R. L. ARORA versus STATE OF U. P.
Supreme Court of India | Decided 15 December 1961 | [1962] SUPP. 2 S.C.R. 149 | 1961 INSC 349
Key facts
- Decided
- 15 December 1961
- Bench
- P.B. GAJENDRAGADKAR*, A.K. SARKAR*, K.N. WANCHOO, K.C. DAS GUPTA, N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR
- Bench size
- 5
- Case number
- CIVIL APPEAL No. 446/1959
- Disposal
- Appeal(s) allowed
- Citation
- [1962] SUPP. 2 S.C.R. 149
- Neutral citation
- 1961 INSC 349
Text of the judgment
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
149
.R. L. ARORA
1961
v.
December 1.
STATE OF U. P.
(P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR,, A. K. SARKAR, K. N.
WANCHOO, K. c. DAS GUPTA AND N. RAJAGOPALA
AYYANGAR, JJ.)
Land Acquisition-Acquisition for Cf!mp<;iny-"Work likely
public", Meaning· of-Right of access w
per.ans having business with company-Product of company
being useful to the public-If satisfy requirement-Land Acquisition Act, 1894 [1of1894], ss. 6, 40, 41.
The Government acquired appellant's land for a company
for setting up a textile manchinery parts factory. The entire
compensation for the acquisitio11 was to be paid by the
company. The Government was satisfied that the product of
the company would be useful to the public and the agreement
between the company and the Government provided that those
who had business with the company shall have access to the
land and works. The notifications under ss. 4 and 6 of the
Land acquisition Act, 1894, were issued showing that the
land was acquired for the company. The appellant contended
that the notification under: s. 6 was invalid as the acquisition
was not for the construction of any work which was
likely to prove useful to the public as contemplated by s. 40
(l)(b) read with cl. (5) of s. 41.
Held, (per Gajendragadkar, Wanchoo, Das Gupia and
Ayyangar, JJ., Sarkar, J. contra), that the notification under
s. 6 of the Act wa> invalid and the proceedings should be
quashed. Section 40 (l)(b), which alone could apply to the
case, provided that in case of acquisition for a company
the Government could give its consent if the acquisition was
needed for the construction of some work which was likely to
prove useful to the public. For such cases cl. (5) of s. 41
provided that the agreement between the company and the
Government shall state the terms on which the public shall be
entitled to use the works. These provisions had to be read
together and required that the work should be directly useful
to the public and that the agreement should contain a term
as to ho\v the public shall have the right to use the work
directly thernselves. The provision of access to the land or
works to those having business with the company or the fact
that the product of the con1pany would b~ useful to the public
were not sufficient to bring the acquisition for a cornpany
withir:t the meaning of the relevant \vords in ss. 40 and 4 l.
The satisfaction of the <;;-overnment that the work was likely
w prove useful to the
150 SUPREME ootmr REPORTS [1962) SUPP.
IHI
..
B. L •Arora
S<.11 of U.P.
to prove useful to the public upon a wrong COD1tructlon of
s. 40 and s. 41 was not binding. The concluslvencu attached
by s. 6(3) to the notification under s. 6( 1) wu only to thit CX·
tent that the land was needed for the purposes of a company
and this was not in dispute.
Bahu Barlcya Thakur v. TM. Stale of Borrtbay, 11961!
1 S.C.R. 128 and Pandit Jllandu Lal v. Stat. of Ptmjab, 1961
2 S. C. R. 459, referred to.
Per Sarkar, J.-The acquU!tion for the company to set
up a textile machinery parts factory wiu for some work which
wu likely to prove'· useful to the public and wu valid. The
work contemplated in s. 40( I)(b) was work from which the
public could in any way derive benefit, whether by dlrm use
of the work or by enjoyment of tilt fruits of the activities
carrird on therr or otherwise; it could not be confined to a
cor.struction for philanthropic purpose or to such work u
could be itself used by the public. The meaning could not be
restricted by cl. (5) of s 41 aa that would defeat the intention
of th• statute. The provisions in the agreement about tbe
terms on which the public would be entitled to use the work
were inapplicable to cases where the work was auch that the
public could not use it.
CzvIL AFP:&LLATB JumsDIOTION: Civil Appeal
w--.J.
No. 446 of 1959.
Appeal from the judgment and decree dated
July 30, 1958, of the Allahabad High Court in
Special Appeal No. 202 of 1957.
C. B. Aganrola andNauntt La/, for the Appel!ant.
G. S. Pathak, S. T. Duai and C. P. LGl for
Repondents Nos. l to 3S. T. De8ai, Devemlm Swarup and J. P. Gogal
for Respondent No. 4.
1961. December 15. The Judgmeni of
Gajendragadkar, Wanchoo, Du Gupta and
Ayyangar JJ., waa deliver•d by Wanchoo, J,
Sarkar J., delivered a separatll Judgment.
WANOHOO, J.-Thia' iB an ap_peal on a oerti1lcate granted by the All~hab&d High Court. The
appellant is the owner of. certain fanda In village
Nauraiya Kher&. Out of\thoee lands, 16.5 acres
,
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME OOURT REPORTS
151
were requisitioned by the Defence Department of
the Government of India and are still in their
possession and we are not concerned with that.
Besides that, the appellant has 9 acres of land
which he had purchased many years ago with the
idea of erecting a factory thereon. The appellant
got information in May 1956 that steps were being
taken to acquire his nine acres of land for an
industrialist in Kanpur. He therefore wrote to the
Collector of Kanpur in that connection. On June
25, 1956, however, a notification was issued under
s. 4 of the Land Acquisition Act No. 1 of 1894
(hereinafter called the Act), stating that certain
land which was specified as 11.664 acres in village
Nauraiya Khera was required for a company for the
construction· of textile machinery parts factory by
.Lakshmi Ratan Engineering Works Limited, Kanpur
(hereinafter called the Works). This was followed on
July 5, 1956 by a notification under s. 6 of the Act,
which was in terms similar to the notification under
s. 4. The notification also provided for the Collector
to take possession of any waste or arable land
forming part of the land mentioned in the Schedule
to the notification immediately under the powers
conferred by s. 17(1) of the Act. It is not in dispute
that this notification was issued without taking any
action under Part VII of the Act. On July 31,
1956, the Collector took possession of the land and
handed it over to the Works along with the
buildings standing on it.
In the mean time the appellant had filed a
writ petition in the High Court on July 31, 1956,
praying that the notification of July 5, 1956, be
quashed and had also applied for interim stay. As
however possession had already been taken on
July 31, 1956, the application for interim stay was
infructuous. One of the main grounds in support
of the writ petition of J µly 31, 1956 appears to
hava been that ss. 38 to 42 of the Act had not been
complied with: It seems that thereafter steps were
19GJ
R. L. Arora
v.
State o.f U.P.
Wanchoo J.
)52 SUPRlWE CX>URT REPORTS (1962] SUPP.
1161
..
R, L. Arora
'
Siii" of U. P,
w""""'° ./.
taken hy the State Government 'tc comply with the
provisions of ss. 38 to 42 of the Act, An agreement
was entered into between the Government and the
Works on August 5, 1956 and was published in the
Gazette· on August 11, 1956; but this was done
without making an inquiry either under e. 5A or
s. ·IO of the Act. Therefore, on Sept.ember 14,
1956, an enquiry was ordered by the Government
under s.40. The enquiry was accordingly made and
the inquiry submitted his report on October 3, 1956.
This wa11 followed by a fresh agreement between the
Government and the Works on December 6, 1956. On
December 7, 1956, a fresh n~ification was issued
under s. 6 of the Act after the formalities provided
under es. 38 to 42 had been compieted. Thereupon
the appellant filed another writ petition on
January 29, 1957, challenging the notification of
Decemb<•r 7, 1956 on various grounds.
It is not ne006Sary to give in detail the ground&
on which the notification of Deoomber 7, 1956 WM
attacked. It is enough to say that one of the
grounds was th:i.t the notification wa.s invalid as it
was not in compliance with s.40(l)(b) of the Act read
with the fifth clause of the matter to be provided
in the agreement UDder s. 41. The leiirned Single
Judge however held that the agreement was in
accordance with the provisions of ss. 40 and 41. He
also held that there was no force in the other
contentions raised on behalf oi the appellant and
dismissed the petition: The appellant then went in
appeal which was di~missed. He then applied for
a oortit'ica.to to enable him to appeal to this Court,
which was granted; and that is how the matt.er has
come up before us.
The only question that haa been urged on
behalf of the appellant before us is that the consent
of the Government is being sought to be given to
an acquisition for a company which is not in
accordance with s. 4lJ (1) (b) read with the fifth
clause of the matters to be provided in tho
2S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORT.3
153
agreement under s. 41 and therefore the notification
of December 7, 1956 is invalid
To determine the question raised by the
appellant it is necessary to look into the scheme of
the Act. The preamble to the Act shows that it is
an amending Act enacted for the purpose of
"acquisition of land needed for public purposes and
for Companies and for determining the amount of
compensation to be paid on account of such
acquisition." Section 3(e) defines the expression
"company." The expression "public purpose" is
given an inclusive definition in s. 3(f). Then comes
s. 4 which provides for the issue of a preliminary
notification to the effect that land in any locality is
needed or is likely to be needed for any public
purpose. On the issue of such notification steps are
taken to survey the land and take all other action
necessary to decide whether the la.nd is fit for the
purpose for which it is needed and in that connection s. 5A provides for objections by any person
interested in the land, ,and the Collector hears the
objector and submits his report to Government for
appropriate action. Then comes a. 6 which is in
these terms : "(l) Subject to the prov1s1ons of
Part VII of this Act when the appropriate
Government is satisfied, after considering the
report, if any, made under s. 5A, 1ub-section
(2), that any particular land is needed for a
public purpose, or for a company, a declara·
tion shall be made to that. effect under
the signature of a. Secretary to such Govern·
ment or of some officer duly authorised to
certify its orders :
Provided that no such declaration shP JI be
made unless the Compensation to be awarded for
such property is to be paid by the Company, or
1961
R. L. Arora
v.
Stae ojU.P.
fVanclwo J,
15i SUPREME <X>URT REPORTS [1962) SUPP.
'"'
R:L.~tDTO
v.
Si.1, of U. P.
Waehoo J.
wholly or partly out of public revenues or some
fund controlled or managed by a local authority.
(2)
x
x
x
x
x
(3) The said deolaration shall be conclusive
evidence that the land is needed for a public purpose or for a Company, as the e&11e may be; and
after making such declaration, the appropriate
Government may acquire the land in manner
hereinafter appl'aring."
Where however land is to be acquired for a company no notification under s. 6 can be iseued till
the provisions of Part VII of the Act are complied
with, for action under s. 6 for acquiring land for
a company is subject to the provisions of Part
VII. Thie is made further clear by s. 39 which
lays down that "the provisions of sections 6 to
37(both inclusive) shall not be put in force in order
to acquire land for any Company, unless with the
previous consent of the appropriate Government, nor
unless the Company ehalI have executed the agreement hereinafter mentioned." Before therefore
the machinery provided for acquisition of land
under as. 6 to 37 (both inclusive) of the Act is put
into force for acquiring land for a company two
conditions precedent must be fufilled, namely, (i)
the previous consent of the appropriate Goverment
has been obtained and (ii) an agreement in the
terms of s. 41 has been executed by the company :
(see Baba Barkya Thakur v. The State of Bombay)
('). In that case the notification under s. 4 of the
Act was challenged as it did not 11ay that the land
was required for a public purpose as provided therein but only said that the land was required for a
company.
Thie Court however pointed out
that" though it muy appear on the words of
the ..\<:t contained in Part II, which contains
the operative portions of the proooedinge
11) Ll961) IS. C.R. 128.
2 S.C.R. SUPREME COUR'l' REPOR'l'S
155
leading up to acquisition by the Collector that
acquisition for a Company may or may not
be for a public purpose, the provisions of
Prat VII make it clea! that the appropriate
Government cannot permit the bringing into
operation the effective machinery of the Act
unless it is satisfied as aforesaid, namely, tliat
the purpose of acquisition is to enable the
Company to erect dwelling houses for workmen
employed by it or for the provision of amenities directly connected with the Company or
that the land is needed for construction of
some work of public utility. These requirements indicate that the acquisation for a
Company also is in substance for a public purpose inasmuch as it cannot be seriously
contend that constructing dwelling houses,
and providing amenities for the benefit of
the workmen employed by it and construction
of some work of public utility do not serve a
public purpose."
Therefore, though the words "public purpose" in
ss. 4 and 6 have the same meaning, they have to be
read in the restricted sense in accordance with
s. 40 when the acquisition is for a company under
s. 6. In one case, the notification under s. 6 will
say that the acquisition is for a public purpose, in
the other case the notification will say that it is for
a company. The proviso to s. 6(1) shows that where
the acquisition is for a public purpose, the compensation haa to be paid wholly or partly out of public
revenues or some fund controlled or managed by a
local authority. Where however the acquisition is
either for a company, the compensation would be
paid wholly by the company. Though therefore this
distinction is there where the acquisition is either for
a public purpose or for a company, there is. not a
complete dichotomy between acquisitions for the two
purposes and it cannot be m~intained that where
1961
R.L.Arora
v.
State ~r U.1'.
Wanchoo J.
156 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1962] SUPP.
1961
R. L ..41010
••
81411 of U. P1
Woncllo. J.
the acquisitiqn is primarily for a company it muet
always be preceded by action under Part VII and
compensation must always be pa.id wholly by the
company. A third class of cases is p011sible where
the acquisition may be primarily for a company but
it may also be at the Sil.me timo for a public
purpose and the whole Ol' part of compensation
may be paid out of public revenues or some fund
controlli-d or m;rnag )d by a local authority. In
such a case though the acquisition may look as if it
is primarily for a oompa.ny it will be covered by that
pa.rt of s. 6 which lays down that acquisition may
ho ma.de for a public purpose if the whole or part of
the oompensa.tion is to be paid out of the public
revenues or P.ome fund cotrollcd or managed by a
local authority. Such wae the case in Pandit
Jhandu Lal, v. The State of Punjab('). In that case
the acquiHition was for the construction of a labour
colony under the Government Mponsored housing
scheme for the industrial workers of the Thapa.r
Industries Co-operative Housing Society Limited
and pa.rt of ihe compensati0n was to be paid out of
the public funds. In such a case this Court held
that "an acquiaition for a company may also be
made for a public purpose within the meaning of
the Act, if a part or the whole of the oost of acquisition is met by public funds" and therefore it wae
not necessary to go through the procedure preacribed by Pa.rt VII. It is only where the acquisition is for a oompany and its cost is to be met
entirely by the company itself that tho provisions
of Pa.rt VII apply. In the present case it ia not
the oaae of the respondents that any part of the
oompensa.tion is to be paid out of what may be
called public funds. It is not in dispute that the
entire compensation is to be paid by the Works and
therefore the provi8ion of Pa.rt VII would apply to
the present case; and it is in this backgrolllld that
(II [1961) 2 S. C.R. 459.
•
-11
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
157
we have to consider the contention raised on behalf
of the appellant.
We have already pointed out that s. 39 as
well as the opening words of s. 6 make it clear that
the operative provisions of the Act for the purpose
of acquiring land for a company will only apply
when two conditions precedent have been satisfied,
namely, (i) the previous consent of the appropriate
government has been given to the acquisition, and
(ii) the company has entered into an agreement as
provided in the Act. This takes us to ss. 40, 41
and 42 of the Act. Section 40 lays down when the
consent of the appropriate government can be given.
Section 41 lays · down the terms which must be
incorporated in the agreement. Section 42 then
provides that every such agreement shall be published in the official gazette and shall thereupon so
far as regards the terms on which the public shall
be entitled to use the work have the same effect a~
if it had formed part of the Act.
Now s. 40(1) lays down that such consent
shall not be given unless the appropriate government is satisfied either on the report of the Collector under s. 5A (2) or by an inquiry held as hereinafter provided (a) that the purpose of the acquisition is to obtain land for the erection of dwelling
houses for workmen employed by the company or
for the provision of amenities directly connected
therewith, or (b) that such acquisition is needed
for the construction of a work, 3.nd that such work
is likely to prove useful to the public.
The Government therefore cannot give consent to the acquisition of land for a company unless
it is satisfied about one or other of the two
conditions mentioned ins. 40(1). We are in the
present case not concerned with cl. (a) of s. 40(1)
and need not refer to it further. The case of the
respondents is that the Government was satisfied
as to cl. (b) of s. 40(1) and that is why it gave the
R, L . .Aror•
v.
State of U. P.
Wanchtx1 .J.
158 SUPRJWI: OOU'RT BDORTS [1962) SUPP.
IHI
B. L . .Ar,,,•
v.
Stall of U.P.
W-.\oo J,
consent required under s, 39. The main dispute
before us is as to the meaning to be given to cl. (b)
of B. 40(1).
We are of opm1on that it. is not poasible to
interprets. 40(l)(b) in isolation and by itself; it has
to be interpreted in the context of what is provided
in s. 41 about th!i agreement to be entered into
between the Government and the company which
agreement hecomes a part of the Act under s. 42 so
far as regards the terms on which the public shall
be entitled to use the work. Now s. 41 provides
that if the appropria,te government is 11atisfied that
the purpose of tho proposed acquisition is to
obtain land for the erection of dwelling houses for
workmen employed by the company or for the
provision of amenities directly connected therewith
or that the proposed acquisition is netlded for the
construction of a work and thnt such work is likely
to prove useful to the public, it shall require the
company to enter into an agreement with it, providing to the satiafaction of the appropriate government for the following matters, namely( I) the payment to the appropriate
Government of the cost of the acquisition;
(2) the transfer, on ~uch payment, .of
the land to the company;
(3) the terms on which the land shall be
held by the company;
(-1) where the acquisition ii for the p1o1~
pose of eree~ng dwelling ho~ or the prov11ion of amenities connected therewith, ihe
time within which, the oonditiona on whioh
and the manner in which the dwelling houses
or amenitile •hall be erected or provided;
.and
(5) Where the acquisition is for the construction of l\lly other work, the time within
which and the conditions on which the work
2 s.c.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
159
shall be executed and maintained, and the
terms on which the public shall be entitled to
use the work.
It will be clear from the above that the fifth term is
directly related to s. 40 (l)(b) and there can be no
doubt that in finding out what is meant by s. 40
(l)(b) we must take into account the fifth term in
a. 41 and it is only by reading the two together that
it will be possible to find out the intention of the
legislature when it provided for acquisition of
land for a company through the machinery of the
Act.
We may here eet out the contentions on either
side as to the interpretation of these provisions.
It is contended for the appellant that though the
words of s. 40 (l)(b) are wide in amplitude and provide for acquisition of land for construction of
some work which is likely to prove useful to the
public, these words do not carry the meaning that
if the product of the company which constructs the
work is useful to the public, land can be acquired
for it. It is urged that on this interpretation the
Government will be turned into a sort of agent for
acquiring lands for all companies which produce
something which may be used by the public. It is
therefore contended that when s. 40 (I )(b) says that
acquisition may be made for the construction of
some work which is likely to prove useful to the
public, it is not the product of the, work which
should be useful to the public _but the work itself
should be of direct use to the public; and it is further
urged that this interpret'1tion of s. 40 (l)(b) is confirmed if one looks at the fifth term to be provided
in the agreement acoording to s. 41. That requires
that the agreement should provide for the terms o.n
which the public shall be entitled to use the work.
It is urged that this means that the public should
be entitled to use the work as such and not merely
the product of the work.
1961
R. L. Aroro
v.
State of U. P.
WllnchooJ.
160
1951
R, L. Aroora
v.
St.u of U .P.
Wnchoo J,
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1962] SUPP·
On the other band it is contended for the respondenta that the words in s. 40(1Xb) are of wide
amplitude and land can he acquired under the Act
for any company when the work set up by the company !s likely to prove useful to the public. It is
urged that thiR means that the work itself may be
useful to the public or the product of the work ma.y
be useful to the public; a.nd so in either case the
work would be useful to the public and therefore
land can be acquired for it. It is also urged that the
fifth term in s. 41 should not be held to cut down the
wide amplitude of the words used in s. 40( l)(b) and
should be read in the samo vide manner and the
public should be held to be entitled to use the
work if it is allowed (say) to go to the work for
business purposes.
The respondents rely on Ezra v. The Secretary
of Stale (') in support of their interpretation of the
relevant words in ss. 40 and 41. In that case the
Bank of Bengal, a Company which was incorporated under Act XI of 1876, was anxious to extend
its premises for the purpose of providing a.ecommoda.tion for the Public Debt Office. The Bank was
unable to acquire the premises required by it by
private treaty and therefore approached the Goviimment to acquire the land for it under the Land Acquisition Act. Action wa~ consequently taken under
Part VII of the Act for acquisition of the premises
for the oompany and the agreement provided that
the public, subject to the Act constituting and the
bye-laws regulating the Bank, Rha.ll be entitled to
uso the said building or buildings in relation to the
said Government 1->usiness so far as the sa;ae might
bo utilised by the Bank for the purposes of such
business. It was urged before the High Court tha.t
this was not sufficient compliance with the fifth
term of the agreement provided bys. 41 The High
Court repelled this contention on the ground, firstly
11)
[1903] IL. R, 30, Cal. 36.
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
161
that the Government was vested with absolute discretion in this matter and was the sole custodian
of the public interllst in this country, and secondly
that the rights of the public generally were dependant upon the Government business and the Government had considered the conditions therein inserted
as .sufficiently safeguarding its interests. It was
further held that that Court had no power to enter
ripon a consideration of the question how far that
provisions sufficiently safeguarded the interests of
the Government or of the public, of which it was
the custodian (see pp. 79-80).. The problem that
has been posed before us does not appear to have
been posed before the High Court in that form.
Further the High Court seems to have thought that
as the sections provided for the satisfaction of the
Government there was no power in a court to enter
upon a consideration of the question how far that
provision safeguarded the interests of the Government or of the public. This decision seems to
suggest that the Government's decision as to the
terms is completely final and as the Government
was satisfied by the terms it had imposed in that
case the matter was no longer open before the
court. All that we need say about this case is, as
already pointed out, that the question was not raised
before the High Court in the manner in which it
has been raised before us and that mav account for
the view. taken by the High Court. ·It is also well.
to remember that in that case premises were required for the Public Debt Ojfice of the Government
which was then under the management of the Bank
of Bengal and that may have h<td something to do
with thefin,11 decision. Rut in any case, this case does
not lay down that it is for the Government to determine what the relevant words in ss. 40 and 41 mean,
though the High Court is right when it says that it is
not for the court to enter upon a consideration of
the que~tion how far the provision m3de by the
Government in the terms of the agreement sufficiently
1981
R. L. Aror4
v.
Stale of U. P.
Wanchoo J.
162
IH1
R. L. Arora
••
Sia" •f U. P.
It ..,,,.. J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS SUPP. [1962]
safeguard& the intereste of tht> public, that being
a matter entirely for tho satisfaction of the Government. But as the mattl>r was not conaidtred by the
High Court from the point of view from which it has
been argued before us, this ca.ae cannot be treated
as a decision on the interpretation of the relevant
words in sa. 40 and 41 merely by implication. In
any case, if by implication the said ded~ion supp._orts
the rospondents' contention, it does not correctly
represent the true legal position in that behalf. In
our opinion tho interpretation of tho material terms
in s. 40( I l(b) and the fifth term of the agreement
provided ins. 41 read together is and must always
be within the jurisdiction of th~ court.
Turning now to the oppoeing contentions as
to the meaning of tho relevant words in 88. 40 and
41, we have already said that the two provisioI!I'
of SB. 40 and 4:1 must be read together to find out
the intention of the legislature when it provided for
acquisition of land for a company through the agency of government. It seems to us that it could
not be the intention of the legislature that the
Government should be made a general agent for
companies to acquire lands for them in order that
the owners of companies may be able to carry on
their activities for private profit. If that was the intention of the logislature, it was entirely unneceasary
to provide for the restrictions contained in ea. 40
and 41 on the powers of the Government to acquire
lands for companies. If we were to give the wide
interpretation contended for on behalf of the respondents on the relevant words in es. 40 and 41 it
would amount to holding that the legislature intended the Government to be a sort of general agent
for companies to acquire lands for them, ao that
there owners may make profits. n can hardly be
denied that a company whioh will satisfy the definition of that word in s. 3 (e) will be producing
somethini: or other which will be ueeful to the
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
163
public and which the public ma.y need to purchase.
So on the wide interpretation contended for on
behalf of the respondents, we must come to the conclu iion that the intention of the legislature was that
the Government sh·ould be an agent for acquiring
land for all companies .for such purposes as they
might have provided the product intended to be
produced is in a general manner useful to the public,
and if that is so there would be clearly no point in
providing the restrictive provisions in ss. 40 and 41.
The very fact therefore that the power to use
the machinery of the Act for the acquisition of
land for a company is conditioned by the restrictions in ss. 40 and 41 indicates that the
legislature intended that land should be acquired
through the coercive machinery of the Act only
for the restricted purpose mentioned in ss. 40 and
41, which would also be a public purpose for the
purpose of s. 4. We find it. impossible to accept
the argument that the intention of the legislature
could have been that individuals should be compelled to part with their lands for private pr9fit of
others who might be owners of companies through
the Government, simply because the company might
produce goods which would be useful to the public.
If therefore the legislature intended by the provisions of ss.40 :i,nd 41 that there should be restrictions on the power to acquire land for companies
it can only be given effect to by putting the narrower meaning on the words used in ss. 40 and 41,
as contended for by the appellant. Further, reading
s.40 ( l\ :bl and the fifth term of the agreement
as provided in s. 41 together (as they must in our
opinion be read together in order to find out the
real intention of the legislature) there can be no
doubt that the only meaning to be given to these
provisions read together is, as contended for on
behalf of the appellant. In this connection we
ought to add that as we shall presently point out
the material words of the fifth term in the
1~61
R. L. Arora
v.
State of U. P.
Wanchoo J.
164
1661
R. L Arora
v ..
Bl•ll of U. I'.
Wane~eo J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1962] SUPP.
agreement provided in s. 41 a.re reasonably incapable
of the construotion suggested by the respondents.
Let us therefore turn to the words of s. 40
(l)(b), which says that acquisition should be for
some work which is likely to prove useful to the
public. Now if the legislature intended these words
~o mean that even where the produrt of the work
is uteful to the public, land can be ac11uired for the
company for that purpose, the legislature could
have easily used the words "the product of" before
the worilli "such work". The very fact that there
is no reference to the product of the work in
s. 40( l)(b) shows that when the legislature eaid
that the work shoud be likely to pro~e useful to tho
public it meant that the work should be directly
useful to the public through the public being able
to use it instead of being indirectly useful to the
public through the public being a.hie to use it.a
product. We have no doubt therefore that when
s. 40(l)(b) says that the work should be useful to
the public it means that it should be directly useful
to the public which should be able to make use of
it. This meaning in our opinion is made perfectly
clear by what is provided in the fifth term in s. 41.
Before the machinery of the Act ca.n be put into
operation t.o acquire land for a. company, the
Government has to take an agreement from the
company, and that agreement must provide, where
acquisition is needed for the construction of some
work and that work is likely to prove useful to the
public, the terms on which the public shall be entitled to use the work. These works oan only
mean that the public should have a right to use the
work itself and not the product of it; and it is the
duty of the Government when it takes an agreement
under s. 41 to see that the public is so entitled
to use the work. To say that the public is
entitled to.use the work because the public can go
to the work in the wa.y of business is in our opinion
not giving any right to the public to use the work
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPO~TS
165
directly as such. All that the agreement has pro.
vided in the present case is that "the public will
have such right of access to and use of the land/
works herein and before specified as may be neces.
sary for the transaction of their business with the
firm." This in our opinion is not what is meant by
the words "the terms on which the public shall be
entitled to use the work" in the fifth term of the
agreement as provided in s. 41. Such use for business is implicit in every bu8'ness, even if the
Government does not acquire land for it, for no
company can carry on for a moment its business
with any profit if it does not allow those with
whom it has business to come to its premises. Therefore, when the fifth term provides for the use of
the work by the public as of right it cannot possibly
envisage the use only by tho~e . who have business
with a factory (for example) and their going there
to transact business; such use would in any case
have to be permitted by the owner of the
company, as otherwise it will not be worth his
while to run the company at all. Therefore, when
the fifth term provides that "the public shall be
entitled to use the work" it means that the public
shall be entitled to use the work directly and
as of ri~ht for its own benefit and does not mean
that those who have business with the company
can go upon the work . for that business.
Reading therefore s. 40 (l)(b) and the fifth
term of the agreement provided in s. 41, there is
in our opinion no doubt that the intention of the
legislature was that land should be acquired only
when the work to be constructed is directly
useful to the public and the public shall be entitled
to use the work as such for its own benefit in accord-·
ance with the terms of the agreement which
under s. 42 are made to have the same effect as
if they form part of the Act. We are of opinion
that this is the only interpretation of the relevant
1961
R. L. Arora
v.
State of U. P.
Wanchoo J.
166 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1962] SUPP.
llfl
R.L.Ar1Wa
v.
St.U of U. P.
W-J.
words of se. 40 and 41, and the legislature could
not have intended otherwise.
Let us now turn to some of the arguments
advanced on behalf of the respondents against the
clear intention of the legislature which is deducible
from the interpretation of the words used in 18. 40
and 41. It is urged in the first place that ss. 40
and 41 both providti for the satisfaction of the
Government and it i~ the Government which has to
be satisfied that the work is likely to prove useful
to the public and further that it is the Government
which has to be satisfied that the terms contain a
provision as to how the public shall be entitled to
use the work. It is further urged that as the
Government in this case was satisfied that the
Works was useful to the public and was also satisfied as to the terms in the agreement on which the
public shall be entitled to uee the Works, the oourt
ha.e no further say in the matter. We are of opinion
th$t this argument is entirely fallacious. It is true
that it is for the Government to be satisfied that the
work to be constructed will be useful to the public;
it is also true that it ie for Uie Government to be
satisfied thlit there is a term in the agreement
providing that tile public shall be entitled to nae the
work; but this does not mean that it is the Government which has tho right to interpret the words
need in ff, 40(l)(b) or in the fifth term of the agreement ins. 41. It iethe court which has to interpret
what those words mean. After the rourt has interpreted these wcrds, it is the Government which
ha.s to carry out the object of. 88. 40 and 41 to ite
satisfaction. The Go~ernment cannot say that as. 40
and 41 mean this and further say that they are
satinfied that the meaning they have given to the
relevant words in these sections bas been carried
out in the terms of the agreement provided by
them. It ill for the court to say what the words in
88. 40 and 41 mean though it ill for the Government
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
167
to decide whether the work is useful to the public
and whether the terms contain provisions for the
manner in which the public shall be entitled to use
the work. It is. only in this latter part that the
Government's satisfaction comes in and if the
Government is satisfied that satisfaction may not
be open to challenge; but the satisfaction 'bf the
Government must be based on the meaning given.
t;o the relevant words in ss. 40 and 41 by the court.
The Government cannot both give meaning to the
words and also say that they are satisfied on the
meaning given by them. The meaning has to be
given by the court and it is only thereafter that the
Government's satisfaction may not be open to challenge if they have carried out the meaning given to
the relevant words by the court. The argument
therefore that it is the Government's satisfaction
which is required both by s. 40 and s. 41 is of no
help to the respondents, for it is for t.he court to
say what these words mean and then see whether
the Government are satisfied according to the mean·
ing given to these words by the court. We have
already indicated what these words mean and if it
plainly appears that the Government are satisfied as
a result of giving some other meaning to the words,
the satisfaction of the Government is of no use, for
then they are not satisfied about what they should
be 'satisfied. In the present case the Government
seems to have taken a wrong view that so long as
the product of the Works is useful to the public
and so long as the public is entitled to go upon the
Works in the way of business, that is all that is
required by the relevant words in ss. 40 and 41.
We have held that this is not the meaning of the
relevant words in ss. 40 and 41 and therefore the
Government's satisfaction on this meaning cannot
be binding and would be worthless.
Learned counsel for the respondents also
relied on certain American decisions and pointed
R. L. Arora
v.
State of U. P.
WanchooJ.
168 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1962] SUPP.
]~]
R.L.Arora
v.
BW.ojU.P.
w...... J.
out that the trend in the United States of Amorica
these days was to give a wide meaning to the
power of eminent domain contained in the fifth
amendp:ient to the Constitution of the United
States. The fifth amendment lays down as follows
in this respect:"nor shall private property be taken for
public use, without just compensation."
It seems that there has been eontroversy in America
as to the meaning of the words "public use" u~ed
in the above amendment and there are two views
prevalent. The older view was, and it is still held
in some States, that "public use" means "use by
the public-that is, public employment-and consequently that to make a use vublio, a duty must
devolve on the person or corporation holding property appropriated by right of eminent domain to
furnish the public with the use intended, and that
there must be & right on the part of the public, or
some portion of it, or some public or quasi-public
agency on beha.lf of the public, to use the property
after it is condemned". The later view is that "public
use" means "public advantage, convenience," or benefit, &nd that anything which tends to enlarge the resources, increase the industrial energies, and pro...aote the productive power of ~my considerable
number of the inhabitantB of a section of the State,
or which leads to the growth of towns and the creation of new resouroes for the employment of capital
and labour oontributee to the general welfare and the
prosperity of the whole community and giving the
Constitution a broad and comprehensive interpretation, constitutes a public use" (see American Jurispmdenoe. Vol. 18. pp. 661-62). In one State, where
the older view is stµ! held, the court JlOinted out
that "if public wie were construed to mean that the
public would be benefited in the sense that the
enterprise or improvement for the use of which the
property wu tr.ken might oont-ribnte to the comfr>rt
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
169
or convenience of the public, or a portion thereof, or
be esteemed necessary for their enjoyment, there
would be absolutely no limit to the right to take
private property, that it would not be difficult to
show that a factory, hotel, etc., the erection of
which was contemplated, would result in benefit to
the public, and that, under this power, the property
of the citizen would never be safe from an invasion." (see ibid. p. 664) It is the later view prevalent in some States in America for which the respondents are contending, and the result of that would
be the same as pointed out above. But we do not
think it necessary to examine the American cases
cited before us because the words in our statute
are not pari materia with the words used in the
fifth amei)dment to the American Constitution. The
fifth am'endment contemplates that private property
shall not be acquired except for public use. The
public use there is thus connected with th¥ purpose
of acquisition and may perhaps in certain co1iceivable circumstances depending upon the conditions
in a particular State, be open to a wider interpretation. But the two views prevalent about it in
America itself show that in one view it is the actual
use of the work that is emphasised while in the
other view it is the public benefi~ arising from the
work that is emphasised. Now so far as the words
in the Act are concerned, it is to our mind perfectly
obvious that it is the actual use of the work which
the Act envisages and n 0 t the public benefit that
might directly or indirectly arise from the use of
the land acquired. This is clear from the words
used both ins. 40(l)(b) and the fifth term of the
agreement provided ins. 41. Section 40( l)(b) requires that the acquisition is for the construction of
some wor}j:, and that that work is likely to prove
useful to the public. It does not say that the ac·
quisition of land would be useful to the public.
Further the fifth term in the agreement provided in
s. 41 makes this clear beyond all doubt for it
1961
R. L. Arora
••
State oj· U.P.
Wanclwo J.
170 SUPREME COURT ft.l!PORTS [lllM] SUPP.
lNJ
R. ! .. Ar01a
T,
SW. of U. P.
WoncA.o J,
provides that the e.grecment. she.11 contain the terms
on whic.h the public shall be entitled to use the work.
These words therefore in the Aot a.re clearly referable to the narrower v.iew preve.lent in America.,
which emphasises the use by the public of the actual
work constructed. We a.re thl'refore of opinion that
the respondents can derive no advantage from the
Americe.n ca.sos cit.ed oil their behalf to show the
wider interpretation of the words used in the fifth
amendment to the American Constitution.
Another argument on behalf of the respondents
is based on s. 50 of tho Damodar Valley Corporation
Act (No. XIV of 1948) which provides the.t "any
land required by the Corporation for carrying out
its functions under this Act she.II be deemed to be
needed for a public purPQllC and auch land shall be
acquired for tho Corporation &8 if the proviaions of
Pe.rt VII of the Land Aoquiaition Act, 189' (l of
1894), were applicable to it and the Corporation
were a company within the meaning of ol. (e) of s. 3
of the il&id Act." That eection is not before Ull for
interpretation and it is therefore not neceuary for
us to sa.y anything about the scope and meaning of
that section. All that we need point out is the.t
that section was no~ enacted to explain what the
legislature meant by the use of the relevant words in
BB. 40 and 41. Whe.tever therefore may be the
interpretation of that section and whatever may be
the reason why the legislature enacted that 1eOtion
in that Aot th"t will not control the mee.ning of the
relevant words in 11. 40 and 41, and it is therefore
not neceesa.ry for ID to interpret that section in the
present proceedings. As •gainst this, learned Cooneel for the appellant pointed out that there are
many other later Aote creating 1tatutory oorpor•tiona like the Damodar Valley Corporation, in which
there is no provision corresponding to s. 50. That
again is a matter into which we need not go, and
it is unneoesae.ry to consider why the legislature
providocl s. 50 in the Damodar Valley Corporation
2S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
171
Act and did not provide some similar section in
other Acts creating statutory corporations which
were enacted after the Damodar Valley Corporation
Act was put on the statute book. These considera·
tions in our opinion have no relevance to the interpretation of the relevant words of ss. 40 and 41 of
the Act and we do not therefore propose to say anything about s, 50 of the Damodar Valley Corporation Act. We may add that the works are not like
the Damodar Valley Corporation and what we say
in the present case may not necessarily be taken to
apply to a statutory. corporation like the Damodar
Valley Corporation, which is wholly owned by the
State,
Then it was urged on behalf of the respondents
thats. 6(3) makes the purpose noted in the notification under s, 6(1) not justiciable. We have not been
able to understand how that provision helps the
respondents. All that s. 6 (3) says is that the declaration shall be conclusive evidence that the land is
needed for a public purpose or for a company, In
this case the declaration was that the land was
needed for a company arid that according to s. 6(3)
is conclusive evidence that tqe land is so needed,
Now it is not the case of the appellant that the land
was not needed for the Works in th(J"·present case,
nor does the appellant say that though the land
was needed for some other purpose, t·he notification
falsely declares that it wru:i needed for the Works.
In the circumstances the conclusiveness envisaged
by s. 6 (3) is of no assistance to ~he solving of the
problem with which we are concerned in the present
case.
It is then urged for the respondents that though
the appellant had alleged ma1a ji<ks, that part of
the case was given up by him and therefore it is not
open to him to urge the contentions that have been
urged before us. There is no force in this argument
either, for there is no question of any mala /ides or
1961
R. L. Arora
v.
Stare of U.P.
Wanchoo J,
172 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1962] SUPP.
ll6l
R. L. Arora
...
St.ii •f U. P.
Wanthoo J.
fraud on the Act in the present case. What the
appellant contends is that the relevant words in
ss.40 and 41 have a certain meaning and that on that
meaning the action of the State Government in
gh ing consent for the use of the machinery prov idcd
in the Act for the acquisiti<·n of land for the Works
is not within the contemplation of the Act. This
contention has nothing to do with mala /ides or with
fraud on the statute. It has always been the case
of the appellant that the consent given by the
Government was not within the meaning of the
relevant words in ss. 40 and 41 and tht>refore the
entire proceedings for acquisition of the appellant's
land must be quashed, for the conditions precedent
for the issue of the notificatidn under s. 6 had not
been complied with. On that case the appellant
must succeed, if we accept the meaning for which he
contends, and that has nothing to do with ma/a fidl!8
or fraud on thee tatute on the part of the Governmen't.
Lastly we may notice an argument on behalf of
tho appellant that if we look to the history behind
the legislation which culminated into the Act, we shall
find that acquisition for a company was always for
construction of some work which the public could
use. Keference in this connection was made to Act
XXII of 1863 which provided for acquisi~ion for
private individuals and companies. That Act applied to works of public utility, which wMe defined
under s. II to mean any bridge, road, railroad, tramroad, canal for irrigation or navigation, work
for the improvement of a river or harbour, dO<lk,
quay, jetty, drainage' work or electric telegraph and
also all works subsidiary to any such work. At
the same time there was another Act in force,
namely, Act VI of 1857, whioh provided for acquisition of land for publio purposes. Then ca.me the
Act (X of 1870), which repealed both Acts No.
VI of 11!57 and No. XXII of 1863 and made
2s.c.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
173
1961
a consolidated provision for acquisition of land for
public purposes and for companies and brought in
Chap. VII for the first tim9. This Act was replaced
in 1894 by the present Act. Howe\'er, Act X
of 1870 was a consolidating and amending Act.
The Act of 1894 is also an amending Act. Therefore, it is not possible to derive much assist>1nce
from the previous law existing before the Act of 1870
was passed, for it not only comolidated the previous law but also amended it. We have therefore to
interpret the Act on the words as th<'y now staud and
cannot derive much assistance from the provisions of
ActXXII of 1863. That is why we have interpreted
above the relevant words of ss. 40 and 41 without
any reference to the past history of t4e law relating
to acquisition of land for public purposes and for
companies.
Coming now to the facts of the present case,
we have to see whether the acquisition is for.a work
which is useful to the public under s. 40 (l) lbl
and which the public is entitled to use in accordance with the fifth term to be entered in the agreement under s. 41. We have already set out the
term in the agreement which shows that those who
have business with the company shall have such
right of access to and use of the land/works herein
and before ;;pecified as may be necessary for the
transaction of their business with the firm." This
in our opinion is not what the relevant provisions
of ss. 40 and 41 require. What these provisions
require is that the work should be directly useful
to public and the agreement shall contain a term
how the public ~hall have the right to use the work
directly themselves. It seems to us that under the
relevant words in ss. 40( l)(b) and 4l it is works like
a hospital, a public reading room or a library or an
educatfonal institution open to that public or such
other work as the public may direc~ Jy use that a.re
contemplated and it is only for such works which
R. L. Arora
v.
Stale of U. P.
Wane/loo J.
174 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1962) SUP:f.
lfllJl
R. L. Aror•
9.
Stot.0 of U. P ••
W-HJ.
Sorkll< J
a.re useful to the public in this wa.y and oa.n be directly used by it that land ca.n ho acquired for a. company
under the Act. This is also the implication of the
following observations of this Court in Babu Barkt;a
Thakur's ca•e(') at pp. 137-38 with reference to
ss. 40 a.nd 41 :
"In a.n industrial oonoern employing a.
large number of workmen away from their
homes it is a. social ne0088ity that there should
be proper housiniz accomodation available for
such workmen. Where a large section of t.he
community ia concerned, itll welfaroie a matter
of public concern. SilIVla.rly, if a Company
is jlenerous enough to erect a hospital or a
public reading room a.nd library or an educationiil institution open to the public, it cannot
be doubteri that the work is one of publio
utility a.nd comes within the provisions of
the Act."
The fa.ct that the product of the company would be
useful to the publio is not sufficient to brinlf the
acquisition for a. oompany within the meaning of the
relevant words in 88. 40 and 41. In tho present oaae
a. II that the Government was satisfied about appears
to be that the product of the company will be useful
to the public and the provision in the a~reement
is merely that the public eba.11 be able to go upnn
the works for purpc>se of business. Thie in our
opinion i~ not the mPnning of the relevant words
under ss. 40 a.nd 41 and therefore the Government's
satisfaction in that behalf.is not enough to entitle
it to use the machinery oft.he Act for the purpose
of acquisition in this ca.so. We therefore allow the
app_eal with costs and setting aside the order of the
High Court quash the notification 1mder s. 6 of the
Act and the proceedings resulting therefrom.
SARKAR, J.-The appellant was the owner of
certain lands. The Government of Lttar Pradesh
acquired the landl! under the Land Aoquisition
(ll [1961] I. S.C.R. 128.
•
2 s.c.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
175
Act, 1894. The appellant, thereupon, moved the
High Court at Allahabad under Art. 226 of the
Constitution for an appropriate with to qu'L~h the
order of acquisition made by the Government.. The
petition was dismissed by the High Court and the
appellant has filed this appeal against the judgment
of the High Court. The land, it may be stated,
was acquired by the Government for a company
called the Lakshmi Ratan Engineerinl!' Works Ltd ..
which required it for setting up a textile machinery
parts factory.
Sections 6 to 37 of the Act lay down the
procedure for a.II acquisitions under it. Part VII of
the Act, which consists of ss. ::18 to 44 provides for
acquisition of lands for companies for certain
specified purposes. It is not in. controversy that the
acquisition in the present case was made under this
part. It is necessary to set out ss. 39, 40 and 41
of Part VII to appreciate the contention of the
appellant:
S. 39. The provisions of sections 6 to 37
(both inclusive) shall not be put in force in
order to acquire land for any Company,
unless with the previous consent of the appropriate Government, nor unloes the Company
shall have executed the agreement hereinafter
mentioned.
S. 40. (1) Such consent shall not be
given unless the appropriate Government be
sati9fied, either on the report of the Collector
under seotion 5A sub.section (2), or by an
enquiry held as hereinafter provided ,(a) that the purpose of the acquisition is to obtain land for .the erection of
dwelling houses for workman employed
by the Company or for the provision of
amenities directly connected therewith, or
1961
--·-
R. L. Arora
v.
Slate of U. P.
SarkarJ.
176
IP61
R. L. Arora
••
Si.11 of F. P.
Sflf'karJ,
SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1962) SUPP.
(b) that such acquisition is needed
for the construction of some work, and
that such work is likely to prove useful to
the pu hlic.
(2) Such enquiry shall be held by such
officer and at such time and place as the
appropriate Government shall appoint.
(:l) Such officer may summon and enforre
the> attendan<'e of witnPRReR and compel the
produ<'tion of documPnU! by the Aame meanR
and as fqr as possible. in the RamP manern as
is provided bv th<> Code of Civil Procedure
in thP case of Civil Court.
a
R. 41. If the appropriate Government is
Rati~fied after considering the
report. if anv,
of thr> C<il!Pctor under· section 5A, subsection (2), or on the report of t.he offil'flr
making thP inquiry under section 40 that the
purpnsc of thP propoReil a<'quisition is to
ohtain land for the erection of dwPIIing houAes
for workman employrd by t.heCompan~' or for
the provi•ion of amenities dircctlv ronn!'cted
therewith, or that the propoRed acqnisition
is nN·rled for th" ronstniction of a work, and
that. 8uch work is lik1•ly to prove usefu I to the
public, it shall require the company to enter
into an agrePn'liJnt with the appropriate
Covnnmrnt, providing to thP. satisfaction of
tlw appropriate Government for thr> following
matt,,r?, namely:--( I)
( ~)
the payment to the appropriate
Gover11ment of the cost of the
acquisition;
the trans for, on Ruch paym<'nt of
the land to the company;
(:l) th<' tt-rms on which tlw land shall
be hel<l by the Company;
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
177
( 4)
where the acquisition is for the purpose of erecting dwe Hing houses or
the provision of amenties connected
therewith, the time within which,
the conditions on which and the
manner in which the dwelling houses
or amenities shall he erected or
provided ; and
(5) where the acquisition is for the
construction of any other work the
time within which and the conditions
on which the work shall be executed
and m~.intained, and the terms on
which the public shall be entitled to
use- the work.
There is no dispute that the Government declared that it was satisfied that the acquisition·
needed for the .construction of a work, namely, a
textile machinery parts factory and that this work
was likely to prove useful to the public
but the appellant contends that such a
factory is not a work contemplated by
s. 40(1)(b) and the Government had no right, therefore, to give its consent to the acquisition. The
precise significance of this contention will have to
be stated more fully later.
The first point taken by the respondents against
this contention of the appellant is that the satisfaction of the Government under s. 40( l )(b) is subjective
and that a declaration in the official gazette that
the acquisition is for a public purpose is under s. 6(3)
conclusive and cannot therefore be questioned in a
court. I think that the appellant is right when he
says that this conclusiveness is of no avail unless
the work can be said to be withins. 40(l)(b). The
Government cannot by simply making a declaration that it is ~atisfied that tbe acquisition is needed
for the construction of some work likely to prove
useful to the public· stop further enquiries even
1961
R. L. Aro1a
v.
Stat• of U. P.
Sarkar J.
178 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1962] SUPP.
JllJIJ
R. L. dro,.
'· U. P.
Stall •f
,)""'"• J.
though the satisfaction contemplated is the Government's irubjective satisfaction. If the work is not
within the Act, the Government's satisfaction avails
nothing. And that is the contention of the appellant.
No doubt if the Government says it is e&tisfied,
it cannot be contended that it is not satisfied. But
the Government haB to bo satisfied about a specified
thing and a question can be raiser! as to whether
the thing about which the Government is satisfied
is the thing contemplated by the section. I therefore, proceed to consider whether the work about
which the Government.was satisfied in the present
case, is withins. 40(l)(b).
The real question raised by the appellant is
as to tho meaning of the words "such work is likely
to prove useful to the public" in d.(b) of s.40( l ).
What is a work likely to prove useful to the public ? The appellant e&ys it is a work which the _
public can use for the purpose for which it was
constructed. Thua a building for a school would
be such a work, for the public can use it for tho pur·
pose for which it was built. So wuuld a building
for a hospital or a librar) be. It is said that this
is the natural and ordinary meaning of the words.
Then it is said, even if it were not 80, they liave to
be so read in view of ss. 39 and U. The matter is
put in this way : In view of 8. 39 land cannot be
acquired under Part VII unless two conditions
are fulfilled. The first is the consent of the Government to the acquisition which, in view of s.41,
cannot be given-leaving out the OllBE'S o( acquisition for workmen's dwelling houses with which we
are not conoerned now-unless the acqui.ition is
needed for the construction of e. work which is likely
to prove useful to the pu blio. The second is the
execution of e.n 11.greement by tbe Company providing .for the matters stated in s.1U, OJle of which is
the terms on which the public shall be entitled to
use the work to be <'Onstructed on the land to be
acquired, about which work the Government has
2 S.C.R.
SUPREMI!.: COURT REPORTS
179
been satisfied that it is likely to prove useful to the
public. Since both these conditions have to be fulfilled, the work must be such as the public can use
directly; if it were not such a work then the condition as to the agreement cannot be fulfilled. Therefore, the work in s. 40(l)(b) must necessarily be
restricted to a work which itself can be used by the
public.
The appellant contends that the work in the
present case being a factory, it is not one which the
public can use and, therefore, it is not a work for
setting up of which the Government could under
s. 40(l)(b) give its consent to the acquisition; It
appears that in the present case the Company had
execute\} an agreement purporting to be in terms of
s. 41 and that agreement provided that the
public would have a "right of access to and use
of the land-works ............... as may be necessary
for the transaction of their business
with
the firm", that is, the Company. It is contended by
the appellant that this is not a compliance with the
second condition. It is said that this is not really
providing for the use of the work for that means
use by the public of the work, for the purpose
for which it was built. Hence, it is argued, that the
acquisition is illegal.
·
I am unable to accept the appellant's reading
of s. 40(1 )(b) as correct. 'The words "such work is
· likely to prove uoeful to the public'' read by themselves seem to me plainly to imply a work the
construction which results in some benefit which the
public would enjoy. They do not contemplate only a
work which itself can be put by the public to its use.
For example, a work producina electricity for supply
to the public isa work whichls useful to the public.
So ali!O a work producing any commodity like say,
edicines or cloth would he a work wpich would be
useful to the public. Again, I feel no doubt that
a radio broadcasting statfon would be a work which
would be useful to the public. Take another oase,
f
19~1
R. L.Arora
v.
State of U. P ·
Bark•r J.
180 SUPREME OOURT REPORTS [1962) SUPP.
1P61
R, L. Arora
••
Sl•u of U. P.
S•wJ.
namely a. post-graduate college turning out a small
number of highly qualified medical doctors. There
Ol\ll be no doubt that the building for the colleize
can be said to be a work useful to the public. It
would be so not because the public would have a.
cha.not> of getting training there and a small number
of the memb~rs of the public would after the
training be abfo to make a good livelihood, but
because an institution of this kind is ul!<lful to the
public as it turne out men who give very useful
service to the public. In all the illustrations given
the workA would be useful to the public though the
public might have no accese to the work or any right
to use them directly. I think it would be unduly
restricting the meaning of the word 'useful' to say
that a work is useful to the public only when it ean
directly be used by the public. The words are not
work which the public can u~e", in whioh case it
might with some justification have been said thai
the work must be such as the public could use. In
the Shorter Oxford Dictionary, among the meanings
of 'useful' appear, "having the qualities to bring
a.bout good or advantage", "helpful in effecting a
puroose''. I find no reason not to apply these
meanings to the word 'useful' in the section that I
am considering.
If the meaning for which the appellant contends were to be given to the words, then thfl work
contemplated can only be a work like a hospital,
school or phflanthropic instituti ona of similar kfud
which itself the public can put to ite Ull\l. It seems
to me that it would be strange if the section only
contemplated that, Pa.rt VII clearly deals with
companies as bllliness institutioDB. A company in
the Act means a company incorporated under one
or other of eertain Companies Acts and includes a
society registered under the Societies Registration
Act, 1800 and a registered society within the meaning of tho Co-operative Societies Act, 1912: sees. 3( e).
Now the first and the last are essentially business
I
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
181
institutions. U 'lder s. 38A again, a company for the
purpose of part VII is to include "an industrial
concern, ordinarily employing not less than one
hundred workmen owned by an individual or by an
association of individuals and not being a Company", This again is essentially a business organisation. It is true that land cannot be acquired
for this last mentioned variety of "Company" under
Part VII tlxcept for erection of dwelling houses for
its workmen or for amenities connected therewith.
I am however referring to s. 38A to show that Part
VII is dealing with "companies" as business organisations and not as donors for philanthropic purpose$, That being so, it would be curious if Part VII
was intended only for acquiring lands for these business organisations so that they might out of charity
set. up philanthropic institutions. If encouragement
of philanthrophy was the idea behind Part VII, why
were its provisions not made available to philanthropic minded private individuals or associations
of individuals ?
Another reason which to my mind indicates
that s. 40(l)(b) is not confined to philanthropic
institutions is that the word 'work' would hardly
then have been used; it is to my mind a very inappropriate use of the word 'work' to describe a
philanthropic institution. 'Work' in the present
case can only mean a structure, a building and,
therefore, a structure or building for any purpose :
see Shorter Oxford Dictionary,
Section 40, furthermore, contemplates. an enquiry for determining whether the work is likely to
prove useful to the public in course of which it
may even be necessary to compel the attendance of
witnesses and production of documents. This is not
an enquiry to hear the objections of the owner of
the land to be acquired, to the acquisition: Ezra v.
Sei;retary of State( 1) I can hardly imagine that
(I) 32 I. A. ~~.
1961
R•.L. Arora
v.
Slat• of U. P.
Sarkar J.
182
1'41
R. L. Arora
••
•
Si.l4°0J U.P.
Sarkor ./.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1962] SUPP.
provisionR for such elaborate enquiry would have
been made if all that the Government had to be satisfied was whether a philanthropic institution would
be useful to the public. It would also appear inPxplicable that Part VII was needed at all for the purpose
of acquisition of land for the establishment of
philanthropic institutions by ,companies Jar that
could well have been done under s. (3 as that would
clearly be an acquisition for a company for. a public
purpose. I do not supp08c there can be any doubt
that the establishment of a philanthropic institution
would be a public purpose. I &Ill unable to agree
with the contention that land can be aoquired tor a
company only under Part VII. Section 43 says
that this Part would not apply to acquisition of land
for a company for the purposes of which under an
agreement with the company, the Government is
bound to provide land. Acquisition in such cases
for the company has therefore to be under BB. 6 to
37. It would follow that under s. 6 land can be
acquired for a company in a case not coming under
Part VII. In the viow that land oan be aoquired
for a company under the Act otherwise than under
Part VII, I am supported by A. Natua Aaari v.
The State of Madraa (').
Lastly, I think it right to point out that
though the provision~ in P11.rt VII have been on
the statute book since at least 1S70", in not a single
c&11e it appears to have been held in a.II th61!6 years·
that the work contemplated is work of a. phil&nthropio nature which the public can put to its use
directly. I am not saying that thia is an argument
whioh ia concl1111ive but it strikes me II.ti aomewhat
extraordinary if the meaning was as the appellant
contends, it should not have struok anyone so long.
In Ezra v. 8~ of State ('), an acquisition of
land for the Bank of Beng~l under Part VII for the
(I) [1953] 2 M.L J. 684.
l2J 32 I. A. 93,
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
183
purpose of constructing a building in which the
.Public Debt Office of the Government which was in
charge of the Bank, was to be housed, was upheld.
This was not a case of acquisition for a phihnthropic .purpose. In Radha Raman v. State of U. P. (1),
an acquisition under Part VII for the purpose of a
co-operative housing society was upheld. In
Ranibala Bhar v. State of West Bengal (') an acquisition for extension of the textile mills of a company
was upheld.
Reading s. 40( 1)(b) by itself, I am for these
reasons unable to accept the view that the work
there contemplated is only a building or other construction put up for .a philanthropic purpose or is
such as itself can be used by the public. In my
opinion, the work contemplated is a work from the
con11truction of which the public can in any way
derive benefit, whether by the direct use of the work
or by the enjoyment of the fruits of the activities
carried on there, or, may be, otherwis.e.
The question then is, however wide may be the
meaning of the words "work.... likely to prove useful
to the public" when read by themselves, has that
meaning to be controlled in view of the fact that
under s. 41 an agreement has to be made with the
company concerning the work providing for the
terms on which the public can use it ? Is that
meaning t.o be restricted and the words understood as
contemplating only a work which is capable of
meaning to be restricted and the words public
directly ? I do not think so. That would not be a.
reasonable way of interpreting the sta.tute, If I am
right in what I have said so for, it would be defeating the intention of the statute ifs. 41 is allowed to
restrict the width of the natural meaning of the
words us.edin s·. 40(l)(b). In my view, Part VII was
enacted ma.inly for acquiring lands for business
organisations and therefore for purposes of their
(ll A.I.R. 1954, All. 700.
(2) 62 C.W.N. ia.
1111
R.L.~r01'•
v.
State of U. P.
Sarkar J.
184 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1962] SUPP.
JHl
R. l . .A.1010
v.
SW. of U. P.
·'tntkor J.
business also, provided that that business was useful
to the.public. Obviously, in a very large majority of
cases of such acquisition it would not be possible to
permit the use by the public of the works put up on
the land. If such is the purpose of the acquisition,
that purpose would be largely defeated if the statute
at the same time proviried that the public must
have the right to use the work put up on the land.
A construction leading to such a result would in my
view be wholly unjustified. The proper view to take
would be to read the statute a& leaving it to the
Government to whom large powers have been given
under the Act to decide the terms of the user of the
work by the public, also to decide the caaes in
which the public shall have the right to use the
work at all.
I think that tho interpretation suggested by
me ha& tho support of authority. It ha& to be
observed that when it is said that the meaning of
s. 40(1 )(b) must be restricted to bring it in consonance withs. 41, it is conceded that the two sections
cannot stand side by side, each having it.~full operation. Now, in such a case, I conceive it is the duty
of the Court to remove the conflict by such interpretation as would carry out the intention or the
legislature. I may read here the following pusa.ge
from Maxwell on the Interpretation of Statutes
(10th ed.) p. 78,
"The beneficial spirit of construction is
also well illustrated by cases where there is
so far a conflict between the general enactment and aome of ita subaidiary provisions
that the former would be limited in the aoope
of its ooeration if the latter were not restrioted.'r
In suoh a O&Be the rnle is to allow scope to the
gell.lV91 enactment. Maxwell cites Cortia v. Kent
Water Worka(') in anpport of this proposition. There
(I) (1827) 7 I!, & c. 314.
-
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
185
an Act authorised the imposition of a local rate on
all persons occupying land in a parish and gave a
dissatisfied rate-payer an appeal but required the
appellant to enter into a recognisance for prosecuting the appeal. Under this Act, a corporation was
subjected to a rate ard a suit was brought to
recover that rate. It was said on behalf of the
corporation that the Act did n:it authorise the
imposition of the rate on a corporation because it
contemplated the imposition of a rate on a person
who could appeal against it and that a corporation
was not such a person because it could not maintain
the appeal provided in the statute as that appeal
was one which a person who could enter into a
recognisance could prosecute, and a, corporation
could not enter into a recognisance. Bayley, J.
observed,
"But assuming that they cannot enter
inte a recognisance, yet if they are persons
capaole of beiqg aggrieved by and appealing
against a rate, I should say that that part of
the clause which gives by the appeal applies to
all persons capbale of appealing, and that the
other part of •the clause which requires a
recognisance to be entered into applies only
to those who are capable of entering into a
recognisance, but is inapplicable to those who
are not."
I think on the same principle I should in the persent
ca.se hold that the provisions in the agreement about
the terms on which the public would be entitled
to use the work would be inapplicable to a case
where the work is such that the public cannot use
it. Thus for example, if land is acquired for setting
up a highly specialised drug factory, it may be a
work to which public admission as of right cannot
conveniently be granted and to such a work the
last part of s. 41(5) would not be applicable.
1961
R. L. A.r.ara
v.
State of U.P.
Sarkar J.
186
JI/fl
R, L. Arora
••
8101< qf U.P.
dorurJ.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1962) SUPP.
I also find some support for the view that it
is not obligatory th:n the public Ehall uso the work
from the fact that the user of the work by the public
shall be such as the Government determines. The
Government may be satisfied with very little user.
The Government's satisfaction as to the quantum
of this user is plainly couclusive. Therefore, it
would seem that the prov1oion as to the term of
the user of the work by the public w&R not intended
to confor a substantial benefit on the public a benefit
which woultl warrant an interpretation defeating
which otherwise would appear to be the main pur·
pose of the statute.
Another reason leading me to the view that
it is not obligatory under the stktute that the public
must have a right to use th~ work is this. Obviously, tho public cannot in auy case have the right
to uso the whole work. Eveu if a hospital was put
up, the public oa.nnot insist on using, say the dispensing room or the place where medicines
aro stocked or the residential quarters of the staff.
That being so, it would be for the Government to
decide what user of the work would be available to
the public. If the Government decides that tho
public shall have the use of a very small part of the
work, I d•> not think that any complaint can be
legitimately made. This would show that the term
as to user by the public was in no case intended to
confer a great benefit on the public. If this is
true, there would be leas reason for thinking that
that was an obligatory term. If it was not obligatory, it cannot of course control the meaning of
s. 40(l)(b).
What I have said so far does not lead to the
reeult that Part VII was enacted for the private
benefit of companies as business organisations. Nor
is its effect to convert the Government into land
agents for them. In order that land may be acquired
under Part VII, the Government must be satisfied that it is required to put up a. work which
2 S.C.R.
-·
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
187
would be useful to the public. So the controlling
idea is benefit to the public. It is because of this
that the Government acquires tbe land for the Company. No doubt the Company would itself derive
some private benefit from the work. But that cannot justify the view that the acqui~ition is for the
benefit of the Company only or that the Act converts the Government· into a land agent for the
Company. No one can force the Government to
acquue the land and when the Government does so,
it does for public benefit and not solely for the
Company's benefit. Take a case where land is
acquired to house the workmen of a company.
Here the public cannot use the land. The aquisition is no doubt for the benefit of the workmen but
at the same time the financial advantage goes
solely to the Company. Is it to be said that the
Act is converting the Government into land agents
for the Company ? Obviously not. If so, neither
can it be said in the case of acy_uisition for a company for putting up a work that the Government
would be acting as a land agent for the company.
It is no argument that the Government might
use its powers under .Part VlI to advance themterest of its friends and supporters. Assume the
Government does that. The Government may
equally use all other powers given to it by various
statutes for a similar purpose. But that would not
justify interpretrng a statute plainly giving the
Uovernment a power, as not clorng so. A country
cannot go on unluos power can ue entrusted to its
Government. The remedy agamst the misuse of
such power is not always to the Court I.Jut to those
who put the Uovernment where it is,
In the present case, it will be remembered,
the land w;is acquired for the setting up of a textile
machinery parts factory. The llovernment was
satiJfied that it was a work which would prove
l!Ml
R. L. Arora
v.
Sta~e of U,
Sarkar J.
P.
188 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1962] SUPP.
Illfl
R. L . .drora
Y.
S141,./U.P.
s.,.,,,'
useful to the public. It seems to me that Government were entitled so to be satisfied within the
meaning of s. 40(l)(b). It is no part of the duty of
this Court to sit in judgment over the merite of
Gov..rnment's satisfaction. I think it rlght how·
ever to point out that I find no fault with the
Government for h!!.ving been satisfied that the
work would be useful to the public, Textiles are
an essential commodity for our daily life. Their
manufacture therefore is useful to the public.
•rextile manufacture requires textile mills and the
mills no doubt require parts. Therefore a factory
for Lhe purpOBe of manufacturing these partll can,
in my view, be said to serve a pub.lie purpose. I
find it impossible to take any objection to the present acquisition on the ground that the work pro·
posed to be set up is not likely to prove useful to
the public. Nor is it a legitimafie objection to the
a.cquieitjon that the public cannot directly use the
work and the reasons for this view have been
earlier stated.
I would therefore di.Bmiaa this appeal wnh
COB ta.
BY CoURT: In accordance with the opinion
of the majority, the appeal is allowed with oos'8.
.A.ppt.al allowed.
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