PRAMATHA NATH TALUQDAR versus SAROJ RANJAN SARKAR
Supreme Court of India | Decided 21 December 1961 | [1962] SUPP. 2 S.C.R. 297 | 1961 INSC 357
Key facts
- Decided
- 21 December 1961
- Bench
- S.K. DAS*, J.L. KAPUR, M. HIDAYATULLAH
- Bench size
- 3
- Case number
- CRIMINAL APPEAL No. 75/1961
- Disposal
- Appeal(s) allowed
- Citation
- [1962] SUPP. 2 S.C.R. 297
- Neutral citation
- 1961 INSC 357
Text of the judgment
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT' REPORTS
297
restore the order of the District Judge, Vizagapa·
tam, setting aside the order of the Board dated
March 28, l!J4 7.
Appeal allowed.
PRAMATHA NATH TALUQDAR
v.
SAROJ RANJAN SARKAR
(S. K. DAs, J. L. KAPUR, and M. HmAYA'fULLAH JJ.)
Criminal .Comp taint-Scope ojenquiry-Secmid complaint
on same facts but fresh evidence-When ca" be entertained-Exceptional circumstances-Manifest error-Gode of Criminal
Procedure, 1898 (Act 5 of 1898), as. 200, 202, 203, 204-0riminal Matter-Special Bench-Validity of Constitution-Calcutta
High Court (Appellate) RukB-Sanction-Abetment by conspiracy-Gode of Criminal Procedure, 1891 (Act 5 of 1898), s.
J96A-lndian Penal Gode, 1860 (XLV of 1860), ss. 107, 109,
120A, 12CB.
On March 17, 1954, Promode Ranjan a brother of N. R.
Sarkar filed a complaint under s. 200 Code of Criminal Procedure against Pramathanath and S. M. Basu alleging offences
punishable under ss. 467, 471 and 109 of the Indian Penal
Code, before the Chief Presidency Magistrate in respect of a
document appointing Pramathanath as the Managing Director
of N. R. Sarkar & Co. and the minutes of the Board meeting
resolving the same. It was alleged therein that me signatures
of N. R. Sarkar on 11..- documents were forgeries. After
considering the evidence of the Handwriting Expert the Magistrate dismissed the complaint. Promode Ranjan preferred a
revision petition to the High Court. The High Court dismissed
the revision Petition. By an application dated January 6, 1956,
when the revision petition was pen<;ling, attention of the High
Court was. drawn to the fact that the minutes dated January
16, 1948, had been typed on· a letter bearing at the top in print
"Telephc>ne City 6091" where as the City Exchange had not
come into existence till December 1948. The Supreme Court
granted special leave against the dismissal of the revision
petition by the High Court but the appeal was withdrawn.
On April 3, 1959, Saroj Ranjan, another brother of
N.R.Sarkar, laid a complaint on the same facts and ail~tions
Ifill
The Poolrari Fakir
Bad..a.rlh;y of
Bondillrpuram
v.
The Commissioner,
Hindu. Reli1ious
anti Charitable
Endownunts
Raghuhor Da;yal J.
1'6J
Dicnnber 2 t
298
""
Pr•oluN.ih
Tollll/tlar
•.
s..; Raja .Satiar
SUPR.EKE COURT REPORTS [1962] SOPP.
agaimt the appellants, in addition alleging the further fact
about the City Exchange in support of the allegation that the
minutes were forged dishonestly and fraudulently and wed as
genuine. Neither in this complaint nor before the High Court
had it been stutd as to when it came to be known that on the
purported date of the minutes the City Exchange was not in
existence. The Presidency Magistrate issued pcOCCM against
the appellants. The appellants went up in reruion to the
Hiirh Court. The matter was first heard by a Division
Bench and was later referred to a larger Bench of three Judges
which dimiissed the revision petition. In these appcab on
special leave it .was contended by the appellants that the
second complaint ought not to have been entertained, that
the· constitution of the special Bench was illegal and that as
the complaint alleged criminal conspiracy sanction under
s. I 96A of the Code of Criminal Procedure was required.
Held, that the enquiry contemplated by ss. 200 to 204,
Code of Criminal Procedure is for the purpose of enabling
the Magistrate to find out if sufficient grounds exist for issuing
prc»:ess.
V adilal Pa~h<Jl v. Daltatraja .Dulaji CltandigaoN.ar,
[i96i] 1 S. C.R. I, Guiab Khan v. Guiab Mohammad KltaA
A.I.R. 1927 Lah. 30 and Ram (}opal Ga"pat R..W v. State of
Bombay, ( 1958) S.C.R. 688 referred to.
Per S. K. Das, ].-The law does not prohibit altogether
the entertainment of a second complaint when a previ<>UB
complaint on the •ame allegations has been dismissed under
1. 203 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. But a oecond
complaint containing more or less the same allegations can be
entertained only in exceptional circumstances. It is not
possible nor desirable that the exceptional circumstances must
be stated with particularity or precision. Generally speaking,
the exceptional circumstances may be classified under three
categoric•: (1) manifest err6r in the earlier procreding, (2)
resulting miJcarriage of justice, and C'l new facts which the
complainant had no knowledge of or could not with reason•
able diligence have brought forward in the previous proceedings. Where the previous order of dismissal was passed on
an incomplete record or on a miJunderstanding of the r.aturc
of the complaint, a oecond complaint may be entertained.
Where a Magistrate misdirects himself as to the scope of an
enquiry under s. 202, Code of. Criminal Procedure, and the
mistake, made gives a wrong direction to the whole proceeding
on the first complaint, the order of dismissal pas•ed thereon
would be due to a m4nifcst error resulting in a miscarriage of
justice. In such a case, a second complaint is entertainable.
.
•
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
299
1961
Per Kapur and Hidayatullah, JJ.--There is no legal
bar to the ent~rtainability of a second complaint. It is only
Pramal/ia Nath
when the Magistrate had misdirected himself, with regard to
raluqdar
v.
the scope of the enquiry under s. 203, Code of Criminal Procedure, or has passed an order misunderstanding the nature of Saroj R 1nj in Sar'/ear
the complaint or the order is manifestly unjust or absurd or
the order is based on an incomplete record, can it be said that_
there is such a manifest error or a manifest miscarriage of
justice that a second complaint on the same allegations may
be ente1 tained. The other exceptional circumstances in which
a second complaint may be ente1tained is when it is supported
by fresh and further evidence.
Case,law referred to.
In the case of fresh evidence it must be such as could
not have been with due diligence on the part of the complaint
adduced on the earlier occJsion.
Queen Empress v. Dole GobinJ,a Das I.L.R. 28 Cal. 211,
Du·arkanath Mandal v. Daniradha Banerjee, I.L.R, 28 Cal.
692 (F .B.), disapproved.
Allah Ditta v. Karam Bakshi, 12 Lah. 9 Ram Narain
Cho1ed/auy v. Punac/1andJain, A.l.R. 1949 Pat. 255, Hansabai
.v. Ananda, A.LR. 1949 Born. 384 and Dorais1cami v. Subramania, A.I. R. 1918 Mad. 484, approved.
In the present case permitting the second co1nplaint to
proceed would be a gross abuse of process.
Htld, further, concurring with S.K. Das, J ., that the
Special Bench was properly constituted.
•.
Per S. K. Das, J.-On the first complaint the Presidency
Magistrate had misdirected himself regarding the scope of the
enquiry under ss. 203 and 204 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and it was a manifest error. The facts about the City
Exchange urged and fresh evidence were decisive of a prima
facie case for issuing process and it was an exceptional circumstance justifying entertaining the second complaint and not to
permit the trial of the case in such circumstances would be a
denial of justice.
K-umariah v. U. Naicker, A.J.R. 1946 Mad, 167 and
Ramanand v. Sh,,,.;, I.L.R. ! 56 All 425, referred :o.
Though Chapter II of the Rules of the High Court
(Appellate Sid~) in terms applies to Civil cases, their substance
could. L~ applied to criminal cases by the Chief Justice in
const 1tuung a larger bench.
The substance of the
allegations
in the
complaint
amounted to an offence of abetment by conspiracy under
300
SUPREME COURT REFORTS [1962] SUPP.
s. 107 Indian Penal Code and not tte offence of Criminal
Conspiracy as defined bys. 120A and the1efore •sanction under
P101Mlho Nath
a. 196A of the Code of Criminal Procedure was not necessary.
Toluqchir
The distinction between the two offences lies in that the first
841oj Rujan s,11<,, rrquircs an overt act in pursuance of the agreement whereas
the second makes the agreement to do the unlawful act itself
punishable.
Baairul Jiaq v. Slate of lr•st li<ngal (1953] S.C:R. 826
and Mu/achy v. The Quee,., (186B; L.R. 3 H. L. 306, referred to.
1961
••
Cm.MINAL APPELLA'.l'E JURISDICTION : Criminal
Appeals Nos. 75 and 77 of 1961.
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and
order dated December 22- 23, 1960, and from the
order dated March 17, 19.61 of the Calcutta High
Court in Cr. Revision Nos.1049 and 681 of 195!!.
C.K. Daphtary, Solicitor General of lndia, and
l. N . .Shroff, for the appellant (in Cr. A. No. 75/61).
Purushottam Trikamdas, Prasunchandra Ghosh,
S.C. Mitter and /. N. Shroff, for the apptllant
Du J,
(in Cr. A. No. i7 of 1961).
M. C. /:)etalt-ad, Attorney Grneral of India, A/,ak
Gupta, S.N. Andley, Rameshu1ar Nath and P.L. Vohra
for the rc~pondents.
1961. December 21. The judgment was deli·
vered by
S. K. DAs, J.-1 regret that I have come to
a conclusion different from that of my learned
brethren in theso appeals. I proceed now to state
the neceaB&ry facts, the arguments advanoed before
us and my conclusions on the various questions
urged.
By an order dated April LO, 1001 this Court
granted special leave asked for by the two appellants herein, Pramatha Nath Talukdar and
Saurindra Mohan Basu, to appeal to this Court from
two orders made by the High Court of Calcutta,
one dated De<'embcr '22/23, 1960 and the otlwr
dated l\larcb Ii, lll6!. By the firnt order a Sp< cial
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
301
Bench of the C~lcutta High Court dismissed two
applications in revision whioh the oippellants had
m:ido to the said High Court •against an order of
the Chief Presidency Magistrate of Calcutta dated
April ll, 1959 by which the said Magistrate issued
processes against the two appellants for offences
alleged to ha.ve been committed by them under
ss. 467 and 4 71 read with s. 109 of the Indian
penal Code on a complaint made by Saroj Ranjan
Sarkar, respondent herein. By the second order
a Division Bench of the said High Court refused
the prayer of the appellants for a certificate under
Art. 134(1 )( o) of the Constitution of India that the
cali.e was a fit one for appeal to this Court. This refusal was based primarily on the ground that the
order sought to be appealed from was not a final
order within the meaning of the Article aforesaid.
In pursuance of the special leave granted by
this Court four appeals were filed, two against
the order dated December 22/23, 1960 and the
other two against the order dated March 17, 1961.
The two appAals numbered 76 and 78 of 1961 from
the order dated March 17, 1961 were withdrawn on
the ground that special leave having been granted
against the order of the Special Bench dated December 22/2J, 1960, the appellants did not wish to
pres3 the apper1ls from the later order dated March,
17, 1961. Therefore, the present judgment relates
to the two appeals numbered 75 and 77of1961 which
are from the judgment and order of the Special
Bench dated December 22/23, 1960.
The principal question which arises for decision in these two appeals is whether a second
complaint can be entertained by a Magistrate who
or whose predecessor had, on the same or similar
allegation, dismissed a previous complaint, and if
so in what circumstances should such a second
complaint be entertained. The question is one of
11111
Pramatha Nath
Taluqdar
y,
Saroj RaRjan 8ark11.r
DasJ.
302
,,.I
p,amatfit. /'laJ4
I aluqJor
Y.
Soroi Ranjan Sa1J.or
Das J.
SUPREME COURT REPOR~ [1~2J SUPl:-.
gen<'ral importance and has given risl' to some
divergence of opinion in the High Courts.
Let me first state the facts which have led
to the filing of tho second complaint in tho present
case. Saroj Ranjan Sarkar, who i~ 1he youngest
brother of the late Nalini Ranjan Sakar-a wellknown pub\io man, financier and industrialist of
Bengal-filed a potition of complaint in the court
of the Chief Preeid.. ncy Magistrate, Calcutta. On
April 3, 1959, I do not paub here to state the
allegations marlc in that petition, as I shall have
occasion to refer to them in detail latn on. The
complaint was filed agn.:nst fo11r persons-the
appellantR herein and two other persons, Narenara.
Nath Law and Amiya Chakravarty. A previous
complaint on more or lees the same a.llegat ions
was made by Promode Ranjan Sarkar, second
brother of the late Nalini Ra.njan Sarkar. That
complaint was ma.de on March Ii, 1954 and was
dismis:oed under s. 203 of the C ido of Criminal
Procedure by the then Chief Pr<?siden<'y :\lagistrate,
ShriN. C. Cbakravarti, on August 6, 1954. Thereafter, an application ir• revision was made by
Prom ode Raujan Sarkar to the ll igh Court of
Calcutta., whi<-h gave rise to Revision Case Xo. 1059
of 1954. Tbib a 11plication in revision was dismi~s.-d
on Jul.\· 8, 1955 by Debabrata ~fookerjee, J. Promode ltanjan Sarkar then applied for a certificate
under ,\rt. 134(l)(c) of the Constitution, but ~uch
a certificate was refused by a. Rench of tho Calcutta
High Court on September I, l 91i5. Promnde Ranjan
Sarkar applied for special lea.vii from this Court
and obtained such leave <m Fe huary I :l, I 956. An
appeal was filed in pursuance of that special J, ·ave,
hut altimately Promode Ranja.n Sarkar withdrew
his appeal by filing a petition on Ftibruary 3, Ul59.
In that petition he stated that at t hi' intervention
of Common friends and woll-wi~hcrs of th<• parties,
he had settled his disputes with the rc8pondents
therein and did not want to proceed with the appeal
>
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2 S.C,R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
~303
19111
The appeal was accordingly withdrawn on March 12,
1959. Then, within about 22 days of that order,
Parmath" N.th
Taluqd01
Saroj Ranjan
Sarkar filed the
complaint
v.
wkich has given 'rise to the present proceedings. Saroj RanjtJn Sar.' ar
For convenience and brevity, I shall refer to ProDasJ.
mode Ranjan Sarkar's complaint as the first complaint and Saroj Ranjan Sarka.r's as the second
complaint.
It is necess&ry here to give a little more of
the background history of the second complaint.
As stated earlier, the late Nalini Ranjan .Sarkar
was a well-known person in Bengal. He was the
Governing or Managing Director of N. R. Sarkar &
Co. Ltd., which managed several public limited
companies, such as, Hindusthan Development
Corporation Ltd., Hindusthan Heavy Chemicals
Ltd., and Hindusthan Pilkington Glass Works Ltd.
He was also closely connected with the Hindusthan
Co-operative Insurance Society Ltd., of• which he
held a large number of shares. On January 4, 1948
he obtained leave of absence from the Directors of N.
R. Sarkar & Co. Ltd. for a period of one year with a
view to joining the Mini3try in West Bengal and
he assumed office as Finance Minister of the West
Bengal Governmeriton January 23, 19+8. Later,
the leave granted to him for one year was extended. He owned 4ti49 shares of N: R. Sarkar & Co.
Ltd. Pramatha Nath Talukdar, who was a paid
employee of the Hindusthan Co-operative Insurance
Society Ltd. np to the end of July, 1953 was also
a Director of N. R. Sirkar & Co. Ltd. He held 299
shares of the said company. Promode Rajan Sarkar
held 50 shares. Santi Ranjan Sarkar; son of a deceased brother of Nalini Ranjan Sarkar, held one share.
Thus, it would appear that Nalini Ranjan Sarkar
was the owner of the largest number of shares of
N. R. Sarkar & Co., Ltd., and for all practical purposes he controlled the affairs of that company.
On July 31, 1951 Nalini Ranjan Sarkar executed
a deed of trust in respect of 3649 shares out of the
S04
,951
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1962] SUPP.
shares held by hitn in N. R. Sarkar & Co. Ltd.
By the said trust-deed he · appointed Promode
TaJ"'I®'
Ranjan Sarkar, Pramathe. Nath Talukdar e.nd
•••
Stuo.f Rottjan Sarbr
Narendra Nath Law as the· trustees; but the
beneficiaries under the trust-deed were his four
t:•as J.
brothers, namely, Promode Re.njan Sarkar,
Pabitra Ranjan Sarkar, Prafulla Ranjan Sarkar and
Saroj Ranjan Sarkar, as also Santi Ranjan Sarkar,
the son of a deceased brother. It 'llas alleged that
the balance of 1000 shares held by Nalini Ranjan
Sarkar was kept in custody with Pramatha Nath
Te.lukdar and according to the case of the complaine.nt, these she.res were kept in .depoeit with
Pramatha Nath Talukdar for tht benefit of the
complainant and this brothers. Nalini Ranjan
Sarkar died on January 25, 1953. It W88 alleged
that a few days after the funeral <ll'remony had
been performed, Saurindra Mohan Basu caaually
informeq Promode Ranjan Sarkar that his brother
Nalini Ranjan Sarkar had executed two documente
to wit, an unregistered deed of agreement daterl
January 19, 1948 by which Pramatha Nath
Talukdar was appointed Managing Director ofN.R.
Sarkar & Co. Ltd. and a deed of transfer of 1000
sharrs dated February 5, 1951 in favour of
Pramatha Nath Talukdar. Promode Ranjan
Sarkar and his brothers did not give credence to the
information cmiveyod, and wanted to see the
rloouments. It was alleged that this request was
not complied with. On July 31, 1953, i.e. about
six months after the death ofNalini Ranjan Sarkar
Pramatha Nath T&lukd.ir resigned from his salaried
post under the Hintiusthan Co-operative Insurance
Society Ltd. and songht to &SSume rontrol of N. R.
Sarkar & Co. Ltd. as its Managing Director. This
led to some trouble between Promode Ranjan
Sarkar and the appellants and also to some co1respondence between Promode Ranjan Sarkar on one
side and N. R. Sarkar & Co Ltd. on the other,
detaili whereof are not neoessary for our purpo116.
Pr..,.u.. Kalli
2 s.c.R.
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I
SUPREME OOURT REPORTS
305
19~1
On September 22, 1953 a meeting of the Board of
Directors of N.R. Sarkar & Co. Ltd. was held. It
Pramathti Nath
Taiuqdar
was alleged that the meeting was held irregularly
•• S""'°
without any agenda.and a resolution was adopted, S111oj &l!jan
despite Promode Ranjan Sarkar's protest, by which
Dos J.
the appointment of P r a e a t h Talukdar as
Managing Director of N. nS&r1'1 & Co. Ltd. was
renewed for seven yea · " · · · September, 1953
Promode Ranjan Sarkar formally wrote to N.R.
Sarkar & Co. Ltd. for inspection of the alleged deeds
of agr~ement and t·ransfer. On October l, 1953 an
inspection was taken, and on October 13, 1953
Promode Ranjan Sarkar was allowed to take photographs of the relevant portions of the documents.
On this occasion Promode Ranjan Sarkar also
inspected the minutes of the proceedings of N. R.
Sarkar .pt, Co. Ltd. and it was alleged that the
proceedfngs dated January 16, 1948 purporting to
bear the signature ofNalini Ranjan Sarkar w1>re
forged. The main allegations in the first and
second complaints related to three documents and
were to the effect "that in order to assume
complete control over N. R. Sarkar & Co. Ltd. and
the concerns under its managing agency, the accused
persons entered into a criminal conspiracy with one
another and others unknown, to dishonestly and
fraudulently forge a deed of agreement, a deed of
transfer and make a false document, to wit, minute
book ofN. R. 1farkar & Co. Ltd. andin pursuance
thereof dishonestly and fraudulently forged and or
ca.used to be forged and used as genuine the said
documents". It will be noticed that three documents
were stated to have been forged, and they were-(1) An unregistered deed of agreement purpor·
ting to have been executed by the late Nalini
Ra'njan Sarkar as Governing Director of N. R.
l:larkar & Co. Ltd. on January 19, 1948 appointing
:rramatha Nath Talukdar as the Managing Director
of N. R. Sarkar & Co. Ltd. on a remmuneration of
Rs. 1500-100-2000 per month. This document bore
306 SUPREME OOURT REPORTS [1962] SUPP.
lgfl
fT(fffttzfM N•tA
To/Ul/i/Jr
v.
s.,.i R..J•• s.,,_
D•1J.
the signature of Saurindra Mohan Basu as a witue88
attesting the ~ignature of Nalini Ranjan Sarkar,
which signature was stated to have been forged.
(2) A transfer deed in reBpt>ct of 1000 shares
ofN. R. Sarkar & Co. Ltd. which were said to ha'l'e
been entrusted to Pramatha Nath Tal11kdar, transferring them to the Ia~ter for and alleg<'d consideration
of rupees one )ao purporting to have been executed
by the late Nalini Ranjan ~arkar on February
5,1951 with Saurindra Mohan Basu as the attesting
witness both for the transferor and the transferee.
(3) Minutes of the proceedings of the Board
meeting of N.R. Sarkar & Co. Ltd. dated January 16,
1948 purporting to bear the signature of the late
Nalini Ranjan Sarkar and containing s resolution
to the effect that the Governing Director approvt>d
of a draft agreement of appointment between the
Company and Pramatha Nath Talnkdar for appointing the latter as Managing Director of the Company
and that the Board of Directors approved of the
said draft agreement.
Of the aforesaid three documents the one
relating to the alleged transfer of 1000 shares
referred to as (2) above, is the subject of a separate
suit stated to be now pending in the Calcutta High
Court. That document is not, therefore, directly
the subject matter of the second complaint. As to
the unregistered deed of agreem"nt referred to es
( 1) above, it may bo stated that the original
document could not be later found, and on b~half
of the appellants and other accused p<>rsons it was
stated that the document was not in.thdr posses·
sion or control. As statPd earlier, Promode Ranjan
Sarkar had obtained a photostatic copy of the rele.
vant portions of the document. As to this dcicu·
mcnt the main e.Jlege.tion of the complainant was
that it was engrossed on a rupee stamp·paper whirh
had been iaeued, on renewal, in the name of P.D.
Himatsinghka & Co., a firm of soliciters in Calcutta
...
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
307
19111
and evidence was led at the enquiry into the first
complaint that the paper was stolen from that firm Pramatha Naf./z
Taluqdar
and furthermore that the signature on the document
•• sa,kar
purporting to be that of Na!ini Ranjan Sarkar was 8 jTOj Ranjan
not his signature at all. With regard to the
DasJ.
minutes of the proceedings dat~d January 16, 1948
the allegation was that the minutes were typed on
a sheet of paper bearing the letter-head N.R.
Sarkar & Co. Ltd. with telephone number "City
6091" printed thereon; but the City Exchange did
not come into existence .untill December, 1948 and
the telephone connection relating to number "City
6091" was· obtained for the first time by the
Hindusthan Co-operative Insurance Society Ltd. on
or about March 18, 1949; and therefore the paper
with ti.e letter-head N. R. Sarkar & Co. Ltd. with
telephone number "City 6091" printed thereon
could not have been in existence on the alleged date
of the proceeding of the Board of Directors,
namely January 16, 19!8. In the second complaint
certain other circumstances wPre also alleged in
support of the allegation that the unregistered
dPed of agreement dated January 19, 1948 and the
minutes of the proceedings dated January, 16, 1948
were forged. It is, however, unnecessary to refer to
those circumstances in detail here.
'Ihe learned Chief Presidency Magistrate, Shri
Bijayesh Mukherjee, who dealt with the second
complaint considered all the relevant materials and
came to the following conclusions:
(1) there was no delay in making the second
complaint, if one had regard to the ciroumstances
which led to the firet complaint and the withdrawal of the appeal in the Supreme Court on
March 12, 1959 arising out of the order made on the
first complaint;
(2) the dismissal of the first complaint and
the applic iti.m in revision arising therefrom by
Debabrata Mookerjee, J. did not, as a matter oflaw,
308 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [19~2] SUPP.
1951
PtanurlMN•IA
TollJl/hr
y,
s....; Rcti.. Bua
Doi J •.
operate as a. ba.r to the entertainment of the second
complaint.
(3) the second complaint wa.e not an attempt
a.t blackmail; a.nd
(4) the relevant materials in the record
showed prima facie tha.t the minutes of the proceedings dated January 16, 1948 were forged and so
a.lso tho unregistered deed of agreement dated January, 19, 1948.
The learned Chief Presidency Magistrate then
ea.id :
"Prima facie, I am satisfied about the truth
pf the allegations the complaint makes. That
a.pa.rt, the complaint is for an offence triable
bv a Court of lfCSSions. And the ma.teria.le I
e~e before me a.re euoh a.s in my opinion may
lead a reasonable body of men to believe
the truth thereof. Judged so, there is in my
opinion sufficient ground for proceedin~ within
the meaning of seotion 20! of the procedure
Code.
On the question a.e to whioh of the fou~ accused
persons against whom prooesa should i11S11e, the
learned Chief Presidency Magistrate oame to the
oonclusion that there was a prima f acie case Against
two of the acoueed persons only, namely, Prams.th&
Nath Talukdar and Saurindra Mohan Basu.
Saurindra Mohan Basu, it may be stated here, was
a solicitor of N.R. Sarkar & Co. Ltd. and had attested the signature of Nalini Ranj11n Sarkar on the
unregistered deed of agreement. The !tl&rned
Chief Presidency Magistrate h<'ld that there was no
sufficient ground for pruct edinga against the
other two aocuaed persons, namely, Narendra Nath
Law ana Amiya Chakravarty.
Againet!the aforesaid order pf tho Chief Presidency Magistrate two applications in revision l\'ero
filed by the appellants hereir... These applications
•
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
309
1961
in revision were first heard by
a division
two Judges of the
Calcutta.
Bench of
Pramatha Nath
TaluqJar
High Court, P. B. Mukherjee and H. K. Bose,
v.
JJ. In view of the importance of the questions Saroj Ranjan SarkaJ
raised in the two applications in revision and some
Das J.
earlier decisions of the Calcutta High Court bearing
on those questions to which I shall presently refer,
P.B. Mukherjee, J. ca.me to the conclusion that the
applications should be referred to a larger Bench
to bo constituted by the Chief Justice under the
rules of the Court. H.K. Bose. J. (as he then was)
was inclined to take the view that the applications
in revision must fail, but in deference to the views
expressed by P.B. Mukherjee, J. agreed that the
applications should be referred to the Chief Justice
for constitu,ting a larger Bench. The matter was
then referted to the learned Chief Justice, who
constituted a Special Bench of three Judges to hear
the two applications in revision. This ::lpecial Bench
heard the two applications in revision and dismissed
them by its order dated December 22/23, 1960.
Three questions were agitated before the
Special Bench. The first was whether the Special
Bench was lawfully in seizin of the case and was
competent to deal with the applications in revision.
The second was whether the learned Chief Presidency Magistrate had jurisdiction to take
cognizance
of th~ offences alleged, in the
absence of a. sanction under s. 196A of the Code
of Criminal Procedure. The third and the principal question was whether it was open to the learned
Chief Presidency Magistrate to entertain a second
complaint on the same allegations when bis predecessor bad dismissed the first complaint; and if it
was open to him to entertain the second complaint
should he have entertained it in the circumstances
of the present case ? The Special Bench unanimusly decided these three questions against the appel·
!ants and further came to the conclusion that
there was no undue delay in making the second
310
SUPREME OOURT REPORTS (1002] SUPP.
complaint; neither was it frivolous nor made in
bad faith. It further expressed the view that it
saw no reasons to differ from the finding of the
~
Sa1kt.r learned Chief Presidency M'l.gistrate that there was
a prima facie ea.se against the two applla.nts.
DasJ.
Now, aa to the first question. Chapter II of
Rules of the High Court at Calcutt& (Appellate Side)
deals with the constitution and powers of the
Benches of the Court. Rule l of tbe said chapter
says in effect that &Division Bench for the hearing
of appeals from decrees or orders of tho Subordinate Civil Courts shall consist of two or more Judges
&s the Chief Justice may think fit; there is & proviso
[proviso (ii)J to the rul'l which says that on the
requisition of any Division Bench, or whenever he
thinks fit, the Chief J nstice may appoint a special
Division Bench to consist of three or more Judges
for the hearing of any particular appeal, or any
particular question of law a.rising in an appeal, or
of the any other matter. It is clear that the rule
and the provieo deal with the hearing of appeals
from decrees or orders of the Subordinate Civil
CourtAJ ; in other words, they deal with civil matters. Rule 9'of the same chapter deals with criminal matter and sub-r. (l) of the said rule says that
a Division Bench for the hearing of cases on appeal,
reference, or revision in respect of tho sentt'nce or
order of any Criminal •0ourt shall consist of two or
more Judges. There is no proviso to this rule similar to tho proviso to r. l, referred to earlier, and the
argument is that in the absence of such a proviso it
was not open to the Division Bench consisting of
Mukherjee and Bose, JJ. to refer the case back to the
Chief Justice for the constitution of a larger Bench
(though it was open to the Chief Justice to constitute
originaily a Division Beneh of three Judges to hear
the case), and iftheJudgee were equally divided in
opinion, s. 429 of the Code of Criminal procedure
would apply and the case had to be la.id hefore another Judge and judgment given according to the
IHI
Pr•.iM Nol/I
T.,._
s.;:..
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
311
opinion of the third Judge. I am unable to
accept this argument as correct. It is clear from
the rules in Chapter II that the constitution of
Benches is a matter for the Chief Justice and r. 13
in Chapter II says that a Full Bench appointed for
any of the purposes mentioned in Chapter VII, rr.
1 to 5, shall consi.>t of five Judges or three Judges
as the Chief Justice may appoint. Now, r. 1 in Ch.
VII says inrer alia that whenever one Division
Bench shall differ from any other Division Bench
upon a point of law or usage having the force of
law, the case shall be referred for decision by a Full
Bench and r. 5 says that if any such question arises
in any case coming before a Di vision Bench as
Court of Criminal Appeal, Hefertnce or Revision,
the Court referring the the case sh11ll state the point
or points on which they differ from the decision of
a former Division Bench, and shall refer the ease
to a Full Bench, for such orders as to such Bench
seem fit. In his judgment P.B. Mukherjee, J. refer·
red to two earlier decisions of the Calcutta High
Court, Nilraf,anSen v. Jogesh Chandra Bhattacharia(')
and Kamal Chandra Pal v. Gourchand Adhikary (')
and observed that the question as to whether
those decisions were good law arose in the case
and he gave that as a reason for referring the
case to the Chief Justice for the constitution of,a
larger Bench. Even if rr.l and 5 in Chapter VII may
not,strictly speaking, apply to the present case because the Division Bench consisting of Mukerjeeand
Bose JJ. did not formulate the point or points on
which they differed from the earlier Division Bench
decisions refferred to by Mukherjee, J., I think that
the principle of those rules would apply and it was
open to the Chief Justice, on a reference by the
Division Bench, to constitute a larger Bench to
consider the case. I am also in agreement with the
view expressed by the Special Bench that the ab·
sence of a proviso to r. 9 in Chapter II correspon·
(1) I. L, R, 23 Cal, 983.
(2) (1897) J.L.R.24 Ca!.286,
1961
Pramatha Noth
Taluqdar
v.
Ba1oj Ranjan Sar/cm
DasJ.
312 SUPREME OOURT REPORTS (1962] SUPP.
ding to tho proviso to r. l does not take nway the
inherent power of the Chief Justice to rnfer any matPr-"'- NoJo
TallM/k
ter to Bench of three Judges. Sub-rule( l)uf r.11 itself
Y,
8,roj R~ion s,,f,r provides that a Division Bench for th1; hearing of
cases on appeal, reference, or revision in respect of
D•sJ.
the sontence or order of any Criminal Court shall
consist of two or more Judges. Therefore, it was
open to the Chief .Justice to constitute a Bench of
three Judges for the hearing of tho case and in my
view it made no difference whether he constituted
such a ilench originally or on a reforence back by
the Division Jfonch. I further think that the
Chief Justice must have the inherent power to
constitute a larger Bench in special circumstances.
Take, for instance, a case where one Judge of th!l
Division Bench feels, for a eufficient and good
reason, that he should m. t hear th11 case. lt id
obvious that in such a case the matter must be
referred back to the Chief Justice for the constitution of another Bencil. The Chief Justice, I
think, must possess such a.n inherent power in the
matter of constitution of Benches and in the exercise thereof he can surely constitute a larger
Bench in a. case of importance where the Division
Bench hearing it considers that a question of the
correctness or Otherwise of earlier Division Bench
decisions of the ea.me Court will fa.II for consideration in tho case. Section 229 of the Code of Criminal Procedure does not apply to such a. caso
because it is not a case where the Judges composing the Court arc equally divided in opinion.
Rather it i~ a. case where the Judges composing the
Division Bench consider that the case is one of
such importance that it should be heard by a larger
Bench.
My conclusion, therefore, is that there wa.s
nothing illegal in the Division Bench consisting of
Mukherjee and Boso, JJ. referring the ca.seback to
the Chief Justice ; nor was there anyting illegal in
tho Chief Justice co11stituting a special Bench of
11181
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
313
three Judges to hear the applications in revision.
The special Bench constituted by the Chief Justice
was IJ.wfully in seizin of the ca.se and was competent
to deal with it. The objection as to the jurisdic·
tion of the special Bench to hear the case was, in
my opinion, rightly overruled by it.
Now, as to saction, .Section l96A of the Code
of Criminal Procedure may be read first. That
section is in these terms :
"l96A. No Court shall take cognizance
of the offence of crimi11al conspiracy punishable under section 120B of the Indian l'enal
Code.
(1) in a case where the object of the conspiracy ·is to commit either an illegal act
other than an offence, or a legal act by
illegal means, or an effence to which the
provisions of section 196 apply, unless
authority from the "State Governupon complaint made by order or under
authority frc·m the "State 'Government"
or some officer empowered by the
"State Government" in this behalf, or
(2) in a case where the· object of the cons.
piracy is to commit any non-cognizable
offence, or a cognizotble offence not punishable with death, imprisonment jQr life
or rigorous imprisonment for a term of
two years or upwards, unless the "State
Government", or a Chief Presidency
Magistrate or District Magistrate empowered in this behalf by the "State
Government", has, by order in writing,
consented to the intiation of the proceedings:
Provided that where the criminal conspiracy is one to which the provisions of subsection (4) of section 195 apply no such
consent shall be necessary."
1961
P1amatha Nat!.
T.Juqdar
v,
Sdf"<J R.mjan Sarkar
DasJ.
314 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1962) SUPP.
Ig6/
Pram.tha Jlolh
ToJuqdor
••
Saroj Ran;an Sarka'
DasJ.
The ar/[umcnt before us on behalf of the appellants
has proceeded on the footing that in para, 5 of the
second complaint Saroj Ranjan Sarkar had alleged
that th" accused persons had entered into a criminal co1rnpiracy with one another and othl'r persons
unknown, to dishonestly and froudulantly forge
certain documents and in rursuancc th<'reof either
forged or caused to be forg .. d 1 hose documents and
used them as genuine. This nllegatiun, it is argued
attracted cl. (2) of s. 196A inasmuch as the object
of the conspiracy \\'as to commit non·cognizable
effences under ss. 467 and 4 71 of tho Indian Penal
Code; therefore, it was nec1'ssary to obtain, by
order in writing, the consent of the State Government or of the Chief Presid1 ncy )fagistrate to the
initiation of the proceedings and such consent not
having been obtained, th<' issue of processes by the
Chief !'residency .Magistrate violated the prr,viHions of s. 196A of the Code of Criminal procedure.
The special Bench repelled this argument on the
following grounds. It pointed out the distinction
between the offence of criminal conspiracy as
defined in s. 120A and punishable bys. 120B and the
offence of abetment by conspiracy as defined in the
clause, Hecondly, i11 s. I Oi of thP Indian Penal
Code. lt then pointed out that the Chief Presidency ~Iagistrate did not take cognizance of the
offence of criminal conspiracy to commit forgery
which would be punishable under s. I 20B read
withs. <Ju7 of the Indian Penal Code, but he tool<
cognizance of the offence of abdmrnt of forgery
punishable under s. 467 read with s. I 09 of the
Indian Penal Code and for this offence no sane·
tion under s. Hl6A of the Code of Criminal Proce<luro was neceBBary. The special Be:ich further
expressed the view that the prim&.rj· offencPs which
the seeoLd complaint <lisdose<l were the off~11c1 s of
forgery, of using forged <locumentll as geuninc,
and of abetment of the Raid offences and aH cognizance of these offences did not require san .. tion or
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REp0RTS
31&
prior consent of the authorities m1>ntioned in s.
1961
196A, the order of the Chief Presidency MagisPramat\a Nath
trate could not be said to have violated the proviTaluqdr,r
sions of that section.
••
Sr.rof Ranjan 8 ar/ca
The correctness of these views of the special
Das J.
Bench has been very seriously contested. I may
make it clear at the very outset that the mandatory
provisions of s. 196A of the Code of Criminal
Procedure cannot be evaded by resorting to a mere
device or camouflage.
The test whether sanction is or is not necessary
does not depend on mere astuteness of drafting the
petition of complaint. For example, in the second
petition of complaint under consideration before us
the heading indicated, that the offences in re~pect of
which the petition of complaint was filed were
offences under ss.467, 471 and 109 of the Indian
Penal Code ; but in para. 5 of the petition the
allegation was that the accused persons had entered into a criminal conspiracy with one another and
others unknown, to forge certain documents. It
would not be .proper to decide the question of
sanction merely by taking into consideration the
offences mentioned in the heading or the use of the
expression "criminal conspiracy" in para. 5. The
proper test should be whether the allegations m:i.de
in the petition of complaint disclosed primarily
and essentially an offence or offences for which a
consent in writing would be nece~sary" to the
initiation of the proceedings within the meaning of
s.196A(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. It is
from that point of view that the petition of
complaint must be examined. There is another
principle laid down by this Court which should be
kept in mind. The allegations made in tho
complaint may have more than one aspect; and may
disclose more than one offence. What would be the
position when some of the offences disclosed do not
require any sanction while others require sanction.?
This question was considered by this Court in
•
316 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1962) SUPP.
1961
Prmatlra Nath
To!uqd"'
v.
S•roj Rcnjan Sarkar
D•s J.
Ba.1ir-.v.l·huq v. State of West Bengal('). That was case
m which the accused person lodged informatil>n at
a police station that X had beaten and throttled his
?1other tu death and when tho funeral pyre was
m flames, he entered· the cremation ground with
police; the dead body was examined and the
complaint was found to be fa 1,e, On the complaint
of X the acc'!bed person was charged with offences
under s. ~97, Indian Penal Cude (tresspass to wound
religious feelings) and s. iiOO, Indian Pena.I Cede
(defamation). It was contended that as tho
complaint disclosed offences under ss. 182 and 211,
Indian Penal Code, the Court could not take
cognizance of the case except on a complaint by the
proper authority under s. I!J5 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure. It was held that the facts
which constituted the offence under s.297 where distinct from those which constituted an offences under
s. 182, as tho act of trespass was alleged to have been
committed after the making of the false 1eport, so
s. I!J5 was no bar to the trial of the charge under
s. :!97. It was further held that as regards the
charge under s. tOO where the allegations made in a
false report disclose two distinct offences, one
against a public servant and tho other against a
private individual, the latt?r is not debarred by
provisions of s. 195 of the Code of Criminal
Prooodurc from seeking redret!S fur the offence
committed against him. Referring to s. 195 of tho
Cude of Criminal Procedure Mahajan, J. who
delivered the judgment of the Comt said :
"The 1tatute thus requires that without a
complaint In writing of the public servant
conoer.ned no prosecution for an offence under
section l!i2 ran be taken cogniz.a.nce of. It does
not further provide that if in the course of the
commission of that offenoe other distinct
offences are committed, the magistrate is
debarred from taking cogni1.anoe in respect of
those offences as well. The allegations made
(1) l19~)J S. C.R. ijJ6.
2 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
317
in a complaint may have a double aspect,
that is on the one hand these mav constitute
an offc·nce against the authority of the· public
servant or public justice, and on the other
hand, they may also constitute the offence of
defamation or some other distinct offence. The
section does not per se bar the cognizance by
the magistrate of that offence, even if no action
is taken by the public servant to whom the
false report has been made. x
x
x x
As regards the charge under section EOO,
Indian Penal Code, it seems fairly clear both
on principle and authority that where the
aHegations made in a false report dic]ose two
distinct offences., one agaist the public ·servant
. and the other against a private individual, that
other is not debarl'.ed by the provisions of
section 195 .from seeki~g redress for the
offence committed against him."
Keeping the aforesaid two principles in mind
let me examine the second complaint in this case
in order to find · out what essential offences the
allegations made therein disclosed. Paragraph 5 of
the petition of complaint on which much reliance
has .been placed on behalf of the appellant alleges
(1) that the accused persons entered into a criminal
conspiracy with one another and others unknown,
t.o forge certain documents; (2) that in pursuance of
th~ compiracy those documents were forged ; ot
caused to be forged·; and (3) that the documents so
forged were used as genuine. The paragraph then
recited three documents which were said to have
been forged. It is thus clear that apart from the
conspiracy, the second <'omplaint alleged that
offences under ss. 467 and 471 of the Indian Penal
Code had -also been committed. The special Bench
rightly pointed out that the offences under ss. 467
and 471 of the Indian Penal Code were distinct
from the offence of criminal conspiracy and did not
require any prior consent for the initiation of
1961
Prainat/,a .1Vath
Tal11qd.r
v.
Sa1oj Ranjan Sarkar
Das J.
3JS SUPREME OOURT REPORTS (11162) l:il'l"l'.
1961
Pr?~edings therefor under s. I 96A(2) of the Code of
Cnmmal Procedure. The question, of therefore,
v.
boils down to this : in view of the allegation that
&ro?} Ranjan Sarktn
there was a criminal conspiracy, was tho chief
Dal J.
Presidency Magistrate <le barre<l from taking
cognizance of the case even though certain other
distinct offences were alleged which did not requite
sanction ? I am in agreement with the special Bench
that the answer to the question must be in the
negative. Furthermore, it appears to me that
though the expression "criminal conspiracy" occurs
in para. 5 of the complaint, the facts alleged in
the petition of complaint essentiall.v disclose an
offence c,f abetment by 0011spiraey. This brings us
to the distinction between the offence of criminal
conspiracy as defined in s. l 20A and the offrnc<> of
abetmcnt by conspiracy as defined ins. i07 of the
Indian Ptmal Code. Section I:?OA which definPs the
offrnci> ,,f criminal conspiracy and s. 120B which
punishes the offence are in C'h. VA of the Indian
Penal Code. This Chapter intro<luced into tho
criminal law of Iudia a nf'w offence, nimely, the
offence of criminal conspiracy. It was intro<luccd
by the criminal Law Amendment. Act, J!l 13 (VIII of
I!J 13). B.. fore that, the sections of the Indian Penal
Code which directly dealt with the subjed of
conspiracy were these contained in Ch. V and s.121
(Ch.VI) of the Corle. Th'll present case is not
Mnoemed with the kind of conspiracy referred to in
s.121A. The point before us is the distinction
betwPen the offence of abetment as defined in s. 107
(Ch. V) and the offence of criminal conspiracy as
defined in s.120A (Ch. VA). L'nder s.107, second
clause, a person abets the doing of a thir•I'.. who
engages with one or more other rerson or persons
in any conspiracy for the doing o that thing, if an
act or illegal omission takes pla.Cf> in pursuance of
that conspiracy, and an order to the doing of that
thing. Therefore, in order to constifute the
offence of &betment by conspiracy, there
Fr, mat/la Jfath
Taluqdar
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
319
1951
must first be a combining to~ether of two or more
P,arnatha Nath
persons in the conspiracy ; secondly, an act or
Tatuqdar
illegal omission must take place in pursuance of
v.
that conspiracy, and in order to the doing of that Saroj Ranjon Sarkar
thing. It is no~ necessary that the abettor should
DasJ.
concert the offence with the person who commits
it. It is sufficient if he engages in the conEpiracy in
pursuance of which the offence is committed. It is
worthy of note that a mere conspiracy or a combination of persons for the doing of a thing does not
amount t.o an abetment. Something more is
necessary, namely, an act or illegal omission must
take place in pursuance of the conspiracy and in
order to the doing of the thing for which the
conspiracy was made. Before the introduction of
Ch.VA conspiracy, except in cases provided by
ss. 121A, 31!, 400, 401 and 402 of the Indian Penal
Code, was 'a mere species of abetment where
an act or an illegal omission took place
in pursuance of that conspiracy, and amounted
to a distinct offence. Chapter. VA, however, intro·
duced a new offence defined bys. 120A. That offence is called the offence of criminal conspiracy and
consists in a mere agreement by two or more pllr·
sons to do or cause to be done an illegal act or
an act which is not illegal by illegal means ; there
is a proviso to the section which says that no agreement except an agreement to commit an offence
shall amount to a criminal conspiracy unless some
act besides the agreement is done by one or moi:e
parties to such agrePment in pursuance thereof.
The position, therefore comes to this. 1he gist of the
offence of criminal conspiracy is in the agreement
to do an illegal act or an act which is not illegal
by illegal means. When the agreement is to commit an offence, the agreement itself becomes the
offence of criminal conspi~acy. Where, however,
the agreement is to do an illegal act which is not
an offence or an act which is not illegal by illegal
means, some act besides the agreement is necessary.
320 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1962] SUPP.
IHI
Pram-tlA4 Nath
T aluqdtw
v.
Soroj Ra11jar& S Jrk•r
D., J.
Therefore, the distinction between the offence of
abetment by comspiracy a.nd the offence of criminal conspiracy, so far as the agreement to commit
an offence is concerned, lies in this. For abetment
by Conspiracy mt>re agreement i~ not enough. An
act or illeg11.I omission mU11t takP place in pursuance
of the conspiracy and in order to the doing of the
thing conspired for .. But in the uffence of criminal
conspiracy the very agreement or plot is an act in
itself and is the gist of the offence. Willes, J.
observed in Mulcahy v. The Queen (') :
"When to agree to carry it into effect,
the very plot is an act in itself. and the act of
each of the parties, promise against promise,
actu.~ contra Mtum, capable of being enforced,
if lawful, punishable if for a criminal object
or for the use of criminal m ans."
Put very briefly, the distinction betwe!'n
the offence of abetment under the seoond clause
of s. 107 and that of criminal conspiracy under
s. 120A is this. In the former offence a mere
combination of persons or agreement between thflm
is not enough. An act or illegal omission muat
take place in puTHuance of the conspiracy and in
order to the doing of the thing conspired for ; in
the latter offence the mere agreement is enough,
if the agreement is to commit an offence.
So far &8 abetment by oonspiracy is concern·
ed the abettor will be liable t.o punishment under
varying circumstances detailerl in ss. 108 to 117.
It is unnecessary to detail those circumstanC<'s for
the present cBle. For the offence of criminal
conspiracy it is punishable under s. l 20B.
Having regard to the distinction pointed out
above, I am of the opinion th'lt para. 5 of the
second complaint, though it used the expression
"criminal conspiracy" really disclosed an offence
of abetment by conspiracy. It made no allegation
0
{I) (1868) L. R. SH. L. 306, 917.
2S.C.R.
•
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
321
11/0I
of any agreement between the several persons at
a particular place or time. It said that the accused
Pramatha Nath
Taluqdar
persons complainel. against entered into a conspi·
v.
racy to forge certain documents were forged or $Moj Banj.,. S•kllr
caused to be forged. In other words, an illegal
Das J.
act was done in pursuance of the conspiracy and
furthermore the documents so forged were used
as genuine. Having regard to these allegations in
para. 5 of the second complaint, I am unable to
hold that the learned Chief Presidency Magistrate
was wrong in taking cogniza,nce of the offence of
abetment by conspiracy, for which offence no
consent or sanction under s. l96A of the Code of
Criminal Procedure was necessary. Therefore, there
was·violation of the provisions of that section.
In this view of the matter it is unneceBBary
to consider the correctness or otherwise of the
further view expressed in some of the decisions (see,
for example, State of Bihnr v. Srrtal Kejriwal ( 1) to
which the special BPnch has referred) that there
tho matter has ~one beyond a mere conspiracy and
substantive offences are. a!IPged to have been
actually committed in pursuance thereof, ss. I20A and
120B are wholly irrelevant. That view has not been
accepted as correct by some of the other High
Courts. Jn the State of Andhra Pradesh v. Kandim.aUa 8Ubbaiah (')this Court held that offences created
by ss. 109 and 120B, Indian Penal Code were distinct offences, though for a reason stated somewhat differently from what I hA.ve stated. It
further held that where a number of offences were
committed by sevnal per~ons in pursuance of a
conspiracy, it was not illegal to charge them. with
those offences aR wi· 11 a.s with th" offence of conspiracy to commit those offences, though it was
not desirable to charge the accused persons with
conspiracy with the ultc>rior object of letting in
evidence whi~h would othPrwise be inadmissible and
futhermore, it was undesirable to complicate a
(I) A·t.R. 1960 Patna 45Q.
(21
[1962] l S. C.R. 19-1.
322 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1962) SUFP.
lHl
trial by introducing a large number of charges
spread over a long period. The question wa~ trt>at.
ed a.s one of propriety rather than of h·gality. The
'.
8aroj Baja S11<klfr question of sanction was also considered in that
case, but in view of the order of remand passed,
Das J.
no opinion waa expressed thereon.
The special Bench expreBBed the view that
it was not nece88ary to g:i to the Pxlent of saying
that in a r.ase of this nature 88. I 20A and 120B became wholly irrelevant. The special Bench proceeded on the footing that irrespective of whe th er
BB. 120A and 120B became wholly irrelevant or not
the second complaint undoubtedly disclosed an
offence of abetment by comspirncy and it was
open to the Chief Presidency Magistrate to take
congnizanoe of that offence. I think that there
are no good reasons for holding that the view
taken by the special Jk.nch is not correct. In my
opinion, the special Bench rightly overruled the
objection as to the alleged violation of tho provi·
eions of s. l OHA of the Code of Crimina.l Procedure.
Now, I come to the third and principal question agitated in these appt>als. On bPhalf of one
of the appellants, Saurindra Mohan Basu, Mr.
Purushottam TrikumdM has argued before us that
when the first complaint containing more or less
the same allegat.ions was cli8miesed under s. 203
of the Code of Criminal Procednre by the Chief
Presidency Magistrate, it was not at all open to
his succe8sor to entertain the second complaint. He
has put the matter as one of law and has argued
that tho only way of getting rid of an order of
dismissal under s. 203 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure kno"'n to the Code of Criminal Procedure is to have it act aside in accordance witl.J tho
procedure laid down in ss. 436 and 439 of the Code.
Ho has further argued that, as a matter of law,
a seoond complaint is not entertainable as long
as the order of dismissal under s. 203 of the Code
l'ramatlia Y oJA
Taiwqdar
•
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
323
1961
of Criminal Procedure is not set aside by a competent authority. His argument is that the two deci- :f'romatha NaJA
Rions in N ilratan Sen v. J ogesh Chandra Bhattacharjee(1)
Tal~;dar
2
and Kamal Chandra Pnl v. Gourchand Adhikary ( ) Saroj Ranjan S1rkar
should be held as good law. Section 403 of the
Das J.
Code of Criminal Procedure is relevant to this
argument. It embodies the well-established rule
of common law that a man may not be put twice
in perii for the same offence and that no man
should he vexed with several trials for offences
arising out of identical acts. An Explanation
appended to the section says inter alia that the
dismissal of complaint or the discharge of accused
person is not an acquittal for the purposes of the
section. If the Legislature had intrnded that the
dismissal of a complaint or the discharge of an
accused person would be a bar to fresh proceeding
on the same allegations unless the order of dismissal or discharge were set aside by a higher court,
it would have said so either explicitly or by omitting the I<Jxplanation altogether. The~efore, the
effect of the Explanation is that under s. 403 a
fresh trial is barred only in cases of acquittal or
conviction by a court of compet<'nt jurisdiction,
coming within the purview of sub-s. ( 1) ther.eof.
This aspect of the question was considered in
Queen Empress v. Dolegobind Dass ('), which was a
case dealing with a previous order of discharge of
the accused person. Jn that case, Maclean, C. J.
referred to the deci>ion in Nilratan Ben's case (1)
and said:
" •There is no express provision in the
Code to the effect that the dismissal of a
complaint shall be a bar to a fresh complaint
being entertained so long as th" order of
dismisRa\ remains
unreversed' (see per
Benerjee, .T. in Nilratan Sens' v. J ogesh
Glnndra Bhattacharjee (supra). I agree in
that.. If, then there be no express provision
(II J.L R 23 f'al. 983.
(31 (1900)
(2) (1857) J.L.R. 24 Cal 2E6,
I L R. 28 Cal. 211.
324 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1962] SUPP.
IHI
p,..,,.,,,. NatA
T.J"'l'4r
v.
S•of IUrnjon S .,,_
DasJ.
in the Code, what is there to warrant us in
implying or in effect introducing into the
Code a provision of such serious import
x x x ? In the absence of any other provisio!I in the Code to justify such an implication x x x x I can appreciate no sound
ground for tht> Cou1t so acting; were it to
do HO it would go perilously nea1· ·to legislat.
ing, instead of confining itself tu construing
the Acts of the Legislature."
The question was then considered hy a Full
Bench of the Calcutt.a High C·mrt in D1rarka Nath
Mcnulul v. Beni Madhab Bamrje,e (1) and it was held
by the Full Bench (Ghose, .J. dissenting) that a
Presidency Magistrate was compPtent to rehear a
warrant <'ase triable under Cb. XXl of the Code
of Criminal Procedure in which he had earlier
discharged the accused person. Nilra/1'71 8cn's
case(') and Kamal, Chandra Pal's case(•) were referred
to in the arguments as summarised in the n·port,
but the ,..iew expressed th1>rein was not acrepted.
Dealing with the question Prinsep, J. said :
"There is no bar to further proceedings
under the law, and, tbereforP, a Magistrate to
'Vhome a complaint has been made ur:der surh
circumstaQceA, is bound to pro<X·ecl in the
manner set out in s. 200, tbat is, to t:>xamin"
the complaint, and, unl••ss he has reason to
distrust the truth of the complaint, or for
some other reason expressly recognised by
law, such as, if ho finds that no olft·nre hacl het"n
committPd, he is bound to take cog11izanco of
the offence on a <'om plaint, and, unleHs he h!ls
good reason to doubt the truth ,,f the com·
plaint., hll is bound to do justice to the complainant, to summon his witnesses and to henr
them in the presence of the arcused ."
0
(IJ
(J~OIJ J.L.R. 28 f".al. 652.
(2) 1.L.R. 23 Cl. 983.
t3J (1897) J.L.R. 24 Cal. 286.
,
2.S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
325
19t1
The same view was expressed by the Madras
High Courtin In re. Koyas81Jn Kutty {') and it was l'ramallia Ne1k
ralugd•r
observed that there was nothing in Jaw against the
entertainment of a second complaint on the same Sorqj R•'fi••.. S.,ka,
facts on which a person had already been dis·
Das J.
charged, inasmuch as a discharge was notequivalent
to an acquittal. This view was reiterated in
·Kumariah v. Chinna Naicker ('), where it was held
that the fact that a previous complaint had been
dismissed under s, 203 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure was no bar to the entertainment of a
secg:0d complaint .. In Hansabi:ii Sayaji v. Ananda
Ganuji (') the question was examined with reference
to a large number of earlier decisions of tieveral
High Courts on the subject and it was held that
there was nothing in law against the entertainment
of a second complaint on the same facts. The same
view was also expressed fa Ram Narain v. Panachand
Jain(•), RamananJl, v' Sheri('), and Allah Ditta v.
Karam Balc8h (6 ). In all these decisions it was
recognised further that though there was nothing in
law to bar the entertainment of a second complaint
on. the same fac~, exceptional circumstan~s must
ei1St for entertamment of a second complaint when
on the same alJegatiolll! a previous complaint had
· been dismiss!ld. · The question of the existence of
.of exceptional circum&ta.nce,s for the entertainment
of a second complaint is a que&tion to which I shall
come later. At· the present moment, I am considering the argument of Mr. Purshot~ Tricumda.s
that the law prohibits altogether the entertainment
of a second complaint when a previous complaint
on the same allegations had been dismi88ed under
s. 203 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. On this
question the High Courts appear to me to be almost
unanimously against the contention of Mr.
Purshottam Tricumdas, and for the reasons given
in the decisions to which I have earlier referrt,d, I
(l) A.J.R. 1918 Mad. '494.
. 13) A.LR. IW9 Born.~.
(5) (1933) LL.R. 56 All, 425.
(2) A.J.R. 1946 Mad. 167..
(4) A.IR. 1949 Pat. 256.
(6) (1930) I.L.}l. 12 Lah. 9.
326
19~1
P""r.J'" f,,."''•
i
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1!!6:!] SUPP.
&?J unable to accept his contention. I lircrpt the
view expressed by the High Courts that there is
nothing in law which prohibits the rntertRinment
·-;~"'Ii.. Sarkar of a second complaint on the same all<'gatioD8 when
Das J.
a previous complaint had been clismissed under
s. :!03 of the Code of Criminal Procerlure. I also
accept the viow that as a rule of neoessary caution
and of proper exercise of the dis<-retion given to a
Magistrate under s. 204(1) of tho Code of Criminal
Procedure, exceptional circumstances must exist for
the Pntertainment of a second complaint on the same
allegations; in other words, there must bP- good
reasons why the Magistrate thinks that th<·re i~
"sufficient i;round for proooeding" with thn second
complaint, wh~n a prc\'ious complaint on the same
allegation" was dismissed under s. :103 of the Code
of Criminal Procedure.
The question now is, what should bo those
exceptional circum.tanceH ~ In Queen Empress v,
lJob.igobind lJass ('),.Maclean, C. J. said :
·•I only desirn to add that no l'rcsi<lenl·y
Magistrate ought, in m.v opinion, to rehear a
case previously dealt with by a Magistrate of
coordinato jurisdiction upon the same <'ddenoc
only, unless he is plainly satisfied that there
has be('n some manifest error or manifest
miocaniago of justice."
Thus, according to this decision, the exceptional circumstance must be such as would lead the
.Magistrate to thiuk that the previous order of
<li;;missal was due tu a manifest error or resulted in
a manifest miscarriage of justire. Ju re. iloyusrnn
KuUy (') Sauasiva Aiyar, J. formulated the t<'st of
exceptwnal circmmtanccs in the following w11r<ls :
•·Taking it tht:u thut the <lisdiargc wad
proper and legal, there is no doubt nothing in
law against the entertainment of a second
! I1
(l!IOO! l.L.R. 28 Cal. 211.
('.·;
1\,l.R. 1918, ~.t.tl..I. ·~'J-i,
2 s.c.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
327
complaint on the same facts as a discharge is
not equivalent to an acquittal; but I think
that unless very strong grounds are shown a
,person who has been charged once and discharged ought not to be harassed again on the
same charge. It is not alleged that new facts
have been discovered which the police did not
know when they brought the first charge."
In this decision the test formulated was the
discovery of new facts which were not known when
the first charge of complaint was made. In
Kumariah v. Chinna Naicker (') the same test was
igain applied when it was observed :
"There is nothing to indicate thht there
was no proper investigation on the previous
complaint or that there was any necessity for
investigating the second complaint. x x x
No additional witness had been cited in the
second complaint, nor, as pointed out by the
Additional Magistrate, was it alleged that any
other kind of evidence had been discovered or
was likely to be forthcoming."
It is worthy of note, however, that Kuppu·
swami Aiyar, J. did not say that the discovery of
a new fact or new evidence must be of such a
character that it was not known to the complainant
when the prior complaint was brought and dismissed.
In Hansribai Sayaji v. Ananda Ganuji (') it was
pointed out that the circumstance that the second
complaint was filed by a person other than the one
who mr.de the first complaint made no difference
and the test laid down in some early Rangoon High
Court decisions· [Ma The Kin v. Nga E Tha (')
and U Shu'e v. Ma Sein Ewin(') ] was accepted as
the correct test. In Ma The Kin's case (supra) the
test was ·thus expressed :
(1) A. I. R. 1946. Mad. 167.
(3) l U· B. R. 19,
(2) A. I. R. 1949 Bom. 384.
(4) A. I. R. 1925 Rao&QOD 114,
1901
Pr.,,.al/sa Nfll/I
T alUf/dar
••
S aroj Ranjan Sa, !tar
DasJ.
328 SUPREME COURT UEPORTS [1962] SUPP.
IHI
T.,._
Ps ••''' N&llt
v.
s• .;a..;.. s.,u,
DaJ.
"It is tho duty of a Magistrate, therefore,
who receives a complaint in a case who re
there has been a previous order of dismissal
or discharge, not to issue process, unless he is
plainly satisfied that there has been some
manifeat error or manifest miscarriage of
justice, or unless new facts are adduet·tl which
the complainant had not knowledge of or
could not with reasonable dilig<'nce have
brought forward in the previous proceedings."
It will be noticed that in the test thus laid
down the exceptional circumstances are brought
under three categories; (1) manifest error, (:!j mani·
fest mis,·arriago of justice, and (3) new facts which
the complainant had no knowledge of or could not
with reasunable diligence have brought forward in
the previous proceedings. Any exceptional circumstances coming within any one or more of the aforesaid three categories would fulfil the test. In Ram
Narain v. Punadzand Juin (') it was observed that
an exhaustive list of the exceptional circumstances
could not b~ given though some of th(; categories
were mentioned. One new category mentioned was
where the previous order of dismissal WM passed
on an incuruplete record or a misunderi;tanding of
the natun· of the complaint. This new category
would pc1haps fall within the category of manifest
error or miscarriage of justice.
It appears to me that the test laid down in
the earliest ,,j th<' aforesaid decisions. Queen
Empress v. Doleyobind Dass ('), i8 really wide enough
to cover the other c'l.tegories mentioned in the later
decisions. Whenever a Magistrate is satisfied
that the previous order of
dismissal was
due to a manifest error or has resulted in a
miscarriage of justice, he can entertain a second
complaint on the. ~ame alle_gat!<•ns even tho~g~
an earlier complamt was dlBlDl88Cd under s. ~03
( 11 A.I.R. 1949 Pat. ~56.
(2)
1:~<r;?'
R.'."A_C';:l!JI.
•
2 IS.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
329
1961
of the Code of Criminal Procedure. I do not
Pramolha Nath
think that in a matter of this kind it is either
Taluqdar
v.
possible or even desirable that the exceptional
Saroj Ranjan Sarkar
circum~tances must be state<l with any more
DasJ.
particularity or precision. The learned Advoc'Lte
for the respondent argued before us that a new
category should be added and he called it "frustration of justico". I am of the view that apart from
any question of felicity of this new expression, this
new category does not give any more assistance
towards· explaining the ·exceptional circumstances
which must exist before a second complaint on the
same allegations can be entertained. I am content .
in this case to proceed on the footing that the
Magistrate must be satisfied that there was a manifest error or a miscarriage of justice before he can
entertain a second complaint on the same facts.
ln this case, two exceptional circumstances
were adverted to before us. One is that the
learned Chief Presidency Magistrate who dealt
with the first complaint completely misdirected
himself as to the true scope and effect of ss. 203
and 204 of the Cude of Criminal Procedure and
this, it is contended, resulted in a manifest
mi~carriage of justice when he dismissed the first
complaint under. s. 203 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure. I am of the view that there is substance
in this contention. Section 203 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure states that the Magistrate may
dismiss the complaint, if, after considering the
statement on oath, if any, of the complainant and
the witnesses and the result of the investigation or
enquiry, if any, under s. 202, there is in his
judgment no sufficient ground for proceeding.
Section 204 lays down that if in the opinion of the
Magistrate taking cognizance of an offence there is
sufficient ground for proceeding, he shall iBBue a
summon or a warrant, as the case ma.y require.
What is the true 1oope and effect of the expression
330
SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1962] SUPP.
"sufficient ground for proceeding" occurring in the
aforesaid two sections ? This was considered by
this Court in Vadilal Panchal v. DaU1itrayu Dulaji
v.
Ghadigavn!.:er
(1). With reference to ss. :!00, 202
Saoj Ban1an Sarkar
and :l03 of the Code of Crimin11.I Procedure it was
D•sJ.
there ob&•rved :
1961
P,am4. Aa Noth
T•luqdar
"The inquiry is for the purpose of
ascertaining thc truth or falsehood of the
complaint ; that is, for ascertaining whether
there is evidence in support of the complaint
so as to justify the issue of prooess and
commencement of proceedings against the
person concerned. The section does not
say that a regular trial for adjudging tho
guilt or otherwise of the person complained
against should take place at that stage ; for
the person complained against can bo legally
<~lied upon to answer tho accusation made
against him only when a process has issued
and he is put on trial."
It was further observed that if the l'r!aizistrate had
not m~sdireoted himself as to the seope of an
enquiry under s. Z02 and had applied his mind
judicially to the material~ before him, it would be
erroneous in law to hold that a pie& ! .411ed on an
cxoeptio.n could not be acr.epted by 11· ..i in arriving
at his judgment. In another decisio.o, of this Court
Hamgopal Genapatria Ruia v. State of Bomhay ('}
the expression "sufficient grounds" occurrin~
in es. 209, 210 and 213 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure was considered and it was held that
the expression did not mean sufficient grounds for
the purpose of conviction but meant such evidence
as would be sufficient to put the ·accused upon
trial by the jury. In dealing with the first comp·
la.int the learned Chief Presidency Magistrate
proceeded to consider not whether there w11.11
(IJ [IS61] IS. C.R. I
(l)
[1!08] S.C R 618
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTts
331
1961
sufficient ground for proceeding within the meaning
of ss. 203 and 204 of the Code o(Criminal Procedure
Pramatha Nath
Taluqd·1r
but whether there was sufficient evidence for
•.
conviction of the accused persons. In my opinion, S1r~i Ranjar•
Sarlcrir
this approach was completely wrong and resulted
DasJ.
in a manifest miscarriage of juatice. The learned
Chief Presidence Magistrate said :
"In cases depending on circumstantial
evidence in order to justify any inforoncc
that an offence has been committed t.he
incriminating facts must be incompatible
with innocence of the person accused and
incapable of explanation upon any other
reasonable hypothesis than that of his guilt.
If tlie circumstances are found to be as
consistent with innocence as with the guilt
of the accused, no inference of guilt can be
drawn. fn the present case the circumstances
above equally may lead to the inference that
the document was ante-dated and might or
might not have been forged. Therefore the
circumstances are not precise to be of any
value as evidence."
These observations clearly show that the learned
Chief Presidency Magistrate misdirected himself
as to the true scope and effect of ss. 203 and 204 of
the Code of Criminal Pro(ledure. He did not keep
in mind the true purpose of the enquiry before
him which was to ascertain whether there was
evidence in support of the complaint so as to
justify the issue of process and commencement
of proceedings against the accused persons. He
further failed to . keep in mind that ss. 203 and 204
of the Code of Criminal !'rocedure did not say that
a regular trial· for judging the guilt or otherwise
of the person complained against should take place
at that stage. It waR not for learned Chief
Presidency Magistrate to apply the test whether
the circumstances were or were not incompatible
with the innocence of the accused persons. Tlie
332 SUPREME COUH.T REPORTS [1962] SUPP.
1981
..
PramatM Natli
T aJIM{dar
S111~ Ronjan SMkar
DosJ.
purpose of the enquiry before him was merel.v to
prime facie the truth or falsPhood of the
complaint. Instead of holding an
enquiry
int11 the complaint, the learned Chief Presidency
Magistrate proceeded as though he was trying
the e.ise itself on merits. I consider that this mistak~ on the part of the learned Chief Presidency
:.\fagistrate gave a ~rong direction to the whole
proceedings on the first complaint and the order of
dismissal passed by him was.due to a manifest error
and resulted in miscarriage of justice.
asc~rtain
The second exceptional circumstance is aR to
the presence of the telephone number "City 6091"
printed on the sheet of pa.per on which were typed
the minutes of the proceedings dated January 16,
1948. When the first complaint was dealt with by
the· Chief Presidency Magistrate no evidence was
led to show that the City Exchange did not come
into existence until December, 1948 and that the
telephone connection relating to that particular
number was obtained fur the first time by the
Hinrlusthan Co-operative Insurance Society Ltd. on
or about March 18, 11149. This, I think, would be
a new matter which was not considered when the
first complaint was dismissed under s. 203 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure. There was a good
deal of argument as to whether this matter relating
to the City Exchange was known to the complainant and his brothers from before, and, if so, why
they did not bring it to the notice of the learned
Chief Presidency Magistrate who dealt with the
first complaint. It appears that an applicll.tlon
dat.ed June 7, 195i> was made before Debabrata.
Mookcrjee, J. who heard the application in revision
with regard to the first complaint. In that appli·
oa.tion certain statement!! were ma.de with regard to
the City Exchs.nge. Those statements did .not,
however, include any a.verment as to the knowl~dge
of the complainant, Promode Ra.njan Sarkar, about
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
333
1961
the facts relating to the· City Exchange and telephone number "City 11091". The application merely
Pramatha ,Vath
Tti.tuqt/ar
stated that the facts stated therein were matters of
v.
public history and it was essential in tlie ends of Saroj Ranjan
Sarkar
justice to t.ake judicial notice thereof. Debabrata
DasJ.
Mookerji, J. apparently rejected this application
but did not record any formal orders on that date.
He recorded formal orders after he had dismissed
the application in revision. He said therein that he
was not. prepared to take into consideration the
facts alleged in the application dated June, 7, 1955
as they related to new matters. The ar!lument on
behalf of the appellants before us is that the facts
relating to the Qity Exchange were not new matters,
because the complainant, Saroj Ranjan Sarkar,
nowhere said that he did not know them before. The
argument, therefore, is that it does not fulfil the
test of "new facts which the complainant have no
knowledge of or could not with reasonable diligence
have brought forword in the previous proceedings".
The learned Advocate for the respondent has, in
my opinion, rightly submitted that it is somewhat
illogical to say at one stage of the proceedings that
the matter was a new matt(lr and could not, therefore, be taken into consideration and at a later
stage to say that it is not a new matter and therefore could not be takan into consideration.
This much, however, is clear that the matter
relating to the City Exchange and in particular
telephone number "City 60)1" was not at all considered when the first complaint was dismissed
under s. !103 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
This matter is of some impertance because if there
was no such telephone number on January 16, 1948,
the minutes of the proceedings purporting to bti of
th'\t date must have come into existence on a later
date. This would have great relevance and bearing
on the allegation of forgery made with regard to
the minutes of the proceedings dated January 16,
1948.
334 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1962] SUPP.
Pramath• Nath
..
1 al•qdar
S1Jtt>j Rt»1jan S1ttlcar
DOJ .i.
On behalf of Saurindrll. Mohan Basu it was
further contended that there was not even primAJ
f acie evidence against him and tho learned Chief
Presidency Maitistrate was wrong in issuing process
against him. It is only nec!'BBary to point out that
the learned Chief Presidency Magistnte found that
there was a primAJ facie case against Saurindra
Mohan Ra.im. He had attested the signature of the
late Nalini Ranjan Sarkar and if that ·signature was
forged, then that would be primAJ facie evidence
against :Saurindra Mohan Basu also.
My learned brethren have taken the view that
the entertaining of the second complaint in the
circumstances of this case i• a gross abuRe of the
processes of the Court. I find myself unable to
subscribe to that view. My conclusion is just
the opposite, namely, that the f'ntertaining of the
second complaint fully l!(>rves the interc8ts of
just.ice. I am further of the opinion that its dismissal would defeat the f'nds of justie1·. In this
counoction, I have already reforr~d to the two
exeeptionaf circumstances \\·hirh exist : one is that
the learned Chief Presidency Magistrate who dealt
with the first complaint comple!Rly misdirected
himself as to . the true scope and effect of ss. 203
and 204 of the Code of Criminal Procedure; the
second is that Debabrata Mookerjee, J. wrongly
refused to take into consideration the circumstances
relating to the installation of the Cit) Exchange
and telephone number "City 600 I", circumstances
which had a decisive btaring on the allegation of
forgery made with regard to the minutes of the
proceedings dated January 16, 1948. Even a cnrsory
perusal of the order of the Chief Presidency Magistrate (Shri N. C. Chakravarti) dated August 6, l!lfi4
with regard to the first complaint shows that the
learned Chief Presidency Ma'.!istrnte proceeded on
the footing as though he was trying a case based
entirely on circumstantial evidence; he formulated
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
335
the tests for drawing conclusions from circumstantial evidence and applying those tests, he came to
P1•matha Nat/a
Taiu.qdar
the conclusion that the complaint was not true. He
v.
rejected the evidence of the ha,nd-writing expert as SarQj Ranjan
Sarkar
though it was his function to try the case. He
DasJ.
rejected the enquiry report of Shri A. B. Syam (who
htJ\d that there was a prima facie case for the issue
of process) on very insufficient grounds. He even
went to the lC'ngth of judging for himself the
peculiar characteristics of Nalini Ranjan Sarkar's
hand-writing depending on the personality of the
writer. In my view, in all these matters the learned
Chief Presidency Magistrate misdirected himself as
to the true scope of the enquiry before him and he
forgot that what he had to find was whether prima
facie there was believable evidence in support of
the allegations made in the complaint. This does
not necessarily mean that a Magistrate dealing with
a com plaint is obliged "to bind himself to a mere
mechanical or a wholly uncritical acceptance of the
complainant's story". Indeed, it is the duty of the
Magistrate to judge the materials on which he has
to make up his mind as to the sufficiency or otherwise of the ground for proceeding further with the
complaint and in judging the materials he must sift
them and su bruit them to a critical examination.
Thi~ aspect of the question was 11rg11ed before
Debabrata Mookerjee, J. and he referred to it in his
judgment. I say this without meaning any disrespect to the learned .Judge, but it appears to me
that he missed the distinction which was pointed
out. by this Court in Ramgopal Ganpatrai Ruia v.
The 8tate of Bombay( 1 ), namely, that the expression
"sufficient grounds" occurinp: in ss. 209, 210 and
213 of the Code of Criminal Procedure does not
mean sufficient grounds for the purpose of conviction, but means such evidence as is sufficient to put
the accused person upon trial by the jury. In ss.
203 and 201, Criminal Procedure Code, the e:x:pres(t: [I.g3a] S.C.R. 618.
•
336 SUPREME COU.H.T REPORTS [1962] SUPP.
11111
l'r•.Wlkt J{Ill A
r.i...,1.,
v.
S4~oJ 8a'ljt111 StuW
o.,J.
sion is "111Iffioient ground for proceeding" which
really means 111Ifficient ground for prooeding with
the oomplaint. Sufficient ground for proceeding
with the complaint is one matter and sufficient
ground for convicting an al'cused person is quite a
different matter. It is thiB distinction which has
to be kept in mind and the failure to keep suoh a di~
tinction in mind in the present case has resulted in
a manifest error. Debabrata. MookP,rjee, J. detailed
seven circumstances as those on whioh the complainant relied in support of the allegation of
forgery. He then went on to deal those circumstances as though the function of the Court then
was to find out whether there was sufficient ground
for convicting the accused person. I refer particularly to the view expressed by the learned Chief
Presidency Magistrate to the effect that one of the
documents in quPstion might have been ante-dated
by Nalini Ranjan Sarkar himself. This was a
suggestion made on behalf of the accused persons
as a possible defence to the charge of forgery and
it was not the function of the Chief' Presidency
Magistrate to consider the defence at that stage.
Debabrata Mookerjee, J. himself said :
"!£, on the other hand, the Magistrate
has met the facts alleged by the comp.11\inant
by anticip&tin!? poBSible defences to the charge,
thus travelling beyond the facts themselves
and the inferences and the probabilititiS
legitimately raised by them, he must be held
to have exceeded the allowable limits of an
initial t~st of the complainant's story."
Yet, the t>ossible defenoe that Nalini Ranjan Sarkar
might have himself ante-dater\ the document was
not only considered by the IMrnen Chief Prl'sidency
Magistrate but was acoepted bv Dcbabrata
Mookerjee J.. This, in my opiuic>n, clearly demonstr11.tes the manifest error or injustioe which has taken
place in this case, though in the conoluding part of his
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
337
1901
judgment Debabrata Mookerjee, J. expressed the
view that he did not oonsider that t.he learned
Pramallia Halli
Taluqitw
Chief Presidency Magistrate had over-stepped the
v.
permissible limits of a preliminary probe into Sar9j Rattjan Sarlcar
the truth or otherwise of the complainant's story.
Da1J,
He further said that in his view the learned Chief
Presidency Magistrate in sifting the materials
offered did not dispose of them by anticipating a
possible defence of the parties ; yet the one possible defence to the charge of forgery was that
Nalini Ranjan Sarkar might himself have antedated the document in question and that very defence was considered and accepted not only by
the learned Chief Presidency Magistrate but by
Debabrat~ Mookarjee, J. also.
The second mistake which led to a manifest
injustice was the refusal to take into consideration the cirumstances relating to the installation of
the City Exchange and the telephone number
"City 6091". Dababrata Mookerjee, J. made no
orders on the application dated June 7, 1955. In
his final order he said :
"The application speaks for itself. I was
not prepared on that date to take any notice
of the new matter;; mentioned in that application and I adhere to· my decision."
In my view Debabrata Mookerjee, J. was grievously
in error in rejecting the application. As I have said
earlier, the circums(ances relating to the installation of the City Ex:change and telephone number
"City 6091" had a decisive bearing on the- truth
or otherwise of tbe allegation of forgery and to
reject the application to take those circumstances
into consideration really amounted to a denial of
justice. Debabrata Mookerjee, J. took the view
that it was a new matter which could not be taken
into consideration and, pradoxically enough, the
argument before us is th>\t not being a new matter
it shoutd not have been taken into consideratio~
338 SUPREME OOURT REPORTS (1962) SUPP.
1961
in connection with the second complaint. Thia
paradox clearly demonstrates tho injustice that
FramaJ!oo Nath
Toluqdor
will result from a. failure to ta.ko into consideration
'· Sartor circumstances which a.re decisive of thA allegations
Boroj R ,..j.,.
made in the complaint. When thA complainant
DosJ,
made an app\icn,tion for a certificate for appeal
to the Supreme Court against the order paBSed by
Debs.bra.ta Mookerjoo. J., he forcofu lly contended
that the refusal to take notice of the circumstances
relating to tho installation of the City Exchange
a.mounted to a. . denin,l of justice. This application
was dealt with by a. Bench of two Judges of the
Calcutta. High Court (Das Gupta. and Bachawa.t, ,J.J.).
Tho learned Judges expressed the view that if they
were dealing witb the matter, they woulrl have
thought it right to refer to the 'appropriate books
for ascertaining tho date on which tho City
Exchange came into existence. Thry, however,
felt that the matter was within the discretion of
Dobabrata. Mookerjee, J. and they were not prepsrad
to give a certificate in a matter of discretion. Another point which was urged before that Bench
was this. Tho complaint was for offences triable
by the Court of seSBions and the question which
the learned Chief Presidency Magistrate had to
put himself was not whether he, for himself, believed
tho allegations to be true but whether the materials
before him were snob that thereupon a reasonable
body of men might believe the allegations to be
true. Tho learned Judge said.:
"In our judgment there is considerable
force in this argument, but at the same
time we have to take notice of tho fact that
this question docs nrit appear to have been
decided by the courts."
Since those observati~ns were made, a. decision has
been given by this Court and that decision supports
tho contention Lurgod on behalf of the complainant.
The matter then ca.me to thia Court on an a.pplica-
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
339
11111
tion for special leave, and specia.1 leave was granted
by this Court on February 13, 1956. An appeal Pramath.J Nall
Talllfdm
w11s filed in pursuance of that special leave, but
v.
ultimately Promode Ranjan Sarkar withdrew his Baroj Ra"jan BCTTw
appeal by filing a petition on February 3, 1959. In
DasJ.
that petition he stated that at the intervention of
common friends and well wishers of the parties,
he had settled his disputes with the respondents
therein and did uot want to proceed with the appeal,
a statement which, iu the circumstances of this
case, amounts almost to. compounding a felony.
The appflal was accordingly withdrawn on March 12,
1959. The present complaint, Saroj Ranjan Sarkar,
alleged in his petition of complaint th:ft the with·
drawal of the appeal filed in this Court in the circumstances stated above was due to undue influence
exercised by the. accused persons. Whether that
allegation is cGrrect or not can only be determined
after evidence has been led. There are, however,
circumstances which seem to me indicate that the
withdrawal of the appeal in this Court was for the
purpose of defeating the ends of justice. The
riccused persons must have realised that if the
evidence relating to the installation of the City
Exchange and telephone No. "City 6091 "was a vilable
and considered, then there would be no escape
from the position that the minutes ol the proceed·
ings of the Board meeting of N. R. Sarkar and Co.
Ltd., dated January 16, Hl48 must have been forged
and this aspect of the matter was very rightly emphasised by the learned Chief Prrsidency Mairistrate
(Shri Bijayesh Mukherjee) who dealt with the
second complaint as also by the Special Bench of
three Judges who dealt with the matter on the revision applications made against the order of the
learned Chief Presidency Magistrate on the second
complaint. It is also worthy of note that this Court
must have granted special leave in respect of the
order passed on the first complaint, because it felt
that there were arguable points in support of the
340
lHI
application for special leave, one of such points
apparently being the .refusal to ooneider the cir-.
cnmstances relating to the installation of the City
v.
Soroj RIVj4" s.k4r
Exchange. On the second complaint the learned
. Chief Presillency Magistrate, as also the High Court,
o., J.
took those eircum~tancea into consideration and
rightly helrl that thos!' circumstanc<'s clearly in<li·
catcd that the alkgationR made in the complaint
were pri'.ma facie true. The learned Chit·f Presidenoy
Magistrate further held that having regard to the
antecedent circumstances, there waij no unduP delav
in filing the SP<'ond complaint. Ht· further held tha"t
there was no intention to hlnckmnil. in the sense
that one brother having failed on the first ("Om·
plaint, another brother was fraudulently trying
to start afresh the criminal law in motion. ThPse
findings oft he learned Chief Presideney )fagistrate
were accepted by a 8pecial Benoh of three Judges of
the Calcutta High Court. I have hea1d nothing in
the course of the arguments addressed before us
which would justify me to go behind those finrlinge,
particularly in an appeal filed by special leav<> under
Art. 136 of the Constitution. The learned Chi~f Presidency Magistrate and a Bench of thne Judgrs of
tho Calcutta High Court held specifically on the
second complaint that there was a primafacie case
and the tli$missal of tho first complaint resulted
in manifo~t injustice. I set> no rea8ons to differ
from the viPw thus f'Xprcsse<l h_y the learned Chief
Posidcm·y !\Tagistrate and the High Court.
For these reasons I have come to the conclu·
sion th&t there ure no good grounds for interfering
with the judgment and order of the .S1,..cial Bench
dated Deccmb<>r 22/2:J, rnuo. I would 'l.ecordingly
dismiss the two appeals.
The .Judgment of Kapur and Hiclayatullah,
JJ., was d<'livercd by
KAPUR, .J.-Thern are two appeals against the
judgment and order of the High Court of
p ..,.,,.. NIJ/t
Tol"'lit.
!
SUPREME OOURT REPORTS (1962] SUPr.
2 s.c.R.
SUPREME COUR't REPOR™
341
1961
Calcutta. which raise the question of -competency of
-~a second complaint in regard to the same matter p,,.,,..l/uJ Nalh
Toluqw
after the first complaint has been dismissed under
v.
s. 203 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The s...; R ..j .. sari...
respective appellants in the two appeals are P. N.
K.pwJ.
Taluqdar and Sourindra. Mohan Basu an attorney of
Calcutta against wliom process has been iBBued by
the Chief Presideney Magistrate Calcutta on a
complaint filed by the respondent Saroj Ranjan
Sarkar.
The facts of these appeals are these: In 1944
a private limited company-.N. R. Sarkar & Co.,
Ltd.-was formed by the late Mr. N. R. Sarkar,
who was a well known financier and incf'ustrialist
and a public man of Bengal. This company was the
Managing Agent of several puplic limited companies
such as Hindusthan Development Corporation Ltd.,
Hindusthan C!iemicals
Limited, Hindusthan
Pilkington Glass -Works Limited etc. Mr. N. R.
Sarkar was the Managing Director of N. R, Sarkar
& Co., Ltd. Out of the share 'capital of this company
he held 4649 shares. His younger brother .l'romode
Ranjan Sarkar held 50 shares. Appellant P. N.
· Taluqdar . who was a paid employee of the
Hindusthan Cooperative Insurance Co., Ltd. held
300 shares and was a director of the Company and
Shanti Ranjan Sarkar, a son of N. R. Sarka.r's
deceased brother, held one share. As Mr. ·N. R.
Sarkar became the Finance Minister in the West
Bengal Government, be obtained leave of abse.nce
on January · 4, 1948, from the directors of N. R.
Sarkar & Co. Ltd. for a period of one yea.r which
was subsequently ext,ended for another year. This
was by a .resolution passed on March 10, 1948.
Mr. N. R. Sarkar joined the Government on
January 23, 1948 and in August 1948 Dr. N. N.
Law became a director of N. R. Sarkar & Co., Ltd.
On July 31, 1951 Mr. N. R. Sarkar executed
a deed of trust in respect of2920 shares out of his
342 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [196!!] SUPP.
1901
p,..,tA. Nub
Tal"'/"'1r
••
.,oj Rturjora S•hzr
XopurJ.
holding in HindUHthan Cooperative i'lociety Ltd.
and 3649 shares out of the shar·es held by him in
N. R. Sa.rkar & Co. Ltd. By this deed he appointed
as trustees his younger brother Promode Ranjan
Sarkar, appellant P. N. Taluqdar and Dr. N. N.
Law and the beneficia.rigs under the truMt deed were
his four younger brothers includiug the eom plain ant
and Shanti Ranj&n Sarkar, his nephew. It is
alleged thc1t the bala.noe of 1,000 shares wa.s to bo
kept in trnst by the appellant P. N. T1duqdar for
the btmefit of his brothers a.nd nephew. N. R.
Sarksr died OH January 25, 1053.
It i' alleged tha_t a. few dayH after the death of
Mr. N. R. Sarkar, the appellant, Sourin.:lra Mohan
Basu in a casual manuer infonn.·d Promode Ranjan
Sarkar that his brother N. R. Sarkar had executed
two documer;ts one an unregistered doed of agreement dated January 19, 1948, appointing tlto appellant P. N. Ta.luqdar as tho Managing Director of
N. R. Sa.r kar & Co., Ltd. and a deed of transfer
dated February fl, 1951, transferring 1,000 shares in
N. R. da.rkar & Co. Ltd., in his (l'. N. 'l'aluqd~r's)
favour. Promode Ranjan Sarkar and his urothers
without giving much credence to this information
wanted to see the documents but they were not
allowed to do so. On July 31, 1953, appellant
P. N. Ta.luqdar resigned from the Hindusthan Cooperative Insurance Sol'iety Ltd., in order to take
control of N. R. Sarkar & Co. Ltd., as its .Managing
Director. This led to trouble between Promode
Ra.njan ~arkar and the appellant P. N. Taluqdar
a.nd there we.s some correspondence between
Promode Hanjan Sarkar and the appellant P. X.
Taluqda.r which it is unnecessary to refer tu. At a
meeting of the Board of Directors of .N. It. Sarkar
& Co., held on September 2:.!, 1953, the appointment of appellant P. N. T"luqdar as Managing
Director of N. H.. Sarkar & Co. Ltd., was renewed
for a period of seven yea.rs. This in spite of the
2 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
343
J96l
protest of Promode Ranjan Sarkar and in spite of
Pr.,,.atha N alh
the fact that that item was not on the agenda of the
T6ZuqJ•r
v.
meeting.
Saroj .Ran.jan Sa1"1
On October l, 1953, Promode Ranjan Sarkar
KapurJ.
took inspection of the agreement. On October Ia,
1953, he took inspection of the Minute book and
took photostat copies of some of the documents but
not of the resolution of January 16, 1948. It is
alleged that the appellants and other entered into
a criminal conspiracy and fraudulently forged
certain documents which in the complaint are described thus :
(a} "An unregistered deed of agreement
purporting to have bAen executed by
the late Sri Nalini Ranjan Sarkar as
Governing Director of N. R. Sarkar
& Company Limited on 19th January
1948, (while he was on leave as
stated above) appointing accused No.
l (P. N. Taluqdar) as the Managing
Director of N. R. Sarkar & Company
Limited on a remuneration of
Rs. 1,500-100-2,000/-per month and
the deed bears the signature of
accused No. 2 (S. N. Basu) as the
sole attesting witness.
(b) A transfer deed in respect of 1000
shares of N. R. Sarkar & Co. Ltd.,
which has been entrusted to accused
No. 1 as stated bofore, transferring
them to accused No. 1 for an alleged
consideration of Rs. 1,00,000 (Rupees
One La.kh} also purporting to have
been executed by the late Sri Nalini
Ranja.n Sarkar on 5th February,
1951, with accused No. 2 as attesting
witness . both for the transferor and
transferee.
344 SUPREME OOURT REPORTS [1962] SUPP.
lHl
(c) Minutes of the proceedings of the
Board. Meetings of the said N. R.
T"""1"'1r
Sarkar & Company Limited including
tho&e of a meeting dated 16th
s...; Rajtm s.rA:.r
January,
1948, purporting to bea.r
/iopwrJ,
the signature of the aforesaid late Sri
Na.lini Ranjan Sarkar."
Theae documents, it is alleged, are forged and
have been used and by the use of these forged docu·
ments a. fraud has been perpetrated. On April 3,
l!J59, respondent filed in the Court of the Chief
Presidency Magistrate, Caloutea, a complaint under
sectsions 467, 471 read withs. 109 of the Indian
Pa.nel Code against the two appellants, Dr. N. N..
La.w and A. Chakravarti. Document No. (b) above
is not the subject matter of the complaint because
a suit in regard to it has been filed and is pending
in the Calcutta High Court. On May 7, 19)9,
process was issued a.gs.inst the appellants by the
Chief Presidency Magistrate. Bofore dealing with
the allegations in this complaint it is necessary to
give some further facts of the O&l!C.
On December 12, 1953 Pramode Rajan Sarkar
la.id an in formation with the Commissioner of
Police, Calcutta, against the pel'8ons against whom
the a.hove mentioned complaint w&11 later filed. It
appears that the matter was investigated by the
polioe and by a.Jetter dated February 10, 1954, the
Polioe CommiBBioner expre88ed the opinion that
there was no substance in the allegatio111 which
were being made by Pea.mode Ranjan Sarkar
against the appellants and two others. He stated,
" ....... : .... I have given this matter very careful
consideration gone through various reports and
papers and even examined an important witnti~~
mJ86lf. My examination has led me to conclusion
that allegations are false and vexations." On
Maroh 17, 1954, Pramode Ranj,an Sarkar filed a
oomplaintunder 1111. 467,471 and 88.467, 471 read with
a. 109. After setting out the fa.ots which have
Pr
.
rl'· NolA
2S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
345
1961
been given above and aftttr referring to the three
documents which were alleged to have been forged
Prarnatka Nath;
Taluqdar
it was stated that the deed of agreement was
engrossed on a stamp paper purchased in the name Raroj Ranjan Sarkar
of P.D. Himmatsinghka & Co., a firm of solicitors,
Kapur J
instead of in the name of the parties ; that the
reoolution of January 16, 1948, which purported
to bear the signature of the deceased was in fact.
not signed by him ; that during the lifetime of
Nalini Ranjan Sarkar and after a considerable period
after his death the appellant, P. N. Taluqdar, never
alleged that he had been appointed the Managing
Director of N. R. Sarkar & Co. Ltd., nor did even
appear from any resolution of the Board of N. R.
Sarkar & Co .. that he was appointed the M&naging
Director until September, 1953. Certain other
allegatione which need not be set out at this stage
were also made in this complaint for the purpose
of showing that the appellants had been guilty of
forgery and for using forged documents and for
conspiracy. The matter was heard by the Chief
Presidency Magistrate Mr. N. C. Chakra.borty who
after examining all the witnesses who were produced before him dismissed the complaint by an order
dated August 6, 1954. The learned Chief Presidency Magistrate examined the handwriting
expert and after taking all the facts into consideration he held :
..
0
"that the evidence on handwriting including the opinion of the Handwriting
Expert does not support the complainant's version."
Against this order the complainant Pramode
Ranja.n Sarkar took a revision to the Calcutta High
Court which was heard by Debabrata Mookerjee,
J. Before him three contentions were raised (1)
that the Chief Presidency Magistrate erred in
examining the witnes'!es himself after he had received the result of the enquiry held by Mr. A· B. Shyain,
346
1961
p,.,,..,,..J(.lh
Tal•qdar
v.
-i.roj R011jtVt 811riar
SUPREME OOURT REPORTS [19112) SUPP.
another Magistrate, under s. 202, Code of Criminal
Procedure; (:!) the learned ~Iagistrate misunderstood
the scope of ss. 202 and ;203 and misdirected himself by insisting upon a standard of proof which
the law did not require at the initial stage when
the only question was whether the process should
issue or not and the tLinl contention related
to the power of revision of High Court under
s. 439 when dealing with orders of a Chief Presidency ~fagistrate. The learned Judge held against
the complainant, Pramodc Ranjan Sarkar on the
points that were raised before him. He held that
it was open to the Chief Presidency .Magistrate to
examine witnesses; (2) the learned Magistrate had
not misdirected himselt in regard to the scopcof 88.
202 and 203 and that he could dismi88 the complaint
if in his judgment there wa.s no sufficient ground for
proceeding. He also held that the order of Magistrate was liable to be interfered with if it was made
in disregard of the rules of procedure or it was so
grossly improper or so palpably incorrect as to
require a revision in the intereat of justice. The
learned judge then examined the evidence which
had been produced before the Magistrate and taking the various circumstances into consideration
discharged the rule and dismi88Cd the revision,
holding that the complainant Pramode Ranjan
Sarkar was guilty of undue delay in taking action
a;gainst tho appellants, because he came to know
on October lJ, l!Jli3, as to the forged nature of the
documents and did not take any action till he
wrote to the Police Commissioner to which be got
reply on February 16, 1954, imd he did not file
any complaint or take any action till march 17,
1951, and this delay was unexplained. He all!o
hold that the complainant Pramode Ranjan Sarkar'11
belief in regard to forgery was not established by
the evidence wbioh had beon produced becanse (lJ
he came to know about the agreement complained.
of in February, Ill53, but he discredited it and di.d
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
347
not take any action ; (:J) that when the agreement
came up for renewal on September 22, 1953, for
another ferm of the 7 years he did not oppose it on
the ground that it was a forgery but on legal
grounds. The learned judge did not believe the
evidence of Pramode kanjan Sarkar that up to
February, 1954, he considered it absurd that there
could be such a document. He referred to the
correspondence which passed between the complainant and the appellant P. N. Taluqdar. He also considered.the evidence relating to the watermark and
the circumstances in support of the allegation of
the theory of forgery and not being satisfied with
the evidence he dismissed the revision peti~ion and
thus the order of the Chief Presidency Magistrate
Mr. Chakraborti was upheld. It may be pointed
out that on behalf of complainant Pramode J{anjan
Sarkar an application was made on June 6, 1955,
drawing the attention of the Court to the fact
that on the sheet of a paper on which the minutes
of the meeting held on January 16, 19'18, had been
typed there was printed Telephone "City 6U91"
and that Exchange had not come into existence
till December, 1948. It was not stated when the
complainant came to know of this fact. The learned Judge did not pass any separate Order on this
application and did not take it into consideration in
his judgment.
Against this order an application was made
for a cartificate under Art. 1il4(l)(c) which was
dismissed but in that order this fact as to the City
Exchange coming into existence in December, 1948,
has been taken note of. Pramode Ranjan Sarkar
then applied to this Court for Special Leave which
was granted on February 13, i 95ti, but the appeal
was withdrawn and was therefore dismissed on
March 2, 1959.
. . . The present rl,l_l!pondent .Saroj &.njan . ~rkar ·
then brought a· complaint Wider the same sections
1961
P1amqtha Nath
Taluqdar
v.
Sar.oj Ranjan Sarkar
Kapur .I.
348 SUPR:EME COURT REPORTS [196!!] SUPP.
1U1
P,omatlta N olh
I T•llfl/da•
v.
S~ Raja 8t1rk"'
1::-J.
on April 3, 1959, making the same allegations as
were.made by his elder brother Pramode Ranjan
Sarkar but there is one further allegation as to the
Telephone City Exchange which did not find place
in the previous complaint. In this complaint after
referring to the facts which have been set out above
it was alleged in paragraph 5 as follows :"That in order to assume complete con·
trol over N. R. Sarkar & Co., Ltd. and the
concerns under its Managing A~ency, the
accused, entered into a criminal conspiracy
with ea.ch other a.nd others unknown, to dishonestly and fraudulently forged a Deed of
Agreement, a. Deed of Transfer and make a.
false document, to wit, minute book of N, R.
Sarkar & Co. Ltd., nnd in pursuance thereof
dishonestly and fraudulently forged and/
or caused to be forged and used as genuine
the said documents."
The grounds for forgery were that the unregistered deed dated January 19, 194.8, was engrOBBed
on a stamp pa.per purchased in ihe name of M/s.
P. D. Himmatsinghka & Co; that tho late N. R .
.:Sarkar was on leave granted by the company and
he never attenaed any meeting of the Board for
more than four yea.rs as long as he wu a Finance
Minister; that the signature of Mr. N. R. Sarkar
on the resolution da.t.ed January 16, 1948, was
forged; that during the lifetime of N.R. Snkar it was
never given out by the appellant P. N. Taluqda.r
that he had been appointed a Managing Director,
that in none of the papers and correspondence and
resolutions of the Board until September, 1953, does
it appear that the appellant, P. N. Ta.luqda.r, was
its Managing Director; that tho appellant P. N.
Ta.luqdar continued to hold his post in the Hindosthan
Cooperative Insurance Society Ltd. up to thP end
of J11ly, 1953; that the signature in t.he deed of
appointment was halting and appeared to be a.
forgery even to the naked eye&; that the resolution
•
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
349
for renewal for seven years was passed inspite of
the protest of Pram ode Ranjan Sarkar who was a
director ofN. R. Sarkar & Co. Ltd., and inspection
of the deed of appointment was not given to Pram ode
Ranjan Sarkar in spite of his demands. It was
further alleged that the resolutions of the Boa.rd of
Directors were all on loose sheets of paper, that the
signatuni on the resolutions were forged; that there
was internal evidence to show that the genuine
minutes book had been dishonestly changed; that
the minutes of the preceedings of the Board of
Directors said to have been held on January 16,
1948, wore on a typed sheet; that the Telephone
No. "City 6091" was printed thereon and•the City
Exchange was not in eidstence in January, 1948,
but came into existence in December, 1948. It was
prayed that the accused named therein which included the two appellants be proceeded against
under ss. 467, 471 read with s. 109 of the Indian
Penal Code. It will be noticed therefore that all
the allegations made by Saroj Ranjan Sarkar are
the same as those made by Pramode Ranja.n Sarkar
except in regard to the City Exchange Telephone
Number.
This complaint was accompanied by an
affidavit not of complainant Saroj Ranjan Sarkar
but of Shanti Ranjan Sarkar, his nephew. In
paragraphs l to 7 of this affidavit he stated that the
facts in rdgard to the Calcutta City Exchange were·
matters of public history as they were duly published in the columns of "statesman" dated December 29, 1948, and .he also stated "that I am aware
of the facts and circumstances stated above," but
he did not say as to when he came to know aboqt
the City Exchange matter. It may also be noted
that in the application which was made by the
complainant Pramode Ranjan Sarkar in the High
Court before Debabrata. Mookarjee J., it was submitted that judicial notice be taken of the new
1961
Pramrrt'ia N•th
T.wqddr
•·.
Saroj Ranja Sarkar
Jra;w J.
350 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1962] SUPP.
1961
telephone exchange und!lr s. 57 but it was not
stated as to when that complainant came to know
about the new Telephone ExchanJrA Numbet'. '.Qiat
\',
has been stated in the affidavit of Sh!:iti
.r::'"o,;
.
Rlfl)On s,rJ.or fact
Ranjan Sarkar in almost the ~ame vague manner.
Pr""'•'ho Jlat1'
T"lttqd.,
The learned Chief Presidency :\!agiatrate, who
took cognizance of the second complaint, Mr.
Bijoyesh Mookerjee, after considering the whole
material plac~d before him issued process against
the appellants only. He held that there was no
delay on the pa.rt of the respondent in making the
complaint; that the previous complaint and the
rPAult thereof was no bar to the filing of the second
complaint; that the complaint was not brought with
a view to blackmail the accused including the
appellants, that what tho brotht>r of the re8pondent
did, did not lay the reBpondent open to the charge
of bl11ockmail. On the merits ho took into consideration tho fact in regard to the City Exchange of
which according to the learned Magistrate he could
take judkial notice under s. 57 of the Evidence Act.
He compared various signatures of the late N. R.
Sarkar and after considering tho elaborate order of
his predecessor he said :"I have read and re-read it and with
respect too duo to one of hi8 eminancP, b·rt it
is my misfortune that I have not been persuaded. Th<'re are various other eonAiderationA which point to the ineluctable prima
facir conclusion of forgery. Rut it is not
proper that r burden my order with all that
at this stage."
He held that he was satisfied about the truth of tho
alleg"ations and there was sufficient ground for
proceeding against the appellants under B. 204,
Criminal Procedure Cude and hP therefore issued
proce8s against them but did not li;sne any proeeFs
~gainst I>r. N. N. Law and Amiya Chakravarty who
wcru accused Nos. 3 and 4.
•
2. S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
351
1961
Against this order a revision was taken by the
appellants 'to the High Court and rule was issued
Pram~th Nath
Taluqdar
against the Chief Presidency Magistrate to show
v.
cause why his order should not be set aside. He Sart; Ra,Ya i Sarkar
shgwed cause and the matter was heard by a DiviEapurJ,
sion Bench consisting of P. B. Mukerjee and H. K.
Bose, JJ., and the matter was referred to a larger
Bench because of the importance of the questions
of law which arose in the case.
1
Three questions were r.'tised before the Special
Bench, ( l) whether und~r the appellate side rules of
the High Court it was competent for a Division
Bench consisting of two judges to refer any matter
to a la.rg0r bench for decisiQn in a criminal matter;
(2) whether a second complaint could be entertain.ad on the same fa.cts after a previous complaint
had been dismissed; and (3) whether the complaint
·could be taken cogniza;nce of by the llfagistrate
in the absence or a sanction under s. 196A of the
Criminal Prooedure Code. On all these three points
the finding or the Special Bench was against thE>
appellants. It held that the attention or the Chief
Justice having been drawn to the fa.ct that the case
involved questions or Importance it was open to him
in the exercise of his inherent jurisdiction to
refer the case to a larger bench and therefore the
reference was not illegal. In regard to the filing o,f
a second complaint it held that a fresh complaint
could be entertained after the dismissal of previous
complaint under s. 203 Criminal Procedure Code
when there wa9 manifest error or manifest miscarriage of j11stioe or when fresh evidence was forthcoming. The Emch was of the opinion that the
fa.ct in regard to the City Telephone Exchange was
a new matter and because Pre.mode Ranjan Sarkar
was not permitted to take a photosta.t copy of the
!1,Un\1.tes Book, it was possible that his attention
was riot drawn to the City Telephone Exchange
which was not in existence at the relevant time
and th'lt there was sufficient reason for Pramode
352 SUPREME OOURT REPORTS (1962) SUPP.
JHI
Prat11IM }/atlt
7 a/~dor
v,
8or1j R.nj•tl Sartor
KopwJ,
Ranjan Sarkar for not mentioning the matter of
City Exchange in his complaint. It also held that
the previous Chief Presidency Magistrate Mr.
Chakraborty had altogethtir ignored the evidence of
a large number of witnesses who were competent to
prove the handwriting and signature of N. R.
Sarkar and he had no good reasons for not accepting their evidence. It could not be said therefore
that there was a judicial enquiry of the matter
before the previous Chief Prf'sidenoy Magistrate ;
the decision was rather arbitrary and so resulted
in manifest miso.uriage of justire. The Court was
of tho opinion therefore that there was no reason
to differ f'rom the finding of the Chief Presidency
Magistrate Mr. Bijoyesh Mukerjee and that there
was a prima facie case against the appellants.
Tho rules were therefore discharged. It is against
this judgment and that the appellants have come
in appeal to this court by Special Leave.
Four appeals were filed by the two appellants,
two against the order of the High Court of Calcutta.
dismiBBing·,the revision petition and two against the
order of the High Court refusing a certificate under
Art. 134 (1) (cl of the Constitution. As this Court
granted special leave a.izainst the order oft.he High
Court diemil!ling the Revision Petition the two
e.ppeals against the order refusing a certificate
under Art. 134 (l) (c) became infructuous and
~erefore were not pressed. It is only tho appeals
against the judgment and order of the High Court
refusing to quash the order of the learned Chief
Presidency Magistrate, Mr. Bij0yeeh .\lukerjee,
which survive for decision.
The first question to be decided and that is
the most vita.I quest.ion in the nase is, whether the
seoond complaint filed by s~roj Ranjan Sarkar
respondent should have been onwrtained T This
complaint was brought on April 3, 1959, tho appeal
in this Court brought by Pre.mode Ranjan Sark~r
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
353
IHI
the complainant in thE> previous complaint, having
been withdrawn OQ. March 2,.1959. The respondent PrOllldtlt• N•tll
TalUIJdM
holds no shares in N. R. Sarkar & Co. Ltd. He is
v.
a beneficiary under the deed of trust in trust in s.,.j R..y.,. s.,i....·
regard to certain number of shares. In regard to the
Kap.,. J •
unregistered deed of agreement appointing P. N.
'l'aluqdar as Managing Director ofN.R. Sarkar &
Co. Ltd., he can have no interest. As regards
the transfer deed of 1,000 shares of N. R. Sarkar &
Co. Ltd., which it is claimed were entrusted to
P. N. Taluqdar appellant for the benefit of the
respondent and his brotlrers, a separate suit has
been brought and is not the subject matter of the
criminal complaint, There then remains the resolution of the Board dated January 16, 1948,
which st'.tnds on the same footing as the
appointment to Managing Diriictorship and is
connected with that matter and relates to it.
Under the Code of Criminal Procedure the
subject of "Complaints to Magiiltrates" is dealt with
in Chapter XVI of the Code of Criminal Prociidure.
Thii provisions rekvant for the purpose. of thi1
case are ss. 200, 202 and 203. Section 200 doals with
examination of complainants and ss. 202, 203 and
204 with the powers of the Magistrate in regard to ·
the dismissal of complaint or the issuing of process.
The scope and extent of ss. 202 and 203 were la.id
down in Vadilal Panchal v. Dattatraya Dulaji
Ohadigaoolcer('). ·The scope of enquiry under s. 202
is limited to finding .out the truth or otherwise of
the complaint in order to determine whether
process should issue or not and s. 203 lays
down what materials are to be considered for the
purpose. lJnder s. : 03 Criminal Procedure Code
the judgmPnt which Magistrate has to form must
be based on the statements of. the complainant
and of his witnesses and the result of the investigation or enquiry if any. He must apply his mind
to materffils and form his judgment whether or
IJ)
[1961] 1 S.C.R. I, 9, 10.
354 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1962) SUPP.
not there is sufficient ground for proceeding.
19'1
Therefore if he has not misdirected himself as to
i'"ramath• NdA
the scope of the enquiry made under s. 202, CrimiT"1U1Jd"'
nal Procedure Code, and has judicially applied his
v.
Baoj B..f"' s..1., mind to the material before him and then proceeds
to mako his order it cannot be said that he has acted
Kopur ·'·
erroneouHly. An order of dismissal under s. 203.
Criminal Procedure Code, is, howe,-.·r, no bar to
the entertainment of a second com1•laint on the
same facts but it will be entertained only in
exceptional circumstances, e.g, where the previous
order was passed on an incomplete record or on
a. misunderstanding of the nature of the complaint
or it was manifestly absurd, unjust or foolish or
where new facts which could not, with reasonable
diligence, have been brought on the record in the
previous proceedings have been adduced. It cannot be said to be in the interests of just.ice that
after a deeision has been given against the complainant upon a full consideration of his case, be or
any other person should be given another
opportunity to have his compliLint enquin•d into Alkih
Ditta v. Karam Baksh('), Ram Narain Chaubey v. Panachand.Jain('), Hansabai v. Ananda(•), Doraisami v.
Subramanfo.'). In regard to the ad<luring of new
facts for the bringing of a fresh complaint the Special
Bench in the judgment under appeal did not e.ccept
the view of the Bombay High Court or the Patna
High Court in cases above quote<l and adopted the
opinion of Macleam, C. ,J. in QU£rn Empns< v.
Dokgobindu Das(') affirmed by a full B"nch in EU'a.•ka
Naih .Mandol v. Benimadlwb l'nnerji ('). It held
therefore t.hA.t a fresh complair>t can Ile e11tc1tained whcr<· there i~ manifrst. error, or mauifrst
miscarriage of justic~ in the previous order or when
fresh cvidPnce is forthcoming.
The Chief Presi<l('ncy Magistrate in the
complaint filed by respondent, held that the second
oomplaint was not unduly delayed ; that ~. 203 is
not a bar to the second 'omplaint and that tht•
(J)
131
(5)
J.L.K. 12 Lah 9, 12.
('.!) A IR (1949) 11a! 2_,.)(;.
A.l.ll. 11'~9J Bom 384.
i4l A..l.R. r 191XJ Mad.11 4
( 1900) 1.L.I\. 28. C.al. 211, 21 G.. 1Gi ( J!-01) I .L.R. ~3 (al. G52.
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
355
complaint was not with a view t.o blackmail the
persons accused. On the merits he held that the
miuutes of the proceedings of Janua1y 16, 1948
wer~ typed on a sheet of paper with Telephone No.
"City 6091" and the City Exchange c~ into
existence later in the year and that on his comparing the signatures of N. R. Sarkar it appeared that
the signature was a forgery. He said :
"And .governing myself by t.his test, I
held that fonrery is there prima facie and
only prima facie."
These then were to facts on which the learned
Presidency Magistrate Mr. B. Mukherjee came to
a conclusion different from that of his pretlecessor
Mr. Chakravorti, who had inquired into the
conplaint of Pramode Ranjan Sarkar, as to the
forged nature of the signatures of Mr. N. R.
E'arkar.
Taking first the question of fresh evidence,
the view of some of the High Courts that it should
be such that it could not with reasonable diligence
have been adduced is, in our opinion, a correct
view of the law. It cannot be the law that the
complainant may first plaee before the Magistrate
some of the facts and evidence in his possession
and if he fails he can then adduce some more
evidence and so on. That in our opinion, is not a
correct vi iw of the law.
The next point to be considered is, wRs the
mention of the telephoni> number "City 6091" on
the note paper on which the resolution was typed
~matter of which the previous Mmplainant Pram ode
Ranjan Sarkar was unaware and was it a fact which
with reasonable diligence he could not place he·
fore the M:igistrate. In the complaint filed by
Pramode Rajan Sarkar no nference was made to
~be City Exchange. It is tr.ue that the question was
.sought to be raised as a fresh piece of evidence
before Debabrata llfooki>rjeP, J. and it was noL
111#1
Promallui Nol/I
Tal<uJdat
v.
S11roj BanJan Sahr
Kapur J.
356 SUPREME OOURT REPORTS (1962] SUPP.
IHI
considered by him but it was not stated before him
when tho then oomplainant came to know of this
f' oluqiW
fact. Acoording to a oopy of the Day Book entry
••
Bmj Rlllfi'" Bari• by Mr. Bimal Chandra. Chakrava.rty, Solicitor fur
the previous complainant Pramode Ranjan Sarkar,
1r.,,.., ·J.
dated October 13, l!J5:J, photostat copies were taken
of the share transfer deod and portions of the
a.1Zrooment dated January 19, 1948 and inspection
of the Minutes Book was also taken but !he requc,st
of the complainant to take photostat copies of certain resolutions was refused, by the appellant S. ;\I,
Basu. It is significant that according to this entry,
Santi Ranja.n Sarkar wa.s acting as tho a.gent of
Pra.mode Ra.njan Sarkar and was present at the
time of the inspection. After this insp1·ction was
ta.ken, Pram ode i: anjan Sarkar discmSfd with his
Legal Advisers the peouliaritiee noted in the impugned
documents. Thie is what he (Pram ode Ranjan Sarkar)
stated as a witness before the Chief Presidency
Magistrate. His evidence also shows that he inspected
the Minutes Book though after much "recriminations."
Witnees Shibakali Ba.gchi stated that Minutes Book
of N. R. Sarkar & Co. Ltd., was examini·d by him
and that it appeared to him that the book was not
genuine and Pramode Ranjan Sarkar complained
that some of the signatureb were forged. It appears
from the statement of Pramode Ii anjan t-arkar that
the appellant S. X. Basu, did not let. them take
photographs of some of the pag~s of the Minutes
Book. It is not stated by either Bagchi or Pramode
Ranjan Sarkar of what documents they wanted to
take photographs which were refused. f n the statement of Bimal Ohaodra Cha.kra.ba.rty, the Snlicitor,
the sa.ms statement is ma.de i. e., they wanted to
take photographs of some documents which were
not allowed t;Q .be ta.ken. The correspondence
produced by Pra.mode Ranja.n Sarkar in his co:nplaint proceedings shows that the Minutes Book wa
produced fc>r his inspection and was inspcoted.
Deb&br&ta Mookarjee, J., in dealing with t.:i.e
Pr_,.._Nolh
2 8.0.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
357
resolution of January 16, 1948, said that it was
not possible on the materials available considered
prima facie that the Magistrate's finding suffered
from such a grave impropriety as to require interference by the Court, He was of the opinion
that the
complainant could not have been
unaware of the resolution of January 16, 1948.
This he concluded from the following ; that on
his own case Pramode Ranjan managed the affairs
of the Company aloug with the appellant P. N.
Taluqdar; that although the proceedings of the
Board dated September 22, 1953, referred to the
resolution of January 16, 1948 yet the ouly protest
made against it by Prarnode J\anjan Sarkar was
the alleged legal difficulties consequent on renewal of the appointment but its genuineness was not
then questioned and it was queRtioned for the first
time on March 17, 1954, when the complaint was
lodged.
Against the judgment and order of Debabrata Mookerjee J., Special Leave to appeal to this
C,ourt was obtained and. one of the points ~aken
in the application was that the resolution was
typed on a sheet of paper bearing Telephone No.
City 6091 although this Telephone Exchange did
not come into existence till December 28, 1948.
It is significant that Pramode Ranjan Sarkar
did not mention when he came to know iibout
the existence of this new fact. It was not;
therefore, made clear to the learned ,Judge
atleast upto that stage as to when, before or
after the filing of the first complaint Pra.mode
Ranjan Sarkar came to know about the existence of
this piece of evidence to which so much importance
is attached. Debabrata Mookerjee, J., also said in
hiR judgment that the affairs of the Company were
managed by Pramode Ranjan Sarkar and the
appellant P. N. Taluqdar and that it was difficult
to believe that he (Pramode Ranjan) had no access
to tho Minutes Book which showed that he himself
JMI
Pramatha Naik
Taluqdar
v.
Sa,oj Ranjan Satk111
Kapu.- J.
358 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1962J SUPP.
1HI
Pr-.Na1i
Toliiqw
S.aj
•• S.b
R.,,;.
,..,..1.
had presided over several meotings and also that
there was nothing extraordinary a.bout the proceedings being typed on separate sheets of paper and
the sheets of paper being pe.sted in that Minutes
Book becaUEc on some of them there wore his own
s:gnatures and it we.s, difficult to believe that ta.m·
pering with the records went on "systematically" for
several months without Pramode Ranjan :Sarkar
having seen the Book or detected tho tampering. It
was, therefore, impo88ible to blame the previous
Chief Presidency Magistrate if he held in those
circumsta.rrnes that there was no forgery in the
Minutes Book or ta.mporing with it. The following
pe.ssage from the learned Judge's judgment is
significant :"Photographs of the impugned documents
were ta.ken on the 13th October when the
Minutes Book was inspected. On the la.st
mentioned date the compla~nt was certain
a.boul the entire book having been tampered
with; but nothing appears to have been said
about it , no challenge made, no protest
entered until full five months pe.ssed whein at
la.st the silence was broken and the ~omplaint
waa lodged on the 17th March, 1954. It is of
course not known what was said a.bout it in
tho in formation to the police. Theae circums·
tancC's a.re explicit in the complainant's case.
That case ha.a only to be presented for these
fea.1ures to be seen, and the Magistrate could
not possible havo overlooked them. His
clear finding is that the Minute Book is
genuine. I am not in a. position to say it is
improper on a. prima facif. consideration of
the evidence offered."
Dea.ling with the question whether the eigna.·
tures of N. R. Sarkar wore forged, the learned
Judge a.greed a.ft.er considering the whole evidence
that the signatures were not t·orged.
2 s.c.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
359
The complaint of the present complaint Saroj
Rajan Sarkar specifically
mention the Cit;}
Exchange and that it ca.me into existence later.
He also alleges that this fact was not known
to the previous complaint,· Pramode Ranjan
Sarkar, and in support there is
the affidavit
of Santi Ranjan Sarkar. Significantly enough .in
that affidavit. also it is not stated as to when the
deponent came to know about this alleged new· fact
of the Telephone City Exchange. All that the
affidavit says il!l that it is a matter of history and
was published in the Statesman of Dt:cember 29,
1948. There is no evidence on the record to show
as to when the matter of "City Exchange"
came to be known to the ·persons who were then
and two those who are now prosecuting the criminal complaints. The document which we have
referred to above i.e., the letter wdtten by tb.e
Solicitor dated October-13, 1953 shows that Santi
&anjan Sarkar was present as agent of Pramode
Ranjan Sarkar at the time of the inspection. The
complaint filed by Saroj Ranjan Sarkar states :-
1901
Pramatha Nath
TaJuqdar
v,
Sd(!j Rary·an Sarkar
Kapur J.
"That with great difficulty the documents
in question were inspected, certified true
copies of the alleged resolutions of the Boa.rd
meetings were obtained and photostatic
c?pies of material portions including alleged
s1gna.tures of late Sri Sarkar on the said
Deed of Agreement and on the Deed of
Transfer could be obtained, as will appear
fro1n correspondence in this respect."
In the. c.omplaint filed by Pramode Ranja.n
Sarkar exactly the · same language was used in
paragraph 10 of the previous complaint. If certi,fied copies were obtained by the complainant
Pramod~ Rai;ijan Sarkar and inspection was ta.ken
by Santi RanJan Sarkar for Pramode Ranjan Sarkar
and by his Solicitor and the facts are as they are
/
360
J#l
p,_<l/M );Gl/i
.
TahqJar
S.oj Raja ;:t•hl
Ka;.it J.
SUPREME OOURT REPORTS (1!16:.?] St:Pl'.
stated above, it is difficult to hold that the fact in
regard to the City Exchange was not know to the
complainant in the first complaint and was a new
fa.ct which could not, with reaaonable diligence, be
adduced by him.
The next question which arises is whether the
order of tht'I previous Chief Presidency Magistrate
who decided Pramode Ranjan's complaint, was
manifestly absurd or unjust and resulted in a manifestly unjust order. The Special Bench of the
High Court has held that it wa.a so because (l) the
Magistrato ignored the evidence of a large number
of witneBBt'B who were competent to prove the hand·
writing and signature of the late Mr. N. R. Sarkar ;
(2) he "set aside'' the report of the enquiring
Magi~trate, Mr. A.B. Sya.m for reasons whiob cannot be held to be proper and judicial reaaons ;
(3) He said in his order that Mr. N. R. Sarkar might
himself havb a.nte-dat<i<l the documents thus accep·
ting a p088ible defence for which there was no basis
before him ; and (4) he relied upon his own comparison of the. disputed signatures of Mr. N. R.
Sarkar. On t!J.eBe grounds the Special Bench waa
of the opinion that tl..e decision of the first Magistrate was rather arbitrary and so resulted in manifest miscarriage of justioe. The question is whether
Mr. N. C. Cha.kra.barti, the previous Presidency
Magistrate h3d applied his mind to the evidence
which W38 produced before him and keeping
in view his func~ons as a M11gistr&te, he gave his
decision. It is not ncoeBll&I'y to refer to the various
findings given by him, Thy are set out and considered in the judgment of Debabrata Mookerjoo, J.
and he (that learn&l Judge) has commented upon
all the infirmitiea in that order which were brought
to his notice.
The previous Chief Presidency Magistrate
found that the Deed of Agreement dated January
19, 1948 was not a forged document. He referred
2 s.c.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
361
to the evidenoe without analizing it. He said that
the complainant examined persons who know the
signature of the late Nalini Ra.njan .::!arkar and
they deposed as to the manner in which Nalini
Ranjan Sarkar used to sign. After making a
reference to the gist of the evidence submitted
before him and to the report of Mr. A. B. Syam,
Presidency Magistrate, he (the learned Cnief
Presidency Magistrate) came to the conclusion :
"For the reasons above, I find that
the evidence on handwriting including the
opinion of the Handwriting Expert
does not support the complainant's version."
Again in a later part of his order he found
that the resolution of the Boa.rd of Directors dated
January 16, 1948 also was.not forged and that the
endorsement of the appellant S. M. Basu, was nothing more or less then the authentication of the
common seal of the Co., and he, therefore, agreed
with the finding of Mr. A.B. Syam that there was
no case against S. M. Basu, appellant but disagreed
with him in regard to the other appellant, P. N.
Talukdar. When the matter went to the High
Court, Debabrata Mookerjee, J., first considered as
to when the revisions.I power of Court to interfere
should be exercised. Then he> discussed the seven
circumstances which were relied upon by the then
complainant Promode Ranjan Sarkar in support
of the allegations of forgery. After dealing with
these various points raised he held :"It may be that one or two items of evidence were not epecilically referred to in the
Order but that does not neoe8811.rily imply
that those items of evidence were not
present to the mind of the Ma.gistrMe.
After all a Magistrate is only required to
record briefly his reasons for diamissing
1961
Pramatha .NiJth
Ta!uqdar
v,
Saroj Rt1njan Sarka1
Kapur J.
362
1go1
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1962] SUPP.
a complaint. Tho Magiatrate's order, I think,
is fairly well."
Tal"f<I'"
The learned Judge then discussed the question
Y,
s ...j Rujan S•rlcar of delay and held that Pramoue Ranjan Sa.rkar
had considerably delayed the bringing of tho com.
K•J•r I.
plaint. He also held that the Deed of Agreement
which was alleged to be a furgery had not been so
proved and he gave various reasons, one of them
being)hat at the meeting of the Boa.rd of Directors
dated September 22, 11153, the then complainant
did not oppose the renewal on the ground that the
Agreement was forged or did not exiat, but on legal
grounds. Then the learned Judge referred to the
correspondonco whioh had passed betw£en the then
complainant Pramode Ranj&n Sarkar and the
appellant .l:'.N. Talukdar and eaid :
"It is therefore clear that the evidence
which the complainant offered in support of
his cal!C contained prima facie on the fi,ral
aspect sufficient materials for distrusting
the truth of the story and I cannot see
how the Magistrate's order can be oh&llenged
in revision on the ground of impropriety u
respect& the Deed of Agreement.
The learned Judge then referred to other upect• of
the case i.e., the evidence of the Deputy Controller
of Stationery, P.W. 15. He also referred to finding
of tho previous Chief Presidency Magistrate that it
was difficult to believe that the coplainant ahould
have been uhaware of the resolution of January 16,
1948 and after referring to all these varioua quce·
tions raised, he diamiued the petition.
Can it be said in theee oirCllllll8tancea that
there has been a manifeat error reaulting in the
passing of an unjust order ? That in our opinion,
has not been made out. The order o~ Uebabrata
Mookerjee J., who reviewed the findings of the
previous Chief Pn sidency M11.Sistrato, 11how1 t.hat the
criticism .that that the learned Magistrate did not
p,.,..,._ 'Noth
2_ S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPOR'r3
363
consider the whole evidence is not justified. Taking
the evidence into consideration he came to
the conclusion that there was no ground to proceed
and, thernfore, refused to issue process. In his
opinion the evidence was not worthy of credit and
he was not satisfied with the correctness of the complaint and dismissed it as he was entitled to do on
those findings. See Gulab Khan v.
Gulam
Mohammad Khan(') which 'W s approved in Vadilal
Panchal v Dattatraya Dulaji Ohadigaonker('). In the
circumstances the order made by the prev10us Chief
Presidency Magistrate was not ·any manner manifestly absurd unjust or foolish, nor can it be said
that the Magistrate ignored in any principles which
were necessary to apply undt.r ss. ~02 and 203 of
the Criminal Procedure Code nor is the order
contrary to what was said in Ramgopal Ganpatrai
Ruia v; State of Bombay ('). That was a case in
whirh the rule in regard to the commitment proceedings and the power of the Committing Magistrate to
commit was discUS1ed and the expression "sufficient
grounds" in 88. 209, 210 and 213 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure was interpreted. That . was
not a case dealing with the powers of the Magistrate under ss. <!02 and 203 which was specifically
raised and decided in Vadilal Panohal'8 case 1'>· In
Ramgopal, Ganpatrai Ruia'8 case (') the followi.Dg
observations of Sinha J., (as he then was) in regard
to the expression "sufficient grounds" a.re pertinent:
"The controversy has centred round interpretation of- the words "sufficient grounds",
occurring in the relevant_ sections ,of the
Code, set out above. In the earliest case
of Lachrnan v. Juala (1882) I.L.R 5 All.
161, decided by Mr. Justice Mahmood in
the Allahabad High Court, governed by
s. 195 of the Criminal Procedure Code of
(I) A,l,R. 1927 Lab, 30.
(2) (1961] I S.C.R.1,9,10•
lS) (19581 s.c.R. 618, 634.
IHI
PramotM b' ath
Taluqdar
v.
Saro} Rania• Sarkar
Kapur J.
364
IHI
PramaU.a N•l"
r.i"""'
v. '
Soroj RanjOll Sarkar
K.pur J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1962) SUPP.
187<! (Act No. X of 18i2), the. eminent
judge took the view that tho expression
"sufficient grounds" has to be undoratood
in a wide sense including tho power oft he
magistrate to weigh evidence. In that
view of the matter, he ruled that if in the
opinion of the uoagistrate, the evidence
against the accused "cannot possibly
justify a conviction·' there was nothing in
the Code to preve nt the Magistrate from
discharging the accused even though the
evidence consisted of statements of witnesaes who claimed .to be eye-witne88e11,
but whom the magistrate entirely dis·
credited. He also held that the High Court
could interfere only if it came to the conclusion that the Magistrate had committed
a material error in discharging the accused
or had illegally or improperly underrated
the value ()f the evidence. Thus, be
overruled the contention raised on behalf
of the prosecution that the powers of the
committing Magistrate did not extent to
weighing the evidence and that the expression "sufficient ground" did not in.
clude the power of discrediting eye-wit.
11esees. Though the Code of Criminal
.l:'rooedure was several times aubstantially
amended afoor the date of that decision,
the basic words "sufficient grounde" have
continued throughout. That decision wu
approved by. a Division Bench of the
Bombay High Court In re Bai Parvati
(1910) I.L.R 3,5 Bom. 163 and the obeervationa aforeaaid in the Allahabad deoieion were held to be an accurate statement
of the law as contained in s. 20 l of the
Code, aa it now stands. The High Court
of Bombay held in that case where the
evidence tendered for the posecution is
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME OOURT RIEPOR.TS
365
1961
totally unworthy of oredit, it is the duty
of the Magistrate to discharge the accuPrattullta Nath
Tsluqdtfr
sed. It also added that where the magisv.
trate entertains any doubt as to the Saroj 'RQnj an Stzrk a'
weight or quality of the evidence, he
Kapur J.
should commit the case to the Court of
Session which is the proper authority to
resolve that doubt and to assess the value
of that evidence."
Debabrata Mookerjee J., in the revision
against the order of the previous Chief Presidency
Magistrate accepted the finding of that Magistrate
in regard to the delay. The present complaint
out of which this appeal has arisen was filed after
the appeal in this Court arising out of this complaint
was withdrawn by Pramode Ranjan Sarkar. Can it
be said that th is is not an abuse of the process of
tho Court-one brother who was a Director of the
Company and who would be interested in the
Managing Directorship of the Company and the
resolutions passed in regard to that office, brought
a complaint in 1954 which was dismissed both by
the Ma~istrate and the High Court. Appeal
against the order of dismissal brought in this court
was withdrawn on March 12, 1959. It was alleged
in his complaint by Pramode Ranjan Sarkar that
the present respondent was celluding with appellant,
P.N. Talukdar, who had offered his some ~dnd of
monetary inducement and that fact was deposed to
by the present respondent himself as a witness in
the previous complaint. He waited all this time
although he knew about the forged signatures of his
late brother on various documents and after at
least the lapse of five years he brought a fresh complaint on the same facts. Neither he has disclosed
as to when he oame to know about the City Exchange nor hav' Santi Ranjan Sarkar and Pramode
.Ranjan Sarkar, which cannot therefore b5 said to be
a fact which oould not with reasonable diligence
be alllloed-at the time of the previous complaint.
366
SUPREME OOURT REPORTS (l9tl2] SUP!'"
1141
The e.rgument the.t this Court ga.ve Specie.I Lea.ve
in the case of Pre.mode Ra.njan Sarkar and there·
fore there were points of importance is, in the cir·
8,rt; Rtn1i«n S"'U' cums ta.noes of this case, a neutral circumstance and
that fact ce.nnot be used as a point in favour of the
,..,,., J.
!espondent.
In these circumstanoes, we are of the opinion
that thf'I bringing or the fresh compla.int is a gross
abuse of the process of the Court and is not with
the object of furthering the interests of justice.
In regard to the power of reference to a larger
Bench, we are in agreement with S. K. Da8, J., and
in the circumetancea it is unnecessary to erpre88 an
opinion as to the applicability of s. 196A Criminal
Procedure .oode to the facts of this e&ee.
For these reMone we allow the appeals, set
a.side the order of the High Court and of the learned
Chief Presidency Magistrate. and diemisa the
oomplaint.
Bv CoURT : In accordance with the judgment
of the' majority, the appeal is allowed.
Apptal allotDtd.
Pr.,,..tlt• N:tth
T•l•qtiM
v.
•
•
THE MUNICIPALITY OF ANAND
1961
STATE OF BOMBAY
(B. P. SINHA, c. J., A. K. SARKAR, K. c. ·DAS
0Ul'TA,
N.
R~AGOPA.LA AYYANOAR
MUDHOLEiR, JJ.)
R.
MHicipal.it11-0rck• by
of-Bo,..ba11
Dia/.riQ Jt1.,&iciptilAcl, 1901 (Boa. t:/ 1901), •· 69-00Mlit•
tio.,. of lt&dia, Art. U.
OrJroi
T...,_l"'J>OlilW.
and J.
Gow"'""'"' pro'ftihUi"'1
by
i•~Validitv
Mirr folloWiog the prooed~ prtteribed by the Bombay
Dl1trict Municii-1 Act, 1901, and al'lrr obtaining the requisite
oanction of the Government, the apptllant lm)><*d an octroi
tax on milk brought within itl limlta for conmmption, uae or
aale therein. Shortly afterward1 the Government passed an
~
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