SARDAR SYEDNA TAHER SAIFUDDIN SAHEB versus THE STATE OF BOMBAY
Supreme Court of India | Decided 9 January 1962 | [1962] SUPP. 2 S.C.R. 496 | 1962 INSC 1
Key facts
- Decided
- 9 January 1962
- Bench
- BHUVNESHWAR PRASAD SINHA*, A.K. SARKAR*, K.C. DAS GUPTA*, N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR, J.R. MUDHOLKAR
- Bench size
- 5
- Case number
- WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) No. 128/1958
- Disposal
- Dismissed
- Citation
- [1962] SUPP. 2 S.C.R. 496
- Neutral citation
- 1962 INSC 1
Text of the judgment
496
SUI- REME COURT REPORTS (1962) SUPP.
S'ARDAR SYEDNA l'AHER SAIFUDDIK SAHEB
v.
THE STATE OF BO'.\IBAY
(B. P. Si~llA c. J., A. K. SARKAR, K. c. DAS
GUP'l'A, N. RAJAOOPALA AYYANOAU and
J. R. Mun110LKAR, JJ.)
Excommunication, Pret·enlion of-Enactment-Conalituticnal rolidity-Fundamrntal rights of membua of Dawoodi
Bohra r.cmmunity and its religious Brad, if infringtd-Bomhay
l:'ret·en:ion of Excommunication Act, I949(Bom. 42 oJ 1949), sa.
2, J-l'o1.stitution of ft,dia, Arts. 25, 26, 17.
By s.3 of the Bombay Prevention of Excommunication Act,
1949 (Born. 42 of 1949), it is provided thal "Norwithstanding
anything contained _in al\Y law, custom or usage for the time
being in force, to the contrary, no t'xcommunication of a mem·
bcr of any community shall be valid and shall be of any effect."
The preamble to the Act stated, inter alia, that in keeping with
the changing times and in the public intrrcst, it was expedient
to stop the practice of excommunication prevalent in certain
con1munitics and the definition of the word "community''
contained ins. 2 of the Act included the reJig;ous denomination of Dawoodi Bohras.
The pietilioner, who wou the religi·
ous head ,,f the Dawoodi Bohra community and trustee of its
property, challenged the constilutional validiry of the Act on
the ground thot it violated its fundamental rights guaranteed
by Arts. 25 and 26 of the Corutitution. Reliance was placed
on behalf of the petitioner on the decision of Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in Ila.an Ali v. Mansoor Ali,
(1947) L.R.75 I.A. I, to which he was a party, as r~ognising
his right a.< the 5lst Dai-ul-Mutlaq of the community to excommunicate any of its membcn under prescribed limits,
/leld, (Per Sarkar, Das Gupta and Mudholkar, JJ.,
Sinha, C. J., diaaenting), that the impugned Act violated
Arts. 25 and 26 of the Cons1itution and was, therefore,
void.
It was evident from the religious faith and :enets of the
Dawoodi Bohra community that the exercise of the power ol
excommunication by its religious head on religioua grounds
formed part of the management of its affairs In matters of
religion and the impugned Act in making even ruch excommunication invalid infringed the right of the community under
Art. 26(b) of the Constitution.
H1J1G11 .41i v. .llaM<JOrali, (1947) L. R. 75 I. A. I,
nfc:ncd to.
"'
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
497
1962
It is well settled that that Arts. 25 and 26 of the Constitution protect not merely religious doctrines and belif'fs but
Sa1dar Syedf!a
also acts done in pursuance of religion and thus bUarant~e
Toher Saijuddin
Saheb
rituals and observances, ceremonies and modes of worship
which are integral parts of religion. What is essential p_art of Tiu State v.
of Bombay
a religion or what~ts religious practice has to be judgerl m the
light of its doctrine and such practices as arc regarded by the
community as a part of iis religion must also be included in
them.
Commissioner of Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras
v. Sri Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar of Sri Shrur Mutt, [I 954]
S. C. R. 1005, Mahant Jagannath Ramanuj Das v. The State
of Orissa, [1954] S.C.R. 1046, Sri Venkataramana Devaru v.
State of Mysore,· [1958] S.C.R. 891 and Durgah Committee,
Ajmer v. Sye~ Hussain Ali, [1962] 1 S.C.R, 383, relied on.
The fundamental right under Art. 26(b) is not subjected
to preservation of civil rights and its only limitations are those
expressly mentioned by the Article itself i e. public order,
morality and health and those mentioned by cl. 2 of Art. 25
as has been held by this court. The fact that in the instant
case civil rights of an excommunicated person would bC affected by the exercise of the fundamental right under Art, 26(b)
can, therefore, be of no consequence nor could it be said that
excommunication was prejudicial to public order, morality and
health.
The impugned Act did not fall within Art. 25(2) (a.) nor
could it be said to be a law "providing for social welfare.and
reform" within the meaning of Art. 25(2)(b) of the Constitu·
tion. It barred excommunication even on religious ground'·'
and could not be said to promote social welfare and reform
even though it sought to prevent consequent loss of civil
rights.
Sri Venkataramana Devaru v. State of Mysore, [1958]
S.C.R. 895, referred to.
Tahu Saifuddin v. Tyebbhai Moo.aji, A. I. R. 1953 Born.
183, disapproved.
Per Sinha, C. J.-It was not <0rrcct to say that the
Privy Council in Hasana/i v. Mansoorali, held that the right
or the Dai-ul-M4tlaq to excommunicate a member of the
community was a purely religious matter. The Dai was not
merely the head of a religious community but also the trustee
of its property. While his actions in the purely religious
aspect could be no conccm of the rourts, 1thosc- touching the
civil rights of the members of the community were justiciable
i'nd liable to interference by the l~islat4rc l\nd the judiciary.
498 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1962] SUPP·
B•Jt11 S,;1J11a
TIM Seiftll/J1n
8oltt6
Tiii
s,_,, '·•I B-'•J
The impuRned Act, thcreforr. in seeking to protrct the civil
right.s .of the members of the community was within the saving
prov1S1om of Art. 2.5(2)(b) of th• constitution sir.cc the right
of'.' rel.igious denomination under Art. 26(b) was subject to
legtslatton under Art. 25(2)(b) of the Constitutio~
Sri Venkataramana Demro v. Sta'I of Myaort, [1958]
S.C.R, 895, relied on.
Tht Commiasiuntr o/ llindu Religioua End<>u•ment8, Mad,
raa v. Sri Lakahmindm Thirtha Swamiar of Sri ShT1ir Mutt,
[1954] S.C.R. Hi05, considered.
Th< Durgah Committee, Ajmer v. Syed Huaaain Ali, [1962]
I S.C.R. 383, referred to.
Case-law discussed.
The Act had for its purpose the fulfilment of individuat
liberty of conscience ~uaranieed by Art 25(1) and sought to
implement Art. 17 of the Con"itution in attempting to save
an excommunicated person from virtually becoming an untouchable in his community and its constitutional validity
could not, therefore, he questioned.
Held, further. that the Act in pith and substance fell
within Eniries 1 and 2 of List Ill of the Legislative Listi of
the Constimtion Act of 1935, and there could be no doubt as
to the con1pettn( y of the Lrgislature in rnarting it.
Per Avyangar, J-The right of Dai-ul-Mutlaq to exercise
the right of exc0mmuniration against a member of the drnomination as recogni.ed by the Privy Council in lltJMJnali v.
.Jfan&00rali, could not be in doubt.
A denomination under Art. 26 and its members under
Art. 25 have the right to ensure ill existence by maintaininc
discipline and ensu1ing adherence to its tenet& and practices
bv such suitable action as excommunicatibn of those who
denied the fundamental bases of the religion. The consequence of such action must n"cessari1y involve the exclusion of
an excommunicated person from participation in the religious
life of the denomination including the use of places of wonhip
or burial grounds dedicated for the use of the members and
vested in the religious head as trustee for the denomination.
Dill v. Wataon, (1836) 3 Jones Rep. (Ir. Ex.) 4S aad
Jl'rt• Church o/ Scotlallcl v. Ovcrlou, [I~] A. C. 515, referred to.
It was not correct to say, in view of the ddinition of
the word 'excomm11nication' contained in the Act., that it
merely sought to save the civil righu of ·~ e_xcommun~~ted
penon and had no concern with ~C011111llUl•cat100 .., reh'IOllfi
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
499
1962
grounds entailing~ under the laws of the denomination, deprivation of civil rights.
Sardaf' Syulna
TalMr Saifudd;•
The impugned Act by depriving the Dai of the right to
Saheb
excommunicate and making its exercise a penal . offence struck
at the very life of the denomination and rendered it impo· 11,, Slatt of s..,q,
tent to protect itself against dissidents and schismatics and
thereby contravened Art. 25 and 26 of the Constitution,
The impugned Act cannot also to sustained as a
measure of social welfare and reform under Art. 25 (2) (b) or
under Art. l 7 of the Constitution.
Venkatarama Devaru v. State of Mysore, [1958] $.C.R.
895, distinguished.
The expression "laws providing: for social welfare and
reform" in Art. 25(2: (b) of the Constitution was not intended
to enable the legislature to "reform" a religion out of exis..
tence or identity. The activities referred to in Art. 25(2)(a)
are obviously not of the essence of the religion nor was Art.
25(2)(b) intended to cover the essentials of a religion which
are protected by Art. 25(1).
••
Faith in the Dai-uJ.Mutlaq being an essenti:.1 part of
the creed of the denominatio;; that held it· together, the
impugned Act clearly contravened Art. 25(1) of the Constitu·
tion by tnking away his po\ver of excomunicate by which he
kept the denomination together and maintained the purity of
its fellowship.
OmGINAL JURISDICTION: ·Petition No. 128 of
1958.
Petition under Art. 32 of the Constitution of
India for enforcement of Fundamental Rights.
K. JI!. Munshi, R.J. Jo.•M, G.K. Jfunshi, T.S.N.
Diwariji, J.B. Dadachanji, S. N. Andtey, Rameshim.r
Nath and P. L. Vohra, for the petitioner.
JI .C. Set,alvad, Attorney General o.f India, C.K.
Daphtary, Solicitor·Generol of l"1dio. H.N .. Sanyal,
Additional Solicitor General of lndhi, B. {{en and
R.H. Dhehar, for the respondent.
l.N. Shroff, for the intervener.
1962. January 9~Sinha. C.J., delivered his
own Judgment. The Judgment of Sarkar, Das Gupta
and Mudholk!t.r, JJ., was delivered by Das Gupta, J.
AyY&ngar J. delivered a separate Judgment.
600
11161
SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1962] SUPP.
S1:<HA, C. J.-By this petition under Art. 3~
of the Constitution, the petitioner, wh') is the 5lst
Dai-ul-ltfutlaq and head of the Da.woodi Bohra
Sah.b
Community. challenges the roustit u1 ic11al ity of the
••
7),, 8'4u of B ,m1a_,
Bombay Prevention of Excommu11il'ation Act,
SinAa C.J.
19.W (Bombay Act XLII of Hl49) (hereinafter n·fer·
red to a.~ the Act) on the ground that the provisions
of the Act infringe Arts. 25 and 26 of the Constitution. The sole respondent in this oaso is the
State of Bombay.
The petition is founded on the following
allegation&. The Dawoodi Rohra Community
consista of Muslims of the Shia sect, holdinl! in
common with all members of that sect the heli< f
that there is one God, that Mohamm•d is His
Prophet to whom Ho revealed th" Holy Koran ;
that Ali, the son-in-law of Mohammad, was the
Wasi (exec·utor) of the Prophet, and that the said
Ali succeC'ded the Prophet by Nas-e-Jali.
Tho
Dawoodi Bohras believe that th" said Ali was
succeeded by a line of Imams, each of whom io
turn was appointed by Nas-e-Jali by his lmmediat<>
predecessor. The Shia sect itself l.ecame di"idPct
into two sub-seota, known respectively as bmai/i.and Ima Asharia. The Dawoodi Bllhras belong to
the former sect, and believe that owing to perser.ution Imam Tyeb (the 21st llfam) went into
seolu'sion and that an Iman from his line "'ill
appear, it being their belief that an I man always
exists although at times he may ho iovi&ihle to his
believers, while in seclusion ; that owing to tho
impen,ling seolusion of the 2 lst Imam {Imam
Tyeb) his predecassor, tho :!0th Imam, clir~cted hie
Hujjat (a. dignitary ranking next to an Imam), on,.
Hurra-tul-.Malaka, to appoint a J)ai, a Mazoon (11
dignitary next ton Dai) and a Muh~ir {a dignitary
ranking next to a Mazoon) to carry on the Duu·a.1
(miBBion) of tho /mJJm S•J long as th" Imam shoukf
remain in seclusion, and to take antl receive from
~e faithful an oath of allegiance. The Doia are
sw,,, s_,,4114
'Tlt.t Saifllddin
2S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
501
196!
known ·as Dai-ul-Mutlaq. The petitioner, as the
S ardar S.JlldnO
Head Priest of the community of Dawoodi Bohras, Toher
Saifudd.in
is the vice gerent of Imam on Earth in seclusion.
. ~alub
The petitioner is a citizen of India. As Dai-ul- 1.'he State••of Bombay
Mutlaq and the vicegerent of Imam on Earth
Sinha C.J.
in seclusion, the Dai has not only civil powers as
head of the sect and as trustee of the property,
but also ecclesiastic11l powers as religious leader of
the community. It is the right and privilege of
the petitioner as Dai-ul-Mntlaq to regulate the exercise of religious rights in places where such rights
and ceremonies are carried out and in which
religious exercises are performed. In his capacity
as the Dai-ul-Mutlaq, that is to say, as· relie:ious
leader as well as trustee of the property of the
community, one of his duties is to manage the
properties which are all under his directions and
control. He has 81so the power of excommunication. This power of excommunication is not an absolute, arbitrary and untrammelled power, but has
to be exercised according to the usage and tenets
of the community. Save in exceptional circumstances, expulsion from the community can be
effected only at a meetmg of the Jamat, after the
person concerned has b•:en given due warning of the
fault complained of and an opportunity of mending,
and after a public statemeut of the grounds of
expulsion. The result of excommunication properly and legally effected involves exclusion from
the exercise of religious rights in places under the
trusteeship of the Dai-ul-Mutlaq. The petitioner
claims that as the head of the Dawoodi Bohra
community and as Dai-ul Mutlaq, he has the right
and power, in a proper case and subject t·o the
conditions oflcgal exercise of that power, to excommunicate a member of the Dawoodi Bohra
community, and this power of excommunication
is an integral part of the religious faith and belief
of the Dawoodi Bohra community. The petitioner
further affirms that the exercise of the right of
502
SUPREllE COURT REPOR'.1'5 [1902] SUPP.
excommunication is a matter of religion, and tha.t,
in
any event, the right is an incident of the manS•d.B•T•""s:tf-"itl agtoment of the affairs of the Dawoodi Bohm
community in matters of religion. He also aHserts
1l1 Stou if B.,.b.i> that the Da.woodi Bohra. community constitutes a
religious denomination within the. meaning of Art .
.... c.J.
26 of thp Constitution ; the said right of the
petitioner to excommunicate a member of the
community, for reasons of which the petitioner is
the sole judge in the exercise of his position as the
religious head, is a guaranteed right under Arts. 25
and 26 of the Constitution.
The Bombay Legislature enacted the Act,
which came into force on November l, 1049, The
petitioner asserts that the Act violates bis right
and pown, ai. Dai-ul-Mutlaq and religioll8 leader of
the Dawoodi Bohra community, to excommunicate
such members of the community as he may think
fit and proper to do; the said right of excommunication and the exercise of that right by the
petitioner in the manner aforesaid are matU,rs of
religion within the meaning of Art. 26( b) of the
Constitution. It is submitted by tho pttitioner
that the said Act violates or infringes both the
Arts. 25 and 26 of the Constitution, and to that
extent., after the coming into force of tho Constitution, has become void under Art. 13 of the
Constitution. Tho petitioner claims that notwithstanding the provisions of the Act, he, as the
religious loader and Dai-ul-MuUaq of the community, is entitled to cxcomm~icatc any member of
the Da.woodi Bohr& community for an offence,
which according to his religious sense justifies
expulsion; and insofar as tho Act interferes with
the said right of the petitioner, it is ultra virea the
Legislature. The Act is also challenged on the
ground of legislative incompetence of the then
Legislature of Bombay, inasmuch as it is contended
that such a power is not contained in any of tho
entries in the Seventh Schedule of the Government of India. Act, 1935.
IHI
.. .
2s.c.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
503
One Tayebhai Moosaji Koicha (Mandivala)
instituted a suit,. being suit No. 1262 of 1949, in the
High Court of Judicature at Bombay, praying inter
alia, for a declaration that certain orders of excom·
munication passed by the petitioner against him
prior to tho enactment of the Act were void and
illegal and of no ·effect, and that the plaintiff
continued to remain a member of the Dawoodi
Bohra community. The said suit was heard by
J.C. Shah, J., who. by his ·judgment dated
February 21, 1952, held · that the Act was not
inconsi11tent with Art. 26 of the Constitution, and
was not ultra vires the Legislature of the Province
of Bombay. The petitioner, being dissatisfied with
the judgment of the learned Judge, preferred an
appeal that came up for hearing before the Court of
Appeal, composed of Chagla, C. J., and Bhagwati
J. By its judgment dated August 26, 1952, the.
Court of Appeal upheld the judgment of the learned
single Judge, though on different grounds. The
petitioner obtained leave from the High Court to
appeal to this Court, and ultimately filed the
appeal, being Civil Appeal No. 99 of 1954. During
the pendency of the appeal, the plaintiff.respondent aforesaid died and an application made on
behalf of his heirs for being brought on the record
was not granted by the High Court of 1.lombay.
This Court dismissed the said appeal on the ground
that the plaintiff having died, the cause of action
did not survive.
The petitioner further alleges that parties
inimical to him and to the Dawoodi Community
have written scurrilous articles challenging and
defying the position, power or authority of the
petitioner as the religious head of the oommunity;
the challenge to the petitioner's position and his
power to excommunicate as the head of the
Dawoodi Bohra community is violat.ive of the petitioner's guaranteed rights under Arts. 25 and 26 of
the Constitution. It is, therefore, claimed that it
Barda< Sydrul
T al&er Salfw/dl1t
SoJieb
v,
Tiu Stale of B1111Hr1'
Sinha c.J,
504 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1962] SUPP.
8.,o S)'Mno
ro1in BaifvdJi•
Solwb
v.
11.SW.•fBW.,,
SW. C• .1.
is inoumbont upon the respondent, in its public
cha.raoter, to forbea.r from enforcing the provisions
of the Act against the petitioner. By the petitioner's attorney's lettl'r, annexure B to the
petition, dated July 18, 1958, the petitioner
pointed out to the respondent the unconstitutionality of thf' Act and requested tho latter to
desist from enforcing tho provisions of tho Act
against the petitioner or against the Dawoodi Bohra
community. In the premises, a. writ of .Mandamus
or a writ in the nature of Mandamus or other
appropriate writ, qirection or order under Art. 32
of the Constitution was prayed for against the
respondent restraining it, its officers, servants and
agents from enforcing the provisionH of the Act.
The answer of the State of Bombay, the sole
respondent, is contained in the affidavit sworn to
by Shri V.N. Kalghatgi, Assistant Secretary to the
Government of Bombay, Home Department, to the
effect that the petitioner not having taken any
proceedings to excommunicate any member of the
community had no cause of action or right to
institute the proceedings under Art. 32 of the
Constitution; that it was not admitted that the
Dai-ul-Mutlaq, as the bead of the community, has
civil powers, including the power to excommunicate
any member of the community; that, alternatively,
such power is not in conformity with the policy of
tba State, as defined in the Constitution; that the
petitioner, as the head of the community may have
the right to regulate religious rights at appropriate
places and occasions, but those rights do not
include tho right to excommunicate any person and
to deprive him of his civil rights and privileges;
and that, in any event, after the coming into effect
of the impugned Act, the petitioner has no such
rights of excommunication; that it was denied that
the right to excommunir,a.te springs from or has its
foundation in religion and religious doctrines, tenets
and faith of the Dawoodi Bohra community that, a.t
2 S.C.R.
•
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
505
any rate, it was denied that the right to excommu·
nicate was an essential part of the religion of the
community; that, altcrnati vely, assuming that it
was part of a religious practice, it. runs counter to
public order, morality and health. It was also
asserted that the impugned Act was a valid piece of
legislation enacted by a competent legislature and
within the limits of Art. 25 and 26 of the
Constitution; and that thP right to manage its own
affairs vested in a feligious community is not an
absolute or untrammelled right but subject to a
regulation in the interest of public order, mprality
and health. It was denied that the alleged right of
the petitioner to excowmunicate a member of the
community is guaranteed by Arts. 25 and-26 of the
Constitution. In the premises, it was denied that
the petitioner had any right to the declaration
sought or the relief claimed that the provisions of
the Act should not be enforced.
At a very late stage of the pendency of th1;
proceedings in this Court, in April 1961, one
Kurbanhusein Sanchawala of Bombay, made an
applicatfon either for being added as a party to the
Writ Petition or, alternatively, for being granted
leilve to intervene in the proceedings. In hi;i
petition for intervention, he stated that he was a
citizen of India and was by birth a member of
the Dawoodi Bohra commun.ity and as such had
been taking an active part in social activities for
bettering the conditions of the members of the
cummunity. He asserted that mem hers of the
community accepted that up to the 46th Dai-ul11!utlaq there was no controversy, . that each one
of them had been properly nominated and
appointed, but that a controversy arose as regards
the propriety and validity of the appointment of
the 47th Dia-ul-Jfut/,aq, which controversy conti.aued
all along until the present time so that opinioa is
divided amonzst the members of the Dawoodi Bohra
commuuity as to the validity of appointments and
Sard11r S,..tna
Taht1 Saifuddin
Solr1b
••
Tiu Stal• of Bomb47
Sinha C.J.
506 SUI'REME COURT REPORTS [1962] SUPP.
11111
existence of Dai·ul-Mul/aq, from the 47th 'to the 6lst
Dai-tJl-Mutlaq, including the present petitioner. The
TN S•ifud4in
intervener also alleged that but for the impugned
Act, the petitioner woul<l have loH no time in
•
•
n. s..u •f "-"' excommunicating him. In the premises, he claims
8/Mo C. .J.
that he is not ooly a proper but necessary pa1 ty to
the Writ Petition. Hi,, therefore, prayed to be
added as a part) -respondent, or, at any rate,
granted leave w intervene at the hearing of the
Writ Petition. We have to dispose of this petition
becaue no orders have been p8.88ed uLril the bee.ring
of the main case before us. In answer to the petitioner's claims, the intervener has raised the following grounds, namely, that the Hoi,y Karan does not
permit excommunication, which is against the spirit
of Islam; that, in any event, the Dai-Ill Mutlaq
had no right or power to excommunicate any member
of the community, and alternatively, that such a
right, assuming that it was there, was wholly "out
of date in modern times and deserves to he
abrogated and was rightly abrogate& by the said
Act." I~ was further asserted that the alleged right
of excommunication was opposed to the universally
aooepted fundamentals of human rights as em·
bodied in the "Universal Declaration of Human
Rights." It Wiii! also &BSerted that the Act was
p881led by a competent legislature and was in consonance with the provisions of Arts. 25 and 26 of the
Coll8titution. The intervener further cfoims that
the rights to belief, faith and worship and the right
to a decent burial were baaio human rights and
were wholly inconsistent with the right of
excommunication claimed by the petitioner, and
that the practice of e:s:oommunication is opposed to
publio order and morality; that the practice of
e:s:communioation was a secul&r activity aSBociated
with religious practice and that the abolition of the
said practice is within the saving cl. 2(a) of Art. 25
of the Constitution. It waa also asaerted that,
under the lllohamadan Law, properties attached to
s.-.s,.a.
8-
2 S.C.R.
.,
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
507
1161.
institutions for religious and charitable purposes
vested in the Almighty God and not in the petiSaur S(l!doa
tioner, and that ·all the members of the Dawoodi Ta/u, Saifutltl1t1
Sall4b
Bohra community had the right to establish and
v.
maintain such institutions, in consonance with Art. Thi Slate of Blllflba.1
26 of the Constitution ; that is to say that Art. 26
Sinha C. J.
guarantees the right of the denomination as a whole
and not an individual like the petitioner. It was also
asserted that the .provisions of the Act· prohibiting
excommunication was in furtherance of public order
and morality and was just and reasonable restriction on a sec1tlar aspect of a religious practice. The
petitioner challenged the right of the intervener
either to intervene or to be added as the party.
respondent. In his rejoinder to the petition for
intervention, the petitioner further alleged that the
practice of excommunication was essential to the
purity of religious denominations because it could
be secured only by removal of persons who weJ:t)
unsuitable for membership of the community. It
was, therefore, asse.rted that those who did not
accept the headship of the Dai-ul-Mutlaq, including
the petitioner, must go out of the community and
anyone openly defying· the authority of the Dai·'ld·
Mutlaq was liable to be excommunicated from the
membership of the community, entailing loss of
rights and privileges belonging to such members.
It was, therefore, claimed that the practice of
excommunication was, and is, an essential and
integral part of the religion and religious belief,
faith and tenets of Dawnodi Bohra community,
which have been guaranteed by Art. 26 of the
Constitution.
It has been argued on behalf of the petitioner,
in support of the petition, that the Dawoodi Bohra
community, of which the petitioner is the religious
head, as also a trustee in respect of the proPE?rty
belonging to the community, is a religious denomination within the meaning of Art. 26 of the Constitu·
tion; that as such a religious denomination it is
508 SUPREME OOURT REPORTS [1962] SUPP.
J~t
s..u. s,..,,
T•~ .CIU/uJdin
Balltb
••
Tlw BloU •! 8-6•7
SWl4 C. J.
entitled to ensure its continuity by maintaininir the
bond of religious unity and dicipline, which woulrl
secure th~ continued acceptllnce by its adherents of
certain e&lential tenets, doctrines and practices; the
right to 8Uch coutinuty involves the right to enforce
discipline, if nece~sary by taking the extreme step
of excommunication; that the petitioner as the
religious head of the denominatio!l is invested with
certain powers, including the right to excommunicate dissidents, which power is a matter of religion
within the meaning of Art. 26(b) of the Constitution
that ·the impugned Act, insofar as it takes away
the pown to fnforce religious disoipline and thus
compels the denomination to accept dissidents as
having full rights as a member of the community,
including the right to use the properties and funds
of the commuity dedicated to religious use, violates
the fundamental rights of the petitioner guaranteed
under Art. 26. In this connection, reliance was
placed on the decision of this Court in The Commis·
sion£r, Hindu Religious Endowmt:nts, Mr'llras v. Sri
Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar of Sri Shirur Mutt('),
which, it is contended, has laid down that the
guarantee under the Constitution not only protects
the freedom of opinion, but also acts done in pursu.
ance of such religious opinion, and that it is the
denomination itself which has a right to dt1termine
what are eBSential parts of its religion, as protected
by the provisions of Arts. :!5 and 26 of the Constitu·
tion. It was further contended that the riirht to
worship in the mosque belonging to the C'.lmmunity
and of burial in the graveyard dedicated to the
community were religious rights which could not
be enjoyed by a person who had b:ien rightly
excommunicated. In~ofar as the Act took away
the right of the petitioner as the head of the com·
munity to excommunicate a particular member of
the community and thus to deprive him of the use
of the funds and property belonging to the commu( J)
[ l~J S.C.R. 1005.
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
509
nity for religious purposes, had the effect of depriving
the petitioner of his right ns the religious head to
regulate the right to the us~ of funds and property
dedicated to religious uses of the community. It
has also beeu contr>nded that religious reform, if
that is the intention of the impmmed Act, is outside
the ambit of Art. 25('!) (b) of the Con~titution.
The learned Attorney-General for th<' respondent contended on the other hand, that thu right
to excommunicate, whiuh has be0n renden·r! · i11 va.lid
by the impugned Act, WilS not a matter of religion
within the meaning of Art. :!G\b) of the Con;tibtion;
that what the Act really intended was to put a
stop to the practice inrlulgcd in by a caste or a denomination to deprive its membJr~ of their cidl rights
as such members, as distinguished from matters
of religion, which were withir1 th•.\ protection of
Art. :.!5 and 2G. Altern 1tively, it WilS al;o argued
that even a~suming that excommunication was
concerned with matters of religion, the Act would
not be void becaius it was a matter of reform in
thil interest of public welfare. It was also argued that
there was no evidence on the record to show that
ex:communication was an essential matter of religion. The right to worship at a particular place or
the right of burial in a particular burial ground were
qllestions of civil natur~. a dispute in resp~ct of
which was within the cvgnizance of the Civil ()ourts.
·rhe legislation in questio:1, in its real aspects, was
a matter of social welfare and soci d reform and
n'.>t within the prohibitioni of Art. 2.5( I) or Art. 26.
E1:commllnication involving deprivation. of rights
of worship or burial and the like wcr•• not matters
of religion witliin the meaning of Art. 2G(b), and
Ii.tally, Art. 26(b) waa controlled by Art. 25(2) (b)
uf th3 Constitution, and, th'.Jrefore, even if excommunication touched oert~in religious matters, the
Aot, insofar as it had abolisheJ it, was in
co111onance with modern notions of human dignity
1962
Sardar ')ytdna
Taher St1ifuddin
Saheh
v.
Tnt State of Bomb•7
Sinla C. J.
510 SUPREME CO~TREPORTS [1962] SUPP.
and individual liberty of action even in matters of
religiouR opinion and faith and practice.
SaifutUi•
So.lib
Shri Shroff, appearing for the intervener,
'v.
T.\t S 1<14 of Bomb•J attempted to reopen tho question whether the
~titioner as Dai-ul-Mutlaq, assuming that he had
BW..C,J,
been properly elected as such, had tho power to
excommunicate, in spite of the decision of their
Lordships of the Judicial Committee of tho Privy
Council in HatJan Ali v. Man..'>001" Ali ('). He also
supported the provisions of the impugned Act on
the grou11d that they were in furtherance of public
order. As we are not here directly concerned with
tho question whether or not the petitioner as tho
head of the religi0us community had thP power to
excommunicate, we did not hear Mr. Shroff at any
length with reference to that qu!'stion. We shall
proceed to determin the controversy in this c11se on
the aseumption that the petitioner bad that power.
We are only directly concemrd with the questions
whether the provisions of the Act, insofar as they
have rrndered invalid the practice of excommunica·
tion, are unconstitutional as infringing Art. 26(b},
and enacted by a legislature which was not competent to do so, as contended on behalf of the petitioner. We will, therefore, confine our attention to
those questions. Keeping in view the limited scope
of the c0ntroversy, we have first tO' determine the
ambit and effect of tho impugned Act. The
Bombay Prevention of Excommunication Act
(Bombay Act XLII of 1919) is an Act to prohibit
excommunication in the province of Bombay. Its
preamble, which shortly states the background of
the le;;islation, is in these terms :
s.,.. 8,.,,..
T-
"Whereas it has come to the notice of
Government that the fractice prevailing in
certain communities o excommunicating its
members is often followed in a manlier whi<.·h
result.a in the deprivation of legitimate right.
and privileges of it8 members ;
(1)
[19f7] L.Jl. 75, J. A. J,
l
2 $.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
511
And whereas in keeping with the spirit of
changing times and in the public interest it is
expedient to stop the practice; it is hereby
enacted is follows"
Tue definition of "Community" as given in s. 2(a)
would include the Dawoodi Bohra community,
because admittedly its members are knit together
by reason of certain common religious doctrines.
and admittedly its members belong to the same
religion or religious creed of a section of the Shia
community of Muslims. The term 'community"
includes a caste or a sub-caste also. "Excommuni·
cation" has been defined. by s. 2 (b) as meaning
"the expulsion of a person fl'Om any community of
which he is member depriving him of rights and
privileges which are legally enforceable by a suit
of civil nature ......... ", and the explanation to the
definition makes it clear that the rights and privileges
within the meaning of the definition ~nclude the
right to office or property or to worship in any religious place or a right of burial or cremation, notwithstanding the fact that the determination of
such right depends entirely on the decision of the
question as to any religious riteH or ceremonies or
rule or usage of a community. By s. 3, excommunication of a member of a community has been
declared to be invalid and of no effect, notwithstanding any law, custom or usage to the contrary.
Any act of excommunication, or any act in furtherance of excommunication, of any member of a
community has been made a penal offence liable to
a puni8hment, on conviction, of fine which may
extend to one thousand rupees. The explanation
has made it clear that any person who has voted
in favour of a decision of excommunication at a
meeting of a body or an association of a particular
denomination is deemed to have committed the
offence made punishable by s. 4, as aforesaid.
Sections 5 and 6 lay down the procedure for the
trial of an offence under the' Act, the limit of time
1962
Sartlor SyeJno
To.her l!Satfuddi11
Salreb
v.
Thi Slal• of BM11"'1
Sinha a. J,
512 SUPREME OOURT REPORTS [1962] SUPP.
1H3
8•44' B(l!in•
r.... s.v..uu.
B.Wt
••
r1u Sl•ll •/ B~
8i•"4 c. J.
within which the prosecution must be launched and
the necessity of previous sanction of the authority
indicated therein.
These, in short, are tho provisions of the
impugned Act. It will be noticed that the Act is a
culmination of tho hietory of social reform which
began more than a century ago with the fnactmt'nt
of s. 9 of Regulation YJI cf 1832 of the :Bengal
Code, which provided, i11ter alia. that the J:rn s of
Hindus and M'ijslims shall nl>t be permitted to ope·
rate to deprive the parties of any property to which,
but for the operation of such laws, they would have
been entitled. Those provisions were subsequently
incorporated in tlio [ndia Act (XXI of 1850)-known
as the Caste Disabilities Removal Act-which provided th~t a person shall not be dcprivt-d of his
rights or property hy reason of his or her renouncing
or exclusion from tho communion of any religion or
being dPprivcd of "~&te, and that an:v 011ch forfeiture
shall not be enfNr<·d as the law in the Court8. The
impugned Act, \],us, has given full dfect to modern
notions of individual freedom to choose one's way
of life and to do away with all those unduc and
outmoded interfen·nces wi,h liberty of conscience,
faith and belief. It. is also aimed at .ensuring
human dignity and removing all those restrictions
which prevent a person from living his own life so
long 'Ul he did not interfere with similar rights of
others. The legislature had to take the logical final
step of creating a now offene<• by laying down that
nobody had the right to deprive others of their civil
rights simply because the latter did not conform to
a particular pattern of conduct. The Act, in subs·
ta.nee, has added a new offence to the penal law of
the country by i:enalising any action which has the
effect of depriving a pPrson of his human dignity
and rights appurtenant thereto. It also adds to the.
provisions of the Criminal Proced11 .. r Code and has
jQsistod upon the previous sanction of the prescribed
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
513
11HJ2
authority as a condition precedent to launching a
prosecution for an alleged .offence against the proSartiqr Syetfna
I oh:~ Saifvddin.
visions of the Act. In my opinion, ·therefore, the
Saheb
enactment, in pith and substance, would come within
v.
Entries 1 & 2 of List III of the Concurrent Legisla- Tf.e "tote of Bom-~Y
tive List of the Constitution Act of 1935. It is true
Sinha C. J.
that "excommunication" does not, in terms, figure
as one of the entries in any one of the three lists.
The legislative competence of the Bombay Legislature to enact the Act has not been seriously
challenged before us; and, therefore, no particular
argument was addressed to us to show that the
legislation in question could not be within the
purview of Entries 1 & 2 of List III aforesaid.
What was seriously challenged before us was the
constitutionality of the Act, in the light of the
Constitution with particular reference to Arts. 25 &
26, and I shall presently deal with that aspect of
the controversy. But before I do that, it is convenient to set out the background of the litigation
culminating in the present proceedings.
The first reported ca.se in relation to some aspects
of Skia I mami Ismailis is that of the Advocate General
ex relation Dave Muhammad v. Muhammad Husen
HuBeni (1). That was a suit commenced befor.e the
coming into existence of the Bombay High Court,
on the Equity Side of the late Supreme Court,
instituted by an information and bill, filed by the
relators and plaintiffs, representing a minority of
the Kkoja community, ·against 'the defendants
representing tbe majority of that community. The
prayer in the action was that an account be taken
of all property belonging to or held in trust for the
Kkoja community of Bombay in the hands of the
treasurer and the accountant, respectively called
Lifukki and Kamaria, and other cognate reliefs not
relevent to the present controversy. In that case,
which was heard on the Original side by Arnould J.,
judgment was delivered in November 1866, after a
(I)
(m75) 2 Born. H.C.R. 323
514
lH2
S•t!.r8..J..
2'w s.v;;;;,.
IMo6
v.
n. Bkio •I B-J
sw..c. J.
~
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1962] SUPP.
prolonged hearing. In that case, the learned Judge
went into a. detailed history of the several sects
amongst Muslims, including the Shia I mami I smaili8,
with pa.rtioula.r reference to the Aga Khan and his
relation with the Ja.mat of the Klwjas of Bombay.
In that case it was la.id down that there was no
public property impressed with a trust, either expreas
or impli<'d, for the benefit of the whole Klwja
oommunity and that Aga. Khan, as the spiritual
head of the Klwjas was entitled to determine on
religious grnnnds who shall or shall not remain
merubers of the Khoja community. In that case,
the learned Judge, with reference to authoritative
texts, went into the detailed history of the two
sects of the Sunnis and Shi.as.
He discuEsed the
origin of the 1wiailis as an offshoot of the Sh-ia,'J,
and traced the hereditary succeesion of the
unrevealed Imams in unbroken line down to
Agha Khan. Except for its historical aspect, the
case does not deal with any mattt•r relevant to the
present controversy.
'l'he next reported case which was brought to
our notice is thl' case of the Advocate Grneml of
Bombay v. Yusufalli Ebrahim (I). That was a case
directly in relation to the Dawoodi Bohra community, with which we a.re concerned
m
this
case. In that
case,
there was a
dispute as regards a mosque and a tomb, and was
heard by Mart-en J., on the Original side in 1921.
We a.re not conct•rned with the details of the controversy in that case.
llut the learned Judge has
noticed the history of this community, with particular reference to the position of the Dai-ul-.Mutlaq,
and how the differences between the ma.jorit.} of th<"
community and the minority arose on the question
of the regularity of the succession of the 4 7th Dai
in 1810. The learned Judge has pointed out that
fae powers of the Dai are at least thrice de legated,
(I)
(l!rl2) 2·! Born. L.R. !OW.
'·•
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
515
namely, by God to Prophet Mohammad, by the
latter to the Imam, and by the Imam to the
Dai-1tl-M utlaq.
The more directly in point is the litigation
which was concluded by the judgment of their
Lordships of the Judicial Committee of the privy
Council in the case of Hasanali v. Mansoorali (').
In that case, the powers of the Dai-ul-Mutlaq
to excommunicate were directly in controversy.
The petitioner was the first defendant in that action,
which had-been commenced in October, 1925, and
was decided by the judgment of the Subordinate
Judge of Ilurhanpur, dated January 2, 1931. -That
decision was reversed by the Judicial Commissioner
of Central Provinces & Berar (later the High
Court at Nagpur) by his judgment dated October 25,
1934. That judgment was taken on appeal to
the Privy Council and the judgment of the Privy
Council very succinctly traces the history of
the Dawoodi Bohi'a community until we come
to the 5lst Dai, who was the first defendant in that
action, and is the petitioner before us. In that
case, certain orders of excommunication were under
challenge. As a res~lt of those orders of excommunication, the plaintiffs had been obstructed in, and
prevented from, entering the property in suit
for the purposes of worship, burial and resting in
the rest house. In that case, their Lordships did
not uphold the claim of the Dai-ul-Mutlaq that he
had unrestricted power of excommunication, though
they found that he could be regarded as Dai-ul_Mu!laq. As regards the power to excommunicate,
it was held that though the power was there, it was
not absolute, arbitrary and untrammelled ; and
then their Lordships laid down the conditions for
the valid exercise of that power. The effect of a
valid excommunication, in their Lordships' view,
was exclusion from the exercise of religious rights
in places under the trusteeship of the head of the
community, because the Dai was not only a religious
(I}
[1947) L.R. 75,l.A. J,
1962
Sor.tar S11Jn.
s.,,,,,
..
Tah11 Saifaidia
Tiu Stall of B""'6_,
Sioluo C. J,
516 SUPREME OOUl{T REPOHTS [106!:?] SUPP.
1962
Sortl•r Syttltu
T alur Soijud<I. n
SaJi.b
Y,
TM Stal# of Homli,:l
Sinlu C, J.
leader but also a trustee of the property of the
community. After examining the evidence in that
ease, their Lordships held that thoi persons alleged
to have been excommunicated had not been validly
expelled from the community.
The judgment of the Privy Council W&ll given
on Decembt•r, I, 1947. Within two years of that
judgment the impugned Act was pa88ed, and soon
after a suit on the Original side of the Bombay High
Court was commenced (being suit No. 1262 of 1949).
That was a suit by a member of the Dawoodi Bohra
community, who had been excommunicated by the
petitioner, functioning as the Dai-ul-Mutlaq, by two
orders of excommunication, one passed in 1934 and
the othPr in 1948, soon after the judgmPnt of the
Privy Council. The suit was, inJ,er alia, for a declaration that the orders of excommunication were
vdd in view of the Act. A number of issuea were
raised at the trial, which was heard by Shah J.
Two questions, by way of preliminary iBBnes, with
which we are immediately concerned in the present
proceedings, were raised before the learned Judge of
the Bombay High Court, namely :
(I) Was the Act within the legislative
competence of the Legislature of 'the Province
ol Bombay?
(2) Wh11ther after the coming into force of
the Constitution, the Act was invalid in
view of Arts. 25 and 26 of the Constitution?
The learned Judge, after an elaborate exami·
naLion of the Constitution Act of 1935, came to the
conclusion that the Bombay Legislature wae compe·
tent to enaot the Act, and that it was not uncons1itutional even after the coming into eff.,ct of the
Constitution because it was not inconsistent with
the provisions of Arte. 25 and 26. An appt>al
was taken to the Court of Appeal, which waa heard
by Chagla C. J. and Bhairwati J. The Court of
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
517
1962
Appeal upheld the decision of Shah J. The matter was
brought up on appeal to this Court in Civil Appeal
Sardar Sytdna
Saifuddin
99 of 195!. During the pendency of the appeal in 1"aherSaheh
this Court, the plaintiff died and it was held, with••
out deo_iding the merits of the controversy,that the Tiu S•ale of Bombay
suit giving rise to the appeal in this Court had abated
Si11ha C. J.
by reason of the fact that the plaintiff had died and
the cause of action being personal to him was also
dead. The Order of this Court dismissing the appeal
as not maintainable is dated November 27, 1957.
This Writ Petition was filed on August 18,
1958 by the petitioner as the 5lst Dai-ul-Mutlaq and
head of the Dawoodi Bohra community, for a
declaration that the Act was void so far as the petitioner and the Dawoodi Bohra community were concerned, and that a writ of mandamus or a writ ;n
the nature of mandamus or other appropriate wrl~.
direction or order under Art. 32 of the Constitution
be issued restraining the respondent, its officers,
servants and agents from enforcing the provisions of
the Act, against the petitioner. or the Dawoodi Bohra
community, or in any manner interfering with the
right of the petitioner, ao the religious leader and
/)ai-ul-Mut/,aq of .the Dawoodi Bohra community, to
excommunicate any member of the community for
an offence which the petitioner; in the exercise of
his religious sense as the religious head of the community may determine as justifying such an
expulsion.
It is not disputed that the petitioner is the
head of the Dawoodi Bohra community or that
the Dawoodi Bohra community is a religious denomination within the meaning of Art. 26 of the
Constitution. It is not even disputed by the State,
the only respondent in the case, that the petitioner
as the head of the community had the right, as
found by the Privy Council in the case of Hasanali
v. Mansoorali (1), to excommunicate a particplar
member of the community for reasons and in the
(l) (1947) L.R. 75 A. I. I.
518 SUPREME OOURT REPORTS [1962] SUPP.
lHI
manner indicated in th" judgment of their Lordships of the Privy Council. But what is contended
s.-s......
Tws,Jf.M;. is that, as a re8ult of the enactment in question,
8.W
excommuniMtion has been completely banned by
Y.
n. SW. .J B.U, the Legislature, which was competent to do so,
and that the ba.n in no way infringes ArtR. 25 and
~-.c.1.
l!6 of the Constitution. I have already indicated my
considered opinion that the Bombay Legislature
was competent to enact the Act. It now remains
to consider the ma.in point in controversy, which
was., as a matter of fact, the only point urged in
support of the petition, namely, that the Act is
void in so far as it is repugnant to the guaranteed
rights under Arts. 25 a.nd 26 of the Constitution.
Art. 25 guarantees the right to every person, whether citizen or non-citizen, the freedom of conscience and the right freely to profess, practise and
propagate religion. But this guaranteed right is not
an absolute one. It is subject to (1) public order,
morality and health, ( 2) the other provisions of
Part III of the Constitution, (3) any existing law
regulating or restricting an economic, financial,
poli~oa.l or other secular activity which may be
associated with religious practice, (4) a law providing for social welfare and reform, and (5) any la.w
that m11.y be mado by the State regulating or re&tricting the activities aforesaid or providing for
social welfare and reform. I have omitted reference
to the provisions of Explanations I and II and
other pn.rte of Art. 25 which are not material to
our present purpose. It is noteworthy that the
right guaranteed by Art. 25 is an individual right
as distini;:uished from, the right of an organised
body like a religious denomination or any section
thereof, dealt with by Art. 26. ffpnce, every
member of the community has the right, so long as
he does not in any way interfere with the corresponding rights of others, to profess, practise
and propagate his religion, and everyone
i9 guaranteed his freedoom of conscience. The
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
519
195!
question naturally arises : Can an individuul
s.,._,s~
be compelled to have a particular belief on pain of
T
ohw ~••/VUitt
a penalty, like excommunication? One is entitled
SaA 6
v.
to believe or not to believe a particular tenet or to
Tiu Stllll •f ~
follow or not to follow a particular practice in
Sinlro C. J.
matters of religion. No one can, therefore, be compelled, against his own judgment and belief, to
hold any particular creed or follow a set of religious practices. The Constitution has left every person
free in the matter of his relation to his Creator,
if he believes in one. It is, thus, dear that il person is left completely free to worohip God according to the dictates of his conscience, and that his
right to .worship as he pleased is unfettered so long
a.s it does not come into conflict with any restraints, as aforesaid, imposed by the State in the interest of public order, etc. A person is not liable to
answer for the verity of his religious views, and he
cannot be questioned as to his religious beliefs, by
the State or by anv other. person. Thus, though
his religious beliefs itre entirely his own and his
freedom to hold those ·beliefs is. absolute, he ha.a
not the absolute right to act in any way he
pleased in exercise of his religious beliefs. He ha.a
been guaranteod the right to practise and
propagate his religion, subject to the limitations
aforesaid.
His right to practise his religion
must also be subject to the criminal laws of
the country, validly passed with reference to
actions which the Legislature has declared to be
of a penal character. Laws made by a• competent
legislature in the interest of public order and the
lika, restricting religious practices, would come
within the r~gulating power of the State. For
example, there may be religious practices of sacrifice of human beings, or sacrifice of animals in a.
way deleterious to the well being of the community at large.
It is open to the State ;,o
intervene, by legislation, to restrict or to regµlate
to
the extent of completely stopping such
deleterious practicel!. lt. must, therefore, be held
!i20 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1962) SUPP.
19<2
v.
71. Stole of Bombay
s .. ~. c. J.
that though the freedom of conscience is guaranteed to every individual so that he may hold any
beliefa he likes, his actions in pursuance of those
buliefs may be liable to restrictions in the interest
of the community 'Lt large, as may be determined
1iy common consent, that is to say, by a competent
l"gislature. It wl\8 on such humanitarian grounds,
and for the purpose of social reform, that eo ca.lied
religious practices like immolating a widow at the
pyre of her deceased husband, or of dedicating a
virgin girl of tender years to a god to function as a
devada8i, or of ostracising a person from all social
contact!' and religious communion on account of
his having eaten forbidden food or taboo, were
stopped by legislation.
But it has been contended on behali of the
petitioner that the right guaranteed, under Art. ~5,
to freedom of conscience and the freedom to
profeas, practise and propagate religion is available
not only to an individual. but !-<> the community at
large, acting through its religious head; the petitioner, as such a religious head has, therefore, the
right to oxcommunica.te, according to the tenets of
his religion, any person who goes against the beliefs and practices connected with those beliefs.
The right of the petitioner to excommunicate is,
therefore, a fundamental right, which cannot be
affected by the impugned Act. In this connection,
reference was made to the following observations
in the leading judgment of this Court, bearing tipon
the interpretations of Arts. 25 and 26 (vide The
Commissioner, Hindu Religious EndowrMnts, Madras
v. Sri Laksh11tindra Thirtha Swamiar of Sri Shirur
Muu) ('):
" A religion may not only lay down a
oode of ethical rules for its followers to accept, it might prescribe rituals and ?been:an
oee ceremonies and modes of worship whichar~ regarded as integral parts of religion, and
(I) [1954) S.C. R 1005, at p. ID24.
2s.c.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
521
these forms and observances might extend
even to matters of food and dress.
·fhe guarantee under our Constitution
not only protects the freedom of religious
opinion but it protects also acts done in pursuance of a religion and this is made · clear by
the use of the expression 'practice of religion'
in Article 25."
On the strength of those observations, it kl
contended on behalf of the petitioner that this
practice of ex-communication· is a part of tht' religion of the community with which we are concerned in the present controversy, Art. 26, in no
uncertain terms, has guaranteed the right to every
religious denomination or a section thereof" to
manage its own affairs in matters of. religion "
(Art. :!6(b) ). Now what are matters of religion and
what are not is not an easy question to decide. It
must vary in each individual case according to the
tenets of the religious denomination concerned.
The expression " matters of religion" in Art 26( b)
and "activities assoeiated with religious practice"
do not cover exactly the same ground. What are
exactly matters of religion are completely outside
State interference, subject of course to public order,
morality and health. But activities associated with
religious practices may have many ramifications and
varieties-economic, financial, political and otheras recoimised by Art. 25(2)(a). Such activities,
as are contemplated by the clause aforesaid cover
a field much wider than that covered by either
Art. 25(1) or Art. 26(b). Those provisions have,
therefore, to be so construed as to create no conflict
between them. We have, therefore, to classify practices into such as are essentially and purely of a
religious character, and those which are not essen·
tially such. But it has been contended on behalf
of the petitioner that it is for the religious denomination itself to determine what are essentially reli-
1962
Sardar s_,.ina
T alur 8 atfuddin
Bala~b
v.
The Stolt oj BombaJ
Sinha C. ~'·
522
19~2
s.,u,8~
T.,,,. S•iJuiiin
S1/v6
v.
n, Bui. of B•rnb•7
Sio4a O. J.
SUPREME OOURT REPORTS [1962] SUPP.
gious practices and what a.re not. Tu this connection, reliance is placed on thP. following observations
of this Court in the leading case, afornsa.id, of The
Commissione1·, Hindu Religious Endowmen/8, Madra.~
v. Sri Lakshminrlra Thirlhtt Swamiar of Sri Shirur
ltfutt ('):
"As we have already indicated, freedom
of religion in our Constitutio11 is not confinf'd
to religious belie fa only; it extends to religious
practices a.a well subject to the restrictions
which the Constitution itself has laid down.
Under Art. 26( b ), therefore, a religious denomination or organisation enjoys complete
autonomy in the matter of deciding aA to what
rites and ceremonies arc cssrntial according to
tho tenets of the religion they hold and no outside authority has any jurisdiction to interfere
with their decision in such matters."
It should be noted that the complrt~ autonomy
which a religious denomination enjoyA under Art.
2tJ(b) iH in 'matters of religion', which has been
interpreted as including rites and ceremonies which
are esst'ntia.I according to the tenets of the religion.
Now, Art. 26(b) it8elf would seem to in<licate that
a religious denomination ha8 to rleal. not only with
matters of religion, but other matters connected
with rdigion, like laying down rult>s am! regulations
for the conduct of its m~mbcl's and the penalties
attached to infringement of those rules, mana~ing
property owned and posse&~e<I by the rcli6ious com·
munity, etc., etc. We have thl'rcfore, to draw a
. line of demarcation between pra~tices consisting of
rites and ceremonies connect..d \\'ith the particular
kind of worship, whith is the ten<'t of the religious
community, and practici>s in other m'ltkrs which
may touch the religious institution' a.t several
point~, but which are not intimat<'ly l'Onccrned with
rites and ceremonies the pcrforman .. c· of which is an
(I) (1954] S.CR. 1005. 1028-:?!•
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
!i23
196'
essential part of the religion. In this connection,
the following observations of this Court in The
S ardor Syedn•
Saifuddin
Durgah Committee, Ajmer v. Syed Hussain Al'i (') TaherSah•6
which were made with reference to the earlier deciv.
sions of this Court in The Commissioner, Hindu Reli- Th• St•t• of Bornb•.1
gious Endou:ments, Madras v. Sri Lakshmindra
Sinh1 C. J.
Thirtha Swamiar of Sri Shirur Mutt (')and in Sri
Venkataramana Devaru v. The State of Mysore('),
that "matters of religion" in Art. 26(h} inr.bde evf'n
practices which are rega1ded by thEI ~ommnnity as
part of its religion, may be noted :
"Whilst we are· dealing with this point it
may not be out of place incidentally to strike
a ncte of caution and observe that in order
that the practices in qiJestion should be treated
as a part of religion they must be regarded by
the said religion as its essential and integral
part; otherwise even purely secular practices
which are not an essential or an integral part
of religion are apt to be clothed with a religious form and may make a claim for being
treated as religious practices within the meaning of Art. 26. Similarly, even practices though
religious may have sprung fro"'! merely superstitious beliefs and may in that sense be extraneous and unessential accretions to religion
itself. Unless such practices are found to
constitute an essential and integral part of a
religion their claim for the protection under
Art. 26 may have to be carefully scrutinised;
in other words, the protection must be confined
to such religious practices as are an essential
and an integral part of it and no other."
But then it is contended that a religious denomination is a quasi-personality, which has to ensure
its continuity and has, therefore, to lay down rules
for observance by mPmuers of its community,
and, in order to maintain proper and strict
(I) [196211 S.C.R. 383.
12\ [1954] S.C.R. 1005, 1028-29
(3) l1958J S.C.R. 895.
524 SUPREME OOURT REPORTS (1962] SUPP.
1962
s..u.s.u..
T•lw SOiji;UJio
s."'1>
v.
771. Si.ii of &mi><>
S;.lto C. J.
discipline, .has to lay down sanctions; the right
to excommunicate a recusa.nt member is an illustration of that sanction. In this connection,
it was contended that the Privy Council had laid
down in the case of Hasanali v. 1lfan.<oorati: (I) that
the pol'.·er of excommunication was a religious
power oxerciseable by the Dai. In my opinion, those
pa.tis'.lges in the judgment of the Privy Council do
not establish the proposition that the right which
the Privy Council found inhered iD the Dai was a
purely roligious right. That it was not a purely
religious right becomes clear from the judgment of
tho Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, which
laid down the appropriate procedure and the manner
of expulsion, which had to be according to justice,
equity and good conscience, and that it was justiciabl~. A matter which is purely rcligio11s could not
come within the purview of the Courts. That conclusion is further strengthened by the <'-Oneideration
that the effect of the excommunication or expulsion
from the community is that the expelled person is
excluded from tho exercise of rights in connection
not only with places of worship but also from burying the dead in the community burial ground and
other rights to property belonging to the community, which are all disputes of a civil nature and are
not purely religious matters. In the case before
their Lordships of the Privy Council, their Lordships
enquired into the regularity of the proceedings
resulting in the excommunication challenged in that
case, and they held that the plaintiff had not been
validly expelled. It cannot, therefore, be asserted
that tho Privy Council held the matter of excommunication as a purely religiollll one. If it were so, the
Courts would be out of the controversy.
The same argument was advancotl in another
form by contending that excommunication is not a
social question and that, therefore, Art. 2.~U)(b)
could not be inl'okorl in aitl of holding the Act to
he conijtitutional. In this connet·tion, it has to h<•
(I)
[1~~7] LR. i5 i.A.1, 14.15.
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
525
1962
borne in mind that the' Dai-uLMutlaq is not only
Sardar SJedna
the head of the religious comminuty but also the Ta~er S.zifudd. n
Saheb
tmstee of the property of the community in which
,._
the , community as a whole is inter<'sted. Even a The Stale of Bomba,
theological head has got to perform acts which are
Sinha C•. J.
not wholly religious but may be said to be quasi
religious or matters which a.re connected with religious practices, though not purely religious. Actions
of the Dai-ul-Jfutk'q in the purely religious aspect ·
are not a concern. of the courts, but his actions
touching the civil rights of the members of the
community are justidable and not outside the pale
of interference by the legislatnre or the ju<liciary.
I am not called upon to decide, nor am I competent to do so, as to what are the religious matters
in which the Dai-ul-Mutlaq functions according to his
religious sense. I am only concnned with the civil
aspect of the controversy relating to . the constitutionality of the Act, and I have to determine only
that controversy.
It has further been argued on behalf of the
petitioner that an excommunicated person has not
the right to say his prayers in the mosque or to bury
his dead in the community burial ground or to the
use of other communal property. Those may be
the reRult of excommunication, but I am concerned
with the question whether the Legislature was competent and constitutionally justified in enacting the
la'v declaring excommunication to be void. As
already indicated, I am not concerned in this case
with the purely religious aspect of excommunication. I am only concerned with the civil rights bf
the members of the community, which riizhts they
will continue to enjoy as such members if excom·
munication was held to be invalid in accordance
with the provision of the Act. Hence, though the
Act may have its repercussions on the religious
aspect of excommunication, in so far as it protects
the civil rights of the members of the community
526 SUPH.EME COURT ItEPORTS [1962) SUP.P.
J9b2
S••w Sy<"'•
Tolw Saifo<Jd;•
Sa/u/J
v.
Tlr.S..,.afB..,..,
sv.~.
c. J.
it has not gone beyond the provisions of Art.
:!5(2J(b) of the constitution.
Then it i8 argued th~t the 1:,1t1ara11tecd right of
religious de1wmination to mauage its own affairs
in mattns nf rPligi<•n (Art. 2fl(b) ) is subject only
tu public cmkr, murnlity and health and is not subject to legislation contemplated by Art. 25(2)(b).
This very argument was advanced in the case of
Slin' Venk11tummana IJevuru. v. 'l'he StalR. of Jfysore(').
At page !JI (i this argument ha8 been specifically dealt
with and negatived. This Court observed as
follows :
I\
"Thl' answer to this contrnti(ln is that it is
impossible to r~ad any such limitation into
tlw language of Art.25(2)(b). It applit's in
u:rms to all religious institutions of a
public character without qualification or resvrve. As already slated, public institutions would m<>an not merely temples dedil'ate<l to the public as a whole but also
those founded for the benefit of sections
thereof,
and denominational temples
wou Id be com prised therein. The Jang·
uage of tho Article being plain and
unambiguous, it is not open to us to read
into it limitatiun8 which aro not there,
baaed on a priori reasoning as to the
probable intention of the Legislature.
Sunh intention can be gathered only
from the words actuallv used in the
statute ; a.n<l in a. Court <;f law, what is
unexpn ssPd has Lho same value &B what
is uniutende<l. We mu~t therefore hold
that denorninat.ional institutions
aro
within Art. 25 (2j(b)."
I 1! that """' aJ,.,, :~s in the present C'ase, rofereneo
was made to the eu rlicr <lcdsior1 vf thiR Court in
(I)
ll9',l!J •; C:. R.1!'15.
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
527
1962
The Commissioner, Hindu Religfrms Endowments, Madras v. Sri Lalcshmindra Thirtha Swamiar of Sri Shirur
S ardar Syadna
Taller Saifuddin
Mutt (I), but the latter decision has explained the
Sahib
legal position with reference to the earlier decision,
v.
and after examining the arguments for and against The State of Bombay
the proposition at pages 916-918, it has been distinSinka C. j.
ctly laid down 'that Art. 20 ( b) must be read subject
to Art. ~5 (2) (b) of the Constitution,
It has further been contended that a person
who has been excommunicated as a result of bis
non-conformity to religious practices is not entiled
to use the communal mosque or tho communal
burial ground or other communal property, thus
showing that for all practical purposes he was no
more to be treated as a member of the community,
and is thus an outcast. Another result of excommunication is that no other member of the community can have any contacts, social or religious,
with the person who has been excommunicated.
All that is true. But the Act is intended to do away
with all that mischief of treating a human being
as a pariah, and of depriving him of his human
dignity and of his sight to follow the dictates of his
own conscience. The Act is, thus, aimed at fulfilment of the individual liberty of conscience guaran·
teed by Art. 25 (I) of the Constitution, and not in
derogation of it. In so far as the Act has any
repercussions on the right of the petitioner, as
trustee of communal property, to deal with such
property, the Act could ccme under the protection
of Art. 26 (d), in the sense that his right to
administer the property is not questioned, but he
has to administer the property in accodance with
law. The law, in the present instance, tells the
petitioner not ·to withhold the civil rights of a
member of the community to a communal property. But as against this it is argued on behalf
of the petitioner that his right to excommunicate
is so bound up with religion that it is protected by
cl. (b) of Art. 26, and is thus completely out of the
(1) [1954] s.<;:.R. lOOs; 1028-29;
528 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1962] SUPP.
1962
regulation of law, in accordance with the provisions of cl. (d) of that Article. But, I am not
Ta°"' SciJ1 t/din
satisfi<>d on the pleadings and on the evidence
Saiub
.I
v.
placed
before us that the right of excommunica1'1at 8101, of Bomha,
tion is a purely religious matter.
As already
Sit1hc. C. J.
pointed out, the indications are all to the contrary,
particularly the judgment to the Privy Council in
the ca.~e of H~nali v. Jfa118QOrali (1) on which
great reliance was placed on behalf of the petitioner.
s..i. s,,.i...
On the eocial aspect of excommunication, one
is inclined to think that the position of an excommunicated person becomes that of an untouchable
in his community, and if that is so, the Act in
declaring such practices to be void has only carried
out the strict injunction of Art. 17 of the Constitu ·
ti on, by whioh untoucbability has been aboliFhed and
its practice in any form forbidden. The Article
further provides that the enforcement of any
disability arising out of untouchability shall be an
offence punishable in accordance with law. The
Act, in this senRe, is it.a logical corollary and must,
therefore, be upheld.
r., ,,,,,, ./.
In my opinion, it has not been established
that the Act has been p&SSed by a h:izislature which
was u0t competent to legislate on the subjPct, or
that it infringes any of the provisions of the
Constitution. This petition must, therrfore, fa.ii.
DAS GuPTA, J.-In our opinion this petition
should succeed.
The '(>f'titioner is the head of the Dawoodi
Bohras who form one of the several sub-sects
of the Shia sect of Musalma.ns. Dawoodi Dohras
believe that since the 21st Imam went to
8 eclu~ion the right~ powt'r and authority of the
Imam ha~c been rightfully exercised by.the Da~·ul
J[utalq, as the vice-re~ent of the J~am m. s~cl~810n.
One of such rights 18 the exercuw. of d1.so1plmary
powers including the right to excommumcate any
(I) [1947] L, R. 75 I. A. I.
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
529
member of the. Dawoodi Bohra community. The
existence of such a right in the Dai-ul.Mutlaq who is
for the sake of convenience often mentioned as the
Dai was questioned before the oourts in a oase
which went up to the Privy Council. But since the
decision of the Privy Council in that case, viz.,
Hasanali .v. Mansoorali (1) that question may be
taken to have been finally settled, and it is no
longer open to dispute that the Dai, as the head
of the Dawoodi Bohra. community has the right to
excommunicate any member of the community.
The claim of the present petitioner to be the 5Jst
Dai-ul-Mutlaq of the community was also upheld in
that case and is no long'lr in dispute. The Privy
Council bad also to consider in that case the
question whether this power to excommunicate
could be exercised by the Dai in any manner he
liked and held after consideration of the previous
oases of excommunication and also a document
composed about 1200 A.D. that normally members of the community can be expelled "only
at a meeting of the Jamat after being given due
warning of the fault complained of and an opportunity of amendment, and after a public statement of the grounds of expulsion." Speaking about
the effect of excommunication their Lordships
said :-"Excommunication .................. necessarily
involve exclusion from the exercise of religious
rights in places under the trusteeship of the head
of the community in which religious exercises are
performed." The present petitioner, it may be
mentioned, was a party to that litigation.
This decision was given on December, 1, 1947;
shortly after that, the Bombay Legislature-it may
be mentioned that there is a large concentration
of Dawoodi Bohras in the State of Bombaystepped in to prevent, as mentioned in the preamble, the practice of excommunication "which
(I)
( 1947) L.R. 751.A. !.
1962
SardJ.r S7ein4
Talier 'aifudtlirt
Salub
v.
1 he State of Bomb0:,1
J)as Gupta J.
530
1162
Sar!W 87.d••
Toh.r Sai/uddi•
..
Sud
no sui. eJ n••n1.7
D., Gy14 J.
SUPREME OOURT REPORTS (1962] St1PP,
results in the deprivation of legitimate rights and
privileges of" members of certain religious communities and enacted the Bombay Act No. XLII
of 194!1 .
It is a short Act of six sections. Section 3tho mn.in operative section-invalidates all excommunication of members of any religious community.
Excommunication is defined in section 2 to mean
"the expulsion of a person· from any community
of which he is a member depriving him of rights
and privileges which are legally enforceable by a
suit of a civil nature by him or on his behalf as
such member". The explanation to the definition to
this section makes it clear that a right to office or
propt·rty or to worship in any religious place or a
right to burial or cremation is included as a right
legally enforceable by suit even though the determination of such right may depend entirely on the
decision of the quest ion as to any religious rites or
ceremonies or rule or usage of a community.
Section 4. makes a person who does any act which
amounts to excommunication or is in furtherance
of the excommunication liable to punishment which
may (•xtend to one thousand rupees.
Faced with the position that the legislation
wholly destroys his right of excornmuniCllting any
member 9f the Dawoodi Bohra. community, the
Dai has presented this petition under Art. 32 of
the Constitution. He contends that the Act
violates the fundamental right of the Dawoodi
Bohras, including himself, freely to practise
religion according to their own faith and praotioea right guaranteed by Art. 25 of the Constitution,
and further that it violates the right of the
Dawoodi Bohra community to manage its own
affairs in matters of religion guaranteed by Art.
26. Therefore, says he, the Act is void and prays
for a. declaration that the Act is void and the
2s.c.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
531
19'2
issue of an appropriate writ restraining the resrardar Sy1Jna
pondent, the State of Bombay, its officers, servants
Saifuddin
and agents from enforcing the provisions of the Ta!ierSaA.b
Aot ag11inst the petitioner and/or any other mem••
TM Stall of Bombay
ber of the Dawoodi Bohra community.
Das Gupt(J,
It may be mentioned that in the petition the
legislative competence of the Bombay legislature to
enact the Bombay Prevention of excommunication
1949 was also challenged. Thie, however was not
pressed at the time of the hearing.
The respondent contends that neither the
right guaranteed under Art. 25 nor that under
Art. 26(b) is contravened by the impugned Aot.
Briefly stated, the respondent's case is that the
right and privilege of the petitioner as Dai-ulMutlaq to regulate the exercise of religious rights do
not include the right to excommunicate any person
so as to deprive him of his civil rights and privileges.
It was denied that the petitioner's power to excommunicate was an essential part of the religion of the
Dawoodi Bohra community and that the right has
its foundation in religion and religious doctrines,
tenets and faith of the Dawoodi Bohra community.
It was also denied that the right to excommunicate
is the religious practice and it was further pleaded
that assuming that it was a religious practice, it
was certainly not a part of religion of the Dawoodi
Bohra community.
The same points were urged on behalf of the
intervener, 0xcept that the learned counsel for the
intervener wanted to reopen the question whether
the petitioner as the head of the Dawoodi Bohra
community·had the power to excommunicate. As
already stated, however, this question is hardly
oplm to dispute in the face of the decision of the
Privy Council in H<tmnali v. jJfansoorali (')and the
point was not pressed.
The content of Arts. 25 and 26 of the Constitution came up for consideration before this Court
(I)
(1947) L. R. 75 I. A. I,
532 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1962] SUPP
in the Commissioner, Hindu &l.igi<Yus A'11Jowment8
.Madras
v. Sri lalr.1hm.irul,ra 'l'hirtha Swa11tiar of
l:J11ttlo• Sy1J111J
T ohtr Saif11d,.i11
Sri
Shirur
Matt (1 ) ; Maha11t Jugcmrwth Rarrum·uj
:>aJub
Da8 v, 'l'he State of Ori.~sa (') ; Sri Venk1ttama11u
Y.
7Ji. SloU "f Bomb·'.1 De:varu v. The State of Mysore (•); Durgah Committee;
Ajmer v. Syed Hussain Ali(') and several other ca& s
DdS Gupta J.
and the main prinoipl1>s underlyin!? these provisions
have by thc·se decisions been placed beyond controversy. The first is that the protection of thePe
articles is not limited to matters of doctrine or belief
they Pxtend also to acts done in pursuance of
rP!igion and therefore contain a guarantee for
rituals and observances, ceremonies -and modes of
worship which are ·integral parts of religion. The
second is that what constitutes an essential part of
a religious or rellgious practice has to be decided by
the courts with reference to the doctrine of a pi.rtieular religion and ·include practices which are regarded hy tho community as a part of its religion.
B· fore however we can give a proper answer
to th" two questions raised, viz., (i) Has the impugmd Act interfered with a right freely to practise
religion and (ii) H~ it interfered with the right of
tho Dawoodi Bohra Community to manage its own
affairs in matters of religion; it is necessary to
examine fir~t the place of excommunication in the
Jifr, of a rflligious community. Much valuablt> information about this is furnished by an article in the
Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences from the pen
of Prof. Hazeltine. "Ettommunication," BRYS Prof.
Hazeltinl', "in one or another of the severid
different meanings of the term has always and in all
civilizations been one of the prinoipa.l means of
mi.intaing discipline within religio11s organizations
and hence of prcs<'rving and strengthening their
solidarit);·" Druids in old Britain are ~aid to bavo
claimed the power to exclude offenders from
sa.orifirc. The early Chiristian Church exerci8C'd
1912
•I·
(3,
i145+JS,C.R. 1001.
Ll95A) S.C.R. 895 .
..
(2)
(4)
[ 19541 S.C, R 1046
[1"6211S.C.R.383.
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
533
1962
this power very largely a.nd expelled and excluded
from the Christian association, those members
Sardor ~yedna
Ta'lur Snifutldin
who proved to be unworthy of its aims
Saiieb
of
governance.
or infringed
its . rules
During the middle ages the Pope used this p_ower Tile State ••of B•mboJ
frequently to secure the observance of what was
Das Gupta J
considered the proper religious rights and practices
of Christianity by excommunicating even the kings
of some European countries when they introduced
or tried to ir. troduce different forms of di vine worship. The power was often used not perhaps always
fairly and justly, as a weapon in the struggle for the
principle that the Church was a hove the State.
Impartial historians have recogni8ed, however, that
many of the instances of excommunication were for
the purpose of securing the adherence to the
orthodox creed and doctrine of Chiristianity as
pronounced by the Catholic Church. (Vide The
Catholic Ency lopaedia, Vol. V, articles on England
and Excommunication).
Turning to the Canon law we find that
t"xcomrnunication may be inflicted as a punishment
for a number of crimes, the most -serious of these
being, heresy, apostasy or schism. Canon 1325,
section· 2 defines a heretic to be a man who while
remaining nominally a Christian, pertinaciously
denies or doubts any one of the truths which must
be believed de fide divina et catholioo ; if he falls
away entirely from the Christian faith, he is an
apostate ; finally if he rejects the authority of the
Supreme Pontiff or refuses communion with the
members of the Church who are subject to him, he
is a schismatic. (Vide Canon Law by Bouscaren and
Ellis).
Among the Muslims also the right of excommunication appears to h'Lve been prl\ctised from
the earliest times. The Prophet and tho Imam,
had this right ; and it is not disputed that the Dais
have also in the past exercised it on a number of
-
534 SUPREME OOURT REPORTS [19e2] SUPP.
IHS
occe.sions. There can be little doubt that heresy
or aposte.sy was a crime for which excommunication
Tu.rs~ was in force among the Dawoodi Bohre.s also. It
may be pointed out in this connection that
••
'l'lll si.1. .1 &ooilu exco~unication in the ce.se of llaaanali v.
I)., a..;1a J.
Ma1MOOrnli (1) which '\\-a.& upheld by the Privy
Council) we.s based on the failure to comply with
the tenets and traditions of the Da.woodi Bohra
community and certain other faults.
According to the petitioner it is "an integral
pa.rt of the religion and religious faith and belief of
the Dawoodi Bohra community" that excommunication should be pronounced by him in suitable
cases. It was urged that even if this right to
excommunicate is considered to be a religioua
practice a.s distinct from religious faith such religious
practice is also a part of the religion of the Dawoodi
Bohra community. It does appear to be a faot
that unquestioning faith in the Dai e.s the head of
community is part of the creed of the Dawoodi
Bohras. It is unnecessary to trace the historical
reason for this extraordinary position of the Dai
a.a it doe.a not appear to be seriously disputed that
the Dai is considered to be the vice-regent of
Imam so long a.s the rightful Imam continues in
seclusion.
Mention must be ma.de in thie connection of
the Mi.!Mk which every Dawoodi Bohra takes at
the time of his initiation, This includes among
other things, an oath of ULquestioning faith in and
loyalty to the Dai. It is urged t.herefore that faith
in the existence of the discipisnary power of the Da.i
including his power to excommunicate forms one of
the reiigiOUB tenets of this community. The argu·
ment that Art. 25 has been contraveneb by the
impugned Act is based mainly on this contention
and the further contention that in any case excommunication is a religious practice in this community.
As rega.rda Art. 26(b) the argument is that
excommunication among the
s.•s~
(I) 1947) L, 11.. 75 LA. I.
2c.s.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
li35
Dawoodi Bohras forms suoh an integral part of the
IH2
management of the community by the religious
Sardar 8.11.W.
head that interference with that right cannot T airer Seifud4in
Sahtb
but amount to an interference with the right of the
v,
community t-o the manage its own affairs in matters T/v SWe of B,..6•y
of religion.
Dn Gu/JI• J,
· Let us consider first whether the impugned
Act contravenes the provisions of Art. 26 (b). It is
unnecessary for the purpose of the present case to
enter into the difficult question whether every case
of excommunication by the Dai on whatever
grounds inflicted is a matter of religion. What
appears however to be clear is that where an
excommunication is itself based on religious grounds
such as lapse from the orthodox religious creed or
doctrine (similar to what is considered heresy,
apostasy or schism under the Canon Law) or breach
of some practice considered. as an essential part of
the religion by the Dawoodi Bohras in genaral
excommunication cannot but be held to be for th~
purpose of maintaining the strength of the religion.
It necessarily follows that the exercise of this power
of excommunication on religious grounds forms part
of the management by the community, through its
religious head, "of its own affairs in matters of
religion." The impugned Act makes even such
excommunications invalid and takes away · the
power of the Dai as the head of the community to
excommunicate even on religious grounds. It
therefore, clearly interferes with the right of the
Dawoodi Bohra community under cl. (b) of Art. 26
of the Constitution.
That excommunication of a member of a
community will affect many of his civil rights is
undoubtedly true. This particular religious deno·
mination is possessed of properties and the neces·
sary consequence of excommunication will be that
the excommunicated member will lose his rights of
enjoyment of such property· It might be thought
undesirable that the head of a. religious community
536 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1962] SUPP.
l9i2
SudP .':J'y1tb••
Ta/J,,. SaijudJitJ
Snh.b
Y.
Thi StGll uf Bombay
Das Gup1a J.
would have the power to take a.way in this manner
the ci1·il rights of any person. The right given
under ,\rt. 26 (b) has not however bef.n made subject lo prPBPrvation of civil rights. The expreSB
limitation in Art. 26 itself is that this right under
the scYeral clauses of the art iclo will exist subject
to public order, morality and health. It has l>Eoen
held by this Cou1t in Sri Venkaiaramana Demru v.
'J'lte Siate of Mysore (') that the ri!!ht undor Art.
21i(b) is subject further to cl. 2 of Art. 25 of the
Constitution.
'Ve shall prest>ntly consider whether these
limitations on the rights of a religious community
to manage its own affairs in matters of rcliizion can
come ti> the help of the impugned Act. It is clear
however that apart from these limitations the Con~·
titution has not imposod any limit on tho right of a
religious community to manage ill! own affair~ in
matters of religion. The fact that civil rights of a
person aro affected by the 1•xt>rcise of thiH funda ·
m~ntal right under Art. 26(b) is therefore of no
consequence. Nor is it possible to say th:it excommunication is prrjudicial to public order, morality
and health.
Though there was a statement in paragraph l 0
of the rospondent's counter affidavit that ''the
religious practice, which runs counter to the public
order, morality and health must give way before tlle
good of th1' people of the 8t>lte", the learned
Attorney-Gtueral did not advance any argument in
support of tlii8 plea.
It, remain• to consider whether the impugned
Act comes within the saving provisions embodied in
cl. 2 of Art. :25. Tho clauae is in these words : -
".l\'ot hi11g in thiB Article shall affect tho
operation of auy c:tiAting law or prevent the
State from maki11g any hw-( l) ~19511J S. C R. ~·15
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
537
IH2
(a) regulating or restrioting any eoonomio,
Sardar s,eJna
finanoial, political or other secular activity Tait
tr Sai/udtlin.
which may bE1 associated with religious
Sah.b
practice ;
Th, Stai.••of Bombay
(b) providing for social welfare and
DasJ.
reform or the throwing open of Hindu religicus institutions of a. public character to all
classes and sections of Hindus."
Quite olearly, the impugned Act cannot be regarded
as a law regulating or restricting any economic,
financial, political or other secular activity. Indeed
that was not even suggested on behalf of the respondent State. It was faintly suggested however
that the Act should be considered to be a law
"providing for social welfare and reform.'' The
mere fact that certain civil rights which might be
lost by members of the Da.woodi Bohra community
as a result of excommunication even though made on
religious grounds and that the Act prevents such loss,
does not offer sufficient basis for a conclusion that
it is a law "providing for social welfare and reform."
The barring of excommunication on grounds other
than religious grounds, say on the breach of some
obnoxious social rule or practice might be a
measure of social reform and a law which ha.rs such
excommunication merely might conceivably come
within the saving provisions of cl. 2(b) of Art. 25.
But barring of excommunication on religious grounds
pure and simple, cannot however be considered to
promote social welfare and reform and consequently
the law in so far as it invalidates excommunication
on religious grounds and takes away the Dai's
power to impose such excommunication cannot
reasonably be considered to be a measure of social
welfare and reform. As the Act invalidates excomm11:n!cation on any. ground whatsoever, including
religious grounds, 1t must be held to be in clear
violation of the right of the Dawoo<li Bohra community under Art. 26(b) of the Constitution .
538 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1962] SUPP.
1'62
s.,a. SJ<du
T.i.. Blli}wJditl
8.W'
••
TL•,,.. of B..,.i,'!1
Dr.sJ.
It is unnecessary te consider the other attack
on the basis of Art. 25 of tho Constitution.
Our conclusion i8 that the Act is· void being in
violation of Art. ~6 of the Constitution. The contrary view taken by the Bombay High Court in
Taker SaYuddin v. Tyebbhai Moosaji (1) is not
correct.
We would, therefore, allow the petition,
declare the Act to be void and direct the issue of a
writ in the nature of m1mdam1tS on tho respondent,
the ~tate of Bombay, not t-0 enforce the provisions
of the Act. The petitioner will get his costs.
AYYANOAR, J.-1 agree that the petition
should succeed and I generally concur in the
reasoning of Das Gupta J., by which he has reached
this conclusion. In view, however, of the importance of the case I consider it proper to state in my
own words the grounds for my concurrence.
It was not in dispute that the Dawoodi Bohras
who form a sub-sect of the Shia sect of Muslims is
a "religious denomirmtion" within the opening
words of Art. 26 of tho Constitution. There are a
few further matters 11 hich were not in controversy
on tho basis of which the contentions urged in
support of the petition have to be viewed. These
might now be briefly stated :
(ll It was the accepted tenet of the Dawoodi
Bohra faith that G,1<1 always had and still 1'as a
representative .on uuth through whom His commands are conveyed to His people. That repre·
eentative was the Imam. The Dai was the repre·
sentative of the Imam and conveyed God's mC1Sage
to His people. The powers of the Dai were
approximated to those of the Imam. When the
Imam came out of seclusion, the powers of the Dai
would cease. The chain of intercession with the
Almighty was a.a follows : The Dai-the Imam(1> A.l.R. 1953 Dom•.183-
•
,.,
.
,
. ,f:
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
539
the ·Holy Prophet-and the one God (See Per
M!\rten J. in Advocate General of Bambay v. Y'U,svfalli
Ebrahim (').
(2) The position and status of .the petitioner
as the Dai··ul Mutlaq was not contested since the
same had been upheld by the Privy Council the
decision reported as Hasanali v. Manumali (').
(3) It was not in dispute that subject to cer·
tain !imitations and to the observance of particular
formalities which were pointed out by the Privy
Council in the decision just referred to, that the
Dai-vLMutlaq has the power of excommunication
and indeed, as observed by Lord Porter in that
judgment, "the right of excommunication by a
Dai-ul-1liutlaq w«s not so strenuously contested as
were the limits within which it is confined.''
(4) The Dai-ul-Miitlaq was not merely a reli·
gious leader-the religious head ofthedenomination
but was the trustee of the property of the community.
(5) The previous history of the community
shows that excommunicated persons WPre deprived
of the exercise of religious rights. It was contended
before the Privy Council that the effect of an
excommunication was ii1 the nature merely of social
ostracism but this was reje'cted and it was held to
have a larger effect as involving an exclusion from
the right to the enjoyment of property/ dedicated
for the benefit of the denomination and of worship
in places of worship similarly dedicated or set
apart.
The v11-lidity of Bombay Act 42of1949 (which
I shall hereafter refer to as the impugned Act) has
to be judged in the light of these admitted premises.
Articles 25 and 26, which are urged as violated by
the impugned Act run:
24 Born. L.R. 1060.
(2) [1947] L.R. 75 I.A. I.
(!)
Sordar Sylfha
Taha1 Saijuddin
Salub
v.
TM State of Bomba'
A,,ongar.T.
540 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1!16~) SUPP.
19'3
San!Gr s,.a...
Tolll<Sai/odd111
s.w
••
711 SIMI of 8-MJJ
A:n-1•'·
"25. (I) Subject to public order, morality
and health and to the other provisions of this
Part, all persons are equally entitled to freedom of conscienoo and the right freely to pro·
fess, practice 11nd propagate religion.
( 2) Nothing in this article shall affect
operation of any existing la\l or prevent the
State from making any law(a) regulating or restricting any economic, financial, political or other secular
activity which may be 11SSoci11ted with
religious practice ;
(b) providing for social welfare and
reform or the throwing open of Hindu
religioua institutions of 11 public character
to all classes and sections of Hindus .
.Kxplanation I.-The
wearing and
carrying of kirparu shall be deemed to be
included in the profeesion of' the Sikh religion.
Explanation IL-In sub-clause (b) of
clause (2), the reference to Hindus shall be
consr.rucd as including a reforence to persons
profeBSing the Sikh, Jaina or Buddhist religion,
and the reference to Hindu religious institutions
shall be construed aooordingly
26. Eubjeot to public order, morality and
health, every religious denomination or any
section thereof shall have the right(a) to establish and mainta.in institutions for religious and charitable purposes;
(b) to manage its own affairs in
matters of religion;
(c) to own and acquire movable and
iinmova.ble property ; and
(d) to administer 8ut·h property in
accordance with lo.w."
I
I
2 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
541
I would add that these Articles embody the principle of religious toleration that haij been the
Serda,. Syednc
Toher 8 2~fuiiin
characteri~tic feature of Indian civilization from
Sahib
the start of history, the instances and periods wht>n
'·
this feature wss absent being merely temporary Tt,e State of Bom~•Y
aberrations. Besides, they SC'rve to emphasize the
Ay>angar J.
secular nature of Indian Democracy which the
founding fathers consider('d •lwuld be the very basis
of the Constitution.
I now proceed to the details of the provisions
of the impugned Act whkh are stated to infrin11e
the rights guaranteed by these two Arti~les. The
preamble to the impugned Act recites :
"\Vhereas it has come to the not.ice of
Go.-ernment that the practice prevailing
in certain communi.tics of excommunicating its members is often followed in a
manner which results in the deprivation
of legitim·1te rights and privileges of its
members;
And whereas in keeping with the
spirit of changing times and in the public
interest, it is .expedient to stop the
practice; it is hereby enacted as
follows :-"
Section 3 is the operative provision which enacts·:
"3. Notwithstanding anything contained in any law, custom or usage for
the time being in force to the contrary,
no excommunication of a. member of any
community shall be valid and shall be of
any effed."
Scrtion 4 pena. lises any person who does "any
a.ct which amounts to or is in furtherance of the
excommunication" and subjects him to criminal
-,
542
1902
Sardar Sv1dna
T aher B aifttddin
Sa/i,b
v.
Thi Stau of Bombay
A.yJangar .J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1962] SUPP.
proceeaings as regards which provision fo made in
Secti')n 2 contains two definitions :
'(1) of the word "community" which
would include the religious denominatiun
of Dawoodi Bohras, and
(2) of "excommunication" as mean·
ing:
s~. 5 and 6.
"the expulsion of a person from any
coµimunity of which he is a member
depriving him of rights and privileges
which are legally enforceable by a suit of
civil nature by him or on his beha If as
such member ;
Explanation.-For tho purposes of
elause a right legally enforceable by a
suit of civil ·nature shall include the
right to office or property or to worship
tn any religious place or a right of burial
or cremation, notwithstanrling the fact
that the determination of MUC'h right
d~ends entirely on the decision of the
'question as to any religious rite~ or
ceremonies or rule or usa.ge of a commu·
hity."
The question t0 consider is whether a Jaw
which penaliees excommunication by a religious
denomination or by its head whether or not the
excommunication be for non.eonformity to the
bas.ic.essentials of the religion of that clenumination
and effects the nullification cf such cxcommunica·
tion a9 regards.the rights of the person excommunicated would or would nc,t, in fringe the rights
guaranteed by ,Arts. 25 and 2G.
First as to Art. 25, as regards d. ( J) it was
not in dispute that the guarantee un<lur it protected
not 'merely freedom to entertain religious beliefs
but also acts do11e in pursuance d that religion,
this being made clear by the use of the expression
,.
I
2 S.C.R.
543
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
"practice of religion".
No doubt, the right to
freedom of conscience and the right to profess,
practise and propagate religion are all subject to
"public order, morality or health and to the other
provisions of this Part" but it waH not suggested
that (subject to an argument about the matter
being a measure of social reform) the practice of
excommunication offended public order, morality
or health or any other part of the Constitution.
Here is a religious denomination within Art.26.
Th~ Dai-uZ.Mutlaq is its spiritual leader, the reli·
gious head of the denomination and in accordance
with the tenets of that denomination he had
invested in him the power to excommunicate
dissidents. Pausing here, it is necessary to examine
the rational basis of the excommunication of persons
who dissent from the fundamental tenets of a faith.
The identity of a religious denomination consists in
the identity of its doctrines, creeds and tenets and
these are intended to ensure the unity of the faith
which its adherents profess and the identity of the
religious views a.re the bonds of the union which
binrls them together as one community. As l::lmith
B. said in Dill v. Watson(') in a passage quoted by
Lord Halsbury in Free Church of Scotland v. Over·
Wun (') :
"In the absence of conformity to
essentials, the denomination would r1ot
be an entity cemented into solidity by
harmonious uniformity of opinion, it
would be a m9re incongruous heap of, as
it were, gra.ins of sand, thrown together
without being united, each of the so
intellectual and isolated grains differing
from every other, and the whole forming
a but nominally united while really
unconnected mass ; fraught with nothing
but interna.1,dissimilitude, and mutual and
reciprocal contra.diction and dissension."
(1836) 2 Jones Rep. (Ir. E'-) 48,9(
(2) [1904] A.O. 515, at p. 616.
(l)
196&
Hardar Sytdna
Tahar Satfuidin
Saheb
v.
The State of Bombay
Ayyangar J.
544 SUPREME OOURT REPORTS [1962] SUPP.
A denomination within Art. 26 and persons
who are members of that denomination are under
1 ... r 8•i/udd1"
Art.
2:i entitled to ensure the continuity of the
Solttb
denomination a.nd such continuity is possible only
v.
71, ~"''' oJ Bombay by maintaininp: the bond of religious disripline which
would secure the continued adherence of its mem hers
A:n-t•J.
to certain eSSPntia.ls like faith. doctrine. tenets and
pra.ctic<'s. The right to such continued existenoo
involv1•s the right to maintain discipline by ta.king
suitable action inter alia of excommunicating those
who deny the fundamental baaes of the religion.
'J,'he consequencCB of the exercise of that power
vested in the denomination or in its head-a power
which is essential for ma.intaing the exist<'nce and
unity of denomination must necessarily be the
exclusion of the person excommunicated from participation in th!l religious life of the denomination,
which would include the use of places of worship or
consecrated pla.CCB for burial dedicated for the use
of the members of the denomination a.nd which a.re
vested in the religious head as a trustre for the
rlenomin·ation.
'Jhe learned Attomey-~enera.I who appeared
for the rPBpondent submitted three points : (I)
A11Suming that excommunication was part of the
religious practice of the denomination, still there
was no avermPnt in the petition that the
civil results flowing from excommunication
in the shape of exclusion from \he beneficial use of denominational property was itself
a. matter of religion. In other words, t.here was no
pleading that the deprivation of the civil rights of
a. person excommunicated was a matter of religion
or of religious practice. (2) The "6xcommunication"
defined by the Aot des.ls with rights of civil na.turtl
a11 distin!!llished from relieious or social rights or
obligations and a. la.w dealing with the ch ii consequence of a.n excommunication does not violate the
freed~m protected by Art. 25 or Art. 26. (3) Even
on the ha.sis that the civil consequences of a.n excommunication are a. matter of religion, still it is a.
Sert. S.11ino
~ S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
545
measure of social reform and as such the legislation
would be saved by the words in Art. 25(2)(b).
1962
Satdar Syldna
Tollw Bil(fuddlo
SaMb
I am unable to a<'cept any of these contentions
as correct. (1) First I do not agree that the plead- Tiu Stak v.of Bdmlay
ings do not sufficiently raise the point th1tt if excomA_,,..,.,. J,
munication was pa1 t of the "practice of a religion"
the conS!'quences that flow tlierefrt•m were not also
part of the "practice of religion". 'Ihe position of the
Dai as the religious head of the denomination not
being disputed and his po\Ver to excommunicate 11,Jso
not being in dispute and it also being admit~d that
places of worship and burial grounds were dedicated
for the use of the members of the denomination, it
appears to me that the consequence of the deprivation of the use of these properties by persons
excommunicated would be logical and would flow
from tho order of excommunication. It could not
be contested that the consequence of a valid order
of excommunication was that the person
excommunicated would cease to be entitled to the
benefits of the trusts created or founded for the
denomination or to the beneficial use or enjoyment
of denominati•rnal
property. If the pruperty
belongs to <L community and if a person by
excommunication ceased to be a member of that
community, it i8 a little difficult to see how his
right to the •·njoyment of the denominational
property could be divorced from the religious
practice which resulted in his ceasing to be a
member of the community. When once it is
conceded that t.he right guaranteed by Art. 25 (1) is
not eonfined to freedom of conscience in the sense
of th" right to hol<l a belief and to 'propagate that
belief, hut includes the right to the practice of
religion, the consequences of that practice must
also bear the same complexion and be the subject
of a like guarantee.
(~) I Ahal! rP.serve for later consideration the
point about the legislation being saved as a matter
546 SUPREAm OOURT REPORTS [1962) SUPP.
1~62
Bar®r S;!t(l..
Tolt<s:::luddin
v.
Th Si.u of &,.lay
AJ!l""l"' J•
of social reform under Art. 25(2)(b), and continue
to deal with the argument that the impugnerl
enactment was va.lirl since it dealt only with the
consequences on the civil rights, of persons
excommunice.ted. It has, however, to be pointed
out that though in t.he definition of "excommunication" under s. 2(b) of the impugned Act the consequences on the civil rights of the excommunicated
persons is set out, that i8 for the purpose of defining
e.n "excommunication". What I desire to point 011t
is that it is not as if the impugned enactment saves
only the civil coneequences of an excommunication
not interfering with ot.her con8equenclll! of an
excommunication falling within the definition.
Taking tho case of the Dawoodi Bohra cnmmunit.y,
if the Uai Pxcommunicatl'd a per8on on the ground
of forswearing the basic tmets of that religious
community the Dai wonk! be committing an offence
under 8. 4, becaU8c the consequences according t.o
the law of that religious denomination would be the
exclusie>n from civil rights of thn excommunicated
person. The learned Attorncy·Gtneral is therefore
not ri;;ht in the submiBBion that the Act is conceru<·d .nnly with the civil rights of the excommunioatcd pereon. On the other barn!, it would he
correct to say that the Act iB concerned with
excommunications which might havo religious significance hut which also operate to deprive persons of
their civil rights.
Article 26 confers on every roligionA donomination two rights which a.re relevant in the presont
context, by cl. (b)-"to manage its own affair" in
matters of religion" -and by the last clause-cl. (d)
-"to administer such property" which the denomination owns or ha.s acquired ( vido cl. (c) ) "in
accordance with law." In considering the scope of
Art. ~6 one he.s to
hl'ar in mind two ba~ic
postulates : First that a religious denomination is
posseseed of prop;>rty whioh is dedicated for definite
uses and which under Art. 26 (d) the religious
.;'
I
2 s.c.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
547
denomination has the right to administer. From
this it would follow that subject to any law
grounded on public order, morality or health the
limitations with whieh Art. 26 opens, the denomination has a right to have the property used for
the purposes for which it was dedicated. So far as
the present case is concerned, the management of
the property and the right and the duty to ensure
the proper application of that property is admittedly vested in the Dai a3 the religious head of the
denomination. Article 26 (d) speaks of the
administration of the property being in accordance
with law and t.110 learned Attorney-General
suggested that a valid law could be enacted which
would permit the di version of those funds to
purposes which the legislature in its wisdom
thought it fit to appropriate. I feel wholly unable
to accept this argument. A law which provides for
or permits the diversion of the property for the
use of persons who have been excluded from the·
denomination would not be "a law" contemplated
by Art. 26(d). Leaving aside for the moment the
right of excommunicated persons to the enjoyment
of property dedicated for the use of a denomination
let me take the case of a person who has renounced
that religion, ancl in pasHing it might be observed
that even in cases of an apostate according to the
principles governing the Dawoodi Bohra denomination there is no ipso f<6cto loss of rights, only
apostasy is a ground for excommunication which
however eould take place. without service of notice
or an enquiry. It could not be contended that an
apostate would-lw ~ntitled to the beneficial use of
property, dedif'nted to the Dawoodi Bohra
<:ommm1ity lw it th<' mosque where worship goes
on or other types of property like consecrated burial
grounds ete. It \rnuld Le obvious that if the Dai
permitkd the use of the property by an apostate
without excommnnic:iting him he would be committing a dereliction of his dnty as the supreme head
1962
Sardar Sytdna
T ah.r Saifuddin
Soheb
v.
The Slate of Bmba/
A.uan1ar r
54i SUPREME OOURT REPORTS (1962] SUPP.
T.
IJ_.,,...
Iff 2
a.ijW/ftl
&Ai6
••
. ,,.
Tiu Sl4U •J •..U9
~
of the religion-in fact an a.ct of sa.crilege besides
being guilty of a breaoh of trust. I consider that it
hardly needs any argument to show that if a law
permitted or enjoined the use of the property belonging to the denomination by an apostate it would be
a. wholly unauthorised diversion which would be a
violation of Art. 26(d) and also of Art. 26(c), not
to speak of Art. 25(1). The other postulate is the
position of the Dai as the head of the religious
denomination and BS the medium through whic.b
spiritual grace is brought to the community and
that this is the central pa.rt of the religion as well as
one of the principal articles of that faith. Any
denial of this position is virtually tantamount to a.
denial of the very foundation of the faith of the
religious denomination.
The attack on the constitutionality of the Act
has to be judged on the basis of these two fundamental points. The practice of excommunication is
of ancient origin. History records the existence of
that practice from Pagan times and Aeschyles
records "The exclusion from purification with holy
water of an offender whose hands were defiled with
bloodshed." Later the Druids a.re said to have
claimed the right of excluding offenders from
sacrifice. Such customary exclusions are stated to
have obtained in primitirn semitic tribes but it is
hardly m·cessar y to deal in detail with this point,
because so far as the Muslims, a11d particularly
among tho religious denomination with which this
petition iH concerned, enough material bas been eet
out in the judgment of the Privy Council already
referred.
Pausing here, it might he mentioned that
excommunication might bear two aspects : ( l) as a
punishment for crimes which the religious com·
munity justifies putting one out of its fold. In this
connection it may be pointed out that in a theo·
era.tic State the punitive aspect of excommunication
2 S.O.R. SUPREME OOURT REPORTS
549
might get emphasized and might almost take the
form of a gener&l administration by religious dignitaries of ordinary civil law. But there is another
aspect which is of real relevance to. the point now
under considera.tion. From this point of view
excommunication might be defined as the judicial
exclusion from the right and privileges of the
religious community to whom the offender belongs.
Here it is not so much as a punishment that excommunication is inflicted but is used as a measure of
discipline. for the maintenance of the integrity of
the community, for in the ultimate an&lysis the
binding force which bolds together a religious community and imparts to it a unity which makes it a
denomination is a common faith, common belief
and a belief in a common creed, doctrines and
dogma. A community has a right to insist that
those who claim to be within its fold are those who
believe in the essentials of its creed and that one
who asserts that he is a member of the denomination does not, at least, openly denounce the essen·
tials of the creed, for if everyone were at liberty to
deny these essentials, the community as a group
would soon cea~e to exist. It is in this sense that
it is a matter of the very life of a denomination
that it exercises discipline over its members for the
purpose of preserving unity of faith, at least so far
as the basic creed or doctrines are concerned. The
impugned enactment by depriving the head of the
power and the right to excommunicate and penalising the exercise of the power, strikes at the very
life of the community by rendering it impotent to
protect itself against dissidents and schismatics. It
is thus a violation of the right to practise religion
guaranteed by Art. 25( I). and is also violative of
Art. 26 in that it interfers with the rights of the
Dai as the trustee of the property of the denominar
tion to so administer it as to exclude dissidents and
excommunicated persons from the beneficial use of
such_ property.
11112
Stir.iMS,.....
r.1ur ~n
5 y,
Tiu St•u •JBomioy
A»""t.,. I.
550 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1962] SUPP.
1162
It is admitted b owever in the present caae
th&t
the D&i as the bead of the denomination has
T... sij/Jdi•
aau
vested
in him the power, subject to the procedur&l
y,
requirement.
indicated in the judgment of the Privy
n, si.11qf a-HJ
Counoil, to excommunicate such of the members of
..,,,...,., J.
the community &s do not adhere to the basic
easentials of the faith and in particular those who
repudiate him as the bead of the denomination
and as a medium through which the community·
derives spiritual satisfaction or efficiency mediately
from the God-head. It might be that if'the enactment
had confined itaelf to dealing with excommunication
as a punishment for 11eoular offences merely and not
as an instrument for the self preservation of a
religious denomination the .position would have
been different and in such &n event the question as
to whether Arts. 25 and 26 would be sufficient to
render such legisl&tion unconstitutional might
require serious consideration. That is not the
posit.ion here. The Act is not confined in its operation to the eventualities just now mentioned but
even excommunication with a view to the preeervation of the identity of the community and to
pervent what might be schism in the denomination
is also brought within the mischief of the enactment. It is not p088ible, in the definition of
excommunioation which the. Aot carries, to read
down the Act so as to confine excommunication as
& punishment of offences which &re unrelated to the
pr&etice of the religion whicb do not touch and
concem the very existence of the faith of the
denomination as such. Such &n exclusion oannot be
achieved except by rewriting the section.
s... s....
3. The next question is whether the impugned
enactment could be sustained as a measure of social
welfare and reform under Art. 25 (2) (b). The
learned Attorney-General is, no doubt, right.in his
submission that on the decision of this Court in the
SUPREME COUR'l' REPORTS
28.C.R.
551
ll02
ll!ulki Temple case-(T'enkat11mmana Devaru v. State
1
of Jfysore( ), the right guara.nteed under Art. 26(b)
Sartkr Syedna
Tahtr Saifuddin
is subject to a law protected by Art. 25(:l)(b) The
Saheb
question then before the CoUit related to the
v.
validity or a law which threw open all public The 1.'itate of BombaJ
temples, even those belonging to5 "a religious
Ayy4ng'ir J.
denomination" to "every community of Hindus
including 'untouchables' " and it was held that,
notwithstanding that the exclusion of these communities from worship in such a temple was an
{'Sscntial part of the "practice of religion" of the
denomination, the constitutionality of the l~w was
saved by the second part of the provision in
Art. 25(2)(b) reading : "the throwing open of Hindu
religious institutions of a public character to all
classes and section of Hindus". The learned
Attorney-General sought support from this ruling
for the proposition that Art. 25(2)(b) could be invoked
to protect the validity of a law which was "a
measure of social welfare and reform" notwithstanding that it involved au abrogation of the whole
or part of the essentials of a religious belief or of a
religious practice. I foe! unable to accept the
deduction as flow ii;g from the Mulki Temple case.
That d£·cision proceeded on two bases : (l) As
regards the position of "untouchables", Art. 17 had
made express provision stating:
" 'Untouchability' is abolished and its
practice in any form is forbidden. The
enforcement of any disability arising out of
'Unt.ouchability' shall be an offence punishable
in accordance with law."
and that had to be recognised as a limitation on the
rights of religious denominations however basic and
essential the practice of the exclusion of untoucha·
bles might be in its tenets or creed. (2) There was
a special saving as regards laws providing for
''throwing open of public Hindu Religious Institu(lJ
(19581 s.c.R. 895.
552 SRUPEME OOURT REPORTS [1962] SUPP.
1"2
tions to all cl&lll!es and sections of Hindus" in Art.
25(2)(b), and effect had to be given to the wide
ff;fj"" language in which this provision waa couched. In
"·
the face of the language used, no distinction could
n. B,_. •f B.,.~ be drawn betwetJn beliefs that were basic toa religion,
,,,,;;;;; J.
or religious practices that were considered to be
eesential by a religious sect, on tho one hand, and
on the other beliefs and practices that did not form
the core of a religion or of the practices ·of that
religion. The phraseology employed cut across
and effaced these distinctions.
But very different consideratious arise when one
has to deal with legislation which is claimed to be
merely a measure "providing for social w.Jifare and
reform". To 11ta.rt with, it has to ho admitted that
this phrase is, as contrasted with the eecond portion
of Art. 25(2)(b), far from precise and is flexible in
its content. In this connection it has to be borne
in mind that limita.tion11 imposed on religioua
practices on
the ground of public order,
morality or health have already been saved
by the opening words of Art. 25( I) and the saving
would ooyer beliefs and practices even though considered e11110ntial or vita.I by those profeasing the
religion. I consider that in the context in which
the phrase occurs, it is intended to save the
validity only of those laws which do not invade the
basic and eeeential praotiC011 of religion which &re
guaranteed by the operative portion of Art. 25(1)
for two reaeone : (I) To read the saving as covering
even the ha.sic l!llllential practices of religion, would
in effect nullify and render moaninglesa the entire
guarantee of religious freedom-a.freedom not merely
to profeu, but to practice religion, for very few
pieoes of legislation for abrogating religious
practices oould fail to be subsumed under the
caption of "a provision for 110cial welfare or
reform". (2) H the phrase just quoted was intended
to have suoh a wide operation as cutting at even
the -ntials guaranteed by Art. 26(1), there
~- s~
7tiw
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
553
would have been no 1rned for the special provision
as to "throwing open of Hindu religious instituticns"to all dass''" a.nd sections of Hindus since the
legislation contemplated by this provision would
be par excellenc<0 one of social reform.
In my view by the phrase "laws providing for
social welfare aud reform" it was not intended to
enable the legislature to "reform", a religion out of
exietence or identity. Article 25 (2)(a) having
provided for legislation dealing with "economic,
financial, political or secular activity which may be
associated with religious practices", the succeeding
cl;mse proceeds to deal with other activities of religious groups and these also must be those which are
associated with religion. Just as the activities
referred to in Art. 25(~}(a) are obviously not of the
essence of the religion, similarly the saving in Art.
25(2)(b) is not intended to cover the basic essentials
of the creed of a religion which is protected by
Art. 25( I).
Coming back to the facts of the present
petition, the position of the Dai-ul-ltfutlaq, is an
essential part of the creed of the Dawoodi Bohra
sect. Faith in his spiritual mission and in the
efficacy of his ministration is one of the bonds
that hold the community together as a unit. The
power of excommunication is vested in him for the
purpose of enforcing discipline and keep the
denomination together as an entity. The purity
of the fellowship is secured by the removal of persolljl
who had rendered themselves unfit and unsuitable
for membership of the sect. The power of excommunication for the purpose of ensuring the preservation of the community, has therefore a prime
significance in the religious life of every member of
the group. A legislation which penalises this power
even when exercised for the purpose above-indicated cannot be sustained as a measure of social
welfare or social reform without evillcerating the
I.HZ
S111iar s,.a.
TdlMr SoijvMin
,,
~--
Tire St"" of Bn.H,J
..
~•.-arJ
554 SUPREME COURT REPORT8 [I!lti2J SUPP.
guarantee under Art. 2.i (I) and rcnderini: thll
lN2
protection illusory.
!i«rdar s,.'"4
Jn my view th" petitio1vr iH entitled to the
Soifa"1i•
SdH
relief that he seeks and the petition will accordingly
T,
·no, Stai. of Biid., be allowed.
}fr Conn : In Ae<·ordaiwe with the majority
view of this Court, the vetition is allowed. The
petitioner is entitled to his costs.
Petition all<JWed.
T•
---
1962
THE JOMMA MASJID, .MERCARA
Jonu"'JI IJ.
v.
KODIMANIANDRA DE\'IAH
(J. L. KAPUR, M. HIDAYA.TULJ,AH, J. C. SHAH and
T. L. VENKA1'ARA.:l!A AJYAH, JJ.)
Tran"fer of Proptrty-Sa/e by ret-ersioner for co11airkration
-Fra"Udu/,e.nt or errc>nt:ou.9 repre.lienlati()tz--f'rr.~1 nt transferable
int1.re~t,
tl1ou9h in/act sprs ,'."ucce~,~inni.t .. S11bRr.quenl- acquiaition
uc
of title-Ejfect-Rult of "''"N><i-11'1.tn lcr
resort'd to Transfer
of Property Act, 18$2(4 of 18821, •· 6(a). Intuprtlalion of
Statute-( 'onsiruing of aertion-1/ nP111 rrvrda wuld be read 1"nto
it-11/u.atration to a section
When
rou/d be ustd lo enlarge the
language-If admissiilt ,,, construi1ig a section.
M and S claiming t0 be revenioners to the estate of N
sold the property in dispute to G predecessor-in-interest of the
re.pondents. The sale dred recited that the property belongcrl
to the joint family of two brothers N and B, and on the death
of N it was inherited by his widow and on her death it had
devolved upon them as reversioners· to the stato. G sued to
recover possession of the propcrties. The suit was contested
by the wiclow of B(brother of N) claiming that the property
was the self acquired pn·pcrty of her hushand. During the
pendency of the litiFatio·' the widow died, and G applied to
the revenue authoritin to transfer the 'pattas' in his name.
The appellants intervened alleging that the property was gifted
to them by the widow, and S one of the reversioners had also
executed a release of the said property for a consideration.
This objection was rejected. The appellants then sued for
posac!Sion of a half share in the properties held by the widow
of B, relying upon the gift by the widow, and the deed of
surrender by S one of the two reversioners to the estate of N.
They contended that the Vendors of the property to G had
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