STATE OF WEST BENGAL versus M/S. B. K. MONDAL AND SONS
Supreme Court of India | Decided 5 December 1961 | [1962] SUPP. 1 S.C.R. 876 | 1961 INSC 333
Key facts
- Decided
- 5 December 1961
- Bench
- P.B. GAJENDRAGADKAR*, A.K. SARKAR, K.N. WANCHOO, K.C. DAS GUPTA, N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR
- Bench size
- 5
- Case number
- CIVIL APPEAL No. 286/1958
- Disposal
- Dismissed
- Citation
- [1962] SUPP. 1 S.C.R. 876
- Neutral citation
- 1961 INSC 333
Text of the judgment
876 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1962) SUPP.
1961
Karirnbil
an
v.
State of Kerafa
Ayyan:ar J.
determination of the ceiling in respect of different
individuals who are brought within the scope of
the enactment, and (3) ss. 52 and 64for determining
the compensation payable to the several classes of
persons whose lands are acquired under Act, all these
are violative the guarantee of the equal protection
of laws under Art. 14 of thr C,,nstitution.
I therefore agree in tho order proposed that
the petitions be allowed, and with costs.
Petitions allowed.
1961
STATE OF WEST BENGAL
December 5.
v.
M/S. B. K. MONDAL AND SONS
(P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, A. K. SARKAR,
K. N. WANCHOo, K. C. DAs GUPTA and
N. RAJAGOPALA .AYYANGAR, JJ.)
State Government-Enjoying beiufit of non-gratuitous workIj bound to pay compen•ation-Absence of valid contract, if exonerate• !iability-lndia'lt Oo'lttract Act, 1872 (9 of 1872)-•.70
Government of India Act, 1935 (25 & 26 Geo.5. Oh.42), •.175(3).
By s. 70 of the Contract Act, "where a per•on lawfully
does anything for another person, or delivers anything to him,
not intending to do so gratuitously; and such other person
enjoys the benefit thereof, the latter is bound to make
compensation to the former in respect of, or to restore, ~he
thing so done or delivered". Under s.175(3) of the Government of India Act all contracts made in the exercise of the
executive authority of a province shall be expre8'ed to be made
by the Governor of the province and shall be executed on
behalf of the Governor by mch persons and in such manner
as he may director authorise.
The respondent, a firm of building contractors doing construction works for the Provincial Government did certain
additional construction on the reque1t of its officers. Its bills
for these latter works were not paid and it sued the Government basing its claim on contract and in the alternative on
s. 70 of the Contract Act. The defence of the Provincial
Government, inter alia, was that there was no valid and binding contract and s. 70 had no application. The trial Judge
(1) S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
877
l'6l
found that although there was no valid contract under s.175(3)
of the Government of India Act, 1935, the claim was jutified State of W11t B111gal
under s. 70 of the Contract and decreed the suit. The Court
v.
of appeal affirmed that decree. The State appealed by special M/s. B. K, M""'41
leave.
lleld (Per curiam), that the courts below were right in
holding that s. 70 of the Contract Act applied to the case and
the appeal must fail.
Per Gajendragadkar, Wanchoo and Ayyangar, JJ.Whether a mandatory provision in a statute is merely directory
or obligatory should be decided on a careful examination of
· the scope of the statute and the object of the particular provi·
sion. In enacting s.175(3) of the Government of India Act,
1935, the intention of the parliament was that the state
should not be burdened with liability based on unauthorised
contracts. The provision made was inJ'ublic interest and so
the word •shall' used therein must be he! to make it obligatory and not directory .
.<Jelh Bhikraj Jaipuria v. Union of India, (1962] 2 S. C. R.
880, approved.
Ohatlurbhllj Vithaldfl8 Jasani v. Moruhwar Prashram
[1964] S. C.R. 817, explained.
In order that a person can invoke s. 70 of the Contract
Act he must be able to show (1) that he acted lawfully,(2)
that he did not intend to act gratuitously and (3) that the
other person enjoyed the benefit.
A claim for compensation under s. 70 therefore is not
one based on any subsisting contract but proceeds on the basis
that something was done or delivered to another who voluntari·
ly accepted it even though he had always the option to refuse
the same.
Recognition of the claim in the present case, could not
therefore, amount to a contravention of s.175(3) of the
Government of India Act, either directly or indirectly.
,,
The word •!awfully' in s. 70 of the Contract Act means
that after something is done or delivered by one person
to another and is voluntarily accepted and enjoyed by the
latter, a lawful relationship arises between the two which
attaracts s. 70 of the Contract Act. In cases falling under the
section, there cannot, therefore be any scope for claims for
specific performance or for damages for breach of contract,
the claim for compensation under the section being on the
footing that there has been no con tract and the conduct of
parties has created a rela tionahip resembling that arising out
of a contract.
878 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1962] SUPP.
IHI
There is nothing in s. 175(3) of the Government of India
Stalt of Wtsl B1n1al Act, tested in the light of s. 23 of the Contract Act, that forv,
11//1. B.Jr. Mun'41
bids a claim under s. 70 of the Contract Act, There is no
conllict between the two sections, each covering a distinct and
separate field and s. 70 Cor;tract Act should be regarded
rather as supplementing s. 175(3} of the Government of India
Act.
Chuli Lal v. Bhagu:an Dru, (1889) I.L.R. 11 Al 1. 234
'
disapproved.
Held, further, that in construing a specific statutory provision such as s. 70 of the Contract Act it would be unreasonable to seek assistance from English decisions on statutory
provisions contained in English law.
Ramanandi Kw.r v. KalawatiKUtr, (1927) L.R. 55 I.A
18, referred to.
The State Government, as much as an ordinary citizen,
must be subject to s. 70 of the Contract Act and it was wrong
to suggest that its position was like that of a minor and,
therefore, it was outside the scope of s. 70 of the Act.
Sudland Ghoaal v. Balaram Mardana, (1911) I.L.R. 38
Cal. I, referred to.
Case law referred to.
Per Sarkar and Das Gupta, lJ. - The question in the
instant ca.e was whether the three requisites of s. 70 of the
Contr . Act had hem satisfied. There was no dispute that
the _, overnment had taken benefit of the work it urgently
ne~<1cd the w~rk and put it to its use immediately. It was also
clear that the respondent did not intend to do the work
gratuitously. What the r.quest made by the officers did
was to inform the rtsponden t that the Government needed
the work immediately and would pay for it when done, and
works similar the respondent, who had previou•ly done and
been paid for, readily acted on it.
There can also be no doubt that the work was done
lawfully. Even ·assuming that work done under a contract
Invalid under s. 175(3} of the Government of India Act, would
be unlawful because of evasion of it, that section does not
say that work done without any contract at all, as in the instant case, would be work unlawfully done nor docs it make it
unlawful for the Government to take benefit of work done for
it without any contract at all.
Section 175(3} of the Government of India Act applies
to a consensual contract which the Government makes and
not to something which is also called a contract but which the
-
"
(i) S.C.R. SUPREME OOURT REPORTS
879
law brings into existence by a fiction irrespective of the con1961
sent of the parties. Section 70 of the Con tract Act applies
&ngal
where its requisites exist, if it is necessary to imply a contract State •f Wesl
v.
or contemplate a quasi-contract for applying the section !hat M/s. B. K. Mondal
must be done and neither s. 175(3) of the Governmenl of
India Act nor any other impediment can stand in the way.
'
Held, further, that a resort to English Law is not justified
for deciding a question arising on an Indian statute unless it
is such that it cannot be ttasonably understood without such
assistance.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal
No. 286 of 1958.
Appeal by special leave from the judgment
and decree dated the January 4, 1957, of the Calcutta High Court in Civil Appeal From Original
Decree No. 155 of 1953.
B. Sen, P. K. Ohatt,erjee and P. K. Bose, for the
appellant.
N. O. Ohatrerjee, A.N. Sinha and P. K. MukherJee,
for the respondent.a.
.
1961. December 5. The Judgment of Gajendragadkar, Wanchoo and Ayyangar, JJ., was delivered
by Gajendragadkar, J. The Judgment of Sarkar
and Das Gupta, JJ. was delivered by Sarkar, J.
GAJENDRAGADKAR, J.-This appeal by special
leave arises out of a suit filed by the respondent
B. K. Mondal & Sons against the appellant the
State of West Bengal on the Original Side of the
Calcutta IDgh Court claiming a sum of Rs. 19,325/for works done by it for the appellant. This claim
was made out in two ways. It was alleged .that the
works in question had been done by the respondent in terms of a contract entered into between
the parties and as such the appellant was liable to
pay the amount due for the said works. In the
alternative it was alleged that if the 'fontract in
question was invalid then the respondent's claim
fell under s. 70 of the Indian Contract Act. The
respondent had lawfully done such works not
Gaj1nilr.,adkar J,
SBO SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1962] SUPP.
1961
intending to act gratuitously in that behalf and the
appellant had enjoy(;cl tlw benefit thereof.
v.
.Vfs. B. A
v ..d,1
l.ojtn«saiadkar ·'·
The respondent's cu.sc was that on February 8,
1944, it offered to put up certain temporary
storage godowns at Arambagh in t.he District of
Hooghly for the use of the Civil Supplies Department of the State of 13engal and that the said offer
was accepted by the said department by a letter
dated February 12, 1944. Accordingly the respondent completed the said construction and its bill
for Rs. 39,476/. was duly paid in July 1944. Meanwhile, on April 7, 1944, the respondent was requested by the Sub-Divisional Officer, Arambagh, to
submit its estimate for the construction of a kutcha
road, guard rooin, office, kitchen and room for
clerks at Arambagh for the Department of Civil
Supplies. The respondent alleged that the Additional Deputy Director of Civil Supplies visited
Arambagh on April 20, 1944, and instructed the
respondent to proceed with the conAtruction in
accordance with the estimates submitted by it.
Accordingly the respondent completed the said constructions and a bill for Rs. 2,322/8 was submitted
in that behalf to the Assistant Director of Civil
Supplies on April 27, 1944. Thereafter the Sub.
Divisional Officer, Aram bagh required the construe·
tion of certain storage sheds at K.hanakul and the
ASBistant Director of Civil Supplies wrote to the
respondent on April 18, 1944, asking it to proceed
with the construction of the said storage sheds.
Thie work also was completed by the respondent in
due course and for the said work a bill for
Ra. 17,003/- was submitted. In the present suit the
respondent claimed that the two bills submitted by
it in which the respondent had claimed Rs. 2,322/8/·
and Ra. 17,003/· respectively had remained unpaid
and that was the basis of the present claim.
The appellant denied all the material allega·
tions made by the respondent in its plaint. It
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(1) S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
881
&lleged that the requests in pursuance of which the
respondent claims to have made the several constructions were invalid and unauthorised and did
not constitute a valid contract binding the appellant under s. 175(3) of the Government of India
Act, 1935 (hereafter called the Act). It pleaded
that there was no privity of contract between the
respondent and itself and it denied its liability for
the entire claim. The written statement filed by
the appellant was very vague and general in terms
and no specific or detailed pleas had been set out
by the &ppellant in its pleading.
However, G.K. Mitter, J., who tried the suit,
" framed five material issues on the pleadings and
recorded his findings on them. He held that having
regard to the provisions of s. 175(3) of the Act
there was no valid and binding contract between
the respondent and the appellant for . the construction of huts and sheds at Khanakul and Arambagh.
This finding was in favour of the appellant. He
held that the respondent's claim against the appellant was, however, justified under s. 70 of the
Indian Contract Act, and he came to the conclusion
that the said claiip was not barred by limitation.
He also rejected the plea of the appellant that the
liability of the Province of Bengal h'ad not devolved upon tutl appellant under the provisions of the
Indian Independence (Rights, Property and Liabilities) Order 1947. Thus, on these three points the
findings of the trial judge were against the appellant.
It appears that at the trial the respondent had also
relied upon s. 65 of the Indian Contract Act in
support of its claim. The learned judge held that
s. 65 did not apply to the facts of the case and so
the finding on this point was in favour of the appellant. The result was that the respondent's claim
was upheld under s. 70 of the Contract Act and a
decree for the amount claimed by it was accordingly paSBed in its favour.
1961
Stall oJW"t BllOfOI
v.
M/1, B. K. Mo Jal
Gajendrazadkar J.
,
•
882 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1962) SUPP
Jgf J
Stat. ofWut B'"tal
v.
M/1. B. Jr. Monda/
Gajtniragadk,. J.
The appellant disputed the correctness and
validity of the said decree by prcferrinrr an '1ppcal
to the Calcutta High Court in its civil appellate
jurisdiction. The said appeal was he'lfd by S.R.
Das Gupta and Bachawat, JJ. The two learned
Judges who heard the said appeal delivered separate though concurring judgments ancl substantially
confirmed the material finding rerorded by the
trial court. In the result the appeal preferred by
the appellant was dismissed. The appPllant then
applied for a certificate to come to this Court but
the High Court rejected itfl application. Thereupon
the appellant moved this Court for a Rpecial certificat-0 and on obtaining it haa come to this (',ourt ; 1
and the principal point which has been urged before us by Mr. Sen on behalf of the appellant is
thats. 70 of the Contract Act does not apply to
the present caae.
Before dealing wit this point it is necessary
to refer briefly to the finding recorded by the
Courts below that the contract on which the respondent relied is invalid under s. li5(3) of the
Act. Mr. Sen argues that this finding is correct
whereas Mr. Chatterjee faintly suggested that the
contract cannot be said to be invalid. Section
175(3) provides, inter alia, that all contracts made
in the exercise of the executive authorit.y of a
province shall be expressed to be made by the
Governor of a Province and all ~uoh contracts made
in exercise of that authoritv shall be executed on
behalf of the Governor by such persons and in such
manner as he may direct or authorise. It is common-ground that the contracts in questicn were not
executed by any persons duly authorised by the
Governor in that behalf, and the question is whether
the said contracts can be said to ho valid inspite c,f
the fact that they do not nomply with the mandatory
requirements of s. 175(3) of the Act. In our opinion, there can be no doubt that failure to comply
with tho mandatory provisions of the said section
•
.
{I) S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
883
1161
makes the contracts invalid. The question as to
whether mandatory provisions contained in statutes Slal1 of W..111 Btntol
sh 'JU!d be considered merely as directory or obli- M/s. B. K. Mondcl
gatory has often been considered in judicial deci- Gajtndrag.dl&ar J.
sions. In dealing with the question no general or
inflexible rule can be laid down.1 It is always a
matter of trying to determine tne real intention
of the Legislature in using the imperative or
mandatory words, and such intention can be gathered by a careful examination of the whole scope
of the statute and the object intended to be achieved by the particular provision containing the
mandatory clause. If it is held that the mandatory
!Jlause is obligatory it inevitably follows that contravention of the said clause implies the nullification
of the contract. There can be no doubt that in
enacting the provisions of s. 175(3) the Parliament
intended that the state should not be burdened with
li<tbility based on unauthorised contracts and the
plain object of the provision, therefore, is to save
the State from spurious claims ma.de on the strength of such unauthorised contracts. Thus the provision is made in the public interest and so there
can be no difficulty in holding that the word "shall"
used in making the provision is dntended to .make
the provision itself obligatory and not directory.
This is th~ view taken by this Court in Seth Bhihraj Jaipuria v. The Union of India (1), and, with
respect, we are in entire agreement with that
view.
As in the case of Rhikraj Jaipuria( 1 ) so in the
present case too Mr. Chl\tterjee has attempted to
argue that the conclusion about the obligatory
character of the provisions of s. 175(3) is inconsistent with the decision of this Court in Ohatturbhuj
Vithaldas Jasani v. M<Jreshwar Parashram (')In that
case a. contract for the supply of goods had bef!n
entered into with the Central Government by the
,
(1)
[1962] 2 S.C.R. 880.
(2) [19541 S.C.R. 817•
•
884 SUPREME OOURT REPORTS [1982) SUPP.
1161
Stat. of West Bmlf'l
v,
M/s. B. K. MondaJ
Gaj1n.dratadkar J,
firm Moolji Scika and Comp•my of which the candidate Chatturbhuj was a partner. The contract in
question had not complied with the mandatory pro·
visions of Art. 299(1) of the Constitution (which
corresponds snbstantially to s. 17 5(3) of the Act)
and the question which this Court had to co~ider
was whether in view of the fact that the contract
in question had contravened the provisions of Art.
299( l) the candidate Chatturbhuj could be said to
be disqualified for being cho8t'n as a member of
Parliament by virtue of the disqualifioation set out
in s. 7( d) of the Representation of the Peoplp, Act
43 of 1951. In dealing with this que&tion Bose, J.,
who spoke for the Court, observed that "s. 7(d) of
the Representation of the People Act docs not
require that the contracts at which it strikes should
be enforceable against tbe Government; all it requires is that the contracts should be for the supply
of goods to the Government. The contracts in question are just that and so are hit by the section". It
would thus be seen that in the case of Chatturbhuj(')
this Court was dealing with the narrow question
as to whether the impugned contract for the supply
of goods would cease to attract the provisions of
s.7(d) of the Representation ofthePeopleActon the
ground that it did not comply with the provisions
of Art. 299(1 ), and this Court held that notwithstanding the fact that the contract could not be enforced
against the Government it was a contract which
fell within the mischief of s. 7(d). 1\fr. Chatterjee,
however, contends that in considering the effect of
non-compliance of Art. 299(1) Bose, J., has also
observed that "the Government may not be bound
by the contract but that is a very different thing
from saying that the contract was void and of no
effect and that it only meant that the principal
(Government) could not be sued but there will be
nothing to prevent ratification if it was for the
benefit of the Government." Mr. Chatterjee points
out that this observation shows that the contract
(1) 1[954] S. C.R. 817 .
•
'
.
(1) S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
885
1961
with whic!i the Court was dealing was not treated
"as void and of no effect." It would be noticed Stall of W1st Ben1al
that the observation on which Mr. Chatterjee relies M /s B, K,v. Monial
has to be read in the context of the question posed
for the decision of this Court and its effect must be (} ajmdragadkar .1.
judged in that way. All that this Court meant by
the said observation was that the contract made in
contravention of Art. 299(1) could be ratified by the
Government if it was for its benefit and as such it
could not take the case of the contractor outside the
purview of s. 7(d). The contract which is void may
not be capable of ratification, but, since according
to the Court the contract in question could have
been ratified it was not void in that technical sense.
That is all that was intended by the observation
in question. We are not prepared to read the said
observation or the final decision in the case of
Chatturbhuj (1) as supporting the proposition that
notwithstanding the failure of the parties to comply
with Art. 299(1) the contract would not be invalid.
Indeed, Bose, J., has expressly stated that such a
contract cannot be enforced against the Govern·
ment and is not binding on it. Therefore, we do
not think that Mr. Chatterjee oa.n successfully challenge the finding of the Courts below that the contracts in question were invalid. It is on this basis
that v.e have to consider the main question about
the applicability of s. 70 to the facts of the present
case.
Mr. Sen argues that in dealing with the 11uestion about the scope and effect of s. 70 it would be
material to remember the background of this
section. He suggests that the rule laid down in
the section is based on the notes in Smith's Leading
Cases to Lampleigh v. Brathwaite ('), and so he
argues that in construing the said section it would
be relevant to refer to the English decisions bearing on the point. The first decision on which
(1) [1954] S.C.R. 817.
(2) Smith'1 Lcadin1 Casea, Vol, I. 13th ed., p. 1.f8,
886 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1962) SUPP.
1961
Si." of l1'tll Bengal
v.
M /1. B. Ir.Moodal
Qojmdro,uk<Zf J.
Mr. Sen very strongly relies is tho case of H. You1u1
&: Co. v. The Mayor and Corporation of RoyalLeaminyton Spa('). In that case, the House of J,ords had
to consider the effect of tho provisions of s. li4( 1)
of the Public Health Act, 18i5 (38 & 30 Viet c. 55).
The said section enacts that "every contract ma.do
by an urban authority whereby tho value or
amount exceeds £50 shall be in writing and sealed
with the common seal of euch authority". It was
held that "the provision of the said section is obli·
gatory and not merely directory and it applies to
an executed contract of which the urban authority
have had the full benefit and enjoyment, and which
has .been effected by their agent duly appointed
under their common seal." It appears that the
Corporation of Leamington had ent-0red into a contract with one Powis for the execution of certain
works to supply the district with water. Before
Powis l:ould complete this contract it was terminated. Then the Council, in its capacity as urban
authority, passed a resolution not under seal whereby its engineer was authorised to enter into a contract for completing the works left unfinished by
Powis. The said engineer employed the plaintiff
who completed the unfinished work and sued the
Corporation for the sum due to him as balance in
respect of the work executed by him. This claim
was resisted by the Corporation on the ground that
the provisions of s. 174(1) were mandatory and
since the contract on which the plaintiff's claim was
based had not complied with the said mandatory
provision no claim could be made against the Corporation. The Queen's Bench Division upheld the
defence and the decision of the Queen's Bench
was confirmed by the Court of Appeal as well as by
the House of Lords.
In dealing with the argument that the contract in question was not void Lord Blackburn cited
(I) (1885) 8 App. Cas. 517.
.........
I
(1) s.c.R.
•'
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
887
1961
with approval the observations made by Lindley,
L.J., in the Court of Appeal. "In a case like the Stat1 of West B11'gal
v.
present before us", observed Lindley, L.J., "if we M /s. B. K,
Mondal
were to hold the defendants liable to pay for what
has been done under the contract, we should in Gajendrazadkar J.
effect be repealing the Act of Parliament and depriving the ratepayers of that protection which
Parliament intended to secure for them". He also
added "it may be said that this is a hard and narrow view of the law, but my answer is that Parliament has thought expedient to require this view
to be taken, and it is not for th is or any other
Court to decline to give effect to a clearly expressed
statute because it may le11d to apparent hardship".
Lord Bramwell went further and in his speech
added that he did not agree in the regret expressed
at having to come to the said conclusion. "The
Legislature has made provision", said Lord Bramwell, "for the protection of ratepayers, shareholders
and others, who must act through the agency of a.
representative body, by requiring the observance
of certain solemnities and formalities which involve
deliberation and reflection. That is the importance
of the seal. It is idle to say that there is no magio
in a water". Mr. Sen argues that the decision in
the case of H. Young & Go('). offers us material
assistance in dealing with the question a.bout the
effect of non-compliance of s. 175(3) of the Act and
the applicability of s. 70 of the Indian Contract
Act.
Incidentally it may be pointed out that in
England the decision in Young's case (') has now
become obsolete because' the relevant provisions
of the Public Health Act, 1875, were repealed in
1933 by the Local Government Act, 1933. Section
266 of the said Act authorises the local authority
to enter into contra.ct neoessary for the discharge
of their functions and provides that all contracts
made by a. local authority or by a committee
thereof shall be made in acoordanoe with the
{I) (1883) 8 App. Cas. 517,
888 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [l!l62] SUPP.
1961
Sl4ll of W1sf Btntal
v.
M/s. B K. Mondol
Gojt"drotadlc41 J.
standing orders of the local authority, an<! in the
case of contracts for the supply of goods or materials, or for the execution of works, the ~!anding
orders shall (a) require that., except as otherwise
provided by or under the standing orders, notice of
the intention of the authority or the committee,
as the case may be, to enter into the contra.ct
sh1<1l be published and tenders invited, and (b)
regulate the manner in which notice sha.11 be published and tenders invited. Tho proviso to this
section lays down that a pl'rson entering into a
contract with the local authority shall not be
bound to enquire whether the standing ordns of
the authority which applied to the contract have
been complied with, and all contracts entered into
with the local authority, if othorwirn valid, shall
have full force and effect not withstanrling that
the standing orders applicable thereto havo not •
been complied with. Subsequently in 1960 the
Corporate Bodies Contract Act 18& 9 Eliz., 2 c. 46)
has been passed ; and s. 1 of the Act now governs
the contracts entered into by the corporate bodies
wherever incorporated. The said section provides
that ( l)(a) a contract which if ma.de between private persons would be by law required to be in
writing, signed by the parties to be charged therewith, may be made on behalf of the body corporate in writing signed by any person acting under
its authority, express or implied, and ( b) a. contract
which if made between private persons would by
law be valid although made by parol only, and
not reduced into writing; may be made by parol
on behalf of the body corporate by any person
acting under ite authority, express or implied ;
(2) a contra.ct made according to this section aha.II be
effectual in law and shall bind the body corporate
and its successors and all other parties thereto.
Sub-section (4) of s. 1 provides that nothing in
this section shall be taken as preventing a contract under seal from being made by or on behalf of
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(1) S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
889
1961
a body corporate. It will thus be seen that the
fochnical and rigorous requirement that the State of JVesl Bengal
v.
oontmct shall be made under seal by a corporation M/s. B. K.
Monda/
has . now become obsolete ; and so the decision in
Young's case (1 ) has ceased to be a matter of any Gajendra:adkar J,
importance.
Before these legislative changes were however made a distinction used to be drawn between
cases where the requirement of a seal was the
result of the common law rule as to contracts by
corporations and those where the said requirement
was based on a statutory provision like the one
under s.174(1) of the Public Health Act, 1875.
The non-observance of the statutory provision
requiring that a contract of the specified type
should be in writing and sealed with the common
seal of the authority in question renders
the contract void and as such exempts
the corporation from any liability to pay compensation for the performance of the contract even
where the corporation may have had the full
benefit and enjoyment of the said contract. On
the other hand, where the requirement as to writing and seal is based not on statutory provision
but on principles of common law, failure to comply
with the said requirement would not afford a valid
defence to the corporation to resist a claim made
by a contractor for compensation for a work done
by him if it is shown that the corporation had
the benefit and enjoyment of the said work. This
latter principle has been laid down by the Court
of Appeal in Lawford v. The Billericay Rural District Council ('). In that case it was held that
"where the purposes for which a corporation is
created render it necessary that work should be
done or goods supplied to carry those purposes
into effect and orders are given by the corporation
in relation to work to be done or goods to be supplied to carry into effect those purposes, if the
(I) (188.'l) 8 App. Cas. 517.
(2) (1903) 1 K.B. 772,
890 SUP.REllIE COURT REPORTS [1962) SUPP.
/flljj
Sta:t of If ut BtngaJ
••
M /;. B. K. MondaJ
Gajtndragadkar J,
work done or goods supplied are accepted by the
corporation and the whole consideration for payment is executed, there is a. contract to pay
implied from the acts of the corporation, and the-·
a.h~ence of a. contra.ct under the sea.I of the corporation is no answer to a.n a tion brought in respect
of the work done or th<l goods supplied." In
coming to this conclusion Vaughan Williams, L. J.,
followed the rule re~ognised by Lord Denman in
Doc v. Taniere (') where he said that "where the
corporation have acted as upon an executed contra.ct, it is to be presumed against them that
everything has been done that was necessary to
make it a binding contract upon both parties,
they having had a.II the advantage they would
have had if the contract had been regularly made.
That is by no means inconsistent with the rule
that, in genera.I, a. corporation can only contra.ct
by deed, it is merely raising a p:-esumption against
them, from their acts, that they have contracted
in such a manner a.a to be binding upon them".
In other words, the decision was based on the
ground that reliance may be placed on a.n implied
contract arising from a.n executed oonsidera.tion
on an ~ccepta.nce of the benefit of the contra.ct.
Mr. Sen's argument is that in dealing with
the question a.bout the effect of the contravention
of s. 175(3) of the Act and the applicability of
s. 70 of the Contract Aot the decision in the ease
of Lawford (') is irrelovent while that in the case of
H. Y aung and Co. (') is relevent and material because we a.re concerned with the contravention of a
statutory provision and not with the contravention
of the provision of the rule of common law. We
are not impreSBed by this argument. The question which the appellant has raised for our decision
falls to be considered in the light of the provisions
of s. 70 and has to be answered on a fair and
reasonable construction of the relevant terms of
0
(ll (1843) 12 Q.B. 998, 1013.
(3) ( 1883) 8 ,\pp. a... 517.
(2)
(1903) I K.B. 772.
(1) S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
891
the said section. In such a case, where we are
dealing with the problem of construing a specific
statutory provision it would be unreasonable to
invoke the assistance of English decisions <lea.ling
with the statutory provisions contained in English
Law. As Lord Sinha has observed in delivering
the judgment of the Privy Council in Ra,manandi
K uer v. Kam'l£ati K uer (1) "it has often been pointed out by this Board that where there is a positive
enactment of the Indian Legislature the proper
course is to examine the language of that statute
and to ascertain its proper meaning uninfluenced
by any consideration derived from the previous
state of the law or of the English law upon which
it may be founded". If the words used in the
Indian statute are obscure or ambiguous perhaps
it may be permissible in interpreting them to examine the background of the law nr to derive
assistance from English decisions bearing on the
point ; but where the words are clear and unambi·
guoua it would be unreasonable to interpret them
in the light of the alleged background of the
statute and to attempt to see that their inter·
pretation conforms to the said background. That
is why, in dealing with the point raised bcforl) us
we must primarily look to the law as embodied
in s. 70 and seek to put upon it a fair and reasonable construction.
Section 70 reads thus :
"Where a person lawfully does any·
thing for another person, or delivers
anything to him, not intending to do so
gratuitously, and such other person enjoy1
the benefit thereof, the latter is bound to
make compensation to the former in respect
of, or to restore, the thing so done or
delivered."
It is plain that three conditions must be
aatisfied before this section can be invoked. The
(I) (1927) L. R. 55 I. A. 18; (1928) I. L. R. 7 Pat. 221.
1961
..
State of Weat Bengal
M /s. B. K. Mond•l
Goj~ndragadkar
J.
892 SUPREME COUI\T REPORTS [1962rsUPP.
1961
first condition is that a peison should lawfully do
something for another person or deliver something
M/s. B.vK. Mond, 1 to him. The second condition is that in doing
the said thing or delivering the said thing he must
Ga;endragadkar J. 'not intend to act gratuitously ; and the third is
·that the other person for whom something is
done or to whom something is delivered must
enjoy the- benefit thereof. When these conditions
are satisfied s. 70 imposes upon the latter person,
the liability to make compensation to the former
in respect of or to restore, the thing so done or
delivered. In appreciating the scope and effect
of the provisions Qf this section it would be useful
to illustrate how this section would operate. If a
person delivers something to another it would ho
open to the latter person . to refuse to accept the
thing or to return it ; in that case s. 70 would not
.· come into operation. Similarly, if a person does
something for another it would be open to the
latter person not to accept what has been done by
the former; in that case again s. 70 would not apply.
In other words, the person said to be made
liable under s. 70 always has the· option not to
-accept the thing or to return it. It is only where
ho voluntarily accepts the thing or enjoys the work
done that tho liability under s. 70 arises. Taking
the facts in the case before us, after the respondent
constructed the warehouse, for instance, it was
open to the appellant to refuse to accept the said
warehouse and to have the benefit of it. It could
, . have called upon the respondent to demolish the
- -said warehouse and take away the materials nsed
by it in constructing it; but, if the appellant accepted the said warehouse and used it and enjoyed
its benefit then different considerations come intoplay and s .. 70 can be invoked. Section 70 occurs
in chapter V which deals with certain relations res··
embling those created by contract. In other words,
this chapter does not deal with the rights or liabili. ties accruing from the contract. It deals with the
t ate of West B.ngol
--
I
(1) S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
893
rights and liabilities accruing from relations which
resemble those created by contract. That being so,
reverting to the facts of the present case once again
after the respondent constructed the warehouse it
would not be open to th~ respondent to compel the
appellant to accept it because what the respondent
has done is not in pursuance of the terms of :iny
vali!l contract and the respondent in making the
conitruction took the risk of the rPjection of the
work by the appellant. Therefore, in cases falling
under s. 70 the person doing something for another
or delivering something to another cannot sue for
the specific performance of the contract nor ask for
damages for the breach of the contract for the
simple reason that there is no contract between him
and the other person for whom he does something
or to whom he delivers something. All that s. 70
provides is that if the goods delivered are accepted
or the work done is voluntarily enjoyed then the
liability to pay compensation for the enjoyment of
the said goods or the acceptance of the said work
arises. Thus, where a claim for compensation is
made by one person against another under s. 70, it
is not on the basis of any subsisting contract between the parties, it is on the basis of the fact that
something was done by the party for another and
the said work so done has been voluntarily accepted
by the other party. That broadly stated is the
effect of the conditions prescribed by s. 70.
It is, however, urged by Mr. Sen that the re·
cognition of the respondent's claim for compensation virtually permits the circ11mvention of the
mandatory provisions of s. 175(3), because, he
argues, the work done by the respondent is no
more than the performance of a so-called contract
which is contrary to the said provisions and that
cannot be the true intent of s. 70. It is thus clear
that this argument proceeds on the assumption that
if a decree is passed in favour of the respondent for
1961
State oflVtJt Bengttl
v
M/s. B. K. Monda/
Gajendragadkar J,
894 SL"'PRE.\IE COL"RT REPORTS [1962] SL"'PP.
11161
Stalt of H'~'' Bmgal
'/!
Mfr. B. K.Jtondal
compensation as alternatively claimed by it,
it would in substance amount to treating the invalid
contract as being \'alid. In our opinion, this argument is not well-fo11nded. It i~ true that the provisions of s. li5(3) are mandatory and if any contract
is mn.d0 in ,contr1wention of the said provisions the
said contract would be invalid; but it must be
rerm•mhL<red that. the eause of action for the alt.ernative e !aim of the respondent is not the breach of
any contract by the appellant~ in fact, the alternative claim is based on the a!lllumption that the
contract in pursuance of which the respondent made
the ctmstructionij in question was ineffective and as
~ch amounted to no contract at all. The respon,Jent says that it has done some work which haa
hee11 ac".·,,pted and enjoyed by the appellant and it
is the voluntary acceptance and enjoyment of the
ea.id work which is the caus of action for the altcrnati\·e claim. Can it be said that when the respondent built the warehouse, for instance, without a
\•1did contract betw,,en it and the appellant it waa
doing something contrr.ry to s. Ii5(3}? As we have
alrfa'.ly made it clear even if the rcRpond.,nt built
the warehouse he could not have forced the appellant to accnpt it ancl the appellant may well havo
askc d it to ,i.molisb the warchome and take away
the materials. Therdore, the mere act of constructing the warehouse on the part of the respondent
cannot be said to contravene the provi•ions of
s. J 75r:l). In this connection it may be relevant to
consider illtrntratinn (a) to "· 70. The said i!luRtration "hows that if A a trad<'sm1m leaves goods at
Jfs hous<• b.v mistake, and B treats the goods as his
own h<' i" bound to pay A for them. .Now, if wc
assume that B ~tands for the State Government, can
it he sni<I that A was contravening the provisions of
s. 175(3) whl'n by mistake he left the goods at the
home of B? The answer to this question is obviously
in the nega.ti ve. Therefore, if gooda are delivered
by A to the State Government by mistake and the
0
~
•
'
(I) S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
895
1961
State Government acoepts the goods and enjoys
them a claim for compensation can be made by A Stat1 of West Bengal
v.
against the State Government, and in entertaining
M /s. B. K. Mondo/
the said claim 'the Court could not be upholding the
contravention of s. 175(3) at a.11 either directly or Gajtn'1ragadAar J.
indirectly. Once it is realised that the cause of
action for a claim for compenRation under s. 70 is
based not upon the delivery of the goods or the
doing of any work as such but upon the acceptance
and enjoyment of the said goods or the said work
it would not be difficult to hold that s. 70 does not
treat as valid the contravention of s. 175(3) of the
Act. That being so, the principal argument urged
by Mr. Sen·that the respondent's construction of
s. 70 nullifies the effect of s. 175(3) of the Act cannot
be .iccepted.
It is true that s. 70 requires that a person
should lawfully do something or lawfully deliver
something to anotllilr. The word "lawfully" is not
a surplusage and must be treafod as an essential
pa.rt of the requirement of s. 70. What then does
the word "lawfully" in s. 70 denote ? l\fr. Sen
contends that the word "lawfully" in s. 70 must be
read in the light of s. 23 of the sa.id Act; and he
argues that a thing cannot be said to have been
done lawfu Uy if the doing of it is forbidden by law.
However, even if this test is applied it is· not possible to hold that the delivery of a thing or a doing
of a thing the acceptance and enjoyment of which
gives rise to a claim for compensation under s. 70 is
forbidden by s. J 75(3) of the Act; and so the interpretation of the word "lawfully" suggested by Mr.
Sen does not show that s. 70 cannot be applied to
the facts in the present case.
Another argument has been placed before us
on the strength of the word "lawfully" and that is
based upon the obser~ations of Mr. Justice Straight
in Ohedi Lal v. Bhagwan Dass ( 1). Dealing with the
construction of s. 70 Straight, J., observed:
(l)
(1889) I.L.R. 11 All. 234.
,
896 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1962] SUPP,
"t presume tba.t the legislature intended something
n· t.1t Rental when it used the word "]~ wfully" and that it had in
contemplation cases in which a person held such a
••
Mjs. B. K. lofondal
relation to another a.~ either directly to create or b}
Oajtndragadl:ar J.
implication reasonably to justify an inference that
by some act done for another person the party doing
the act was entitled to look for compensat.ion for it
to the person for whom it. was done.'' It is urged
that in the liirht of this test it cannot be Raid that
the respond~nt held such a relation to the appellant
as to be able to claim compensation from the appellant. With respect, we arc not satisfied that the
test laid down by Straight, J., can he said to be
j11st ifi1•d loy the tcr ms of s. iO. rt is of course true
that between the person claiming compenAation and
p<·rson ag~inst whom it is claimed Rome lawful relationship must subsist, for that is the implication of
the use of the word "lawfully" ins. 'iO; but the said
lawful relAtionship arises not because the party
claiming compensation has done something for the
party against whom the compensatic>n iA claimed
but because what has Leen done by the former has
been accepted and enjoyed by the latter. It is only
when the latter accepts and enjoys what iR done by
the fnrmer that a lawful relationship arises between
the two and it is the existence of tho said lawful
relationship which j?ivcs rise to the claim for compensation. This aspect of the matter has not been
properly Lrought into the picture when Straight, J.,
laid down the test on which ::lfr. Sen'H argument is
based. If the said test is 1iterally applied then it is
open to the comment that if one person is f'ntitled
by reason of the relationship as therein contemplated to recPive compensation from the others. 70
would be hardl.v necessary. Therefore, in our
opinion, a JI that the word "lawfully" in the context
indicates is that after something is delivered or
something ie done by one person for another and
that thing is accepted and enjoyed by the latter, a
lawful relationship is born between the two which
19~1
Slatt rif
•
...
(1) e.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
'i
••
897
1111
under the provisions of s. '70 gives rise to a claim
Sta'< of West B"'lal
for compensation.
v.
There is no doubt that the thing delivered or M/s, B. K. Mondal
done must not be delivered or done fraudulently or Gajmdrog~d/;ar J,
dishonestly nor must it be delivered or done gratuitously; Section 70 is not intended to entertain claims
for compensation made by persons who officiously
interfere with the affairs of another or who impose
on others services not desired by them. Section 70
deals with cases where a person does a thing
for another not intending to act gratuitously and
the other enjoys it. It is thus clear that when a
thing is delivered or done by one person it must be
open to the other person to reject it. Therefore,
the acceptance and enjoyment of the thing delivered
or done which is the basis for the claim for compensation under s. 70 must be voluntary. It would
thus be noticed that this requirement affords sufficient and effective safeguard. against spurious
claims based on unauthoriRed acts. If the act done
by the respondent was unauthorised and spurious
the appellant could have easily refused to accept the
said act and then the respondent would not have
been able to make a claim for compensation. It is
unnecessary to repeat that in cases falling under
s. 70 there i9 no scope for claims for specific performance or for damages for breach of contract. In
the very nature of things claims for compensation are based on the footing that there has been
no contract and that the conduct of the parties in
relation to what is delivered or done creates a relationship resembling that arising out of contract.
In regard to the claim made against the
Government of a State under s. 70 it may be that
in many cases the work done or the goods delivered
are the result of a request made by some officer or
other on behalf of .the said Government. In such
a case, the request may be in effective or invalid for
898 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1962] SUPP.
&t•t1 of Wut B111gal
••
M/s. B. K. Moodll/
Gajtnbogtu!Ju,,. J.
the reason that the officer making the requrst was
not authorised under s. 175(3 ), or, if the said offioer
was authorised to make the said request the request
becomes inoperative because it was not followed
up by a contract executed in the manner prescribed
bys. 175 \3). In either case the thing has been
delivered or the work has been done without a contract and that brings in s. 70. A request is thus
not an element of s. 70 at all though the existence
of an invalid request may not make s. 70 inapplie&ble. An invalid request is in law no request at
all, and so the conduct of the parties has to be
judged on the basis that there was no fiubsisting
contract between them at the material time. Dealing with the ease on the basiR we have to enquire
whether the requisite conditions pn•scribed by s. 70
have been satisfied. If they are satisfied then a
claim for compensation can and must be entertained. In this connection it is necessary to emphasise
that what s. 70 provides is that compensation has
to be pRid in respect of the goods delivered or the
work done. The alternative to the compensation
thus provides is the restoration of the thing so delivered or done. In the prllsent case there has been
no dispute about the am0unt of compensation but
normally a claim for compens11tion made under
s. 70 may not mean the samu thin~ a8 a claim for
damages for breach of con:ract if a c011tr~ct wa.8
en bsisting b~tween the parties. Thus <:ons1dered 1t
would, we think, not be rcasollablc to suggest that.
in recognising the claim for compensation umler
s. 70 we are either directly or indirectly nullifying the
effect of s. 175 (3) of the Act or treating a" valid a
contract which is invalid. The fielcl8 cnverecl by
the two provisions are separate and ?ist inct, "· 17'\
(3) deals with contracts and prov1dt>s how t h!'Y
should be made. Section 70 deals with rases wht,re
there is no valid contract and provides for compensation to be paid in a case where the three r~quisit~
conditions prescribed by it are sati8fie<l. We arc
•
(1) S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
•
899
therefore, satisfied that there is no conflict between
the two provisions.
It is well-known that in the functioning
of the vast organisation represented by a modern
State Government officers have invariably to enter
into a variety of contracts which are often of a
petty nature. Sometimes they may have to act in
emergency, and on many occasions, in the pursuit
of the welfare policy of the State Government
officers may have to enter into contract orally or
through correspondence without strictly complying
with the provisions of s. 175(3) of the Act. If, in
all these cases, what is done in pursuance of the
contracts is for the benefit of the Government and
for their use and enjoyment and is otherwise legitimate and propers. 70 would step in and support a
claim for compensation made by the contracting
parties notwithstanding the fact that the contracts
had not been made as required by s. 175(3). If it
was held that s. 70 was inapplicable in regard to
such dealings by government offir.ers it would lead
to extremely unreasonable consequences and may
even hamper, if not wholly bring to a standstill the
efficient working of the Government from day- to
day. We a.r<> referring to this aspect of the matter
not with a view to detract from the binding character of the provisions -of s. 175 (3) of the Act but to
point out tha,t like ordinary citizens. even the State
Government is subject to the provisions of s. 70,
and if it has accepted the things delivered to it or
enjoyed the work done for it, such acceptance and
enjoyment would afford a valid basis for claims of
compensation a!('Linst it. Claims based on a contract validly made under s. 175(3) must, therefore,
be distinguished from claims for compensation made
under s. 70, and if that distinction is borne in mind
there would be no difficulty in rejecting the argu.
ment that s. 70 treats as valid the contravention of
s. 175(3) of tho Act. In a sense it may be said that
1961
Stot1 •f W11t Blft1al
v.
M/s. B. K. Mon4al
Oajendragadkar J.
900 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1962) SUPP.
s. 70 should be read a.s supplementing tho provi...,, of w,, 1B,.1.i sions of s. 175(3) of the Act .
••
There is one more argument which yet re14 /1. B. IC Mondo/
mains to be considered. Mr. Sen ingt'niously sug.
gested that the position of the appellant is like that
of a minor in the matter of it4! capacity to make a
contra.ct, and he argues that just as a minor is outside the purview of s. 70 so would be the appellant.
It is true as hM been held by the Privy Council in
Mohcri Bibee v.DhurmodasGhose(') that a minor, like
a. lunatic, is incompetent, to contract, and so where
he purports to enter into a contract the alleged
contract is void and neither s. 64 nor s. 65 of the
Contract Act can apply to it. It . i~ also true that
e. 68 of the Contract Act specifically provkles that
certain claims for necessaries can be made against
a minor and eo a minor cannot be sued for compensation under s. 70 of the Contract Act (Vide :
Bankay
Behari Prasad v. },[ahendra Prasad (').
Mr. Sen pressed into service the analogy of the
minor and contends that the result of s. l 75('l) of
the Act is to make the appellant incompetent to
enter into a contract unless the contract is made
as required bys. 175(3). In our opinion, this argument is not well founded. Section l i5( l) provides
for and recognises the power of the Province to
purchase or acquire property fpr the purposes there
specified and to make contracts. :N'o doubt s. 175( 3)
provides for the making of contracts in the speci·
fied manner. We are not satisfied that <in reading
s. 175 as a whole it would be possible to t'ntertain
the argument that the appellant is in the position
of a minor for the purposP of s. 70 of the Contract
Act. Incidentally, the minor is excluded from the
operation of s. 70 for the reason that his case has
been specifically provided for by s. 68. What s. 70
prevents is unjust enrichment and it applies
es much to individuals a.s to corporations and
1961
(1) (1903) L.R.30 J.A. lH.
(21
(19<40) l.L.R.19 Pat. 739.
...
I
(1) S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
I
'
.
901
1161
Government. Therefore, we do not think it would be
possible to accept the very broad argument that the State of W•sl Be111al
State Government is outside the purview of s. 70. M/s. B. v.
K. MonUl
Besides, in the case of a minor, even the voluntary
acceptance of the benefit of work done or thing Qqj1niTaiadkat J.
delivered which is the foundation of the claim under s. 70 would not be present, and so, on principle
s. 70 cannot be invoked against a minor.
The question about the scope and effect of
s. 70 and its applicability to cases of invalid contracts
ma.de by the Provincial Government or by corpora·
tions has been the subject-matter of several judicial decisions in this coun~ry ; and it may be stated
broadly that the preponderance of opinion is in
favour of the view which we are inolined to take
(Vide : Mathura Mohan Saha v. Ram Kumar Saha
and Ohittagcmg District Board('); Aba]i Sitaram
Modale v. The Trimbak Municipality(•); Pallonjee
.Ed·uljee & Sons, Bombay v. Lonavla Oity Municipality(•);
Municipal Committee, Gujranwala v. Fazal Din(');
Ram Na.gin Singh v. Governor-General in Oourwil(•);
Union of India v. Ramnagina Singh(•); Union of
India v. New Marine Ooal Oo. (Bengal) Ltd.(');
Damodara Mudaliar v. Secretary of St,ate for India(');
Oorpuration of
Madras v. M. KothandapaniNaidu('); Yogambal Boyee Ammani Ammal v.
Naina Pillai Markayar(' 0 ); and, Ram Das v. Ram
Babu (11 ). Sometimes a note of dissent from this
view has no doubt been struck (Vide : Ohedi Lal
v. Bhagwan Das("); Radha Krishna Das v. The
Municipal Board of Benare.<!(1' ) ; Anath Bandba Deb
v. Dominion of India(") ; Punjabhai v. Bhagwan
das Kisandas("); and G. R. Sanchuiti v. Pt. R. K.
Ohoudhari (").
(1) (1916) I.L.R. 43 Cal. 790.
(3) (1937) l.L.R. Born. 782.
A l.R. (39) 1952 Cal. 306.
7 (1959) 65 C.W.N. 441.
9 A.I.R. 1955 Mad. 82.
· ((11) A .LR. 1936 Pat, 194,
(13) (1905) I.L.R. 27 All. 592.
15) (IV29) I.L.R. 53 Bom. 309,
5l
!
(2) (1904) l.L.R. 23 Born. 66.
(4) (1930) I L.R. 11 Lah,121, 325, 387.
(6) (1952) 89 CLJ. 342.
(8) (1895) I L.R. 18 Mad. 88.
(10) (1909) LL.R. 33 Mad. 15.
(12) (1889) I.L.R. 11 All. 234,
( 14) A.lR. 1955 Cal. 626.
(16) (lg52) J.L.R. 31 Pat. 303.
902 SUPREME COURT REPOHTS (1962] SUPP.
1951
SW. of W "' B1111ol
v.
M /1. B. IC M ondol
Gaj#lfiTltoilOT J.
Before we part with this point we think it
woul<l bo useful to refer to the observations made
by Jenkins, C. J. in dealing with the scope of the
provisions of s. 70 in Suchand Ghosal v. Balaram
Mardana( 1). "The terms of s.70", said Jenkins, C. J.,
"are unquestionably wide, but applied with discretion they enable the Courts to do substantial
juatico in cases whore it would be difficult to
impute to tho persons concerned relations actually
created by contract. It is, however, especially
incumbent on final Cou~ts of fact to be guarded
and circumspect in their conclusions and not to
countenance acts or payments that are really
officious."
Turning to tho facts of this case it is clear
that both the Courts have found that the acts done
by the respondent were done in fact in pursuance
of the requests invalidly made by the relevent
officers of the appellant, and so they must be deemed to have been done without a contract. It was
not disputed in the Courts below that the acts
done by the resp,>ndent have been accepted by
the appellant and the buildings constructed h<>ve
been used by it. In fact, both the learned judges
of the Appellate Court have expressly pointed
out that the appellant did not contest this part of
the respondent's oase. "I should mention", says
i::; • .R. Dai Gupta., J., "that the appellant did not
contest before us the quantum decreed in favour
of the plaintiff" ; and Baohawat, J., has observed
that "the materials from the reoord also show
that the Government urgently needed the work
which was done by the respondent and that the
Government aocepted it as soon as it was done
and used it for its benefit''. In fact the learned
judge adds that "the learned Advocate-General
frankly confessed that this is a case where the
ProTinoe of Bengal was under a moral obligation
to pay the respondent", and has further added
(I) (1911) 1.L.R. 38. Cal. I.
•
(I) S.C.R.
.-.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
903
1961
his comment tha.t "an obligation of this kind
which is apart from the provisions of s. 70 of Stall of West Bing•
Indian Contract Act a moral a.nd natural M /s. B. v.K. Mond•I
. obligation is by the provision of that section
convertd into a legal obligation". Therefore <Jajmdr•1aikar J.
once we reach the conclusion that s. 70 can be
invoked by the respondent against the ap1Jellant
on the findings there is no doubt that the requisite
conditions of the sa.id section have been satisfied.
That being so, the Courts below were right in
decreeing the respondent's claim.
The result is the appeal fails and is dismissed
with costs.
Sarkar J.
SARKAR, J.-We also think that this appeal
should fail.
In 1944, the respondent, a firm of contractors,
had at the request of certain officers of the Government of Bengal as it then existed, done certain construction work for that Government and the latter
had taken the benefit of that work. These officers,
however, had not been authorised by the Government to make the request on its behalf and the
respondent was aware of such lack of authority
all along. These facts are not in controversy.
As the respondent did not receive payment
for the work, it filed a suit in the Original Side
of the High Court at Calcutta in 19•9 against the
Province of West Bengal for a decree for moneya
in respect of the work. The Hiizh Court, both in
the original hearing and appeal, held that there was·
no contract between the respondent and the Govern·
ment in respect .of the work on which the suit
might be decreed but the respondent was entitled
to compensation under s. 70 of the Contract Act
a.nd that the liability to pay the compensation
which was originally of the Government of Bengal,
had under the Indian Independence (Rights, Properties and Liabilities) Order, 1947, devolved
on the Province West Bengal (now the State
904 SUPREME COURT REPOR'fS [1962] .SUPP.
IDBI
of West Bengal) which came into existence on .tho
partition of India. In .the result tho rcspoiideut.
suit succeeded. The State of West Bengal has
M/s. B. K. Mondal
appealed against the. decision of the High Uourt.
Sarkar J,
Tlle only question arguc<l in this appeal is
whether the High Court was right in passing a
decree under under s. 70 of the Contr.act Act. We
think it was.
·
· .Now s. 70 is in these terms :Section 70 "Where,. a person lawfully docs
anything for anqt]Jer person, or dr•livors anything to him, not intending to do so gratuitously, and such other person enjoys· tho benefit
thereof, the latter is bound to make compensation to the former in respect of, or to
restore, the thirlg so .dom1 or delivered."
G: K. Mitter, 'J., wnq hoard the suit-in thu
first instance, .Qbserved in regard to s. 70 that.,
"~e requisites for ehtitl_ing a person to compensation for work done are: (il ~hat it should be fawfully done, (ii) that it should not be intended to lie
done gratditously and (iii) that the person for·
whom the work is done should -onjoy the benefit
thereof". We agree with this analysis of the
section and the view of· the High Court that, the
necessary requisites exist in tho present caso.
In this Court the case was i:irgued on lielialf
of the appell;:nt on the 'basis .that the Higli Court
wrui in efrot m holding that, relief under 8. 70 can
be granted where
Government nrui the benefit
of work done' uiJ.cler a contract 'with it which "'as
not made in terms of
i 75(3) of the G'ovemment
of India- Act, ·1~35, and ·was; ther,efore; in valid.
Various authorities, both Englisli"and Indian, were
cited in support . of this "argtlinent. we think it
unnecess~:ry to' discuss thein as the basis on which
the present1contentioh is adv;anel;)d does not eiist
. ' ·ih thiB' .. 011se. Nor-do we think that the High
:coii'rt decided the·,case on th'at bail.is.
Stat1 of Wul Benr,al
v.
ihe
s.
,j
(1) S,C.R. SUPREME COURr REPORTS
'
905
It is clear from the findings of the High Court,
to whieh we shall presently refer, that there was
in fact no agreement, valid or invalid, between
the respondent and the Government. It follows
that the work had not been done. under any agreement with the Government. No question, therefore arises as to the validity or invalidity of an
agreement with the Government because of a
failure to comply with the terms of s. 175 (3) of
the Government of India Act nor as to the applicability of s. iO of the Contract Act foi· granting
compensation for work done under a contract with
the Government which is invaJid because it had
not been made in the manner prescribed by
B. 175 (3).
The reason why we say that there was no
agreement whatever between the Government and
the respondent is that the agreement could in the
present case have been made only through the
officers but these officers did not to the knowledge
of thll respondent possess the authority of the
Government to bind it by contract. That was
what the High Court held, as would appear from
the observations of the learned Judges which we
will now set out. G. K. Mitter, J., said, "The
plantiff never hRd any doubt about the fact that no
agreement of any kind had been entered into between
it and the province of Bengal" and "The plantiff
knew .right from the beginning, that the officers
who were requesting the plantiff to proceed with
the work had, no authority to enter into a bind·
ing contract with the plantiff and that they were
awaiting sanction from higher officials whioh they
hoped to get." The loamed Judges of the appellate
bench also took the same view. Ba.chawat, J.,
observing, "Neither of these officers had any autho·
rity from the Province of Bengal to make the
request to the plaintiff. There was no agreement
either express or implied between the plaintiff and
1161
8'011 •J W 1st Bengal
v.
Jl./s. B. K. Mondal
Sarkar J.
006
1161
St au of Wut Ben:al
••
Mjs.B.K. Mondal
Sarktu J.
SUPRE~IE COURT REPORTS [1962] SUPP.
tho Provinoe of Bengal. There is, therefore, no agreoment which is void or which is discovered to be void".
The learned Judges no doubt referred to s. 175(3)
of the Government of Indid Act tha.t was obviously
because arguments based on it had been advanced
before them. They distinguished th3 case of Union
of India v. Ramnagi.oo Sinyh (') in which it had
been held that s. 70 of the Contract Act had no
application where work wa.e done under a request
which had resulted in a. void agreement, on the
ground that in the present case there had been no
request from the G-Overument as the persons making the request had no authority to do so for the
G-Overnment and 10 no question of an agreement
with the Government, which was void, arose. It
is wrong, to contend, as the lea.rued advocate for
the appellant did, that the lea.rued Judges ol the
High Court decided the case on the basis that
s. 70 is applicable where work is done for the
Government under an invalid contract with it.
No doubt the learned Judges dealt with certain
casee dealing with the question of work done under
an invalid contract but that was becaus.i those
cases had been cited at the bar.
We are not, therefore, called upon in the
present oaee to pronounce upon the question
whether compensation under s. 10 of the Contract
Act can be awarded where goods are delivered to,
or work done (or, the Government under a contract
with it which is invalid (or the rea.eon that it had
not been made in the terms prescribed bys. 175(3)
of the Govt.rnment of India Act and we do not
do so.
Now, if the work was done at the request o(
the offioers of Government who had no authority to
make the request for G-Ovemment and the respondent
was aware ofthis, it would follow that the work had
been done at the request made by the officers in their
personal capacity. In such a case it eeema to us
(ll (1951) 89 C.LJ. 342,
,
t
,
f·
(1) s.c.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
907
1961
that if the request resulted in a contract between
the officers and the respondent under which the State ofWts' B1ngd
v.
officers were persona.Uy bound to pay the respon- M/1. B. A.Mondal
dent reasonable remuneration for the work, then
Sa1kor J.
it would be a. very debatable question whether the
respondent would have any claim against the
· Government under s. 70. We say debatable because we have grave doubts if the section wa.s
intended to give a person in the position of the
respondent who had a. remedy aga.inst the officers
personally under a. contra.ct with them, a. remedy
against the Government for the same thing in
addition to the remedy under the contract. We,
however, need say no more on this aspect of the
matter for we do not think that any contract had
in the present case come into existence betweAn
the officers and the respondent.
It is true that when one requests 11.nother to
do work for him a tacit promise to pay reasonable
remuneration for the work may be inferred in
certain circumsta.nees and that promise may result
in a contract when the work is done whioh may be
enforced. That may also be the case when the
request is to do the work for another's benefit,
for consideration for the promise would tn either
oase be the detriment suffered by the promisee by
doing the work. The following illustration m&y
be given from Pollock on Contraota (13th edition)
p. 9 :- "The passenger who steps into ferry-boat
thereby requests the ferryman to take him over
for the usual fa.re ". We should suppose the poai.tion would be the same where a person expressly
asks the ferryman to oarry him or another over
without saying anything about the remuneration
to be pa.id for the carriage ; in ea.ch of these oases
the person making the request would be tacitly
promising to pay the ferryman his usual fa.re.
A ta.cit promise of this kind may however
be inferred only if the oiroumsta.nces a.re auoh that
908
1961
.. - - - - - - - -SUPRE~IE COURT REPORTS (1962] SUPP.
from them a man of business 'and experience would
:. ofW.,1 Bengal consider it reasonable to infer. It is an inference
v.
of fact and not which any law requiresto be made
1. B. K • .Jlondal
A .
f
C
· n interesting passage rom heshire aud Fifoot's
S4T!ar J.
Law of Contract '(5th Edition) p. ao may be quoted here : "It would b) ludicrous to suppose
that businessmen couch their communications in the
.--·form of a catechism or reduce their negotiations
to such a species of interrogatory as was formu'
lated fu the Roman stipulatio. · The rules which
the Judges have elaborated from the· promise of
I offer and acceptance are neither the rigid deduc. ,·
tions of'logic nor the inspiration of natural. justice.
They are only presumption, drawn ·from experience, to be applied fu so far as they serve the
ultimate object of establishing the phenomena of
.
agreement ... "
.
Now on the facts of this case we are entirely
unable to infer any tacit promise by the officers to
pay personally for the work done. As the High
Court pointed out, the officers made it clear, of
which indeed the respondent itself was fully aware,
that the payment would be by the Government,
and, therefore, that they themselves ·would have
no liability. They said the respondent's " estimates have been submitted to the Deputy Director for formal sanction which when received will
be communicated to them. Meanwhile they must
not delay the work." The Deputy Director
presumably was the officer authorised to grant the
sanction.· He however was not one of the officers
who had made the request for the work. The respondent was fully aware that the work was needed
for the Government and the officers _had no personal interest in it. And what is · most . important is
that the respondent never itself thought that the
officers had made any personal promise to pay.
Throughout, the respondent had been requesting
the Government to sanction the orders placed by
..
Ii
•
-
-
(1) S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
909
19~1
the officers, submitting estimates for the work to
the Government and requesting the latter for pay- State of Wesl /Hlo1
ment ; not once did it look to the officers for any M/s. B. v.K, Mor
liability in respect of the work done under their
Sarkar J.
orders. The respondent had on previous occasions
done work for the Government on Rimilar requests
and had never thought that the officers had thereby undertaken any personnl liability. If it itself
did not get that impression, no other person of
experience could reasonably infer in the same
circumstances a tacit promise by the officers to pay
personally. It is of some interest to point out
that the learned advocate for the appellant never
even sug!?ested there was such a contract. We find
it impossible in such circumstances to think that
there was any tacit promise by the ,officers personally to pay for the work or any contract between them and the respondent in respect of it.
It is also not possible to say on the materials
on the record that the officers promised to the
respondent that they would secure payment for
the work done. We think Bachawat, J., of the
appellate bench of the High Court correctly put the
position when he said :-" The work was certainly
done at the request of these officers but it was
done under'circumstances in which it is not possible to imply that the officers ,personally promised
to pay for the work done. There is, therefore, no
scope for any argument that the work was done in
course of performance of a contract between the
plaintiff and the officers who requested him to do
the work ...... The materials on the record clearly
show that the plaintiff did the work for the Province
of Bengal. Credit was given to the Provillce of
Bengal and not to the officers. It is impossible to
say on the materials on the record that work was
done for the officers." If the other learned Judges
of the High Court· did not expressly refer to this
aspect of the case that was clearly because· it was
not argued by the advocates ; it was obviously not
910 SUPREME OOURT REPORTS [1962) SUPP.
1961
·au of Wtsl Btnttal
••
'/s. B. IC Mondal
St11ka1 J.
a point which 'lny advocate could reasonably
advance on the facts of this case.
We are, however, not to be underRtood as saying that in no case can Governm~nt officers undertake persona.I liability to contrators in the position
of tht'I respondent. Each case must depend on its
own facts. Circnm~tances may con0eiva.bly exist
'l\'hPre it would be ri>11Bcmable to infer a personal
undertaking by the officers to pay a <'.ontractor doing work for the Government. All that we decide
is that such is not the present case.
The position then is that the respondent had
done the work for t.he Government without any
contract with anybody. Tho question is, a.re the
three requisites of s. iO, a.s vny correctly formulated by G. K. Mitter, J., satisfied ? We think they
a.re. There is no dispute that Government ha.cl
takl'n the ben£>fit of the work. We also feel no
doubt that the re~p0ndent did not intend to do the
work gratuitously. It submitted its rstimate for the
work :i.nd was very prompt in submitting its bill
after the work wa.s dc>ne. It had earlier in similar
circumstances without proper contract with the
Government done work for it at the request of
its officers and received payment from the Government. It was a firm of contractors whose trade
it was to carry 011t works of construction for payment a.nd th J Government wa.s aw a.re of this.
There is no reason to think that in the present
case it did the work gratuitously. On its part tho
Government never thought that the work had
bet>n done gratuitously for it raised objections to
the bill submitt!'d by the responilent on grounds
of bad quality of the work and that it had been
done without prop!'r sanction. The Government
urgently needt>d the work 11nd no sooner was it completed, it promptly put it to its use. It wa.s pie.inly
fully aware that the work was done for it by a
party whose trade was to work for remuneration
(I) S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
•
I
9ll
1Y61
and who had previously done similar work and
Stitt ef West Ben:'"
had been paid for it by the Government.
v,
The request by the oflicns does not aft'eC't the M /s. B. K. Mondo/
question that arises in this case. It had no compelSarkar J,
ling effect and no effect as a. promise and in fact no
effect at all. Its practical use was to inform the
respondent that the Government needed the work
immediately and it would give a sanction in respect
of it in due course and pay for it when done, an information on which the respondent readily acted as
it gave it a chance to do more business. So the
work was done by the respondent really out of its
free choice by way of its business and with the intention of getting paid for it.
We also feel no doubt that the work was done
lawfully. It was work which the Government badly
needed. We will assume for the present purpose,
a.s the learned advocate for the appellant said, that
work done under a contract with the Government
which is invalid in view of the provision of s. 175(3)
of the Government of India. Act, is work unlawfully
done. The learned advocate contended that that
would be because thereby section 175 (3) of the
Government of India Act would be evaded which is
the same thiug a.s doing that which the section
forbids. Assume that is so. But that section does not
say that if work is done for the Government without
any contra.ct or agreement at all and voluntarily,
as was done in the present case, that work would
not have been lawfully done. Government is free
not to take the benefit of such work. There is no
law, and none has been pointed out to us, which
makes the doing of such work unl11wful. No other
reason was given or strikes us for saying that the
work was not lawfully done. There is no law, as
Bachawat, J., s!l.id that G'>vernment cannot take any
work except under a contract in respect of it ma.de
in terms of s. 175(3) of the Government of India.
Aot. That section may forbid a Government to
take work under a contract which is invalid because
912 SUPREME OOURT REPORTS [1962] SUPP.
, ..
1901
not in terms of it, but it does not maka it unlawful
for the Government to take the benefit of
8tai, of w,,1 B1neal
v.
work
done
for it without any contract at all. We
M/1.B. K. Monda/
shou Id suppose that if t.he doing of the work was
SarkM J,
unlawful the Government would not have accepted
the benefit of it. In the present case, the Government needed the work ha.div and we do not see how
tlien the Government oan Sa.v that the work was
not done lawfully. Wo therefore think that the
work was done lawfully.
It was contended that the obligation under
s. 70 of the Contract Act arises only in circumstances
in which Enrlisb law would have created an obligation on the basiA of an implied contract or a quaAi·
contract 1md that there could be no implied contract
or quasi-contract with the GovernmPnt be<'ause a
contract could be made with it only in accordance
withs. 175(3) of the Government of India Act. Now
it has been repeatedly held that a resort to English
law is not justifh·d for deciding a question a.rising
on our statute unleBB the statute is such that it r.an·
not be reasonably understood without the assist&nce
of English Jaw, indeed, there is good authority
for saying that s. 70 was framed in the form in
which it appears with a virw to avoid the niceties
of English law on the subject, arising largely from
historical reasons and to make the position simple
and free from fictions of lnw and consequent complications : see Pollock on Contracts (13th ed.) p. 10.
Furthermore, we do pot see that s. 175(3) in any
way prevents a contract with the Government being
implied or a Government from incurring an obligation under a quasi-contract. A contract impJi.,,I in
law or a quasi-contract is not a r<'al contract or, as
it is called, a consensual contract and s. 175(3) is
concerned only with such contracts. The section
save that "all contracts 1nllde in the exercise of the
executive authority of the Federation or of a Pro.
vince shall be expreSBed" in a certain manner ~nd
'
f.
--
(1) S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
913
"shall be executed on behalf of the GoTemorGeneral or Governor by such person and in such
manner as he may direct or authorise". It therefore
applies to consensual contracts which the Government makes and not to something which is also called a contract but which the law brings into existence by a fiction irrespective of the parties having
agreed to it. Now, by its terms s. 70 of the Contract Act must be applied where !ts requisites exi!t,
if it is necessary to imply a contract or to contemplate the existence of a quasi-contract for applying
the section that must be done and we do not think
that s. 175(3) of the Government of India Act prevents that, nor are we aware of any other impediment in this regard. This argument must also fail.
We, therefore, feel thats. 70 of the Contract
Act applies to this case and the decree of the High
Court should be confirmed.
1961
Slate of WtSt Bengal
v.
M/1. B. K. Mondal
Sarka, J.
Appeal dismissed.
• f
M/S. MATHRA PRASHAD AND SONS.
1961
v.
December i
STATE OF PUNJAB
(B.P. Srnru, C.J., J. L. KAPUR, M. HmAYAT-ULLAH,
J.C. SHAH AND J.R. MUDHOLKAR, JJ.)
Sales Tax-Exemptions-Notification is8'Ueil after commencement of financial 11ear-Whether effective from ilate of
notification or trom eommenctment of financial year-East
Punjab Genera Sales Tax Act, 1948 (E. P. of 1948).
ss. 4,5,6, 10,11-Notification dated Sepltmber 27, 19ti4.
Section 6( I) of the East Punjab General Sales Tax
Act, 1948, provided that no tax shall be payable on the sale of
goods specified in the Schedule to the Act and that no dealer
shall charge sale~ tax on the sale of goods which were
"declared tax-free from time to time". Sub-section (2) of s. 6
empowe"d the State Government by notification to add or .
to delete from the Schedule. On September 27, 1954, the
State Government issued a notification under s. 6 (2)
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