MAHARANA SHRI JAYVANTSINGHJI RANMALSINGHJI ETC. versus THE STATE OF GUJRAT
Supreme Court of India | Decided 22 December 1961 | [1962] SUPP. 2 S.C.R. 411 | 1961 INSC 359
Key facts
- Decided
- 22 December 1961
- Bench
- BHUVNESHWAR PRASAD SINHA*, S.K. DAS, A.K. SARKAR, N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR, J.R. MUDHOLKAR
- Bench size
- 5
- Case number
- WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) No. 120/1958
- Disposal
- Appeal(s) allowed
- Citation
- [1962] SUPP. 2 S.C.R. 411
- Neutral citation
- 1961 INSC 359
Text of the judgment
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
411
for attendance of the company "in person", but
apart from that we wish to point out that the
resolution made by the two companies do not
appear to us to delegate the powers of the directors
to Arjun Prasad.
The conclusion of the High Court that the
votes cast by Arjun Prasad on behalf of the two
companies., viz., Bhandani Brothers and the
Hindustan Coal Company, were not valid votes is,
in our opinion, correct.
The appeals are accordingly dismis~ed with
costs. One set of hearing fee.
Appeals d;ismisse,d.
MAHARANA SHRI JAYVANTSINGHJI
RANMALSINGHJI ETC.
v.
THE STATE OF GUJRAT
(B. P. SINHA, c. J., s. K. DAS, A. K. SARKAR,
N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR and
J. R. MUDHOLKAR, JJ.)
Land Tenure, Abolition of-Amendment of enactment-If
creates a new cla.!s of permanenl. tenanl8-0onslitutional
validity-If infringes fundamental rights of erstwhile tenure·
holdera--Bombay Land Tenure Abol-ition Laws (Amendment)
Act, 1958 (Bom. LYII of 1958), ss. 3, 4, 6-0on•titution of
India, Arts. U, 19 (1)(/), 31, 31-A.
The petitioners, who were tenure-holders, challenged
the constitutional validity of the Bombay Land Tenure Abolition Laws (Amendment) Act, 1958 and in.particular ss. 3 and
4 read withs. 6 of that Act, as infringing their fundamental
rights guaranteed by Arts. 14, 19 and 31 of the Constitution.
Their case in brief was that those provisions by making certain
non-permanent tenants permanent as from the commencement
of the Bombay Taluqdari Tenure Abolition Act, 1949,
enabled them to acquire occupancy right by payment of six
times the assessment or the rent under s. 5A of that Act
instead of 20 timea to 200 times the as>essment under s. 32H
of ~e Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948,
1951
.4rjun Prarad
v.
Sha•lital SiuJllkarl•I
Shah
1961
Denmber 32.
412 SUPREME COU.KT REPORTS [1962] St:Pl'.
IHI
Mo},o,ana 8/ari
J oywntJ iltglej i
R.-lriogJiii etc.
v.
T"' Slot. of Gufrat
a' amended in
1956, and thereby substantially deprived the
petitioners of the rifhts acquired by them on the 'tillers' day,
April 1, 1957, when they ceased to be tenur<-holders. It was
urged that the impugned Act was a piece of colourable legislation in that it had confiscated, under the guise of defining a
permanent tenant or changing a rule of evidence, a large part
of rhc purchase price the pl"'tit10 tt>rs were cnti1lcd to from
their tenants, and that the Stat : Legislature had not the
competence to enact it as it was not saved by Art. 31A of the
C orutitution.
Held, (Sarkar and Mudholkar, JJ., dissenting), that
ss. 3, 4 and 6 of the Bombay Land Tenure Abolition Laws
(Amendment) Act, 1958, in so far as they deemed some
tenants as permanent tenants in possession of Taluqudari land,
were unconstitutional and void. Under the guise of changing the definition of a permanent trnant and changing a rule
of evidence, they really reduced the purchase price that the
petitioners "'·ere entitled to receive under s. 32H of the
Bombay Tenancy and Agriculrural L•n<ls Act, 1948, as
amended in 1956, from some of their tenants on the "tillers'
day."
Per Sinha, C. J., and Das, J .-There can be no doubt
that s. 4 of the impugned Act, properly construed, created a
new class of permanent tenants not contemplated by s. 83 of
the Bombay Land Revenue Code, 1879, and not in existence
on the "tillers' day", and the combined effect of ss. 3, 4 and 6
of the impugned Act was that if the tenµre holder did not
m•ke an appli:ation under s. 6 w,thin six months from the
commencement of the impugned Act for a declaration that a
tenant under him waJ not a permanent tenant, the name of
the tenant would be recorded as a permanent tenant if he
fulfilled the conditions lai<l down by s. 4 and thereafter he
would be dremed under s. 3 to be a permanent tenant and
under s. 4 all the provisions of the Taluqd;,ri Abolition Act
1949, would apply to him. The result of this combined effect
would be to deprive the tenure-holder of any real opportunity
of contesting the claims of the tenant and deprive him of
the purchase prfce prescribed bys. 32H of the Bombay,
Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948.
The right of the petitioners to the said purchase pr;ce from
those of their tenants who were non-permanent on April J,
1957, was a right ofpropertf guaranteed by Art. 19 (I) (f)
and the impugned sections adversely afl'cctrd that right with
retrospe<:tive effect Section 6, tested in the light of Art. 1!1(5),
could not be said to impose a reasonable re~t• iction in the
intcr<st of the general public.
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
413
Bombay llyeing and Manufacturing Oo. Ltd. v. State of
Bombay, [1958] S.C.R. 1122, applied.
Sri Ram Ram Narain Medhi v. The State of Bombay.
(J959] Supp. 1 S.C.R. 489, referred to.
Article 31A of the Constitution had no application:
The relation between the tenure-holders and the tenants had
changed from that of landlord and tenant to that of creditor
and debtor on April 1, 1957, and the impugned Act which
affected such rights, did not come within the protection of
that Article.
In view of the true scope and effect of ss. 3, 4 and 6, the
impugned Act could not fall within any entry of List II or
List III of the s~venth Schedule to the Constitution anp was a
piece of colourable legislation.
K. 0. Gajapati Narayan Deo v. Stale of Orissa [1954]
S.O.R. I, referred to.
Per Sarkar and Mudholkar, JJ.-Section 4 of the iJnpugned
Act did not expand the definition of a permanent tenant and
did not take away any property that was vested in the landlord on the "tillers day". Nor did it confer any new property
on the tenant. It only applied to and rescued a permanent
tenant faced with the task of proving the nature of his ten~presumption of permanency in his favour.
If in fact his tenancy was not permanent and had been
extinguished by law but he was tentatively recQrded as permanent, the landlord could rebut the presumption in a
proceeding under s. 6 (1) by producing the documents in ·his
possession or otherwise by showing that the tenancy was not
in fact permanent and, therefore, had been extinguished by
s. 32(1) of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act,
1948, and claim compensation or the purchase money under
s. 32H(l)(II) of the Act, that right of his not having been
affected in any way by the impugned Act. If he failed, he
would itet the purchase price according to s. 5A of the Bombay Taluqdari Tenure Abolition Act, 1949, chich would not
be and wa. not challenged.
Dhirubha De11Uingh Gohil v. State of Bombay, (1955]
I S.O.R. 69!, referred to.
The impugned Act d.ealt with matters arising out of the
relationship between landlord and tenant. Its provisions
were not intended to apply where such relationohip did not
subsist. The Act was, therefore, within the competence of
the Legislature under entry 18 of List II of the Seventh
Schedule to the Constitution and was thus not a piece of
colourable legislation.
ancy, by raising"
1961
Mahara1'4 Shri
J ayvantsinghii
Ramnalsinghji etc,
v.
Tiu State of Gujrat
414 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1962] SUPP.
1P8.
Jlalunona Sh,i
Jap""'si111hji
RnmalJinthji tic.
v,
77w 81ot1 ojGujmt
There was, therrfore, no infringement of Art. 31(1} and
the Act w33 within the protection of Art. 3 lA of the Constitution and its Constitutional Validity could not be challen·
ged under An. 14 and 19(l)(f) of the Constitution.
Held, further, that the distinction made between tenure
villages and non-tenure ones was a classification based on the
extent of availability of the material for raising the inference
or the presumption and such cl83•ification had a reasonable
ncxu< with the object sought to be achieved by the Act.
Per Ayyangar, J.-There was no basis for the argument
that s. 4 of the impugned Act mrrely intended to provide a
rule of evidence for determining who was a permanent tenant
under '· 83 of the Bombay Land Revenue Code, IBn, and
did ncit extend the cate~ory of such tenants. It enacts a
po•itive rule of law by which a penon in poo11C11ion of holding
of a tenure-land must be "deemed" t<1 be a permanent tenant
on fulfilment of the three •pccified conditioru. This is evident
from the provisions of s. 6( 1) under which every person who
satisfied the definition of a permanent tenant under s. 4
wao entilled automatically and without applying for to be
entered a• a permanent tenant in the record of rights by the
Mamlatdar unless the tenure-holder filed an objection in
writing. Obviously such objection could only be on grounds
open to him under s. 4. Section 4(b) and s.6(1) of the
impugned Act had to be read together a• forming an
integrated whole. The entire object and purpose of the
impugned enactment was not, therefore, to enact a rule of
evidence for determining who were pcrmancat tenants under
the pre-existing law but to define and create a new class of
permanent tenants who satisfied.s. 4 of the Act.
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION : Petition Noe. 120
of
58 etc.
Petition un<ler Art. 32 of the Constitution of
India for enforcement of Fundamental Rights.
G. S. Pa/Mk, J.B. Dadadianji, S.N. Andky,
Rameshwar Nath and P.L. Vohra, f,·r the pet,itionen
(in l'ctns. 120 and 147of1958).
8. T. Duai, J.B. Dadaclia"lji, 8.N. Afldley,
Rameahwar Nath and P.L. Vohra, for the petitioner
(in Petn. No. 149/58).
J.B. Dadachanji, S.N. Andley, Ramtahu:ar Nath
and P.L. Vohra, for the petitioners (in Petns. Noa.
148 and 150/58).
'L,
II
....'
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
415
O.K. Daphl;ary, Solicitor-General of India,
N.P. Nathwani, R.H. Dhebar and T .•M. Sen, for the
respondents.
N.P. Nathwani and J. N. Shroff for re~pond
ents Nos. 5 and 6 (in Petns. Nos. 120, 148 and 156
of 1958).
1961
Maharona ~hri
Jayranto;, ghji
Ranma/singhji etc.
y,
Tt.. St•te of Guj.at
1961. December 22.-The Judgment of Sinha,
C. J., and Das, J., was delivered by Dd.B, J., the
judgment of Sarkar and Mudholkar JJ., was delivered by Mudholkar, J., and Ayyangar, J., delivered
a separate judgment.
S. K. Das, J,-In these 13 writ petitions arises
a common question of law, namely, the constitutional validity of some of the provisions of the
Bombay Land Tenure Abolition Laws (Amendment)
Act, 1958 (Bombay Act LVII of 1958) and in particular, of the provisions contained in ss. 3 and 4
read with s. 6 thereof. We shall hereinafter refer
to this Act as the impugned Act, 1958.
Put very briefly, the case of the petitioners is
that as a result of the provisions of the impugned
Act, 1958, certain non-permanent tenants were
deemed to be permanent tenants as from the
commencement of the Bombay Taluqdari Tenure
Abolition Act, 1949 (Bombay Act LXII of 1949},
hereinafter referred to as the Taluqdari Abolition
Act, 1949 and thereby became entitled to acquire
on payment of six times the assessment or six times
the rent insten.d of at least the minimum of twenty
times the assesament, the rights of an "occupant"'
within the meaning of s. 5A of the Taluqdari Abolition Act, 1949. This resuTh, it is contended, has
substantially deprived the _petitioners of the rights
which they acquired on tillers' day (April l, 1957)
by relj.Bon of the provisions contained in s. 32 and
other relevant sections of the Bombay Tenancy and
Agricultural Lands Act, 19!8 (Bombay Act LXVII
of Hl48) as amended from time to time. It is
Dos J
416 SUPREME OOURT REPORTS [1962] SUPP.
1111
MoMraa Sltri
,/• .,ronti U.g~;i
B~Win1h1i tic.
Y,
71" St.It of Gujrfl
Das .i.
stated that this deprivation has resulted in the
violation of certain fundamental rights of the peti·
tioners, such as those guaranteed under Arts. 14, rn
and :• l of the Constitution. On behalf of the petitioners it has also been contended that ape.rt from
the question of violation of thdr fundamental
rights, the impugned Act, 1958 is a piece of colourable legislation in the sense that under the guise of
changing a rule of evidence, it has in effect taken
away thu petitioners' property witl)__out payment of
compensation and given it to another; it is, therefore, a piece of legislation which does not come
within any entry of the two legislative lists under
which the State Legislature was competent to make
laws.
To appreciate the points urged in support of
the petitions which have all been heard together,
it will be necc88&ty to consider the effect and inter-;
action of some of the provisions of four principal
Acts, namely, (l) the Bombay Land Revenue Code
1879 (Bombay Act V of 1879), hP.reinafter referred
to as the Revenue Code; (2) the Bombay Tenancy
and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948, as amended from
time·to time, hereinafter called the Tenancy Act,
1948; (3) the Taluqdari Abolition Ac·t I 949; and (4)
the impugned Act, 1958. We shall presently rPad
the relevant proviliions of these Acts. But before
we do so, it is neoessarv to state some fact!'. The
facts are similar, though not the same, in all the
petitions. It will be sufficient to state the facts of
one of the petitions (Petition no. 120 of 1958) in
detail in order to focus attention on the main question of Jaw whi.ch is i.he same in all these petitions
and which we have indicated briefly in the preceding paragraph.
The petitioners a.re all ex-Taluqdars. In
Petition No. 120 of 1958 the petitioner was a.
Taluqdar of two estates known &11 Sanand und Koth
in the Ahmeda.bad district of the then State of
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
417
Bombay and now of the State of Gujarat. These
two estates comprised 24 Taluqdari village8. The
petitioner was the absolute proprietor of all the
lands comprised in the two estates, subject to. payment of land revenue to the State Government.
Under the petitioner there were tenants-it is
stated, some permanent and some non-permanent.
In theyear 1949, the Bombay Provincial Legislature enacted the Taluqdari Abolition Act, 1949
which came into force Qn August 15, 1950. As a
result of the provisions of that Act, the Taluqdari
tenure as such was abolished and cert11.in properties,
such as, wells, tanks, waste lands, uncultivated
lands, etc., were · acquired· by the State; and the
Taluqdar was converted into a mere "occupant" as
defined in the Revenue Code a.nd was to pay land
revenue in accordance with the provisions of that
Code. Section 3 (16) of the Revenue Code defined
an "occupant" as meaning· "a holder in actual
possession of unalienated land, other than a tenant;
provided that where the holder in actual possession
is a tenant, the landlord or superior landlord, as
the case may be, shall be deemed to be the
occupant." In 1955 the Taluqdari Abolition Act,
1949 was amended and s. 5A was inserted. This
section, in effect, gave a permanent tenant in
possession of Taluqdari land the right to become an
occupant if he paid six times the assessment for
acquiring the right cf occupancy. In other words,
if a permanent tenant of an ex-Taluqdar paid the
required amount as stated in s. 5A, he became
an occupant himself in place of the ex-Taluqdar and
came into direct relation with the State in the
matter of payment of land revenue, and acquired
all the rights of an occup1nt under the Revenue
Code. The right which was conferred by s. 5A was
available at first for a limited period only, but it
was extended till 1962 as stated at the Bar. It is
necessary to state now what is meant by a "perma·
nent tenant". Section 16 of the TaluqdariAbolition
1961
Mahar411a Sisti
J ayvantsinghji
RanmalsingAji eto.
v.
T/,, St•te ofGujaro
DasJ.
418 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1962] SUPP.
1961
M aharand Shri
J ayvantsinghji
fiamnal.singhJi etc.
v.
17i1 State of Gujarat
Das J,
Act, 1949 made the provisions of the Revenue Code
applicable thereto and an attempt was made to
harmonize the provisions of the Taluqdari Abolition
Aet, 1949 with the provisions of the Revenue Code;
therefore, for understanding what is a "permanent
tenant" we have to go to the Revc·nue Code, s. 83
whereof, so far as it is relevant, rea(ls as follows :
"83.
x
x
x
x
x
And where by reason of the antiquity of
a tenancy, no satisfactory evidence of its
commencement is forthcoming, and there is
not any such evidence of the period of its
intended duration, if any, a.greed upon between the landlord and tenant, or those under
whom they respectivP!y claim title, or any
usage of the locality as to duration of such
tenants, it shall, as against the immediate
land lord of the tenant, be presumed to be coextensive with the duration of the tenure of
such landlord and of those who derive title
under him.
And where there is no satisfactory evi·
dance of the capacity in which a person in
possession of land in respect of which he
renders. service or pays rent to the landlord
received, holds or retains possession of the
same it shall be presumed that ho is in possession as tcnan t.
x"
x
x
x
It will be noticed that the expression "permanent
tenant" does not occnr in the section. 'Vhat is
stated therein is that in certain circnm;,iitnccs the
duration of the knancv nf a tPnant •ts ac;ainst his
immedia.tc landlorrl s.hn,ll be presumed' to he CO·
extensive with the durntiop of tho tennrc of sueh
landlord. The two circumstances montionerl :ire.
(l) whero by re,tson of tho antiquity of the tenancy
nn Ratlsfootorv Pviclence of its commencement is
or~hcomin", n~d (~} wh.ero there is no such edclonce
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
419
of the perhd of its intended duration, if any,
agreed upon between the landlord and tenant, or
any usage of the locality as to duration of the
tenancy. Some time later, by Bombay Act, Xill
of 1956, the definition of a'· permanent tenant" was
inserted in s. 2(IOA) of the Tenancy Act, 1948.
That definition was in these terms :
" 'permanent tenant' means a person(a) who immediately before the commencement of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands (Amendment) Act, 1955 (hereinafter called 'the Amending Act, 1955')(i) holds land
mirasdar; or
as
mulgenidar
or
(ii) by custom, agrePment, or the
decree or order of a Court holds the land
on lease permanently ; or
(b) the commencerr.ent or duration of
whose tenancy cannot satisfactorily be proved
by reason of antiquity;
and includes a tenant whose name or the
name of whose predecessor-in-title has been entered in the reco.rd of rights or in any public
record or in any other revenue record as a
permanent tenant immediately before the
commencement of the Amending Act, 1955."
Section 87 A of the Tenancy Act, 19~8, which was
also inserted by Bombay Act XIII of 1956 by
s. 47 thereof, said :
"Nothing . in this Act, shall affect the
provisions of any of the L!!.nd Tenures Abolition Acts, specified in Schedule III to this
Act, in so far as such provisions relate to
the conferment of right of an occupant in
favour of any inferior- holder or tenant in
respect of any Ian d held by him."
1961
M aharana SAri
J a)f'anlsinfhj i
Ranmalsingf!ii elo,
••
The Stale of Grgaf'ld
DasJ.
420 SUPREME OOURT REPORTS (1962) SUPP.
lPf1
In Schedule III to the Tenancy Act, 1948, was
.llohm..,a Sltti
.J.S1f'011lrinthft
given a list of Land Tenures Abolition Acta including the Taluqdari Abolition Act, 1949. Therefore,
the effect of s. 87 A aforesaid was that nothing in
the Tena.ncy Act, 1948, affectod the provisions of
the Taluqdari Abolition Act, 1949, in so far as tho
provisions in s. 5A of the Taluqdari. A holition Act,
1949, conferred the right of an occupant in favour
of a permanent tenant in posscs8ion of any taluqdari land on payment of tho sums mentioned
thorein. The arguments before us have proceeded
on the footing that before the comin~ into force of
the impugned Act, 1958, the status of a permanent
tenant in possession of any taluqdari land was to be
determined by the provisions in s. 83 of the
Revenue Code; in other words, hy the two circumstances mentioned in that section.
Batunal1in.i:lij1 tie.
v.
Tit< Slal1 of Oujarol
Das J.
\Vhat was the position with rPgard to tenants
who were not permanent? No right was conferred
on thf'm bys. liA of the Taluqrlari Abolition Act,
1949, which section was inserted in that Act in I 955
by Bombay Act I of 1955. The rights of these
non-permanent tenants were governed by the
Tenancy Act, 1948, which underwent some funda.
mental changes in 1956 (see Bombay Act XIII of
1956). The cha.ngc8 relevant for our purpose were
contained in s, :l2 and some of the succeeding
sections. The effect of these RPCtions was considered by this Court in Sri Ram Ram .Varain Jtedhi
v. The State of Bombay (l). After 8ummarising the
proviHions contained in ss. 32 to 3:!R, this Court
said:
"The title of the landlord to thl' land
passes immediately to th~ tl'nant on the
tillers' day and there is a c11mplcte<l purchase
or sale thereof as between the landlord and the
tenant. The tenant iH no doubt given a locus
penitentiae an<l an option of deelaring whether
(1)
[1959] Supp. I S.C.R.4S9, SIB, 519 .
..
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
421
1B61
he is or is not willing to purchase the land
Afaharona Shti
hdd by him as a tenant. If he fails to appear
JO,Yvantsinehji
or makes a statement that he is not willing Ranmalainghji tie.
to purchase the land, the Tribunal shall by an Thi Stot•v,of Guj.,.q1
orck·r in writing declare that such tenant is
DasJ.
not willing to purchase the land and that the
purchase is ineffective. It is only by such a
declaration by the Tribunal that the purchase
becomes ineffective. If no such declaration
is made by the Tribunal the purchase would
stand as statutorily effected on the tillers'
day and will continue to be operativ~, the only
obligation on the tenant then being the payment of price in the mode determined by the
Tribunal. If the tenant commits default in
the payment of such price either in lump or
by instalments as determind by the Tribunal,
s. 32M declares the purchase to be ineffective
but in that event the land shall then be at
the disposal of the Collector to be disposed of
by him in the manner provided therein.
Here also the purchase continues to be effective as from the tillers' day until such default
is committed and there is no question of a
conditional purchase or sale taking place
between the landlord and tenant. The title
to the land which was vested originally in the
landlord passes to the tenant on the tillers'
day or the alternative period prescribed in
that behalf. This title is defeasible only in
the event of the tenant failing to appear or
making a statement that he is not willing to
purchase the land or committing default in
payment of the price thereof as .determined
by the Tribunal. The tenant gets a vested
interest in the land defeasible only in either
of those cases and it cannot therefore be said
that the title of landlord to the land is suspended for any period definite or indefinite."
422 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1962] SUPP.
1161
The tillern' day referred to above was the first day
of April, 1957. The argument on behalf of the
M """'""• S liri
J~ltji
petitioners is that according to the deoi,ion of this
R-uin:hji u,.
Court, tho titlo of the petitioners to lands hclcl by
v.
TM Si.u of Gujarat tenants who were entitled to the benefit of so. 32 to
.32R. pa,ssed immediately to the tenants on the
DasJ.
tillers day and there was a completed purchase or
sale thereof as between the petitioners and the
tenants. So far as permanent tenant.a in possession
of taluqdari lands were concerned, they were
governed by s. 5A of the Taluqdari Abolition Act,
1949, and nothing in the Tenancy Act, 1948, affected
their right under that section. But. non·permnnent
tenants in possession of t&luqdari lands became purcha.sers of their lands on the tillers' day with an
obligation to pay the purchase price mentioned in
s. 32H of the Tenancy Act, !948. Section 32H, in
so far as it boars upon non-permanent tenants, says :
"32H. (I) Subject to the additions and
<leduction8 as provided in sub-sections ( lA)
an<l (I B), the purchase price shall be reckoned
as follows, namely :(i) in the case of a permanent tenant
x
x
x
(ii) in the case of other tenants, the
purchase price shall be the aggregate of
the following amounts, that is to say,(a) such amounts as the Tribunal may
determine not being less than 20 times the
assessment and not more than 200 times the
assessment;
(b) the value of any structures, wells, and
embankment constructed and other permanent
fixtures made and trees planted by the landlord on the land ;
(c) the amount of thP arreas of rent, if
any lawfully due on the tillers' day or the
postponed date ;
2 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
423
· (d) the amounts, if any, paid by or recovered from the landlord as land revenue and
other cesses referred to in clauses (a), (b), (c)
and (d) of sub-section (1) of section IOA, in
the event of the failure on the part of the
tenant to pay the same.
Explanation 1.*
*
*
Explanation 2.*
*
*
(IA) Where a tenant to whom subsections (I) and (2) of section JOA do not
apply,· has, after the commencement of the
Bombay Tenancy and agricultural Lands
(Amendment) Act, 1955, paid in respect of
the land held by him ~s tenant land revenue
and other cesses referred to in sub-section
( 1) of that section, on account of the failure
of the landlord to pay the same, a sum equal
to the total amount so paid by the tenant
until the date of the determination of the
purchase price shall be deducted from the
aggregate of the amounts determined under
sub-section (I).
(IB) (a) On the amount arrived at in
accordance with the provisions of sub-sections
(1) and (IA) there shall be calculated interest
at 4:, per cent, per annum for the period
between the date on which the tenant i8
deemed to have purchased the land under
section 32 and the date of the d<>termination
of the purchase price.
(b) (i) The amount of interest so calculated shall be added to, and
(ii) the amount of rent, if any, paid by
the tenant to the landlord and the value of
any products of trees planted by the landlord if such products are removed by the
landlord during the said period shall be deducted from, the &mount so arrived at.
IHl
Makarana Shri.
J aytJant.singhji
Ronmalsinghji etc.
v.
The Stat, of Gujarat _
Das J.
424 SUPREME OOURT REPORTS [ 1962) SUPP.
IHI
.11•-
84ri
'"
•Jlf1H"Jli11(4i&
....,.,,"ii tic.
v.
·n. 81a1uj Gwjrut
Das J.
(2) The State Government may by ·general or special order, fix diffen'nt minima and
maxima for tho purpose of sub-clause (a) of
clause (ii) of sub·section (1) in respect of any
kind of land hold by tenants in any backward area. In fixing such minima and maxima,
the State Government shall have regard to
the rent payable for the land and the factors
specified in sub-section (3) of secticn 63A."
The differenoe in the purchase price mentioned in
s. 5A of the Taluqdari;Abolition Act, 19411, and the
purchaao prico mentioned in s. 32H of the Tenancy
Act, l 948, is noticeable. Under s. 5A of the
Taluqdari Abolition Act, 1949, the purchase price
for the right of occupancy is approximately six
times the assessment fixed for the land. Under
s. 32H, however, the minimum is 20 times the assessment and the maximum 200 times the assessment.
These mmima and maxima are liable tO reduction
in the case of land held by tenants in any backward area.
Now, the main grievance of the pttitioners is
this. So for as non-permanent tenants were conce·
rned, the title of the petitioners to their lands passed
on April I, 1957, to the tenants and the petitioners
ceased to be l~ndlords. All that they became
etitled to on that day was the purchase price mentioned in s. S2H. By one stroke of the pen as
it were, the impugned Act, 1958, made 11lmost all
non-permanPnt tanants into permanent tenants
and thereby deprived the petitionerB of the higher
purchase price which they were entitled to got
under s. 32H and the aucoeedinf eeotiona of the
Tenanoy Aot. 19i8. In petition No. 120 of 1968
the petitionm has stated th&t he would loee about
Rs. 14 laos as a reeult of the provisiona of the
impugned Act, 1968.
We may now read some of the provisions of \he
impugned Aot, 1958. The Aot is entWed "an Act
i
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
425
further to define permanent tenants, inferior holders
aud permanent holders for the purposes. of certain
Land Tenure Abolition laws and to provide for certain other mi.tters." In view of the argument advanced before us on behalf of the respondents that the
impugned Act, 1958 merely changes a rule of evidence, it is worthly of note that the long title itself
states that the Act is an Act further to define pc1manent tenants, Section 2 of the Act is the interpretation
section and the expression 'Land Tenure Abolition
law' means in relation to a permanPnt tenant, Acts
specified in l'art I of the Schedule. The Taluqdari
Abolition Act, l!I±!) is one of the Am,s mentioned
in Part I of the t:lchedule. The expression 'tcnureholder' means inter alia a taluqdar and 'tenureland' means inter alia taluqdari land Sections 3,
4 are U aud important for our purpose and should
be read in full.
" 3. A person shall, within the meaning
of the relevant Land Tenure Abolition law, be
det'med to be an inferior holder, a permanent
ho-Ider or. as the C<Lse may be, a permanent
tenant, on the date of the abolition of the
relevant land tenure, if his name has been
reoor<led in the record of rights or other public
or revenue record as an inferior holder, permanent holder or permanent tenant in respect
of any tenure-land-
(a) on the date of the abolition of the
relevant land tenure, or
(b) in pursuance of orders issu!ld during
the course of any proceedings under the
relevant Land Tenure Abolition law or, as
the ca.se may be, the Bombey Land Revenue
Code, 1879(i) before the commencement of this
Act, or
1941
AJ aharana Shri
J ayvaritsinghJi
(Ra~malsinglrji etc.
v,
'Tht Stute of Gujaf'at
Das J.
426 SUPREME COURT REPORTIS (1962] SUP.I:'·
11111
Molw ... Sltri
J 41l*· tMzAii
s...lsiltghji '"·
v.
71., Stal< of Gujar•I
D., J.
(ii) after the commenre of this Act
in oa11es in which inquiries were pending
at the commencement of this Act, or
(c) in pursuance of an m der issued by
the Mamlatdar in respect of an entry under
section 6 of this Act.
4. For the purpu>l's of the 1ekvant Act
specified in Part I of the Schedule, a person(a) who on the date of the commencement
of that Act was holding any tenure-land
and
(b) who and whose predecessors in title,
if any, were, immediately before that elate for
such continuous period of twelve years or
more, holding the same tenure-land, or any
other tenure-Janel, as a tenant or inferior
holder under the tenure-holder for the time
being on payment of an amount exceeding
the assessment of the land, ehall unless it is
proved by the tenure-holder that he would not
have been a permanent tenant on the basis
of continued posseesion of the land under
clause ( b ), be beemed to be a permanent
tenant of the land under clause (a) and all the
provisions of that Act shall apply to him 118
they apply to a permanent tenant.
Explanation.-The assesament for the
purpose of this section shall be reckoned as
provided in clauses (a) anel (b) of section 5.
6. (I) The rights of an inferior holder,
permanent holder or permanent tenant under
sections 4 and 5 shall be entered in the record
of rights unleBB the tenure holder applies in
writing to the Mamlatelar within six months
from the date of the commencement of this
Act for a declaration that any holder or
tenant uneler him is nut an inferior holder, a
z s.o.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
427
permanent holder or, as the case may be, a
permanent tenant.
(2) Any such application shall be disposed
of as if it were an application in respect of a
disputed case under section I 35D of the
Bombay Land Revenue Code, 1879."
'.f'he constitutional validity of the aforesaid
provisions has been challenged before us on behalf
of the petitioners on the following grounds.
(I) The Bombay State legislature was not
competent to enact the impugned Act, which is a
piece of colourable legislation inasmuch as under
the guise of defining a permanent tenant, or changing a rule of evidence, it has really confiscated a
large part of the :iurchase p1 ice which the petitioners
were er!titled to under s. 32H of the TtJnancy Act,
1948 from some of their tenants;
(2) The
impugned Act contravenes the
rights of the petitioners guaranteed by the
Constitution under Arts. 14, 19 (1) (f) and 31 thereof; and
(3)
\
Article 31A does not save it.
On behalf of the respondents the main argument is that the impugned Act, 1958, merely
changes a rule of evidence for determining who are
permanent tenants in
possession of taluqdari
lands ; it does nothing more than that and is not,
therefore, bad on any of the grounds urged on
behalf of the petitioners. It is clear that if the
impugned Act merely changes a rule of evidence
for determining who are permanent tenants in
possession of taluqdari lands, then the points urged
as to the violation of the petitioners' fundamental
rights under Arts. 14, HJ (1) (f) and 31 would not
at all ariae. If, on the contrary, it is found that the
impugned Act is not a piece of legislation which
changes a rule of evidence but is a device by which
the petitioners have been deprived of their property
Maharana Sh t
·' ayva11Jjingkji
Ranmalairigh 1te.
v.
The Stat1 of Gujora
DasJ.
428 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1962] SUPP.
1961
Malusrc.na Sfi,i
,,~ ... tsi.,~ji
Raf'JMUU.,hji etc,
n, QW.••oJGMjtuol
D&1J•
without pa.ymont of compensation,then it would be
a pieoo of coloura.blo legislation not within the
competence of tho State Legislature. The legislation
would then fall on the main ground that it is a piece
of colourable legislation, the subj~ct matter of
which is not covered by any entry in List II or
List III.
Therefore, the crux of tho matter iN what is
the true scope and. effect of the provisions of the
impugned Act, 1958. To this question we now
a.ddreas ourselves.
It may be stated at the very outset that the
coustitutional validity of the r.,Jovant provisirms
of tho Taluqdari Abolition Act, 1949 and the Tenancy Act, 1948 aa amended by Bombay Aot, XIII of
1956 has not been challenged before us. In Dhirubha
Devisingh Gohil v. The sf,a/,e of Bombay (')and Sri
Ram Ram Narain Me,dhi v. 'l'he State of Bombay(•), it
was held by this Court that the relevant provi•iona
of those two Acts were Constitutionally valid. What
has been challenged before us is the constitutional
validity of the relevant provisions of the impugned
Act 1958, particularly the pm visions in 88. 3, 4 and 6
which we h'lve quoted earlier. What is the scope
and effect of those provisions? l::ection 3 in effect
states that a person shall, within th'lf meaning of tho
relevant Land Tenure Abolition law,be deemed to
be a permanent tenant on the date of the abolition
of the relevant land tenure, if his name haa been
recordod in the record of rights or other public or
revenue record as a. permanent tenant in respect
of any tenure land in any of the three following
oircumstancea(a) Ln the di.to of the abolition of the relevant land-tenure ; or
( b) in pursuance of orders is1med during the
course of any prccecding under the relevant
]and tenure abolition law or tho Rcv"nue Code
(IJ [19!i5J 1 s.c.R. w1.
12)
ll959JSupp. l ~.C.R.4l!9.5\8·519.
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
429
1961
either before or after the commencement of the
M aharana Slari
impugned Act, 1958 ; or
J~vtu;tsin~hji
(cl in pursuance of an order issued by the Ranmalainghji etc.
Mamlatdar in respect of an entry under s. 6 of the Tht St~v.of Gujarat
impugned Act, 1958. It is worthy of note that s. 3
DasJ.
does not create a mere presumption, as is refocred
to in s. 135J of the Revenue Code. .Section 135J
of the Revenue Code states inter alia that an entry
in the record of rights shall be presumed to be true
until the contrary is proved. Section 3 of the
impugned Act, 1958 states, however, that a person
shall be deemed to be a permanent tenant on the
date of the abolition of the relevant land tenure if
his name has been recorded in the record of rights in
respect of any tenure land in any of the three
circumstances mentioned as (a), (b)and (c) therein.
In other word~. if any one of the three circumstances mentioned in the section exists, then by a
fiction of ·law a person who fulfils that circumstance
must be deemed ~o be a permanent tenant. Section 4
says in effect that a tenant(a) who on the date of the
commencement of the Taluqdari Abolition Act,
1949 was holding a.ny tenure land, and (b) who and
whose predecessors in title, if any, were immediately
before that date for such continuous periods as
aggregate to a total contin•10us period of 12 years
or more, holding the same tenure land, or any other
tenure land shall unless it is proved by the tenurehol<ler that he would not have been a permanent
tenant on the basis of continued passession of the land
under( b)above, be deemed to be a permanent tenant
of the land under (a), and all the provisions of the
Taluqdari Abolition Act, 1949 shall apply to him
as they apply to a permanent tenant. There is a
third condition mentioned in s. 4, namely, the
amount which the tenant pays must exceed the
assessment of the land. This condition does not,
however have any importance in the discussion
which follows and no further reference to it is
neCPRRary.
430 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1S62) SUPP.
1961
M aharana Shri
J a_yt!anising~ji
Ranmalsinghji etc.
v.
The Stale of Gujarat
Das J.
There is no difficulty in' .understanding cl. (a)
of s. 4 but cl. (b) is not so clear. The expres$ion
"continuous periods as aggregate to a total continuous period of twelve, years or more" is neither
very elegant nor very clear. Perhaps, the expression
means that one particular continuous period may
be of less than twelve years but there may be more
than one such continuous period and in SU('h a
case t~e totality of. such continuous periods must
aggregate twelve years or more ; if however, one
continuous period extends over twelve years or
more, there is no difficulty, and the question of the
aggregate totalling twelve years does not arise.
The question of the aggregate totalling twelve
years will arise when ·there are more continuous
periods than one, of less than twelve years duration
each. The possessions for such continuous periods
may be of the same tenure· land or of different
tenure-lands. If however, the aggregate of cnntinuous periods of possessinn of the 8ame ier,ure-iand
or of any other tenure-land cqmes to twelve years
or more, then cl. (b) of s. 4 is fulfilled. It further
appears that conditions mentioned in (a) and (h) are
comulati ve. In other words, for the applicat.ion
of s.4.a tenant must be in possession of tenure-land
on the date of the commencerr,ent of the Taluqdari
Abolition Act, 1949 (August 15, i950) and furthermore must have been in possession of the same
tenure-land or of any other tenure-land for continuous periods aggregating more than twelve years
immediately before the slLid date. A person who
fulfils the a,foresaid two condit.ions shall be deemed
to be a permanent tenant of th" land unles• it is TJTOved b"TJ t!l~; t;~11Uf·e~}101<ltr thn.t f~C VfY}~ii•] (lOt.}1a,·.•l\ beeri
(~ Th~1·ffianent tCliants on the ba.,.-.i8 of poSSf.'S8iuu tefe~
"
•
" •• •
1"!'1:1
•
r
•
•
1
"T.';;:.~ ~..,:; 11.J. c~L., bJ . .i.'11e c:xp1·essto:1 ' unless 1t 1s pro'T~f
bv t.he tanur,.,·bo!dcr th~t he ;\·oulJ uot have been a
permanent. tenant on the basis of c·ontinuPd possession of tbe land wider clause (b)" has again given
rise to some difficulty. Two view~ have been can-
'
I
I
2•8.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
- 431
1961
vassed before us. One view is that,, the expression
means "that the tenure-holder can t1nly contest the
correctness of the claim of tweh·e years' possession
and show that the tenant was not. in posse 0 sion
of the !rind or lands concerned or thn.t tho conti·
nuous period or periods of possession did not aggregate twelve years. The other view i~ that the
teµnre-holder c,m show that. the tenancv commenced
on a particular date or that there is' satisfactory
eviclC'ncc of the duration of the tRna11cy, am! therefore, under s. 83 of Lli~ Revenue Code the tenaut
would not be a _pernrn,nent t<'nant merely· by reasu11
of twelve y~ars' pciesession. Section J as worded
is somewhat obscure and if one wore to go m<>rely
by the words used, one wnuld b'e inclined to accept
the first view. On that view, the Se<'tion 1111(\"nhtcrlly
w:mld go much furt'hcr than merely intr0<luc·
in~ a rule of evi<lenee ; it would create a new ,,]ass
ofperumuent tenant·" not contemplated by s. 83 of
th<' H.e,·vmw Code. l!:u k.tter ~n~tion talk• of two
,.;.,."nmM~.;nces which dP.termi1w the stntus of a
t 1~114111 : :.in<' rolntf•S to c-0r.ir11enc<'mPnt lJf the l{~nan·
c·.- ,1:1.._ ii1e c;thc·r t.Q lt~1 int.llnded. dt1ratiorL T...11dC'r
8:1 t.he onus w1li ia' or. thn nerso11 who r.Inini '"
1JCrllli\.lh..'!Ilt t=.t;i.tus US a tf'nant. to prove that oi t-her
thu (·omno<'nc>empnt. ol' the ter.ancy is not known
0!1 tlrn~ its intt•nrkr1 duration was not' agrc·P.d upon
between thl' landlord and tenant or was not ~overn~d
by any usage of 'the locality. R~C'-!inn 4 of tho
impugn•·d Act, Ul58 gi,·e~ a go· by to thesP circum~tanc!.'s. It bringM in diffor1~nt consirfomtions :tlt0geth«1« In effect. it says that. if n. pernon \\·hs in
possp;;siou of m1y tenure-limcl on AuQw;t 1:3, UlB"\l
(the elate of conimeneell:icnt of the T:i.ii,;1ci>ll"i A holitiou At't, I 0-l!l) and was further more in P"'··'e~g;. "l '- f
the same tenure-land or any other tent' tr· hnd for· a
co::tiPut1u,1 n.ggrPgate pei·iotl of- t\\·eh-e Y<'ars, he
11·111tld Le deer.it•rl 10 l;o a p\Jrrn~.:t?t!t t.Pnant, unless
the temtre-hulder pt«Jved that he wa~ not !!t JJGE.,t·o~
io11 fur a. continuous aggregate period of twelve'years
8:
Mah.a1an.J Shri
JaJVOntsinghji
Ranmalsinghj1 f.!c.
v.
The State of Gujarat
DasJ.
432
Illd/
Maharona Slf.i
J'!1f!antJilt11t)i
RamnolJinghji tic.
T~ Stalt of Gujarat
DasJ.
SUPREME OOURT REPORTS [1962] SUPP.
(b) of the St'lction. This means
that instead of the two circumstanoes relating to
commencement and duration a new consideration is
brought in, namely, whether the tenant ha~ been
in possession for a continuous, aggregate period
of twelve years. If he has been, then he is a
permanent tenant. If he has not been in such
possession, then he is not a permanent tenant. In
other words, s. 4 of the impugned Act, 1958,
completely changes the definition of a permanent
t<>nant and creates a new cl:uis of perqmmmt tenants
who wcrn not permanent tenants on April 1, )!)57.
If this virw id correct, and we think thnt there is
a good deal to be said in favour of this view, then
s. 4 of the impugned Act, I 958 in spite of giving
the t<•nure·holder an opportunity of proving that
the tenant was not in possession for an aggr«gate
continuous period of twelve ~·ears under s. 4 rPad
withs. 6, undoubtedly changeR the very definition
of permanent tenant and by that change wipes out
a hrge part of the purchase priCP which tlJe p~t i·
tionf·rs were Pntitled to get on April I, 1957 from
some of their tt-nant-R. It is not disputPd that on
this view of e. 4, the impugm·d h·gislation would
be unconstitutional inasmuc·h as it would b1 ing
within the category of permanent tenants persons
who were non·pcrmanent tenants under the
previous law and there by deprive the tenure-holders
of part of the purchase money which thPy were to
get from them.
It has been contended that the second view
with regard to the expression "unless it is provrd Ly
the tenure-holder that he would not have bern a
permanent tenant on the basis of continued JH•sses·
sion of the land under clause ( b)" is prefcralilc on
the ground that cl. (bl is on•· of the conditions
which the tenant must fulfil befor•J ho can !!'Ct the
benefit of s. 4 and there would not be much sense
in allowing tho tenure-holder to disprove a condition which the tenant must fulfil before he l·an get
&R laid down in cl.
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME OOURT REPORTS
433
the benefit of s. 4. We find it difficult to accept
this view. On a pure question of construction of M aharona Sltti
J ayoantsinghji
the words used in s. 4, we see nothing wrong in Ranmolsinghji
,tc.
v.
allowing the tenure.holder to prove that the tenant
was not in possession for continuous periods aggre- Tll, 8tat1 of (}ujaf'at
gating twelve years. Let us, however, assume that
Dis J.
the second view as to the interpretation of s. 4 of
the impugned Act, 1958, is preferable to the first
view. What then is the position? The position
then is that a tenant who fulfils the two conditions
mentioned in els. (a) and (b) must be deemed to be
a permanent tenant unless the tenure-holder proves
the commencement and/or duration of the tenancy.
From this point of view it may be argued that s. 4
merely changes a rule of evidence and throws the
onus on the tenure holder to prove that in spite of
twe Ive years' continuous possession mentioned in
cl. (b), the tenant is not a permanent tenant by
reason of the circumstance that the commencement
of the tenancy or its intended duration is known.
Under s. 6 the rights of a permanent tenant under
s. 4 shall be entered in the record of rights unless
the tenure-holder applies in writing to the llfamlat,dar
within six months from the date of the commencement of the impugned Act, 1958, for the declaration that the tenant under him is not a permanent
tenant. Jf any such application is filed hy the
tenure-holder, it shall be disposed of as if it were an
application in respect of a disputed case under
s. I 35D of the Revenue Code. What is the effect of
s. 6 ? It was conceded by the learned counsel
appearing for the respondent State and &!so the
respondent tenants that the tenure-holder has only
one opportunity of saJ ing that a tenant under him
is not a permanent tenant and t.he tenure- holder
must avail himself of that opportunity within six
months from June IO, 1958, the date on which the
impugned Act, 1858, came into force.
The
combined effect of ss. 3, 4 aud 6 appears to us to be
this. If the tenure holder has made no application
--------------------------------
434
ill •harana .Shr:
Jayrantsingl•.ii
R•nmalsinghji et,.
v.
The State of Gujarat
Das J.
"SUPREME COUB,T REPORTS [1962] SUPr·
within six months from .June 10, 1958, for a
declaration that a tenant under him is not a perma.·
nent t<>nant, every tenant under him -who-folfils the
oonoitit>ns mentioned in els. (a} and (b) of s. 4 art;
once gets recm·ded in the record of rights as 3'
permanent tenant.. As soon as he is so rncbrded,
he must be deemed under s. 3 to J,,, a permanent
tenant by a fiction of law ·and under s. 4 all the
provisions of the Taluqdari Abolition Act, 1949, will
apply to h!m a8 thtiy apply to a permanent tenant.
Thi~ combined effect of ss. if, 4 and 6 of the im~
pugned Act, 1958 does in our opinion depri•:!'I the
tenure-holder of any real opportunit.y of contesting
the claims of his tenants 1md makeR them permanen~ -tenants once they ate recorded in the record of
rights, thereby depriving the tenure-holde~ of the
purchase price which he was entitled to get from
t.Jiem under s. 32H of the Tenancy Aet, 1948.
O!l lwl-ialf of the respondents it was stated at
the ~'1.-.· that tht1 petitioners had made applications
for a dP.da.:·:.' ;on ,under s. 6 of the impugned Act.,,
l fl:i8, and ~lt<it thus;, P·!Jplications are still pending.
We ha1•c. nu lii.:tp1·i:!ls in Bt<pport of this i;tn.~ment.
Nu affidavit has beeu m•de o,; !'r.half of th"
rnspw1dent~ to this effect; nor do \\~ know ii t:.,:~n
ap].Jlicatic~1~ relq.ted to all the non-permanent
tenants of the petitfoners. What we knew is that
in a stay applioation made by tho petitioner in
petition No. 120 of 1958 it was averred that the
petitioner had filed several deelaratbry suits before
the Mamlatdar under R. 70(b} of the Tenancy Act,
1948, for a deeluration that the tenants concerned
were not permanent tenants. Those suits were
however, filed prior to the er•rn ing into force of the
impugned Act, 1958. The petitioner asked for a stay
of thu~~- suits on two grounds: firstly, that after
tho coming into force of the impugned Act, 1958,
the suits would become infructuous, and secondly,
that the ~fam],.tdar concerned would have ·no
jurisdiction t.o adj11dicate upoi. t!ie constitutional
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME OOUR'I' REPORTS
435
1961
validitv of the provisions of tlie impugned
Act, 1958, and in view of those provisions would
Mahara"a Sim
J ayvantsin,/aji
be bound to hold that the tenants had become
1 c.
permanent tenants. This Court passed no order on Ranmalsintlrji
v.
the application for stay. But the petitioner, it The Stat1 of Gujara
appears, moved the Mamlatdar to stay the hearing
D,isJ.
of the suits pending the disposal of the writ peti·
tion in this Court and the suits were stayed. In a
second petition filed on behalf of the petitioner it
was stated that after the coming into force of the
impugned Act, 1958, the petitioner received a
notice to show cause why the non-permanent
tenants under him should not be declared to be
permanent tenants and the record of rights
amended accordingly. The petitioner applied to
the Revenue Officer <'oncerned to stay the proceedings in view of the writ petition pending in this
Court. This request was, however, turned down.
The petitioner then came to this Court and it
appears that ail order was made to the effect that
any investigation which might be necessary for the
proceedings pending before the Revenue Officer
might be continued, but no final order or entry
should be made till the disposal of the writ petition.
Such an order appears to have been made in respect
of a number of villages and the petitioner stated
that he had thousands of tenants in 24 villages,
some of whom were permanent, some protected,
and some ordinary. Nothing was stated in those
petitions or in the replies thereto as to whether
the tenur-holder had made an application for a
declaration within the meaning of s. 6 of the
impugned Act, 1958. All that has been stated in
the application is that in response to a notice
received from the Revenue Officer, the petitioner,
as a tenure·holder, had moved this Court for a stay
of t.he proceedings. If the petitioner had filed no
application for a declaration within the meaning of
s. 6 of the i!Upugned Act, l 95S, and within the
time allow<'d by that section, tlien it is obvious
436 SUPREME OOURT REPORTS [1962] SUPP
1951
that the Revenue Officer dealing with the suits
under s. 70(b) of the Tenancy Act, 1048, pending
J qtitn1IJin1hji
before him, or the Revenue Offiet>r dealing with
BtllllMlsinglrji lko
v.
other proCt>edings before him, must give effect to
7L Stot1 of Guj01at
~he provisions oi ss. 3, 4 and 6 of the impugned
Das I.
Act, 1958. It is, therefore difficult to ~cw how the
pendency of the suits or other proceedin~s before the
Revenue Officers concerned can he of any aBSistance
to the petitioners. The question. therefore, boils
down to this. Section 6 of the im pugnecl Act, 1958
does give one opportunity to the petitioners to
make a.n application for a decla.mtion that any ten·
ant under him is not a permanent tPnant, but that
opportunity was to be availed of within six months
from June IO, 1958. Once that opportunity iR lost,
the tenure-holder cannot claim that a tc11a.nt who
fulfils els. (a) and (b) of s. 4 is not a permanent
tenant. Our attention was drawn to sub ss. (3), (4)
11.ncJ (5) of s. 5A of the Taluqdari Abolition Act,I!l49.
Those suh-Rections say in effent that if any question
a.rises whether any person is a permanent tenant,
the Sta,te Government or an officer authorised by
the State Government in that behalf shall decide
the question; where such officer decides 8uch question
any person aggrieved by the decision may file an
appeal to the State Government within 60 days from
the date of the decision; 'Ind the decision of the State
Government shall be final. It waH not sull'gestcd
before us that the aforesaid sub-sections would give
the tenure-holder a second opportunity of contesting the claim of the tenant, and it seem;; to us
quite clear that the tenure-bolder who had failPd to
make an application within the time mentioned in
s. 6 of the impugned Act, I 9;i8, would not be in
a position to take advantage of sub-ss. (3), (4) and
(5) of 8. 5A of the Taluqdari Abolition Act, 1949.
If se. 3, 4 and 6 of the impugned Act, 1958, .are
good and valid in law, then whichever be the autho·
rity that has to decide the claim of the tenant, it
must decide it in accordance with those provisions.
Maluirmro Shti
•
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
437
In thesP. circumstances can it be said that the opportunity given by s. 6 is' a real opportunity and does
it amount to merely changing a rule of evidenci:?
We think that this question must be answered m
the negative.
It is to be noted that on April 1, 1957 the
p~titioners ceased to be tenure-holders of the lands
held by non-permanent tenants and as held by this
Court, ss. 32 to 32R of the Tenancy Act, 1948,
clearly contemplated the vesting of the title in the
tenants on the tillers' day, defeasible only on certain specified contingencies. This· Court held that
those sections were designed to bring about an extinguishment, or in any event a modification of the
landlord's rights in the estate within the meaning of
Art. 31A ( 1) (a) of the Constitution. If that was
the true effect of ss. 32 to 32R of the Tenancy Act,
1948, then on April 1, 1957 the petitioners were left
only with the right to get the purchase price under
s. 32H. That right of the petitioners was undoub·
tedly a right to property. In Bombay Dyeing and.
.Manufacturing Go. Lf,(l. v. The State of Bombay(')
this Court observed, with regard to unpaid wages
of an employee, that when an employee had done
his work, the amount of wages earned by nim become a debt due to him from the employer and this
was property which Pould be assigned under the law.
The provisions of the Bombay Labour Welfare
Fund Act (Bombay Act XL of 1953) were under
consideration in that case. Section 3 of the Act
transferred inter alia all unpaid accumulation of
wages to a fund known as the Bombay Labour
Welfare Fund. This Court held thats, 3 (1) of the
Act in so far as it related to unpaid accumulation
in s. 3(2) (b) was unconstitutional and void by reason of the riifht guaranteed under Art. 19(1) (f) of
the Constitut10n and was not saved by cl.( 5) thereof.
We think that the same principle must apply in the
I [J95B] S. C. R. 1.22.
ll/Ol
Maharona Slwi
JayuanlJinghji
Ranmalsinghji etc.
v.
Th State of Gujarat
Das J.
438
IHl
--
JI M#'an• SAri
K"'""'~U.,Mi
411fft4/Jt1111tji tk.
v.
TJ., .~'"" 1J Gujqral
Das J,
SUPREME COURT REPOl~TS (1962) SUPP·
present case. The right of the petitioners to the purchase price under s. 3:?H of the Tenancy Act, 1948,
from those of their tenants who were non-prrmanent
on April 1, 1957, was a right of property in respect of
which the petitioners have a guarantee under Art 19
(l)(f). The provisions in ss. 3,4 and 6 of the impugned
Act, 1958, in so fa.r as they laid down that in certain
circumstances a tenant shall be deemed to be a permanent tenant from the date of the Taluqdari
abolition Act, 1949, adversely affected the right of
the petitioners with retrospective effect; it practically wiped off a large part of the purchase price
which the petitionol"!I wore entitled to get. Ifs. 6
of the impugned Act, 1958, is to be tested on the
touchstone of reasonable restrictions in tho interests
of the general public as laid down in cl. (5) of Art.
19 of the Constitution, it must be held that it does
not impose a reasonable restriction. We have found
it very difficult to understand why and l10w it is
re11.11onablc that the tenure-holder must make an
application within six months from the commenceme::t of the impugned Act, 1958, for a declaration
that his tcnunts arc not pei:manent teuants. Tho
pctitiont>rs have thr<'<' kinds of tenants-permanent
tenants, prott-cted tenants, and ordinary tenants.
On April I, I \157 the petitioners ceased to be tenure
holders in respect of all tpnants other than permanent tenants and berame •·ntitled only to the purchase price under s. :l2H. If any tenant claimed
on that datti that he was a permanent tenant, he
had to e~tablish his claim in accordance with s. 83
of the Revenue Cude. Such a claim could be conte.ited by tho tenurc·holder whenever ma.de by t~e
tenant. But liy tho impugned Act. l!J58, all this
was changed, and unless the tenure holder mitde an
application within six months of the commencement of the impugned Act, 1958, he was uot in _a
position to say that a particular teuant who was m
pOSl'ession of tonure·laud for continuc•us period aggregating twelve years on und Lefore August 15,
-
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
439
1950, was not a permanent tenant. We are unable
to hold that the six months' limit imposed by s. 6
of the impugned Act, 1958, is in the circumstances,
a reasonable restriction within the meaning of Art.
19(5) of the Constitution. It is a little difficult to
understand how the tenure-holder could know which
of his non-permanent tenants would claim to be
permanent rin the coming into force of the impug·
ned Act, 1958. Obviously, the tenure-holder ha.d to
anticipate that all his non-permanent tenants might
claim to be permanent and therefore it was incumbent on him to make an application for a determination that none of his non-permanent tenants were
pArmanent, and unless he did so he would lose his
right to get the purchase price under s. 32H of the
Tenancy Act., 1948. We are clearly of the view that
the time limit imposed by s. '6 of the impugned Act,
1958, is, in these circumstances, an unreasonable
restriction and cannot be justified under Art. 19( 5)
of the Constitution.
In view of this finding it is unnecessary to
consider the effect of Art. 31 of the Constitution.
On behalf of the respondent State reliance was
sought to bJ placed on Art. 31A of the Constitution.
That Article, in our opinion, has no application to
the present cases, inasmuch as there was no acquisition by the State of any estat.e or any rights therein
or the extinguishment or modification of any such
rights. On April 1, 1957, the tenure-holders had ceased
to be tenure-holders in .respect of lands held by
non-permanent tenants. The relation between the
tenureholders and the tenants h&d changed from that
of landlord and tenant to that of creditor and debtor.
When, therefore, the impugned Act, 1958, affected
the right of the petitioners as creditors to get a certain sum of money from the debtors, it did not
provide for the acquisition by the State of any
estate or of any rights therein; nor did it provide
for the extinguishment or modification of any such
IHI
M alrarana Shf'i
Joyvamsinghji
Ranmalsint"i• etc.
••
Ti1' Stai. ofGi!iaro
v., J.
440
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1962) SUPP.
1961
rights. Therefore, Art. 31A has no application and
cannot sa.ve the i'llpugned Act, Hl;"i8.
S/rri
J..,.atsillghji
It has been contended before us that while
&-IJM,lrji ,,,,
v.
implementing the provisions of s. 5A of tho Taluqn. SW. of Gujaral dari Abolition Act, 1949, it was found that because
DasJ.
of the failure or inability of the t·x-Taluq<lar to
produce old records concerning the tenants it was
difficult for the tenants to take th" benefit of that
provision; therefore, it became necessary for the
Legislature to define permanent tenant in such a
way that th" tenure-holder might not defeat the
provisions of M. 5A. That it was stated, was the reason for enacting ss. 3, 4 and 6 of the impugned Act,
1958. We lll'e unaLle to accept this argument as
oorrect. If the rcason was as stated aLove, t.hon the
tenure-holder should have beon given a chance to
contest the claim of the tenant wLenever he ruadc
a claim of being a permanent tenant. It appears
to us that the true scope and effect of tho provisions in ss. 3, 4 and 6 of the impugned Act, 1958 is to
con~iclemuly rcducn the purchase price payable to
the petitioners and this has been secured by the
device of defming permanent tenant in sueh a way
that the tenure-holder has no real opportunity of
contesting the claim "f the tenants. In that view of
the matter, the un pugned Act, 1958, does not fa.II
within any entry of List II or List III of the
Seventh Schedule to the Constitution and is a piece
of eolourablc legislation. What is colourable legis·
latiou was explained Ly this Court in K. C. Gaja'[Jati
Narayan Dro v. 1'he 81!1te of Orissa ('). This Court
said that the idea conveyed by the expression
"coloura.ble legis!Mion" is that although apparently & lagislature in passing a statute purported to
within the limits of its powers, yet in substance and
in reality it transgressed thoso powers, the transgression being veiled by what appears, on proper
examination, to be a mere pretence or disguise. We
are of the view that, that is what has happened in
the present case. Under th(• guise of defining a
JI--
(I)
Ll954J S.C.R. I, p-11.
2s.c.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
441
permanent tenant or changing a rule of evidence
what has been done is to reduce the purchase price
which became payable to the tenure-holders on
April 1, 1957.
For t.hese reasons we must hold that ss. 3, 4
and 6 of the impugned Act, 1958 in so far as they
deem some tenants as permanent tenants in posses~ion of taluqdari land are unconstitutional and
void. Under the guise of changing the definition of
a permenent tenant, they really take away a large
part of the right of the petitioners tQ get the
purchase price under s. 32H of the Tenancy Act,
1948, from some of their tenants. The petitions
must accordingly be allowed with costs. As the
petitions have been heard together there will be
only one hearing fee.
MUDHOLKAR, J,-Writ petition No. 120 of
1958 was heard along with writ petitions Nos. 147
to 158 of 1958. But a common argument was
advanced before us on behalf of the petitioner in
each case by Mr. G.S. Pathak ruid by the Solicitor
General on behalf of the State of Gujarat and by
Mr. Nathwani on behalf of the tenants.
The petitioners in these cases were Talukdars
of certain villages in that part of the f orner state of
Bombay whioh is now the State of Gujarat. The
rights of Talukdars in different parts of Gujrat to
Talukdari villages were regulated by the Ahmedabad
Talnqdars Act,.1862 (Boru. 6 of 1862) and the Broach
and Kaira Incumbered Estates Act, 1881 (XXI of
188l)and theGujaratTaluqdarsAct, 1888. The Bombay Taluqdari Tenure Abolition Act, 194~ (herein referred to as the Abolition Act) repealed the afore.
mentioned Taluqdari Acts and s. 3 thereof abolished
the Taluqdari tenure wherever it prevailed. That
section further abolished all incidents of the said
tenure attaching to any land comprised in a
Taluqdari Estate. Section 5 of that Act made all
the taluqdars "occupants" of the lands in their
11/dl
Maharana Shrt
JayvJntsi~hji
RanmUsinghji tic.
v,
The State of Gujarat
DaJ J.
11/. udholkar J.
442 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1962) SUPP.
IHI
possession, within the meaning of the expression
"occupant" occurriug in the Bombay Land
.1.,....,,u.,11;1
Hevenue Code (hereafter referred to as the Code) .
8-•I. U.1Ajt 1ie
Like "Occupants" in other areas of the Bombay
••
7A. ~lal1 o/Gfljar•t Statlj theHe persons became liable to pay land
revenue to the Government subject to the prnvisions
MwJ/oo/ldr .I.
of cl.(b) of sub-s.2 ofs.5. Nothing, however, turns on
these provisions. Section Hi of the aforesaid Act
makes the provisions of the Code applicable to
taluqdari villages subject to certain modifications
with which we are not concerned. The validity of
the Abolition Act was challenged before this Court
but that challenge failed vide Dhisubha Detii.singh
Gohil v. The State of Bombay(').
Vast areas of lands in these villages were in the
oocuption of inferior holders, permanent tenants,
proetected tenants, ordinary tt>nants iitc. It is not
disputed that the provisions of Ch. VII of the Code
which deals with "superior holders and inferior holders" govem the relationship between tho tenure
holders and prrmanrnt tenants. In addition to these
provisions there are those in the Bombay Tenancy
and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948 (hereafter referred
to as the 'Tenancy Act,') which deal with the relationship between landlord and tenant and till April 1,
1957, it is these provisions which execlueively
governed the relationship between the tenure-holder
and tenants other than permanent tenants and
inferior holders. ·It would be necesaary to refer to
some of the provisions of this Act while dealing
with the arguments advanced before us.
By Bombay Taluqdari Abolition (Amendment)
Act l of 1955 which came into force on March l,
195:., the Abolition Act was amended and a now
provision was added therein, viz : H. 5A the reliivent
portion of which rracls thus :
"(I} Notwithstanding anything coi.tai11~J
in il<'Ction 5 a permanent l.l·nant in posscljl!ion
Md••n• Sltri
ll) {1955] J.S.C.R. 6~1.
2 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
443
of any taluqdari land, and also an inferior
holder holding such land on payment of
annual assessment only, shall be deemed
to be occupants within the meaning of
Code, in respect of such land in their
possession and shall be primarily liable to
the State Gqvemment for the payment of
land revenue due in respect of such hnd, and
shall be entitled to all the rights and shall be
liable to all the obligations in respect of such
land as occupants under the Code or any other
law for time being in force :
Provided that·
(a) such permanent tenant shall be
entitled to the rights of an occupant in
respect of such land on payment to the
taluqdar or the cadet as the case may be :·(i) of the occupancy price equivalent
to four multiples of the assessment· fixed
for such land, and
(ii) for' the extinguishment or modi.
fication of any rights of the taluqdar or
cadet, as the case may be, including the
right of reversion in the lands, of a further
sum equivalent to two multiples of such
assessment ;
x
x
x
(2) The right conferred under subsection ( l) shall not be exercisable after a
period of (five) years from the date on which
the Bombay Taluqdari Tenures Abolition
(Amendment), Act J 954. comes into force.
x
x
x
This section for the first time conferred upon a
permanent touant the right to acquire the Htatus of
an occupant in respect of the land held by him as a
permanent tenant of the tenuer-holder upon payment of a certain sum of money as the price of
ocoupanoy to the tenure-holder within five years of
the commencement of the Amending Act of 1955.
'
1961
Maharana SI.ti
J syvanlsinghji
Ranmalsinihji tlc.
v.
The Statt of Gtgal'td
Mudholkar J.
444 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1962] SUPP.
1911
It was accepted before us that the period fixed by
s.
5A has been extended upto the year 196'~.
Moharana SMi
J "Y""'" ingloj i
Section 5A of the Act has never been challenged,
RaMulsingltji tk•
and t.he argument before us procrcded upon the
v.
Tht Sta/1 of Gujarat footing that it is a perfectly valid piece of law.
MuJJio/k" J.
Though the Abolition Act by s. oiA thus
conforred upon the pe1 rnanent ttmants in the
taluqdari villages the right become occupants, it
did not define what a perma.nant tenant was.
By an amendment made by Bombay Act XVIII of
1958, it was provided that certain persona would
be permanent tenants but that does not really
define what a permanent tenant is. This absence
of definition of a permanent tenant rlid not,
however, create any difficulty ber,ause in Bombay
that term has been understood to mean the tenant
described in paragaph 2 of s. 83 of the Code. Indeed,
in the petitions themselves it is stated that s.83 of
the Code defines a permanent tenant. The second
paragraph of that section is in these terms :
"And where by reason (Jf the antiquity
of a tenancy no satisfactory evidence of its
commencement is forthcoming, and there is
not any such evidence of the period of its
intended duration, if any, a.greed upon
between the landlord and tenant, or those
under whom they respectively claim title
or any usage of the locality as to duration of
such tenancy, it shall, as against the immedi·
ate landlord of the tenant, be presumed to
be co-extensive with the duration of tlie
tenure of such landlord and of those who
derive title under him."
L' nrler this section, therefore, a permanent tenant ia
one whose tenure is co-extensive with that of hi11
Janilord and a tenant is to be persumed to be such
a tenant when by reason of antiquity, the commencement of the tenancy cannot be proved and there
i~ no satisfactory evidence of the •~greed duration
of the tenancy or of any usage of the looality a.s
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
445
1961
to such duration· The Bombay Tenancy and Agri·
cultral Lands Act, 1956 (13 of 1956) whioh among Maharano Sh1i
.1 oyuantsint?hJi
other provisions, has amended s. 2 of the Tenancy Act Ranmal11ing4,ii
tk.
has given a definition of the expression in the new
v.
sub-s.IOA thereof but it is not necessary to repro· The State "f Gujarat
duce it as no. argument based on it is advanced
Mudholkar J,
before us as indeed none could be advanced.
That Act made extensive and far-reaching
amendments in the Bombay Tenancy Act. Several
sections thereof were recast including s.32. Amogst
the Provisions added are ss. 32A to 32-R which
appear in the second part of Chapter 3 of that Act,
dealing with "Purchase of land by tenants" to
which we will refer hereafter. By virtue of
s.32, sub. s. 1, on April 1, 195/, called the "tillers'
day" every tenant, including permanent tenant
was, subject to the other provisions of that
section and of the succeeding sections deemed to
have purchased the tenancy land in his possession
from the landlord free of all encumbrances subsisting
thereon. Section 87 A, which also was added to the
Tenancy Act by the Amending Act of 1956, provi·
ded that nothing in the Tenancy Act was to affect
the provisions of any of the Land Tenure Abolition
Acts specified in Schedule II (which includes the
Abolition Act in question) in so f~r as such provi·
sions relate to the confirment of the right of an
occupant upon a permanent tenant in reapect of
land held by him. In consequence of this the provisions of s. 32-H of the Tenancy Act which deal
with the purchase price payable by pe1manent
tenants will not apply to such permanent tenant.
He would, therefore, have only that right which is
conferred upon a permanent tenant bys. 5-A of the
Abolition Act. The result of this is that he would
not be hound to po.y the purchase price at once
under s. 32-H of the Tenancy Act and tan m'I ke his
election to acquire or not to acquire the right of an
occupant within the period allowed by s. 5-A (as
extended from time to time).
44!1
.\laltar.1nfl Slt'i
Jayrant•ittthji
R.,,,,../singh.ii de.
Y.
Tiu Slat1 oJOllja,at
MuJJoo/1- J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1962) SUPP.
The records relating to tenancies in taluqdari
villages ueed to be mainta.ined by the tenure-holders .
It is from these records that information could be
obtained as to the nature of the tenancies of tho
tenants in those villages. While implementinit the
provisions of s. 5-A of the Abolition Act it was
found that because of the refu~l. failure or inability
of the taluqdar to produce old records concerning
the tenants it was difficult for the tenants to take
the benefit of that provision. Therefore, the legislature pa.ssed Bombay Act No. 57 of 1958 ca.lied the
Bombay Land Tenure Abolifr1n Laws (Amendment)
Act, 1958. The long title of the Act runs thus :
"An Act further to define pel"Jl1anent tenants,
inferior holders and permanent holclers for the purposes of certain Land Tenure Abolition la.we and to
provide for certain other matters." Section 4 or
this Act states who a.re to be deemed to be permanent tenants for the purpose of the Land 'l'cnure
Abolition laws specified in Part J[ of the Schedule
to the Act. The validity of this Act (hereancr
refE>rred to as the impugned Act) and in particular of
the provisions of s. 4 is challenged before us.
We will reproduoe hereafter this section and
certain other provisions of the Act which have a
bearing upon the arguments addrt·ssed before us.
Aocording to l\lr. Pathak ~- 4 of the Act in
effect expands the categ«;>ry of permanent tenants
by bringing within its fold persons who were merely
ordinary tenants prior to the enactment of this
provision. So far BB an ordinary tenant is concerned
it is Mr. Pathak's contention that on the tille1 s' clay
he bec,\me an occupant of the land or at any rate
the landlord (or tenure-holder) lo~t his interest
therein and that thereafter the latter became
entitled to receive from the tenant the purchase
price by the combined operation of a. 32(1) arid
s. 32-H(l) (i) of the Tenancy Act. Section 32(1) so
far a.a material runs thus :
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
447
"On the 1st day of April, 1957, (hereinafter referred to as ',the tillers' day') every
tenant shall, subject to the provisions of the
next succeeding sections, be deemed to have
purchased from his landlord, free of all encumbrances subsisting thereon on the said day, the
land held by him as tenant, if
(a) such tenant is a permanent tenant
thereof and cultivates the land leased per·
sonally ;
(b) such tenant is not a permanent tenant
but cultivates the land leased personally ;
and
(i) the landlord has not given notice
of termination of this tenancy under section 31 ; or
(ii) notice has been given under section
31, but the landlord has not applied to
the Mamlatdar on or before the 31st day
of March, 1957 under section 29 for obtaining possession of the land ; (or)
(iii) the landlord has not terminated
this tenancy on any of the grounds specified in section 15, or has so terminated
the tenancy but has not applied to the
Mamlatdar on or before the 31st day of
March, 1957 under section 29, for obtaining posseBSion of the lands ;
"
St>ction 32-H, so far as material, runs thus :
"(1) Subject to the additions and deductions as provided in sub-sections IA and IB,
the purchase price shall be reckoned as follows,
namely:(i) In the case of a permanent tenant
who is cultivating the land personally
1951
Makar1.na Shri
Jayvant1inghji
Ranmalsinghji etc.
v.
The State of Cujora
M udholkQr J,
448 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1962) SUPP.
1961
M ohar.itta Sltri
J 01i antsingltji
Ra111Mls1nghji tlt.
••
Tht )ltJtt ofG1;jaral
]Jfuah.ol/ta, J.
the purchase price shall be the aggre!rnto
of th!' following amounts, that is to say,-
"
(ii) In the case of other tenants
the purchase price shall be the aggregate
of the following amounts, that is to say,(a) such amount as the TribunRI
may determine not being less than 20
times the assessment and not morn
than 200 times the asseBBment ;
"
According to the petitioner in W. P. 120 of
1958 the total area of land held by him in his
vilfa.ges is 02,588 acres out of which only 703 acres
are in hi~ personal cultivation and the rest is held
by tenants who are non-permanent tcnantP. He
contenrls that by the operation of s. 4 of the impng·
ned Act most of these persons are likely to be placed
in the cate~ory of permanent tenants with the
result that the petitioners would be compelled to
accept purchase price at R much lower rate, that is,
they would get only six times the assessment instead
of bctwPen 20 and 200 times the assessment, ns may
bn determined by tho tribunal. According to him
his estimated lo88 would be over Rs. 14,00,000. On
i:Jehalf of the State it is denied that the petitioner
would be put to any such JOBS.
The substance of the argument of :\Ir. Pathak
iR that the right to claim compensation under
s.32H(l)(ii) from the ordinary tenants having v'sted
in the petitioner it cannot be taken away by the
Bombay legislature by extemling the definitinn of
"permanent tenant" so as to include within it thost>
who were merely ordinary tennrts on the "Tillers'
Day". He formulated his grounds of attack on the
legislation as follows :
(I) The Bombay le11islature was not competent to enact the impugned Act as the eubjecl
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT RBPORTS
44\l
matter thereof is not covered by any entry
in List II.
(2) The impL1gned Act is colourable
legislation as it amounts to a device adopted
for the purpose of confiscating money, the
right to claim which had vested in the landlord as purchaser on April l, 1957, and that
the State legislature had no power to make a
law with respect to this matter.
(3) The impugned Act being outside the
legislative competence of tho Bombay legislature, taking away of the petitioner's mowey
was a contravention of A.rt. 31(1) of the Constitution.
(+)The acquisition of money is not for a
public purpose as taking money from one and
giving to another is not a public purpose.
(5) Even assuming that the acquisition
was for a public purpose no compensation has
been provided by the Act or could indeed be
provided by the Act and, therefore, Art~ 31(2)
is contravened.
(6) The impugned Act contravenes Art.
19(l)(f) of the Constitution inasmuch as it
authorises the confiscation of money.
(7) The Act infringes Art. 14 of the Constitution as there are other classes of tenureholders similarly situate to whom the impugned Act does not apply.
All these grounds of attack, except the last, rest
upon one assu~tion and that assumption is that
s. 4 of the impugned Act extends the definition of
permanent tenants .anrl brings within.its fold pe.rson~
who were till 4.pr1l l, 1957, that 1s, tho "tillers
day'', ordinary tenants. .If this. assumption is
invalid then the whole edifice wInch ilir. Pathak
has built upon it muRt tumble down. Let us
1961
M 11harano Shti
J ayvantsingli:ji
Rt:.nrnalsinghji e1c.
•.oJ Gujar•t
T~ Stati
Jlutilr.olk•) J.
450
JHl
MM.-8/rti
1..,_m. loji
~.,,.J; 11<.
v.
n.si-.o/~"
--
JI~].
SUPREME OOURT REPORTS (1962] Slfl'P.
oonsidcr what exactly s. 4 of the impugned
Act does. In order to appreciate Mr. Pathak's
argument p~operly it would be desirable to reproduce that section as well as ss. 3 and 6. These sections
run thus:
Section 3 : "A person she.II, within the
meaning of the relevant Land Tenure Abolition
law, be deemed to be an inferior holder, a permanent holder or, as the case may be, a
permanent tenant, on the date of the abolition
of the relevant l1t.nd tenure, if hie name has
been recorded in the record of right.a or other
public or revenue records as an inferior holder,
permanent holder or permanent tenant in
reRpect of any tenure-land(a.) on the date of the abolition of
the relevant land tenure, or
(b) in pursuance of orders issued
during the course of any proceedings
under the relevant Land Tenure Abolition
law or, as the case may be, the Bombay
Land Revenue Code, l879(i) before the commencement of
this Act, or
(ii) after the commencement of
this Act in cases in which inquiries
were pending a.t the commencement
of this Act, or
/c) in pursuance of an order issued by
the Mamlatdar in respect of an entry under
section 6 of this Act."
The relevant Land Tenure Abolition law for our
purposes is the Bombay Tenancy Ab8lition Act and
tenure land means taluqda.ri land.
Section 4 runa thus :
"For the purposes of the relevant Act
specified in part I of the Schedule, a person-
2 s.c.R.
SUPREME COURT REPOR'l'S
451
(a) who on the date of the commencement
of that Act was holding any tenure land, and
(L) 'vh1> and who~c predecessors in title,
if any were, immediately before that date for
such cl)ntirnrnm periods as aggregate to a total
coutiBuous period of twelve years or more,
holding the same tenure-land or any other
tenure-land,
as a tenant or inferior holder under the
tenur~·holder for the time being on payment
of an amount cxr<'c·ding the assessment of the
land, shall unless iL is proved by the tenurcholdcr that he would not have been a permanent tenant on the La~is of continued possession of the land under clause {b ), be deemed to
be a permaBPnt tenant of the land under clause
(a) and all the provisions of that Act shall
apply to him as they apply to a permanent
tenant."
Section 6 runs thus :
''( 1) The rights of an inferior holder, permanent holder or pt·rmanent tenant under
sections 4 aud 5 shall be entered in the record
of rights unless the tenure-holder applies in
writinir to the Mam la tdar within Rix months
from the date of the commencement of this
Act for a dcelaration that any holder or
tenant under him is not an inferior holder, a
permanent holder ur, as the case may be, a
perma!ll·nt truant.
(2) Any such application shall be disposed
of as if it were an u pplicatfon in respect of a
dispPtcd case under secti(JJ1 135D of tho
Bombay Land RcY<'nue Code, 1879."
Thus according to s. 3 a person whose name is
recorded in the rrcord of rights or other public
reve11110 rrcords as a permanent tenant in r<'spect of
tenure land he will be d~emod to be a permanent
1961
JIo/HUtlU .S .. t
JoytJonlsintJJi
Ranmol 1U.,ltji .1tc.
v.
Tl:e ~tat• of Ovj•at
lrl ut/Aolkar J,
452 SUPREME OOURT REPORTS (1962] SUPP.
IHI
tenant within the meaning of tho expreseion occurring
J,,,-....~ iu the AbQlition Act.
As already stated, for 11Scertaining the meaning
~iJi11<.
of
the
expression ono has to go Lo para. 2 of s. SJ
Bwa••, <J ,.,
of tho Code. No doubt, it merely mises a prcsump·
tion as to permanent tenancy but from that para.
we ca.n deduce tho essential feature of a. permanent
tenancy.
The argument is that s. 3 being n deeming
provision in so far as the Abolition Act is concerned,
gives n~w definition of a permanent tenant. What
the section says is that certain persons will be
deemed to be pcrmanont tenants for the purpose of
the Abolition Act. Who a.re these persons ? Are
they chosen arbitrarily nnd put in that class though
they could not possibly have been so put under tho
previous law ? A bare perusid of clauses (a) to (cl
of s. 3 shows that only tenants who have been found
on enquiry to be permanent tenants, a.t lea.at
presumptively, are to be rogarded a.s permanent
tenant, for the purpose of the Abolition Acts
and their status as permanent tenants can no
longer be questioned. In regard to persons whose
ca.sea fa.II under clauses (a) and (b) all that tho
BeCtion has done is to take away the right of the
tenure-holder to challenge in a collateral proceeding
their status as permanent tenants. As regards
tenants falling under cl. (c) what the provision has
done is to require the tenure holder to object to the
recording 0f such person as permanent tenant with·
in a certain time before the mamlat<lar. If he fails
to a.ya.ii h!mself of the opportunity tho ~loor is shut
to hl.8 saymg· thereafter that the person 18 not a per·
manent tenant. It is to be noted that tenants who
are to bo regarded a.s permanent tenants for the
purposes of the Abolition Act have been so found in
enquiries held by revenue courts and not persons
arbitrarily selected or porsons who could not reasonably be regarded a.s permanent tenants.
11-...S1rt1
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
453
1911
-.
The inclusion of persons as permanent tenants
... Shrl
in the register of rights may be prior to the com- M.a/rar
J .,...1sU.,lrji
mencement of the Abolition Act or after its com- Ramnalsint/tji fla,
V.·
mencement, The proceedings for the inclusion may
T"4 Slale ol G•jor#
h'.Lve been instituted prior to the commencement of
Jiu
J,
the Abolition Act or may be instituted under the
impugned Act. If they hold in favour of the tenant
he will be deemed to be a. permanent tenant. The
landlord cannot then be permitted to say ·that he
is not a permanent tenant. It is difficult to see how
this disability imposed upon a landlord to dispute
tho fact that a person is a permanent tenant be
regarded as enlarging the definition of a perma·
nent tenant. It is true that s. 135.J of the Code
granted the landlord a right to challenge the
correctness oC an entry in the record of rights in
colhter.al proceedings without reference to time and
that right is abrogated by the impugned Act but
even so doing that cannot be regarded as taking
away a vested right. Within what time, in what
circumstances and in which manner a particular fact
is opJn to challenge is only a matter of procedure
and it cannot be disputed that there is no vested
right in procedure.
,
The effect of the provision thus is that in
proceedir gs under the Abolition Act for conferral of'
a right of an occupant the claimant's status as &
permanent tenant cannot, if he satisfies the requirement of any of the three clauses of s. 3 of the
impugned Act be open to question by the tenureholder. Would the position have been any different
if the impugned Act had not been passed ? Let us
consider s. 5A of the Abolition Act by itself. Suppose
a person recorded as a permanent tenant in the
record of rights claimed to enforce the right conferred by this section to obtain the right of an
occupant in proceedings thereunder. These proceedings would be taken before a revenue officer and
he would be bounrl to act on the entry in the record
454 SUPR.EME COUHT REPORTS [1962] SUPP.
1961
M •4.trac1 .5'1-i
J~gAji
R.....Uiog!ji tlO.
n. ,,_•••f Gig,,.,
11/udh.I '. .. J.
of rights until and unless it was lawfully Aubsituted
by another. No suit iiea for correcting an entry in
the record of rights. Only in a collateral proceeding
could it have boon challenged and the jurisdiction
of a civil court be invoked. \Vhere no such suit or
proceeding is pending when the proceedings under s.
5A are going on the tenure·hol<lL"r cannot be permitted to go behind tho entry. However, as an
additional s<>f,·guar<l the Abolition Act has provided
ins. 5A itself a remedy and that. is to approach
the State Government or an 11uthority empowered
by it in this behalf for deciding to question.
Clause (b) of s. 3 of tho impug:ncd Act, as also
el. (c}, expr~ssly contemplate cases where there is a
dispute as to the status flf a pcl'!!on and if it has been
decided in favour of the person claiminz to be a
permanent tenant be is to be deemerl to be a prirma.nent t<•nant for thn purposffi of the Abolition Act.
True that ther~after tho tenure-holder cannot chall- ·
enge the fact oven in a collateral proceeding but
that would ho by rPason of the prm·isions of a. 5A
itself which havo not been challenger!. No doubt
after the c.immcncement of the imlm!.!nod Act no
new proceedi11~s under s. 5A of the Abolition Act
a.re permi~~ib]d hut that is b'·eau~) an alternative
remedy is available undor s. Gof tho impugned Act.
We must now examine s. 4 in d~t:i.iL, It provides that a pPrdon who, on the date of the commencement of the Abolition Aot 1v11~ h·.ilding a.ny
tenure lanr! :~ml who, and whose pct·rlccos~ors in
title, if any, wcro immediately before that date "for
such continuous periods 1\$ aggregat: to a total
coneinuous p<'riod of 12 y~ars or m·ir"" holding the
same tenure hmd or any oth•·r land as a tenant be
dee.ned to be a permanent tenant "unlrss it is proved
by tho temmi·holder that ho would not have been
a permanent tPnant on the bnsis of continued
possesssion of the lam! undN clause (b)". It ia
difficult to appreciate how it expands the definition
of permi.nent t"nant. True, it says that aucJJ ..
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 455
19111
tenant will be deemed to be a permanent tenant
but it does not stop there. It goes on to say that Ma.larOM "";
J'!)loantJ~IJji
he will be so deemed unless the tenure-holder can Nan"nolsiftthJi
1'0.
show that he cannot be so deemed ! What does
••
s.4 mean when it says that a tenant shall be deemed Tht Stall of Gu1ar•I
to be a permanent tenant ? Clearly, the legislature
Mui/Ml/ear .I.
had in mind the provisions of s. 83 of the Code
which by virtue of s. 16 of the Abolition Act apply
to all ex-taluqdari villages. To repeat, the. impugned Act does not define "permanant tenant" any·
whero and that it is from para 2 of s. 83 of the
Code that we must infer that a person whose tenanoy
is co-extensive with that of the landlord is a permanent tenant. A tenure-holder can get rid of the
presumption raised by this provision if he can show
the precise date of the commencement of the
tenancy or if he oan show that the tenancy is ter·
minable in particular circumstances or on a particular date. We find nothing ins. 4 1which directly
or indirectly modifies the requirements of the defi.
nition of "permanent tenant". No doubt, para 2
of s. 83 of the Code sets out certain conditions for
raising a presumption of permanent tenancy and
s. 4 of the impugned Act modifies them. But by
doing so, it is difficult to see how it alters the
basic requirements of a permanent tenancy as
deducible from para 2 of s. 83 of the Code. All
that s. 4 does is to alter the conditions for raising
the presumption but that cannot amount to altering
the definition of "permanent tenant,"
According to Mr. Pathak, however, the section
permits the landlord to prove only that the tenant
and his pr.idecessors in title were not in possession
for a continuous period of twelve years or more, on
.the date of the commencement of the Abolition Act
and that if they fa.ii to prove this, the presumption
raised by the section would be irrebuttable. Thns
according to him s. 4 makes a person who ie in
pOBBession as a tenant for over twelve years, a
permanent tenanj; even if the date of the commence-
456 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1962) SUPP.
IHI
JI daro11't 8/wi
J tpDilllhi•t~ji
ll,,,.dsi"l'•ii 1tc.
••
1lt. St•t• •I Geforat
"'.dAolJ;•• ••
ment of his tenancy was known or the duration
thereof was for a definite period. In our opinion,
reading the section that way would lead to an absurdity. It is admittrd on both bands that s. 4 is
intended to be uvailed of only in proceedings under
11.6 to ·which a landlord would be a party. Clause (b)
of that section which enacts the second condition whir.h has to he fulfilled by a person before he
can avail himsd f of the prcsum ption under that
section prescribes the minimum "duration" of a
tenancy and docs not deal with the qurstion of its
commencement or terms. Either the tenant fulfils
that condition or he does not. If he does not fulfil
it no further question arises and he must be deemed
to be an ordinary tenant and nothing more. There·
fore, if the tenant satisfies tho condition, it would
be meaningless to give to tho tenure-holder an
opportunity of disproving th') very thing which had
been proved in his presence and upon proof of
which the tena.nt has been able to enlist the preeumption created by the section in his aid. Such
a construction would render the provision absurd
or at best useless.
If the section was capable of being read in
the way Mr. Pathak wants, it would read thus :
"A person who has been in possession of tenure
land at the commencement of the AbolitionAet and
was holding the same or any other land undtr the
same tenure holder for a continuous period of 12
vears he shall unlC88 the tenure holder proves that
he was not holding the land or lands for the continuous period of i 2 years, be deemed to be a perma,
nent tenant". Surely this would be making
nonsense of the section. We are wholly unable to
accept such a reading. We think, therefore, that
the t.enure·holder can prove under the section that
on the basis of twelve years continued
p086688ion the tenant would not have been a
permanent tenant for other reason~. These other
re.aa<ms must be the reasons which in spite of the
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
457
length of possession would show that he is not a
permanent tenant becauae the tenancy commenced
at a certain time or because a term had been
agreed upon for the tenancy or fixed by usage.
It may be, as the learned Solicitor General
says, that the language used by the legislature is
not felicitous. Even so, we think that it would not
at all be far-fetched to construe it as meaning that
the tenure-holder has the right to establish for
getting over the presumption, that the tenancy
originated at a definite point of time or was of a
finite duration. The language used by the legislature is in our view capable of only such
construction.
Then it is said that even ifs. 4 is construed as
giving an opportnnitv to the tenure-holder to
prove otherwise .than by disproving that the tenant
had been in continuous possession of land under
him for twelve years that he is not a permanent
tenant, that opportunity is i!Iusory and really nonexistent and, therefore, s. 4 in effect extends the
definition of a permanent tenant. This contention
is based on s. 6 of the Act which, it may be stated
gives the tenure holder a period of six months
from the commencement of the impugned Act to
move the Mamlatdar in writing for a declaratioa
that the tenant is not a permanant tenant within
s. 4. It may be Mated that the respondents concede
thats. 6 has that effect.
We are, however, unable to agree that s. 6
makes the opportunity to rebut the presumption
raised under s. 4 by continuous possession for
twelve years illusory or non-existent. We have
first to point out that we do not fiind this point
taken in the petitions. Secondly, WP. fail to
appreciate why the six months' time prescribed
should be considered as if no time had really been
given to the tenure-holder which would be the
effect of accepting the petitioners' contentioJl,
1H1
MaAu..• Slri
.Tayo.nts~lefi
RanmdsinthJi ttc.
v.
ne Stat1 o/011jcro
Jfudhtlbrr .T.
458 SRUPEME OOURT REPORTS [1962] SUPP.
1961
Sinco six months is not a. short period, within tha.t
time it is ea.sily possible for the tenure-holder to
.1e. move tho required application. Then it is sa.id that
it is illusory because there may be a very large
TA. lf'"'4 •J Giij4'ot number of tenants and the tenure-holder could be
required t.o make numerous applications. Even so,
M ""1tolluz. J •
wo do not see why it should not have been reasonably possible to lodge these a.pplica.tions within the
period allowed. All that the tenure-holder has to
do is to uame the tenant oonoerned a.nd state that
ho wants a declaration that the tenant is not a.
p~rmaneut tenant. It is a.Isa ea.id t.hat the tenureholder hns to make tho application in anticipation
of tho te uant making a claim to be a permanent
tenant. But we a.re unable to appreoia.te how this
by it.self ran mako the opportunity to rebut none:i:istent. We find no practical dificulty in the
tenure-holder ma.king the application in anticipation.
Furthermore, the question has to be considered
according to the rca.litirn of the case. It i8 ndmitted
in the p~titioners' affidavit in opposition that the
propa.ration of thti record of rights in r<'spect of the
tenants in the ta.luqdari villages commenced soon
after the Abolition Act came into force, that is,
soon aft.N· August I 5, I 950. Many of tho tenants
havt' already been recorded as permam•nt tonants
and since thi-< could only have been dono with
reference to the provision of s. 83 of the Code the
petit ionrrs can have nn grievance against. such
entriris F11rth,,r, R. :l(b)(ii) of the impu>!llt.'d Act
takes into ac~01111t the fact t.hat the proc""rlin·~s in
respect of the pr<•paration of the r .. ~ord of rights
were prmding at. the commrncement of this Act. In
these proc•·!•tiings the tenure holdor must already
have objcctl'd-of course where he thought fit-to
the ten mt being recorded as a permanent tenantTh<•sc ag:1iu would covN quite a numbN of ca.ees.
It is only in rag:ird to tho remaining cases that
M damM Sitt;
Jd:Jl1Gt1tsiltt/tjl
&n..isi•tlt.i;
v.
2 s.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
459
applications under s. 6 would be required. We
think it right also to point out. tha.t the rights under
s. 4 of the impugned Aet can be claimed by a tenant
who pays for his holding an amount exceeding the
a~sessment of the land. This we suppose would
further reduce the number of tenants to whom s. 6
would apply. We have no materials on which to
show that these would form a very large number.
As we have already stated the petitioners not
having raised the present point out of s. 6, they
have not given any materials to show the oases of
how many tenants a.re outstanding. Therefore, on
the facts on this case, the petitioners cannot legitimately urge any practical difficulty in making appiioations under s. 6. We may also state here that many
cfaims by tenants to be permanent tenants must
have long a.go been raised because under s. 5A of
the Abolition Act, as originally framed, a tenant
had fivo years from its commencement, that is, from
August 15, 1950, within which to exercise his right.
At the date of the impugned Act this period had
been extended upto February 28, 1960. The impugned Act came into force on Juno 10, 1958. There·
fore, at the date of the impugned Act the tenant
had about one year and nine months within which
to exercise the right given to him by s. 5-A of
the Abolition Act. It is apparently for this reason
that s. 6 of the impugned Act fixed the period of six
months. It is true that later the period under s.5-A
was extended but that was by Act XVIII of 1960
which ca.mfl into force on April 8, 1960 and had,
therefore, no bearing on the legislature fixing tho
time under s. 6 of the impllgucd Act.
Ancording to one of our brethren the definition
of "permanent tenant" is enlarged because even
though the point of time when the tenancies of
persons over certain lands commenced were known,
the.se persons a.re also inclu <led in the definition of
"permanent tenant" under the impugned Act and
cl, (b) of s. 4 is said to do this. We may point out
19/Jl
Afaharana 8hri
J oy1/11/.tsingAji
Ranm1laingltji 118.
••
The State ofGqjaF•t
Mudholkar J,
460 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1962] SUPP.
lllfl
that this wa.e not one of tht> arguments advanced at
the
~ar ~nd the respondents had no opportunity of
J~,~llii
meetmg
it. That apart, it is clear that this clause
a..;.;1.;.,AJi 1te.
h.as
to
be
read with Exp!. II to s. 5-A of the Aboli••
Tloc S"™ o,/ CujcrllA
tion Act. As already stated s. 5-A was not attacked
M,,._/U.J.
a.a unconstitutional. Explanation II thereto provides
a.a follows :
"For the purpose of this section, a perma·
nent tenant includes a tenant who holds a
ta.luqdari land in exchange of another taluqdari land of which he was, and but for the
exchange would have been a permant tenant
and who has been in continuous possession
thereof since the date of exchange."
We may assume that the Explanation extends the
definition of "permanent tenant" but its validity
has not been ohallenged by tho plaintiffs. Clause (b)
of s. 4 of the impugned Act merely takes note
of the practice in tenuro villages of changing the
holdings of tenants frnm timo to time and it is
apparently for this reason that there was no challenge to s. 4 of the impugned Act on this ground.
It is only the persons who or whose predecessors in
title were tenants in tenure villages from time
immemorial who will get the benefit of tho impugndd
Act and no others. No new persons will thus be
brought in by s. 4!b) and so it is idle to say that
it enlarges the definition of permanent tenant.
It is said that s. 4 widens tho definition of
permanent tenant by including tcnantR the commencement of whose tenancies is definitely known.
But doos it do that ? Tho tenant in a tenure village
is a person holding tenure land. It is not neeessnry
that he and his predccrssors in title should have
been holding tho Ra.me parcel of lnnd since tho
commencement of their tenancy. Tac practice of
exchanging parcels of lands prevailed in tenuro
vill&.ges and Exp!. II to s. 5-A has been founded
upon it. Section 83 of the Code refers to the per/Jlcfln- Stw;
•
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME OOUR'r REPORTS
461
manency of the relationship of landlord and tenant
and not to the existence of permanent tenancy with
respect to a specific parcel of land. These provisions have to be read along with s. 4 of the impugned Act because this Act cannot stand or was not
intended to stand by itself. It adds certain provisions to the Abolition Act and the Code and these
provisions must necessarily be assimilated to those
of the main Act. Looked at this way it is clear
that what s. 4 contemplates is a person the commencement of the tenancy of whose predecessors in
title is unknown but who has been in possession of
the same or different parcels of tenure land for a
period of not less than twelve years prior to the
commencement of the Abolition Act. It may be
possible to say when he came into possession of a
parcel of land •X' where it was taken by him within
or more than twelve years of the commencement
of the Abolition Act but that is not the same thing
as saying that the relation between him and tenureh older came into existence on that date for the first
time. If in fact it came into existence more than
twelve years before the Abolition Act came into
force, may be with respect to different parcels of
land from time to time, he is entitled to be regarded
as a permanent tenant, unless of course it can be
shown by the landlord that he or his predecessor in
title was first inducted as a tenant in the tenure
village at a definite period of time or that the
tenancy was of a finite duration.
Thus, in our judgment, s. 4 of the impugnetl
Act does not expand the definition of a permanent
tenant. Therefore, it cannot be said that it has
the effect of taking away from the land.lord any
property which had vested in him on the tillers'
day. It may be thitt a tenant who, prior to the
enactment of s. 4, waa merely recorded as an ordinary tenant because he could not show that the
origin of bis tenancy was lost in the mist.a of anti-
1661
Jla/rar.,,,. li/J,i
J aYfJants inhtji
R11nma/JintAJi 1k·
v.
The St•te 1/G11i••
Mwlh•lkar J.
462
JY61
Al altaran I 5h, 1
J •youantJingly i
Ilamal,inghji 1tc.
••
7/,. Skt1:1fGujora1
Mw/Nillt111 J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1962) SUPP.
quity and that now availing himsolf of this provi·
sion, h" can get himself recorded as a permanent
knant by showing his continuous possession for
tw..!v<· yca:·8. llat s. 4 does not, as we read it, say
that he b~cozncs a permanent. tenant in these circumstances in every ca,c. He would not become one
if the landlord shows that his tenancy commenced
on a particular date beyond those twelvo years or
is of a. finite duration.
Section 32H( I) does not confer upon the landlord the right to claim the price of occupancy at tho
rates prescribed in sub·s. (!)(ii) from a person
bocaus0 he is recorded as an ordinary t~nant but
only from one who is in fa.ct other than a perm&nent tenant. If, in fact, ho was a permanent
tenant, or can be presumed to be a. permanent tenant
though till the coming into force of the impugned
Act he was not recorded al! such no right to claim
tho price of occupancy on the footing that he is not
a permanent tenant of tenure land vested in the
tenure.holder by virtue of that provision. Section
87-A of the Tenancy Act renders s. 32H(l}(i) inap·
propriate to such a tenant. No question of infringe·
ment of the right under Art. 19( 1)(f) therefore arises
in such cases.
It was also said that s. 6 of the impugned Act
is void because it puts an unreasonable restriction upon tho tenure-holder's right to hold
property and, therefore, offends Art. l!J( 1)(f) of
tho Constitution. This point does not appear to
have been taken in the petitions. In any case, if
our. construction 0f s. 4 is right, then tho impugnP.d
Act woulJ be saved by Art. 31.A of tho Constitution
and ita validity "vu Id not bf. open to attack on tho
ground that it violated Art. 19(l)(f) of the Constitution.
Furthermore, it is difficult to appreciate how
the tenure· holder's right to hold prorrty is aft'ected
by s. 6. His right of property wit which we are
•,.
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
463
concerned, is as occupant of certain land having
some permanent or other tenants under him. Sec,
tion 5-A of the Abolition Act gives the permanent
tenants the right to convert themselves into occupants and thereby cease to be tenants of the tenureholder. The validity of this provision is not at all
challenged. A tenant may claim the benefit under
this sectio11 only if he establishea that he is a permanent tenant. It is plainly conceivable that in many
oases the tenure-holder may dispute that the tenant
is a permanent tenant. On such dispute being
raised, the tenant has to prove that he is a permanent tenant. All that s. 6 d<iJeS is to fix a time
limit within which the tenure-holder shall have the
right to dispute that certain permanent tenants are
not permanent tenants. That does make those
wh() were not permanent tenants, such tenants.
Therefore, s. 6 can in no way be said to affect the
tenure-holder's right to property.
Further, it would appear that in most cases
the tenure-holders themselves including the petitioners, have actually applied to the mamlatdars
for a declaration in their favour under this provision
and those applications are pending. The learned
Solicitor-General informed us that as a matter of
fact upon the basis of the records made available
by the tenurfl-holders tentative entries were made
in the record of rights immediately after the coming
into force of the impugned Act and that thereupon
the tenure-holders have applied to the mamlatdar
well within six months for a declaration under that
provision. Thus, according to him the section
affords and has afforded a real opportunity to the
tenure-holders to rebut the presumption created by
s. 4. We agree with him.
To summarise, the position is that s. 4 of the
impugned Act by merely enacting the presumption
does not take away any property of the tenure-holder.
His property such as it is, is left in tact. That section
1961
Maharana SMi
J ayDOntsingllji
RQ.Mt.a/singhjl ete.
v.
The Stat. of GujM•I
Jludlrolfar J,
464
JHl
....,.on•
JI
Siu i
]1('1t4ntsin3'iji
Ri.tune/Jiri9h;I ttc.
v.
Tiii SW. of GujaroJ
lludllo/hr J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS (lg62) StrPP
does not confer any new property upon a tenant.
It only comes to the rescue of a permanent tenant
who is fac<'d with the tMk of proving the nature of
his tenancy, by 1;.i.ising a presumption of permanency
in his favour. If in fact his tenanc,v is not permanent ar.<l has bePn extinguished by law but he is
tentatively recorded or is sought to be recorded as
permanent, the landlord can, in a proceeding under
s.6( I) rebut the persumption by producing the
documents in his possession or otherwise that the
tenancy is not in fact permanent and, therefore, has
been extinguished by the operation of s.32(1) of the
Tenancy Act. If ho proves this he will be entitled
to claim compt·nsation or purchase money at the
rates permissihle under s. 32H(l)(ii) of that Act.
That right of his is not affected in any way by the
impugned Act. If he does not succeed in establishing that, then ho will be only entitled to get purchnse price at the rate provided in s.5A of the
Abolition Act. That, however, would be by virtue
of the operation of s.5A of the Abolition Act
-a provision which, as we have already said has
not been challenged-and not because any provision
of tho impugned Act deprives him of a right to claim
a higher purchase price.
The impugned Act is plainly applicable only
to mattHs arising out of a relationship between
landlord and tenant. ft.d provisions arc not intended
to apply wh~re such relationship does not subsist.
Tberefort•, thP. law must be held to Le within the
competence <1f the legislature by virtue of entry 18
of List II of the Co11stitution which is to the follow
ing effect:
"Land, that is to sn.y, rights in or over land,
land tenur<s including the n·l1ttion of landlord
and tenant, am1 tli1· eollection of rents; tra11sfer
and alil'natiou of agri<:ultural land; land
imprnvemt•nt anrl itgri1·11ltural loanR; coloniz
ation."
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
465
There can be no question of regarding the impugned
Act as colourable because it directly falls under
Entry 18 and de.a.ls with matters which have a bearing upon the relationship of landlord and tenant.
'l'he law being thus within the competence of the
Bombay legislature, Art.31( l) of the Constitution cannot be said to have been infringed. The first three
points urged by Mr. Pathak accordingly fall to the
ground. The fourth, fifth and sixth points are also
based on the assumption that the impugned Act
confers upon the persons whose tenancy
rights were extinguished on April l, 1957,
rights of permanent tenancy. Upon the construction which alone can properly be placed on s. 4 it
cannot be said to confer any new rights on such
persons. To repeat, the section applies to permanent tenants and permanent tenants alone. Therefore, the three contentions raised by Mr. Pathak do
not fall for consideration.
The seventh point urged by Mr. Pathak is
that ss. 4 and 5 of the impugned Act do not apply to
other occupants under the Bombay Land Revenue
Code, who are similarly situnte and that the result
of this would be that they will be entitled to higher
purchase price than that permissible under s. 5A of
the Abolition Act. This, according to him, is a
classification without any reasonable connection with
the objects sought to be achieved by the statute.
If our construction of s. 4 is correct, Art. 31-A of
the Constitution' would protect the law and
the petitioners would be precludt>d from challenging
it on the ground that it infringes Art 14. Apart
from that we may point out that ~hough the impugned Act applies only to tenure villages and not to
non-tenure villages, there is, in fact a ground of
distinction between villages of the two types.
Th'.tt ground is the availability
or otherwise of the records. In the former all the
relevant records were with the tenure-holders
themselves, but as Rtated in the statement of
1~1
Mtiharana Shri
Jq:vvantsinghji
Ranma/singhji 1lc.
v.
The State ojGujaral
Mudlwlkar J.
466 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1962) SUPP.
19'1
M oAorhlla Shri
J'9r:iantsmth]i
Ra11mclsi111hji tk.
v.
Tiu 8141< o/Ouja•ot
Mwlho/k., J.
"objects a.nd reasons" were not produc!'rl by them
and this created difficulties in completing the r!'cord
of rights. In the latter the records having been
maintained by the Government were av11.ilable and
theroforo, no diffieultv was experienced in completing the record of rights. The claK.~ification is thus
ha.Red on the extent of the availability of the material
for raising an inference or a p;e,umption and,
therefore, has a roasonable nexus with the object
sought to be achieved by tho impugned Act.
Upon this view it is not necessary to
consider the other points urged by Mr. Pathak on
the authortity of various decisions because the very
basis of those arguments is, in our opinion, unsound.
The petitions are, therefore, dismiBBed with costs.
As there was only one common argument we direct
that there will be only one set of costs.
AYYA~GAR, J.-I entiroly agree with the order
proposed to be passed by my Lord the Chic! Justice
and my learned Brother S.IC Das .T. The only
reason for my separate judgment is because of the
views I entertain regarding tho import of the
Bombay Land Tenure Abolition Laws (Amendment),
Aot l9ii8 (Bombay Act LVII of 1958) hereinafter
referred to as the impugned Act, and in particular
of s. 4 thereof.
Tho facts of the case and the relevant
statutory provisions bearing upon it are set out in
extenso in the judgments of my learned brethren
and they do not need.to be repeated
Beforo entering on a consideration of the proper
construction of the impugned Act it, is neceRB&ry to
state tliat I did not understand the learned Solicitor-General to contest the poaitio11 that if the
impugned Act extended the definition of the term
permanent tenant beyond that which obtained under
s.83 of the Land Revenuo Code, and brought into
that category tenants who before then were com·
prehended within the class or "other tenants"
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME OOURT REPORTS
467
1901
under's.32H(l)(ii) of Bombay Act 13 of 1956, its
aharana Shri
consitutional validity could be sustained, having MJ ayvanbinghji
rf'gard to the decision of this Court in Sri Ram Ram Ranmalsinghji et&.
v.
Nnrain Medhi v. State of Bombay(') holding that the
n,, Stale of Gujarat
effect of the 1956 legislation was to replace the rela.·
Ayyangar J,
tionship of landlord and tenant by that of vendor
and purcha~er as between the temire-holder and his
tenants. His sn bmission was accordingly directed to
establishing that the impugned Act while not
modifying in any manner the basic requirement~
needed to constitute a person a "permanent tenant'
under s. 83 of the Code, merely shifted the onus
of proof on to the tenure-holder on certain stated
facts being found.
It is this view which has found favour with
my learned brother Mudholkar J. On the construction of the relevant provisions of the impugned
Act, he has held that the status or character of a
permanent tenant or the definition of that term
has not been altered in any manner, and that
whereas before the impugned enactment the onus
was upon the tenant to prove all the nf\cessary
elements to establiRh his claim to he a permanent
tenant, the change effected by the Act of 19158 was
to throw on the landlord the burden of proving the
origin of the tenancy and· its terminahle character
in the event of its being proved that the tenant had
been in posseRsion of his holding for twelve years
before August 15, 1950. If this construction of the
effect of the impugned Act were accepted I agree
it would go a considerable way towards establishin!!
the constitutional validity of the impugned
provision.
I feel mvself however unable to accent the
construction of s.4 of the impugned Act whi<'h was
put forward before us bv the learned SolicitorGeneral for the State and l\fr. Nathwani on behalf
of the contesting tenants. To start with, the long
(I)
[1959] Supp. IS. C, R. 489.
468 SUPREME OOURT REPORTS [1962) SUPP
1961
Malt11rana Slr1i
Ja)amui11ehji
Ranmal1inghji tk,
••
17w 81414 "'f Gujar_at
AJ!10lltar J.
title of the Act itself stlLtes that the Act is one for
further to "define" permanent tenants. No doubt,
where the orwrnti v" words of the prol'iaion aro
clear that only a shifting of the onus of proof ia
effected, the long title of the Act cannot be called
in aid to vary their proper intPrpn:ta• ion, but that
is not the position hne. On th(l other hand
as I shall shQw presently, the 0111•rative provisions of the enactment app,.arH to me dPsiµned
to clearly carryout the purpose '"t out in thn long
title, viz., to "define" or to reddhe the elass of
persons who shall be considered to be "permanent
tenant•" for the purposes of obt:liuing the bern·fits
conferred upon "permanent t(·nauts" nndn tho hnv
that existed before that dat,._
The operative provisions of the impugned
Act rel1>vant to the present enquiry are ss. :!, 4 and
6 and they read :
"3. A person shall, within tho meaning
of the relevant Land Tenure Abolition Law
(in the context the Taluqdari Abolition Act,
HJ.19), be dcrml·d to bc ........................... a
pnmanent tenant on the date of the abolition
of the relevant land tenur<', if hi" name has
bt>en recordeci in .the T<'Cf'rd of rid1ts or other
publie or revenue rec•)rc] as ........ :·... pcrmanent
tenant in r(•spect of any h·nure-land
(a) on the •late of the aliolition of the
relevant land tenure, or
(b 1· in pursuance of ord«rs issued durini!
th•· courB<' of any proceP<linc~ 1111dn the relevant Land Tenure A!J1Jlitiun Jaw or, as the
cas" may be, the Land Revenu" Code, J87!)(i) before the •·u;.imenecment of this
Act,
(ii) after the commenePml'nt of this
Ait in cases in which inquiri•·H were pending at the commencement of thiH Act, 01·
2 S.C.R.
SUPRElliE COURT REPORTS
469
(iii) in put'suance of an order issued
by the Mamlatdar in respect of art entry
under section 6 of. this Act."
"+. For the purposes of the relevant Act
specified in Part I of the ~che<lule, a person(a) who on the date of the commencement
of that Act was hoi<ling any tenure-land, and
( b) who and whose predecessors in title, if
any were, immediately before that date for
suuh continuous periods as aggregate to a
total continuous period of twelve years or
more, holding the same tenure-land or any
othe.r tenure-land,
as a tenant ............ under the tenureholder for the time being on payment of an
amount ex~eeding the assessment of the land
shall unless it is proved by the tenure-holder
that he would not have been a permanent
tenant on the basis of continued possession of
the land under clause. (b), be deemed to be a
permanent tenant of the land under clause (a)
and all the provisions of that Act shall apply
to him as they apply to a permanent tenant.
Explarwtion.-The assessment for the
purpose of this section shall be reckoned as
provided in clauses (a) and (b) of section
5."
"6. (1) The rights of..................... (a)
permanent tenant under sections 4 and 5
shall be entered in the record of rights unless
the tenure-holder applies in writing to the
Mamlatdar within six months from the date
of the commencement of this Act for a declaration that any holder or tenant under his is
not...•........ a permanent tenant.
(2) Any such applicati•m shall be disposed
of as if it were an applioation in respect of a
1961
])1 aharana Slari
J ~1vantsinghji
Ranmalsinghji etc.
v.
The State of Gujarat
A)yangar J.
470
19C1
Mahsrat1t1 Sltri
J'fYNICtsiirt.h.ii
RCIUff4lsUcgliji tic.
••
Th. Sl•'4 q[Guj11T•I
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1962] SUPP.
disputed caso under section 135D of the
Bombay Land R-0venuo Code, 1879."
to extract only the portion pertinent to tho controversy before us.
It will be seen that by force of s. 3 persons
are deemed to be permanent tenants under the
Taluqdari Abolition Act, 1949, if the name of such
tenant is recorded in the record of rights or other
public records aB "a permanent te!lant" in any one
of the three events specified in els. (a), (b) and (c)
of the section. In so far as reference is made to
porsons already recorded in the record of ri!:hts
before the passing of the Act, the characteristics for
determining who a permanent tenant was would
obviously have been based on the pre-existing law
and they would have beon permanent tenants under
the law apart from the "deeming" provision. The
position of those recorded under cl. (b) might be
similar, and it is unnecessary to enter into a discussion as to whether in cases where an enquiry
commenced before the commencement of the Act
but is completed thereafter, the tcl!ts brought in by
s. 4 of the Act could be availed of to determine the
status of the tenant. If ono proceeded on tho
aesumption that the provisions of tho impugned
Act aro not to be brought in into an enquiry already
started there would be no difl'erenoe between els. (a)
and (b) of s. 3-and in both MBOB they would be
actual and not statutorily deemed "permanent
tenant.a". Sub-cl. (cl however st!\nde on a different
footing. It brings in, if my construction af a. 4 ( b)
i.e correct, a new class of "permanent tenants"persons who were before the date of the impugned
enactment non-permanent tenants in whom by
virtue of the provisions of Bombay Act 13 of 1956
the interest of the landlord stood transferred and
by whom the purchase-price specified in s.32H(l)(ii)
was payable, into the category of "permanent
tenants."
2 S.C:R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
471
Section 3( c) refers to an entry made by a
llfamlatdar under s. 6, but when one looks at s. 6
he is referred to s. 4 as containing or defining the
clasp of tenants whom the Mamlatdar is enjoined
to enter in the revenue r~cords as a "permanent
tenant." Turning now to s. 4, it would be s~en
that persons are deemed to be "permanent tenants"
if they satisfied three cumulative conditions : (a)
they must be holding tenure-land on the date of the
commencement of that Act, viz., The Taluqdari
Abolition Act, i.e., on August 15, 1950, (b) they or
those from whom. they claim should immediately
before August 15, 1950, have been continuously in
possession of that or any other tenure-land for twelve
years, (c) the amount of rent payable by them
should exceed the assessment.Jeviable on the land
calculated according to s. 5. The effect of condition (a) would be to exclude from the category of
permanent tenants those who came into occupation
or were inducted on the land of· which they could
claim to be permanent tenants, after August 15,
1950. But every tenant who was in possession of
t:enure-land on that date could apparently qualify
for obtaining the status of a permanent tenant,
being deemed to be such, if he satisfied the other two
conditions. As regards condition (b ), there is
obscurity and contradiction attending the expression "continuous periods aggregating to a total
continuous period of twelve years". Aggregation
would obviously mean an addition of integers, and
when units of time are the integers as is apparent
from the context, in plain words it would mean the
addition of broken periods. To posit continuity in
such a case, might possibly suggest that it refers to
cases where a tenant is in possession of different
parcels of tenu:e-land throughout the twelve-year
period, though he is not ip. possession of any particular parcel continuously for a period of 12 years;
and that the terms of the section would be satisfied
and he would be deemed to have been in "continuous
1961
Maha,.ona Shri
J tJ,JtJantsinghji
Ranma/Jinghji etc.
v.
Th• Stat, of Gi!iarat
AyJangar J.
472 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1962] SUPP.
IHI
posscesion" of the land of which he was in possession
at the commencement of the Taluqdari AboliJ .,.,_tsi111Aji
R-1sVo,Aji ti<. tion Act for the purpose of qualifying for permanent
v.
n. Stci. ofGujatat tenancy of that parcel. An analJ sis of the circumstances attendant on this condition would reveal the
A.va1.,.J.
following: (1) Let us take it that during the period
twelve years before August 15, l!J50 a tenant had
been in poaseasion of three distinct parcels of tenure
land •A', 'B' and 'C' at different periods but continuous, i.e., there being no point of time at
which he was not in poasesaion of one or the other
of these three parcels and that on the date of the
commencement of the Act he is in possession of
parcel •C'. It is possible that such a situation
might arise from exchange of holdings with the consent of the tenure-holder by a person who was a
p<?rmanent tenant under the existing law. But the
provision on its terms is not confined to exchanges
by such tenants, but is of wider. application. If
tho proper construction of this unclear provision of
s. 4 be as above, any tenant who satisfied the
other conditions of the section, would bu deemed to
bo a perman~nt tenant in respect of parcel •C'. It
will at once be seen that the origin of his tenancy
of holding •C' is ex concessis known. Surely, such a
tenant would not be a permanent tenant within
s. 83 of the Bombay Land Revenue Code. It has
only to be added that he would not fall within the
definition of a permanent tenant even under
s. 2( lOA) of the Tenancy Act inserted by Bombay
Act 13 of 1956. The argument, therefore that s. 4
was merely intended to and provided a rule of
evidence for determining who a permanent tenant
was :under s. 83 of the Bombay Land R-0venue
Code, 18i!I and did not extend such category of
persons by an artificial definition, would appear to
be negatived even by the first paragraph of s. 4(1.>).
This conclusion is strengthened by the provision made at the end of s. 4(b) of the impugned Act
as regards the grounds upon whi"h tho lamllor<l or
JI dorao Shri
2.S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
4i3
the tenure-holder could disprove the right of a tenant to the status of ii permanent tenant. That provision reads:
"Unless it is proved by the tenure-holder
that he would not have been a permanent
tenant on the basis of continued posseesion of
land under clause (b) ...... "
The learned Solicitor-General submitted that to
read this portion of s. 4 (b) as meaning that the
landlord has to disprove what the tenant has
already proved would be to give it no mea~1ing at
all and that consequently it should be held that in
order to give some rational meaning to the words
quoted they refer to tenure·holder having to prove
that the tenant was not a permanent tenant under
s. 83 of the Bombay Land Revenue Code. To put
it differently, the construction suggested was that
on the conditions laid down in s. 4(b) being ful ·
filled, viz., continuous possession of tenure-land
by a tenant for twelve years computed as described, the onus was shifted to the tenure-holder
to prove that the tenant did not . fall within the
category of persons described in s. 83 of the Code.
I find myself unable to accept this interpretation of
the section. Even if one started with the presumption that what the impugned Act sought to achieve
was not to "define'' a permanent tenant but
merely to shift the onus of proving tho status-the
conditions of s. 83 of the Code being assumed to be
still the determinant, I do not find words in s. 4 to
support the interpretation which the learned Solicitor-General desires the Court to accept. There is
no reference to s. 83 in the impugned Act and the
class of persons who are termed "permanent
tenants" are expressly stated to be those who are
deemed to be such. That itself would be some indication tha.t the class is an artificial creation brought
into existence by the Act. That apart, I have
already pointed out that the opening words of the
1941
M IJ~/JTmJIJ Shrr
Jayi·antsinghii
Ranmalsinghji etc.
v.
The State 'of Gujarat
Ayyangar J.
4i4
1961
M allarana Shri
Ja)l!Ol"llJin.~IJi
Rantr.alsin1hji tt ..
••
Tlt1~l4'* of Gujt.ral
Ayynn1or J.
~UPREMJ£ COUHT REPORTS [19til!J SUP!'.
first paragraph of s. 4(b) contemplate cases where
the origin of th€1 tenancy of the parcel in respect of
which permanent tenancy is claimed is known.
Lastly, the words in which the content of the right
of the tenure-holder to <lis1.ute the "deemed"
permanent tenancy are couched are wholly incompatible with his having a right to establish that the
tc,nant docs not satisfy the requirements of s. 83 of
the Code. The words used are "that the tenant
would not have been .a permanent tenant on the
basis of continued pcs>ession of land under elau8e
(b)''. The conditions on the fulfilment of which a
person iH deemed to be a permanent tenant aro, as
already pointed out, three and of these two aro set
out in sub.cl. (b}, viz., the "continuous" posses.
sion of tenure-land and the rent of the land being
higher than the revenue aSl!essment. In my opinion
the argument about the irrationality of the literal
construction of the quoted words or ~. 4(b) stems
from the assumption thats. 4 contemplates an
enquiry or proceeding initiated by the tenants who
by evidence establish the matters set out in s. 4 and
it b on that basis that the submission is made that
the legislature could not have made a provision for
the same matters being disproved by the tenur·
holder. Even if the basis be assumed to be corrct,
I do not see any absurdity in the provision. But
that apart, in my judgmont s. 4(b) doos not contemplate or provide for any application by the tenant
and therefore there is no question of the tenant
having Cotablished that the conditions of s. 4(b)
havo been satisfied. Section 4(b) enacts a positive
rule of law by which a person in possess10n of a
holding of tenure-land on Au!,'llSt 15, 1930 is
"deemed" to be a permanent tenant on the fulfilment of three conditions, the tenure.bolder
being entitled to C8tablish that the conditions of
that section have not been satitificd when proceedings for that purpose are initiated by him. Tho
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
475
provision for proceedings being initiated by the
tenure-holder to take advantage of the right
granted to him bys. 4(b) is to be found ins. 6.
l!Ml
Afahuan.a Shri
JtJyvantsfozhji
Ra.nm 1lri'lghji etc•
...
What has just been stated is amply borne out Tiit State of Gujarat
by the terms of s. 6, for it enacts that the rights of
AyyangarJ.
a permanent tenant under s. 4 "shall be entered in
the record. of rights unless the tenure-holder applies
in writing to the Mamlatdar within six months from
the commencement "of the Act of a declaration that
the tenant under him is not a permanent tenant"
(to quote only the material words). It will therefore be seen that the concept of permanent tenant as
envisaged under s. 4 is incorporated into the texture
of s. 6. Every person who satisfies the detlnition
of a permanent tenant under s. 4 is therefore automatically entitled w;+.hout application by him, to
be entered in the revenue records as a permanent
tenant by the Mamlatdar unless the tenure-holder
applies in writing objecting to the entry. Obviously
the objections which he could raise and which
would be the subject of adjudication under s. 6 are
tliost· set out as being open to him under s. 4. In
this connection it has to be noticed that s. 6 does
not specify the grounds upon which the tenureholder might object to a tenant being treated as a
permanent tenant and it is on the absence uf those
provisions that the learned Solicitor-General bases
his argument suggesting that the objections of the
tenure holder would extend to disproving tbat the
tenant was a permanent tenant under s. 8il of the
Code. It is not possible .to accede to this submission.
It is common ground that no enquiry 'is contiimplated
under s. 4(b) and that the right of the tenure-holder
to object to the entry of the tenant as a permanent
tenant is by taking advantage of the provision in
s. 6. It would therefore follow that s. 4(b) and s. 6
are integrated provisions, the one laying down the
grounds of objection open to the tenure-holder, and
s. 6 making provision for the forum in which and
476 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1962] SUPP.
I~I
M•hartlU s~,;
Jo)YentJinghji
R11n1MlJingliji tk•
v.
TJ11 SW1 of Guj.,•I
..._,_,.., .. J.
the procedure by which such objections could be
urged. To put the matter slightly differently
s. 4ib) specifies the grounds of objection open to a
t<'nure-holder but does not indicate where and in
which proceeding the objrctions could be raised-whfle s. 6 indicates that t !"' authority to dccido is
the Mamlatdar and that ti"' proceeding would be
initiated by an objection petition filed by the tenureholder. Hoth s. 4(b) ands. 6 would be truncated
unless they were read as forming. an integrated
whole. It is in this manner that a reconciliation is
possible between the terms of ss. 4 and 6 which so
to speak form together provision for determining,
after investigation. the class of persons who shall
be entitled to claim rights as permanent tenants.
Section 4 having defined a permanent tenant in
positive terms, s. 6 ste_ps in and sets up a procedure
and creates a forum in which that positive provision
might be tested and if not displaced wou Id be given
effect to. In the view I have expressed the reference
to the enquiry being under s. 135D of the Code
would not make any difference, because the officials
and Tribunals or Courts vested with authority
under s. 135D of the Code and the related provisions would have still to consider whether the tenant
had or had not qulified to be a permanent tenant
by the application of the criteria enacted by s. 6.
I am therefore clearly of the opinion that the entire
object and purposo of the impugned en~ctment
which is given effect to by its operative provisions
enacts not a rule of evidence for determining who
permanent tenants are under the pre-existing law,
but to define, create and as it were, add a new
class of "permanent tP.nants", i.e., those who satisfy
the requiremets of s. 4.
If this were the proper construction of the
impugned enactment it was not seriously contested
that the enactment would be void and uncoll8titutional and liable to be struck down. I agree therefore that these petitions should be allowed,
'o
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
477
BY CoURT : In accordance with the opinion
of the majority, these petitions are allowed with
costs. As tne petitions have bP-en heMd together
there will be only one hearing fee.
ll/Gl
Maharana Shri
Jayvantsinghji
Ranmalsinghji etc.
v.
Tht State of Gu.iaral
Ayyan.1ar J.
MUNSHI RAM
v
BANWARILAL
(M. HIDAYATULLAH and J. c. SHAH JJ.)
Arbitration-Award .filed in Court-Application for setting
aside award-Oompram1:ae between parties-DecreP in terms of
award as mo·iified by compromiae-Validity of-Arbitration Act
1940 (10 of 1940) ss., 15, 23, 30, 3! and 41-Code of Civil
Procedure, 1908 (.5 of 1908), O. 23.
The dispute between the parties regarding their shares
in a firm was referred to arbitration. The arbitrator made
his award, inter alia, awarding certain sums of moneys to be
paid by certain instalments. There was also a provision in
the award that the p;irties shall be liable t" pay in eq ta!
shares theincome-tax to be assessed. The award was filed in
court by the arbitrator. The appellant made an application
for set~iug aside the award and the respondents filed their
replies to the application. Thereafter, the parties came to
ter111'> and askej for a decree to be pass~d in accorda.nce therewith. The court passed a decree on the award as modified
by the c )mpromise. In execution, the appellant contended
that the decree was a nullity as the cr,urt had no jurisdiction
to mo.iify the award by compromise.
Held, that the decree was not a nullity and was e:<ecutable. In cases of compromise after an award, if the parties
are dissatisfied with the award and wanted to substitute it by
a co1npron1ise involvinb· matters alien t() the original dispute
\YhL::h are inseparable, the court n1ay supersede the submhsion
and leave the parties to \vork out their agreement in accordance with the law outside the Arbitration ;\ct. In such
circumstance-s the new cornpr-.1mise itself furnishes a very g<lod
ground for superseding the reference and thus revoking the
award. Where the parties do not throw the award overboard
but modify it in its operation, the award, in so fa1 as it is not
altered still remains operative and continuous to bind the
parties and cannot be revoked. If the whole of the subject-
January 9
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