KARIMBIL KUNHIKOMAN versus STATE OF KERALA
Supreme Court of India | Decided 5 December 1961 | [1962] SUPP. 1 S.C.R. 829 | 1961 INSC 332
Key facts
- Decided
- 5 December 1961
- Bench
- P.B. GAJENDRAGADKAR*, A.K. SARKAR, K.N. WANCHOO, K.C. DAS GUPTA, N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR
- Bench size
- 5
- Case number
- WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) No. 114/1961
- Disposal
- Appeal(s) allowed
- Citation
- [1962] SUPP. 1 S.C.R. 829
- Neutral citation
- 1961 INSC 332
Text of the judgment
S:JO SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1962] SUPP.
!96J
K°CTiJUiJ
K•~itomall
••
Slal1 of Knalo
Puru•hothaman Nambudiri v. Stal< of Kera/a, [1962)
Supp. I S.C.R. 753, followed.
(II) The Act which made certain deductions from the
compensation payable to the landholders under Ch. II and
to others who held excess land under Ch. III cannot be
struck doY.n as a piece of colourable legislation which is beyond the competence of the State Legislature, and it cannot
be said that any device has been employed in the Act to take
away the moneys of the landbwners or the versons from whom
excess land is taken away for the purpose of adding to the
revenue of the State.
Section 80 'of the Act provides for the Constitution of an
agriculturist rehabilitation fund for the purpose of rendering
help by way of loan, grant or otherwise to persons affected by
the Act and eligible for the same under the rules but rr. 161
(a) (III) and 161 (b) (Ill) are so framed as to take within
their scope even persons not affected by the Act. Those rules
are ultra viru of s. 80 and must be struck down.
(Ill) The lands held by ryotwari pattadars in the
area which came to the State of Kerala by virtue of the
States Reorganisation Act from the State of Madras are not
•estates' within the meaning of Art. 31A(2J(a) of the Constitution and therefore the Act is not protected under Art. 31A
( 1) from attack under Arts. 14, 19 and 31 of the Constitution.
State of Bihar v. Ramtahwar Pralap Narain Singh, A.l.R.
1961 S.C. 1649, referred to.
(IV) The reasons which call for exemption of tea,
coffee and rubber plantations. from certain provisions of the
Act equally apply to areca and pepper plantations and there
is no intelligible differentia related to the object and purpose
of the Act which would justify any distinction in the ca•e of
tea, coffee and rubber plantations as against areca and pepper plantation~. The provisions in the Ac.t rc.!ating to plantations are violative of Art. 14 of the Conslltut10n.
The provisions relating to plantatioru cannot be severed
from the Act and struck down only by themselves. The whole
Act must be struck down as violative of Art. 14 of the Constitution so far as it applied to ryotwari fands in those areas
of the State which were transferred to 1t from the State of
Madras.
(V) The manner in which ceiling. has been.fixed. under
s. 58( l) is violative of the fundament~l r.•ght enshrined m A~t.
14 of the constitution and as that sect1?n ';8 the basis of entire
Ch. III the whole chapter must fall with 11;
(1) S.C.R. SUPREME OOURT REPORTS
831
(IV' The manner in which progressive cuts have been
imposed on the purchase price under s. 52 and the market
value under s. 64 in order to determine the compensation payable to lando\vners or intermediaries in one case and to persons from whom excess land is taken in another, results in discrimination and cannot be justified on any intelligible
differentia which has any relation to the objects and purposes
of the Act. The provision as to compensation is all pervasive
and the entire Act must be struck down a• violative of Art. 14
of the Constitution in its application to ryotwari lands which
have come to the State of Kerala from the State of Madras.
Per Sarkar, J .-Sections 52 and 64 of the Act which provide for payment of Compensation at progressively smaller
rates for larger valuations of the interests acquired are not invalid as offending Art. 14 of the Constitution. The provisions in
the act making a discrimination in favour of tea, coffee, rubber
and cardamom plantalion and also in favour of cashew plantations cannot be upheld. Sections 3(viii), 57 (1) (d) and 59
(2) are therefore invalid. These are however severable from
the other parts of the Act and the whole Act cannot be held
to be bad merely because those provisions are bad.
Per Ayyangar, ].-Properties held on ryotwari tenures
and the interest of the ryot in such lands would not be "estates" for the purposes of Art. 31A(2) as it stood even after the
Fourth Amendment of the Constitution.
Where an existing law in relation to land-tenures in force
in an area contains a definition of an 'estates' and that defini..
tion excludes the interest of a ryotwari proprietor, the very
words of Art. 3 IA(2) of the Constitution negatived the applicability of its provisions to that tenure.
Ram R4m Narain Medhi, v. Stale of Bombay, [1959] Supp.
I S.C.R. 489 and Atma Ram v. State of Punjab, [1959] Supp.
1 S.C.R. 748, referred to.
Section 2(39) which by definition excludes pepper and
arcca plantations from the category of the pl~ntations named
in it which are exempted from the operative provisions of the
impugned Act, s. 58 for the determination of the ceiling in
respect of different individuals who are brought within the
scope of the enactment and ss. 52 and 64 for determining the
compensation payable to the several classes of persons whose
lands arc acquired under the Act are all violative of the
guarantee of equal protection of laws nuder Art. 14 of the
Constitution.
O:BIGINAL JURISDICTION: Petitions Nos. 114
and 115 of 1961.
Petition under Art. 32 of the Constitution of
India. for enforcement of Fundamental Rights.
191JI
Karimbil
Kunhikoman
v.
Stale of K11ala
836 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1962) SUPP.
1961
Ka,imhil
Kunhil:om..
Y.
Stat. of Kna/•
W011<hoo J.
•
devices has taken away money, which should have
gone to land-owners or to those from wh')m excess
lands wero being acquired. The attack is based on
the facts that in s. 52 of the Act compensation pay·
able to a land-owner is reduced aft.er the pur·
chase prioe to be paid by the tenant to whom the
land is to be a<isigned has been &~ccrtained, and
that in s. 64 of the Act the oompemation payable
to a pereon from whome cxoosR land is takPn is
reduced by cPrtain percentage after the market
value of tho land has been determined. It is urged
that by these devices the State is acquiring money
which should properly have gone to the land-owner
to whome compensation is payable under s. 52 and
to the person who surrenders excess land to whom
compensation is p<i.yable under s. 61. There is no
doubt that certain deductions are made from the
purchase price payable by the tenant under s. 45
and from th~ market value before componstion is
arrived at for payment to the land-owner under s. 52
and to the person surrendering excess land under
s. 6!. But if one looks at the purpose and object
of the Act it will be clear that the main provisions
of the Act are clearly within the legislative competence of the State lll~islature under item 18 of
List II and item 42 of List III. The scheme of
the Aet so far as Chap. JI dealing with extinction
of the land-owner's right is concerned Is that
the land-own<>r's right vested in the State
under ss. 41 and 42 on a day to be notified by \he
Government in that behalf. Thereafter, s. 4:l
provides that cultivating tenants of the landH which
have vested in the ::itate shall have a right to
assignment of the right, title and interest so vestrd
in the State on payment of a certain price which i11
calculated under s. 45 and is called the purchase
price. After the purchase price is determined, the
compensation to be paid to the land-owner
is provided bys. 52 and thero is reduction in the
purchase priee for the purposes of given compensation. It is howover obvious that the object of
Chap. II ia to vest proprietorship in the land in the
I
(1) S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
.
•
•
837
cultivating tenants and for that purpose Chap.
II provides for carrying out the object in two stages.
In the first stage, the property of the landowner
is vested in the State. Thereafter the tenant is
given the right to acquire that property from the
State. What price the tenant is to pay for j;he
land is worked out under s. 45 and what compensation the State is to pay to the !and-owner is
worked out under s. 52, which however reduces
the purchase price arrived at under s. 45 for the
purpose of giving compensation. It is however
clear that tenants are not bound to apply to acquire the land which they hold as tenants and where
they do not do so, s. 44 (3) provides that they become the tenants of Government and shall be liable
to pay to the Government the rent payable in respect of the land from the date on which the right,
title and interest over the land vested in the Government. It cannot therefore be said that the scheme
which provides for two stages, namely, first acquisition by .Government and secondly assignment to tenants is a camoflage devised for the purpose of taking
away the money which would otherwise have been
payable to the land-owner in case the interest of the
landowner was directly transferred to the cultivating
tenants. It is also clear that there is bound to be a
time lag between the acquisition underss. 41 and 42
and the assignment to tenants under s. 43 and the
subsequent sections and in the meantime the Government would be the owner of the right11 acquired.
Clearly, therefore Chap. II of the Act envisages first
the acquirement of the land-owner's interest by the
State for which compensation is payable under
s. 52. Thereafter the State will assign to such culti-.
vs.ting tenants as may apply the rights acquired by
the State and there is likely to be an interval between the two transactions. Besides some cultivating tenants may not apply at all and that pa.rt
of the property will remain with the State Government. In these circumstances it cannot be said
that the scheme evoh·ed in Chap. II is a device for
1961
Kari ..hil
Kunl,;J;-
v.
Stat. of KwoLt
w.,,,,... J.
838 SUPREME COURTLREPORTS [1962) SUPP.
11141
KtJrilfChil
E wahjkontat1
••
ill.U of Ktr•liJ
W.""lico J.
taking away :my part of the money to the landowner from the tf'nant to whom his interest may
eventually ho assigned. Besides the adequacy of
componsat.ion provided under s. 52 for acquisition
by the Stato of the intorest of the land-owner
cannot be challanged on the ground that the compenHation provided by the law is not adequate :
see Art. 31 (2). It is only because the compensation prodded under s. 52 is 1L percentage of the
purchase price as culculated under s. 45 that it
appears as if tho State is taking away a part of
the compensation due to the landowner. Section
52 is however only a met hod for determining
compenAation and the whole compensation duo to
the land-owner is to be foun<l in s. 52 and it cannot
therefore be said that any part of the compensation is being taken away by the State.
Similarly the scheme of Chap. HI which provides a ceiling is that any laud in excess of the
ceiling shall vest in the Go\·ernment under s. 62.
Thereafter thr land so vested in Government can
be assigned undrr s. 70 to porsons who do not possess any land or possess land less than 5 acres of
double crop nilam or its equivalent. It i~ true
that Government may assign the lands to those
who apply under s. 70 but it is not bound to do so
and here again there will be a timP lag between the
vesting of the excess land in the Government under
s. 62 and its· assignment to those who are eligible
under s. 70. The charge that in this Chapter there
is a device for taking away the compensation due to
the Jami-owner is baaed on the fact that s. 72 the
person to whom the land is assigned under s. 70
has to pay 55 per cent. of the market value of the
land while the person from whom tht' excPss land is
taken is not always paid 55 per cent. of the market
value, inasmnch 1\8 the percentage goes down to 25
per cent. of tht> mn.rket value in certain circumstan ·
ces. But here again the compensation is provided
entirely under s. 64 and it is that section which sets
out the manner in whioh the compensation is to be
I
I
840 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1962) SUPP.
1961
Karimbil
Kunlrikcm4n
v.
Stal# of ~ttola
Wi111clloo J.
challenged in view of Art. 31(2), and there is
therefore no justification for saying that the
money due to the landowner or the persr,n from
whom the excess land is acquired is being taken
away by the State. That argument would only be
poSBible if the compensation was the whole amount
arrived at under s. 45 or under s. 7:! and frorn that
the Government deducted money due to the land·
owner. That however is not so and the compensation
to which tho landowner or the person from whom
the excess land is acquired is to be found only in
.ss. 52 and 64 and there is thus no question of
taking away any money dne to the landowner.
Further, whatever unfairness might appear
because of the difference between as. 45 an::! 52 on
the one hand and BB. 64 and 72 on the other and
the manner in which the compensation is shown as
a percentage of the purchase price or the market
value is removed by the provision in s. 80 of the
Act. That section provides for the constitution
of an agriculturist rehabilitation fund in which the
surplus, if any, of the purchase price r.ftcr the disbursement therefrom of the compensation is to he
put along with other moneys. This surplus does
not to go to the revenues of the State and t.he State
cannot be sr.id to have taken away for its own purpose any part of the compensation. Further s. 80
provides that the fund shall be utilised for rendering help by way of loan, grant or otherwise to
persons affected by the Act who are eligible for the
same in accordance with the rules framed by the
Government. The fund therefore created under
s. 80 of the surplus, if any, is to be utilised for
rendering help to peraons affected by the Act.
That our opinion clearly means either the landowners whose rights are affected by Chap. II or
the persons from whom exec~& land is taken under
Cht.p. III. The surplus money therefore is to be
utiliiled for the benefit of the persons affected by
the Act as indicated above. This section l\lFo
in:
'
.
ii
(1) S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
8•1
provides that the Government will frame rules with
respect to the persons affected and their eligibility
for help from the fund. Our attention in this
connection has been drawn to f he eligibility rules
framed under this section for the administration
of the fund, and in particular to r. 161 which
provides for eligibility for grants and loan. That
rule in our opinion goes beyon9 the scope of s. 80
in so far as it provides for making of grants
or loans to persons not affected by the Act.
We may in this connection refer to r. 161 (a)(i)
and (ii) and r. 161 (bl (i) and (ii) which are
so framed as to take within their scope even persons not affected by the Act., though r. 16l(a)(iii)
and r. 16l(b)(iii) are with respect to persons who
may be affected by the Act. Rule 16l(a)(i) and (ii)
and r. l6l(b)(i) and (ii) in so far as they take in
persons not affected by the Act are uUra vires of
the provisions of s. 80 and must be struck down on
that ground and may have to be replaced by more
suitable rules. But the rules which have been
actually framed will not affect the provisions of
s. 80 which clearly show that the ·fund is for the
benefit of those who are affected by the Act,
namely, those who are affected by Chapters II and
III of the Act, i.e., those landowners whose rights
have been acquired under ss. 41 and 42 and those
persons from whom excess land is taken away
under s. 62. Section 80 thus clearly shows that
any surplus that may arise is not tflken away by
the State for its own revenue purposes but is meant
to be used for the benefit of those affected by the
Act and therefore even the a.pparent result of the
difference between ss. 45 and 52 and ss. 64 and 72is taken away by the constitution of the fund
under s. 80, and it cannot be said at all under the
circumstances that any device has been employed
in the Act to take away the moneys of the landowners or the persona from whom excess land is
taken away for the purpose of adding to the revenue of the State. We are therefore of opinion that
1961
Karim11il
Kunkikoman
v.
State of i·tralo
Waneho1 J.
(I) S.C.R.
FIUPREME COURT REPORTS
843
It will be seen therefore that so far as the
meaning of the word " estate " is concerned, there
was no change in sub-cl.(a)and the only change was
with respect to the inclusive part of the definition
of the word "estate". The word " estate has !I.II
along been defined to have the same meaning in relation to any local area as that expression or its local
equivalent has in the existing law relilting to landtenures in force in that area. It is also remarkable that the word " intermeiliary" does not
occur in sub-cl. (a) thouirh it occurs in sub-cl. (h).
The definition in sub-cl. (a) is self-contained and
there is no scope for importing any idea of intermediary in the definition from s11b-cl. (b ). The
reason why the words "other intermediary " are
used in sub-cl. (b) which defines rights in relation
to an estate, is that that sub-clause mentions a
number of intermediaries as such, like sub-proprietors, under-proprietors, tenure-holders b11t does
not give a complete enumeration of all intermediaries that may be existing in estates all over
India and therefore uses the words "other intermediary " to bring in all kinds of intermediaries
existing in an estate. As an example we may
piention that formerly in Uttar Pradesh there were
fixed rate tenants in the permanently settled districts who were also intermediaries and it iB such
persons or their likes who were brought in within
the sweep of the definition of rights ill' relation to
an estate by the use of the wo1ds "other interm&diary". Therefore, when the words "raiyat, under
raiyat" were added in sub-cl. (b) in 1955, it WSB
further enumeration within a class already there;
further as held in The State of Bihar v. Rameshwar
Prafap Narain Singh (1 ), their inclusion in the
circumstances and in the particular setting showed
that the words " or other intermediary" did not
necessarily qualify or colour the meaning to be
attached to these new tenures. The meaning of
the word "estate" has however to be found in
(1) AJ.R. 1961 S.C.
1si~.
1961
liarimhil
Kunhikomon
••
Stall of K'11fJ/&
Wa11<hoo J.
844 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (l!l62] SUPP.
1961
A'o•i,,,hil
A"imhsko11UJJt
••
-'"'"of Ktrol•
w..,,.,. J,
sub-cl. (a) and it is the words used in that sub-clause
only which will determine its meaning irrespective
of whether any intermediary exiRted in an estate
or not. Tho meaning of the word " estate " in
eu b-cl. (al is the same as it might be in the existing
law relating to land-tenure in force in a particular
area. Where therefore there is an existing law in
a particular area in which the word "estate" as
such is defined the word would have that ml'aning for that area and there is no necessity then
for looking for its local equivalent. But if in existing law of a particu Jar area the word " estate " as
such is not defined, but there is a definition of
some othor term which in that aroa. is the local
equivalent of the word " estate " then the wor<l
" estate " wo uld have the meaning assigned
to that term in tho existing law in that area.
In order, howrvcr, that one may he ablo to say
that~ a particular term in an existing law in a
particular area is a local equivalent of tho word
" estate " used in sub-cl. (a) it is necessary to have
some basic idea of the meaning of the word
" estate " for that purpose. 'lhat basic idea seems
to be that the person holding tho estate should be
the proprietor of the eoil and should be in direct
relationship with the State paying land-revenue to
it, when it is not remitted in whole or in part. If a
tenn therefore is defined in any existing law in a
local area which corresponds to this basic idea of
an estate that term would be a local equivalent of
the word " estate " in that area. It is unnecessary
to pursue the matter further because this aspect
of the case has also been considered in Writ
Petition No. 105 of 1961.
It may be added that !IS the definition of the
word "estate" came into the Constitution from
January 26, 1950, and is based on existing law
we have to Jor,~ into law existing on Ja.naary 26,
1950, for the parpose of finding out the meaning
of the word "estate" in Art. 31A.
(1) S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
845
Let us therefore look at state of the law as it
was in the State of Madras on January 26, 1950, for
the area from which these petitions come was then
in the district of South Canara, which was th~n
a part of the Province of .Madras, which became
the State of M1dras on January 26, 1950. The
usual feature of land-tenure fa Madras was the
ryotwari form but in some districts, a l:indlord
class had grown up both in the northern and
southern parts of the Presidency of Madras as it
wa~ before the Constitution.
The permanent
settlement was introduced in a part of the Madras
Presidency in 1802. There were also various
tenures arising out of revenue free grants all ovc1·
the Province (see Chap. IV, Vol. IH of land
Systems of British India by Baden Powell) and
sometimes iu some districts both kinds of tenures,
namely, landlord tenures and the ryotwari tenurp,s
were prevalent. There were various Acts in force
in the Presidency of Madras with respect, to
landlord tenures while ryotwari tenures were
governed by the Standing Orders of the Board of
Itevenue.
Eventually, in 1908, the Madras
legislature passed the Madras Estates Land Act,
No. I of 1908, which was later amended from time
to time. It contains a definition of the word
"estate" as such ins. 3(2) and when the Constitution came into force the relevant part of the definition was as followe :"Est.ates' means : (a) any permanently settled estate or
temporarily settled zamindari;
(b) any portion of such permanently
settled estate or temporarily settled zamindari which is separately registered in the
office of the Collector;
(c) any unsettled palaiyam or jagir;
(d) any inam village of which the grant
bes'been'made, confirmed or recognised by the
.!Britiah Government, ·notwithstanding'"that
1961
Korimbtl
Kunhiknman
v.
Stab of Ktrala
Wa11ch110 J.
846 SUPREME COURT REPOR'r8 (1962] SUPP.
1961
.Karim6Jl
K~nA&komon
'·
)tat. of Kno/o
w..,1 .. 1.
subsequent to the grant, the village has been
partitioned among th• grantees or tho successors-in-title of the grantee or grantees."
This Act applied to the entire Presidency of Madras
except the Presidency town of Madras, the district
of Malabar and the portion of the Nilgiri district
known as South East Wynaad. It thus applied
to the district of South Canara from where these
petitions come. So far therefore as the District
or South Canara was concerned, there was an
existing law which defined the word "estate" for
that local area. Shortly before the Constitution
eamo into force the Madras legislature had paSBed
the Madras Estates (Abolitio!l and Conversion into
Ryotwari) Act No. XXVI of 1948. That Act
provided for the abolition of estates subject to
certain restrictions with which we arc not concerned. It also provided for repeal of the Madras
Permanent Settlement Regulation, 1802, and the
Estates Land Act of l!l08 to the extent and from
the date on which notifications were made under
s. 3 of that Act. There was thus no repeal of Act
I of 1908 by the Act of 1948, and it is not in
dispute that Act No. l of 1908 was in force on
January 26, 1950, in large pints of the Province
of Madras including South Canara, and is still in
force in auch parts of it as have not been notified
under s. 3 of the Act of 1948. Therefore, we reaoh
the position that when Art. 31 became applicable
from January 26, 1950, Act No. 1 of 1908 was still
in force in large parts of the Madras State and it
contained ii definition of the word "estate" as
suoh. Further, Act I of 1908 was clearly a law
of land-tenures as a brief review of its provisions
will ehow. Section 6 of the Act conferred ocou-.
panoy rights on tenants of certain lands in "estates"
as defined in the Act of 1908. Chapter II dealt
with the general rights of landlords and tenants.
Chapter III dealt with provisions relating to rate
of rent payable by tenants and provided for
enhancement, reduction. commutation, alteration
-
-
847
(l) S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
and remission of rent. Chapter IV dealt with
pattas and muchilikas. Chapter V provided for
payment of rent and for realisation of arrears of
rent. Chapter VI provided the procedure for
recovery of rent. Other Chapters dealt with other
matters including Chap. X which dealt with relinquishment and ejectment. It is clear therefore
that the Act of 1908 was a law relating to landtenures. Therefore, we reach the posit.ion that in
a law relating to land-tenures which was in force
in the State of Madras when the Constitution came
into force the word "estate" was specifkally defined.
This law was in force in the whole of the State of
Madras except some parts and was thus in force in
the area from which the present petitions come.
This area was then in the south Canara district of
the State of Madras. We are therefore of opinion
that the word "estate" in the circumstances can only
have the meaning given to it in the Act of 1908 as
amended up to 1950 in the State of Madras as it
was on the date the Constitution came into force.
We have already said that the Act of 1908 dealt
with landlord tenures of Madras and was an existing law relating to land-tenures. The other class
of land-tenures consisted of. ryotwari pattadars
which were governed by the Board's Standing
Orders, there being no Act of the legislature with
respect to them. The holders of ryotwari pattas
used to hold lands on lease from Government. The
basic idea of ryotwari settlement is that every bit
or land is assessed to a .certain revenue. and assigned
a survey number for a period of years, which is usually thirty and each oocupant of such land holds it
subject to his paying t.he land-revenue fix·,d on that
land. But it is open to the occupant to • •· Hnquish
his land or to take new land which has been relinquished by some other occupant or become otherwise
·available on payment of a11sessment, (see Land
Systems of British India by Baden-Powell, Vol. III,
Chap. IV, s. II, p. 128). Though, theoretically, according to some authorities, the occupant of ryotwari
11111
Karimhil
Kunhikoman
••
SM, of Korala
Wanchoo J.
848 SUPREME OOURT REPORTS fl 962] SUPP.
1961
Ka•imhil
Ku1ahi1onw1~
••
81411 of K~ala
Ji'Q'lthH J.
land held it under an annual lease (see Maeleanc,
Vol. I Revenue Settlement, p. 104). it appears that
in fact the Collector had no power to terminate tho
tenant's holding for any cause whatever except
failure to pay the revenue or tho ryot's own relin·
quishmcnt or abandonment. The ryot is generally
called a tenant of Government but he id not a
tenant, from year to year and cannot ho oust.ad as
long ns he p»ys the land-revenue assessed. He has
also tho right to sell 01· mortgage or gift the land or
lease it and the transferee becomes liable in his place
for the revenue. Further, the lessee of a ryotwari
pattadar has no rights except those conferred under
the lease and is generally a sub-tenant at-will liable
to ejectmcnt at the end of each year. In the
llfa11U11I of Admini.stmtion, as quoted by Bad!'nPowell, in Vol. III of Land Systems of British India
at p. 129, the ryotwari tenure is summarised as that
"of a tenant of tho State enjoying a tenant-right
which can be inherited, sold, or burdened for debt
in precisely the same manner as a proprietary right
subject alway~ to payment of the revenue due to
the Stat.a''. Though therefore the ryotwari pattadar is virtually like a proprietor and has many ·of
the advantages of such a proprietor, he could still
relinquish or abandon his land in favour of tho government. It is because of this position that the
ryotwari pattadar was never considered a proprietor
of the land under ltis patta, though he had many
of the advantages of a proprietor. Considering,
however, that the Act of 1908 was in forr,o all over
tho State of Madras but did not apply to lands held
on ryotwari settlcmt>nt and contained a definition
of the word "estate" which was also applicable
throughout the State of l\Ia<lras except tho areas
indicated above, it is clear that in the existing law
relating to land-tenures the wor<l "estate" did not
include the lands of ryotwari pat! adars, however
valuable might be their rights in lands as they
eventually came to ho recognised.
(1) S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
849
. 1961
Turning now to the district of South Canara
and the areas from .which the present petitions come
it appears that originally the ryotwari settlement
was not inforce in this area and two kinds of tenures were recognised, namely, mulawargdar and
Sarlcarigeniivargdar. It is, however, unnecessary to go
into the past history of the matter, for it is not in
dispute that the ryotwari system was introduced
in South Canara district in the early years of this
century. The history will be found in the Book
"Land Tenures in the Madras Presidency" by
S. Sunderaraja Iyengar, II Edn., pp. 45-47, where
it is said that "after the introduction of the ryotwari system into South Canara, no distinction now
exists between the wargadar, the mulawargadar and
kudutaledar and they are all ryotwari pattadars",
Therefore, when the Constitution came into force
the ryotwari p11ttadars of S'outh Canara were fo.
the same position as the ryotwari pattadars
of the rest of the State of Madras. Further, as the
Act of 1908 was in force in South Canara also,
though there may not be many estates as defined in
that Act in this area it follows that in this area also
the word "estate" would have the same meaning as
in the Act of 1908 and therefore ryotwari pattadars
and their lands would not be covered by the word
"estate". Further, there can ·be no question of
seeking for a local equivalent so far as this part of
the State of Kera.la which has come to it from the
former State of Madras is concerned. We are
therefore of opinion that lands held by ryotwari
pattadars in this part which has come to the State
of Kerala by virtue of the States ReorganiSation Act
from the State of Madras are not estates within the
meaning of Art. 3 lA (2)( a) of the Constitution arid
therefore the Act is not protected under Art. 3IA(l)
from attack under Arts. 14, 19 and 31 of the
Constitution.
. Karimhil
!lunhikoman
V•
Stat1o1Kerala
, Wanchoo J.
""~
-~
-·--·
856 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1962] SUPP.
1961
.Karimhil
.Kunhikoman
v.
· State of Kerala
Wanchoo J.
Re. (4).
The next contention on behalf of the petitioners
is that the Act m<tkes a discrimination between areca
and pepper plantations on the one hand and certain
other plantations on the other and should therefore
be struck down as violative of Art. 14 of the
Constitution. Section 2(39) of the Act defines
"plantation" to mean any land used by a person
principally for the cultivation of tea, coffee, rubber
or cardamom or such other kind of special crops as
may be specified by the Government by notification
in the gazette. Areca and pepper plantations have
however not been included in this definition. It is
urged on behalf of the petitioners that in this part
of the State there are a large number of areca and
pepper plantations which are practically run on the
same lines as tea, coffee and rubber plantations and
there is no reason why discrimination should be made
between areca and pepper plantations on the one
hand and tea, coffee and rubber plantations on the
other. The discrimination is said to arise from the
provisions of s. 3 and s. 57 of the Act. Section 3(viii)
which occurs in Chap. II dealing with the acquisition
of the interest of landowners by tenants excepts
tenancies in respect of plantations exceeding thirty
acres in extent from the application of that chapter.
The result of this ia that tenants in plantations
exceeding thirty acres in extent cannot acquir
the interest of the landowners with respect to such
plantations and the landowners continue to own
such planations as before. Further s. 57 which is
in Chap. III provides for exemption of all plantations
whatever their extent from the provisions of that
Chapter. Thus the ceiling area provided in s. 58
will not apply to plantations which will be left out
in calculating the ceiling area for the purpose of
s.58. Further, s.59(2) provides that in calculating the
ceiling area any cashew estate if it was a cashew
estate on April, 11, 1957 and continued as such at the
•
..
(i) S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPOR1i'S
851
commencement of s. 59 (provided the cashew estate
was principally planted with cashewnuts tree and be
a contiguous area not below 10 acres) will continue
to bff owned or held as before, though ·the ceiling in
such cases would be reduced to half of that provided
in s.58. These provisions inter alia confer benefits on
those who hold plantations as defined in s. 2(39)
and also on those who have cashew estates as
defined in the Explanation to s. 59(2). The contention
on behalf of the petitioners is that there is no
reason why the same benefits which have been
conferred on plantations as defined in the Act
should not be conferred on those who hold areca
and pepper plantations, and that there are no
intelligible differentia which would justify the State
· legislature in treating the pepper and areca plantations differently from rubber, tea and coffee
plantations.
Article 14 has been the subject of consideration
by this Court on a number of occasions and the
principles. which govern its application have been
summarised in Shri Ram Krishna Dahnia v. Shri
Justice S. R. Tendolkar (1), in these words :"(a) that a law may be constitutional even
though it relates to a -single individual if,
on account of some special circumstance~
or reasons applicable to him and not
applicable to others, that single individual
may be treated as a class by himself;
(b) that there is always a presumption in
favour of the constitutionality of an
enactment and the burden is upon him
who attacks it .to show that there has
been a clear transgression of the
constitutional principles ;
(c) that it must be · presumed that the
legislature understands and correctly
appreciates the need · of its own people
that its laws are directed to problem~
(I) [1959] S.O.R. 279, 297,
Karimbil
Kunhikoman
v.
State of Kera(a
Wanchoo J.
852 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1962] SUPP.
1961
Ka1imbil
Kunhikoman
V,
St ;le of Kerala
w~nchoo J.
made manifest by experience and that
its discriminations are based on adequate
grounds;
(d) that the legislature is free to recognise
degrees of harm and may confine its
restrictions to those cases where the need
is deemed to be the clearest ;
(e) that in order to sustain the presumption
of constitutionality the court may take
into consideration matters of common
knowledge, matters of common report,
the history of the times and may assume
every state of facts which can be
conceived existing at the time of
legislation ; and
(f) that while good faith and knowledge of
the existing conditions on the part of a
legislature are to be presumed, if there is
nothing on the face of the law or the
surrounding circumstances brought to
the notice of the court on which the
cla.ssification may reasonably be regarded
as based, the presumption of constitutionality cannot be carried to 1.he extent of
always holding that there must be some
undisclosed and unknown reasons for
subjecting certain individuals or corporations
to hostile or discriminating
legislation."
The petitioners rely on cl. (f) of this summary and
contention is that there is nothing to show either in
the Act or even in the affidavit filed un behalf of 1.he
State in reply to the petitions or in the circumstances brought to the notice of th'l court that the classification in this case which excludes areca and
pepper plantations and includes tea, coffee and
rubber plantations is a. proper classification based
on intelligible differeiitia which are related to the
obj Jets and purposes of the Act.
( l) S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
853
This brings us to .a consideration of the
reasons which may have impelled the legislature to
treat plantations as a class differently from other
lands. The objective of land reform including the
imposition of ceilings on land holdings is to remove
all impediments which arise from the agrarian
structure inherited from the past in order to increase agricultural production, and to create conditions
for evolving as speedly as possible an agrarian
economy with a high level of efficiency and
productivity (see p. 178 of the Second Five Year
Plan). It is with this opjee:t in view that ceiling on
land.holdings has been imposed in various States.
Even so, it is recognised that some exemptions will
have to be granted from the ceiling in order that
production may not suffer. This . was considered
in the Second Five Year Plan at p. 196 and three
main factors were taken into account in deciding
upon exemptions from the ceiling, namely :·-(!) integrated nature of
operations,
especially where industrial and agricultural
work are undertaken as a composite enterprise,
(2) specialised character of operations,
and
(3) from the aspect of agricultural
production the need to ensure that efficiently
managed farms which fulfil certain conditions
are notbroken up.
·
Bearing these criteria in mind it was recommended
in the Second Five Year Plan (see p. 196) that the
following categories of 'farms may be 1>xempted from
the operation of ceiling namely :
"(l) tea, coffee and rubbei: plantation;
(2) orchards where
they
reasonably compact areas ;
constitute
1961
Karimbil
Kunhikoman
v.
.State of·Kera/a
WanchooJ.
854 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1962] SUPP.
1961
Karimbil
Kunhikoman
v.
State oj Kera/a
Waachoo J.
(3) specialised farms engaged in cattle
breeding, dairying, wool raising etc ;
(4) sugarcane farms operated by sugar
factories; and
(5) efficiently managed farms which
consist of compact blocks, on which heavy
investment or permanent structural improvements have been made and whose break-up
is likely to lead to a fall in production."
The same view has been reiterated in Chap. XIV
of the Third Five Year Plan dealing with Land
Reform and ceiling on agricultural holdings and
para 28 thereof refers to the grounds of
exemption envisaged by the Second Five Year Plan.
rt:is obvious therefore that when the State legislature in this case exempted tea, coffee, rubber and
cardamom plantations from the ceiling under Chap.
III and treated plantations of over 30 acres as a
special case for the purpose of Chap. II, it must
have had the principles enunciated above in mind to
differentiate them from ordinary cultivation of other
crops. If that bo so, the question immediately
arises whether there is any reason for treating areca
and pepper plantations differently. If there is none
and ,areca and pepper plantations stand so far as
these conditions are concerned on the same footing
as tea, coffee and rubber plantations there will
clearly be a discrimination against them by the
provisions of the Act referred to above.
Turning now to pepper plantations, first, we
may refer to the information contained in Farm
Bulletin No. 55 relating to pepper cultivation in
India issued by the Farm Inform<ition Unit, Directorate of Extension, Ministry of Food and Agriculture, New Delhi in September 1959. It appears
from this bulletin that Kerala is the most important
pepper producing State in India, where pepper is
cultivated on an organised :plantation scale ovllr
(1) S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
855
fairly extensive areas. There are three ·distinct
regions of the pepper growing belt, namely, (1) The
Travancore and Cochin region. (2) The Malabar and
South Canara region, and (3) the Coorg and North
Canara region. Though pepper is essentially a
homestead garden crop, growers were· encouraged to
grow it on plantation scale since 1928 when the
price of pepper rose to about Rs. 700/- per candy.
Since then there has been a further rise in the price
of pepper with the result that new homestead gardens and plant11tions have sprung up and pepper
cultivation has extended a good deal. During the
last fifty years, pepper which was largely a household garden crop has emerged as a plantation crop
and fairly large sized plantations of pepper exist
in the submontane eastern parts of North Malabar
and the Hosdrng taluk of South Canara, (the area
from which these petitions come). In Hosdrug taluk
in particular pepper is grown mostly on large scale
plantations and it is here that the finest and the
best organised pepper plantations in India exist.
Some of the largest plantations among them have
an area of a 100 to 150 acres. Pepper vines commence yielding usually from the third year, the yield
increasing gradually until the vines come to full
bearing in about ten years. The economic life of a
vine varies from place to place. From the tenth to
the 25th year, the vines are in full bearing, and the
yield begins to decline after the 30th year. The
initial outlay on pepper plantations is heavy and
the pepper crop requires continuous attention and
care. The total area under pepper is over 2 lakhs
acres out of which about 20,000 acres are under
pure pepper plantations. The initial expenditure on
laying out a pepper plantation can be recovered
only after several years and the best organised and
most extensive pepper plantations of India are in
the Hosdrug taluk, South Canara (from where thes(;l
petitions coxpe) iwid North M1J>l1J>bar,
1961
Karimhil
Kunhikoman
v.
S fate of Kera/a
Wanchoo J.
856
1961
Karimbil
Kunhikoman
v.
State of Kerala
Jfanchoo J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1962) SUPP.
This information taken from ]'arm Bulletin 55
shows that in the last fifty years pepper in India
has reached the plantation stage and in particular in
Hosdrug taluk from where these petitions come
there are the best organized and most extensive
pepper plantations in India. The initial cost of
laying out a pepper plantation is heavy and the
pepper vines yield nothing for three years and full
production comes only in the tenth year. There·
fore, where pepper is cultivated as a plantation crop
on a large scale the cost is heavy and may be comparable to the outlay on large scale tea, coffee and
rubber plantations. It is in these circumstances
that we have to consider whether there has been
discrimination against pepper plantations when
they have not been included in the definition of
plantation under s. 2( 39) of the Act.
Turning to arecanut, reference may be made
to Farm Bulletin No. 14 issued by the same authority. The major arecanut growing belt in India is
again the same regions, i.e., South Canara, Malabar,
Coorg and Travancore-Cochin along with parts of
Mysore, Bengal and Assam. Arecanut is also grown
on plantation scale. Since the crop begins to bear
fruit after about eight years, large sums have to be
expended up to the bearing stage without any
income till then. The estimated life of an arecanut
garden is about 50 to 60 years, though some of the
palms in the garden will be dying occasionally or
becoming uneconomic and it will be necessary to
replace them. For this reason underplanting is taken
up periodically. It appears further from the Proceedings of the Ninth Annual General Special and Twelfth
Ordinary Meetings of the Indian Central Arecanut
Committee held on January 23, 1958, that the question whether arecanut gardens should be put under
ceiling or not and whether there would be hampering
of production which would be against national interest if a ceiling were imposed on such gardens had
been referred to a Sub-committee for consideration.
(1) S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
857
The Sub.committee reported that if areca gardens
were brought under the ceiling it ·would )lamper
production which would be against the- national
interest and recommended to the Planning Commission, the Central Government and the State Governments that, as proposed by the Planning Commission in respect of tea, coffee and rubber plantations,
orchards, specialised farms and efficiently managed
farms, arecanut gardens be also similarly exempted
from ceiling. The Sub-committee also noticed that.
arecanut cultivation involved heavy capital outlay in
establishing, maintaining and protecting the arecanut trees. This recommendation of the Sub-committee came up for consideration before the Indian
Central Arecanut Committee on January 23, 1958,
and was accepted. Thus these proceedings show
that fixation of ceiling on arecanut gardens would
hamper production which would be detrim~ntal to
national economy. It is in this background therefore that we have to consider whether the non-inclusion of areca and pepper plantations in. the definition in s. 2( 39) with the result that areca and pepper
plantations do not enjoy similar benefits as others,
is discriminatory.
From what we have said above it has not
been shown that there is any appreciable difference
between the economics of tea, coffee and rubber
plantations and areca and pepper plantations. It,
is true that plantations in· are ca and pepper are not
so widespread as tea, coffee and rubber plantations
but it is equally true that in this particular area
from which these petitions come areca and pepper
plantations are very common. The fact however
that areca and pepper plantations are very common
only in this area of the State of Kerala is no reason
for treating them differently from tea, coffee and
rubber plantations which are apparently more.
evenly distributed throughout the State. If the
criteria evolved by the Planning Commission, as
already indicated, apply to tea, coffee ·and rubber
1961
Karimbil
Kunhikoman
v,
State oj ·K~ra!a
Wartchoo J.
858
1961
Karimhil
Kunhikoman
..
State of Kerala
Wmwhoo J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1962] SUPP.
plantations in our opinion they equally apply to
areca and pepper plantations and there is no reason
for differentiating between these two sets of plantationA. So far a;; areca is concerned we have the
recommendation of the Sub-committee, mentioned
above, endorsed by the Indian Central Arecanut
Committee, that it would be detrimental to national
economy not to extend the benefit of exemption
from ceiling to arecanut plantations in the same
way as is done in the case of tea, coffee and rubber
plantations. As for pepper we have it from Farm
Bulletin No. 55 that the best organised and most
extensive pepper plantations of India are in Hosdrug Taluk of South Canara and that some of them
are even as large as 100 to 150 acres each. The
result of the application of the ceiling and other
provisions of the Act would mean the break-up of
these plantations and may result in fall in production. It is to avoid the break-up of tea, coffee and
rubber plantations and the consequent fall in production that ceiling has not been imposed on these
plantations. The same reasons in our opinion lead
to the conclusion that pepper plantations should
also be treated similarly. In this connection reference may be made to the opinion expressed in
Farm Bulletin No. 55 where the author has said
that it is impossible to keep a large plantation of
pepper in good tip-top condition, without incurring
heavy expenditure and without great efforts and
has added that in the existing conditions no one
planter should have more than 10 acres of pepper
plantation. This would seem to suggest that 10
acres is the economic optimum limit for pepper
plantations. It is not clear however on what basis
this recommendation is based, for undoubtedly the
bulletin shows that there are plantations of much
larger extent in this area and the plantations here are
the best organised and the most extensive throughout the whole of India. The only reason which seems
to have beep. given in support of the opinion that
(1) S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
859
.10 ·acres is the optimum area for a pepper planta-
1961
Karimbil
tion is that one planter in that region was of the
Kunhikoman
Y.
view that unless the price of one candy of pepper
Stale of Kerala
remained at a high level of anything between
Wonclio!1 'j
Rs. 1,500/- and Rs. 2,000/- it will be impracticable
and unprofitable to maintain large scale plantations
of pepper in these ·regions, and if p~ices go down for
below this level, large scale pepper plantations may
have even to be abandoned. This does not afford
a sufficient basis for holding thett 10 acres is the
optimum holding for a pepp0r plantation. In the
first place, it is mentioned at p. 8 of the bulletin
that pepper began to be grown on plaintation scale
when the price rose to about Rs. 700/- per candy in
1928. Therefore even if the price falls below
-Rs. l,t>OO/- to Rs. 2,000/- per candy there is no
reason why pepper cultivation on a plantation scale
should become impracticable, particularly as it is
unlikely that the cost of only pepper will fall and
not all other commodities. At p. 72 the bulletin
· mentions that the cost of cultivation· of pepper can
be brought down only if the general price level is
brought down substantially. Now there fa no
reason to suppose that there would be a catastrophic
fall in the price level of pepper only which would
make all pepper plantations above 10 acres uneco·
nomic and unprofitable. In any 'case thi.F is not the
reason urged on behalf of the State in support of
· not including pepper pl:i.ntations in the definition
of plantation. In this connection we ought to add
that the counter :i.ffidavit filed by the respondent
is very unsatisfactory ; no serious attempt ·has
been made at all to justify the exclusion_ of pepper
and areCtLnut' from the exemption granted to tea,
coffee, rubber and cardamom ; no facts :i.re stated
and no data supplied in reply to the detailed allegations made in the petitions challenging the
. validity of the classification in question. · The only
reason given by the State in the counter affidavit
is that a plantation crop is ~enerally underi,1tood
860 SUPREME COURT REl'ORTS [1962] SUPP.
1961
Karimbil
KunhJko1nan
v.
Stat1 rif Kera/a
Wanckoo J.
to refer only to tea, coffee and rPbber and cardamom. It is not quite clear what exaytly is meant
bv this one sentence in the counter affidavit in
support of the definition. If a plantation crop is
generally understood to refer to only tea, coffee,
rubber aud cardamom, it is not understood why the
definition provides for extending the word "plantation
to other crops by notificatiou. The very fact that
power has been reserved for extending the definition
by notification to other crops shows that other
crops can also be grown on plantat.ion scale. In
view therefore of what we have said above with
respect to the economics of areca and pepper cultivation, it is obvious that no sufficient reason has been
shown for differentiating areca and pepper plantations in this area from tea, coffee and rubber
plantations in the State. Making all the presumptions in favour of the classification made under
. s.2(39) it is clear that there is nothing on the face
of the law or the surrounding circumstances which
has been brought to our notice in this case on which
the classification contained in s . 2(39) can be said
to be reasonably based. Considering the object
and purpose of the Act and the basis on which exemption has been granted under Chapters II and III
to plantations as defined in the Act, there appears
to be no reason for making any distinction between
tea, coffee and rubber on the one hand and areca
and pepper on the other in this particular case. It
is not as if tea, coffee and rubber are grown only
on a large scale while areca and pepper are mostly
grown on a small scale. We find from the report
of the Plantation Inquiry Commission, 1956, that
small holdings exist in tea, coffee and rubber plantations also and are in fact the majority of such
plantations. For example, in the report of the
Plantation Inquiry Commission relating to coffee
at pp. 9 and 14 we find that out of the total number of registered estates more than 4,500 are between 5 acres and 25 acres while only about 2,200
(l) S.C.R. SUPREME COUR'F REPOltTS
861
1961
estates are above 25 acres. Further ,there are
Karimbil
more than 24-,000 estates below 5 acres. , Similarly
Kunhik1Jman
at p. 97, Chap. XI, Part III of the Report dealing
v.
State of Keralo
with rubber, out of the total of over 26, 70'1 rubber
estates, 23,300 are up to 5 acres, 1,900 up to 10
Wanchoo J.
acres and only about 1,500 above 10 acres. So it
·appears that the large majority of plantations whether they be of coffee or rubber are below 10 acres
and that is also the case with areca and pepper
plantations. Thus there is no reason for giviug
preference to plantations of tea, coffee and rubber
over plantations of areca and pepper for the conditions in the two sets of plantations whether for
the purpose of ceiling under Chap. III or for the
purpose of acquisition of landowners' rights under
Chap. II are the same. The reasons therefore
which call for exemption of tea, coffee and rubber
plantations equally apply to areca and pepper plantations and there is no intelligible differentia related ·
to the object and purpose of the Act which would
justify any distinction in · the case of tea,
coffee and rubber plantations as against areca and
pepper plantations. We are therefore of opinion
that the provisions relating to plantations are violative of Art. 14 of the Constitution.
The next que~tion is whether these provisions
are severable, that is to say, whether the Kerala
legislature would have passed the Act witho.ut
these provisions. That depends upon the intention
of the legislature and as far as we can judge that
intention from the provisions of the Act, it seems
clear to us that the legislature did not intend that
the provisions relating to acquisition by tenants ·
and ceilings should apply to plantations · as
dafined in the Act, so that they may have to be
broken-up with consequent loss of production and"
detriment to national economy.. It seems that· the·
legislature could not have intended in order to .
carry out the purpose of the legislation to do. so
even after breaking-up all the plantations which
-
- -~' ·-
8tl2 SUPREME COURT BlfFOB'.IS [l!l62] SUPP.
1961
Karimbil
Kunhiloman
v.
tale of Kerala
JVanchoo"'J.
existed in the State. It follows therefore that the
legislature would not have passed the rest of the
Act without the provisions relating to plantations.
As these provisions affect the entire working out of
Chapters II and III of the Act which are the main
provisions thereof, it follows that these provisions
relating to plantations cannot be severed from the
Act and struck down only by themselves. Therefore,
the whole Act must be struck down as violative of
Art. 14 of the Constitution so far as it applies to
ryotwari lands in those areas of the State which
were transferred to it from the State of Madras, and
we order accordingly.
Re. (5).
Then we come to the attack that the Act is
violative of Art. 14 on account of the manner in
which ceiling has been fixed under s. 58 thereof.
Section 2( 12) defines a "family" as meaning husband,
wife and their unmarried minor children or such
of them as exist. There are three kinds of families
existing in this State namely, the joint Hindu family,
Marumakhathayam family and Aliyasanthana
family, the latter two being matriarchal. In the
matriarchal family the husband and wife are n'ot
members of the same family but belong to di:ffierent families. The joint Hindu family does not merely consist of the husband, wife and unmarried minor
children ; it consists at least of the husband
wife and all the children whether married or unmarried and whether minor or adult. The definition of "family" therefore in the ·Act is an artificial
one which does not conform to any of the three
kinds of famlies prevalent in the State.
Turning now to a. 58, the ceiling has been
fixed in two ways. The first is by reference to a
family as defined in the Act of not more than five
members which is allowed 15 acreR of double crop
nilam or its equivalent with an addition of one acre
of double crop niJP -:;1 or its equivalent for each
(1) s.c.:R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
s6a
member in excess of five, so however that the total
extent of the land shall not exceed 25 acres of
dou hie crop nilam or its equivalent. The second
is by reference to an adult, unmarried person who
is allowed 7! acres of double crop nilam or its equivalent. It has been urged on behalf of the State
that the provisions as they stand do not make any
discrimination whatsoever for there is the same
provision for all adult unmarried persons ·and the
same for all families as defined in the Act. This in
our opinion is an over-simplification of the provi- .
sion relating to ceiling under s. 58. On an argument
of this kind no provision would ever be discriminatory for it is unlikely that a provision would:on
the face of it make a discrimination. The discrimi·
natory nature of the provision has to be judged
from the results that follow from it and we have
no doubt that the results which follow from lthis
double provision as to ceiling are bound to be discriminatory. If the ceiling had been fixed with
respect to one standard whether it be of an individual person or of a natural family by which we
mean a family recognised in personal law, the
results may not have been discriminatory. But
where the ceiling is fixed as in the present~ case. by
a double standard and over and above that the
family has been given an artificial definition which
does not correspond with a natural family as known
to personal law, there is bound to be discrimination
resulting from such a provision. A simple illustration will explain how the results of the manner in
which the ceiling has been fixed by s. 58 will lead
to clear discrimination between person and person.
Take the case of an adult unmarried person and a
minor who is an orphan with no father, mother
brother or sister. Assume further that each
o.wns 25 acres of
land
under · personal
cultivation. The former who is an adult unniarried
person will retain 7! acres and will have to surrender 17! acres as· excess land. The latter will be
an artificial .family under the definition of. that word
.
1961
Karimbil
Kunhikoman
v.
Slate of K<ralu
WanclwoJ.
864 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1962] SUPP.
Karimbit
li.Unhilcoman
v.
Si1Jte of Kert1la
Waricho~ J,
ins. 2(12). This follows from the fact that a family
consists of husband, wife ancl. their unmarried minor
children or such of them as exist. This is also made
clear bys. 61(2) which shows that even a minor
who has no parents, and no brothers or sisters will
constitute a family under s. 2(12). This minor therefore as constituting a family will be entitled to 15
acres of law! and will have to surrender only 10
acres as excess land. No justification has been
shown to us on behalf of the State for this discriminatory treatment of two individual persons; nor
are we able to underntand why such discrimination
which clearly resu Its from the application of the
provisions of s. 58(1) is not violative of Art; 14 of
the Constitution. Examples can be multiplied
with reference to joint Hindu families also,
which would show that in many cases discrimination will result on the application of these
provisions to joint Hindu families. Similar would
in our opinion be the case with J\farumakhathayam
and Aliyasanthana families where as we have already
pointed out the husband and wife do not belong to
the same family as known to personal law. Discrimination therefore is writ large on the consegnences that follow from the provisions of s. 58( 1). We
are therefore of opinion thats. 58(1) is violative
of the fundamental right enshrined in Art. 14; as
that section is the basis of entire Chap.III the whole
Chapter must fall with it. This would be an
additional reason why Chap. III should be struck
down as violative of Art. 14 in its application to
ryotwari lands which have come to the State of
Kerala from the State of Madras.
Re. (6).
It is contended that the manner in which the
compensation is cut down progressively in ss. 52
and 64 of the Act is violative of Art. 14. The Compensation payable under s. 52 is determined in this
manner. First the purchase price is arrived at
under s. 45. Thereafter s. 52(2)(b) provides that
the landowner or the intermediary, except in the
,
(1) S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
865
case of religious, charitable and educational institution of a public nature, would be entitled to compensation, The compensation would consist of (1)
the value of structures, wells and. embankments of
a permanent nature situated in the land and belonging to the landowner or the intermediary, as the
case maybe, and (2) the percentage of the value of
interest of the landowner or the intermediary in
respect of the land and the j~provements other than
those falling under sub-cl. (i) according to the scales
specified in Sch. II. Schedule II then provides that
the first Rs: 15,000/-. of the compensation will be
paid in full. Thereafter there will be a reduction
of 5 {>er cent. in each slab of Rs. 10,000/- till we
reach compensation above Rs. 1,45,000/- Thereafter the compensation arrived at under s. 52 read
with s. 45 is reduced by 70 per cent so that the
landowner or the intermediary gets only 30 per
cent of what has been arrived at under s. 52 (2) (bl
read with s. 45.
Similarly in s. 64 the compensation payable
for excess land surrendJJred is (i) the full value of
any structures, wells and embankments of a permanent nature situate in the land and belonging to the
person who surrenders such land, and (ii) the percentage of the market value of the land.and improvements other than those specified above. Here again
on the first Rs. 15,000/- compensation at 60 per cent
is to be paid. Thereafter the compensation is reduced
by 5 per cent for each slab\)'[ Rs. 15,000/- till, we
reach over Rs. 1,75,000/- when the compensation is
.reduced by 75 per cent.
The contention on behalf of the petioners is
that there is no intelligible differentia on whioh the
purchase price determined under s. 45 or the market
value ~s to be reduced by different percentages
dependmg on the total purchase price or
the total
market value
of the interest
~o be acquired. The reply on behalf of the State
IS that there is really no discrimination inasmuch
1161
.
·Karimhil
Kunhikoman
:state of Keral11
Wanch11 J,
866 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1962] SUPP.
1961
Karimbil
Kunhikoman
v.
Stale of Kerala
Wanchoo J.
as the same percentage is reduced where the
compenAation payable to different persons is the
same. That is undoubtedly so. But that alone
is not in our opinion the end of the matter. The
question which is posed for our consideration is why
a person in whose case the purcha~o price or the
market value Rs. 15,000/- should get the full purchase price or suffer a reduction in themarket value
at a certain rate while another person in whose case
compensation is more than Rs. 15,000/- should suffer
reductions at a different rate which reductions become progressively higher as the purchase price or
the market value increases. We could understand
once the purchase price or the market value bad
been determined a uniform cut therefrom for all
persons entitled to compensation. That would then
raise the question of adequacy of compensation and
unless the cut was so large as to make the compensation illusory the cut may be protected by Art.31(2).
But in the persent case there is not a uniform cut
on the purchase price or the market value for all
persons, the cut is higher as the purchase price or
the market value gets bigger and bigger after the
first slab of Rs. 15,000J-. This difference in cut is
being justified on behalf of the State on the same
principle on which (for example) the slab system
exists for purposes of income-tax. We are however
of opininon that there is no comparison between the
slab system of income-tax rates and the present cuts.
Taxation is a cumpu,liory levy from each individual
for the purpose of the maintenance of the State. We
may therefore reasonably expect that a ri<>h man
may be required to make a contribution which may
be higher than what may be proportionately due
from his income for that purpose as compared to a
poor man. This principle cannot be applied in a
case where a person is deprived of his property
under the power of eminent domain for which he is
entitled to compensation. There is no reason why
when two persons are deprived of their property one
richer than the other, they should be paid at
I) S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
867
different rates when the property of which they are
deprived is of the s:1me kind and differs only in
extent. No such principle can be applied in case
where compensation is heing granted to a person for
deprivation of his property. Where one person owns
property valued at Rs. 15,000/- while another owns
property valued at Rs. 30,000/-, both are equally
deprived of the property. When therefore it comes
to a question of payment of compensation we can
see no reason why a person whose compensation
amounts to Rs. 15,000/- should get the whole of it
or a large part of it while another person whose
compensation amounts to (say) Rs. 30,000/- should
get something less than the first person. It is not
as if there is some difference in the nature of the
property which might justify different payments of
compensation. What the Act provides is to work
out the purchase price or the market value first for
the purpose of determining compensation and then
make different cuts from the purchase price or the
market value according to whether in one case
the purchase price or the market value is Rs.
l 5 000/- and in another case it is more than
Rs'. 15,000/-. No justification, is pointed out for this
discrimination except the principle on which the
slab system for the purpose of income-tax is justified. That principle as we have just pointed out
does not apply to a case of compensation.
Nor are we able to see any rational classification which would justify different cuts based simply
on the amount of compensation worked out on the
basis of purchase price or market value. The only
thing we can see is that because a person is possibly
richer he must be paid less for the same type ofland
while a person who is poorer must be paid more.
This kind of discrimination in the payment of compensation cannot in our opinion be possibly justified
on the objects and 1mrposes of the Act. The object
and purpose of the Act, as we have already said, is
to grant rights to cultivating tenants so that they may
1161
Karimbil
Kunhikoman
v.
State of Kera/a
Wanchoo J,
868 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1962] SUPP.
Karimbil
Eunhikoman
••
Stile ef lfoala
W1mlhooJ.
improve their lands resulting in larger production to
the benefit of the national economy. Secondly, the
object of the Act is to provide land for the landless
and to t.hose who may have little land by taking
excess land from those who have large tracts of
lands so that peasant proprietorship may increase
with consequent increase in pro< 1uction due to
greater interest of the cultivator in the soil. But
these objects have no rational relation which would
justify the making of different cuts from the purchase
price or the market value for the purpose of giving
compensation to those whose interests are being
acquired under the Act. ·we can therefore see no
justification for givinir different compensation
based on different cuts from the purchase price or
the market value as provided in ss. 52 and 64 of
the Act.
We may in this connection refer to Kameshwar
Singh v. The State of Bihar (1), in which similar
question with respect to compensation provided
in the Bihar Land
Reforms Act, 1950,
came up for consideration. There the Act
provided compensation at different rates depending upon the net income. The landowner having
the smallest net income below Rs. 500/- was to
get twenty times the net income as compensation
while the landowner having the largest net
income, i.e., above 1,00,000/- was to get only
three times of the net income. Intermediate slabs
provided different multiples for different amounts
of net income. That provision was struck down
by the Special Bench of the Patna High Court as
violative of Art. 14. It may he montiontd that
that decision was given btforn the Constitution
(First Amendment) Act adding Art. 31A and the
Ninth Schedule to the Constitution was passed.
Three learned Judges composing the Special Bench
who heard that case were unanimously of the
(l) A.LR. 1951Pat.91,
-
(1) S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
869
opinion that such difference in payment was violative of Art. 14 and the principle of progressive
taxation did not apply to compensation for land
acquired. We are of opinion that the view taken
in that case is correct and the same applies to the
present case. We may point out that that case
came in appeal to this Court (see, The State of
Bihar v. Maharajadhiraja Sir Kameshwar Singh (1) ).
The appeal however was heard after Art. 31A and
the Ninth Schedule had been introduced in the
Constitution and therefore this Court had no occasion to consider whether such difference in payment of compensation would be violative of .Art. 14.
We are therefore clearly of opinion that the
manner in which progressive cuts have been imposed on the purchase price under s. 52 a11d the
market value under s. 64 in order to determine the
compensation payable to land owners or intermediaries in one case and to persons from whom
excess land is taken in another results in discrimination and cannot be justified on any intelligible
differentia which has any relation to the objects
and purposes of the Act. As the provision as to
compensation is all pervasives, the entire Act
must be struck down as violative of Art. 14 in its
application to ryotwari lands which have come to
the State of Kerala from the State of Madras.
In view of what we have said above on the
main points urged in the petitions, it is unnecessary
to consider other subsidiary points attacking particular sections of the Act on the ground that they
were unreasonable restrictions on the right to
acquire, hold and dispose of property under .Art.
19( l)(f). We therefore allow the petitions and
strike down the Act in relation to its application
to ryotwari lands which have come to the State of
Kerala from the State of Madras. The petitioners
will get their costs from the State of Kera.la, one
set of hearing costs.
Karimbil
Eunhikuman
Y,
Stat1 of Eual•
Sarkar J,
[ 1)(1952] S. C, R. 889.
'
870 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1962] SUPP.
1961
Karimbil
Kunhikoman
••
State of Kerala
Sarkar J.
SARKAR, J.-I wi~h to say a few words on
two of the questions that arise in these cases.
The Act, the validity of which is challenged,
provides for acquisition of lands for equitable
distribution among the people who require it for
cultivation by themselves. It provides for payment of compensation to those whose interests are
acquired. It also provides for a mode of valuation
of these interests. Then it provides b>- ss.52 and
64 for payment of compensation at a progressively
smaller rate for larger valuations. For the higher
slabs in the valuation made as provided by the
Act, less and less is paid by way of compensation.
It is said that these provisions for progressively
diminishing compensation are discriminatory and
unconstitutional. This is the first point with which
I propose to deal.
The question is whether the payment of compensation at a progressively smaller· rate as the
valuation is higher offend5 Art. 14 of tho Constitution. Now it is not disputed that progressively
higher rate of taxation by an Act taxing income
is not unconstitutional. I think such taxation is
too well recognised now to be challenged. If that
is so--and that was the basis on which arguments
proceeded in this case-I am unable to see that
a statute providing for acquisition of property and
for payment of compensation at a progressively
lower rate for the higher slabs of valuation can
be unconstitutional.
"The reason for progressive taxation in the
case of inheritance taxes and income taxes is the
ability of those receiving or giving to pay" :
Willis's Constitutional Law (1936 ed.) p. 597. The
cases in America that I have looked up also put
the matter on the same basis. The classification
by progressively higher taxation in a taxing
statute is therefore good if based on the tax payers'
ability to pay.
It is however said that what applies in the
case of a taxing statute cannot apply to a statute
(1) S,C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
871
permitting acquisition of property on payment of
compensation. I do not see why ? I am not
aware that the test for determining whether there
has been unequal treatment is different with
different varieties of statutes, that the test for a
taxing statute is not the same as that. for a statute
providing for acquisition on payment of compensation. I think the test is the same for all statutes,
and it is that there must be an intelligible differentia having a rational relation to the object of the
Act.
Now the object of a taxing statute is to collect
revenue for the governance of the country. Ability
to pay is a9knowledged to be an intelligible <lifferentia having a relation io such an object. The
object of the statute with which we are <Joncerned
is to acquire land on payment of compensation so
that the land may be equitably distributed among
the people. If under a statute whose object is
to collect revenue more can be legitimately demanded from a person having more, it seems to me
that under a statute whose object is to acquire
land by paying compensation less can equally
legitimately be paid to a person who has more.
Ability to pay, or which is the same thing as ability
to bear the loss arising from smaller payment
received, would in either case be an intelligible
differentia having a rational relation to the object
of the Act. In one case it serves the object by
collecting more revenue for adding to the resources
for governing the country and in the other case
it serves the object by making it possible for the
State by payment of less money out of its resources
to acquire lands for better distribution. In both
cases the State resources are benefited, in one by
augmentation and in the other by prevention of
larger depletion. Therefore, I would accept the
learned Attorney-General's argument that ss.52
and 64 of the Act cannot be held to be discriminatory and void for the same reason on which
Karimbil
Kunhikoman
v.
State of Kerala
!Sarkar J.
872
IHI
.Kari»iiil
Kuriillom••
••
--
~tat• of X1r•I•
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ll962] SUPP.
progressive rates of taxation are held not to be
so in ~he case of an Income-tax Act .
The next question on which I wish to say a
few words concerns those provisions of the Act
which exempt plantations of tea, coffee, rubber
or cardamom or such other kinds of special crops
as the Government may specify, from certain provisions of the Act. Plantations have been defined
in s. 2(39) of the Act as land used by a person
principally for the cultivation of tea, coffee,
rubber or cardamom or other notified crops. No
other crop appears to have been notified yet.
Section 58 of the Act provides the ceiling area of
land which may be held by any individual proprietor. Land above the ceiling has to be surrendered to the Government. Section 57 of the Act
provides that this provision would not apply to
plantations as defined in s. 2(39). Again, Ch. 2
of the Act which gives the tenants the right to
purchase land from the landlords and vests in the
Government the lands of the landlords not themselves cultivating them above the ceiling fixed, is
by s. 3 (viii) not made applicable to plantations
exceeding thirty acres in extent. The question
iB whether the benefit so given to the plantations
as defined in the Act is discriminatory. The
petitioners own large scale cultivation of areca
and pepper. They contend that no legitimate
differentiation is possible between lands on which
areca and pepper are grown and lands on which
tea, coffee, rubber and cardamom are grown.
No doubt the presumption is that a statute
is constitutional but such presumption is not conclusive. It is also true tha.t a court is entitled to
assume the existence of all rational basis on which
the cla.ssification made by an Act may be justified.
Even so, it seems to me, that the present classification is, on the materials now before us not
justified. It may be that plantations of tea, coffee
(1) S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
873
rubber and cardamom, especially the first three,
are usually large in size and require big investment;;. It may be that they are carried on as
industries which give employment to a large
labour force. These characteristics may however
only justify the putting of large plantations of
these crops in a class. The Act however exempts
all lands ·on which tea, coffee, rubber or cardamom is grown irrespective of the size of the
business carried on or of labour employed on
them, as a class. Materials have been placed
before us to show that there are a very large number
of smaller plantations growing tea, coffee and
rubber. There are also many areca, and pepper plantations exceeding thirty acres in area. There is no
reason to put tea, coffee, rubber and cardamom plan·
tations in a class as distinguished from similar sizes
of plantations of areca and pepper. None at least has
been shown by the State of Kerala to exist. The only
ground shown in the affidavit of the State ofKerala
seeking to justify the classification of tea, coffee, rubber and cardamom plantations in one class is that
"plantation crop is generally understood to refer only
to tea, coffee, rubber and cardamom" and that "areca
and pepper are not generally grown on a plantation
scale". I am unable to think that thiese afford
sufficient justification for making a discrmination
in favour of tea, coffee, rubber and cardamom
plantations. It would appear from the Planning
Commission's Report that other kinds of crops might
profitably be grown as plantation crops. In
any case, a general understanding even if there
was one, is not sufficient basis for discrimination.
With regard to the other statements of the State,
it is enough to say that the Aot does not make a
discrimination because of the size of the plantations.
Therefore, there is no point in saying that areoa.
and pepper are not grown on a plantation scale.
For these reasons I think the p~ovisions
in the Act making a discrimination in fav our of tea,
1961
Karimhil
Kunhikoman
v.
State o j Kera
SarktJr J,
874 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1962] SUPP ..
1961
Karimbil
KunhiAoman
v.
State of Kera/a
Sarkar J.
Ayyangar J,
coffee, rubber and cardamom plantations cannot be
upheld. For the same reason, I think the discriminatory treatment made in favour of cashew plant.
ation also cannot be sustained. Sections 3 (viiiL
57(l)(d) and 59(2) of the Act are therefore, in my
opininion, invalid. I think however that these
provisions are severable from other parts of the
Act. I think it cannot be 1 t·asonably said that the
legislature would not put the Act into operation
if these provisions are taken out of it. The deletion
of the provisions does not further make it impossible for the rest of the Act to operate. I am, therefore, unable, to hold that because the sections
mentioned above are bad, the whole Act should be
declared to be bad.
That is all I wish to say in this judgment.
With regard to the other matters arising in this
case, I agree with the judgment delivered by
Wanchoo J.
AYYANGAR, J.-I entirely agree with the order
that the petitions should be allowed and the impugned Act struck down in relation to its application
to ryotwari lands which came into the State of
Kerala from the State of Madras-this being the
only relief which the petitioners seek from this
Court. My only reason for thiH separate judgment
is because I do not agree with that portion of the
reasoning in the judgment just now pronounced in
these petitions where it deals with the interpretation
of Art. 31A(2). In my judgment in the companion
case-Writ Petition No. 105 of 1961-I have endeavoured to point out what according to me is the
proper construction of this Article and I adhere to
that view.
I consider that on Art. 3 IA( 2) as it stands even
after the fourth Amendment, properties held on
ryotwari tenures and the interest of the royt in such
lands would not be "estates" for the purposes of that
rticleA. No doubt, as pointed out by me in the
(1) S.C.R..
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
875
other judgment, if there was a law existing on the
date of the Constitution in relation to land-tenures
under which "estates" were defined as including not
merely lands held by intermediaries and of others
holding under favourable tenurers, but also of ryotwari proprietors having direct relationship with the
Government and paying full assessment, such latter
category of interests might also be comprehended
within the term· "estate" by reason of the words
"oove the same meaning as that expression ...... has
in the existing /,aw re/,ating to land tenures inforce in
that area" in Art.31A(2)(a). That is the real basis and
the ratio underlying the decisions of this Court in
Ram Ram Narain Medhi v. State of Bombay('), and
Atma Ram v. State of PunJab( 2 ). In all other cases
(apart from the two categories specially added by the
Fourth Amendment) no lands other than those held
by intermediaries or held on a favourable tenure
would fall within the definition of"an estate" this being according to me the central concept or the
thread which runs through the entire definition.
The choice between the diffierent interpretations of the Article does not however present itself
for the disposal of this petition which has to be ans·
wered in favo11r of the petitioner even on the view
of the scope of Art. 31A which has commended
itself to my colleagues. Where an "existing law. in
relation to land-tenures in force in an area"
contains a definition of an "est'l.te" and that definition excludes the interest of a roytwari proprietor,
the very words of Art.31A(2)(a) which I have extracted earlier would negative the applicability of its
provisions to that tenure.
Art. 31A being out of the way I agree that
the provision in (l) s. 2 ( 39) of the Act which by
definition excludes pepper and areca plantations
from the category of the plantations which are
named in it which are exempted from the operative
provisions of the impugned Act, (2)s. 58 for the
(1) [1959] Supp. IS. C. R, 489.
(2) [1959] Supp. 1 S. C.R. 748.
1961
Karimhil
Kunhikoman
v.
State of Kerala
Ayyangar J.
876 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1962) SUPP.
1961
Karirnbil
an
v.
State of Kerafa
Ayyan:ar J.
determination of the ceiling in respect of different
individuals who are brought within the scope of
the enactment, and (3) ss. 52 and 64for determining
the compensation payable to the several classes of
persons whose lands are acquired under Act, all these
are violative the guarantee of the equal protection
of laws under Art. 14 of thr C,,nstitution.
I therefore agree in tho order proposed that
the petitions be allowed, and with costs.
Petitions allowed.
1961
STATE OF WEST BENGAL
December 5.
v.
M/S. B. K. MONDAL AND SONS
(P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, A. K. SARKAR,
K. N. WANCHOo, K. C. DAs GUPTA and
N. RAJAGOPALA .AYYANGAR, JJ.)
State Government-Enjoying beiufit of non-gratuitous workIj bound to pay compen•ation-Absence of valid contract, if exonerate• !iability-lndia'lt Oo'lttract Act, 1872 (9 of 1872)-•.70
Government of India Act, 1935 (25 & 26 Geo.5. Oh.42), •.175(3).
By s. 70 of the Contract Act, "where a per•on lawfully
does anything for another person, or delivers anything to him,
not intending to do so gratuitously; and such other person
enjoys the benefit thereof, the latter is bound to make
compensation to the former in respect of, or to restore, ~he
thing so done or delivered". Under s.175(3) of the Government of India Act all contracts made in the exercise of the
executive authority of a province shall be expre8'ed to be made
by the Governor of the province and shall be executed on
behalf of the Governor by mch persons and in such manner
as he may director authorise.
The respondent, a firm of building contractors doing construction works for the Provincial Government did certain
additional construction on the reque1t of its officers. Its bills
for these latter works were not paid and it sued the Government basing its claim on contract and in the alternative on
s. 70 of the Contract Act. The defence of the Provincial
Government, inter alia, was that there was no valid and binding contract and s. 70 had no application. The trial Judge
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