THE COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, MADRAS versus K.T.M.T.M ABDUL KAYOOM
Supreme Court of India | Decided 23 November 1961 | [1962] SUPP. 1 S.C.R. 518 | 1961 INSC 319
Key facts
- Decided
- 23 November 1961
- Bench
- S.K. DAS*, J.L. KAPUR, M. HIDAYATULLAH
- Bench size
- 3
- Case number
- REVIEW PETITION (CIVIL) No. 16/1960
- Disposal
- Appeal(s) allowed
- Citation
- [1962] SUPP. 1 S.C.R. 518
- Neutral citation
- 1961 INSC 319
Text of the judgment
-----------·--
-51s
'lf/'51
SUPREl\IB COURT REPORTS [l!JG2] SUPP.
THE CO:.\HIISSIONER OF INCOi\IE-TAX, MADRAS
v.
IC T .. .ilI. T. l\I. ABDUL KAYOOi\I
(S. K: DAs, J. L. KAPUR and l\I. HrnAYATULLAII, JJ.)
, - -- · - Income Tax~Capital Expenditure-Dealer in conch
•hells-Lease money paicifor gatherin~ shells from sea-Nature
ojexpenditure-Income·tax Act, 1922(11 of l!J22), s.10 (2)(xy).
_The assessee firm canicd on the business in purchase and
sale of conch shells. It obtained a lease for 3 years for gathering
specified types of shells from the sea along the coastline abutting
on the South Arcot District. It sought to deduct the amount
paid as lease money- from its profits from business on the
ground that this \vas an expenditure not of a capital nature
-but wholly and exclusively laid out for the purpose of business.
_under s. 10(2)(xv) of_ the Income Tax Act.
. II.Zd, (per Kapur and Hidayatullah, JJ., Das, J. di'5ent•
ing) that the expenditure was capital expenditure and could
not be deducted from the profits. The business of the assessce
- was buying and selling shells but when it took the lease it
· went in for a new speculative business of fishing for shells.
The amount paid for reserving the vast coastline for future
fishing \Vas not price paid for obtaining the stock in trade i.e.
shells with which assessce did his business. The" amount was
paid to obtain an enduring asset in the shape of an exclusive
_right to fish and the payment was not related to the shells.
Mohanlal Hargovind v. Comrni8sioner - oj Income-tax,
G. P. & Berar, (194!1) 17 I. T. R. 473(P. C.), distinguished
Pringle lndustriea Ltd., Secunderabad v. Commi.s'Jionlr
of Income-tax, Hyderabad, [1960] 3 S. C.R. 681, applied.
Per Das J.-The expenditure \vas not capital expenditure and was'deductible from the profits. It was not an ex- penditure for the acquisition of property or of rights of a
. pexmanent character, the possession of \ovhich was n~cessary
' for carrying on of the asse.ssee's trade. By this lease the assessee acquired it.s stocks-in-trade rather than a source or enduring_ asset_ for producing the stock-in-trade.
_ .llloha~lal I!argovind v. Gommi•sioner of Income-tax,
G. P. & Berar (1949) 17 I. T. R. 473(P. C.), applied.
· Pringle Industries Ltd., Secunrlerabad v. Commissioner
of Income-tax, Hyderabad, [1960] 3 S.C.R. 681, distinguished.
C1v:ll. APPELLATE JURISDIOTION: Review Peti·
tion No. 16 of 19130.
-
'
(1) S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
519
1961
Petition for Review of this court's judgment
a.nd order dated April 26, 1960, in Civil Appeal Tht Commis.u'oner of
lncomtatox, M odras
No. 64of1956.
••
K. T.M.T.1'1.
A. V. Viswanatha Sastri, R. Ganapathy Iyer
Abdul Kayoom
and G. Gopalakrishnan, for the petitioners.
K. N. Rajagopala Sastri, and P. D. Menon, for
respondent.
1961. November 23. Das, J., delivered his
own Judgment.
The Judgment of Kapur and
Hidayatullah, JJ. was delivered by Hidayatullah, J.
8.K. Das J,
S. K. DAS, J.-I had taken a view different
from that of my learned brethren when this appeal
was heard along with Pringle Industries Ltd.,
Sec.underabad v. 1.'he Comrnissioner of lncome~t!lx,
Hyderabad (1 ), and that view was expressed in a very
short judgment dated April 26, 1960.
Now, we have had the advantage of hearing a very full argument with regard to the facts
of this appeal, and I for myself have had the
further advantage and privilege of reading the
judgment which my learned brother Hidayatullah,
J., is proposing to deliver in this appeal. I have
very carefully considered the question again with
reference to the facts relating thereto and, much to
my regret, have come to the conclusion that I must
adhere to the opinion which I expressed earlier.
My view is that the facts of this case a.re indistinguishable from the facts on which the decision
of the Privy Council in Mohanlal Horgovind v.
Commissioner of Income-tax, C. P. and Berar (')
was rendered, and on the principles laid down by
this Court in Assam Bengal Cement Go., Ltd. v.
The Commissioner of Income-tax, West Bengal ('),
it must be held that the expenditure of Rs. 6111/in this case was on reYenue account and the respondent firm was entitled to the allowance which
it claimed.
(1) (1960] 3 S.C.R, 681.
(3)
() (1949) 17 I.T.R. 473 (P.C.),
(1956) 1 S.C,R. 972,
520
1901
Tlie Commissioner of
lne~ltVC, Madras
v.
K.T.M.T.JI.
A•iul Kayaom
S. X. D11sJ,
,
SUPREME COURT REPORTS (19G2] SUPP.
1'
The short facts are these. The respondent
firm carried on a hnssinoss in the purchase and
sale of couch shells (called chanks). It used to
acquire the stock of lJonch shells {I) by .,purchase
from diver•, (2) by purchase from tlie Fisheries
Department of the Government of Madras, ·and (3)
by fishing fur antl g»thering such shells from tho
sea. It dispo3cd of tho stock so acquired at. Calcutta, the difference bet.ween the cost price and selling price less expenses being its profit made in.
business. On November 9, 1945 it took on lease
from tho Director of Industries·. and ·Commere,
'
Madras, tho exclusive right, liberty and authority
to fish for, take and carry away "chank" shells in
the sea off the coa9t line of tho South Arcot District
including the French Kuppania of .Pondicherry.
Tho boundary of the area within which the ·'right
could ho exercised waf! ,given in a schedule to the
lease. The lease wtis -for a period of three years
from July' I, 1944 to June 30, lfl47 on a consideration of an yearly i:ent of Rs. 6111/· to be paid in
advance. Clause 3 of ._the lease contained the
material terms thereof anil may be set out in full.
"3. The lessor hereby convenants-' with
the lesson as follows : '
~
• {i) To pay the rent on the day a."Ua- in manner aforesaid .
.' '\il.l To 'deliv;er to the Assistant
Director of Pearl arid Chank Fisheries,
,T~tico~n all· Velampuri" shells that may
be obtaincq. 'by the lessee upon payment
of their value' as determined by the
Assistant Director.
{iii) To collect chanks c;aught in
nets and by means of-diving as well. In
the process of sucli collectio~ of shells
not to. fish c):J.ank shells less than
2t inches in diameter and if any
I
chank shells leRB than 21 inches ill
"
l
rl
-
(1) S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
fi21
diameter be hrouht inadvertently to shore,
to return at once alive to t.he ~ea all such
undt>rsized shells.
(iv) Not at any time hereafter to
transfer or underlet or part with posse·
ssion of this grant or the rights and
pr ivile~es hereby granted or any part
thereof without the written consent of
the lessor.
(v) At the encl or sooner determination of the term hereby created peaceably aml quietly to yield to the lesson
the rights ftn<:l privileges hereby granted,
and
(vi) To report to the Assistant
Director of Pearl and Chank Fisheries
(South), Tuticorn the actual number of
shells kept unsold in different stations
after the expiry of the lease period.
For the assessment year 1946-47, the respondent
firm submitted a return of its income to the Incometax Officer, Karaikudi Circle, showing its income
from sale of ch inks purch'lscd from divers at
Rs. 7191/- by sale of chanks purchased from
Government Department at Rs. 23, 588/· and
Rs. 2819/- by aalo of chanks gathered by themselves
(through divers) after deducting Rs. 6111/- being
the rent paid to Government under the contract
referred to abov,J. It sought to deduct Rs. 6111/from its profits from business on the ground that
this was an expenditure not of a capital nature but
wholy and exclusively laid out for the purpose of
business under s. I0{2)(xv) of the Income-'tax Act.
This claim was disallowed by the Income-tax
Officer and on appeal by the :Appellate Assistant
Commissioner. On further appeal to the Appella,te
Trib~nal the respondent firm conteqded that the
1961
The CommiSJiontr of
lncome•IAX Madras
••
K.T.M.T.M.
Aldul Kayoom
S. K. Das J,
5!12 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1!162] SUPP.
1961
Tit. Comminioner of
l"'om1-tox, MoJrOJ
v.
K. T. M. T.M.
Abdul Kayoom
S. K. D.,J,
decison of the Privy Council in Mohanlal Hargovind
v. Commissioner of Jncome.taz(')applied to this case
inasmuch as the payment was to secure tho stockin-trade for its busim-ss. Tho Appellate Tribunal
was of the opinion that the Privy Council
decision covered the case, but felt itself bound by
the decision of tho Full Bench of the Madras High
Court in K. '!'. M. 'l'. M. Abdul Kayum Hussain
Su.hib v. Commissioner of Income-tax, Madras (1 ).
The Tribunal acceded to tho demand for a reference to the High Court, and accordingly referred
the following question to the High Court for it.s
decision.
"Whether on the facts and circ::mMtances
of the case the payment of the sum of Rs.
GI 11 /- made by the assessee under tho terms
of the agreement entered into with the
Director of Industries and Commerce, Madras
on 9th November, 1945 was not an item of
revenue cxp<>nditure incurred in the course of
carrying on the business of the assessee and,
therefore, allowable under the provisions of
section I 0 of the Indian Income· tax Act?"
The reference first came before a Division
Bench and was then referred to a J<'ull Bench. By
its judgment dated April 2, 1953 .the Full Bench
answered the question in favour of the respondent
firm. On a certificate of fitness granted by the
High Court tho Commissioner of Income-tax,
Madras, brought the present appeal to this Court.
In A,.~am Bengal Cement Co., Ltd. v. The Commis~ioner of lncome-m ('I, this Court referred to
the decision in Benarlli.das Jagannath. In re.(') and
accepwd the following broad principles for the
purpose of discriminating between a capital and a
revenue expenditure.
(II (19'9) 17 I. T. R. 473 (P.C.I
(li
(19Hl I. T. R. 652.
(31 [1955] I S. C. R, 972.
(4)
(19461 15 I. T. R. 185.
-
(I} S.C.R,
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 52:i
(I) The outlay is deemed to be capital when it is
made for the initiation of a business, for extension
of a business, or for a substantial replacement of
equipment (See Commissioners of Inland Revenue v.
Granite City Steamship Company Ltd.(')]. Such
expenditure is regarded as on capital account, for
it is incurred not in earning profits but in setting
the profit-earning machinery in motion. In my
opinion this test does not apply in the present case
where no profit-earning machinery was set in
motion.
(2) Expenditure may be treated as propel'!y attributable to capital when it is made not only once
and for all, but with a view to bringing in•o existence an asset or an advant<>ge for the enduring
benefit of a trade. (See Atherton v. British lnsu/,ated and H elsby Cables Ltd. (')). In elucidation of this
principle it has been laid down in several decisions
that by "enduring" is meant "enduring in the way
that fued cal'ital endures" and it does not connote
a benefit t'hat 1 ndures in the sense that for a good
number of years it relieves the assessee of a revenue
payment. In Robert Addie & Sons Collieries Ltd.
v. Comminioners of Jnl,a,nd Revenue ('} Lord
Clyde formulated the same test in these words:
"What is 'money wholly and exclusively
laid out for the purposes of the trade' in a
question which must be determined upon the
principles of ordinary commercial trading. It
is necessary accordingly to attend to the true
nature of the expenditure, and to ask one's
self the question, is it a part of the Company's
working expenses?-is it expenditure laid out
as part of the process of profit-earning?-or,
on the other hand, is it a capital outlay?-is
it expenditure necessary for the acquisition of
property or of rights of a permanent character,
(l)
(1927) 13 T. C. l, 14.
(2) (1925) 10 T. C. 155,
(3) (l92f) 6 T. C. 671, 676.
1961
The Commissioner of
lncome-iax, Madtas
••
K. T. M. T. M,
Abdul Kay(;om
S. K. DasJ,
524" SUPltEME COURT REPORTS [1962) SUPP.
1961
the possession of which is a condition of
carrying on its trade at all?''
This test was advo,.rted to by the Privy Council in
v.
K.T.M.T.M.
Tata Hydro-Ekctric A!(ilncies Ltd. v. Commissioner
.Abdul Kayoom
of Income tax('). In my opinion the application of this
S. K. DasJ.
te'Bt makes it at one; clear that the sum ofRs.6111/which "tho respondent firm' spent was expenditure
laid out· as part.of. the process of profit-earning;_ it
was not a capital outlay, tliat is, expenditure nec;:essary for the acquisition of property or of rights of
a permanent character, the possession of whiol:i was
a condition of carrying on its, trade. Under the
contract in question the ,respondc•rit firm did not
acquire any right" to, immpvablc P.roperty. It
acquired no right in t.he bed .of' the sea or in the sea.
The. only right conferred on the respondent firm
was the right to fi'sh for,. gat-her and carry away
conch ·shel1" (in motion under tho surfacQ of the sea)
01' a specified type and size.
The respondent firm
wa.s under an ·'"obligation to return to the sea
conch shells less than 21 in.ch es · in diameter. The
busines~ of the respondent firm consisted in buying
and selling conch shells. No m,l}nufacturing process
was involved in it. Therefore, tho stock-in-trade
of the respondent firm ~:as conch shells. It scour:
ed this stock-in-trade in many different ways, by
purchase from divers, by purchase from Government and private parties; and also by gathering
conch shells under the contract in question. In my
_ opinion1 the contract into w~ich the respondent
firm ente!'ed was merely for securing its stock-intra.de. It is indeed true that.im considering whether
a.n item of expenditure is of a capital or a revenue
nature,_9ne must .consider- the ·nature of the concern, the ordinary course of business· usually
adopted in that· concern, and the object with which
the -expJnse is ipcurred. The. true nature of the
tra.nsactfon must be cpllectcd from the entire
Tiu CommUsion1r of
Income-tax, Madras
( 1)
(1937) 5 I. T. R. 202,
(l) S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
525
IHI
document with reference to all the relevant facts
Commi'asiorur of
and circumstances. Having regard to the nature of Thi
/neomc•te:x Madra1
the respondent firm's business and the course adopv.
X.TM.T.M.
ted by it for carrying it on, it appears to me to be
AtdvlXo.rather far-fetched to hold that by the contract
S.". DosJ.
in
question the respondent firm acquired
property or right of a rermanent character, the
possession of which was a condition of carrying on
its trade. To me it seems that the better view, in a
busini·ss sense, is that the respondent firm merely
acquired by means of the contract its stock-in-trade,
rather than a source or enduring asset for producing
the stock-in-trade.
It was argued before us, as it was argued in
the High Court, that what was acquired in the
present case was the means of obtaining the stockin-trade for the business rather than the stock-intra.de itself. I am unable to accept this argument
as correct. The contract entered into by the
respondent firm was wholly and exclusively for the
purpose of obtaining conch shells, which were its
stock-in-trade. As I havo stated earlier, the contract
granted no interest in the sea, sea bed, or sea water
etc. It was simply a contract giving the grantee
the right to pick and carry away conch shells of a
specified type and size which of course implied the
right to appropriate them as its own property. In
my opinion, in a case of this nature no distinction
can bf. drawn in a. business sense between the right
of picking and ca,rrying away conch shells and the
actual buying of them. It is not unusual for businessmen to secure, by means of a contract, a supply of
raw materials or of goods which form their stock-intrade, extending over several years for the payment
of a lump sum down. Even if the conch shells were
stored in a godown and the respondent firm was
given a riirht to go and fetch them and so reduce
them into its ownership, it could scarcely have been
526 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1962] SUPP.
suggested that the price paid was capital expenditure. I may ex11lain what I have in mind by giving
a simple illustration. · Take the case of a fisher may
K. T.ii-r.M.
who sells fish. Fish is his stock-in-trade. He man
Abdul Kayoom . __ buy the fish he requires from other persons; or he
sx. DasJ.\ · : may obt3in the supply of fish he requires by catch. ing. the fish of a specified size and type in particular
water over a short period under a contract entered
into by him and take them away. I do not think
that in a business sense any distinction can be made
between the two means of ·obtaining the stook-intrade. Both really amount to securing the stock. in·trad~ rather than acquiring an.enduring asset or
. a permanent right for producing the stock·in-trade.
And a business man, like . the fisher man in the
illustration given above, would indeed be surprieed
to learn that. buying of fish for his business is
revenue expenditure whereas catching fiish in
particular water under a contract entered into by
him for the purpose of obtaining his stock-in-trade
on payment of a lump sum down, is capital
expenditure.
(3) The test whether for the purpose of the expenditure any capital was withdrawn,· or, in other
words; whether the object of incurring the expenditure was to employ what was taken in as capital of
the business does not arise in the present case and
need not be considered.
,
No different principles w~re laid down by my
learned brethren in their decision in Pringle Industries Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income-tax(') and so
far a> that c~se is concerned, their decision must
· hold the field. The difficulty and difference of
opinion that arise now relate to the application of
those principles to the facts of the '}Jresent case:
One is reminded in this case of what Lord
Macmillan said in Tata Hydro-Electric Agencies
Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income-tax(') at page 209:
w11
T;,, l'Jommi.<'i°'" of
Inw•e-t« .lfadra;
I
(ll [1960] 3 S.C.R. 681.
(2) [1937] 5 I.T.R. 202.
-
(1) S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
527
"Their Lordships recognise and the
decided cases show how difficult it is to discriminate between expenditure which is and
expenditure which is not, incurred solely for
the purpose of earning profits or gains."
;961
Tiu Cammisllioner of
/1uome-tax, .ltadras
Lord Greene (Master of the Rolls) expressed himself
more strongly and adverting to the distinction
between capital and income, said:
"There have been many c1tses where this
matter of capital or income has been debated.
There have been many cases which fall upon
the borderline: indeed, in many cases it is
aimost true to say that the spin of a coin
would decide the matter almost as satisfactorily as an attempt to find reasons."
[Vi(ie Commissioners of Inland Revenue v. British
Salmson Aero Engines Ltd.I•)].
Perhaps, the case before us is not as bad as the
cases whroh the Master of the Rolls had in mind
when he made the above observations. It is, however, a truism that each case must_ turn upon its
own facts. Nevertheless the decisions are useful as
illustrations of some relevant general principles.
The nearest illustration that we can get is the
decision of the Privy Council in JllolUJnlal Hargovind
v. Commissioner of Income-tax('). That decision
was binding on the Indian Courts at the time when
it was given and as I think that it is still good law
and is indistinguishable from the present case, I
offer no apology for referring to it in great detail.
The facts of that case were these. The assessees
there carried on a business at S\)Veral places as
manufacturers and vendors · of country-made
cigarettes known as bidis. These cigarettes were
composed of tobacco rolled in leaves of a
tree known as tendu leaves, which were obtained
by the assessees by entering ihto a number of
(I)
(1938) 221'. C. 29, 43.
(2)
1194~!.)7 I. T. R. 473 (P.. C,).
v.
/(. T. ii-t. T. Al.
Abdul Kayoom
S. K. Das J.
528 SUPREME OOURT REPORTs [l!J62) SUPP.
1061
short term contracts with the Goveruml'nt an<l
other owners of forests. Under the cnl! tracts, in
f1te01QC-iax, MQtltas
consideration of a certain sum payable by i11staJ.
•.
ments, the. a8sessees were granted the exK. T.M. T.M.
A !du/ K ayoom
clusive right to pick and carry away the
tendu leaves from the fo1 est area described. Tho
S. K. Da1J.
asseseee
were
allowed
to coppice small
tendu plant11 a few months in advance to obtain
good leaves and to polls.rd tendu trees a few months
in advance to obtain better and bigger leaves. The
picking of tho leaves however had to start at once
or practically at once and to proceed continuously.
On these essential facts, the Privy Council held that
the contracts were entered into by the assessees
wholly and exclusively for the purpose of supplying
themselves with one of the raw mat.-rials of their
busineee, that they granted no interest in land, or
in the trees or plants, that under them it was tho
tendu ll'aves and nothing hut tho tendu loaves that
were acquired, that the right to piCk the leaves or
to go on to the land for the purpose was merely
ancillary to the real purpose of the contracts
and if. not exprt>sscd would bo implied by law in
the sail' of a growing crop, and that therefore the
expenditure incurred in acquiring the raw material
was in a business sense an expenditure on revenue
account and not on capital, just as much ae if the
tendu le:wes had been b•Jught in a shop. I can find
no distinction which would make any difference
between the facts of that case and the facts of the
1iresent case. Let me compare the essential
facts of these two cases and see whether there is
any difference.
Th• C<lmrnissionv oj
11) Two of the contracts were taken as typical
of the rest by the Privy Coundl. One contract was
for the period from September 5, 1939 to June
30, 1941 and tho other was for the period from
Ocober 1, 1938toJune30, 19·11. Thus one of the contracts was for a period of about two years and the
other oontra.ot for a period of about three yea.re.
-
(1) S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
5211
1911
In the case under our consideration the period of
the contract is three years. Indeed, there is no Tlte CommissfMJW •I
M4rlrt1. s
vital difference between the periods in the two lncom1·tax,
v.
K.T.M. T.M.
cases.
.A.;1u1 Ka_,..,,,
( 2) In the case before us the contract area is
described in a schedule. In the two contracts which · S. K. n.;J.
were under consideration by the Privy Council the
f.Ontra.ct area was also indicated in a schedule. The
; boundaries of the forests in which tendu leaves
· could be plucked were delimited by the schedule.
Same is the case with the contra.ct before us. The
contract area in which conch shells of a specified
type and size can be picked and gathered is
described in a schedule. Such description does not
mean that the assessee gets any right other than the
right to gather conch shells. In the Privy Council
case the assessees were granted no interest in land
or in the· trees or plants; it was the tendu leaves
and nothing but the tendu leaves that were acquired. In the case before us no interest was given in
the sea bed or in the sea water or in any of the
products thereof. Con ch shells of a specified type
and size and nothing hut such conch shells were
acquired by the contra.ct. I do not think that the
reference to the coast line off the· South Arcot
District makes any difference between the present
case and the case on which the decision in M oha:nlal,
Hargovind v. Commissioner of Income-tax (')was
rendered. If in the matter of plucking of te:ndu
leaves the expenditure under the contract was,
in a business sense, expenditure on revenue
account, I fa.ii to see why a similar expenditure for
gathering conch shells in motion under the surface
of the sea near the coast line should not, in a
business sense, be considered as expenditure on
revenue account. This aspect of the case was
emphasised by their Lordships in the following
para.graph:
(I) (1949) 17LT.R.473(P. C.).
\
530 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1962] SUPP.
T ltt C0111mission" of
Income-ta, Maritas
••
Ir. T, 11. T, M,
Ab~l llayoom
.•, K. D., J,
"It appears to their Lordships that there
has been some misapprehension as to the true
nature of these agreements and they wish to
state at L'ncc what in their opinion is and
what i8 not the effect of them. They are
merely examples of many similar contracts
entered into by the appellants w},Jolly and
exclusively for the purpose of their business,
that purpose being to supply themselves with
one of the raw materials of that business.
The contracts grant no interest in land and
no interest in the tree~; or plants themselves.
They are simply an<l solely contracts giving
to the grantees the right to pick and carry
away leaves, which of course, implies the right
to a appropriate them M their own property."
In the 04oe under our consideration the only right
granted to the respondent firm was to take and
carry away conch shells of a specified type and Hize,
which of course, implies the right to appropriate
them as the respondent firm's own property. The
right to go into the sea and cast nets etc. was
merely ancillary to the real purpose of the contract.
Nor do I think that the circumstance that
the contracts conferred an exclusive privilege or
right is a matter of any significance. In M ohanlal
llargovind v. Commissioner of Income-tax (') the
contracts were exclusive and their Lordships s~tcd:
"It is true that the rights under the
contracts are exclusive but in such a case as
this that is a matter whieh appears to their
Lordships to be of no significan<',e.
These observations are as apt in their application
to the present case as they were in the case before
their Lordships of the Privy Council.
(3) The Privy Council draw a distinction
between cases relating to the purchase or leasing of
(I) (1949) 17 I. T. R. 473 (P. C.).
•
-
(1) S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
531
1961
mines, quarries, deposits of brick earth, land with
standing timber etc. On one side and the case under Tht Commiuian11 of
Madras
its consideration on the other. It referred to the Income-fox,
v.
decision in Alianza Go. v. Bell(') and said:
K.T.M.T.M.
Abdul Kayoom
""·the present case resembles much more
closely the case described and distinguished
S. K. DasJ.
by Channell, J. at page 673 of the re-port
in Alianza Co. v. Bell of the cost of
material worked up in a manufactory. That
side the learned Judge, is a current expenditure
and does not become 'a capital expenditure
merely because the material is provided by
something like a forward contract, under which
a person for the payment of a lump sum
down secures a supply of the raw material for
a period extending over sever'll years'.''
In.Kaur£ Timber Co. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Taxes(')
the company's business consisted in cutting and
disposing of timber. It acquired in som.e cases
timber bearing lands, in other cases it purchased the
standing timber. The leases we1e for 99 years. So
far as the cases where the land was acquired were
concerned there could have been no doubt that the
expenditure made in acquiring it was capital expenditure. In the case of the purchase of the
standing timber what was acquired was an interest
in land. The purcha.sers bought the trees which
they could allow to remain standing as long as they
liked. It was pointed out that so long as the timber
at the option of the company remained upon the
soil, it derived its s:istenance and nutriment from
it. The additional growths became ipso jure the
property of the company. In these circumstances
it was held that the expenditure was capital expenditure. In the case before us some reliance was placed
by the appellant on the term that shells less than
2t inches in diameter brought inadvertently to
shore had to be returned at once alive to the sea.
(1) [1904) 2 K. B. 666 (affirmed on appeal in [1905] 1 K. B. 184and
[906] A. C. 18.)
(2) [1913] A. C. 771.
532 SUPI~EME COURT REPORTS [1962] SUPP.
1961
'1 h1 Commissioner of
Incom1•tax, Mad1os
v.
K.T.M.T.M.
Aitlrd Kayoom
S. K. DosJ.
The argument was that such, shells might ·later grow
in size by recei "ing sustenance and nutriment from
sea water and could be later gathered by the res·
pondent firm when they reached the size of 2t
inches in diameter or more. This, it was argued,
brought the present case nea.rer' the decision in
Kauri Timber case (1 ). I am unable to agree. It
is to be remembered that live shells move under I.he
surface 7f the sea. and they do not ramain at the
same pl~ce; as trees do. A shell less than 2~
inches ih dig.meter returned a.live to the sea may
move away from the contra.at area and may never
be gathered by the 'respondent firm. In these
circumstances tho· a.p-pellant is not entitlecl ,to ca.II to
his aid the test of "further vegetation" or "sustenance and nutriment" referred to in the Kauri
Timber case (1).
,
'
From. whatever point of view we may !oak at
the case, it seems to me that the facts of the pnsent
case a.re indistiriguis~ble from those o~ the case in
1l:fohanlal llargovind ,., Gommiisioner of Inc.orne-tax{')
In Mohanlal Harg1n1ind's case(') the right was to
pluck tendw leave~; in our case the right is/ to
gather conch shells of·specified type and size. This
distinction, it is obvious, makes no difference. Irr
the High Court it was contended on behalf of the
appellant that Mohanlal Hm·govind's case(') related
to the. acquisition of ·raw materials whereas the
present case relates to the acquisition of "chanks"
by a dealer who sells thenr without subjecting them
to· any manufacturing process, aria this-distinction,
it was contended, made the decision in Mohanlal
Hurgovind's case (') inapplicable to the present case .
.The High Court rejected this contention and in my
opinion rightly. I agree with the High Court -that
on principle and in a business sense, there is no
distinction between acquiring raw materials for a
manufacturing busim·ss~nd [Lcquiring or purchasing
goods by it dealer for the ·purpose of sale, particularly when there ii; no question of any excavation
(1)
[1913) A. C. 771.
(2)
(1949) 17 I.T.R. 473 (P.C.).
•
'
(1) S.C..R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
533
etc .. in order to win the g.Jod8 and make su.,h goo.Is
parts of the stock-in-trade, a point which weighed
with the Court of Appeal in .'!iow B1irdulph Gravel
( 10. Lf.l. v. Poole(') and with my leame<I brethren
1 1 Pingle lndmtries Ltd. v. Oon1missi"nr r of lnr.mne'.ax ('}. No such point is priwnl in this case. I
have been unable to find any other distinction
between the two cases which w(l\t!d make a difference
in the application of the principles for discriminating between capital expe11rliture and revenue
t>xpenditure.
To adopt again the language of Lord Green,
I see no ground in principle or reason for differf'ntiating the present case from the case in Mohanlal
H11rgovind v. Commissioner of Income-tax ('}.
On behalf of the respondent firm a further
question was agita.ted. namely, whether an allowance for the cost of gathering the conch shdls by
nets etc., should not be given, even though the rent
paid under the contract was not allowable, under
s. 10 (2) (xv) of the Income-tax Act and a reference
was made in th is connection to the decision in Hood
Barrs v. Commissioners of Inland Re·i•enue ('). I do
not think that we are concemed with that matter
in the present appeal. The only question which
arisAs for decision is the one referred to the High
Court. I have held that the High Court
correctly answered the question which related
to the payment of the sum of Rs. 61 ll/- only. The
question having been correctly answered by the
High Court, the appeal fails and must be dismissed
with cost.
HIDAYATULLAH, J.-TJ?is appeal was heard
with Pingle Industries, Ltd., Sccunderabad v. The
Commissioner of Income-tax ('), in which judgment
wa.s delivered by us on April W l 960. In accordance with the decision in Pingh Industries case ( 1 ),
(I\ [1954) 35 T. a. 459.
(2\ [i960J s s. a. R. 681.
1
(3)
(1949) 17 1.T.R. 473 (P.C)
(4) 195137 T.C. 188.
'.5\ [19601 3 S. C.R. 681.
1961
The CommissiQRIT Pf
Income-tax, 14 adras
••
K T.M. TM.
Abiul Kayoom
Hidayatu/lah .J,
I
!i34 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1962) SUPP.
/Ml
this appeal was allowed. Ll\ter, a review potition
Tit, Co·11r'fliJJio ;tf of (No. 16 of l!l60) was filt>d on the ground that this
!11conu-1~x • •\ladrtu
appeal was not governed hy the rlecision in Pingle
v.
h1,-/u.,fri1~' mse ( 1), an<l that as it was not fully
A·. TM. T. M.
Ah1i11I 1i·,1_room
argued, it 5ho11ld he rnh<·•ir<l. It is um;ec<·B!'ary to
go into the rcason8 why the rehearing was granted,
except to say that there was perhaps a mis11ndcrRtanding about t.he concessions made by counsel.
We were, thereforP, satisfied that we should grant
tho r"hcaring. and have since heard full arguments
in this appeal.
K. T. M. T. !If. Abdul Kayoom and Hussain
Sahib {respon<ll'nt) is 1i regi><trrPd firm, and r.arrks
on business in conch shells lncallv known as
''c·hanks", which are found on the bed 'of the sea all
along the coast-line abutting on the South Arcot
DiBtrict. The rcspon<lcnt took on lease from the
Director of Ill'lustries an<! CommP.rce, Madras "the
rxduaivl' right, liberty and authority to take and
carry away all chanks found in tho sea"' for a
period of three years ending on Junu 30, 1947..The
consideration was Hs. 6, 111/- per y(·ar payable in
advance. Fur the year of assessment, l!l464 7 (the
ye!\!" of account ending .Tune 30, 1945) the respondent in showing its profits from business sought to
deduct Rs. fi, 111 /- on the ground that this was a.n
expenditure not of a capita 1 nature but wholly and
exclusiv<>ly laid out for the purpose of business
. under a. 10 (2) (XV) of the Income-tax Act. This
claim was disallowed by tho Income-tax Officer,
and on appeal, by the Appellate Assistant CommisRioner. On further appeal tu the Appellate Tribunal,
the r<.'spondent contended that tho mling of tho
Privy Counril in .MolVJ11/al llaraovind'.s case (')
applie<l to the <'ase, inasmuch as the payment was
to s"curo the btock-in·trade for its businl'BS. The
Appellate Tribunal, though it was of opinion that
the Privy Council rase applied, felt itself bound by
the •.>arlicr Full Bench d"cision of the Madras High
1
111fl960i3 S. C.R. 681.
t71(1949)171. T. R. 473 IP. C.i.
1
(1) S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
535
Court in K.T.M.T.M. Abdul Kayoom Hu8sain Sahib
v. Oommis8ioner of Income-tax, 11fadras (') relating
to thi3 respondent, and dismissed the appeal. The
Tribunal, however, acceded to a demand for a case,
and referred the following question to the High
Court for its decision :
"Whether on the facts and circumstances
of the case the payment of the sum of
Rs. 6,111/- made by the assessee under the
terms of the agreement entered into with the
Director of Industries and Commerce, Madras;
on 9th November 1945 was not an item of
revenue expenditure incurred in the course of
carrying on the business of the assessee and,
"therefore, allowable under the provisions of
section 10 of the Indian Income-tax Act".
The reference went before a Divisional Bench,
which referred the case for decision of a Full Bench.
The Full Bench held that the case was covered by
the Privy Council case above referred to, observing:
"In our opinion, the facts in the case
before the Judicial Committee are indistinguishable from the facts of the present case.
In one case, the leaves had to be picked from
trees by going upon the land, while in the
other case the chanks had to be collected and
gathered by diving into the sea. It is impossible to construe the documents in the present
case as conferring any interest in t.hat portion
of the sea from which the exclusive right of
winning the chanks was conferred upon the
asses see."
The High Court also did not see any difference
between raw materials acquired for a manufacturing
business and the acquisition of chanks in the
present case, and held that the chanks were acquired
as the stock-in-trade of the respondent and the
transaction was tantamount to purchase of goode.
(ll (1939) 1.T.R. 652.
lllfll
The Commissioner 'J
lncotnrtox, M•tirt1s
v.
K. T.M. T. M.
Abdul /(ayoom
Hidqyatu//ah J.
•
536 SUPREME COUltT REPORTS [1962] SUPP.
If/el
T., CttmlCissiotUT of
/11(ttrM·Wt, JI Uras
'·
K. T. II. T.M.
JUlll K•YI""
liii•1.iull•• J.
The High Court, however, certifierl the case as fit
for appeal, and the Commiasioner of Income-tax
hM filed thia appeal.
1
The material terms of the agreement in the
case are as follows :
"!. The lessor hereby grants unto the
lessees the full free and exclusive right, liberty
and authority to fish or take and carry away
all chank shells in the sea off the coast line
of the South Arcot District including the
French Kuppams of Pondicherry more particularlv described in tl1'i schedule hereto to
hold "the premises to the lessees from the
first day of July 1944 for a period of three
years ending 30th June 1947 paying therefor
the yearly rent of Rs. 6, 111 (rupees six
thousand one hundred and eleven only) to be
paid yearly in advance, the first payment to
be made within fifteen days from the date of
intimation of acceptance and the second and
third payment~ to be made on or before the
15th June 1:?45 and 19·16, respectively at the
Government Treasury at Tuticor-in or Madras.
x
x
x
3. The lessee hereby covenants with the
lessor as follows :x
x
x
(ii) To deliver to the Assistant Director
of Pearl and Chank l<'ishcries, Tuticorin all
Velampuri shells that may be obtained by
the le&1ces upon payment of their value as
determined by the Aseistant Director.
(iii) To collect Chan ks in nets and by
means of diving as well. In the process of
such collection of shell not to fish chank shells
less than 2! inches in diamel<'r if any
r.hank shells leis than 2t inches in diameter
"
(I) S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
537
be brought inadvertently to shore, to return
at once alive to the sea all such undersized
shells.
(iv) Not at any time hereafter to transfer or underlet or part with possession of
tbis grant or the rights and privileges hereby
granted or any part thereof without the
written consent of the lessor.
x
x
x
(vi) To report to the A1sistant Director
of Pearl and Chank Fisheries (South), Tuticorin the actual number of shells kept unsold
in · different stations after the expiry of the
lease period."
An analysis of the agreement shows that the
respondent obtained an exclusive right to fish for
"chanks" by the method of diving and nets and
to appropriate them except those below 2
inches in diameter, which had to be returned
alive to the sea and Velampuri shells which had
to be sold compulsorily to Government. The
respondent had also to report to its lessors at the
end of the term, the numher of shells not sold.
The right was exclusive, but was -not capable of
being transferred or underlet, and it was for a fairly long period. The coast line involved was also
fairly long.
There is no doubt that the payment of
Rs. 6,l ll/· was an expenditure wholly and exclusively for the purpose of the business of selling shells,
just as the payment to the divers and other sundry
expenses were. But an expenditure for the purpose of the business may be of a capital nature,
and if it is so, it cannot be claimed as a deduction.
The question is whether this payment was of a
capital nature.
What is attributable to capital and what, to
revenue has led to a long strin~ of eases Ii.ere aqq
1961
TIM Commissioner of
lncome·tax MJ•as
v.
K T.M.T.M.
Abdul Kayoom
Hidayatullah J,
53~ SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1962) SUPP.
1961
Th. C.-missiontr of
Irtctm1-tax, Madras
v.
K.T.M. T. M.
Abdul Koyoom
Hidayalul/ah J.
in the English Courts. The decisions of this Court
reported in Assam Bengal Cement Go., Ltd, v. Commissioner of Income-tax( 1 ) and Pingle Industries
case (i) have consillered all the leading cases, and
havo also indicated the tests, which are usually
applied in such casrs. It is not necessary for us
to cover the same ground again. Further, none
of the tests is either exhaustive or universal. Each
case depends on its own facts, and a close similarity between one case and ,another is not enough,
bAcause even a single significant deta.il may alter
the entire aspect. In deciding surh casrs, one
sh'mld avoid the• temptation to dPcide r,ases (as sa'd
by Cordozo* by matchirg the colour of one case
against the colour of JJ,n(>ther. To decide, therefore,
on which 'side .of th() line a case falls, its broad
resemblanc~ to· another case is not at all decisive.
What is decisive \s~the nature of the business,
the nature of the expenditure, the nature of the
right acquired, and their relation inter se, and this
is the only key to rcsol vc the issue in the light of the
general principles, which are followed in such cases.
A trader may spend money to acquire his
raw materials, or his stock-in-trade, and the payment may .often be on revenue account but· not
necessarily. A person selling goods by retail may
be said to be acquiring his stock-in-trade when he
buys snch goods from a wholesaler. But the same
<!annot be said of another retailer who buys a monopoly right over a long period ~rom a producer of those
goods. ·The· amount, he pays to secure the monopoly, through a part of the expenditure to secure
his stock-in-trade is not of the" same character as
t.he price he pays in the first 'illustration. By that
payment, he secures an enduring advantage and an
asset which is a capital-asset of his business. In the
same w11y, if a manufacturer buy~ his raw materials he rilakes a revenue expenditure, but when he
acquires· a source fr0m :which he would derive his
(I) (1955) 271.T,R. 34.
(2) [1960] 3 S.C.R. 681.
• The nature of the Judicial Pr~ p. 20,
,
~,
(1} S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
5!l9
1961
raw materials for thL' <'nduring benefit, of his business, he spenrlR on th•' capital side. Thus, a manu- The Commissfoiur oj
facturer of woll<'n gnods who buys his wool buys Income-tax, Madras
••
his raw m11teri11ls, but when be buys a sheep farm,
K. T. M. T. M.
Abdul h'ayoom
he buys a c ipital asset.. There is then no difference
between purchase of a factory and the purchase lliday11f11llah J.
of the sheep farm, because both are c.'tpital asset
of enduring nature.
The respondent in this ease has tried to distinguish Pingle lnd·ustries case (1 } and to bring its
case within the ruling of the Privy Council in
Molwnl<il liargovind'" wse ('). When the former
case wa3 argued, the attemot was to bring it also
within the mle of the Privy Council, but now, the
differences between the two cases are recognised and
Pingle lnd'll.strics case (1 ) is said to b3 entirely different. In deciding the present appeal, it is hardly
necessary to do more th•tn analyse once again the
facts and drcnmstances of these two cases to show
why those two cases were differently decided, and
the present case will then be easily disposed of, not
on its similarity to another hut on its own facts.
We shall begin with the Privy Council.
Mohanlal Hargovind and Co., was a firm of
bidi manufacturers, which needs tendu leaves in
which tobacco is wrapped to make bidis. Tendu
leaves were thus the raw material of the·business.
Tendu leaves can be bought from dealers who sell
tendu leaves in a large way. Now, what dirl the firm
do ? It took leaves of forests with a right to pick the
leaves. This right carried with it the right to
coppice small tendu plants and to pollard the tendu
trees. There was, however, no right in the trees
or the land and the right to go over the land was
merely ancilhry. Looked at from the point of view
of business, there was no more than a purchase of
the leaves, and the leaves were needed as raw
materials of the business. In deciding the ease,
the Judicial Committee discounted the right to
(
(I )[1960] 3 S, C.R. 681.
(2) (1949) 17 I. T. R. 473 (P.C.).
540 SUPREME QOURT REPORTS [1962] SUPP.
1961
The Wotruniuiondr nf
Incomt·l<V. 1 Marlrfl:.
v.
K.1'. M. T.M
Ahdu/ Ka)'oont
lfidr1yatullrih J.
coppice small tendu plants and to pollard the tendu
trees as a very insignificant right of cultivation
necessary to improve' the qua.lity of the leaves, but
.whinh right ranked no higher than the right to
spray a fruit tree. The right of entry upon the
hnd wa8 also considered ancillary to the Ip.ain
purpose of the contract, which was acquisition of
!Pndu leaves and tendu leaves alone, and it was
observed that even if this right of going on the
laud and plucking the leaves was not expressed in
the cbntra.ct, it would have been implied by law.
Their Lordships then observed that the High Court
ti iverted its vie ;v from these points, and ·attached
toq much importance to -cases decided. upon quite
different facts. They then observed that "oases
relating to tho purchase or leasing of mines, quarries, deposits of brick earth, land with standing
timber ........ .'' wer!l of no assistance, and concluded:
"If the tendu leaves had been stored in
a merchant's godown and the appellants had
bought the right to go amcl fetch them and
so reduce them into' their possession -anct ownership it could scarcely have been suggested that the purchase price was capital expencliture. Th9ir •Lordships see no ground in
pr-inciple or reason for differentiating the
present case from that supposed." (p. 478)
That case thus involved no right in land or
trees; the licence to be on the land was merely an
accessory right; the right of cultivation was insignificant. .{rhe term was short, and the collection of
leaves was seasonal. Leaves once collected, the
operation pro tempore was over till the fresh crop
came. There was thus no acquisition of an e'nquring asset in the way capipal endures; it was more
a purchase of crops of two or three successive years
shewereQ_ on an agreement to en~re the ~upply !lf
r~w l!laterials,
,
I
ti
(l) S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
541
Contrast this with the facts of Pingle Industries case (1 ). The business of the assessee there,
was selling stone slabs called flag stones. These
stones were first won from the quarries and then
dressed and shaped and then sold. Now, \\<hat did
the assessee do ? It took leases of stone quarries
in a large number of villages for twelve years.
PJ;ima!'.ily, this was done to obtain ston~s for its
bJlsiness. It could have been a contract by which
it would have been entitled to so many cubic feet
of stones to be extracted in a particular period. It
took long-term leases of vast :ireas in several
villages to ensure supplies for a considerable time.
The leases were not limited by quantity, nor did
they refer to any stones in particular. It could take
all or it could take none; but it could not
have carried away all the stones, if the
eupply outran its efforts. The stones were
embedded in earth, layer upon layer, and
had to be systematically extracted. Till the
stones at the top were removed, it could not remov£
those at the bottom, and there were still more
layers further below. In these circumstances, no
specific quantity having been bought or sold either
expressly or impliedly, the stones being immovable
property or a pa.rt thereof and the contra.ct being
long-te1m contracts, Mohanlal Hargovind's case (')
was held inapplicable, and it was held that the assessee in Pingle Industries case (1) had acquired an
enduring a.sset and the expenditure was on capital
account.
These cases between them show adequately
the dividing line, which exists between capital expenditure and revenue expenditure. To determine
on which side of the line the particular expenditure
falls, one ma.y often put himself the question posed
by Lord Clyde in Robert Addie an& Sons Collieries
JM. v. CommiBsioners Inland Revenue\').
(1) [1960) 3 s. a. R. 681.
(2) [1949) 17 r. T. R. 473 (P.C.).
(3)
[1921] 8 T. C. 671, 676.
1961
The Commissionlr of
lncome·lax, A-1.adii'i'
Y.
K.T.M. T.M.
Abdul Kayoom
H id•yalullah J.
1961
71u Com·ni·sumtr uj
/ncom-lax, ,\ft1drar
••
K. TM. T.M.
Abdul Koyoom
Hidaya11.illah J.
542 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [l!l62] SUPP.
"Is it part of the Company's working expen·
scs, is it expenditure laid out as part of the process
of profit earning ?-or, on the other band, is it capital outlay, is it expenrliture necc,sary for the acquisition of property or of rights of a permanent character, the possession of which is a. condition of
carrying on its trade at all?"
The i;ame question was again poS<'d by the Judicial
Committee in Tata Hydro-Electric Agencies, Ltd.
v. Commisswner of lnc.omP·fax ('). The answer to
this question in each of the two case of 1WoharUal
Hargom"nd (') and Pingle lnd11slrie.~ (') is entirely
different. The difference c.an lie noticed easily, if
we were t-0 read here what Channell, J. Ra.id in
Alianza Co. Ltd. v. Bell(') :
"In the ordinary case, the cost of the material worked up in a ma.nufactory i~ not a. capital
expenditure, it is a current expenditure and
does not become a capital expenditure mncly
l.Joca.usc the mat~rial is provided Ly something
like a. forward contract, under whieh a person
for the payment of a lump sum secures a supply of the raw material for a period cxwnding
over several yeara ...... Jf it is merdy a manu·
facturing husi1wss, then t.hc procuring of the
raw material would not be a capital expenditure. But if it is like the working of a par.
ticular mine, or bed of brick earth and eonvcrting the stuff into a mnrketal.Jlc commodity,
thon, the money paid for the prim<: cost of the
stuff so dealt with is just as mucl) capital a<
the money sunk in machinery or buildings."
The first. part of the observation is applicable to
M ohanla/, fl argovind'8 case (') and the latter part, to
Pingle Indu.~trie.• case (3 ). What is said of a manufoc.
turing concern is equally applicable to a non.
manufacturing business. It is the quality of the
payment ta.ken with what is obtained, t.hat is
decisive of the character of the paymt-nt.
(I)
(!~137) !.. R. <A I. A. ll5 : 5 l.T.Il. ~O:>.
(2)
( !!!49) 17 1.T .R.173 (P.C,).
(3)
(4) [l!!ti0] 5,. c. 60.
[19GO] 3 S.C.R. 681.
t
(l) S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
543
1961
We may now pass on to the facts of the case
before us. The respondent carried on the business The Commissiorur o.,
Madras
of selling chanks. It obtained its Aupplies from Jncome•tax,
v.
divers, from whom it purchased the chanks, and K.TcM.T.M.
Abdul Koyoom
having got them, perhaps cheap, it . resold theµi a.t
a. profit. This is one mode in which it carried oil its HidoJatvlluh J ·
business. In this business, it was directly buying its
stock-in-trade for resale. The other method was to
acquire exclusive right to fish for chanks by employing divers and nets. The business then changed
to something different. The sale was now of the
product of another business, in which divers and
equipment were first employed to get the shells. It
thus took leases of extensive coastline with all the
right to fish for chanks for some years. The shells
were not the subject of the bargain at a.II, as were
the tendu leaves; but the bargain was about the
right to fi~h. There can be no doubt that what it
paid the divers when it bought chanks from them
with the view of reselling them was expenditure laid
out wholly and exc.Jusively for the purpose of its
business, which was not of a capital nature. That
business was buying goods and reselling them at a
profit. But a different kind of business was involved when it we1;1t in for fishing for chanks. To be
able to fish for chanks in reserved ,waters it had to
obtain the right first. It, therefore took lease of
that right. To Mohanlal Hargovind, the leaves
were raw materials, and that firm preferred to buy
a number of crops over years rather than buy them
as it went along. Hence the remark that the leaves
were bought, as if they were in a shop.
Under the lease which the respondent
obtained, it had a right to take only chanks of
particular dimensions and shape, but it had to fish
for them and obtain them first. The rest of the
chanks were not its property. The smaller chanks
had to be returned alive to the sea, and Velampuri
chanks had to be compulsorily sold to the state. Of
Courae, the smaller ohanke put back into the sea
5U
IHI
Thi Ccmvnissio1ur of
ln:on11 ..lOJC, Madras
v.
J<.T.M.T.M.
Abdul Kayo""'
HiiayoMlah J.
SUPREME COUl~ H.EPORTI:l [1962] SUPP.
would grow, and if filhed later, be its propel'ty to
take, but till they grnw, it had no claim. The chanks
were on the bed of the sea. Their exact existence
was nut known, till the divers found them, or they
got netted. Chanks which were there one day might
have been washed back into the deep sea, and
might never be washed back into a place where
they would be within reach. Similarly, other
chanks not there one day might come within reach
on another day. All these matters make the case
entirely different from the case of a purchase from
the divers. In obtaining the lease, the respondent
obtained a speculative right to fish for chanks
which it hoped to obtain and which might be in
large quantities or small, according to its luck.
The repondent changed the nature of its business to
fishing for chanks instead of buying them. To be
able to fish, it had to arrange for an area to fish,
and that a'rrangement had to be of some duration
to be effective.
This is not a case of so much clay or so much
salt petre or a dump of tailings or leaves on the
trees in a forest. The two modes in which the
respondent did the businCSll furnish adequate distinguishing characteristics. Here is an agreement
to reserve a source, where the repondent hoped to
find ~hells which, when found, became its e&ock-intrade but which, insitu, were no more the firm's
than a shell in the deepest part of the ocean beyond the reach of its divers and nets. The expenses of fishing shells were its current expenses as
also the expenses incurred over the purchase of
shells from the divers. But to say that the payment
of lease money for reserving an exclusive right to
fish for chanks was on a par with payments of the
other character is to err. It was possible to say of
the former, as it was possible to say of the tendu
leaves in Mohanlal Hargovirul's case('), that the
chanks were bought because the money paid was
the price of the chanks. But it would be a straining of the imagination to say that the amount paid
Ill (19f9) 17 LT. R. 471 (P.C.).
(l) S.C.R. SUPREME COUR'l' REPORTS
545
1961
for reserving the coastline for future fi8hing wa~ the
price of chanks, with which the respondent did its Tlte Commissioner of
/If odros
business. That• amount was paid to obtain an Income-1t1:>:,
v.
enduring asset in the shape of an exclusive right to K.T. M.T.M .
.Abdul Ka)'Oom
fish, and the . payment was not related to · the
chanks, which it might or might not have brought Hid•yatullah J.
to the surface in this speculative business. The
rights were not trasferable, but if they were and
the firm had sold them, the gain, if any, would
have been on the capital side and not a realising of
the chanks as stock-in-trade, because none had
been bought by the firm, and none would have been
sold by it.
In our opinion, the decision of the High
Court, with all due respect, WllAI, therefore, erroneous, and the ear lier decision of the Full Bench of
the same High Court was ri@ht in the circum1tanceH of the case.
In the result, the appeal is allowed; but there
will be no order about cost.
.BY CoURT. In accordance with the majority
judgment of the Court, the appeal is allowed, but
there will be no order about costs.
MOHAMMAD SERAJUDDIN
1961
fl,
N ovnnb~r 24.
R. C. MISHRA
(J. L. KAPUR, II. HlDAYATULLAH and J.C. SHAH, JJ.)
Oustom•-Seizure t( documenu-Warrant · issued by
Magi•trate-Ouatodf of 4ocume11t8-lf cuato1r1B aut!iorities
•ntitled to-Facili11'8 for iMjHction-Sea Customs 'A.ct, 1878
( 8 of 187 8), 8. 172,-0otle Ill Criminal Procedure, 1898 (Act 5
of 1898), 8. 96, Sclleds/e V 1'orm VIII.
The respondent wao suspected of having exported
dutiable goods in contraYendon of the Sea Customs Act and of
having secreted docmnentl ia connection therewith in two
prem iJes. An applicaP<>n - made w the Chief Presidency
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