minne-
Kld.r fta111 S1tcglt.
v.
Slat. 9f Biliar
SW..C.J.
.<Otta).
Those observations were made to bring out
the dilicrcnco between the "security of the State"
and "public order". As the latter exprol!Bion did
not find a place in Art. HJ(:?) of the Con1titution,
as it stood originally, tho sectioa was struck down
as unconstitutional. F1lZl Ali, .J., dissented from
the views thus expressed by the majority and reiterated his observations in Brij Bhu,.,/11.m'« ca.'-e (').
In the courso of hiH diSHl'nting judgment, he observed as follows :
"It app<'ars tu me that. in tht' ultimate aua·
lysis th" n•al question to be <leci<lt:'cl in this case
is whether "disorders involving menace to the
(I)
(1~50] S.C.R. 605.
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COUR'r REPORTS
801
peace and tranquillity of the Province" and
affecting "Public safety" will be a matter
which undermines the security of the State or
not. I have borrowi>d the words quoted within inverted commas from the prcamhle of th11
Act which shows its scope and necessity and
the que1ition raised before us attacking the
validity, of the Act must be formulated in the
manner I have suggested. If the answer to
the question is in the affirmati rn, as I think it
must be, then the impugned law which prohibits entry into the State of Madras of "any
document or class of documents" for securing
public safety and maintenance of public order
should satisfy the requirementR laid down in
article 19(2) of the Constitution. From the
trend of the arguments addreesed to us, it
would appear that if a document is seditious,
its entry could be validly prohibited, because
sedition is a matter which undermine3 the
Security of the State ; but if on the other
hand, the document is calculated to disturb
public tranquillity and affect public safety, its
entry cannot be prohibited, because public
disorder and disturbance of public tranquillity
are not matters which undermine the secmitv
of the State. Speaking for myself, I cannot understand this argument. In Brij
Bhushan v. The State. I have quoted good
authority to show that sedition owes itsgrnvity
to its tendency to crea.te disorders and an authority on Criminal Law like Sir James Stephen has classed sedition as an offence against
public tranquillity."
In Brij Bhushan case('), Faz! Ali, J,, who was
ag!l.in the dissenting judge, gave his reasons to
greater detail. He refrrred to the judgment of tlw
Federal Court in Niharendu Dutt Majumdar's C<!se (')
(1) [1950) S. C.R. 605.
(2) [1942] F. C R. 38.
J96J
.
K1rlar Natl Si1igh
Btafe of Bil.ar
Sinha 0. J
802 SUPREME OOURT REPORTS (1962] SUPP.
1'61
K-.. NIAii s;,,,1a
v.
Bt.i.o/BUS;.MC. J.
and to the judgment of the Privy Council t-0 the
contrary in King Emperor v. Sada Shiv Narayan(').
After having pointed out tho divergenoy of opinion
between the Federal Court of India and the Judicial
Committee of tho Privy Council, the learned Judge
made the following observations in order t-0 explain
why the term "sedition" was not specifically mentioned in Art. 19(2) of the Constitution :
"The framers of the Constitution must
h'\ve therefore found themselves face to face
with the dilemma. as to whether the word
"sedition" should be used in article 19(2) and
if it was to be used in what sense it
was to be used. On the one hand, they
must have had before their mind the very
widely accepted view supported by numerous
authorities that sedition was e88entially 8ll
offence agiiinst public tranquillity and was
connected in some way or other with public
disorder; and, on the other hand, there WM
the pronouncement of the Judicial Committee
that sedition as defined in the Indian Penal
Code did not neoessarily imply any intention
or tendency to incite disorder. In these
circumstances, it is not surprising that they
decided not to use the word "sedition" in
clause (2) but used the more general words
which cover seditionandeverythingelse which
makes sedition such a serious offence. That
sedition does undermine the security of the
State is a matter which cannot admit of muoh
doubt. That it undermines the security of the
state usually through the medium of public
disorder is also a matter on which eminent
Judges and juriRt.s are a.greed. Therefore, it
is difficult to hold that public disorder or
dil:lturba.nce of public tra.nquillity are not
matters which undermine the security of the
State."
(I) 7+ I. A· 89.
-
2s.c.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
803
As a result of their differences in the interpretation of Art.19( 2) of the Constitution, the Parliament amended cl.(2) of Art. 19, in the form in which
it stands at present, by the Constitution (First
Amendment) Act, 1951, by s. 3 of the Act, which
substituted the original cl. (2) by the new cl. (2).
This amendment was made with retrospective
effect, thus indicating that it accepted the statement
of the law as contained in the dissenting judgment
of Faz! Ali, J., in so far as he had pointed out that
the concept of "security -0f the state" was very much
allied to the concept of "public order" and that
restrictions on freedom of speech and expression
could validly be imposed in the interest of public
order.
Again the question of the limits of legislative
powers with reference to the provisions of Arts. 19
(l)(a) and 19(2) of the Constitution came up for
decision by a Constitution Bench of this Court in
Ramji Lal Modi v. The State of U.P. ('). In that case,
the validity of s. :295A of the Indian Penal Code was
challenged on the ground that it imposed restrictions
on thefundamental right of freedom of speech and
expression beyond the limits prescribed by cl.(2) of
Art. 19 of the Constitution. In this connection, the
Court observed as follows :
"the question for our consideration is
whether the impugned section can be properly
said to be a law imposing reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the fundamental rights
to freedom of speech and expreBSion in the
interests of public order. It will be noticed
that language employed in the amended clause
is "in the interests of" and not "for the
maintenance of''. As one of us pointed out in
Debi Baron v. The State of Bihar, the expression
"in the interests of" makes the ambit of the
protection very wide. A law may not have
(I) (1957) s. c. R. 860.
1961
K1dOT N.0.8m1•
v.
Stalt of BiJuv
Sio/o•C.I.
804
19'1
Li.NdlBu.,11
••
Si.u •! BiM•
Biw.C• ./.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1962) SUPP.
been designed to directly maintain public order
and yet it may have been enacted in the interests of public order."
'lhough the observations quoted above do not
<iirectly bear upon the present controvvrsy, thuy
throw a good deal of light upon thn ambit of the
power of the legislature to impose reasonable restrictions on tho exercise of the fundamental right
of freedom of speech and expression.
Iu this case, we arc directly concerned with tho
question how for the offence, as defined in s. l 2tA
of .the Indian Penal Code, is consistent with the
fundamental right guaranteed by Art. 19 (I) (a) of
lhe Constitution, which is in these terms :
"l!J. (I) All citizens shall have the right.
(a) to freedom of speech and expression ... "
This guaranteed right i<; subject to the right of
the legislature to impose reasonabh· rcstrictious, the
ambit of which is indicated by cl. (2i, which, in its
amended form, reads as followH :
"(2) Nothing in sub-clause (a) of clause (I)
~hall affect the operation of any existing law
or prevent the State from making any law, in
so far as such Jaw imposes reasonable restrictions on the exerdse of the right conferred by
tho said sub-clause in the interests of the
security of the State, friendly relations with
foreign ::itatc~, public order, decency or morali·
ty, or in relation to contempt of court, defamation or incitement to an offence."
It has not been questioned before us that the funda·
mental right guaranteed by Art. 19( I)( a) uf the
freedom of speech and expression i& not an absolute
right. It is common ground that the right is sub·
ject to such re~onable r~strictio°;8 a;i woul_d come
within the rurv1ew of cl. (2)' whtch comprises (a)
security o the State, (b) friendly relations with
foreign States, (c) public order, (d) decency o~ mo:a·
Jity, etc., etc. With reference to the const1tut1onahty
2·8.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
805
of s. l24A or s. 505 of the Indian Penal Code, as to
how far they are consistent with the requirements
of cl. ( 2) of Art. 19 with particular reference to
security of the State and public order, the section,
it must be noted, penalises any spoken or written
words or signs or visible representations, etc., which
have the effect of bringing, or which attempt to
bring into hatred or contempt or excites or attempts
to excite disaffection towards the Government established by law. Now, the expression "the Government
established by law" has to be distinguished from the
person's for the time being engaged in carrying on
the administration. "Government established by
law" is the visible symbol of the State. The very
existence of the State will be in jeopardy if the
Government established by law is subverted. Hence
the continued existi>nce of tho Government established by law is an eRsential condition of the
stability of the State. That is why 'sedition',
as the
offence in s. 124A has been
characterised, comes under Chapter VI relating to
offences against the State. Hence any acts within
the meaning of s. l24A which have the effect of
subverting the Government by bringing that
Government into contempt -0r hatred, or creating
disaffection against it, would be within the penal
statute because the feeling of disloyalty to the
Government established by law or enmity to it
imports the idea of tendency to public disorder by
the use of actual violence or incitement to violence.
In other words, any written or spoken words, eto. ·
"hi ch have implicit in them the idea of subverting
Government by violent means, which are compendwusly included in the term 'revolution', have
been made penal by the section in question. But
the section has taken care to indicate clearly that
strong words used to express disapprobation of the
meamres of Government with a view to their
improvement or alteration by lawful means would
not come within the section. Similarly, comments,
19/JB
1"1/ar Noli'tlta;i
v,
·Si.u of Bi/tar
Sin/r4 C. J.
806 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1962] SUPP,
1962
lf1i• No/J. SU.g~
••
S..,,o/Bik.r
BW.C.J,
however strongly worded, expressing disapprobation of actions of the Government, without exciting
those feelings which generate the inclination to
cause public disorder by acts of violence, would not
be penal. In other words, disloyalty to Govern·
ment established by law is not the same thing aa
comment.in~ in strong terms upon the measures or
acts of Government, or its agencies, so as to
ameliorate the condition of the people or to secure
the cancellation or alteration of those acts or
measures by lawful means, that is to say, without
exciting thoso feelings of enmity and disloyalty
which imply excitement to public disorder or the
use of violence.
It haa not been contended before us that if a
speech or a writing excites people to violence or
have the tendency to create public disorder, it
would not come within the definition of 'sedition'.
What has been contended is that a person who
makes a very strong speech or uses very vigorous
words in a writin~ direcWd to a very strong criticism of measures of Government or acts of public
officials, might also come within the ambit of the
penal section. But, in our opinion, surh words
written or spoken would be outside the scope of the
section. In this connection, it is pertinent to
observe that the security of the State, which depends
upon the maintenance of law and order i• the very
basic consideration upon which legislation, with a
view to punishing offences against the State, is
undertaken. Such a legislation has, on the one
hand, fully to protect and guarantee tho freedom of
speech and expression, which is the sine qoo nan of a
democratic form of Government that our Constitution has established. This Court, as the custodian and
guarantor of the fundamental rights of the citizens,
has the duty cast upon it of striking down any law
which unduly restricts the freedom of speech and
expression with which we are concerned in this
case. But the freedom has to be guarded againp'
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
807
becoming a licence for vilification and condemnation
of the Government established by law, in words
which incite violence or have the tendency to create
public disorder. A citizen has a right to say or
write whatever he likes about the Government, or
ita measures, by way of criticism or comment, so
long as he does not incite people to violence
against the Government established by law or with
the intention of creating public disorder. The
Court, has, therefore, the duty cast upon it of
drawing a clear line of demarcation between the
ambit of a citizen's fundamental right guaranteed
under Art. 19(l)(a) of the Constitution and the
power of the legislature to impose reasonable restrictions on that guaranteed right in the interest of,
inter aUa, security of the State and public order.
We have, therefore, to determine how far the
ss. 124A and 505 of the Indian Penal Code could be
said to be within the justifiable limits oflegislation.
If it is held, in consonance with the views expressed
by the Federal Court in the case of Niharendu Dutt
Majumdar v. Tlw Kiny Emperor(') that the gist of
the offence of 'sedition' is incitement to violence or
the tendency or the intention to create public disorder by words spoken or written, which have the
tendency or the effect of bringing the Government
established by law into hatred or contempt or creating disaffection in the sense of disloyalty to the State
in other words bringing the law into line with the
law of sedition in England, as was the intention of
the legislators when they introduced s. 124A into
the Indian Penal Code in J 870 as aforesaid, the law
will be within the permissible limits. laid down in
cl. (2) of Art. 19 of the Constitution, if on the other
hand we give a literal meaning to the words of the
section, divorced from all the antecedent background in which the law of sedition has prown, as
laid down in the several decisions of the Judicial
Committee of the Privy Council, it will be true to
(I) ( 19t2) P. C. R. SS.
1968
K• Nalh Binlh
y,
Bu.'6 of Bi/urr
Sinha C. J,
SOS SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1962] SUPP.
JHZ
K,,U, Nath Sinth
v.
St.aofBiMr
say that. the section is not only within b•1t also very
much Leyond tho limits laid down in cl. (:!)
aforesaid.
In view of tho conflicting decisions of the
Federal Court and of the Privy Council, referred to
above, we have to detnmino whether and how far
tho provisions of 88. I 24A nnd 5U5 of the Indian
Penal Code have to be struck down as unconstitutional.
If we accopt tho interpretation of the
Federal Court as to th1: gist of criminality in an
alleged crime of sedition, namely, incitement to
disorder or tendency or likolihood of public disorder
or reasona.blo appr.. hension thereof, the section may
lie within the ambit of permissible legislative
tho fundamental right
of
restrictions on
froodom of speech and expreBBion. Thero can be
no doubt that apart from the provisions of ol. (2)
of Art. 19, BB. l24A and 505 are clearly violative of
A1t. l9(l)(a) of the Constitution. But then we have
to see how far the saving clause, namely, ol. (2) of
Art. 19.protccts the sections aforesaid. Now, M
already pointed out, in terms of the amended
cl. (2), quoted above, the expres;ion "in the interest
of... puhlic order" are words of great amplitude and
are much more comprehensive than the expression
"for the maintenance of", !\S observed by this Court
in the cl\Be of Virendra v. The State of Punjab (1 ).
Any law which is enacted in the interost of publio
order may be saved from the vice of constitutional
invalidity. If, on the other hand, we were to hold
that even without any tendency to disorder or
intention to croate di8turbance of law and order,
by the use of words written or spoken which merely
create disaffoction or feolings of enmity against
the Government, the offonco of sedition is complete,
thon such an interpretation of the sections would
make them unconstitutional in view of Art. 19(l}(a)
read with cl. (2). It is well settled that if certain
provi~ions of law construed in one way would make
(I) [19S8] S.C.R. 508, 317.
2 $.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
809
1P6t
them consistent with the Constitution, and another
interpretation would rnnder them unconstitutional, lirdtir H•lh /JlP,rli
v,
the Court would lean in favour of the former
Stole '4f Bibar
construction. The provisions of the sections read
Siwl;,J.
as a whole, ~long with the explanations, make it
reasonably clear that the sections aim at rendering
pllnal only such activities as would be intended, or
have a tendency, to create disorder or disturbance
of public peace by resort to violence. As already
pointed out, the explanations a.ppended to the main
body of the section make it clear that criticism of
public measures or comment on Government action,
however strongly worded, would be within reason·
able limits and would be consistent with the
fundamental right of freedom of speech and ex pres.
sion. It is only when the words, written or spoken,
etc. which have the pernicious tendency or futention
of creating public disorder or disturbance of law
and order that the law steps in to prevent such
activities in the interest of public order. So construed, the section, in our opinion, strikes the correct
balance betwPen individual fundamental rights and
the interest of public order. It is also well settled .
that in interpreting an enactment the Court should
have regard not merely to the liter~! meaning of the
words used, but also take into conoderation the
antecedent history of the legislation, its purpose
and the mischief it seeks to suppress (vide (1)). The
Bengal Immunity Company Limited v. The State of
Bihar (1) and {l) R.M.D. Chamarbaugwalla v. The
Union of India ('). Viewed in that light, we have
no hesitation in so construing·the provisions of the
sections impugned in these cases as to limit their
application to acts involving intention or tendency
to create disorder, or disturbance of law and order,
or incitement to violence.
We may also consider the legal position, as it
should emerge, assuming that the main s. I24A is
(I) [1955] 2 S.C R. 603.
(2) [1957] S.C.R, 93(1,
810 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1962] SUPP.
JHll
K• N .i. S¥
•·
81111 fl/ Bilw
SinluC.J.
capable of being construed in tho literal sense in
which the Jurlicial Committee of tho Privv Council
has construed it in tho oases referred to above. On
that assumption, it is not open to this Court to
construe the section in such a way as to avoid the
alleged unconstitutionality by limiting the application of the section in the way in which the Federal
Court intenrled to apply it ? In our opinion, there
are decisions of this Court which amply justify our
taking that view of the l<'gal position. This Court,
in the case of R.Jf.D. Chamarbaugu-alla v. The Union
of lridia (I) has rxamincd in detail the several
docisions of this Court, as also of the Courts in
America and Australia. After examining those
decisions, this Court came to the conclubion that
if tho impugnrd provisions of a Jaw come within the
constitutional powers of the legislature by adopting
one view of the words of the impugned Hection or
Act, thr Court will take that vi1·w of the matter aod
limit its application accor rlingly, in preference to
tho view whil"h would make it unconstitutional on
another view of the interpretation of the words in
question. In that case, tho Court had to choose
between a definition of the expression "Prize Competitions" as limited to those competitions which
wore of a gfmbling character and those which wore
not. The Court chose the forml"r interpretation
which mado tho rest of the provisions of the Act,
Prize Competitions Act (XLII of 1955), with pnrti·
cular reference to ss. 4 and 5 of the Act and Rules
11 and 12 framed thereunder, valid. The Court
held that the penalty attached only to those
competition~ which involved the element of gambling a.nd those oompP.titions in :vhioh success depended to a substantial degree on ~kill were held to be
out of the purview of the Act. The ratio decidendi
in that ca.Ile, in our opinion, applied to the case in
hand in so far as we propose to limit its operation
only to such activities as come within the ambit of
(I)
(19~7) S.C.R. 930.
2s.c.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
811
the observations of the Federal Court, that is to
say, activities involving incitement to violence or
intention or tendency to create public disorder or
caus':l disturbance of public peace.
-{
•'
We do not think it necessary to discuss or to
refer in detail to the authorities cited and discussed
in the reported case R.M .D. Cha,marbaugwalla v. The
Union of India 11) at pages 940 to 952. We may
add that the provisions of the impugned sections,
impose restrictions on tho fundamental freedom of
speech and expression, but those restrictions cannot
but be said to be in the interest of public order and
within the ambit of permissible legislative interference with that fundamental right.
It is only necessary to add a few observations
with respect to the constitutionality of s. 505 of the
Indian Penal Code. With reference to each of the
three clauses of the section, it will be found that
the gravamen of the offpnee is making, publishing
or circulating any statement, rumour or report (a)
with intent to cause or which is likely to cause any
member of the Army, Navy or Air Force to mutiny
or otherwise disregard or fail in his duty as such ;
or (b) to cause fear or alarm to the public or a
section of the public which may induce the commission of an offence against the State or against public
tranquillity ; or (o) to incite or which is likely
to incite one class or community of persons to commit an offence against any other class or community.
It is manifest thateach one of the constituent elements of the offence under s. 50ti has reference to,
and a direct effect on, the securitv of the State or
public order. Hence, these provisions would not exceed the bounds of reasonable restrictions on the
right of freedom of speech and expression. It is clear,
(I) (1957] S.C.R. 930.
Kedor N otli B...h
v.
State ef BiMrr
Sinllo C.11,
812 SUPREME OOURT REPORTS [1962) SUPP.
ZfU
Ktiltlr ~.,~ s;.1~
v.
llwl of Billar
sw..c. J.
11/Gt
Jnuary 16.
therefore, that cl. (2) of Art. I 9 olearly eaves thA
section from the vice of unconstitutionality.
It has not be~n contended hefore us on behalf
of the appellant in C.A. 169 of 1957 or on behalf of
the respondents in tho other appeals (No. 124·126
of 1958) that the words used by them did not
come within the purview of the definition of sedition
as interpreted by us. No arguments were advanced
before us to show that even on the interpreta.tiop
given by us their cases did not come within tho
mischit>f of the one or the other section, as the CiUlll
may be. It follows, therefore, that the Criminal
Appeal Hi!J of 195i has to be dismissed. Criminal
Appeals 124-126 of 1958 will be remanded to the
High Court to pa.ss such order as it thinks fit awl
proper in the light of the interpretation given by
us.
Appeal No. 169 of 1957 dismissed.
Appeal~ Nos. 124 lo 126 of 19ii8 all,owed.
DAULATRAM
v.
STATE OP PUNJAB
(J. L. KAPUR, 111. HIDAYATULLAH and RAGllUDAR
DAYAL, JJ.)
Pro-~ecution-Cognizance-Comp!aint in
writing liy thf
Public Sen'<lnt concerned-If incumbent--Indian l'enal CO<k,
1860 (Act XLV of 1860), s. 182-Code or Criminal Proc.dure,
11!.?8 (Act F of 1898), •· 11/5.
The appellant a Patwari WTote a letter to the Tehsildar
under whom he was working that he had been robbed of
certain official papers and money. The police reported that
on invcstigationt the allegations were found to be falst":.
The
Tchsi1dar asked the police that a "calendar" be drawn up.
The police launched a prosecution under s. 182 of the Indian
Penal Code. No complaint in writing as required by 1. 195
of the Code of Criminal Procedu1 e was made by the Tchsildar
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