N. MASTHAN SAHIB versus CHIEF COMMISSIONER, PONDICHERRY
Supreme Court of India | Decided 8 December 1961 | [1962] SUPP. 1 S.C.R. 981 | 1961 INSC 340
Key facts
- Decided
- 8 December 1961
- Bench
- P.B. GAJENDRAGADKAR*, A.K. SARKAR, K.N. WANCHOO, K.C. DAS GUPTA, N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR
- Bench size
- 5
- Case number
- CIVIL APPEAL No. 42/1961
- Disposal
- Appeal(s) allowed
- Citation
- [1962] SUPP. 1 S.C.R. 981
- Neutral citation
- 1961 INSC 340
Text of the judgment
(l) S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
981
N. MASTHAN SAHIB
v.
CHIEF COMMISSIONER, PONDICHERRY
(P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, A. K. SARKAR, K. N.
WANOHOO,
K. C. DAS GUPTA and N. RAJ.A.GOP.A.LA
AYYANGAR, JJ,)
Territory of India-Pondicherry, if part of India-Question referred to Union Governmtnt-Amwer of Union Gol!t.rament, if binding on Gourt-Ordera of authorities in Pondicherry
-Ap~l and Writ Petition, if maintainable in Supremt Gwrt-Gon11titution of India, Arts. I (3), 32 and 136.
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The Supreme Court referred two questions to the Union
Government viz (i) whether.Pondicherry was comprised within
the territory oflndia, and (ii) if not, what was the extent of
the jurisdiction exercised by the Union Government and the
French Government over the territory. The answers given
were that (i) Pondicherry was not comprised within the territory of India and (ii) the Union Government exercised full
jurisdiction over Pondicherry and the French Government did
not exercise any de facto jurisdiction over it. There was a
treaty of cession between France and India in respect of
Pondichcrry but it had not been ratified as required by the
French and Indian laws. The appellant contended that the
answer of the Union Government to the second question
established that Pondicherry was part of the territory of India
and that the Court was not bound by the answer to the first
question.
Hekl, that Pondichorry was not comprised within the
territory of India as specified in Art. I (3) of the Constitution.
The answer of the Union Government on this question was
binding on the Court. There was no conflict between the
answers to the two questions. Though complete administrative control over Pondicherry had been transferred to the
Government of India it could not be equated to a transfer of
territory. Unless there was ratification of the Treaty there
could legally be no transfer of'territory. Accordingly, no
appeal could be entertained by the Court under Art. 136 of
the Constitution apinst the decisions of the authorities in
Pondicherry.
1961
982 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1962) SUPP.
W61
N. M asthan Sahib
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Chief Commissioner;
Pondicherry
Duff Dei·elopment Company v. Government aj Kelantan
1924 A.O. 197, Government of the Republic of Spain v. Arant·
razu Mendi, (1939) A. C. 256 and Fageri,es 1927 Probate
311, applied.
Jolley v. Mainka 49 C.L.R. 242 and Fjrost v. Stevenson,
58 C.L.R. 528, distingui•hed .
. Per Gajendragadkar, Wanchoo and Ayyangar, JJ.Havmg regard to the nature of the relief sought no writ under
Art. 32 of the Constitution could be issued to the authorities in
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P.r Sarkar and Das Gupta, JJ.-The Supreme Court
could issue a writ under Art. 32 to the quasi-Judicial authori·
ties in Pondicherry. Article 32 was a fundamental right and the
right to obtain a writ was equally a fundamental right. If the
Constitution gave to a party a fundamental right to a writ the
Court could not refuse that right. The consideration that the
,
writ i1Sued may not be enforced in Pondicherry could not be
allowed to defeat the provisions of the Constitution. Such a
consideration is relevant only in the case of discretionary •
orders.
K. K. Kochunni v. 'l'he State of Madras, [1959) Supp.
2 S.C.R. 316, In re International Pulp and Paper Oo. Ltd.,
(1876) 3 Ch.U.594, Reg v. Fox, 8 E. & B. 939, R. v. OasBel,
(1916) 1 K.B. 595 and Jn re Banwari!al Roy, 48, C.W.N. 755,
referred to.
C1vn. ·APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal
Nos. 42 and 43 of 1961.
Appeals by special leave from the judgments
and orders dated September 7, 1960 of the Chief
Commissioner, Pondicherry in Appeals Nos. 56 and
57 of 1960.
WITH
Petitions Nos. 297 and 298 of 1960.
Petitions under Art. 32 of the Constitution of
India for enforcement of Fundamental Rights.
A. V. Viswanathr,,Sastri,R. K. Garg, M.K.Ramamurthy, S. 0. Agarwal and D.P. Singh, for the appellants/petitioners (In both the appeals and the
petitions.)
O. K. Daphtary, Solicitor-General of India,
B. Sen, B. R. L. Iyengarand T. M. Sen, for 1he
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
983
respondent No. I (in both the appeals) and respondents Nos. I and 2 (in both the petitions).
A. S. R. Chari, K. R. Ohoudhria.nd R. Mahalingier, for respondent No. 2 (in both the appeals).
R. GcYpawkrishnan, for respondent No. 3 (in
both the petitions).
1961. December, 8.-The Judgment of
Gajendragadkar, Wanchoo and Ayyangar, JJ., was
delivered by Ayyangar, J. The judgment of Sarkar
and Das Gupta, JJ., was delivered by Sarkar, J .
AYYANGAR, J.-The two Civil Appeals are
by special leave of this Court and the two Writ
Petitions have been filed bj the respective appellants seeking the same relief as in the appeals, the
relief sought being the setting aside of orders passed by the Chief Commissioner of Pondicherry as
the State Transport appellate authority (under the
Motor Vehicles Act). All these four have been
heard together because of a common point raised
regarding the jurisdiction of this Court to entertain
the appeals and the petitions.
It is manifest that the preliminary point
about the jurisdiction of this Court should have
first to be considered before dealing with the
merits of the contentions raised in the appeals and
petitions. It might be convenient to state a few
faots to appreciate the context in which the questions debated before us arise and the point concerned in the order now passed.
Sivarama Reddiar the appellant in Civil
Appeal 43 of 1961 and the petitioner in Writ Petition 298 of 1960, is a citizen of India and is engaged. in ~he business of motor transport. By a
notification dated December 27, 1958 in the Official
G~z~tte of Pond!cherry .th~ State Traniport Comm1BB10n of Pondicherry mv1ted applications for the
grant of stage carriage p'!rmits to be submitted
before February 27, 1959, including the route from
Pondicherry to Karaikal, the latter being another
1961
N. Masthan Sahi~
v.
Chit/ Commissioner,
Pondielwry
Ayyanear ..
984 SUPREME COUR'l' REPORTS [1962] SUPP·
1961
former French possession. In response to this
notification, Sivarama Reddiar as well as one Gopal
v.
Pillai who is the second respondent to the appeal
Chief Go'.•mi.,fon.,, and the second respondent in the Writ Petition
P ondicherry
were two of the 19 persons who made applications
Ayyangar J,
for the grant of this permit to them. Before the
State Transport Commission dealt with these applications, the Government. of India in the exercise
of its powers under s. 4 of the Foreign Jurisdiction
Act, 194 7 published a notification in the Offici11tl
Gazette of Pondicherry extending the provisions of
the Indian Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 as in force in
Delhi to Pondicherry with effect from June 19,
1959. Rules 3(4) and 4 of this order promulgated
under the Foreign Jurisdiction Act provided :
"3( 4). Any Court, tribunal or authority
required or empowered to enforce the said
Act in Pondicherry may for the purpose of
facilitating its application in relation to
Pondicherry construe the said Act with such
alteration not affecting the substance as may
be necessary or proper with respect to the
matter before the Court, tribunal or authority
as the case may be."
Rule 4 effected a repeal of existing laws in these
terms:
"Repeal of existing laws :-All laws in
force in Pondicherry immediately before the
commencement of the Order which correspond
to the Act and the rules, notifications and
'Orders applied to Pondicherry by this order
shall, except in so far as such laws relate to
the levy of any fee, cease to have effect save
as respects things done or omitted to be done
before such commencement."
On July 21, 1959, the Chief Commissioner of Pondicherry, in exercise of the powers conferred on him
by s. 44 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 collBtituted
a Sta.te Transport Authority for Pondicherry Thu
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N. Masthan Sahib
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985
1961
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State Transport Authority, Pondicherry thus created, issued a notification on August 1, 1959 by which N, M1sthan S.Jiib
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it required persons who had applied for Stage Chi,j Commissioner,
Pondicherry
Carriage permits in response to the notification
dated December 27, 1958 to furnish particulars with
.4yyangar J.
regard to a number of matters which were relevant
for being considered for the grant of a Stage Carriage permit under the Motor Vehicles Act. Both
~he appellant-petitioner Sivarama Reddia.r as
well as inter alia. the respondent Gopal
Pillai
furnished the
required particulars.
The Particulars supplied by the parties were
checked and verified by designated authorities
and thereafter the State Transport Authority
by an order on April 30, 1960 directed
the grant of the permit to the appellant-petitioner
Sivarama Reddiar rejecting the claims of all others
including the respondent Gopala Pillai. Though
the Motor Vehicles Act which had been extended
to Pondicherry included s. 64, whereby persons aggrieved by an order of a State Transport Authority
could file appeals against such order, no appellate
authority had been constituted by the Chief Commissioner. This situation was remedied by a notification by the Chief Commissioner dated May 4,
1960 whereby he constituted himself under s. 68 of
the Act as the appellate authority for the purpose
of exercising jurisdiction under 11. 64 thereof. Several of the aggrieved operators including Gopala
Pillai preferred appeals to the Chief Commissioner.
By an order dated September 5, 1960 the Chief
Commissioner, Pondicherry allowed the appeal of
the respondent GopRla Pillai, set aside the order of
th., State Transport Authority granting the permit
to the appellant Siva.ram a Reddiar and directed that
the permit for the route Pondicherry to Karaikal
be issued in favour of the respondent Gopala Pillai.
Writ Petition 293 of 1960 has been filed to 11ecure
the setting aside of this order of the Chief Commissioner on the ground that the order violates the
fundamental rights guaranteed to the petitioner b;y
986 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1962] SUPP.
1961
N. M as<han Saliib
v.
':hie f Commissioner,
Pondichtrryj
A))'antar J,
Part III of the Constitution and Civil Appeal No. 43
of 1961 is directed to obtain the same relief. It is not
necessary at this stage to set out. the facts of the
other appeal and petition by Masthan Sahib, because
except that the route is different and so are the
grounds on which the order of the Chief Commissioner is sought to be impu11ged, the other material
facts relevant for the consideration of the preliminary point to which we adverted are exactly the
same.
The preliminary objection that is raised to the
entertainment of the appeal is shortly as follows :
.Art. 136 (1) of the Constitution under which
the appellant has obtained special leave reads :
"136 (1). Notwithstanding anything in this
Chapter, the Supreme Court may, in its discretion, grant special leave to appeal from
any judgment, decree, determination, sentence
or order in any cause or matter passed or
made by any court or tribunal in the territory
of India."
In order, therefore, that this Court might have
jurisdiction to entertain the appeal it is a prerequisite that the Court or tribunal from whose judgment or order the appeal is preferred should be one
in the territory of India. It is urged on behalf of
the respondent that Pondicherry is not part of the
territory of India, with the con~equence that the
Chief Commissioner whose order is impugned in the
appeal is not "a Court or tribunal in the territory of
India." The question thus raised is of great poli·
tical and constitutional significance and it is not
disputed that if this area were not part of the terri·
tory of India, this Court would have no jurisdiction
in the absence of any legislation by Parliament
under Art. 138 ( l), and the Civil Appeal would have
to be dismissed as incompetent.
It was common ground that this was the posi·
tion in regard to the maintainability of the appeal
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
987
1961
but in regard to the Writ Petition Mr. Vishwanatha.
Sha.stri-learned Counsel for the petitioner-sought N. Mastlian Sahib
v.
to sustain its maintainability on slightly different Chi.f Commissiolllf,
Pontfich1rry
grounds. He invited our attention to the terms of
Art. 12 of the Constitution which reads:
J.
"In this Part, unless the context otherwise requires, "the State" includes the Government
and Parliament of India and the Government
and the Legislature of each of the States and
all local or other authorities within the terri·
tory of India or under the control of the
Government of India."
Learned Counsel pointed out tha.t for the purpose
of the exercise of this Court's powers under Art.
32 of the Constitution for the enforcement of the
,
fundamental rights its jurisdiction was not limited
• to the authorities functioning within the territory
of India but that it extended also to the giving of
directions and the issuing of orders to authorities
functioning even outside the territory of Indi11.,
provided that such authorities were subject to the
oontrol of the Government of India. This submission
appears to us well-founded and that the powers of
• this Court under Art. 32 of the Constitution are not
circumscribed by any territorial limitation. It extends not merely over every authority within the
territory of India but also those functioning outside
provided that such authorities are under the control of the Government of India.
The po.wer. conferred on this Court by Part III
of the Const1tut1on has, however, to be read in conjunction with Art. 142 of the Constitution which
reads:
"142 (1) The Supreme Court in the exercise of
the jurisdiction may pass such decree or make
~uo~ or~r as is necessary for doing complete
JUSt1ce m any cause or matter pending before
it, and any decree so passed or order so made
shall be enforceable throughout the territory
A.,,..,.,
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988 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1962] SUPP.
1961
N. !4.astha,, Sahib
v.
ChUJ Commijsioner,
Pondielurry
Ayyangat J.
of India in such manner as may be prescribed
by or under any law made by Parliament and
until provision in that behalf is so made, in
such manner as the President may by order
prescribe.
(2) Subject to the provi:-ions of any law made
in this behalf by Parliament, the Supreme
Court shall, as respects the whole of the territory of India, have all and every power to
make any order for the purpose of securing
the attendance of any person, the discovery
or production of any documents, or the investigation or punishment of any contempt of
itself."
It would be seen that Art. 142 brings in a limitation
as regards the territory which the orders or directions
of this Court could be enforced. It is manifest
that there is an anomaly or a discordance between
the powers of this Court under .Art. 32 read with
Art. 12 and the executability or enforceability of
the orders under Art. 142. It is possible that this
has apparently arisen because the last words of
Art. 12 extending the juri1diction of this Court
to authorities "under the control of the Government
of India" were added at a late stage of the constitution making while Arts. 142 and 144, the latter
reading:
"All authorities, civil and judicial, in the
territory of India shall act in aid of the
Supreme Court".
were taken, in whole or in part, from s. 210 of the
Government of India Act, 1935 and that no necessary changes were made in Art. 142 to bring it
into line with Art. 12 as it finally emerged and
the powers of this Court under Art. 32. But this
however oflers us no solution to the question which
is whether, in view of the limitation imposed by
Art. 142 on the area within which alone the directions or orders of this Court could be directly
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enforced, the Court could issue a writ in the
nature of certiorari or other appropriate writ or
direction to quash a quasi-judicial order passed
by an authority outside the territory of India,
though such authority is under the control of the
Government of India. If the order of the authority under the control of the GovArnment of India
but functioning outside the territory of India. was
of an executive or administrative nature, relief
could be afforded to a. petitioner under Art. 32 by
passing suitable orders against the Government of
India directing them to give effect to the decision
of this Court by the exercise of their powers of
control over the authurity outside the territory of
India.. Such an order could be enforceable by
virtue of Art. 144, as also Art. 142. But in a case
where the order of the outside authority is of a
quasi-judicial nature, as in the case before us,
we consider that resort to such a procedure is not
possible and that if the orders or directions of
this Court could not be directly enforced against the
authority in Pondicherry, the order would be ineffective and the Court will not stultify itself by passing
such an order .
In these circumstances it becomes imperative
that we should ascertain the constitutional and
political status of Pondicherry in relation to the
Union of India. Certain documents have been placed before us and in particular an agreement dated
October 21, 1954 entered into between the Government of India and of France by which the administration of Pondioherry was ceded to the Government of India. Mr. Viswanatha Sastri, learned
Counsel for the appellant-petitioner contended that
on the terms and convenants contained in this
agreement, Pondioherry was a part of the territory
of India. On the other hand, Mr. Chari-learned
Counsel for the respondents urged that the reservations contained in the agreement were such as to
preclude the Court from reaching the conclusion
1'~1
N. M asthan Sohi6
v.
O/,ief CommUsiotllf',
Pondiche"y
Ayyangar J.
990 SUPREME OOURT REPORTS [1962] SUPP. , i..-"·
1981
that there had been a. transfer of complete sovereignty, which according to him was necessary in
N. Mmthan Sahib
v.
order to constitute the area. a.s part of the territory
Clrilf Commissioner,
of
India. The learned Solicitor-General who appearPandi<htrry
ed in response to the notice to the Union of India,
A.vllllgar J.
submitted that the Union Government was agreeable to the respective contentions urged by the
parties being decided by the Court.
We have considered the matter urged before
us with great care and desire to make the following observations: So far as the Constitution of
Im'· d is cc;ncerned, we have an express definition of
wnat the phrase "territory of India" means. Art.
1 (3) enacts :
"l. ( 3) The territory of India. shall comprise (a) the territories of the Stu,tes;
(b) the Union territories specified in the
First Schedule ; and
(c) such other territories as may be acquired."
There might be little difficulty about locating the
territories which are set out in els. (a) & (b) but
when one comes to (c) the question arises as to
when a territory is "acquired" and what constitutes
"acquisition". Having regard to the subject dealt
with, the expression "acquired" should be taken
to be a reference to "acquisition" as understood
in Public International Law.
If there were
any public notification assertion or declaration by
which the Government of this country had declared or treated a territory as part and parcel of the
territory of India, the Courts would be bound to
recognise an "acquisition" as having taken place,
with the consequence that that territory would be
part of the territory of the Union within Art.1(3)(c).
In the present case, we have this feature that the
administration of the territory is being conducted
under the powers vested in the Government under
the Foreign Jurisdiction Act. The preamble to
that Act recites that it was :
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991
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"An Act to provide for the exercise of
B•lli6,
certain foreign jurisdiction of the Central N. M ul/ra•
v.
Government".
C/tuf Commissio"'!,
PonJiehmy
and accordingly the e::q:iression "foreign jurisdiction"
A,,..,.,J.
is defined in its s. 2(&) to mean "the jurisdiction
which the Central Government has for the time
being in or in relation io any territorv outside
India.'' Thus this would prima facie show that
' Pondicherry has not been ''acquired" but still
~ntinues to be outside the territory of India. In
*r opinion, however, though this might be
very strong evidence th1t the territory has not been
"acquired" and so not part of the "territory of
India", it is still not conclusive. In this state of
circumstances two courses would be open to us:
(1) to decide for our11elves on the material that bas
• been placed before us in the shape of the agreement
between the two Governments etc. Whether Pondicherry has been "acquired" so as to become part
of the territory of India, or (2) to invoke the assistance of the Government of India by inviting
them to state whether the territory has been acquired within Art. 1(3) of the Constitution and whether
• Pondicherrv is thus now part of the "territory of
India". We originally_ proposed to avail IWlelves
only of the procedure indicated in s.6 of the ?o"reign
Jurisdiction Act 1947 which enacts:
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"6. (1) If in any proceeding, civil or
criminal, in a Court established in India or
by the authority of the Central Government outside India, any question arises
the existence or extent of
as to
any foreign jurisdiction of the Central
Government, the Secretary to the Government
of India in the appropriate department shall
on the application of the Court,' send to th~
Court the decision of the Central Government
on the question, and that decision shall for
the purposes of the proceeding be final.
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992
1961
N. 11 asthan Sahib
v.
Chkj Commissioner,
Pondichmy
A.JJ""l• J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1962] SUPP.
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(2) The Court shall send to the said Seoretary
in a document under the seal of the Court or
signed by a Judge of the Court, questions
framed so as properly to raise the question, and
sufficient answers to those
questions shall be returned to the Court by the
Secretary and those answers shall on production thereof be conclusive evidence of the
~
matters therein contained."
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But the learned Solicitor-General very properly
pointed out that an answer to the question which
could be referred under this provision would relate
merely to "the existence or extent of jurisdiction"
and that information on these points might not be
sufficient to solve the problem posed by the
preliminary question raised in the appeals and
petitions as to whether Pondicherry is a part of '
the "territory of India" or not. We agree with
the learne<l Solicitor-General that information
relating to the "existence or extent" of the jurisdiction exerciseable by the Union Government in the
territory might not completely solve the question
for our decision as to whether Pondicherry is part
of the territory of India or not, but still if the •
extent of the jurisdiction veEted in the Union
Gove~nt by the arrangements entered into
between the two Governments virtually amounts
to a transfer of sovereignty for every practical
purpose, it would be possible to contend that such
a transfer or cession was so incompatible with the
existence of any practical sovereignt,y in the French
Government as to detract from the surrender or t transfer being other than complete. It is for this
reason that we consider it proper to exercise the
powers vested in the Court under s. 6 of the }foreign
Jurisdiction Act,
It would be observed from what has been
stated above that it would be more satisfactory
and more useful for the disposal of the proceedings
(J) S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
993
before us if we ascertain from the Union Government an answer to the question whether they do or
do not consider that Pondicherry is. part of the
territory of India. We have only to add that on
the decisions in England, the Court has jurisdiction
to invite the Government to assist it by information
as to whether according to Government any
territory was part of Her Majesty's Dominion or
' not (vide The Fagernes L. R. 1927 Probate 311).
Besides, the learned Solicitor-General agreed thai
the Government would assist us by answering our
reference. In view of the matters set out above we
direct that the following questions shall be forwarded to the Union of India under the seal of this
Court for the submission of their answers :
(1) Whether Pondicherry which was a former
' French Settlement is or is not at present comprised
within the territory of India as specified in Art. I (3)
of the Constitution by virtue of the Articles of the
Merger Agreement dated October 21, 1954 between
the Governments of India and France and other
relevant agreements, arrangements, act1 and
conduct of the two Governments.
(2) If the answer to Question 1 is that
'
Pondicherry is not within the territory of India,
what is the extent of the jurisdiction exercised by
the Union Government over the said territory and
whether it extends to making all and every arrangement for its civil administration, its defence and in
regard to its foreign affairs. The Government of
India might also state the extent of jurisdiction
' i which France possesses over the area and which
operates as a diminution of the jurisdiction ceded
to or enjoyed by the Government of India.
On the receipt of the answers to these
que1tions the appeals will be posted for further
hearing.
S111,x1R J.-Four matters came up for hearing together. Two of these are appeals brought with leave
1951
JV. Masthan So/lib
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ChU/Commission•r,
Pondich.1T.J
.fJ!1ongOT J•
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994
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SUPRE~IE COURT REPORTS [1962] SUP!'.
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1961
granted by this Court and two are petitions under
Art. 32 of the Constitution. One appeal and one
v.
petition are by one party and the other appeal and
Chitf Commi.rsioner.
petition
are by another. The appeal and the
Pondiclurry
Sarkar-J. - -,'petition by each party challenge an order made by
· the Chief Commissioner of Pondicherry under the
Motor Vehicles Act, HJ39. Each of the two orders
challenged was ma.de on applications for the grant
of bus permits. By one of the orders a. permit for
a c:ertain route had been given to a person other
than one of the parties who has moved us, in
preference to him. By the other order, similarly,
-the claim of the other party movivg us, to a permit
for a different route was rejected;- All- the matters
raise substantially the same question concerning
the validity of the Chief Commissioner's orders.
Now, Pondicherry was earlier a French posses·
sion administered by the Government of France.
By an agreement between _the Governments of
India and France, the administration of Pondi·
'cherry· was transferred to the Government of
India as from November l, 1954. The Government
of India had been exercising power in Pondicherry
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since, under the Foreign Jurisdiction Act, 194 7.
The Chief Commissioner of Pondicherry is an officer
of the Government of India appointed under the
powers derived as a result of the agreement.
With regard to the appe11.ls, a. question aro3e
- at the hearing before us_ as to whether they were
competent. The appeals had been filed with
leave granted under Art. 136 of the Constitution. It
was said that the appeals were incompetent be: ·cause Pondicherry was outside the Indian territories and under Art. 136 no appeal from any
- court outside such territories lay to this Court.
It was, however, contended on behalf of the appellants that since - the Inclo-French agreement
or very soon
thereafter, Pondicherry became
p11.rt of the Iriclian territories as a territory acquired by India and, therefor£'_. t]Jf' arrrr. 1:- '"HJ
.v. Masthan Sahib
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competent. As the most satisfactory way of
deciding the question whether Pondicherry is with- N, Masthan Sahib
v.
in India or not is to seek information from the Chkf Commissittntr,
Government on the point, the majority of the
Pondilherry
members of the bench are of opinion that the
SarkOT J,
Government of India should be approached to
enlighten us about it. The learned SolicitorGeneral, appearing for the Government, ha.a not
objected to this procedure being adopted.
With regard to the Petitions under Art. 32,
it was contended that the Chief Commissioner of
Pondicherry was a State within the meaning of
Art. 12 of the Constitution as under that article
&ny authority under the control of the Government of India outside the territory of India was
a St&te for the purpose of Part III of the Constitution. On this basis it was contended on behalf
of the petitioners that the pt'titions under Art. 32
uking for certain writs to quash the orders of the
Chier Commissioner of Pondicherry were alllo
competent. A further question then arises aa to
whether in view of Art. 142 of the Constitution the
writs, if issued, could be enforced against an au~ority under the control of Government of India
at Pondicherry, if Pondicherry was outside India
and if they could not, whether the Court should
issueithe writs as it would only be stultifying itself
by doing so.
It seems to us that it is unnecessary to
~eoide these questions at this stage, for we are gomg to ask the Government to inform us whether
Po~dioherry. w~s at the relevant time part of
Indian terr1tor1es. If the Government inform u1
~at Pondichei:y was part. of India, then no quest1~n. would a~1se concermng the powers or juried1ct1on of th18 court in any of the matters now
before us. If the information from the Governme!1t is that. Pondicherry is not within the territone1 of India, that will, in our opinion, be the
996
~
SUPREME COURT REPORTIS [19112] SUPP.
1961
proper time to consider whether the Court oan
still give the p(·titioners the relief which they
ask.
Chi.f Commission, r,
J>..dic,,,,,y
These cases involve other questions of dilliculty and importance on which it would be proper,
a1k01 J.
in our view, to make a pronouncement after the
Government of India's answer to our request is
received. As to none of these are indeed any
question arising in these cases we express any
opinion. at this stage. We wish, however, to
observe now that it seems to us exceedingly strange
that if this Court finds that a party's fundamental
right has been violated, from which it would follow
that that party has a right to move this Court
under Art. 32 and to obtain the necessary writ,
this Court could refuse to issue it for the reason
that it would' thereby be stultifying itself. If a
party is entitled to a writ under Art. 32, then we
are not awarfl that there is any discretion in the
Court to refuse the writ on the ground that the wri~
cannot be enforced. Even assuming that in view
of Art. 142 of the Constitution, a writ cannot be enforced outside India-as to· which we pronounce
no opinion now-might is not be said with justification that it is not necessary for us to be unduly
pressed by considerations of the difficulties of the
enforcement of the writ and that if ·would be
reasonable for us to think that the Government of
India has sufficient respect for this Court to do
all that is in its power to give effect to this Court's
order, whether or not there might be technical
dilliculties in the way of its enforcement by this
Court. In view of these doubts; we are unable,
as at present advised, to concur in the opinion
expressed in the Judgment of the majority of the
learned Judges constituting the Bench that
Art.. 142 stands in the way of this Court iBBuing
a writ under Art. 32 in this case. We would
'reserve our opinion till a later stage and till it becomes necessary to expresa any opinion at alL
N. Mast.Ian Salii6
v.
'
•
, '
t ...,
(1) S.C.R.
SUPREME OOURT REPORTS
997
1gs1
BY CouRT: We direct that the two questions set out in the majority judgment be for- N. Mast"4n Sc.\w
v.
warded to the Union of India under the seal of Chilf Commissitfur,
this Court for submission of their answers.
s.ur J,
On receipt of the amwers to the questions the
appeals will be posted for further hearing.
The Judgment of Gajendragadkar, Wanchoo
and Ayyangar, JJ., was delivered by Ayyangar J.
The Judgment of Sarkar and Das Gupta, JJ., was
delivered by Sarkar J.
AYYANGAR, J.-In compliance with our directions the two questions were forwarded to the
Union Government and they submitted their
answers to them in the following terms:
"Questian No. (1)-Whether Pondicherry
which was a former French Settlement is or
is not at present comprised within the territory
India as specified in Article 1(3) of the
Constitution by virtue of th~ Articles of the
Merger Agreement dated October 21, 195i
between the Governments of India and France
and other relevant agreements; arrangements,
acts and conduct of the two Governments.
'•""""'"'
•
•
Answer--The French Settlement (Establishment) of Pondicherry is at present not comprised
within the territory of India as specified in clause (3)
of Article l of the Constitution by virtue of the
Agreement dated the 21st October, 1954, made
between the Go-vernment of :France and the Government of India or by any other agreement or
arrangement. By the aforesaid Agreement, dated
the 2;lst October, J 954, the Government of France
transferred, and the Government of India took over,
administration of the territory of all the French
Establishments in India, including Pondicherry,
with effect from the 1st November, 1954. A copy
of the Agreement is enclosed. This is expressed to
be & 4e facto transfer and was intende4 ~o \l\l
998 SUPREME COURT,REPORTS [1962) SUPP.
1961
N. M asthan Sahib
v.
Chief Commissioner,
Pondiche"y
AyyangarJ.
followed up by a de jure transfer. A treaty of
Cession providing for de jure transfer has been
signed by the Government of France and the
Government of India on the 28th May, 1956, but
has not been so fa:r ratified in accordance with the
French Law as well as in accordance with the article
:n of the Treaty. A copy of the Treaty is also
enclosed. The Government of India has been
administering Pondicherry under the Foreign
Jurisdiction Act, 1947, on the basis that it is
outside India and does not form part of the territory
of India.
Question No.( 2)-If the answer to question
1 is that Pondicherry is not within the
territory of India, what is the extent of the
jurisdiction exercised by the Union Government over the said territory and whether it
extends to making all and every arrangement
for its civil administration, its defence and in
regard to its foreign affairs. The Government
of India might also state the extent of jurisdiction which France posseBSes over the area and
which operates as a diminution of the jurisdiction ceded to or enjoyed by the Government of
India.
Answer-The Government of India has been
exercising full jurisdiction over Pondicherry in executive, legislative and judicial matters in accordance
with Foreign Jurisdiction Act, 1947. In doing so it
has followed the aforesaid Agreement. The Government of France has not also exercised any executive,
legislative or judicial authority since the said
Agreement.
The jurisdiction of the Government of India
over Pondicherry extends to making all arrangements
for its civil administration. The administration of
the territory is being carried on under the Foreign
Jurisdiction Act, 1947, and in accordance with the
French Establishments (Administration} Order, 1954,
_.--..-
(l} S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
999
1961
and other Orders made under sections 3 and 4 of that
81.hib
Act. The Government of India have been aiming at .iY. Masthan
v.
conducting the administration of Pondicherry so as Cbit.f Commissio111f',
P ondicherry
to conform to the pattern of administration obtaining
to in India consistent with the said Agreement. AccoAyyangar J.
rdingly a large number of Acts in force in India have
already been extended to Pondicherry.
, .
The Government of India hold the view that
the sole responsibility in regard to arrangements
' for the defence of Pondicherry devolves on
themselves.
Pondioherry has no foreign relations of its own.
No claims have been made by the Government of
France in this matter nor have the Government of
India recognized the existence of any such claim.
The Government of France do not possess any
' de facto jurisdiction over Pondicherry which would
imply any diminution of the jurisdiction exercised by
the Government of India."
The appeals and the writ petitions were thereafter posted for further hearing before us on October
9, 1961.
Mr. N. C. Chatterji-learned Counsel for Shri
• Masthan
Sahib, appellant in Civil Appeal No. 42 of
1961 and petitioner in writ petition No. 297 of 1960,
urged before us two contentions. The first was that
the answer to the second question clearly established that the French establishments incbiding Pondicherry were part of the territory of India, having
been acquired by the Union Government within the
meaning of Art. 1(3)( c) and that in view of this
-~· position it was not necessary to consider nor proper
for us to accept the views expressed by the Union
Government in their answer to the first question
wherein they had expressly stated that they did not
consider the French "establishments" covered by
the agreement between the Union Government and
the Government of France dated October 21, 1954
as being within the territory of India within
1000 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1962] SUPP.
11161
N. M asth,n Sahib
v.
CAilf Commiss~tur
'l>..dieh'"y
AyyonglWJ.
.-
Art.1(3) of the Constitution of India. Secondly, a. po·
int which was necessarily involved in the first one just
set out-that this Court was not bound bv the sta.tement of the Government of India in its ·answer to
Question No. land that it should disregard such an
answer and investigate for it8elf on the materials
placed before it as to whether Pondicherry was part
of th'· territory of India or not.
In support of the first submission Mr. Cha.tterji ,
placed considerable reliance on the passage in our
judgment rendered on April 28, 1961 reading :
"Still if the extent of the jurisdiction vested
in the Union Government by the arrangements
entered into between the two Governments
virtually amounts to a transfer of sovereignty
for every practical purpose, it would be possi.
hie to contend that such a transfer or cession ,
was so incompatible with the existence of any
prautical sovereignty in the French Government as to detract from the surrender or t.ransfer being other than complete."
The argument was that the anPwer to the
second question showed (1) positively that the
Government of India exercised complete jurisdiction •
over the territory-executive, legislative and judicial, its authority being plenary and extending to
the making of laws. Their execution and the administration of justice with complete power over its
defence and foreign affairs and (2) negatively that
the Government of France possessed no authority
in the territory, so much so that it could not be
predicated that there had been any retention of
even a. vestigal sovereignty to detract from the
completeness of the transfer. In the circumstanoes,
learned Counsel urged that he was justified in inviting us to ignore or disregard the answer to the
first question and instead answer the question as to
whether these .l<'rench establishments were within
the territory of India or not on the basis of the
second question.
4
'--=
( 1) S.C.R. SUPREME COURT :REPORTS
•
a
1
'
1001
Having regard to the nature of this argument
it is necessary to state briefly the circumstances in
which we felt it necessary to frame the two questions
that we did. At the stage of the hearing of the
petitions on the first occasirin, notice was issued t<>
the Union Government and the learned Solicitor·
General appearing in response to the notice did not
convey to us arty definite views on the part of the
Government as to whether Pondicherry was or was
not considered by t·hem to be part of the territory
of India hut invited the Court to decide th0 ques·
tion on the materials that might be placed by the
parties before us. At that stage therefore wa were
not quite certain whether Government woulrl
be prepared to make a formal statement
about their views on this question. If therefore the
Government were inclined still to leave the mattar
to th~ Court, WP desired to have complete information as to the factual position regarding the government of the territory. It was in view of that possibility that Question No. 2 was framed. It was, of
course, possible that Government might communi·
cate their views to the Court and with a view to
enable this to be done we framed Question No. 1.
In these circumstances nothing is gained by refe.
rence to the passage in our judgment dated April 28,
1961. The passage extracted is certainly not an
authority for the position as to whether if Question
No. 1 was answered, the Court could properly
consider any implications or inferences arising on
the answer to Question No. 2.
We shall therefore proceed to consider the
principal question that arises at this stage, viz.,
whether the answer of the Government is replv to a
specific and formal enquiry by the Court that .it did
not consider a particular area to have been
"acquired" by the Indian Government and therefore
not a part of the territory of India was binding on
the Court or not. A number of decisions of the
English and Australian Courts in which the poin~
1961
Y. Mastha Sahib
v.
ChU/ Commi.uiontr ,
Po.,dich1"JI
Ayyangar J.
1002 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1962) SUPP.
1981
N. Masthan Sahib
v.
Chief Commissioner,
Pondic.?erry
Ayyangar J.
JO-,
has been considered were placed before us and we
shall proceed to refer to the more important of
them.
In Duff Development Company v. Government of
Kelantan (1) the question related as to whether the
Sultan of Kelantan \vas the ruler of an independent
Rovereign State, such that the Courts in England
had no jurisdiction over the Sultan or the Govern- •
ment of that State. The Secretary of State for the
Colonies who was requested by the Court to furnish
information as regards the status of the ruler and of
the Government, stated that the Sultan was the
head of an independent sovereign State. The
binding character of this statement was however
questioned and it was argued before the House of
Lords on foot of certain public documents that t
Kelantan was merely a dependency of the British
Government and not a sovereign State. On the
other side; it was pressed upon the House, that the
statement of the Secretary of State was binding and
this latter submission was unanimously accepted by
the House. In doing so Viscount Cave observed :
"If after this definite statement a different •
view were taken by a British Court, an undesirable conflict might arise ; and in my
opinion it is the duty of the Court to accept
the statement of the Secretary of State thus
clearly and positively made as conclusive upon
the point."
,..
Viscount Finlay expressed himself thus :
"It has long been s!'ttled that on any
question of the status of a.ny foreign power
oourse is that the Court Rhould apply to His
Majesty's Government, and that !n any s~ch
matter it is bound to act on the mformation
given to them through the proper department.
Such information is not in the nature of
(I) [1924] A. C. 797.
t
__
·~_.
( 1) S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 1003
1151
evidence ; it is a statement by the Sovereign
of this country through one of his Ministers N. Masthan Sahib
v.
upon a matter which is peculiarly within his Chief CMnmission.tT
Pondichtrt:J
cogmzance. "
Ayyanear ].
Lord Sumner said :
''Where such a statement is forthcoming
no other evidence is admissible or needed."
There is one other decision of the Honse of Lord to
wJ1ioh reference may usefully be made-Government
ofthe Republic o.f Spain v. Arantzazu Mendi.(') The
question for decision was whether it was General
Franco's GovernmE>nt that was the Government in
Spain or the Republican Government. The Secretary
of State for Forei~ Affairs had, in a formal communication to the Court in rej)ly to a letter forwarded under the direction of Bucknill J., stated that
His Majesty's Government had recowiised the Nationalist Government as the Government which had
administrative control over a large portion of Spain
and particularly over the Basque Provinces wherein
the ship, title to which was in question, had been
regist1>red. Lord Wright in his speech said :
"The Court ie, in my opinion, bound without
any qualification by the stati>ment of the
Foreign Office, which is the organ of His
Majesty's Government for this purpose in a
matter of this nature. Such a statement is a
statement of fact, the c1ntents of which are
not open to be discussed by the Court on
grounde of law."
No doubt, these decisions were in relation to
the status of or recognition by the Government of
foreign sovereign and are therefore not ad idem
with the point which now arises for consideration
~·· whether a particu!ar piece of territory is or
1s not part of the territory of India. A statement
by Government in relation to a similar question
.
a
•
(I) [1931) A.C. 255.
1004 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1961] SUPP.
1961
N. Mastha• Sahib
v.
Clailf Commissiontr
Pondic1l~rv
Ayyangar J.
came up before the Court of Appeal in Fa.gernes (').
The question for the Court's consideration was
whether the Bristol Channel, particularly at the
point where a collision was stated to have ta.ken
place, was or was not part of British territory. Hill
J. before whom an action for damage caused by the
alleged collision ca.me up held that the waters of
the Bristol Channel were part of British territory
and therefore within the jurisdiction of the High
Court. The defendants appealed to the Court of
Appeal and at that stage the Attorney-Genera.I
appeared and in response to a formal enquiry by
the Court as to whether the place where the collision waA sta.t.ed to have occurred was within the
realm of England, replied that "the spot where the
collision is alleged ti:> have occurred is not within
the limits to which the territorial sovereignty of
His Majesty extends." On the basis of this statement the Court of Appeal unanimously reversed the
judgment of Hill J. An argument was raised before the Court as regards the binding character of
the statement by the Attorney-General and in
regard to this Akin L.J. said :
"I consider that statement binds the Court, and
constrains it to decide that this portion of the
Bristol Channel is not within British jurisdiction, and that the appeal must be allowed. I
think that it is desirable to make it clear that
this is not a decision on a point of law, and that
no responsibility rests upon this Court save
that of treating the statement of the Crown
by its proper officer as conclusive."
Lawrence L.J. observed :
"It is the duty of the Court to take judicial
cognizance of the extent of the King's territory and, if the Court itself is unacquainted
with the fact whether a particular place is or is
not within the King's territory, the Court is
entitled to inform itself of that fact byma.kina
{I) 1927PrQb1tQ]Sll.
t
'
(I) S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
}
'
1005
lHl
such inquiry as it considers proper. As it is
highly expedient, if not essential, that in a N. M as11um Sahib
v.
matter of this kind the Courts of the King ChUfCommissionlr,
should act in unison with the Government of
Pondi<hn17
the King, this Court invited the AttorneyA.1)'11111"' J •
General to attend at the hearing of the appeal
and at the conclusion of the arguments asked
him whether the Crown claimed that the spot
where the collision occurred was within the
territory of the King. The Attorney-General
in answer to this inquiry, stated that he had
communicated with the Secretary of State for
Home Affairs, who had instructed him to inform the Court that "the spot where this collision is alleged to have occurred is not within
the limits to which the territorial sovereignty of
His Majesty extends." In view of this answer,
given with the authority of the Home Secretary upon a matter which is peculiarly within
the cognizance of the Home Office, this Court
could not, in my opinion, properly do otherwise than hold that the alleged tort was not
committed within the jurisdiction of the High
Court''.
Bankes L.J., though he agreed with his colleagues
in allowing the appeal, however ~truck a slightly
different note saying :
"This information was given at the instance of
the Court, and for the information of the
Court. Given under such circumstances, and
on such a subject, it does not in my opinioJJ
necessarily bind the Court in the sellB6 that
it is under an obligation to accept 'it "
·
The entire matter is thus summarised in Hals·
bury's Laws of England, Third Edition, Volume 7 :
"There is a class of facts whioh are conveniently termed 'facts of state'. It consists of
matters and questions the determination of
which is solely in the hands of the Crown or
1006 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1961] SUPP.
1961
N. M asth.1n Sahib
v.
Chief Co"imissiorur,
Pondichmy
-4.W•llfar J.
•
the government, of which the following are
examples:
(1)
o•
0 0 0
o e 0 O 0 o 0 o o I o o o o O o o o 0 0 o o O 0 0 o o 0 ••o 0 0 o o o o o o o 0 0 0 0 0 o o 0 0 0 • 0
(2) Whether a particular territory is hostiln or
foreign, or within the boundaries of a particular state."
Mr. Chatterji, however, invited our attention to
certain observations contained in two decisions of
the High Court of Australia-Jolley v. Matinka (1 )
and Ffrost v. Stevenson ('). In both these cases the
point involved wr.s as to the status of the territory
of New Guinea which Australia was administering
as mandatory territory under a mandate from the
League of Nations. There are, no doubt, observations in thebe cases dealing with the meaning of the
word 'acquired' ins. 122 of the Commonwealth of
Australia Act, but the point to be noticed however
ii that there was no statement by the Government
of the Commonwealth of Australia as to whether
this area was or was not part of the territory of
Australia., such as we have in the present case. We
do not, therefore, consider that these observations
afford us any assistance for the solution of the
question before us.
Both Mr. Ch&tterji and Mr. Viswanatha Sa.1tri learned Counsel who appeared for Sivarama.
Reddiar, the appellant and petitioner in the other
cases, stressed the fa.ct that what we were called
upon to decida was the meaning of the expression 'acquired' in Art. 1 (3) ( c) of the Constitution
and that in the case of a written Constitution suoh
as we had to construe, jurisdiction of this Court
was not to be cut down and the enquiry by
it limited by reasons of principles accepted
in other jurisdictions. In particular, learned
Counsel stressed the fact that it would not be
(I) 49 C.L.R. 242.
(l!) 58 C.L.R. !i28,
!
•
(1) S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
t
1007
zg5z
proper for the Court to ignore patent facts and hold
itself bound by the statement of Govern- N. Masth.a• 8a~i6
••
ment in cases where, for instance, the Govern- Chkf Commissiotk
ment of the day for reasons of its own
Pondi&lkrr1/
desiring to exclude the jurisdiction of this
Apan1• J,
Court denied that a part of territory which 'patently was within Art. 1(3) was within it. lt is not
necessary for us to examine what the position would
be in the contingency visualized, but assuredly it
is not suggested that the case before us falls within
that category. The proposition laid down in the
English decieions that a conflict is not to be envisaged between the Executive Government and the
judiciary appears to us to rest on sound reasoning
and except possibly in the extreme cases referred to
by the learned Counsel, the statement of the Government must be held binding on the Court and to be
given effect to by it.
There is one other matter which was specially
pressed upon us during the course of argument to
which is nece&sary to refer. The submission was that
the answer by the Union Government to the two
questions were really contradictory and that whereas the answer to the second question made it out
that the French establishments had been acquired
and were pa.rt of the territory of India, the Government had in relation to the first question made a
contradictory answer. We do not consider this argument well-founded. In cases where the only fact
available is the de faoto exercise of complete
sovereignty by one State in a particular area, the
soTereignty of that State over that area and the
area being regarded as part of the territory of that
State would prima faoie follow. But this would
apply normally only to cases where sovereignty and
control was exercised by unilateral action. Where
however the exercise of power and authority and
the right to administer is referable to an agreement
between two States, the question whether the territory has become integrated with and become part
1008 SUPREME OOURT REPORTS (1961] SUl>P.
J96I
N. Masthnn Sti•ih
v.
ChUf Commission,,,
PondU:herrJ
Ayyangaf' J.
of the territory of the State exercising de facto
control depenrls wholly on the terms upon which
the new Government was invited or permitted to
exercise such control and authority. If the instruments evidencing such agreements negatived the
implication arising from the factual exercise of
Governmental authority then it would not follow
th~t there is an inte~ration of the territory with
that of the administering power and that is precisely what has happened in the present case. As
annexures to their reply the Union Government
have included The Treaty of Cession dated May
28, 1956, which is a sequel to the agreement dated
October 21, 1954, transferring the powers of the
Government of the French Republic to the Government of the Indian Union. Under the terms, this
Treaty would become operative and full sovereignty
as regards the territory of the establishments of
Pondicherry, Karikal, Maha and Yanam would be
ceded to the Indian Government only when the
treaty comes into force. It is not necessary to refer
to all the clauses of this Treaty except the one which
stipulates tha,t it would come into force on the day
of ratification by the two Governments concerned.
According to the Constitution of France an Act of
the France Assembly is required for the validity of
a Treaty relating to or involving the cession of
French territory. It is common ground that the
Treaty has not been ratified yet. The resulting
position therefore is that by the agreement dated
October 21, 1954, though complete administrative
control has been transferred to the Government of
India, this transfer of control cannot be equated
to a transfer of territory, that being the common
intention of the parties to that agreement. Unless
a ratification takes place there.would legally be no
transfer of territory and ~thout I' transfer of
territory there would not be m the circumstances an
"acquisition of territory", with the consequence that
at present Fondicberry has to be treated as .not part
1
(1) s.c.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 1009
'
1961
or the territory of India. It is unnecessary to considPr what the position would have been if the N. M as!han Sahib
v.
Union Government hid, notwithstanding the terms
Chief Conunissiontr,
_ of the Treaty, treated. the former French estabPolllii<lurry
lishments as having become part of the territory of
Awangar J.
India.
.--There was one minor aubmiasibn made by
Mr. Viswanatha Sastri to which ii, passing rE1ference
may be made. He suggested that the term "territory of India" in Art. U2 might not represent
the same concept as 'the territory of India' within
Art. l (3) and that m the context of Art. 142 the
term 'territory of India' might include every territory over which the Government of the Union exercised de facto control. We are not impressed by this
argument. The term 'territory of India' has been
used in several Articles of the Constitution and we
are clearly of the opinion that in .very Article where
this phraseology is employed it means the territory
of India for the time being as falls within
Art. I (3) and that the phrase cannot mean different
territories in different Articles.
We have already dealt with the question as
to what the effect on the maintainability of the
appeals and the petitions would be if Pondicherry
were not part of the territory of India. In view
or Pondich~rry not being within the territory of
India we hold that this Court has no jurisdiction to
entertain the appeals. The appeals therefore fail
and are dismissed. The writ Petitions must also
fail and be dismissed for the reason that having
regard to the nature of the relief sought and the
authority against whose orders relief is claimed
they too must fail. They are also dismissed. We
would ,&4d that these dismissals would not include
the petitlanel'!I from approaching this Court if so
desired, hi the event of Pondicherry beooming part
of the territory of India. In the peculiar circumstances of tflill case we direct that the pa1ties be4.r
their respectivti costs
'
1010 SUPREME
COURT REPORTS [1961] SUPP.
1111
Before leaving this case, we desire to point
that
the 11ituation created by the French estabout
N. Jl.111th•n B•IU6
v.
lishmenta
not being part of tbe territory of India
Chil_f Ctmmi.ui1rur,
is
somewhat
anomalous. Their administration is ·
:/J1n~ithnry
being conducted by the extension of enactments in
.4..JJ•n1a J.
:fortle in India by virtue of the power conferred by
the Foreign Jurisdiction Act. We havP had occasion
to point out that tl;iough technically the areas are
not part of Indian territory, they are governed practically as part of India. But so far as the orders of
the courts and other authorities-judicial and quasijudioial within that area are concerned, the Superior Courts in India have nor., subject to what we
have stated as regards the limited jurisdiction of
thil Court, any appellate or revisional jurisdiction
over them and this might in a large number of cases
lead to injustice and a sense of grievance. There is 1
enough power in Government ev13n at the stage of the
de faaf-0 transfer to remedy the situation. By appropriate action under the Foreign Jurisdiction Act,
or by Parliamentary Legislation under the entry
'Foreign Jurisdiction' the appellate Jurisdiction of
the High Court or of this Court could be enlarged
under Arts. 225 and 138 [ l'] respectively so as to ,.
afford an adequate remedy for the inhabitants of
these areas. To this aspect of the matter we con·
aider that the attention of Government should be
drawn.
kar J,
SARKAR, J.-On the earlier occasion when these
cases came up before this Court, we postponed
further hearing of them till we received the answers
of the Government of India to two quest;ons whiuh
we then referred to it. These quest.ions substantially were, (a) whether Pondicherry is or is not
within the territories of India and (b) if it is not,
the extent of the jurisdiction exercised by the
Union Government over it and the. JUrisdiction
which France still possesses in regard to it. These
que!tion1 were put because considerable doubt was
felt :01 to the real 1t&tu1 of Pondicherry. If it
·I
.
-
{l) S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 1011
was a foreign territory, no appeal could lie to thi1
Court under Art. 136 of the Constitution from any
tribunal in Pondicherry and two of these matters
were such appeals. 'l'he other two matters were
petitions asking for writs against certain authorities
in Pondicherry and the majority held that no writ
could issue to a foreign territory in view of
Art. 142 of the Constitution and thereforti for the
·~ purposes of these petitions also it was necessary to
ascertain the st!ttus of pondicherry. We however
'I
then felt some difficulty about the question whether
we could refuse to issue writs to an officer of the
Government of India outside the territory of India
and expressed our inability to concur in the opinion
of the majority. We said that the propei; time to
discuss that question would be when on receipt of
t the Government's answers to our questions, it bad
to be held that Pondicherry was a foreign territory
and reserved our final decision on the que1tion till
then.
The Government'• answers to our questions
have now been received. On the basi11 of these
answers, for the reasons hereafter mentioned, it
, has to be held that Pondicherry is a foreign
territory. We, ·therefore, now wish to say a few
words on the question or;. which '1"e reserved our
opinion on the former occasion. The opinion of
the majority no doubt prevails inspite of what we
shall say. Before we discuss the question which we
reserved we desire to observe in regard to the
appeals that it must be held that they are not
/ ~. maintainable as Pondicherry i11 a foreign territory.
Now, the writs are sought to quuh tne
orders of a quasi-judicial authority functionillg
in Pondioherry on the ground that they violate
certain fundamental rights of the petitioner• This
authority however is an officer of the Government
of India. How far write oan be issued under Art. 32
of the ·Constitution of India to quuh a quai:ijudicial order even if made in India, is it11elf •
lffl
N. JlulUrl S<llY
••
C/tUf C1rmPissitlur,
P""iclurry
••rl•r J.
1012 SUPREME COURT RlllPORTS P961] SUPP.
1961
N. Mast/um Sahib
v.
Chi1f Commissio111r,
Pondichmy
Sarkar J.
question of considerable difficulty on which there
has been a difference of opinion in this Court.
That question wa11 recently discu88ed before another
Bench but the judgment in that case has not yet
baen delivered. For the present purpose however
,·re will assume that writs can be issued under
_irt. 32 to quash a quasi-judicial order.
The First observation that we wish to make is
that it has now been finally held by this Court, tdealing with an application under Art. 32 that "the
right to move this Court by appropriate proceedings for the enforcement of the rights conferred by
Part III of the Constitution is itself a guaranteed
right": Kavalanruira Kottarthill K ochttnni v. The
State of Madras. (1) A right to move this Court
by a petition under Art. 32 is, therefore, a fundamental right. That being so, a right to obtain a \
writ when the petition establishes & case for it,
must equally be a fundamental right. For, it
would be idle to give a fundamental right to move
this Court and not a similar right to the writ the
issue of which the petition might clearly justify. If
then a fundamental right to a writ is established.and that is the assumption on which we are examin- ,
ing the present question-the party who establishes
such right must be entitled ex debito justitiae to the
issue of the necessary writ. There would then be
uo power in the Court to refuse in its discretion to
issue it.
But it is said that if a writ was issued in the
present case, it could not in view of Art. 142 which
says that an order of this Court shall be enforced
throughout the territory of India, be enforced iD
Pondicheuy. Let us assume that is so. Then it
is said that if the Court were to issue the writ it
would only be stultifying itself and should · not
ther$lfore issue it. We 'l.l'e unable to accede to
this contention. If a p&rty has been .given by the
Cl)
[19591 Sub. 2 S. C.R. Sl6, 325.
I
"
(1)
'
s.c.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 1013
Constitution a fundamental right to a writ, there is
no power in the Court to refuse that· right. Supposed practical considerations of incapacity to
inforce the writ issued cannot be allowed to defeat
the provisions of the Constitution.
No authority has been cited to us in support
of the proposition that when a party is entitled as
of right to an order, a court can refuse to make
that order on the ground tha.t it would thereby
be stultifying it.self. So far as we have been able
to ascertain orders are refused on this ground
when the matter is one for the discretion of
the Court.
Such cases have, for instance,
frequently occurred in proceedings relating to
the issue of injunctions, to grant or not to
grant which is well known, in the discretion
of the Court. The discretion has no doubt to be
judicially exercised as indeed all discretions have,
but none the less the right to the relief is in the
discretion of the Court as opposed to a relief to
which a party is entitled ex d,ebito justitiae, a distinction which is well understood. Thus,. dealing
with a case of the issue of an injunction restraining
a person from. proceeding with an action in a
foreign court, Jessel M.R. observed, in In re International Pulp and Paper Co. Ltd.( 1 ), "Therefore,
as to a purely foreign country, it is of no use asking for an order, beoa.use the order cannot be enforced". Take another case. In England an
information in the nature of quo wa.rranto is not
issuiid as a matter of course (R. v. Staoey (1785)
1.T,8. l]and therefore the courts there refused to
issue it when an information would be futile in
its results. Ha.lsba.ry Laws of England (3rd ed.)
Vol. 11 p. 148. So in Reg. v Fin(•) the Court
refused to iasue the information for the reason
that the person sought to be retnov:ed by it could
~ reappoimed at once. ~ .however are mses
m whiah a Court would be inclined not to make
(I) (1876) 3 Ch. D. 594, 599
(2) 8 B. & B. 939.
1901
N. Masthan Sahib
v.
Chief Omrmissionn,
fondichmy
Sa1br J.
1014 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1961] SUPP.
1961 .
a discretionary order on the ground that the Court
would thereby be stultifying itself. Instances
v.
might
be multiplied but it is unneceBS'J.l"Y to do so.
Chief Commi.uioner,
We
do
not think that the principle of these cases
Pondicherry
can be applied where a court has no option but to
Sarkar J,
make the order which we think is the present case.
It would clear!.} be Jess :cpplicable to a case like
the present where, as we shall immediately show,
it would be wrong to think that the order would not
be carried out.
Lastly, can we be certain that the Court
would be stultifying itself by issuing the writ in
this case ? That would be only if our order is
sure to be ignored. We think that thlli
Court would be fully justified in proceeding on
the basis that any order ma.de by it would be carried
out by any officer of the Government of India
to whom it is directed wherever he may be, out
of respect for the Constitution and this Court and
this without ·requiring to be forced to do so. In
this connection the case of R. v. Speyer, R. v.
Cassel(•) is of interest. There Speyer and Cassel
had been called upon by the court by rules nisi
to show cause why an information in the na.ture
of quo warra.nto should not be exhibited against
them to show by what authority they respectively
claimed to be members of His Majesty's Privy
·Council for Great Brita.in. Speyer and Cassel
were naturalised British subjects and the question
was whether under certain statutes they were not
disqualified from ·being appointed to the Privy
Council. One of the arguments on behalf of ~
respondents was that the oourt would be powerless to enforce a judgment of ouster for it oould
not prevent the immediate reinstatement of the
names of these persons in the .roll of Privy Councillor1 if the King though fit to alter it, The answer that Reading C.J. gave to thia argument wu
N. A1 as than Sahib
(I) {1916] I K. B. 595.
>I
~
I--
t•
Ill
i
\
'
(1) S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
I
1015
"Although it may be interesting and useful for the
purpose of testing the propositions now under
consideration to assume the difficulties suggested
by the Attorney-General, none of them would in
truth occur. This is the King's Court ; WE' sit
here to administer justioe and to interpre' the
laws of the realm in the King's name. It is
respectful and proper to assume that once the law
is declared by a competent judicial authority it
will be followed by the Crown." The other members of the Bench also took the same view, Lu$h
J. observing, "The consequence!! he suggests are
argumentative and not real, and we cannot regard
them aa fettering the exercise of our jurisdiction".
Now this was a. case of a. discretionary order.
Even so, the Court felt that it would be wrong to
stay its hand only on the ground that it could not
directly enforce its order. This salutary principle
has been acted upon in our country by Das J.
who later booame the Chief Justice of this Court,
in In re Banwarilaf, Roy('). There Das J. issued
an information in the nature of quo wa.rranto
inspite of the fact that he could not command tlie
Governor of Bengal to comply with his order
which might therefore have become futile. We
think it is a very healthy prineiple and should be
followed. We do not think that we can allow
our powers for the protection of fundamental
rights to be fettered by considerations of the enforcement of orders ma.de by us ; we must assume
that the authorities in Pondicherry will willingly
carry out our order.
We turn now to the other questionH arising
on the Government's answers. Pondicherry was
admittedly a French possession but under an
agreement with France, the Government of India
is now administ.ering it. The Government has
definitely stated that Pondicherry is not comprised
(I) 4110.W.N. 786,
l
Vo
Chia/ Comm i.uit>nl1',
Pondiclu".J
Sarkar J.
1016 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1962] SUPP.
1961
N. Masthan Sahib
v.
Chief Commissioner,
Pondicht"Y
Sarkar J.
within the territory of India. It has also said
that it has full jurisdiction over Pondicherry under
that agreement, that the liability for defence of
Pondicherry is on it and that Pondicherry has no
foreign relations. It has further said that France
does not possess any de facto jurisdiction over
Pondicherry which /Would imply a diminution of
the jurisdiction exercised by it.
L
It was contended that we are not bound by !'the Government's answer to the first question,
namely, that Pondicherry is outside India and t~t
on the basis of the answer to the second question
..we shoulrl hold, inspite of the Government's view,
that Pondicherry is a part of Indian territory. It
was said that since India had admittedly full jurisdiction over Pondicherry and France exercised
none, it must be held the India has acquired \
sovereignty over it and that it had, therefore, become Indian territory by acquisition. We are
entirely unable to accept this contention. We think
that we are bound by the Government's decision
at least in a case where we have referred to it
for our guidance. That is the view tenken in England and it is a view which is based on sound >principle: see Duff Devdopment Co. v. The Govt. of
Kelantan.(1) Any other view would create a oha.os
and we cannot be a party to it. We may say that
by a treaty, as in the present CIJ.Be, India may acquire
full jurisdiction over a foreign territory which under
the ea.me treaty may nonetheless remain a foreign
territory.
It was contended that this would be absolute •<
surrender to the executive Government ; that such
a view would enable the Government when it
so liked, to disown a territory which was patently
a pa.rt of India so that it might act therein as it
liked in complete disregard of the law:s and without any check from any court inc'luding this
Court. This contention, to use the words of Lush
J. in Speyer's case(')is "argumentative and not real''. .J.I/.
(1) (1924) A. c. 797.
(2) [1916] l K. B. 595.
Ij
1
'
1 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1017
We cannot imagine that in a democracy any Government would ever act in the way suggested and we
are sure no Government of this country will ever
do so.
Furthermore, the contention has no foundation
whatever and is wholly imaginary. It is the duty of
a court to take judicial notice of the extent of the
territory of its own State. Section 57 of the Evidence
Act requires that. Therefore, if the fact is patent
that a certain territory is within India, the courts
will take judicial notice of it and there will be no
occassion to refer to the Government for any information regarding it. It may however be that in certain
circumstances the fact is not patent but \:Ven then it
appears that it will be the duty of a court to take
I judicial notice and it does so by requesting the
Government to enlighten it on the point. So Lawrence L. J. said in Fagemes (1), "It is the duty of
the Court to take judicial cognisance of the extent of
the King's territory and, if the Court itself is unacquainted with the fact whether a particular place
is or is not within the King's torritory, the Court is
.., entitled to inform itself of that fact by making such
enquiry as it considers necessary." It is only in cases
where the Court is not aware of the facts that the
question of referring to the Government will arise
and therefore no occassion can possible arise where
the Government might have the chance of distorting a
patent fact.
This is all that we desire to say. As the major.
ity of the learned Judges of the Bench have taken a
different view, the order to be made will follow their
decision.
(l) 1927] P.roh 31!],329.
1961
N. Mastlwn S•hil
v.
ChiefComminloM
PondicherrJ
Sarkar, /.
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