PURUSHOTHAMAN NAMBUDIRI versus THE STATE OF KERALA
Supreme Court of India | Decided 5 December 1961 | [1962] SUPP. 1 S.C.R. 753 | 1961 INSC 331
Key facts
- Decided
- 5 December 1961
- Bench
- P.B. GAJENDRAGADKAR*, A.K. SARKAR, K.N. WANCHOO, K.C. DAS GUPTA, N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR
- Bench size
- 5
- Case number
- WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) No. 105/1961
- Disposal
- Dismissed
- Citation
- [1962] SUPP. 1 S.C.R. 753
- Neutral citation
- 1961 INSC 331
Text of the judgment
(1) S.C.R.
SUPREME OOURT REPOR~
758
PURUSHOTHAMAN NAMBUDIRI
v.
THE STATE OF KERALA
(P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, A. K. SARKAR,
K. N. WANCHOO, K. C. DAS GUPTA and
N. RilAGOPALA AYYANGAR JJ.)
•
.Agrarain Relations-Constitutional validity of enaetmentDi8solution of State A8'embly pending President's asBent-Re·
consideration of Bill by New Asseml,ly-Pandarvaka Verumapat·
tom and Puravaka l,a.nds-JJ amount to estales-"Estate",
meaning of-Kerala Agrarian Relations Act, 1.960 ( Kerala 4
of 1961).-Constitution of India Arts. 31A, 172, 194(3), 196,
200, 201.
The Kerala Agrarian Relations Bill was introduced in
the Kerala Legislative Assembly on December 21, 1957, and
was ultimately passed by it on June JO, 1959.
It
wa• then reserved by the Governor of the State for the assent
of the President under Art. 200 of the Constitution of India.
Meanwhile, on July 31, 1959, the President issued a proclamation under Art. 356 and the Assembly was dissolved. In
February 1960 fresh elections took place in Kerala and on
July 27,1960, the President for whose assent the Bill was pending sent it back with his message requesting the Legislative
Assembly to reconsider the Bill in the light of the amendments
suggested by him. On October 15, 1960, the Bill as amended
in the light of the President's recommendations was pac;sed
by the A'8embly. It then received the assent of the President
on January 21, 1961, and became law as the Kerala Agararian
Relations Act, 1960. The petitioner challenged the validity
of the Act on the ground that the Bill which was pending
before the President for his assent at the time when the Lcgis·
lativc Assembly was dissolved lapsed in consequence of the said
dissolution and so it was not competent to the President to
give his assent to a lapsed Bill with the result that the said
assent and all proceedings taken subsequent to it were constitutionally invalid.
Ht!d, that the Constitution of India radically departs
from the practice obtaining in the Parliament of the United
Kingdom under which Bilis not assented to before the dissolution of the Houses arc treated as having lapsed on that event
occuring. Under Art. 196 of the Constitution ": Bill which is
pending assent of the Governor or the Prestdcnt does not
lapse on the dis>olution of the Legislative Assembly of the
State.
IHI
December 1.
754 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [19fi2] SUPP.
~
Held, further, that the consideration of the remitted Bill
by
the new Legis)ati\'e Assemhly diet not violate the provisions
l'urwhoth11m01t
of Art. 201 of the Con<titution.
N amhvdiri
v.
Per Gajendragadkar, Sarkar. Wancboo and Das Gupta,
Tiu 81a11 of Kttala
JJ.-(1) Clause (5) of Art. 196 of the Constitution of India
1161
deals exhaustively with the circumstance-s under "·hich Bil1s
would lapse on the di,,olution of the L·~islative Assembly of
a State, and all cases not faJJing within it~ scope are not ,
aubject to the doctrine of lapse of pending business on the
dissolution of the AS>embly.
\2) Under Ans. 200 and 201 th-.re is no time limit
within which the Governor or the President should reach a
decision on the Bill referred to him for his assent and those
Articles do not rrquire that th• mil which is sent back with
the message of the Governor or the Pn·sident should be to the
same House which had considered it in the first instance.
Per Ayyangar, J.-(1) A Bill before the legistative
Assembly of a State ceasrs to be pending, uncfrr Art. 196(5)
when it has pa!!!ed through all the proe<dure pr.scribed for
its passage through the Home and bas been pa•sed by it, and
h not deemed as pendin~ beforr the Hou<e till the receipt of
the assent of the Governor or the President as the case may be.
(2) Though under Art. 172 each Le~islative A"enihly
of a State is conceived of a• having' a life of Jimitecl duration,
in Art. 201 the expression "The House of the Legislature" .
used in the sense of a House regarded as a permanent body.'
Attom•y-Gmeralfor New South Wal~• v. Pennie, [1896)
A.C. 376, relied on.
.
The Kerala Agrarian Relations Act, I 960, was enacted
with the object of providing for the acq11isition of c.rtain types
of agricultural lands in the State beyond the 'pecific maximum
extents laid down in the statute. 'fhe petitioner who was
the owner of certain lands in Trichur of which 900 acres were
classified in the land records of the State as Pandar.lvaka
Verumpattom lands and the remaining were enttred as
Puravaka lands, claimed that the lands did not con5titute
estates under Art. 31A(2)1a) and, therefore, the Act wiu not
applicable to them. His ca<c wao (!) that as rrgards
Pandaravaka Verumpattom land" he wa~ paying rent to the
State calculated as a proportion of the gross yield of the
properties, that he held the lands under the State as a tenant
and that a5 he WaJ not an
intermediary between
the State and the tiller of the soil, the lands were not an
eata•e under cl. 2 (al of Art. 31A, and (2) that the Puravaka
lands were held under a Jenmi and that as they had within
it1 scope a particular form of ]and-holding known as kanom
I
•
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
755
tenancy they were outside the purview of cl. 2 (a). It was not
disputed that the proclamation issued by the Ruler of Cochin
on March 10, 1905, was the relevant existing law for the purpose of deciding whether the prope1 ties of the petitioner, were
an estate under Art. 31A (2)(a). Under cl. 13 of the proclamation the holders of the Pandaravaka Verumpattom tenure
acquired full rights t<;> the soil of the lands and held them
subject to the liability to pay the aS>essment to the State.
Clause 15 provided that in the ca" of Puravaka Lands the
Jenmi was recognised as owning proprietorship in the land
and entitled to share the produce with the cultivator and the
State.
Held, that the lands held by the petitioner on Puravaka
tenure satisfied the test as to what constituted an estate under
Art. 31A(2)(a) of the Constitution and, therefor~, the provision of the Kerala Agrarian Relations Act, 1960, were applicable to them.
Held, further (Ayyangar, J., di88enting), that the basic
concept of the word "e1tate..- as used in Art. 31A(2){a) of the
Constitution is that the person holding the estate should be
proprietor of the soil and should be in direct relationship with
the State paying land revenue to it except where it is remitted
in whole or in part. If a term is used or defined in any existing law in a local area which corresponds to this basic concept of estate that would be the local equivalent of the word
''estate" in the area. It is not necessary that there must be
an intermediary in an estate before it can be called an estate
within the meaning of Art. 31A(2)(a).
Shri Ram Ram Narain Medhi v. State of Bombay, (1959]
Supp. l S.C.R. 489, Atma Ram v. 8tate of Punjab, [1959)
Supp. I S.C.R. 748, 8hri Mohadeo Paikoji Kolhe Yavatmal v.
State of Bombay, (1962] l S.C. R. 733 and The State of Bihar,
v. Rameshwar Pratap Narain Singh, [1962] 2 S.C.R. 382.
relied on.
The holder of lands held on Pandaravaka Verumpattom
tenure was a proprietor of the lands and held the lands subject to the liability to pay the a55essment to the State and
therefore, Pandaravaka Verumpattom could be regarded a• a
loacal equivalent of an estate under cl.2(a) of Art. 31A. 382.
Per Ayyan~ar, J.-(l) The word "estate" in sub ch.(a) and
(b) in Art. 31 A(2) has the same meaning and signifies lands
held by an intermediary who stood between the State and the
actual tiller of the soil an~ also the interests of those in whose
favour there had been alienation of the right to revenue.
IHI
l'urushothaman
Naml·11!liri
••
1k Stall of Kerala
756
1Hl
PwMJliothoman
.Nambuti&11
v.
TM Start of KnolO
SUPREME OOURT REPORTS [1962] SUPP.
(2) The First Amendment to the Constitution did not
bring within the definition of an <Slate ht Art. 31A(2)(al the
holding of pe1sona other than intrrmeciiarics or tho~e who held
land under grants on favourable tenurCi from Covl:'rnmr:nt.
(3) lands held hy a ryotwari proprietor other than
thooe in 'estates' would not Le an estate within sub-cl. (a) of
Art. 31.'\(2), nor the interest of such ryot in his holding an
'interest in an estate' v.:ithin sub-cl. (b).
(4) The word 'inrludrs' in Art 31A(2)(b) is used in
the sense of 'means and includrs 1 •
(5) The holdrr ('f Pandaravaka Vmimpatt<·m tenur.e
was in the position of a ryotwari pattadar, and, thcreforr., hts
lands were not an estate withi~ the meaning of Art. 31A(2).
(6) The lands held by the p•titioner on Puravaka tenure
were within Art. 31A(2) b<came they -..ere lands b<longing
to a Jcnmi and so covered by thr: definition of an estate as
amended bv virtue
of the
Fourth
Amendment
to
the
Constitntion'.
ORIGINAL Jl'RISillCTION : Petition No. 105 of
1961. P1>tition under Art. 32 of the Constitution of
India for the cnforc~ment of Fundam,..ntnl Right!'.
A. V. ViM~·anatlia Sastri, ,'If. K. B. Xamburdripal and llf. R. K. Pillai, for the petitioner.
M. C. S-.talvad AU-0rmy.{]encral of India, K. K.
Mathew, Advor.ate Genera.I for the State of Kerala,
Sardar Bahadu.r, George PwJi.,sary and V. A. Scyid
Muhammad, for the respond.,nt.
l!J6l. December 5. T.~P. .Judgment of P.B.
Gajondragadkar, A. K. Sarkar, 1(. N. Wanchoo and
K. C. D8.8 Gupta., JJ., was delivN"d by Gajendragadkar, J.. N. Rajagopa.la Ayy.rngar, J., delivered
a separate judgmt>nt.
GAJllNDRAGADKAR, J. - '!'his pctiliun
has
been file<l under Art. ;~2 of the Cc>nstitut.irm and it
seeks to challenge the validity of the Kenda Agrarian ltela.tions Act, 1960 (Act 4 of 196 l) (hereafter
called the Act). Tho petitioner owns about I, 250
nr res of land in the Kera la State. These lands
wr·re originally situated within the t•n;t.while State of
Cochin which now forms part of the Kera.la State.
•
(l) S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
757
Out of the lands owned by the petitioner nearly
900 acres are classified in the land records maintained by the State as Pandaravaka. holdings while
the remaining lands are cle.ssified as Puravaka holdings. By his petition the petitioner claims a declaration that the Act is ultra vires and unconstitutional and prays for a writ of certiorari or other
-appropriate writ, order or direction against the
respondent, the State of Kerala, restraining it from
implementing the provisions of the Act. It appears
that a notification has been issued by the respondent
on February 15, 1961, directing the implementation of ss. l to 40, 57,58,60, 74 to 79 as well as ss. 81
to 95 of the Act from the date of the notification.
The petitioner contends that the notification issued
under the Act is also ultra vires, unconstitutional
and illegal and as such he wants an appropriate
writ or order to be issued quashing the said notification. That in brief is the nature of the reliefs
claimed by the petitioner.
The Kerala Agrarian Relations Bill which has
ultimately become the Act was published in the
Government Gazette of Kerala 011December18,1957,
and was introduced in the Kerala Legislative Assembly on December 21, 1957, by the Communist
Government which was then in power. The bill was
discussed in the Assembly and was ultimately
passed by it on June 10, 1959. It was then reserved
by the Governor of the State for the assent of the
President under Ait. ZOO of tlie Constitution. Mean·
while, on July 31, 1959 the President issued a proclamation under Art. 356 and the Assembly was
dissolved. In February 1960 mid-term general elections took place in Kerala and as a result a coali.
tion Government came into power. On July 27,1960,
the President for whose assent the bill was pending
sent it back with his message requesting the Legislative Assembly to reconsider the bill in the light
of the specific amendments suggested by him.
On August 2, 1960, the Governor returned the bill
Pur1lJh;Jtha~nan
Nambudiri
v.
The State of KnaltJ
GcJenclratadkar J.
'·..
remitted by the President with his message and
the
amendments suggested by him to the new
Purushothamon
Assemblv for consideration. On September 26,
Nambutliri
1960, the amendments suggested by the President
The Stat~••of K1rala.
·. w.ere taken up for consideration by the Assembly
Gajmdragadk111 J. · 'and ultimately on Octa.b er 15, 1960, the bi11 as
amended in the light of the President's reeommen.--· dations was passed by the Assembly. It then
received tho assent of the President on January 21,
1961, and after. it thus became law the impugned
notification was issued by the respondent on Febru,/ ary 15, 1961. On March 9, 1961, the present writ
. petition was filed.
' Broadly st'lted three pol~ts fall to ·be considered in this petition. The petitioner challenges
tho validity of the Act on the preliminary ground
that the bill which was pending before the President
for his afsent at the time when the Legislative
Assembly was dissolved lapsed in conspquence of
the said dissolution and so it was not competent to
the President to give his assent to a lapsed bill
with the result that the said assent and all proceedings taken subsequPnt to it are constitutionally
invalid. If this preliminary point is upheld no
further question would arise and the petition will
have to be allowed on that ground alone. If however, this preliminary challenge to the validity of
the bill does not succeed the respondent raises its
· . preliminary objection that the Act is protected
. under Art. 31 A (l) (a) and as such its validity
cannot l:e challenged on the ground that it is inconsistent with, or takes away, or abridges, any of the
rights conferred by Arts. 14, 19 and 31. This point
raises the question as to whether the properties
owned and possessed by the petitioner are an
"estate" within the meaning of Art. 31 A (2) (a).
If this question is answered in the affirmative then.
the Act would be protected under Art. 31 A (1) (a)
and the challenge to its validity on the ground
that it is inconsistent with Arts. 14,19 and 31 will not
1961
I
758 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1962) SUPP.
(1) S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
759
111111
survive. If, however, it is held that the whole or
any part of the properties with which the petitioner
Puruahotham an
Nombutfiri
is concerned is outside the purview of "estate" as
v.
described by Art. 31 A (2) (a) the challenge to the Tht Stat• of K'1ala
validity of the Act on the merits would have to be G.jentlra1adkar J.
considered. The petitioner contends that the
material provisions of the Act contravenes the fundamental rights guaranteed by Arts. 14, 19 (I) (f}
and 31 of the Constitution. That is how three
principal points would call for our decision in the
present writ petition.
Let us first examine the argument that the
bill which was pending the assent of the President
at the time when the legislative Asse1?bly was dissolved has lapsed and so no further proceedings
could have been validly taken in· rPspect of it.
In support of this argument it is urged that wherever the English parliamentary form of Government ·
prevails the words "prorogation" and. "dissolution"
have acquired the status of terms of art and their
significance and consequence are well settled. The
argument is that if there is no provision to the
contrary in our Constitution the English convention with regard to the consequence of i;lissolution
should be held to follow even in India. There is
no doubt that, in England, in addition to bringing
a session of Parliament to a close prorogation puts
an end to all business which is pending consideration before either House · at the time of·
such prorogation ; as a result .any proceedings either in the House or in any Committee
of the house lapse with the session Dissolution
of
Parliament
is
invariably · preceded
by prorogation, and what is true about the
result of prorogation is, it is said, a fortiori true
about the result of dissobtion ('). · Dissolution
of Parliament is sometimes described as "a• civil
death of Parliament " (2 ). Ilbert, in his work on
Vitk : Ridge•s "COnstitutional Law," 8th ed .• p. 39 ; Earl
Jowitt'a "The Dictionary of Enaiisb Law"' p. 1427.
(2) Wharton's "Law ~xicon," p. 336.
(I)
760 SUPREME COURT RE"POR'fS [1962) SUPP.
1961
PJ1t1Uholh1MU1n
Nrmibudiri
v.
%'ht Slo~ of Kiral.
'Parliament', bas obsl•rved that "prorogation means
the end of a session (not of a Parliament)"; and
adds that "like dissolution, it kills all bills which
have not yet passed". Ho also describes dissolution
as an "encl of a Parliament (not merely of a ~rs
sion) by royal procl~mation", and observes that
"it wipes the slate cle11n of all uncompleted bills or
other procec<lings". Thus, the petitioner contends
that the inP.vitable conventional conseq1H'nee of
<lissolution (!f Parliament is that there is a civil
death of Parliam<mt. and all uneomplef cd business
pending before Parliament lapses.
In this eonncetion it would be relevant to see
how Parliament is prorcgurd. This is bow prnrogation is deti('ribed in May's "Parliami;ntary Practice":
"If Her l'l-!ajeoty attends in pcrnou to prorogue
Padiament at the end of tho sesoion. the same
ceremonies arc obsernd as at the 01wniug of Parliament: the attendance of the Commons in 1he House
of Peers i~ commanded; and, on their iLrrival at the
bar, the Speaker addresses Her MajcHty, on presenting the supply bills, and ad\·eits to the lll'>Ft important measures that have receive<! the ~anction of
Parliament during the ses8ion. The royal aBBcnt is
then gi\•en to the bills which aro awaiting that sanction, and Hrr Majesty's speech is read to both
Houses of Parliament by herself or by her Chancellor; after which the Lord Chancellor, h'lving received directions from Her Majesty for that purpose,
addresaeR both Houses in this manner: "My Lords
and Members of the House of Commons, it is Her
llajesty'H royal will and pleasure that this Parliament be prorogued (to a certain day) to be then
here holden; a.nd this Parliament is accordingly
prorogued" ('). According to May, the effect of
prorogation is at once to strnpend all busineBS until
Parliament shall be summoned again. Not only are
tho proceedings of Parliament at an end but all
proceedings pending at the timo arn quashed except
(l>
May's "Parliamenlary Practice,'' 1Glh ed., p. 214.
II
..
(1) S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
761
1961
impeachment by the Commons and appeals before
the House of Lords. Every bill must therefore be
Purusl.othtJman
J{ambudiri
rdnewed after prorogation as if it had never been
Y.
introduced. To the same effect are the statements The Staf1 of Ktrala
in Halsbury's "Laws olf England" (Vide: Vol. 28, Gaj1nd,agadkar J.
pp. 371, 372, paragraphs ti48 to 651). According
to Anson, "prorogation ends the session of both
Houses simultaneously and terminates all pending
bu~iness. A bill which has passed through some
stages but which is not ripe for royal assent at the
<late of prorogation must begin at the eariiest stage
when Parliament is summoned again and opened
by a speech from the throne" (1 ). It would thus he
seen that under Engli~h parliamentary practice
bills which have passed by both Houses and are
awaiting assent of the Crown receive the royal assent
before the Houses of Parliament are prorogned. In
other words, the procedure which appears to be
invariably followed in proroguing and dissolving
the Houses shows that no bill pending royal assent
is leff outstanding at the time of prorogation or
dissolution. That is why the question as to whether
a bill which is pending assent lapses as a result of
prorogation or dissolution does not normally arise
in England. Thus, there can be no doubt that in
Ene;land the dissolution of the Houses of Parliament kills all b11siness pending before either House
at the time of dissolution. According to the petitio·
ner, under our Constitution the result of dissolution
should be held to be the same; and since the bill in
question did not receive the assent of the President
before the Assembly was dissolved it 8hould be held
that the said bill lapsed.
This argument ·has taken another form. The
duration of the Legislative Assembly is prescribed
by Art. 172( l ), and normally at the end of five
years the life of the Assembly would come . to an
end. Its life could come to an end even
said period
before the expiration of the
{l) Anson's "Law and Custom of The Constitution," Vol. 1, 5th ed:, p.73.
762
/YU
Pllft1sltotliaman
. "°'"
N ambwliri
TJ,, S1of1 of K
Gojtndrogodkar J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1962) SUPP.
-
of five years if during the e&id five yea.rs the Presi·
dent acts under Art. 356. In any case there is no
continuity in th<' personality of the Assembly where
th<> life of one ABBPmbly comes to an end and an·
other AAsembly is in due course elected. ff that
he so, a bill paAsed by "ne Assembly <',imnot, on
well recognised principles of d<'mocratic govern·
ment. be brougl1t back to th"e successor Assembly
as though a change in t.he personality of the
Assfmbly had not taken place. The scheme of the
Constitution in regard to the duration of the life of
State Legislative Assembly, it is urged, supports the
argument that with the dissolution of the i\ssembly
all businf'ss pending before the Assembly a\. tbe date
of diBBolution must lv.pse. This posit ion would bo
consonant with the well recognised principles l•f
democratic rule. The Assembly derives it8 sovereign
power to legislate essentially because it represents
the will of the citizens of the State, and whPn one
Assembly has been dissolved .'J.nd another has been
elected in its place, the successor Assembly cannot
be required to carry on with the business pending
before ita predecessor, because that would assume
continuity of personality which in the eyes of the
C»nstitution does not exist. Therefore, sending
the bill back to the successor Assembly with the
message of the President would be inconsisk•nt with
this basic principle of democracy.
It is also urged that in dealing with the
effect of the relevant. provi8iuns of the legislative
procedure prescribed
by Art. !!)()
it would he neceBSary to bear in mind that
the powers of the legislature which arc recognised in England will also be available to the State
Legislature under Art. 194 (3). The argument is
that whether or not a. successor Legislati1•e AB<lem·
bly can carry on with the business pending before
its predcceB<!or at the time of itA dissolution is really
•
(1) S.0.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
i63
a matter of the power of the Legislature and as
such the powers of the Legislative Assembly
shall be "ouch as may from time to time be defined
by the Legislature by law, and, until so defined,
shall be those of the House of Commons of Parliament of the United Kingdom, and of its Members
and Committees, at the commencement of this
Constitution". In other words, this argument. assumes that the oonventional position with regard to
the effect of dissolution of Parliament which
prevails in England is expressly saved in India by
virtue of Art. 194(3) until a definite law is passed
by the State Legi~lature in that behalf to the
contrary. It would be no.ticed that this argument purports
to supply a constitutional
basis for the contention which we have already set
out that the word "dissolution" is a term of art
and its effrct should be the same in India as it is
in England. It may incidentally be pointed out
that the corresponding provisions for our Parliament are contained in Art. 104(3).
As we have already mentioned there is no
doubt that dissolution of the House of Parliament
in England brings to a close and in that souse kills
all business pending before either House at the
time of dissolution; but, before accepting the broad
argument that this must, inevitably be the consequence in every country which has adopted the
English Parliamentary Corm of Government it would
be necessary to enquire whether there are any provisions made bv our Constitution whieh deal with
the matter; and if the relevant provisions of our
Constitution provide for the solution of the problem
it is that solution which obviously must be adopted.
This position is not disputed. Therefore, in determining the validity of the contentions raised by the
petitioner it would be necessary to interpret the
provisions of Art. 196 and determine their effect.
The corresponding provisions in regard to the
1'61
Purushothaman
Nambudi•i
v.
7 ht State of K1rala
Gajendragadkar J,
764 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1962] SUPP.
1961
Pruushoth1.trttn
Nambudiri
v.
7 ht S/att of Ktrola
legislative procedure of Parliament are contained
in Art. 107.
Tho argument base<l on the provisions of Art.
l94(:J) is, in our opinion, €'ntirely misconceived.
The powers, privileges and immunitit•S of StnteLcgiBlnturcs and thdr Dl< rnhe1s with which th11
said Article deals have no refHencc or relevance
ro the l<;gislalive procedure which is the subject·
matter of the provitiions of Art. 196. In the context,
the wor<l 'powers' Utied in Art. 194(3) must be considered along with the words "pr.ivileges and immunities,. to which the said clause refers, and thore can
be no doubt that the s.1id word can have no reference to the effect of dissolution with which we
arc concorncd. The powers of the House of the
Legislature of a State to which reference is ma<le
in Art. 194(J) may, for instance, refer to the powers
of the House to punish cont<.>mpt of the House.
The two topics are entirely different and distinct
and the provisions in respect of one cannot be
invoked in regard to the other. Therefore, there is
no constitutional basis for the argument that unl<•ss
the J:..Cgislaturo by law has made a contrary provision the English convention "with regard to the
effect of dissolution shall prevail in this country.
What then is the roault of the provisions
of Art. HJ6 which deals with the legislative
procedure an<l makes provisions in rcgar<l to
the introduction and pas,ing of bills? Befur.: dealing with this question it may be useful to refor to
some relevant provisions in regard to the State
Legislature under the constitution. Article 168 provides that for every State there shall be a Legislature which shall consi~t of the Governor and {a) in
the States of Bihar, Bombay, .Madhya Pradesh,
Madras, :\1ysore, Punjab, l.Jttar Pradesh and West
Bengal, two Houses, al.Id (b) in other States, one
House. In the present petition we a1 e concerned
with tho State of Kerala which has only one House
,_
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
765
Article 168 (2) provides that where there a.re two
of the Legislature of a Stato, one shall be
known as the Legisl<itive Council and the other as
the Legislative Assembly, and where there is only
one House, it shall be· known as the J,egi•lative
Assembly. Article 170 deals with the composition
of the Legisla.tiva Assembly. a'1d Art. 171 with that
of the Legislative Council. Article, 172 provides for
the duration of the State Legislatures. Under Art.
172( l) the normal period for the life of the Assembly
is five years unless it is sooner dissolved. Article
172(2) provides that the L~gislative Council of a
State shall not be subjected to dissolution, hut as
nearly as possible one-third of the members thereof
shall retire as soon as may be on the expiration of
every ~econd year in accordance with the provisions
made in that behalf by ParliamPnt by law. It
would thus be seen that under the Constitution
where the State Legislature is bicameral the Legislative Council is not subject to dissolution and this
is a feature which distinguishes the State Legislatures from the English Houses of Parliament. When
the Parliament is dissolved both the Houses stand
dissolved, whereas the position is different in India.
In the States with bicameral Legislature only the
Legislative Assembly can be dissolved but not the
Legislative Council. The same is the position under
Art. 83 in regard to the House of the People
and the Council of Sti1tes. This material distinction has to be borne in mind in construing the
provisions of Art. 196 and appreciating their
effect.
Article 196 reads thus :
Hous~s
"196. (1) Subject to the provisions of
Articles 198 and 207 with respect to Money
Bi[];, cmri other financial Bills, a Bill may
originate in Pit.her House of· the Legis1..ture of a State which has a Legislative
Council.
Purushathaman
Nambudiri
v,
Tiu State of Ker 1la
Gajenirngndkar J.
766 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1962] SUPP.
19~1
l'uroJhothaman
Namhudiri
v.
Tiu Stote of Kerala
Gajmdragadk.ir J. .
(2). Subject to the provision of articles
197 and 198, a Bill shall not be deemed to
have been passed by the Houses of the Legis· 1ature of a State having a Legislative Council
unless it has been agreed to by both Houses,
either without amendment or with such
amendments only as are agreed to by both
.Houses. .
·
(3) A Bill pending in the Legislature of
.
a State shall not lapse by reason of the prorogation of the ~ouse or Houses thereof.
(4} A Bill p~nding in the· Legislative
Council of a State which has not been passed
by the Legislative Assembly shall not lapse
on a dissoluHon of the Assembly.
(5) A Bill which is pending in the
Legislative Assembly of a State, or which
having been passed by the Legislative Assembly is pending in the Legislative Council,
shall lapse on a. dissolution of the Assembly".
With the first two clauses of this Article we are not
directly concerned in the present petition. It is
the last three clauses that call for our examination
Under cl. (3) a Bill pending in the Legislature of
a State will not lapse by reason of the prorogation
of the House or Housrs thereof. Thus, this clause
marks a complete departure from the English
· convention inasmuch as the prorogation of the
House or Houses does not affect the business pending . before the Legislature at the time of prorogation. In considering the effect of dissolution on
pending business it is therefore necessary to be.i.r
in mind this significant departure made by the
Constitution in .regard to the effect of prorogation.
Under this clause the pending bueiness may be
pending either in the Legislative Assembly or in
the Legislative Council or may be pending the
assent of the Governor. At whicheTer stage the
(1) S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
767
pen-ling bnsinr,ss may stand, so long as it is pending before the L~gislature of a state it shall not
lapse by the prorogation of the Assembly. Thus,
there can be no doubt that 1rnlik1J in En;.;l:tnd prnrogation does not wipe out the pewling busineRs.
Clause (4) deals with a c1tse wh;;re a Bill is
pending in the Legislative Council of a State an<{ the
same has not been passed by the Legislative
As~embly ; and it provides that such a bill pending
before the Legislative Council of a State shall not
lapse on the dissolution of the Legislative Assembly.
It would be noticed that this clause deals with
the case of a Bill which has originated in the
Legi~latimi Council and has yet to reach the
Legislative Assembly ; and so the Constitution
provides that in regard to such a Bill which has
yet to reaeh, and be dealt with by, the Legislative
Assembly the dissolution of the Legislative Assembly will not affect its further progress and it will
not lapse despite such dissolution.
That takes us to cl. (5). This clause deals
with two categories of cas·es. The first part deals
with Bills which are pending before the Legislative
Assembly of a State, and the seoond with Bills
which having been passed by the Legislative
Assembly are pending before the Legislative Council. The Bills falling under both the clauses lapse
on the dissolution of the Assembly. The latter
part of cl. (5) deals with Cl.ses of Bills which are
supplemental to the cases covered by cl. (4).
Whereas cl.\4) dealt with Bills which had originated
in the Legislative Council the latter part of cl. (5)
deals with Bills which, having originated in the
Legislative Assembly, have bsen passed by it and
are pending before the Legislative Council. Since
cl. (4) had provided that Bills falling under it shall
not lapse on diRsolution of thi:i Assembly it was
thought necessary to provide as a matter of precaution that Bills falling under tj1e latter part of cl. (5)
•hall lapse on the dissolution of the Assembly.
1981
Pururlwtharnan
.Nambudiri
..
The Stale of.";era/a
G'dendragcdkar J,
..
768 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1962] SUPP.
lHl
PunuhutJwman
A'ambudiri
••
Tht Start of K~rJa
Gaitntbagadkar J,
That leaves pa.rt l of cl. (5) to be considered. This
part may cover three classes of oases. It may include a Bill which is pending before the Legislative
Assembly of a State which is unicameral and that
is the case with which we are concerned in the
present proceedings. It may also include a case
of a Bill which is pending before the Legislative
ABBem bly of a state which is bicameral ; or it may
inolurle a case of a Bill which has been passed by
the Legislative Council in a bicameral State and is
pending before the Legislative Assembly. In all
these cases the dissolution of the Assembly leads
to the consoqU<mce that the Bills lapse. It is significant that whereas cl. (3) deals w,ith the case of a
Bill pending in the Legislature of a State, cl. (5)
deals with a Bill pending in the Legislative Assembly of a State or pending in the Legislative Council;
and that clearly means that a Bill pending 8.88ent
of the Governor or the President is outside cl. (5).
If the Constitution-makers had intended that a Bill
pending a~Pcnt should also lapse on the dissolutfon
of the Assembly a specific provision to that effect
would undoubtedly have been made. Similarly, if
the Constitntion makers had intended that the dissolntion of the Assembly should lead to the lapse
of all pending business it would have been unnecessary to make the provisions of cl. (5) at all. The
cases of Bills contemplated by cl. (5) would have
been governed b:v the English convention in th•lt
matter and wonld have lapsed without a specific
provision in that behalf. Thflrefore, it seems to us
that the <'ffoct of cl. (5) is to provide for all cases
where the principle of lapse on diBSolution should
apply. lf that be so, a Bill pending &BBent of the
Governor or PreRident is outside cl. (5) and
cannot be said to lapse on the dissolution of the
Assembly.
It is however, contended by the petitioner
that if cl. (5) was intended to deal with all oases
(1) S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT R.EPORTS
,69
where pending business would lapse on the dissolution of the Assembly it was hardly necessary to
make any provision by cl. (4). There is no doubt
in force in the contention; but, on the other hand
it may ha.ve been thought necessary to make a
provision for Bill pending in the Legislative Council
of a State because the Legislative Council is a continuing body not subject to dissolution and the
Constitution wanted to wake a specific provision
based on that distinctive chara.cter of the Legislative Council. Having made a provision for a Hill
originating and pending in the Legislative Council
by cl. (4) it was thought necessary to deal
with a different category of cases where Bills
have been paBBed by the Legislative Assembly and
are pending in the Legislative Council; and so the
latter part of cl. (5) was included in cl. (5). On
the other hand, if the petitioner's contention is
right els. (3) and (4) of Art. 196 having provided
for cases were business did not lapse it was hardly
necessary to have made any provisions by cl. (5)
at all. In the absence of ol. (5) it would have
followed that all pending business, on the analogy
of the English convention, would laps on the
dissolution of the Legislative Assembly. It is true
that the question raised before us by the present
petition under Art. 196 is not free, from difficulty
but, on the whole, we are inclined t© take the view
that the effect of cl. (5) is that all cases not falling
within its scope are not subject to the doctrine of
lapse of pending business on the dissolution 0 r the
Legislative Assembly. In that sense we read cl.
(5) as dealing exhaustively with Bills.which would
lapse on the dissolution of the Assembly. If that
be the true position then the argument that the Bill
which was pending assent of the President lapsed on
the dissolution of the Legislative Assembly cannot
be upheld.
In this connection it is necessary to consider
Arts. 200 and 201 which deal with Bills reserved
for the assent of the Governor or the President.
Purwhot/wmml
No.mbudifi
••
The Stale of Kerala
Gaj"""•1adkar J.
770
1961
Prirwhothtzm•ll
;Varr..~rt./iri
Y,
TA, Stot1 •f
Ir"°"'
Ottjmdt4g44ar J,
SUPREME OOURT REPORTS (1962] SUPP.
Article 200 provides, inter alia, that when a Bill
has been passed by the Legislative ABBombly of a
State it shall be presentrd to the Governor, and
tho Governor shall declare either that he assents
to the Bill or that ho withholds assent therefrom or
that he reserves the Bill for the consideration of
the President. The proviso to this Article requires
that the Governor may, as soon as possible after
the presentation to him of the Bill for &BBent,
return the Bill if it is not a Money Bill together
with a mel!l!age requesting that the House or Houses
will reconsider the Bill or any specified provisions
thereof and, in partiou Jar, will consider the deeir&·
bility of introducing any such amendments as he
may recommend in hie message and, when a Bill
is so returned the House or Houses shall reconsider
the Bill accordingly, and if the Bill ia pas1ed
a.gain by the House or Houees with or without
amendment and presented to the Grovernor for
assent the Governor ahall not withhold aBSent
therefrom. 'rhe Second proviso deals with ca.see
where the Governor shall not assent to but
shall reserve for the consideration of the President
any Bill which in the opinion of the Governor
would, if it became law, so derogate from the powers
of the High Court as to endanger the position which
that Court is by this Constitution designed to fill.
Article 201 then deals with the procedure which
has to be adopted when a Bill is be assented to
by the President. Undtr the said Article the
President shall declare either that he assents to
the Bill or that he withholds assent therefrom.
The proviso lays <lown, inter alw, that the Presi·
dent may direct the Governor to return the Bill to
the House together, with such meBBage as is
mentioned in the first proviso to Art. 200, and
when a Bill is so returned the House shall reconsider it accordingly within a period of six months
from the date of receipt of such message, and if it is
a.gain passed by the House with or without
amendment it shall be presented a.gain to the
President for hie consideration. The provisions of
•
(1) S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
771
these two Articles incidentally have a bearing on
the decision of the question as to the effect of Art.
196. The corresponding provision for Parliamentary
Bill is contained in Art. lll.
It is clear that if a Bill pornlin::r tho asRent of
the Governor or the Presid<.'nt iR hrl<l tn lapse on
the dissolution of the Assembly it is not unlikely
that a fair number of Bills whfoh may have been
passed by the Assembly, say during the last six
months of its existence, may be exposed to the
risk of lapse consequent on the dissolution of the
Assembly, unless assent is either withheld or granted before the date of the dissolution. If we look
at the relevan~ provisions of Arts. 200 and 201
from this point of view it would be significant that
neither Article provides for a time limit within
which the Governor or the President should come
to a decision on the Bill referred to him for his
assent. Where it appeared necessary and expedient
to prescribe a time limit the Constitution has made
appropriate provisions in that behalf ( vide : Art.
197 (l)(b) and (2)(b)). In fact the proviso to Art.
201 requires that the House to which the Bill is
remitted with a message from the President shall
reconsider it acoordingly within a period of six
months from the date of-the receipt of such message.
Therefore, the failure to make any provision as to
the time within which the Governor or the President should reach a deoision may suggest that the
Constitution makers knew that a Bill which was
pending the assent of the Governor or the President did not stand the risk of laps on the dissolution of the Aasembly. That is why no time limit
was prescribed by Arts. 200 and 201. Therefore,
in our opinion, the scheme of Arts. 200 and 201
supports the conolusion that a Bill pending the
assent of the Governor or the President does not
lapse .as a result of the dissolution of the Assembly
and that incidentally shows that the provisions of
Art. 196(5) are exhaustive.
1961
Pururhothaman
Nr.1mf,udi.•i
v.
The Stale iJj Kera la
Gajtndragadk~' J.
772 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1962] SUPP·
JffJ
hr11Jliothamaft
Namlndiri
•·.
Tiu Blott of Ktrala
Gojmdrapdltm J.
At this stage it is necessary to examine
another
argnm('nt which has been urged
against the valiuiLy of the Act on tho strength
of the provision8 oi Arts. !:OU and 201. It
is urged that even if it be held t.hat the
Bill does not lapse, the Act is invalid because it
has been passed in contravention of Art<!. 200 and
201. The argument is that the scheme of the said
two Articles postulates that t.ho Bill which is sent
baok with the message of the President ought to
be sent back to the same House that originally passed it. It is pointed out that when the message
is sent by the President the House is requested to
reconsider the Bill and it is provided that if the
Bill is again passed by tho House the Governor
shall not withhold assent therefrom. This argument proceeds on the basis that the concept of
reconsideration must involve the identity of the
House, because unleBB the House had considered it
in the first instance it would be illogical to suggest
that it should reconsider it. Reconsideration means
consideration of the Bill again and that could be
appropriately done only if it is the same House
that should consider it at the second stage. The
same comment is made on the use of the expression
"if the Bill is passed ngain". It is also urged that
it would be basically unsound to ask the succeBSor
House to take the Bill as it stands and not give it
an opportunity to consider the merits of all the
provisions of the Bill. We are not impreBSed by
these pleas. When the succe88or House is considering the Bill it would be oorreot to say that the Bill
ill being reconsidered because in fact it had been
considered once. Similarly, when it is said that if
the Bill is pa886d again the Governor shall not
withhold assent therefrom it does not postulate
the existence of the same House because even if it
is the sucoeBBor House which paBSes it it is true to
say that the Bill has been passed again because
in fact it had been passed on an early ocoa.sion.
.Besides, if the effect of Art. 196 is that the Bills
l.
•
(1) S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
773
pending assent do not lapse on the dissolution of the
House then relevant provisions of Art. 200 must be
read in "the light of that conclusion. In our opinion,
there is nothing iu the proviso to Art. 201 which is
inconsistent with the basic concept of democratic
Government in asking a successor House to reconsider the Bill w:~h the amendments suggested by
the President because the proviso makes jj; perfectly
clear that it is open to the successor House to throw
out the Bill altogether. It is only if the Bill
passed by the successor House tba.t the stage is
reached to present it to the Governor or President
for his assent, not otherwise. Therefore, there is no
substance in the argument that even if the effect of
Art. 196 is held to be against the theory of lapse propounded by the petitioner the Bill is invalid because
it has been passed in contravention of the provisions of Arts. 200 and 201. This argument proceeds
on the assumption that the House to which the Bill
is sent must be the same House and that assumption, we think is not wellfounded. We would accordingly hold that the preliminary contention raised
against the validity of the Bill cannot be sustained.
That takes us to the point raised by the respondent that the Act attracts the protection of
Art. 31A (l)(a) and so is immune from any challenge
under Arts. 14, 19 and ·31. Thro is no doubt that
if the Act falls under Art. 31A(l)(a) its validity cannot be impugned on the ground that it contravenes
Arts. 14, 19 and 31; but the question still remains :
Does the Act fall under Art. :JlA (1) (a)?; and the
answer to this question depends on whether or
not the properties of the petitioner fall within Art.
31A(2)(a). Before dealing with this point it is necessary to set out the relevant provisions of Art. 31A
(2) Article 31A(2) reads thus :
" 31A (2). In this article(a) the expression ' estate ' shall, in rg.
lation to any local area, have the same meall~
Illfl
Puruslioth.m•
Namhudiri
••
Tiu 81011 ef S:tr<A<f
Oajmdrat;adMT J.
774 SUPRE~IB COURT REPORTS [1962] SUPP.
}951
Purwhothr;.man
J{ambu.diri
v.
TM Stale of Kerala
Gqjendra,adkar J.
----------
. is · that expression or its local equivalent
has in ..the existing law relating to land tenu·
res in force in that area, and shall also in·
elude any jagir, inam or muafi or other simi·
Jar grant, and in the States of Madras and
Kerala any janmam right ;
·
·. · .
(b) tho expression ' rights ', in rel~tion t~
an estate, shall include any rights· vesting in
a proprietor, sub-proprietor, under-proprietor
tenure-holder, raiyat, under-raiyat or · other
intermediary and any rights or privileges in
·
respect of land revenue.". , ·
Article 31A was added by the Constitution (First
Amendment) Act, 1951, with· retrospective effect.
Similarly, the portion in italics was added by the
Constitution (Forth Amendment) Act, 1955, with
retrospective effect.
It is well-known that the Constitution First
Amendment of 1951 was made in order to validate
the acquisition of zamindari estates and the aholi·
tion of permanent settlement. In other words the
effect of the ]'irst Amendment was to provide that
any law which affected the right of any proprietor
or intermediate holder in any estate shall not be
void on the ground that its provisions were inoonsis;
tent with any of the fundamental rights guaranteed
by part III of the Constitution. The acquisition
- of zamindari rights and the abolition of permanent
settlement, however, was only the first step in the
mattf r of agrarian reform which the Constitution·
makers had in mind. When the first zamindari
abolition la1ys were passed in pursuance of the programme of social welfare legislation their validity
was impugned on the ground that they contravened
the provisions of Arts. 14, 19 and 31. In order to
save the impugned legislation from any such chal·
lenge Arts. 31A and 31B and tho Ninth Schedule
wore enacted by the Constitution First Amendment
Act; and it is in that context that Art. 31A (2) (a)
(I) S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
775
and (b) were also enacted. After the zamindari
abolition legislation was thus saved the Constitution-makers thought of enabling the State Legislatures to take the next step in the matter of agrarian
reform. As subsequent legislation passed by several States shows the next step which was intended
to be taken in the matter of agrarian reform was
to put a ceiling on the extent of individual holding
of agricultural land. The inevitable consequence
of ;rutting a ceiling on individual occupation or
ownership of such agricultural land was to provide
for' the acquisition of the land held in excess of the
prescribed maximum for distribution amongst thfl
tillers of the soil. It is in the light of this background that we have to determine the question as
to whether the property with which the petitioner
is concerned constitutes an estate or rights in
·
relation to an estate under cl. (2)(a) or (b).
The petitioner contends that in interpreting
the expression " estate " we must have regard to
the fact that originally it was intended to cover
cases of zamindars and other intermediaries who
stood between the State and the cultivator and
who were generally alienees of land revenue ; and
so it is urged that it is only what may be broadly
described as landlord tenures which fall within the
scope of the expression " estate ". It is conceded
that the expression "rights in relation to an
estate " as it now stands is very broad and it includes the interest of a raiyat and also an underraiyat; but it is pointed out that the said rights, however comprehensive and broad they may be, must
be rights in relation to an estate, and unless the property satisfies the test which would have been reasonably applied in determining the scope of "estate"
in 1950 the amendment made in cl. (2)(b) will not
make the denotation of the word " estate " any
broader. In other words, the argument is that the
denotation which the expression " estate " had in
1950 continues to be t4e same even after the
1111
p,,,.,,,,.,t/Jmoan
NambuJiri
...
Tlit Btu• of K".tli
GojmJra1•dAar J.
•
776 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1962] SUPP.
1901
r.rwflD,,_,.•
Nanib"4iri
v.
TM Stal• of K"ala
flaj111dra14lltar J.
amendments of 1955 because no suitable amendment has boen made in cl. (2) (a.). But the infirmity in this arg11mcnt is that the limitation which
the petitioner seeks to plaoo on tho denotation of the
expression " estate" is not justified bv any words
used in cl. (2)(a.) at all ; it is introduced by reading
els. (2)(a.) and (b) together, and that would not be
reasonable or legitimate. In deciding what an
" estate " means in cl. (a) we must in tho first instance construe cl. (a) by itself.
In dealing with the effect of cl. (2) (a) two
features of the clause arc significant. First, that
the definition has been deliberately made inclusive,
and second, that its scope has been left to be determined not only in the light of the content of the
expression " estate " but also in tho light of th5
local equivalent of tho expression " estate " as
may be found in the existing law relating to land
tenure in force in that area. The Constitutionmakers were fully conscious of the fact that the
content of the expression " estate" may not be
identical in all the areas in this country and that
the said concept may not be described by the same
word by the relevant existing law ; and so the
decision of the question as to what an estate ie
has been delibernteh· left rather ela.stic. In each
crue tho question t0 decide would bo whether the
property in question is described ae an estate in
the terminology adopted by the rovelent law. If
the said law uses the word "estate" and defines it
then there is no difficulty in holding tho property
described by the local law a.e an estate is an estate
for the purpose of this clause. The difficulty arises
only where tho relevant local law does not describe
any agricultural property expressly as an
eat&te. It is conceded that though no agricultural
property may be expressly described as a.n estate
by the local law, even so there may be some
properties in the area which may constitute an
(1) S.O.R.
SUPREME OOURT REPORTS
777
esta.te under cl. (2) (a) ; and so in deciding which
property constitutes an estate it would be necessary to examine its attributes and essential,features and enquire whether it satisfies the test implied by the expression " estate " as used in cl.' (2)
(a).
In this connection it is pertinent to remember
that the Constitution-makers were aware that in
several local areas in the country where the
zamindari tenure did not prevail the expression
"estate" as defined by the relevant law included
estates which did not satisfy tho requirement of
the presence of intermediaries, and yet cl. (2)(s)
expressly includes estates in such areas ' within
its purview and that incidentally shows that the
concept of " estate " as contemplated by cl. (2)( a)
is not necessarily conditioned by the rigid and
inflexible requirement that it must be landlordtenure of the character of zamindari estate. That
is why, treating the expression " estate " as of
wide denotation, in every case we will have to enquire whether there is a local definition of
" estate " prevailing in the relevant existing law ;
if there is one that would determine the nature of
the property. If there is no da~inition in the
relevant existing law defining the word " estate "
as such, we will have to enctuire whether there is
a local equivalent, and in that connection it would
be necessary to consider the character of the given
agricntural property and its attributes and then decide whether it can constitute an estate under cl.
(2)(a). If the expression " estate " is construed in
the narrow sense in which the petitioner wants i1i
to be construed then it may not be easy to reconcile
the said narrow denotation with the wide extent
of the word " estate " as is defined in some local
definitions of the word "estate ". Therefore, in
deciding the question as to whether the properties
of the petitioner are an " estate " within the meaning of Art. 31A(2Xa) we are ndt l'repared to ~
ltlf I
P111USAolha"'4ll
Nam/Judjrj
••
Tiu Stall of Xnll·•
Gajmdr.,a41"" ·J
778 SUPREME OOURT REPORTS [1962] SUPP.
the narrow construction tha.t tho osta.te must a.lwa.ys
a.nd in every case represent the estate held by
J(~
za.mindars or other similar intermediaries who a.re
••
n. •w• efr"""' the a.lienees of la.nd revenue.
This question can a.lso bo considorcd from
9o}MrJt.,.,Aor J.
another point of view. As we will presently point
out, decisions of this Court in relation to a.gri·
cultural estates oxisting in areas where the zamin·
da.ri tenure does not prova.i! clearly show that the
definitions in the relevant ·existing la.ws in those
areas include properties within the expreSBion
" estate " despite the fact that the condition of
the existence of tho intermediary is not satisfied
by them, and so there can be no doubt that even
io suoh areas if the definition of the word
" estate '' includl's specified agricultural properties they would be treated as estates under cl. (2Xa).
Now just consider what would be the position in
areas where the zaminda.ri tenure does not pervail
and where the relevant existing law do<"s not contain a. definition of a.n" estato " as such. According to the petitioner's argument where in such a
oaso it is necessary to find out a. loca.l el{uivalent
of an estate the search for such a local equivalent would be futile, boca.uso in the area
in question th1i condition or test of tho presence
of intormedia.rios ma.y not be satisfied and that
would moan that the ma.in object with which tho
Constitution First and Fourth Amendment Acts of
1951and1955 wore paslKld would hoof no assistance
to tho State Legislatures in such local areas. If
tho Sta.to Legislatures in such looa.l areas want to
enact a law for agra.rian reform they would not ho
able to claim tho benefit of Art. 31 A (l)(a). Indeed,
the petitimwr conc~des that on his comtruction of
cl. (2) (a) tho intended object of tho amondmonta
may not ho carried out in certain areas where tho
e:1:iatiog relevant law does not define an estate as
such ; but his argument is that the Constitution·
makers failed to give effoot to their i11tentioia
IHI
,._..,_.,,
•
(1) S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
779
because they omitted to introduce a suitable
amendment in cl. (2)(a). On a fair construction of
cl. (2) (a) we do not think that we are driven to
such a conclusion. Therefore, we are not inclined
to acoept the petitioner's narrow interpretation of
the word "estate" in cl. (2) (a).
It is necessary therefore to have som'3 basic
idea of the meaning of the word "estate" as used
in Art. 31A(2} (a). Aswehav~saidalready, -where the
word "estate" as such is used in the existing law
relating to land tenures in force in a particular
area, there is no difficulty and the word"estate"as
defined in the exiting law would have that meaning
for that area and there would be no necessity for
looking for a local equivalent. But where the word
"estate" as such is not defined in an existing law it
will be necesmary to see if some other term is
defined or used in the existing law in a particular
area which in that area is the local equivalent of
the word "estate". In that oase the word "estate"
would have the meaning assigned to that term in
the existing law in that area. To determine therefore whether a particular term defined or used
in a particular 'area is the local equivalent of the
word "estate" as used in Art. ,3'1 A (2) (a) it is
necessary to have some basic concept of the
meaning of the word "estate" as used in the
relevant Article of the Constitution. It seems to
us that the basic concept of the word "estate" is
that the person holding the est11,te should be
proprietor of the soil and should be in direct
relationship with the State paying land 'revenue ~o
it except where it is remitted in whole or in part.
If therefore a term is used or defined in any
existinf! law in a local area which corresponds to
this basic concept of "estate" that would be the
looal equivalent of word "estate" in that area. It
is not necessarv that there must be an intermediary
in an estate before it can be called an estate within
the meaning of Art. 31 A (2)(a); it is true that in
ltGI
, Purushotlwtna
Nambruliri
v.
Thi Slal1 •f K,,,I•
G•jeftdr'ladkcr J,
780 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1962) SUPP.
IHI
hriuAot.......
Namhlirl
n. S"'-•••/lfnal•
o~.,..a.
'
J.
many C&t!Os of estate such intermediaries exist, but
there l\re many holders of small estates who
cultivate th• ir lands without any intermediary
wha.tever. It is not the presence of the intermediary
that determines whether a particular landed
property is an estate or not ; what determines the
character of suoh property to be an estate is
whether it oomos within the definition of the word
"estate" in the existing law in a pa.rtioular area or
is for the purpose of that area the local equivalent
of, the word "estate" irrespective of whether there
a.re intermediaries in existenoe or not. Thie in our
opinion, is also borne out by consideration of the
relevant decisions of this Court to which we will
now tum.
· The decisions of this Court where this question
has been considered lend support to the construction
of the word "estate" for which the respondent
contends. In Sri Ram Ram Narain Medhi v. The
State of Bombay (') the constitutional validity of
the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands
(Amendment) Act 1956 (Bombay Act XIII of 1956)
a.mending the Bombay Tenancy ~nd Agricultural
Landa Aot, 1948 (Bombay Act LXVII of 1948), was
considered by this Court. Section 2( 5) of the
Bombay Land Revenue Code, 1879, had defined
the word "estate" as meaning any interest lands
and the aggregate of such interested vested in a
person or aggregate of persons capable of holding
the same. Thie Court held that the Bombay Land
Revenue Code was the existing law relating to land
tenures in force in the State of Bombay and that the
definition of the word "estate" as prescribed by s.2(5)
''had tho meaning of any interest in land and it
was not confined merely t-0 the holdings ofla.nd·
holden of alienated lands. The expression applied
not only to suoh estate-holders but also t-0 land
holders and oooupants of una.liena.ted lands". It
would be noticed that s. 2(5) referred t-0 "any
(I) [19.59] Supp. IS. C.R. 489.
_,
(1) S,C.R. SUPREME COUR'l' REPORTS
781
interest in landS" and the expression "lands" was
undoubtedly capable of comprising within its ambit
alienated and unalienated lands. The argument
urged by the petitioner in that case in attacking the
validity of the impul(ul'!d Aot in substance was that
having rt'gard to the narrow denotation of the
"estate" nsed in Art. 31A(2)( a) the qroader eonstruotion of s. 2(5) of the Bombay Land lievenue Code
should not be adopted, and in construing what is
the local equivalent of the expression "estate" in
Bombay the narrow construction of s. 2(5) should
be adopted a.11d it~ operation should be confined to
alienated lands alone. This contention was rejected
and it was held that the estate as defined was not
confined merely to the holdings of landholders of
alienated lands. It is true that the decision
proceeded substantially on the interpretation of
s. 2(5) of the local Act ; but it may be observed
that if the denotation of the word "estate" occurring
in Art. 31A(2)(a)'was as narrow as is suggested to
by the petitioner before us this Court would have
treated that as a relevant and material fact in
considering the contention of the petitioner before
it that the narrow construction of s. 2(5) should be
adopted. 'Ihere is nc• doubt that the property which
was held to be an estate in Med_iti1s case (') would
not be an estate within the narrow meaning of.the
word" as suggested by the petitioner.
In Atma Ram v. The State of Punjab ('), this
Court had occasion to consider the meaning of
the expression "estate" in the light of the Punjab
Land Revenue Act, 1887. Section 3(1) of the said
Act had provided that an "estate" means any area-(a) for which a separate reoord of rights has been
made, or (b) whioh has separately assessed to land
revenue, or would have been so assessed if the land
revenue had not been released, compounded for
or redeemed, or(c) which the State Government may
by general rule or special order, declare to be !iii
estate. Section 3(3) which is also relevant provided
(I) [1"9] Sapp. I S.C.R. 489.
(2) [19'9] Supp. I S.C.R. 748.
11111
husliollram4n
NamlNdiri
••
TM. Slae, oflfmia
Gojmtlt"ladlw ./,
782 Sl'PREME COURT REPORTS [1962] SUPP.
""
1'16wAolhmlt41I
l"omhtAdiri
v.
'I'lw 8tate oJ Kna/4
Qojnttlr11gatllcttr J.
that "holding" means a share or portion of an
estate hPld by one landr·wner or jointly by two or
more landowners. One of the argum<'nts urged by
the petitioner before the Court was that a part of
the holding- wae not an estate within the meaning
of s. 3( I) of thv local Act. This argument was
rejectEd. Jn dealing with the question 8.8 to
whether the property held by the petitioner was an
estate undl'r thn Art. 31A(2)(a) it became necessary
for the Court to cr.nsider the amplitude of the
expre~sion "any est~te or of any right<! therein" in
Art. 3IA ( 1) (a). Sinha J., as he then was, who
spoJ,.o for the Court, has elaborately examined the
different kinds of land tenurt>s prevailing in different
parts of India, and has described the process of
sub-infeudation which Wal.' noticeable in most of the
areas in course of time. An "ebtate", it waa
observed, "is an area of land which is unit of
revenue asscssment and which is separately entered
in the Land Revenue Collector's register or revenue
paying or revenul'·frce estates". "Speaking generally",
observed Sinha, J., "It may be said that at the
apex of the pyramid stands the State. l"nder the
State, a large number of persons variously called
proprietors, zamindars, malguzars, inamda.rs and
ja.girdars, etc., hold parcels of land, subject to the
payment of land revenue designated as pes:Fikash,
quitrent or malguzari, etc., representing the
Government demands by way of land tax out of the
usufruct of the land constituting an state, except
where the Government demands had been excused
in whole or in part by way of reward for service
rendered to the State in the past, or to be rendered
in the future" (p. 759). "Tenure-holders", it was
observed, "were persons who took lands of an eat.ate
not necessarily for the purpose of self.cultivation,
but also for settling tenants on 'the land and
realiaing rents from them ......... Thus, in each grade
of holders of land, in the pr00088 of sub-infeudation
the holder ill a tenant under hill superior holder
...
(I) S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
783
the landlord, and also the landlord of the holder
directly holding under him" (pp. 760, 761 ).
Having thus conside1 ed the background of
the land tl'nures in Punjab and elsewhere this Court
pr0<ieeded to consider the amplitude of the crucial
words "any estate or of any rights therein" in Art.
31A(l)(a). "According to this decision as the connotation of the term "estate" was different in different
parts of the country, the expression "estate" described
in cl. (2) of Art. 31A, has been so broadly defined as to
cove,r all estates in the oou11try, and to cover all pos&ible kinds of rights in estates, as shown by sub-cl. (b)
of cl. (2) of Art. 31 A" (p. 762). "'l'he expression
'rights' in. relation to an estate has been given an allinclusive meaning comprisiug both what we have
called, for the sake of brevity, the horizontal and
vertical divisions of an estate. The· Provisions
aforesaid of Art. 31 A, bearing on the construction
of the expression 'estate' or 'rights' in an estate, have
been deliberately made as wide as they could be in
order to take in all kinds of rights-quantitative
and qualitative-in an area coextensive with an
estate or only a portion thereof" (p. 763). Further
observations made in the judgment in regard to the
effect of the addition of words "raiyats" and
"under-raiyats" in cl. (b) may also be usefully
quoted : "The expression 'rights' in relation to an
estate again has been u~ed in a very comprehensive sense of including not only the interests of
proprietors or Sub-propritors but also of lower grade
tenants, like raiyats or under-raiyq,ts, and thon they
added, by way of further emphasising their intention, the expression 'other intermediary', thus clearly
1howing that the enumeration of intermediaries
was only illustrative and not exhaustive" (p. 765).
Thus, this decision show& that the amendments made
by the constitution First and Fourth Amendment
Acts of 1951and1955 were intended to enable the
Sta~ Legislatures to undertake the task of agrarian
reform with the object of abolishing intermediaries
Illal
Purushol/ul,,,.,,
Naml>rdirl
••
Th• State •f Ktr0la
Gajendraiadk.,, .J,
t1
I_
784
1981
Purnshothama•
Na,,,hudfri
I
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1962] SUPP.
and establishing direct
relationship between the
· State and tillers of the mil; and it is in that context
that the wotd "estate" occurring in cl. (2) of Art.
seae:·,f K.,ara . 31 A was construed by this Court. What we have
said about the decision in .iJtedhi's case (')is equally.
Gojetu!mgadk" J.
true about the decision in the case of Atma Ram (2).,
· The property which was held to be an estate was
not an -estate in the narrow sense for which the
petitioner contends.
_
In Shri JJfahadeo Paikaji Kolhe Yavatmal v.
The State of Bombay and Shri Namadeorao Baliramji
,/
v. The State of Bombay (3 ) this Court had to consi·
der the case of the petitioners in Vidarbha who
held lands under the State and paid' land- revenue .
for the said lands thus held by them. The relevant .
provisions of the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue
Code. 1954 (II of 1955) were examined and it
was held that though the word "estate" as. such
had not been employed by the _said Code the equivalent of the estate had to be determined under Art.
31 A (2) (a), and as a result of provisions of ss. 145
and 146 of tho said Code it was held that the
estates held by the petitioners sati5fied the test of
the local equivalent of "estate" as contemplated
by Art. 31A (2) (a). In The State of Bihar v.
Rameshwar Pratap Narain Singh('), this Court had
occasion to consider. the scope and effect of the expression "rights in relation to an estate" -used in
cl. (2) (b), and it heH that "in the circumstances
and in the particular settillg in· which the words
. 'raiyat' and 'under,raiyat' were introducecl into
the definition it must be held that the words "or
other intermediary" occurring at the end do not
qualify -or colour the meaning to be attached to
the tenures newly added". It is in the light of ~
-- these decisions that we must now proceed to examine the character of the properties with which _
the petitioner is concerned. - -- - -- ·
·
_
As we have already seen the petitioner owns about 900 acres of land which are classified
(I) [1959) Supp. I S.C.R. 489.
(3) [19621 1 s.c.R. 733.
(2) [1959) Supp. I S.C.R. 748.
(4) [1962] 2 S.C.R. 382.
(I) S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
785
as Pandaravaka holdings and about 350 acres
which are described as Puravaka holdings. In
meeting the respondent's contention that these
lands are an estate under cl. (2) (a) of Art. 31A the
petitioner has alleged that the Pandaravaka
tenure represents lands of which the State was
in the position of the landlord and whatever rights
other persons possessed were directly· derived from
the State. Of the several classes of Pandaravaka
tenure the most common is the verumpattom and
most of the petitioner's lands falling under the
Pandaravaka tenure belong to this class. The
petitioner's case is that his liability is to pay rent
to the State calculated as a proportion of the gross
yield of the properties ; and so the lands held by
the petitioner as tenant under the State cannot be
said to be an estate under cl. (2) (a). He is not
an intermediary between the State and the tiller of
soil and so is outside the purview of cl. (2) (a). It
has also been alleged by the petitioner that his
properties cannot be said to· be an estate even in
the sense of a Iooal equivalent of the term "estate"
because there is no unified record of rights over the
area in question ; "each survey number is often
divided into several sub-numbers and representing holdings that do not often take in more than
a few cents has his own record of rights and sepa·
rate assessment register". It is for these reasons
that the petitioner resists the application of cl. (2)
(al to his Pandaravaka Verumpattom lands.
No clear and specific plea has been expressly
made by the petitioner in regard to Puravaka lands.
In that connection the petitioner has, however,
alleged that the Janmam is another peculiar feature of the land system in Kerala which it is not
easy to define since a good deal of ambiguity attaches to the term. However he contends that the Janmam right has to be understood in its limited and
technical sense as taking within its scope a particular
form of land-holding known as the kanom tenancy.
1961
Purushoihaman
Nambudiri
v.
The Stau of Kerala
Gajentfragadkar J,
786 SUPREME cOURT REPORTS [1962) SUPP.
1901
Prnus1t.t11aman
.Namhudi1i
v.
The Slatt of 11"trala
0-Jtntlratad/car J.
According to the petitioner the J anmam right included in cl. (2) (a) ean take in only the rights 1md
liabilities controlled and created by the two Ten ency
Acts to which he has referred. That is how the
petitioner contends that the Pura vaka lands are
also outside the purview of cl. (2) (a}.
It is comm on-ground tha.t the procla.ma.tion
issued by his Highn.-ss Sir Rama Varma Raja of
Cochin on March JO, 1905, is the relevant existing
law for the purpo~e of <leciding whether the agricul·
tural properties of the petitio11er constitute a.n
estate under cl. {2)(a). It is therefore, nccl•Rsary to
examine the schemr of this proclamatio11 and decide
whether in view of the characteristics and attributeR
of the properties held by the petitioner they can he
said to constitute a local equivalent of an estate undrr
cl.(2)(a). This proclamation oonRists of twenty-eight
clauses which deal broadly with all the aspects of
land tenure prevailing in the State of Cochin. The
preamble to the proclamation recites that the
Raja. had alrt·ady ordered that a compl1>tc survey
embracing demarcation and mapping and the preparation of an accurate record of titles in respect
of a.II descriptions of properties within his entire
State Hhall be carried out, and it adds that directions had been issued that a revenue settlement
or revision of the State demand shall be conducted
in aeoordan~e with tho principles laid down hy the
prochniatio11. Clause 6 enumerates the tenures of
lands pre,•ailing in the State. Under this clause
there am two major tenures (I) Pandaravaka and
(2) Puravaka. Tho former are held on one or the
other of six varieties of tenur~a; of these we
arc concerned with the verumpattom sub-tenure.
This clause provides that thu Pa.ndara.vaka verumpattom tenure shall be deemed as the normal tenure
for settling the foll State demand and that the
other tenures shall be treated as favourable tenures
and settled on the lines indicated in els. 14 to 17.
ClauHl· 7 says that the present rate of as~essmcnt
(I} S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
787
1951
on Pandarav11ka verumpattom nilas varies from one
PunJs/wthaman
eighth para to twelve paras of paddy for every
Namhud1ri
pn.ra of land; and it adds that such e. vast disparity of rates is indicative of unequal incidence The Stat1••of Keral•
under the existing revenue systnm. That is why Gaj1ndragadkar J.
the clause proceeds to lay down that the State
demand should bear a fixed proportion to the produce a land is capable of yielding and so it prescribes that under the Pandarave.ka verumpattom
tennre the holder should pay half of the net produce to the State. The clause then proceeds to
provide for the method in which this half of the
net produce should be determined. Clauses 11 and
12 deal with the assessment on tree.
Clause 13 is important. It says "at present
holders of Pandaravaka verumpattom lands do not
possess any property in the soil. As we are con·
vinccd that proprietorship in tho soil will induce
the cultivator to improve his land and thereby add
to the prosperity of the land, we hereby declare
that the verumpattom holders of lands shall, after
the new settlement has been introduced, acquire
full rights to the soil of the lands they hnld -ind
that their rights shall remain undisturbed so long
as they regularly pay the State revenue provided
that the rights to metals, minerals possessl'd by
the State in all lands under whatever tenure they
are held are reserved to the State".
Under cl.18 it is provided, inter alia, that in the
case of Pandaravaka lands held on the erumpattom
tenure the settelement shall be made with the pre·
sent holder of the land and in reg11rd to Puravaka land with the Janmam. Clause 22
prescribes the , procedure and the time for
the introduction of settlement. It requires that
before the introduction of the new rates of assessment a rough patta shall be issued to each of the
landholders showing the relevant detail of his holdings and the assessment to be paid by him hereafter. The object of preparing such a patta is to
788 SUPREME OOURT REPORTS (11162) SFPP.
give an opportunity to the landholderH to bring to
the notice of the authorities their objections if any.
The objections are then required to be heard before
••
7711 Stau of Knala the final entries are made. Clause 26 declares that
the new settlement shall be current for & term of
Gajm4ra,..iJ;a. J.
thirty years. This has been done with a view to
secure the utmost freedom of action to the land·
holders in improving their properties and turning
them to the best advantage according to their
means and inclination. Clause 27 deals with escheata; and cl. 28 makes general provisions as to the
formation of a new land record including reassessment of land and the registration of titles "a work
calculated to promote the well-being of a State".
It would thus be seen that under cl. 13 the
person holding lands on the Pandaravaka verumpattom tenure is not a tenant. He is given the
propriotary right in the soil itself, subject of course
to the rights as to metals and minerals re~erved in
favour of the State. Indeed, the whole scheme of
the new proclamation appears to be to change the
character of the possession of the Pandarav6ka
verumpattom tenure-holder from that of a tenant
into that of a proprietor-holder. It is true that he
is made liable to pay half of the net produce and
that may appear to be a little too high, but the
measure of the levy will not convert what is intended to be a recovery of assessment into a recovery
of rent. The proprietor of the land held on P11ndaravaka verumpattom tenure is neverthe!eSB a proprietor of the land and he holds the land subject to
his liability t-0 pay the assessment to the State.
It is not difficult to imagine that in a fairly large
number of lands held by Pandaravaka verumpattom
tenure-holders the holders in turn would let out the
lands to the cultivators and thus would come into
existence a local equivalent of the class of intermediaries. Land revenue record is required to be
prepared by the proclamation and relevant entries
showing the extent of the properties belonging to
1#1
l'lnruholham..
Nam!Uiri
I
(1) S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
789
1961
p,,,~
the respective holders and the details about their
N tmt/nllliri
liability to pay the assessment are intended to be
shown in the said record. In our opinion, it would Tiu Sttd<••of K,,.Jo
not be reasonable to hold that the lands held by Gqjmmogadkar J •
the petitioner under the Pandaravaka verumpattom
tenure do not confer on him the proprietary right
at all but make him a tenant of the State. In the
proclamation there doesnot appear to be a provision
for forfeiture or surrender and the scheme adopted
by the proclamation suggests that the amount due
from the tenure-holder by way of assessment would
presumably be recovered as arrears of land revenue
and not as rent. Therefore, we are inclined to hold
that the Pandaravaka Verumpa.ttom can be rega.rd(ed as a local equivalent of an estate under cl. (2)
a) of Art. 31A.
.
The position with regard to Puravaka Janda
is still more clear. Clause 14 of the proclamation
enumerates four kinds of more favourable tenures.
The first of these is the class of Puravaka lands.
Clause 15 provides that in the case of Pura,vaka
lands a third party called Janmi is recognised
as owning proprietorship in the land and
therefore entitled to share the produce with the
cultivator and the sirkar. Then the clause describes
the mode in which share of the State or its demand
on these Puravaka lands is calculated, under the
previously existing land system; and it provides
new rates of assessment payable in respect of the
Puravaka tenure. The Puravaka tenure .in the State,
the clause adds, corresponds to the normal conditions of land tenure in the District of Malabar
where, in the recently introduced settlements, the
net produce was distributed. among the cultivator
the Janmi and the State in the following pro:
portion:
790 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ll!l62J SUPP.
11161
In Wet Lands
Put1'1itot!iaman
.Noml>udirt
v.
Tlr1SlaU•fK,,,a/a - - · - - - - - · - - - - · ------·
-
<J~imtbotodk11< J.
A•:JO"l•r J,
Cultivator
Jenmi
State
5 out of 15
4 out of 15
6 out of 15
In G.ir<ltn Lands or
Vrikshapattom
Parambas
5outofl5
5 out of 15
5 out of 15
Since it was thought that the said method of apportionment was fair and equitable the clause adopted
the 811.me in the State of Cochin. It would thus be
clear that the lands held by the petitioner under the
Puravaka tenure satisfy the test of even tho narrow
construction placed by the petitioner on the term
"estate" in cl. (2)(a). Therefore, there can be no
doubt that about :J50 acres of land held by the
petitioner on the Puravaka tenure constitute an
estate under cl. {2)(a).
The result is that the lands held by the petitioner are an estate under cl. (2Xa), and so the Att
in so far as it operates against the holdings of the
petitioner is protected under Art. 31A(l)(a) and so
it is not open to the petitioner to thalli>nge its
validity on the ground that its material provisions
offend against Arts. 14, 19 and 31 of the Consti.
tution. The writ petition accordingly fails and is
dismi.Hsed. There will be no order as to costs.
AYYANGAR, J.-1 regret I am unable to agree
that Art. 3 i A of the Constitution saves the Kera la
Agrarian Hclations Act, 1960, from challenge under
Arts. 14, 11) and 31 of the Constitution in so far as
the said Act relates to the Pandaravaka lands of
the petitioner.
Before however dealing with this point I consider it proper to acid that I entirely agree that the
Aot waa properly enacted by the State Legislature
and that the consideration of the remitted bill by
the new Legislative A88embly did not violate the
provisions of Art. 201 of the Constitution. In my
judgment the t('rms of Art. 196 of the Constitutioa
proceed on the baeia that the Constitution-makern
,·
(I) s.C.R. SUPREME coun:r REPOR'.l'S
791
1961
in line with the framers of the Government of India
Act, 1935, radically departed from the theory of
Purushoth4man
the British Constitutional Law and .the practice
Nambudfri
obtaining in the Parliament of the United Kingdom . ThlSta:·,JK11ala
as regards the effect of dissolution of the Houses of
the Legislature on bills passed by the House or
AY.Yaniar J •
Houses and pending the assent of the head of the
State. Article 196 by its third clause having negatived the English rule that bills pending in t.he
legislature lapse by reason of prorogation, goes on
to enact els. (4) and (5) making special provision
for lapse in the event of not prorogation but dissolution. Clause (5) en1cts:
"A bill which is pending in the Legislative Assembly of a State or which having
been pi,ssed by the Legislative Assembly is
pending in the Legislative Council, shall lapse
on a dissolution of the Assembly."
..
This clause on its terms applies both to States
which have and which do not have a bicameral
legislature. In its application to a State without a
Legislative Council the relevant words of the clause
would read : "A bill which is pending in a Legislative Assembly of a State ............ shall lapse on
dissolution of the Assembly". The. question that
arises on the terms of this clause' may be stated
thus : Can a bill be said to be pending before the
Legislative Assembly when it has gone through all
the stages of the procedure precribed for its passage
through the house and has been passed by the
Assembly ? Expressed in other words, does the
pendency of a bill before the Assembly -0ease when
it has•passed through all the stages through which
bills pass before the House or is it to be deemed as
pending before the House until the bill receives the
assent of the Governor or the President, as the
case may be the latter event arising when bills are
reserved by the Governor for the President's
assent? Unless it could be contended that a bill
792 SUPREME COURT REl'ORTS [1962] SCPP.
1161
PwlUAnt/urnu'"
J'lombudari
v.
n, 81.u ofK,,ala,
.t,,..,.,J.
is pending in thl3 Legislative Ass.;mbly until assent,
there could be no scope for the argument based on
Art. 196( 5) in support of the position that an u11assented bill is still pending in the Assembly. In
this context the difference in the terminology employed
in Art. 196(3) and 196(5) requir('S
to be noticed. Whereas Art. 196(3) speaks
of the pendency of a bill in the Leyisl.ature
of a State which would, having regard to the description of 'Legislature' in Art. 168, include t}.e
Governor, Art. 196(5) uses the words 'Legislative
Assembly' as if to indicate that it is only in the
event of the bill being pending before that body
that it lapses on dissolution. In the face of the
provision in Art. 196(5) there is no justification
for invoking the British pratice under which bills
not assented to before the dissolution of the Houses
are treated as having lapsed on that event occurring.
If the Governor can assent or refuse to assent
to a bill, which has passed through all the stages
of consideration by a Legislative Assembly even
though that Assembly is dissolved under the terms
of Art. 200, because the bill is a live bill within
the terms of that Article, it would follow that he
can exercise the other alternative open to him under
that Article, viz., to reserve the bill for the
President's assent. If by reason of the language
employed in Art. 196(5) the bill ie alive so far,
and the President could assent to the bill it would
follow that subject to an argument based on the
terms of Art. 201 he can also remit the bill for•
reconsideration by the Assembly notwithstanding
1
the dissolution.
·,
The next question for consideration is whether
there is anything in the terms of Art. 201 which
precludes effect being given to the above principle.
The Article rune :
•
(1) S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
793
"201. When a Bill is reserved by a
Governor for the consideration of the
President, the President shall declare either
that he assents to the Bill or that he withholds assent therefrom:
Provided that, where the Bill is not a
Money Bill, the President · may direct the
Governor to return the Bill to the House or,
as the case may be, the Houses of the Legislature of the State together with such a
message as is mentioned in the first proviso to
artfole 200 and, when a Bill is so returned,
the House or Houses shall reconsider it
accordingly within a period of six moths from
the date of receipt . of such message and if it
is again passed by the House or Houses with
or without amendment, it shall be presented
again to the President for his consideration."
Considerable stress was la.id by the Learned Counsel
on the use of the two expressions 'return the bill
to the House' and 'the House shall reconsider it
accordingly' as indicating that the words underlined•
unmistakably implied that the consideration of
the bill must be by the Assembly which originally
passed it. It was in this connection that reliance
was placed on the terms of Art. 172(1) reading
(omitting the proviso which is immaterjal for the
present purpose) :
"172. (1) Every Legislative Assembly.
of every State, unless sooner dissolved, shall
continue for five yea.rs from the date appointed for its first meeting and no longer and the
expiration of the said period of five years
shall operate as a dissolution of the Assembly:
............................................................,,
The argument was that the Constitution did not
envisage the Assemblies having a continuous life but
•Heno printed in italics.
1981
Purushothamlffl
JVambudiri
v.
The Stal• of Kmla
.Ayyan1ar J.
79~
1961
Pu,ushotluunan
.Nomhau:ifri
••
1 lzt StaCt of A"tro/d
Ayyangar J.
SUPltEl\IE COURT REPORTS (1962] SUPP.
that on the other hand it clearly contemplated
diffortnt Legislative Assemblies each une having
a definite life which ended t·ithl'r automatically a.t
the end of five years or at an earlier period. by
disHolution and that in the cont<>xt of this provi·
sion, to the words 'return' and 'reconsider' employed in Art. 201 their literal meaning must be
attached.
It is not poosible to accept this construction
as to the effect of Art. 17 l on the rest of the prov i·
sions in this Part. No doubt, for particular
purposes each Assembly is conceived of as having
a life of limited duration but it does not follow
tlw.t tho Constitution does not envisa.ge tho Legis·
laturc as an institution. In this connection I
consider it useful to refer to the decision of the
Privy Council in Attorney-General /or N tw South
Wales v. Rennie('). The question before the Board
was as ragards the true construction of a New South
Wales statute-"The Parliamentary Representatives' Allowance Act"'-which by its s. 2 ma.de a.n
annual grant to "every member uf the Legisla·
tivc Assembly now serving or hereafter to serve
therein". Section 2 of the Imperial Act which
enacted the Constitution Act of the Colony provided
tbat "every Legislative Assembly was to continue
for five yea.rs from the day of the return of writs
for choosing the same and no longer, subject to
be sooner prorogued or dissolved by the Governor
of the Colony", which term was by a later enactment reduced to three years. The AttorneyGeneral for New South Wales raised an information seeking a declaration that there were no
moneys legally available or applicable to the payment of members of future Assemblies with a
prayer that the Auditor-General might be restrained from countereigning the au~horisation of such
payments. The Supreme Court of the Colony
dismissed the information whereupon the Attorney·
General brought the matter in appeal to the Privy
(I) [1896] A. C. 376.
-
(1) S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
795
Council. The question turned on the meaning of
the words 'the Legislative Assembly' ins. 2 of the
Act a.nd reliance was placed on behalf.of the appellant on the provision for dissolution contained in
the Imperial Act. It was contended that the
Assembly wa.8 a. body of limited duration oalled
into existence from time to time and not a perma.
nent and continuous body and that consequently
the Act granting the allowance should be construed
as applying to the members of the particular
Assembly in existence on the date of the Act.
Rejecting this argument, Sir, Richard Couch
9tated:
"They think tha.t according to the ordinary use of the term 'lagislativlJ assembly it means the aBSembly created by
the Constitution Act which, though liable
to be dissolved or to expire by effluxion
of time, is an essential part of the const.itution of the colony and must be regarded
as a permanent body."
I consider these words apt to describe the reference
to the "House of the Legislature" in the proviso
to Art. 201. I therefore respectfully concur
in the view that the .bill wa.s validly ·passed and
that the objection based on a.n, infringement or
contravention of Art. 201 must be repelled.
I shall now take up for consideration the merits
of the petition. The petitioner is the owner of a.bout
1,250 acres of land in Trichur in the erstwhile
princely State of Cochin. Out of this extent, 900
a.ores are ola.BSified in the land records of the State
as Pandaravaka Verumpattom lands and the Fe~
maining are entered as Pura.vaka lands.
While so the Kera.la Legislature enacted tbe
Kera.la Agrarian Relations Act, 1960 (Kera.la Act IV
of 1961), providing for the acquisition of certain types
of agricultural lands in the State beyond the specified maximum extents laid down in the statute and
1161
Purushothaman
Namht/;ri
v.
The State of Kera/a
A;yyangar J,
796 SUPREl'ifE COURT REPORTS (1962] SUPP.
!Ml
r11rwh«lumum
Jt 'mbuiiri
v.
Tiu S•ut!.'of K11a/•
on payment of compensation as determined by it.
The details of this legislation arc set out and their
impact on tho owners of landed property in the
Stute are dealt with in foll in th~ judgment in
Writ Petitions 114 and ll5 which is being pronounetd today. In the cirrumstances it is not necessa.ry
to say more about the l'nactmcnt than point out
that it seriously interferes with the rights of landowners in a manner which, as held in the judgment
in the other petitions, is violative of the rights
guaranteed to citizens by Part III of the Constitution. For the respondent however the main defence
on this petition is based on Art. 3 lA, the submission being that the lands of the petitioner by
reason of the tenure by which he holds them,
constitute an "estate" within the definition of that
term in Art. 3JA (2)(a). As the tenures which are
involved in the case cover considerable areas of
the former State of Coe-bin, and as the implications
arising from any decision as regards these tenures
might afrect other areas, particularly in South
India the effect of the acceptance of th11 submisson
by the respondent would be far-reaching. I have
therefore considered it proper to deal with matter
from a wider angle than would be necessary if
the effeot of our decision would be confined to
tenures of infrequent occurrence.
The two tenures into which the lands held Ly
the petitioner fall are, as stated earlier, Pandaravaka Verumpattom and the Puravaka, but before
considering their characteristics it will be useful
to attempt a picture of the general system of landholding in Malabar. As is well known, Malabarcomprising
the territories of the former
princely State of Travanoore & Coohin and the
contiguous district of Malabar in the fonnar Presideacy of Madras, was among the few areas in India
in which freehold rights in land were recognised.
This exclusive right and hereditary po811e88ion and
uaufruot of the soil was denoted by the term "Jenm"
(1) S·.C.R.
SUPRE:VIE COURT REPORTS
797
1981
and the holder was designated the Jenmi or the
Jenmikaran. The Jenmis had full and absolute
Puruskotliama
Namhidiri
property in the soil. All land which was not the
v.
property of Jenmis or ceased to be theirs-such as Tiu Stat' of Irera/a
by forfeiture, were held by the State. These lands
Ayyangar J.
were let for rent to cultivators on terms of paying
rent. The assertion by the State to the proprietorship of the soil which carried with it a denial of the
right of alienation by the tenant of the leased lands
and so of the right to hereditary enjoyment was
besides being contrary to the .iccepted theory of the
Hindu law givers, was also productive of grave
economic ills. According to the Hindu Law givers
starting from Manu, property in the soil arose out
of occupation and cultivation. The texts which expound this position are set out and discussed by Westropp, C. J., in Vykunta Bapuji v. Government of Bombay(') (See also Sundaraja Iyengar Land Tenures in
the Madras Presidency, pp. 5 to21 ). According to this
theory theKing was not the owner of cultivated land
but the proprietary interset in it vested in the cultivator, the right of the King being merely to the Raja
bhagam which represented various proportions of the
prm~uce, sometimes thought of as being a sixth anti
at other times at higher proportions ranging up to
a half. As observed by Subramania Iyer, J., in Venkata Narasimha v. Kotayya (') .
"For, in the first place, sovereigns, ancient
or modern, did here set up more than a right
to a share of the produce raised by raiyats in
lands oultivated by them, however much
that share varied at different times. And,in the
language of the Board of Revenue whirh long
after the Perma.nent Settlement Regulations
were passed, investigated and reported upon
the nature of the rights of ryots in the various
parts of the Presidency, 'whether rendered in
eervice, in money or in kind and whet.her paid to
rajas, jagirdars, zemindars, poligars, mutadara
(I) 12 Bom. H.C.R. Appendix p. I PP• 29-43.
(2)1 .L.ll. 20 Mad. 2>l9, 301-302.
798 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1962] SUPP.
shro-triemdars, inamdars or to Government officers, such a.a tahsildars, amildars,
amine or thannao:lars, the payment8 which
have always been made are universally deemed
the due of Government.' (See t.he Proceedings
of the Board of Revenue, dated 5th January, 1818, quoted in the note at page 223 of
Dewan Bahadur Srinivasa Ra!!hava Ayyangar's
•Progress in the Madras Presidency')."
1Hl
l'latu,,..,,.,,,..
Nombudiri
T l.1 St alt"·of K
tTal11
A»dnlar J.
This proprietary interest of the cultivator was in
its tru11 sense a property right- being capable of
alienation and of hereditary enjoyment. At the
time of Permanent Settlement Regulation in
Bengal (1793), and subeequently when its Madl'&ll
oounterpart was enacted (Regulation XXV of 1802),
there was a gr<>at deal of controversy as to whether
the East India Company as the Ruler was or was
not entitled to the proprietary rights to the soil
in the country. In the words ofWestropp, C. J., in
Vykunm Bapuji v. Government of Bamby (') involved in this
"was t.he question as to the character in
which native governments claimed, from the
occupants of the land, payments either in
money or in produce in re8pect of the land.
Were thE>se payments rent or revenue? Some
maintained that those payments were rent, not
revPnue ; beoaus J, it was said, the land could
only be oocupied and cultivated by the
permission of the sovereign, and that such
produce, as there may be in exoeB11 of what
sufficed for the bare subt>istenoe of the cultivators and for the expenses of oultivation,
i8 the property of the sovereign. Others
maintained that the sovereign was only
entitled to a fixed portion of the produce,
and that the surplus beyond that portion,
plus the subsistence of the rayut11 (cultivators)
0
(I)
12 Dom. H.C.R. Appmdix p. I pp. 25-26.
(1) S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
799
and the cost of cutivation, belonged to a class of
great landlords between the sovereign and the
rayuts, which intermediate Glass consisted of
zamindars, talukdars or similar personages ;
while others again strongly contended that,
. subject to a land-tax payable to the sovereign,
the property in the soil was vested in the
cultivator, sometimes in tqe form of village
communities holding corporately, at other
times individuals holding in severalty, or
jointly as members of an undivided family.
In 1793, (either ·upon the ground that the
soil was vested in the sovereign power, !l.Ild
that it was expedient that, by that power, a
landed 11oristocraey should be created, or upon
the ground, that the land, subject to the revenue assessment i. e., the king's (or State's
share of the produce, ought to be publicly recognized as vested in the class
of zamindars. & e., as landlords) the
permanent settlement in Bengal, Bihar
and Orissa was made by the Government of
Lord Cornwallis, by recogniziiig the z&mindars, & c., as the proprietors of the soil, and
entitled to transfer it, and by fixing, once
for all, the land-tax payaqle by them to the
State at an immutable anrtual rate."
In 1796 the Government of Madras declared that
"it is the first feature in all the Governments of
India, that the Sovereign, whether he be a Mus11ulman or Hindoo is lord of the soil; and hence
it is that no alienation of lands from the property
of. the oircar, or rather no possession of land
whatever is valid without a written instrument
from the superior 1ord ; and this distinetion has
invariably followed the conquests of all nations
who have established themselves in India".
This statement was directly contrary to accepted
practice and the consciousness of the cultivator in
Madras. It is not therefore a matter for surprise
1901
Pwusl.otluJman
Namf:u-1£ri
••
Tiu Slate of Kir•la
A1yanzarJ.
J~l
p,,,usJi,,t,..,,,,,,,
..
Nomhudiri
Tiu Slau of Kvala
A.vangtn J.
800 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1962] SUPP.
tha.t in answer to this declara.tion of the Government, the Board of Revenue at once pointed out
tha.t "there were heredita.ry cultivators on lands
with the right of making any disposition of them
by sale, mortgage or otherwise as long as they pa.id
the Government revenue, a.nd that they only could
not make a.ny alienation of them to the exclusion of
tho royal share of the revenue."
Acting on the view that the Crown was tho proprietor of the soil, tho Birtish Government purported to confer proprietary rights in the soil on the
zamindars unrler the Permanent Settlement the preamble to whir.h referred to the reservation by the ru).
ing power of the "implied right and actua.I exP-rcise
of the proprietary right to possession of all la.nds
whatever'' and by s. 2 purported to vest in the
zamindars the proprietary right to the soil. It
was however found that this interfered with the
established rights of cultivators and Madras Regulation IV of 1822 was passed to declare that the
provisions of Regulation XXV of I 802 were not
intended to affect the actual ryots in cultivation
of lands. It might be added that the Privy Council
ruled in CoU~aor of Trichinapally v. Lekkamoni (')
that the theory underlying these words in the
Regulation were not susta.inab\e and that. there
were proprieta.ry rights in la.nd not tra.cea.b\e to or
derived from the Rovereign.
The introduction of the Perma.nent Settlement with the creation of a class of za.mindars a.s
in Bengal was not cosider <l to be a beneficial system by the Government of Madrs and so after the
grant of some sanads under MadrBB Regulation
XXV of 180~-mostly in recognition of ancient
titles-the creation of new pP.rmanently settled
estates was stopped and in its pli:r.'l, the system of
revenue administration associated with the name
of Sir Thomas Munro known as the ryotwa.ri syetem
was a.doptccl. According to Munro · there was
(I} L.R.ll.A.282
-
(1) S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
801
no need for the interposition of an intermediary between the State and the actual cultivator, particularly
as it was clear that the system meant that the zamindars enjoyed what the cultivator parted with to the
State ; in other words, the difference between the
rent paid by the actual cultivator, viz., the melwaram and the peishcush or the Jama fixed by the
zamindar or proprietor was so much profit for the
middleman and therefore pro tanto a diminution of
the amount which would have accrued to the State.
Besides, l\iunro considered that on economic grounds
and with a view to increase agricultural production
it was necessary for the State being in touch with
the actual cultivatol'. For these reasons he formulated the "ryotwari system" and introduced it in
several areas of the Madras Presidency and
Coimbatore district adjoining th'l State of Cochin
being almost the first among the districts where the
system was introduced. The basic and essential
feature of the system was that the fixation of the
r\)venue assessment payable by the cultivator had
to be proceeded by a survey of the a land which
included the ascertainment of the productivity
of the soil and that the asseBBment should he based
on what was known as 'tharam' (or quality) classification. The assessment thus began to .be based on
scientific data and principles-and was so designed
as to leave a sufficient margin to the cultivator to
induce him to remain on the land and be assured
of a good share in increased production resulting
from the employment of his labour and capital.
The terms on which the ryot held the land was
contained in the patta issued to him on behalf of
the Government and this specified the extent of land
held by him as well as the amount of the assessment and the time when the instalments had to be
paid. This was not however considered to be any
document of title, because the ryot had the
property in him and his interest was a
proprietary interest in the soil and so capable
IHI
PU1wJ,.1/ianwr
Nambudiri
v.
The State of Ker•l•
AJy..,ar J.
802 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1962) SUPP.
IHI
of being alienated and of being transmitted to
his heirs. This however was not anything new and
it was not a.s if the intercet of the cultivator was
Tiii Sl4t1•••f lrtr•I o not alienable before the ryotwari system was introJuccd. Before that date however, the assessment
A_,,,,,.,., J.
of the land was both heavy in most parts and unequal- not being based on the productive capacity
of the soil, as to leave little or no margin to the
cultivator. Besides the predations of revenue and
the severity of the tax was dependent on the
exigencies and necessities, if not the whims of the
ruler and in such a situation, even though technically cultivated land was capable of alienation there
boing no ban on alienation, still having regard to
the meagre margin left to the owner and tho fear
of incn•sed taxttion based on no principle, no purchaser could be found; though owing to t.he imposibility of finding a more profitable use for manual
labour a.pa.rt from the sentimental attachment to
land, tho actual cultivator clung to his holding. But
when with the auvent of a system of assessment
baserl on fixed and scientific principles whioh left a
sufficient margin for the cultivator, and there was no
fear of sudden increases of assessment, land became
a. marketable commodity investment in which was
rendered worthwhile.
Notwithstanding that in Ma.la.bar absolute
owncrBhip of the soil by the Jenmi where the land
was the property of individuals and of the State
where it was the owner, was a. characteristic of the
landholding, still from a fairly early date after the
British conquest of the neighbouring areas the
concept of the cultivator with whom the State
entered into direct relations being conceded the
proprietorship of the soil slowly permeated.
P11n11/aatluzmon
Nambu4iri
In this connection I might usefolly refer to a
proclamation of the ruler of Trava.ncore of
1865 ( 1040 M. E.) regarding Sarkar-pa.ttom la.nds,
with the observation that subject to variations
-
(i) S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
803
...' usages, the system of land
dependent on local
tenure and the concepts a.s regards the rights of
property in land were substantially similar in
Travancore and Cochin. Sarkar-pattom lands were
what might be termed 'Crown lands' of which the
ruler was deemed to be the Jenmi or the landlord.
Previous to the proclamation the lands were legally
capable of being resumed by the ruler, though this
was seldom done and the cultivators were not
legally entitled to transfer their rights and where
this was done the Government had the right to
ignore the transaction. The fact that the cultivator
was conceived of as having no proprietary interest
on the land also bore adversely on the State since
the State was deprived of the means of realising
any arrears of revenue by bringing the holding
to sale. It was to remedy this situation that the
proclamation was issued and the preamble and its
terms carry the impress of the impact of the
ryotwari system of Madras. The proclamation reads:
"Whereas we earnestly desire that the
possession of landed as well as other property
in Our T~rritory should be as secure as possible; and whereas We are of opinion that,
with this view Sirkar Pattdm lands can be
placed on a much better footing than at present so as to enhance their value; we are pleased to notify to our Ryotslst. That the Sirkar hereby and for ever
surrenders, for the benefit of the people, all
optional power over the following classes of
lands, whether wet, garden or dry, and
whether included in the Ayacut accounts or
registered since :
Ven Pattom,
Vettolivoo Pattom,
Mara.ya Pattom,
Olavoo Pattom,
Mara Pattom,
rHJ
Puruiii.i,__.
NambUiri. . '
v.
TA, Stall of/(110lo
AJJatl,.,J.
8()4
1111
~
Y.m.iirl
••
Tiii St"1• of Irralo
~J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1962] 8l'PP.
and all such Durkast Pattom, the tax of which
is understood to bo fixed till the next Survey
and assessmPnt.
2ndly. That. the Ryots holding these
lands may regard them full.v as private., heritable, saleable, and otherwise trunsfcrable,
property.
3rdly. Accordingly, the sales, mortgages,
k o., of these lands will hcncl'forward bo valid!
may be effected on stamped c,1djans, and wil
be duly registered. The lamh may bo sold for
a1Tears of tax, in exoeution of decrees of
Courts and suC'h other legitimate purposes,
and may also be accepted as security by the
Sirkar as well as by private individuals.
4thly. That the holders of the fonds in
question may rest assured that they miiy
enjoy them undisturbed so long as the appoin ·
ted BBSessment is paid.
5thly. That the said holders are henceforth at full liberty to lay out labour and
capital on their lands of the aforl'said descrip·
tion to any extent they please, being sure of
continued and secure possession ................. .
.................."
The language employed in the proclamation
is or significance. It speaks of the relinquishment
or withdrawal of the right or the State and not or
the conferment of a right on the ryot so as to render
the ryot a grantee from the State, just in line with
the Hindu Law theory of the proprietorship of the
soil vesting in the occupant-cultivator.
With this background, I sh111l proceed to con·
sider the nature or the tenures-Pandaravaka and
Puravaka-with whioh this petition is coucerned.
The two tenures are quite different in their origin '
and essential characteristics and so have to be
separately dealt with. Pandaravaka lands are those
in which the State held proprietary rights-the
(1) S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
8011
name being derived from Bandara or the treasury,
while in regard to the Puravaka, they were lands in
which the proprietorship vested in the Jenmi, but
which were under the cultivation of tenants on
whom the St..te imposed land revenue. Putting
aside for the moment the Puravaka lands, the
Pandaravaka lands might be al}proximated to the
Crown lands dealt with by tne Travancore Proclamation of 1865 already referred to. The terms
on which the tenants held the right of the Crown
were almost the same as in the other case. The
evils which the system gave rise to, the economic
insecurity of the tenant and the consequent lack
of incentive on his part to put his best exertion on
. the land and tlie resultant loss to the State in the
shape of revenue as well as the rise of a contented
peasantry were exactly parallel to the situation
which faced the ruler of Travancore leading to the
proclamation of 186.5. It was in these circumstances
that the ruler of Cochin issued a proclamation on
March 10, 1905, which defined with precision the
rights of the State and of the cultivator in regard
to these lands and it is the submission of the learned
Attorney-General that the effect of this proclamation is to render ths Pandaravaka and Purava.ka
lands held by the petitioner "estates" within the
meaning of Art. 31A(2) of the Constitution as it
now stands. It is therefore necessary to set out in
some detail the terms of this proclamation.
The preamble to the proclamation recites the
fact that the State demand had not been fixed
either with reference to the actual measurements
of the land or on any fi.'!:ed or uniform principles
and that a revision of tho State demand based
upon
a
correct
measurement
of lands
and definite principles, fair alike to the
State
and "our"
agricultural
population,
is desirable in the interest of a sound
revenue adqiinistration. It then proceeds to Btl\oW
-....
~J.
806 SUPREME OOURT REPORTS [1962] SUPP.
llll
""'"'"'••
NatkJiri
TA1 ~lol10j K,,alo
,j.,...,.,J.
that a survey which included the demarcation, map·
ping and the preparation of an accurate record of
titles in respect of all descriptions of properties was
to be carried out and that a Settlement or revision of
the State demand would be eonducted in accordance
with the principles laid down by the proclamation.
In passing it may OO'mentioned that this is reminis·
cent of the despatches of Thomas Munro in which
he expatiates upon the need of a proper survey and
a oorrect definition of the principles upon which land
revenue shall be asseBSed and that the quantum of
revenue should be such as while providing for a
fair share to the State, should leave enough for '
the cultivator to live upon and offer an induce·
ment to him to increase the output of his fields in
which event the surplus available to him would be
more. In particular I might refer to a passage in
a clespatch which is extracted by Westropp, C.J.,
in Vykunla Bapuji v. Gooemment of Bombay(')
reading:
"When the land revenue is fixed and
light, the farmer sees that he will reap the
reward of his own industry : the cheerful prospect
of improving his situation animates his labours, and
enables him to replaoe in a short time the losses
he may sustain from adverse seasons, the devasta·
tions of war, and other accidents."
Paragraph 5 of the proclamation directs that
lands, whether wet or dry, were to be classified with
reference to the nature of their soils in accordance
with the table of claBSification prescribed in the
Madras Settlement Manual which is sufficiently
indicative of the close correspondence between the
ryotwari system and mode of fixation of land
revenue and the principles underlying it as prevailed
in the neighbouring Presidency of Madras. Paragraph 6 reads :
"Under the present land revenue system
of the State, lands are held under two main
(I) 12 Bom. H.C.R. Appeadi
\.I at p. 121.
(1) S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
807
tenures, viz., Pandaravaka and Puravaka ...
"
At this stage it is necessary only to add that the
proclamation does not deal with the rights as between the State and Jenmis, i.e., that class of land
owners who were entitled to a freehold interest in
the land as explained earlier. I shall deal later
with special legislation with reference to J enmis in
the other princely State which is a constituent of
present State of Kerala in its proper place. Para·
graph 6 proceeds to enumerate the six subsidiary
classifications of the Pandaravaka tenure and
enumerates the Verumpattom type as the first among
them and this type is taken as the standard for
fixing the land revenue of the other categories
which, it might be mentioned, are favourable
tenants, the State demand being reduced. To
these others which partake of the nature of grants
of land revenue very different considerations would
apply. The lands of the petitioner held on
Pandaravaka tenure, it should be added fall within
the sub-category of Verumpattom lands. The
proclamation then proceeds to state :
"The revenue paid to the State varies
according to the nature of the tenure, i. e.,
the six sub-classes. It is however only the
Pandaravak& Verumpattom lands which pay
the full pattom or Bhare due to the State.
We have accordingly decided that the Pandaravaka Verumpattom shall be deemed as the
normal tenure for settling the full State demand
and that the other tenures shall be treated
as favourable tenures and settled on the lines
hereinafter indicated ............... "
Paragraph 7, after reciting that the rates of assessment on Pandaravaka Verumpattom wet lands
vary from place to place, points out that such disparity is indicative of unequal incidence and stating
that it was essential that the State demand should
Ilel
Puru.rlwt1i4f11411
Nambudiri
Y,
TM Stall of !(,,ala
Ayyangar J,
808 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1962) SUPP.
1961
Pu.usllot"""""'
Nomlnldiri
••
7L /JUie •I K.'1rata
A.van:cr J.
bear a fixed proportion to the produce a land is
capable of yielding announces the decision that the
same shall Im half the net produce. Tho deductions
to be made for ascertaining the net pro<luce are in di·
ca.tcd. The next claus" whieh is of relevance and
importance in the present oontext is cl. 13 which
runs:
"13. At present holders of Pandaravaka
Vorumpattom lands do not possess any
property in th~ soil. As we are convinced that
proprietorship in soil will induce a cultivatvr
to improve his land and thereby add to the
agricultural prosperity of the co1mtry, we
hereby declare that our Verumpattom holders
of Janela shall, after the now Settlement has
been introduced, acquire full rights to the soil
of tho lande they hold and that their rights
shall remain undisturbed so long as t.hey
regularly pay the State revenue, provided that
the rights to metals and minerals, possessed by
the State in all lands under whatever tenures
they arc held, are reserved to the State."
Paragraph 14 onwards deal with favourable
tenures and of theso we are ooncerned only with
Puravaka lands and it is pointed out in Paragraph
15 that in the caso of Puravaka lands the J enmi is
reoognised a6 owning tho proprietorship in the land
and is consequently entitled to share the produce
with the cultivator and the Sirkar, and proceeds to
define the State demand in such lands. There arc
other clauses dealing with other incidents in regard
to these tenures and in regard to other interests in
the land such as house-sites etc. but we are not
concerned with them. The proclamation also
makes provision for the grant of rough or draft
patt&S to cultivators and of fair pattas dot:iiling the
assessment payable on such lands-provisions
exaotly parallel to the practice and proeti·
durc prevailing in the adjoining area of
the Madras Presiden<w. Besides, it also makes
-
{I) C.S.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
809
provision against any revision of the assessment
once fixed before the expiry of 30 years, also in
line with the then practice in Madras. I have made
this analysis of the provisions of the proclamation
for the purpose of emphasizing that what the
proclamation intended to achieve was the introduction of ryotwari system of &ettlement in the place
of exactions by the State based on no principles
and unrelated to the proiluctivity of the soil and
haying an unequal incidence for different areas and
different lands.
The holder of Pandaravaka
Verumpattom patta was therefore nothing more or
nothing less than the holder of a ryotwari patta in
the adjoining Madras State. The only point of
difference that could be suggested is this. Under
the ryotwari system, the proprietorship of the ryot
to the soil is not in theory derived from the State,
whereas under the proclamation of 1905, it appears
to rest on a grant. In my opinion this makes no
difference, because the essential features of the
system are the same as those of ryotwari-( 1) a
direct relationship between the State and the cultivator, and with the absenoe of any intermediary to
intercept the raja bhagam or land revenue, (2) there
is no grant or alienation of the States' right to
revenue in favour of the grantee.
The Puravaka tenure was wholly different.
They were lands held by Jenmis. As I shall show
later, Jenmam lands were not exempt from the
payment of land revenue but the Puravaka tenant
had the benefit of a favourable assessment. In other
words, in respect of those lands the produce of the
land was the subject of sharing as between the
actual cultivator, the Jenmi and the State, though
th ii J enmi had a freehold interest in the land
it.tielf.
The question for consideration now is whether
the lands held under a patta. by a Pandarava\ra
Verumpattom and of Jenmam lands b! a Puraval!:11-
1961
Purwltolhaman
Namlnuliti
v.
The State of Kefala
Ayy""lfar .J.
810 SUPREME OOURT REPORTS [1962] SUPP.
IHI
~
N.,.b.Wi
Y.
TM SIMI oj 1;,,.i
~..,.,J.
tenant are "estates" within the meaning of Art.
31 A (:!}.
Before examining the terms of Art. 31 A (2)
as they now stand, it is necessary to refer to the
antecedent history which led to the First and the
Fourth Constitutional Amendment.a. Preliminary
to this it might not be out of place to briefly
explain the circumstances which neceSBitated the
First amendment as pointing to the mischief which
that amendment was designed to remedy. Very
soon after independence several States initiated
land reforms whose object was the elimination of
the intermediaries. The Madras Legislature enacted
the Madras Abolition of Estates and Conversion
into Ryotwari Act, 1948, by which intermediaries
in the ehape of zemindars, Palayagars, J agirdars,
Inemdars and other such proprietors were eliminated and persons in actual cultivation of the lands
under the zemindars were brought into direct
relationship with the government by being granted
ryotwari pattas in respect of their former holdings.
There 'was similar legislation in Bihar-Bihar Act l
of 1950, as also in some of the other States of the
Indian Union. The validity of the several pieces
of legislation was challenged in the respective High
Courts principally on the ground that the deprivation of the right.a of the zamindars etc. effected by
these enactment.a and the principles upon which
the compensation payable for the deprivation
was determined violated Arts. 14, 19 and 31 of the
Constitution. The firat case in which a decision
was rendered by a High Court in respect of the
contentions urg~d was by the Patnl\ High Court in
Kame8hwar Singh v. St,ate of Bihar (') in which the
petition succeeded and Biha.r Abolition of Estates
Act 1 of 1950 was declared unconstitutional. An
appeal we.e preferred by the State against the
judgment to this Court and it was during
(ll A,l.R. 1951 PatDa 91,
-
'
{l) S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
811
the pendency of this appeal and with a view to
validat.e the legislation which had been enacted in
the several States and which was the subject of
attack in several Courts, including this Court, that
First Constitutional Amendment by which Art. 31A
was introduced into the Constitution, was enacted.
The Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951,
received the assent of the President on June 18,
1951, but Art. 31A which was introduced bys. 4 of
this Aot was expressly made retrospective from the
commencement of the Constitution. As then enacted
Art. 3IA ran:
"31A. Saving of laws providing for
acquisition of estates: etc.-( 1) Notwithstanding
anything in the foregoing provisions of this
Part, no law providing for the acquisition by
the State of any estate or of any rights therein
or for the extinguishment or modification
of any suoh rights shall be deemed to be void
on the ground that it is inconsistent with, or
takes away or a.bridges any of the rights
conferred by, any provisions of this Pa.rt :
Provided that where such law is a law made
by the Legislature of a State, the provisions of
this article shall not apply thereto unless such
law, h1'ving been reser'17"ed for the considerl\tion of the President, has received his assent.
(2) In this article, (a) the expression 'estate' shall in relation
to any local area, have the same meaning as
that expression or its local equivalent bas
in the existing law relating to land tenures in
force in that area, and shall also include any
jagir, inam or muafi or other similar grant ;
(b) the expression 'rights' in relation to
an estate shall include any rights vesting in a
proprietor, sub-proprietor, under-proprietor
tenure-holder or other intermediary and any
rights or privileges in respect of 1-nd
j.'eVenue.~'
IllI
Prmuho,,,.._
Nam/Juiliri
••
TA. Stall of K1rola
A»""l"' J,
812 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1962) SUPP.
JllU
hnuh4'/wnan
Nambwliri
'·
'1711 814'1 of Irml•
A-"""'"' J,
In addition t.he First Constitution Amendment Act
also enacted by its s. 5 a further provision -Art.
31B expre,,Jy validating the several enactments
of tho various States which were then under
challeng1> aml which were all set out in Sch. 9 of the
Cc•nstitution. J<'rom this collocation it would be
seen that whereas Art. 3IB immunised from attack
all the pieces of legislation which had been enacted
by June 1951, Art. 3IA was intended to render the
same typrs of l~gislation enacted in future immune
from attack, provided that the enactments were re·
S'.lrved for the Presi<lcnt.'s assent and were assented
to by him. It is with this hack ground that one hll<l
to approach the construction o(Art. 3IA.
Clause (I) of Art. 31 A docs not present any
difficulty in construction with reference to the point
now under discussion, because its terms are clear
and apply to laws providing for "tht• acquisition by
the State of any estate or rights therein" or "the
cxtinguishmcnt or modification of any such rights".
The cruci.il words h1>rc are that tho rights which
arc acquired, extinguisher! or modified arc rights in
or in respect of an "estate". If there had been no
definition of the expression 'estate', one might have
had to look to the gramm:itical of literal meaning
of the wrird, ;,nd the word might conceivably be
understood as including "' purson 's interest in
landt•d pro1wrty whatover ma} be tho nature or
extent of the interest, though the width of this
meaning might be co11trolled by the history of the
provision, the antecedent. state of circumstances
and the mischid whidi it was de~igned to overcome.
But the c11actmcnt has not left this matter for
inve8tigatioH in that manner. Sub-clause (2)(a)
contains tho definition of expression 'cstato' and
sub-cl. (b) of "righti< in relation to an estate". It
is obvious that the word 'estate' in sub-els. (a) and
(b) mean the same am! is employed to cfosignate
identical types of la.nd holcling. If the expression
"right.a in relation to an estate" in sui;>.ol. (b)
(1) S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
813
indicates that it is the "estate" or the right of the
intermediary that is comprehended by the use of
the words "proprietor, sub-proprietor, under-propriltor, tenure-holder or other intermediary", clearly the
expression 'estate' in sub-cl.(a) must be understood
as referring to such types of landholder. It is also
worth noting that the words "shall also include any
jagir, inam or muafi or other similar grant'' in subcl. (a) have their parallel in sub-cl. (b) by the words
"any rights or privileges in respect of land
revenue." The net result therefore was that the
term 'estate' signified the land held by an intermediary who stood between the State and the actual
tiller of the soil, and also the interests of those in
whose favour there had been alienation of the right
to revenue, i. e., landli held on revenue free or on
favourable tenures. The two sub.clauses may now
be futher examined to determine their content and
significance. Taking first sub-cl. (a) it is necessary
to advert to two matters : (I) the reference to the
"local equivalent" of the term 'estate' in the law
existing in any local area, and (2) the denotation of
the words 'the existing law in relatwn to land tenures
in force in that area'. In regard to the 'local equivalent' of the term 'estate' there is one observation
I desire to make. These words were not in the Bill as
originally presented to Parljament and were brought
in as a result of the suggestion of the J<;>i.nt Select
Committee to which the Bill was referred. In their
report the Select Committee stated :
"We have amended the definition of an
'estate' to cover cases where the existing Jaw
relating to land-tenure is in a regional language
for example in Hindi or Urdu and uses the
local equivalent of 'estate'."
I am far from saying that if the meaning of the
expression were clear the purpose for which the
words were used would determine their construction
J90l
Punuhot"Namiudiri
••
TM Stah of K#!Glo
A.JYDnl01'J.
_..
814 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [19(.2] SUPP.
11111
""""""""""""
••
N lllftJudiri
Tlie ~ of Ke1a(a
A»"1'lt11 J.
but I a.m drawing attention to this passage from
the report of the Joint Select Committee for
pointing out that by the use of the expression 'local
equivall'nt' the central concept f,f an 'estate', a.s
would be clear from the terms of sub-cl. (b), which
in eft'ect is a further definition of the term 'estate'
was not intended to be departed from.
Next a.s to the meaning of "in the existing
law in relation to land-tenures". These words raise
for consideration the question as to what constitutes
"a. land-tenure". If one had to go merely by tho
grammatical meaning merely of 'tenure' derived
from the Latin 'tenere' to hold, any kind of right
or title by which property is held would be indudrd,
the only requirement would be that the property
should be held of another. In that wide Bense it
wou Id include the case of land hdd under an
ordinary tenancy under a. landlord under the
Transfer of Property Act. Obviously that is not
the sense in which the word is employed in the
clause. It has therefore to be understood as
comprehending that typo of "holding" where the
holder is a.n intermediary between the Sta.to and
the tiller, or is otherwise the grantee of land revenue
holding the land under a favourable tenure. If this
is the essential feature of the concept of an 'estate'
under cl. (2), the expreBSion 'land-tenure' must in
the context mean the 'tenure' under which a.n
'estat~' as defined is held. To read it otherwise and
understand 'land-tenure' as designating any system
of landholding, whether or not such system
conforms to the central and essential concept
of estate, would not be correct. Such a.n
interpretation would result in anomaly that in
an existing law in force in a. local area. which
uses the word 'estate' and includes within that
definition particular tenures, only they and none
else a.re included, but if such law does not refer to
a. tenure as a.n 'estate' then it comprehends any
(I} S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPOR.TS
sis
11/tl
holding of land under Government whatever be
hnshotli....,,
the nature of the tenure. That would constitute a
Nambudiri
radical departure from the purpose of the First
••
Amendment and a construction which is not Th< Stllk of Kerala
compelled by the wor<ls, but on the other hand conA:gongarJ.
tradicted by the context and setting in which they
occur.
This leads me to the case where an "existing law
in relation to land-tenures" uses the term 'estate' and
defines it in a particular manner and that definition includes not merely the proprietary rights of
intermediaries or others holding land on favourable
tenures as described in sub-cl. (b) but also others who
hold properties in their own right and describes the
land-holding of these others also as 'estates'. The
question would then arise whether literal effect bas
or has not to be given to the words 'defined as
an estate under the law relating to land-tenures'
occurring in sub-cl. (a). One possible view to take
would be that having regard to the central concept
of an 'estate' as signifying the' rights in land of
an intermediary etc., those whose rights in land did
not involve any assignment of the Raja bh>1gam
but were in direct relationship with the State and
subject to the payment of the foll assessment of the
revenue lawfully imposed upon it, could not be
termed to have an interest in an 'estate', nor the
land held by them to fall within the concept of an
'estate' as comprehended in sub-ol. (a).
The other view would be that if the operative
terms of Art. 31A and in particular the definition
of "an estate" contained in cl. (2)(a) unambiguously
covered oases of non intermediaries also, effect
would have to be given to the terms used for it
is a cardinal rule of interpretation that the operative words of an enactment, and in this must be
included the terms of the Constitution, cannot be
controlled by reference to the object for which the
provision was introduced where the words are
unambiguous. If a law in force in any local area
•
816 SUPREME COURT REF01 TS [1£62) srPP.
at the commencement of the Constitution whioh
relation to land-tenures" containerl
Putw""'hama
Nam&utliri
the definition of an 'estate' thon every 8pecies of
7 ltt 8tai1•• of Kmld . land-holding which fell \dthin the definition and
Wal! comprehended by such law relating to landAXJO!lla J.
tenure would, for the purpose of the Con8titution
be comprehended within tho ambit of an 'estate'
and it might be no answer in regard to any particular species of land-tenure that its holder was
not an intermediary. I shall havn ocr,asion tp
refer to the decisionH which turn on this aspect of
the matter a little later. Apart from tho exceptional coses just now mentioned where one is faced
with a definition of' an estate' in an existing law,
I consider that thfl First Amendment to the Constitution did not bring within the definition of 'an
estate' the holdings of persons other than intermediaries or those who held land under grants
on favourable tenures from Government-Jagirdar,
Inamda.r, Mua.fidar, etc. As pointed out by Venka.tarama. Ayyar, J., speaking for this Court in 1'hal.-ur
Amar Si71{Jliji v. State of Rajasthan (') :
"The object of Art. 31A was to save
legislation which was directed to tho abolition of intermediaries so as to establish direct
relationship between the State and the tillers
of the soil, ............ "
I shall now turn to sub-cl. (b) and to the terminology employed in it to define 'rights in relation to a.n estate' and examine how far this definition affects the content of cl. (a) as above explained. In the first place a.s already noticed, the use
of the word 'estate in the clause serves to bring
into it the concept of a.n 'estate' a.s defined in cl. (a)
pointing to the inter-dependence of the two clauses
necessitating their having to be read together. The
seoond point requiring atlvertance is as rcg:uds the
definition purporting to be inclusive and not exhaustive. The question a.rising therefrom may be
1901
Wll8 "a law in
(I) [19'5] 2 S. C.R. 303, 332-333.
,Y
(I) S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
81'7
posed thus : Does the definition include any other
type of interest besides those enumerated, particularly of a different nature or characteristic which
could not be comprehended within the extension
brought in by the words 'or other intermediary'. I
am clearly of the opinion that it does not and that
the word 'includes' is here used in the- sense o!
•means and includes'. In this connection I would
UJlefully refer to the observations of Lord Watson
delivering the judgment o! the Privy Council in
Dilu·orth v. Commissioner for Land and lrworntr
t&x (') :
"The word 'include' ie very generally used
in interpretation clauses in order to enlarge
the mooning of words or phrases occurring in
the body of the statute; and when it is 10
used these words or phrases must be comstrued as comprehending not only such thing•
as they signify according to their natural
import, but also those things which the
interpretation clause declares that they shall
include. But the word 'include' is susceptible of another construction, which may become imperative, if the context of the Act
is sufficient to shew that it was not merely
employed for the purpose of adding to the
natural significance of the words or expressions defined. It may be equivalent to 'mean
and include', and in that case it may afford
an exhaustive explanation of the meaning
which for the purposes of the Act, must invariably be attached to these words or expressions."
If therefore the constitutional validity of a
legislation extin 11;uishing or modifying the rights
either of the Pandaravaka Verumpattomdars who
were in the position of a ryotwari pattadar ~r of the
Puravaka hli>lders who held under a Jenm1 of Jenmam land had to be tested with reference to
(.1) [189}] A. C. 99, 105.
IHI
Iturush1th•m en
N•mitdiri
Y,
-
Till Sl•te ef IC11.J•
Ayy•nt•r J,
818
JlllJJ
l\mirlt"'"""''"
N "'"iutlfri
••
n, Slal< •f K11ala
A»-101 J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1962] SUPP.
Art. 3IA as it stood when it was introdn<>ed by the
First Amendment, these interests under the proclamation of 1905 would not bo held to be an 'estate'
and therefore outside the scope of the protection
against tho guaranteed fundamental rights.
Before examining the effect of the change
introduced by the Fourth Amendment to Art. 3IA
it might be useful to detail the circumstances which
put these tenures outside Art. 31A under the First
Constitution Amendment. Taking the Puravaka
tenure first, it ought to be mentioned that as would
be seen from tho terms of the proclamation of
1905 extracted earlier, Puravaka lands were those
in tho ownership of the Jenmi but in respect of which
he was not directly in cultivation. The Jenmi
was considered an absolute proprietor not more~ of
lands which were cultivated but unlike the ryotwari pattadar also those which were not under his
cnltivatiol! such as waste lands, forests, etc., and he
did not hold land under the State. In other words,
hie proprietorship to or rights over the land or
which he claimed ownership was not traceable to
any title d~rivcd from the State. But notwithstanding this freehold right that he claimed and enjoyed
the State was entitled from the earliest times to
aeseBB his lands to land-revenue. Exemption from
taxation was not any essential condition of Jenmam tenure and the Jenmi waa under an obliga·
tion to pay what was termed 'Raja bhagam' which
was the equivalent of tho expression ')and-revenue'.
This incidence of Jenmam land did not therefore
detract from its character of its being the private
and absolute property of the Jenmi. There was
legislation in Tra van core as regards the liability
of the Jenmi to pay the land-tax or the Raja
bhagam except, of course, in those oases where anr
particular land was rendered tax-free a.a a mattey
of grace or concession by the ruler. The legislation
started with a royal proclamation 1869 (1042 M.E.)
dealing with the lands of Jenmis and their relation
(1) s.c.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
819
with their tenants. This proclamation was replaced by Regulation 5 of 1071 (July 3, 1896) which
continued in force with various amendments right
up to the date of the Act whose validity is now
impugned and is referred to in it. By these pieces
of legislation the rights of the Jenmi quoad his
tenants were regulated, the grounds upon which
eviction would take place were laid down and the
costomary rights enjoyed by either party were, so,
to speak, codified. I am pointing this out because
the existence of a law regulating the rights of property-owners and defining their rights or obligations
either quoad the Government in respect of landrevenue -or as regards persons holding land under
them did not by itself render such law one "relating to land-tenure" within the meaning of Art.
31A(2)( a). In order to be such a law it should
regulate the rights of persons holding under grants
from the government of the Raja bhagom. A Jaw
defining or regulating the levy of asssesment or
revenue on lands held not under such grants from
the State would not be such a law. It was for
this reason that the interest of Jenmis and the
lands owned in Jenmam right did not fall within
Art. 31A as it stood under the First Amendment to
the Constitution and which necessitated the Fourth
Amendment to which I shall refer later. The position of persons holding lands on Puravaka tenure
would not be different from that of the Jenmis.
As the Puravaka lands were held not under the State
or under a. grant from it but under the Jenmis,
though liable to pay Raja. bhaga.m, they would not
be 'estates'.
'
The case of the Pandaravaka Verumpattomdats
would be similar and the lands held by them would
also not fall within the category of 'estate.' This
would be so because they like ryotwa.ri pa.tta.da.rs
held the lands for cultivation directly from the
State, and were niether intermediaries nor persons
1901
Purwhothaman
Nambudiri
••
Tht State of Kera/ti
AJJangat J.
820 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1962] SUPP.
19dI
Purwhothamari
Nambutliri
v.
Tiu Btal1 of Jftrala
Ayyangar J.
who held their lands on a favourable tenure ~s
regards the payment of land revenue in
other words, they were not alienees of the
Raja bhagam to any extent, and were therefore· not intended to ho affected by the First
Amendment. For this purpose it would make
no difference whether the origin of the ryot's pro-.
prietary interest in the land be traceable to the
Hindu law concept of titlC' based on occupation
and cultivation or to tho relinquishment by the
State under the Travancore Proclamation of 1865
or even to the .confernie!).tr o-f 'propril•tary rights by
the· Cochin Proclamation of. 1!)0~- It is only necessary to add that, their being outside the ambit of
Art. 3~A(l!), and this would eqwdly llpply to the
interest of'the·Jenmi; was not 'due to their ·tenure
not being regulated 'by enacted. law, as distinct
from rogul'ation either by the common law or by
·departmental instructions in the shape of the
Standing Ordtirs of the B'oard of ·Revenue or otner
similar ho.dies.
The Jloint next to be .considered is ·regarding
the effect of the change brought about by the Fourth Amendment in l!l55 which on its terms was
also to hav'c retrospective effect from the commencement of the Constitution. Clause 3 of tlie
Ac~ which \>as substituted for, th'l origina~ cl. 1 of
Art. 31A, provideR for vari01rn t.ypcs of legislation
interfering w.ith prnperty right.~. bnt in h•spect of
the I!).att~r now in question the 'wottls in the original cJ. 1 reft"rring to "a law providing for tlio
acquisition by the s'tate -Q_f an estate or of any
rights therein or the extinguishment or morlifieation
of any suchJights" wQre left unt.onche<l. In .regard
to the definitioq,of an "est:i.t:i" contained in cl. 2
the only change effeote<l ,in sub,-.cl., (a) was the
addition >0£ the -words "in the ~tat.es of Madras and
Travancore & Cochin a_ny Janmam right" after the
WO!'d "gr.ant" jn'the pl11use as it stood.and in sub-cl.
( b) the addition of the words "ryot and under-ryot"
(1) S.O.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
821
after the word "tenure-holder"' in t,!10 original
clause. After tho amendment, the relevant words
in Art. 31A road as follows:
"( l) Notwithstanding anything contained
in article 13, no law providing for(a) the acquisition by the Stat;e of any
estate or of any rights therein or the extinguishment or modification of any such rights
............ shall be deemPd to be void on the
ground that it is inconsistent with, or takes
away or abridges any of the rights conferred
by article 14, artfolo 19 01· article 31:
Provided th[l,t where such law is a law
made by the Legislature of a State, the provisions of this article shall not apply thereto unless such law, having been reserved for the
consideration of the President, has received
his assent.
(2) In thia >trticle,-(a) tho expression 'estate' shall, in relation
to any local•uea, have the same meaning as
that erpression or it.s local equivalent has in
the existing law relating to land tenures in
force in that area, and shall also include ai.y
Jagir, inam or muafi or other similar graiit,
and in the States of Madras and Kerala, an:f•
Janman right;
(b) the expression 'rights' iu relation to
an estate, shall iuclude any rights vesting in a
proprietor, sub-proprietor, nuder-proprietor,
tenure-holder, raiyat, under·raiyat or other
int.ermediary and any rights or privileges in
respeet of land revenue."
It is not open to dispute that if the words of the
statute are clear their import or content cannot be
modified or varied either by way of extension or of-
1961
Pwushothaman
.Nambudiri
v.
The State qf Kera/a
Ayyangar J.
822 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1902) SUPP.
19'1
i>wwholh!Wlan
Narnburli1i
Y,
T~ State of A';·olu
A
ncm J.
diminution by reference to the presumed intention
gatherable from the statement of objects and reasons
to which I shall refer presently, for it is the enacted
words that constitute the record of the intention of
the legislature and where this is clear any extriDBic
aid is forbiddon. Now lPt us look at tho definition of
an "estnte'' in sub-cl.(a) where in express terms the
lands held by a Jcnmi a.re deemed to be a pa.rt of
an estate. The words that precede the newly intro·
<faced words still retain their original form, with the
result that they ·continue to connot the same idea
and their content remains unaltered. The result of
this would be that to the class of the lands of
proprietors who were intermediaries and of others
holding on favourable tenures which was designated as an "estat,c" under the First Constitutional
Amendment, Jenmi lands were by specific ad hoc
addition included. If therefore the holding of a
ryotwari proprietor was not eomprehcnded within
the definition of an estate, the same cannot be inclu·
ded by reason of Jenmi lands being brought in.
The argument that a raiyatwari holding has merely
by the inclusion of the Jenmi become an "estate"
would require the entire clause to be rewritten so as
to make it read as ombraoing all lands which are
subject to payment of land revenue to government.
I consider this contention so unreasonable and
unrelated to the langu'lge UBed in the clause as
not to deserve serious consideration.
Proceeding next to sub-cl. (b), I must point
out that it was on the introduction into it of the
words 'raiyat and under-raiyat' that almost the
entire argument on behalf of the respondent was
rested. lt is therefore necessary to scrutinize carefully the effect of these words. There is no doubt
that if the words 'raiya.t and under-raiyat' ha.d been
introduced in sub-cl. (b) as an independent ca.tegory
of persons whose interest.a were intended to be
covered by the definition, just as the lands held by
Jenmis were brought into sub-cl.(a) then the wor~
,__
•
(I) B.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
823
IHI
•
of the definition would have to be given full efi'ect
Purush.othaman
and the expression 'raiyat and under-raiyat' receive
NQm6udiri
the construction urged before us by the respondent.
••
But they are, however, not introduced as an inde- n, Stoi. •1 E,,.i.
.._,,,.Ill., J.
pendent category as has been done in the case of
the Jenm~ right, but are wedged in the midst of
the enumeration of the several types of tenures in
e~tates such as those of proprietor, sub-proprietor
under-proprietor and tenure-holder-persons derivlng their title to the interest held by them either
under grants by a sovereign or under a title derived
from grantees from government, the clause continuing to be wound up by a reference to "other interme·
diaries". As regards this a few observations m11y pertinently be made. The first is that even after the
Fourth Amendment, "the rights vesting in a proprietor" etc. still continue to be a definition of "rights
in relation to an eetate" and if the word •estate'
in cl. (b) has to be read in the light of the definition
of that word in cl. (a) no interest other than one in
the estate of an intermediary or of a grantee on a
favourable tenure and other than one in the estate
of a Jenmi would be covered by sub-cl.(b). (2) I
have already had occassion to point out that
raiyats in proprietary estates like those of zamindarli etc. did not claim title to hold their lands from
the proprietor but according to law, as understood
their rights even preceded that of the proprietor,
i.e., the rights vested in them even before their
proprietor. The interest of such raiyats cannot
therefore be comprehended within the expression
'rights in relation to an estate' which as ordinarily
understood would mean 'rights created in an estate
or held under the proprietor'. Undoubtedly, the
words 'raiyat and under-raiyat' introduced by the
Fourth Amendment would comprehend this class
of raiyats because they were raiyats in an estate as
defined in sub-cl.(a). I am pointing this out for the
purpose of showing that it is not as if the words
'rai;rat and under-raiyat' would be without anr
824 SUPREME COURT REl ORTS [1962] SUPP.
1961
Purwhotham.ui
,,V•miudiri
v.
1M StaU of Kua'.a
meaning if they were not takl'.n lo extend to the
interest uf every raiyatwari proprictl1r h;iving
direct relationship with the St:ttt•. fn this "nmoce.
tion the decision in this Court in The State of Bihor \-.
Rameshwar Pratap Namin Sim:;h (') is very
relevant. The point in controversy bcforn the Court
was this. Under the Bihar Land Reforms Act ( 1 of
l!J50), the ex-intermediaries were coufcrred a ryoti
interest in certain types of Jami previously held by
them as proprietors. As owners of these lands they
had been holding me las in somo places on these lands
aud were deriving con~idcrable income therefr<>m.
By the Hihar L1.nd Hoforms Amendment Act of
1!15!!, their right to hold melas was taken away and
it was the validity of this enactment that was
challenged in the case. It was urged on their behalf
that when the land-holders were converted into
raiy1its, they were entitled to hold melas as an
incident of their rights as raiyats and that this
could not be adversely affected by State legislation
without the same standing the test of scrutiny
under Art". I \J, 31 etc. of tho Constitut.ion. The
State uf Bihar which was the rcspon<knt in the
Writ Petition sought the protection of Art. 31A of
the Constitution as amended by the Fourth Amendment. Dealing with the meaning of the words the
'raiyat and unucr-rniyat' in Art. 3IA(2Xb) this Court
s:i.id:
"lt iB reasonable to think that the word
'raiyat' was used in its ordinary well-accepted
Bense, of the pcr8on who holds the !ttnd under
the proprietor or a tenure·holder for the
purpose of cultivation, and the word 'underraiyat' used in the equally well-acocpted
and oridinary sense of a person who holds
land under a niyat for the purpose of cultivation".
and speaking of tho purpose of the Fourth Amendment it was observed :
(ll [1962] 2 S.C.R. 382.
•
-
(1) S.C.R. SUPREME COL1Rl' REPORTS
825
"At that time laws had already been
Purush1thaman
passed in most of the States for the acquisi.Nambutliri
tion of the rights of intermediaries in the
v.
estates; rights of raiyats or under raiyats who Thi Stall of Kerala
might answer the description 'intermediary'
AJ.7cnz•r J.
were also within the definition because of the
use of the word 'or other intermediary'. The
only reason for specifically including the rights
of 'raiyats' and 'under-raiyats' in the definition
could therefore be to extend the protection of
Art. 31A to laws providing for acquisition by
the State Governments ofrights of these 'raiyats'
or 'under-raiyats'. In the circumstances and
in the particular setting in which ,the words
'raiyat' or 'under raiyat' were introduced into
the definition, it must be held that the words 'or
other intermediary'ooeurring at the end, do not;
qualify or colour the meaning to be attacl:led
to the tenures newly added".
In other words, the decision was that the object
achieved by the Fourth Amendment by the introduction of these two words in sub-cl. (b) was to
ropu in the interests of 'raiyats' and 'under raiyats'
in 'estates'; notwithstanding that
the ryot
might not derive his interest ,in his holding from
the proprietor. The lands held by a ryotwari proprieter other than those in 'estates' would not be an
'estate' within sub-cl. (a} nor the interest of such
ryot in his holding an 'interest in an estate' within
sub-cl. (b) having regard to the collocation of the
words which I have attempted to explain earlier.
In support of the construction that the holdings of ryots were comprehended within the definition of 'estates' in Art. 31A(2), to submissions were
made. The first was based on the object sought
to be achieved by the Fourth Constitutional
Amendment Act as set out in the statement of
objects and reasons of the Bill. The pa81!&ge relied
on rttads:
826 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1962) SUPP.
Punu/uJ//taman
Nombruii<i
v.
7:\, Stat1 of K1rola
Anangar J.
"While tho abolition of zamindaris and
the numerous intermediaries between tho
State and tho tiller of the soil has been
achieved for the most part our noxt objectives in land reform are the fixing of limits
to the extent of agricultural lands that could
be held or kept by any person, the disposal
of any land held in excess of the prescribed
maximum and tho further modification of the
rights of landowners' tenants and agricultural
holders".
I am unable to accept the argument that this
passage can be of any assistance in tho construction of cl. (a) or (b) of Art. 3IA (2). As already
pointed out, any extrinsic aid to construction can
sought only when the words of the statute reasonably and properly interpreted are of ambiguous
import, and the construction of tho clnuses now under consideration leads to no ambiguity. In the circumstances, to accept the construction contended for
by respondent would be not to interpret the enacted
words but to rewrite the clauses altogether. Besides,
Art. 31A makes provision for special cases where on
account of overwhelming social needs, the protection normally afforded to the citizen by the guarantee of fundamental rights is withdrawn. It would,
I consider, be a proper rule of construction to
interpret the terms of such a provision with strictness which would serve to preserve the area of
the guaranteed freedoms from encroachment except
as specially provided. In other words, if the
construction of Art. 31 A were ambiguous, the
ambiguity should be resolved in favour of the
citizen, so as to preserve to him the guarantee of
the fundamental rights guaranteed by Arts. 14,
19 and 31 except where the same has been denied to
him by the clear words of the Constitution.
Secondly reliance was placed on three
'
(1) S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
827
decisions of this Court: Shri Ram Ram Narayan
Medhi v. The Stn,te of Bor11bay (1), Atnra Ram v. The
Stn,te of PunJab (2 ) and Yavatamal v. Stn,te of Bombay ('). In the two reported decisions, no doubt
this Court held that interests of persons simila,r to
those of raiyatwari proprietors were comprehended
within the definition of an 'estate' within sub-cl.
(a) but the reasoning upon which this was rested is
wholly inapplicable for resolving the controversy
now before us. In the first case Sri Rani Narain
Medhi v. The Stn,te of Bombay (1}, - the Bombay
Land Revenue Code 1879 contained a definition of
an 'estate' which included not merely the estates
of intermediaries such as zamin<laro, taluqdars and
other proprietors but also an occupant, i.e., a
person who held directly under the government
and whose property was assessed to land revenue
in full. The question however was whether the
provision in Art. 31 A (2) (a) that the expression
'estates' "shall have the same meaning as that
expression has in the existing law relating to landtenures inforce in the area" could be read as permitting the exclusion from the definition of interest.a
which were defined in such a law as 'estates' on the
ground that such interests were not those of a.n
intermediary. This Court held that full effect had
to be given to these words and that the definition
of an 'estate' in a pre-Constitution law relating to
land-tenures must determine the content of that
expression. It would be seen that the result would
have been the same whether the case arose before
or after the Fourth Amendment. The !lecision in
Atma Ram v. The 'State of Punjab (•)proceeds
on an identical basis and turned on the definition
of an 'estate' in the Punjab Revenue Act 17of1887.
In this, as in the earlier case in relation to the
Bombay Land Revenue Code, there could be no
dispute that the enactment was a law in relation
to land-tenure. The only question therefore wits
(I) [1959] Supp. 1 S. C.R. 489.
(2) [1959) Suw. 1 s. c. R. 748,
!3) [1962) 1 S.C.R. 733.
1961
..
Purus/iQl/uJm4n
Nambudiri
Tiu Stah of Keralti
Ay; a"lar J.
828 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1962] SUPP.
Purusltfltltorrwa
l'fambud,,1
v.
Tiil 5, 'It of Kmrla
Ayy.tnz.,- J.
whether full effect could or ought to be given to the
words of the definition, and this was answered in
the affirmative. In my opinion, the learned Attor·
ney-General cannot derive any assistance from
either of these decisions. In the unreported decision in J'avatmal v. The St11te of Bombay (') the
challenge was to the validity of a Bombay enact·
ment of 1958 whieh extended the.Bombay Tenancy &
Agricultural Lands Act 1956 to the Vidarbha region,
an enactment whose constitutional validity had been
upheld by this Court in Medhi's case. The argument
before the Court was that the lands of the poti·
tioners were not an 'estate' and this, for the most
pa.rt, was sought to be supported by the absence of
any definition of the word 'estate' in the ~fadhya
Pradesh Land Revenue Code of 1954 which was
taken to be "the existing law relating to land·
tenures" in the Vidarbha region. Thie Court a.ccep·
ted the su bmieeion of Counsel for the respondent
that Art. 31A applied to and saved the legislation
from being impugned under Arts. U, 19 and 31 for
the reason that the interest of the petitionrrs in that
oaee (who were bhoomiewamis) was the local
equivalent of an 'estate'. The decision, therefore,
is no authority for the point now under consideration
as to the proper meaning to be attached to the
word 'raiyat' and 'under-ra.iyat' in sub-cl. (2)(b) of
Art. 31A or as regards the effect of the Fourth
Amendment to the Constitution in regard to the
point now under controversy.
From the foregoing it would be seen that the
interests of the petitioner in the lands held by him
·on Puravaka tenure a.re within Art. 31A because
they are lands belonging to a Jenmi and so covered
by the definition of an 'estate' as amended by
virtue of the Fourth Amendment to the Constitutiou.
With regard, however, to the Pandaravaka Verumpattom lands I am clearly of the opinion that they
are not an 'estate' and that the interests of the
(I) [1962] I S. C.R. 733.
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