L. JANAKIRAMA IYER AND OTHERS versus P. M. NILAKANTA IYER AND OTHERS
Supreme Court of India | Decided 26 October 1961 | [1962] SUPP. 1 S.C.R. 206 | 1961 INSC 301
Key facts
- Decided
- 26 October 1961
- Bench
- BHUVNESHWAR PRASAD SINHA*, P.B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, RAGHUBAR DAYAL
- Bench size
- 3
- Case number
- CIVIL APPEAL No. 62/1959
- Disposal
- Dismissed
- Citation
- [1962] SUPP. 1 S.C.R. 206
- Neutral citation
- 1961 INSC 301
Text of the judgment
!06 SUPREME OOURT REPORTS (1962] SUPP.
IHl
Oct#nll.
L. JANAKIRAHA IYER AND OTHERS
v.
P. M. NILAKANTA IYER AND OTHERS
(B. P. Sm11&, C. J., P. B. GA.JXNDR4GA.DIUR and
R.A.GJIUJIAB DAYAL, JJ.)
'l'rwt-Dtblor1 cr.n"'lli11f P""]Wly to thru tnutu1 /or
repayment of ddi11--.A4minillraUon suit by debtor• dinniut4
o" 111ilhdra111<1/,-Sul>ltqiunt suit on bthal/ of gttural body of
crdilor1--I/ barred by res judicata-Limilalion claim /or
pos1twta-Mairil4'nability-Sak <lui tucuttd by llPO of tM
thm lruatu1-Validilg-A1Mrtdmtnl of ckcru by High Court
afttr admiuion of "'PpuU by S11prt- Court-A11>1Jrd of "''
projJt ID tnut utalt eflll intuut to morlgagtt-Adjuslmenl of
tquilit•-01111rl'• power-Validity of alit11ation in /aoour of
pt.1'809 inltrmtddli11g with tnut ulaft-Truslu de son tortlftdian Trust~ Act, 1882 (2 of 1882), u. 48, 63-Cod• of Civil
Proctd111·e, 1908 (Act Y of 1908), 88. 11, 161and162-lndian
Limi~1 Act, 1908 (IJC of 1908), Arta. JIU, 120.
or
ThCJC appeals arose out
a representative sult
filed on ~half of the crediton of defendants I to 6 who
had executed a trust deed on August 26, 1936, conveying
their properties to three trustees with authority to dispose
of the same and distribute the sale proceeds rateably
amongst the credlton. The tru1t deed required "the three
trustees to act accordfn~ to the decision arrived at either
unanfmonsly or by m&Jority." The trustees accepted the
trust and conveyed all the properties e•cept the family
house in admini1tralion of the trust. Two of the 'ale dteds
in favour of tt.>o of the creditors,. defendants 13 and I 4, a
mortgagee creditor, In the 111it were executed by only two
of the trustees. In a suit bronght by the said defendants
I to 6 for adminiJtratlon of the trust, the trial court passed
a preliminary decree. The High Court on appeal remanded
the matter to the trial court (or a finding aa to the market
value of the lands sold. The trial court submitted its
finding. At this stage defendants I to 6 withdrew the suit
which was dismisoed. The preoent suit under 0. I, r. 8 of
the Code of Civil Procedure was filed on October 29, 1947,
before such withdrawal. The claims made therein, inler
11/ia, were for a declaration that the properties In question
were still impressed with the trust, for the removal the
Rll'Vivin1 trustee and appointment of an admini.trator to
l'Cll!iae the amounts, recover possession of the properties and
re-sell them. Tbe trial Judge paued a decree in favour of
the plalntilra. The Hi1h Court In substance confirmed
that decree but modified It by awarding aimple interest
(I} s.c.R,
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
207
ins~ad of compound Interest decreed in favour of defend·
!\nt 14. The two sale deeds, executed by only two of the
trustees, were declared in valid and it was found that the
third trustee did not give his consent to it. The sale deed
in favour of defendant 12 was declared imalid on the ground
that he had intcrmeddled with the trust estate and had thus
became a trustee dt 1ou tort. The courts below also rejected
the picas of limitation and res j1'dicata raised on behalf of
the defendants. Some of the creditor defendants appealed.
After the appeals had been admitted by this Court the High
Court amended the decretal ·order by substimting the word•
'mesne profits' by 'net profits' under ss. 151 and 152 of the
Code of Civil Procedure.
Held, that the question whether Art. 120 or Art. 134
of Indian Limitation Act applied to a case bad to be
decided on the case made in the plaint, read as whole and
properly construed. Since the present suit was not one
for a mere declaration but for possession of property, having
been valued and framed as such, deliverable to the adminis·
trator, it was governed by Art. 134 and not by Art. 120 of
the Act and was thus within time.
It was not correct to say that 1. 63 of the Indian Trust
Act was exhaustive as to the remedies available to a beneficiary under a private trust or that a claim for constructive
possession, such as was made in the present suit, was prohibited under that section.
Rani Chhatm K umari Devi v. Prince Mohan Bikram
Shah, (1931) I. L. R. 10 Pat. 851, distinguished.
Subbaiya Pandaram v. Mohammad M"stapha Mara·
chayar, (1923) L. R. 50 I. A. 295, A Subramania Iyer v.
P. Nagarathna Naick.r, (1910)20 Mad. L. J. 151 and
Masjid Shahid Ganj v. 8hiromani Gurdwara Prabandhak
Committee Amrit~ar, (1940) L. R. 67 I. A. 251, referred to.
Nor could the suit be said to be barred by r.s j"dicata
since it did not fall within the scope of s. 11 of the Code
of Civil Procedure. The suit being one under 0. 1, r. 8 of
the Code, it could not be said that defendants l to 6, plain·
tiffs in the earlier suit, and the creditors, plaintiffs in the
present suit, were the same party or parties claiming through
each other.
Clause 23 of the trust deed, properly construed, con·
formed to the provision of s. 48 of the Trusts Act that where
there are more trustees than one, they must all join in the
execution of the trust, and did not provide for an exception
to that rule, even though it provided that decisions by the
trustees need not a ways be unanimous but could be by
majority aa well. Such sale deed• a• had been executed by
IHI
L. J,111kirmw IJ't.'
••
P. M. Nilck•nra
l:1rr
208 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1962] SUPP.
.
L. ,flfltOkirau IJ"
P. JI. NiJak.,,1a
~rer
two of the trustees only must therefore fail. The alterna·
tive case of consent given by the third trustee to the trans·
actions could be of no avail since it could not be substantiatc:l
by evidenc•.
Lala Man Mohan D<u v. Jallki Pr<Mad, (1944) L. R.
72 I. A. 39, referred to.
The High Court had jurisdiction under ss. 151 and 152
of the Code of Ci' ii Proctdure to correct the obvious error in
the decn:tal order even though the appeals from the said
decree had already been admitted by this Court. Nor could
the amendment be challenged on merits. Although a success·
ful plaintiff would not normally be entitled te> mesne profits
for more than three year; in view of Art. 109 of the Limita·
tion Act, the court had jurisdiction in tlie case of a tru•t to
make appropriate directions in the decree, while awarding
net profits to the tru'it and interest to the mortgagee, in
adjustment of the equities between them.
Satgur l'ra•ad v. flar Narain Daa, (1932) L. R.
59 !. A. 147, Rhagwat Dayal Singh v. Debi Dayal Sahu,
(1908) L. R. 35 I. A. 48 and ./aganna:h Prasad Siftgh
Clll>uvlhury v. 8urajmal Jalal, (1926) L. R. 54 I. A. I,
reforred to.
F.ven slight intermcddling with the trust estate is
sufficient to make a person trustee dt aoft tori. Since in the
instant case, the acts of intermeddling hy one of the defen·
dant covered a fairly long period, the courts below were
right in holdin~ that the sale in his favour must he '°t
aside as one in favour of a tmstee de "°n tor!.
CIVIL
APPELLATE
JURISDICTION :
Civil
Appeals Nos. 62 and 77 of 1959.
Appeals from the judgment and decree dated
March 25, 1953, of the Madras High Court in
A. S. Nos. 731 and 720 of 1950.
Jf. C. Setdvad, Atwrney-General for India and
M. S. K. Sastri, for the appellantll Nos. 2 to 8 1>nd
also for legal Representatives of appellant No. I
in C. A. No. 62 of 1959.
A. V. Viswanatha Sastri, ill. K. Ramammthi
and B. T. Venkataraman, for respondenta Nos. 2
and lO(in C. A. No. 62 of 59) and respondents
Noe. 2 and 15 (ID C. A. No. 77/59).
·
(1) S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
209
R. Ganapathy Iyer and G. Gopalalcrishnan,
for appellant No. 2 and also for legal Representative of appellant No. 1 (in C. A. No. 77 of 1961).
•
1961
L. J anakirama Iyer
••
P. M. Ni/a/cant•
Iyer
C. R. PaUabhi Raman and G. Gopalakrishnan,
for appellant No. 3 in (C. A. No. 77/59).
1961. October 26. The Judgment of the Court
was delivered by
GAJENDRAGADKAR, J.-These two appeals Gajmdragadkor J,
have been brought to this Court by two sets of
defendants with a certificate of the Madras High
Court and they arise out of a suit instituted under
0. I, r. 8 on behalf of the genera.I body of creditors
for administration against the trustees and alienees
of the properties which belonged to their debtors.
Defendant 14 and his sons defendants 18 to 24
are the appellants in Civil Appeal No. 62 of 1959
while defendants 12, l3 and 16 are the appellants
in Civil Appeal No. 77 of 1959. Defendants 1 to 6
are the debtors. They were members of an undivided Hindu family known as Kalakkad Pannayar
family in Tirunelveli District. The family was
doing commission agency business in petrol, kerosene ,
and crude oil. It had secured agency rights from
the Burmah-Shell Company. The members of the
family became heavily indebted by about June,
1936, and as a result there was a. pressure from
their creditors. In order to meet the said pressure
a deed of composition was executed (Ex. B. 2) on
July 8, 1936. As a result of this composition 56
out of the creditors of the family agreed to a
scheme for settlement of their debts. Under this
deed defendant 7 was constituted as a trustee and
as such was empowered to take over the assets of
the debtors, sell them to the best advantage and
distribute the proceeds ratea.bly amongst all creditors. It appears that before the scheme under the
composition could be successfully or effectively
worked out one of the creditors, Ayyah Ayy&r,
filed an insolvency petition, No. 25 of 1936, in the
Sub-Court at Tirunelveli on July 30, l ll36. By thia
210 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1962] SUPP.
1961
L. Janal·irawra l;·f"
v.
P. lf. Nilakanta
r.Jn
petition the creditor wanted defendants I to 6 to be
adjudged insolvnnt. Dmin1; tho pcndeney of these
proceedings, on August 2{i, I !:136, defendants I to tl
executed a deed of trnst, (Ex . .B. 7); by t.his document they com·c\·ed all their movable and immovable
properti~s incl11iling t.he outstandings due to them
to thrc<~ trustreg. These were defendant 7 Subbarayalu Reddiar, Vcernbahu Pillni and Narayana Pillai.
Tho trustePs wt re authorised to dispose of the
a~scts of defendants l to 6 ancl distribute the
proceeds r•1tcably amougst the creditors. Narayana
l'illai died in February, 1938. Veerabahu Pillai
died sometime before the present suit was instituted.
Defc1Hlants 8, 9 and 10 are the undivided eons of
defendant 7, whereas defendant 11 is th(' widow
and defendants 12 and 13 are the stcp-brothns of
Veerabahu Pillai. The truiltccs accepted the trust
and entered upc.n their duties. They took poseession of the immovable properties covered by the
trust. They paid off tho secured creditors, and in
regard to unsecured creditors they arranged to pay
50% of their dues by selling the immovable properties either to the creditors themselves or to third
parties directing them to discharge the secured
debts, and the unsecured debts to the extent of
50% of their value. It is common ground that
except their family house in which defendants I to
6 resided all other immo,·able properties bclongi11!!
to them were conveyed under the trust deed.
·
Defendant 14 was a secured creditor in whose
favour a mortgage of the first schedule properties
had bern executed for a sum of Rs. 30,000 on .Jum•
3, l!l35 (Ex. B-95). This mortgage carried 10~';,,
compound interest. It appears that he had also
lent a sum of Rs. 3,000 on a promiBSory note on
,July 17, 19:15 [Ex. B-95(a)J. This note canie<l
interest at 12%. The promissory note was supported
bv the pledge of the mort1:age deed. In ordrr to
pay off the debts thus duo to defendant 14 the
trustees conveyed to him schedule I mortgaged prouerties for Rs. 42,000 on !'lfay 22, 1937 (Ex. B.94).
•
(1) S.C.R .
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
211
Out of the said consideration the amount due under
the mortgage as well as the amount due under the
promissory note were satisfied leaving a balance
of Rs. 3,030 in the hands of the purchaser. He was
directed to utilise this balance for repaying 50% of
t.he dues of plaintiffs 2 and 3 who have brought the
present suit. The sale deed in favour of defendant
14 was executed by only two out of the three
trustees, defendant 7 and Veerabahu Pillai. Defendants 18 to 24 are the sons of defendant 14. As we
have already seen defendant 14 and his sons are
the appellants in Civil Appeal No. 62 of 1959.
Defendant 7 who was one of the trustees was
a creditor of the estate to the extent of Rs. 6,000.
His daughter-in-law was a creditor to the extent of
Rs. 2,000. In satisfaction of 50% of the debt due
to these two persons the trustees conveyed schedule
III properties to defendants 8, 9 and 10 who are
the undivided sons of defendant 7 (Ex. B. 8). TJ1is
document was executed on December 16, 1936, for
Rs. 4/'00. The purchasers in their turn sold tho
properties to defendant 17 on May 30, 1947.
Defendant 12 is the step-brother of the trustee
Veerabahu Pillai and he purchased schedule V properties on November 7, 1941, for Rs. 2,000 (Ex. B-90).
Defendant 13 who is the brother of defendant 12
purchased schedule II properties for Rs. 15,000 on
August 29, 1937, iEx. B. 37). This document was
executed only .by two out of the three trustees.
Another sale deed was passed in favour of defendant 13 in respect of schedule VIII properties
(Ex. B. 79) on February 6, 1942, for Rs. 2,000.
Defendant 16 who is the son-in-law of defendant 13
purchased two sets of properties schedule VII and
schedule VII-A on May 7, 1943, and June 4, 1943,
(Exs. B-10! and B-105) for Rs. 8,000 and Rs. 600
respectively. The properties thus conveyed to the
respective purchasers were put into their possession.
It is with the sale deed3 executed in favour of
defendant 14 and those executed in favour of
1911
L. Janakirama ly1r·
v.
P. M. Ntlakonta
Ip
Gaj~ndragatlkar J.
..
212 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1962] SUPP.
1961
L. JllNlltirama Ip
v.
P. .If. NilokanJa
l]·tr
Gajmd1•:a1/l:ar J.
defendants 12, 13 and 16 that we are conoemtd in
the present appeal9. Defendants 12, 13 and 16 are
the appellants in Civil Appeal No. 77 of 1959.
In 1943 defendants I to 6 brought a suit, 0. S.
:N" o. 30 of I 943 in the Sub Court at Tirunel veli for
the administration of the trust creatccl by them,
for account from the trustees and for recovery of
the trust properties. To this snit they implca.ded
the surviving trustees and the alienee11 as defendants. In thid suit a preliminary decree for account
was paBBed by the Sub Court. Their claim, however, for the recovery of immovable properties was
not granted. This decree gave rise to three
appeals before the Madras High Court, one by
defendants l to 6 and the others by the trustees
and the alienees respectively. These appeals
were appeals A. S. Nos. 473, 510 and 544 of
1944. The three appeals were heard together
and on December 20, 1946, a common judgment was delivered. The High Court oonfimed
the finding of the trial court that the trustE:ea were
liable to rendtir account for the management of the
trust, and it remanded the suit for a finding a11 to
the market value of the lands covered by the respective sale deeds which had been challenged by
clefondants 1 to 6. The High Court thought
that in determining the validity of the claim
made by defendants 1 to 6 it was neoeBSary
to find out the proper value of the properties
at the relevant time for that alone would
enable the Court to decide whether ·the alienations
had been effected by the trustees for groBBly inadequate price as alleged by defendants I to 6.
In the course of ita judgment the High Court observed that it was not open to the authors of the
trust to challenge the validity of the transaction
which was permitted by them by the instrument
of trust, for it was clear that under the said trust
deed the trustees were empowered to convey properties to the creditors in the discharge of tl.eir
dutiea. After rem&Dd the Subordinate Judge took
•
i
•,.
(1) S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
213
evidence, made his findings and submitted them to
the High Court. It was at th1t stage that defendants l to 6 filed a petition for withdrawal of
the litigation. This petition was allowed on December 12, 1947, with the result that the suit filed
by defendants l to 6, O.S. No. 30 of 1943, was dismissed with costs throughout.
Whilst the proceedings in the said three
appeals were pending in the High Court and before
defendants l to 6 were allowed to withdraw the
litigation the present suit was filed on October 29,
1947, by the three plaintiffs who are the creditors
of defendants l to 6 and who purported to act on
behalf of the general body of creditors. Leave was
granted to the plaintiffs under 0. 1, r. 8 and the
suit has, therefore, been conducted as a representative suit. In the suit the plaintiffs ask for an
account from defendant 7 and defendants 11 to 13
who are the legal representatives of Veerabahu
Pillai on the allegation that the trustees have been
guilty of wilful default. They also claim a declaration that the properties described in schedules I to
VII-A and VIII are still impressed with the trust
and they ask for an order for the administration of
the trust by removing defendant 7 and appointing
an administrator to realise the amount due from
the trustees on such account and to recover possession of the properties mentioned in the said schedules, re-sell them and distribute the sale proceeds
rateably amongst the unsecured creditors.
Several defences . were raised to this suit by
the several defendants. It was denied that the
trustees were negligent in the matter of collecting
the outsta.ndings and that the alienations effec~d
by them were for inadequate considerations and
otherwise improper and unjustified. It was urged
that the present suit was barred by res judic.ata as
a result of the withdrawal of 0. S. No. 30 of 1943.
It was further alleged that the suit was not
maintainable, that it was bad for non-joinder of
1961
L. J anakirama Iyer
v.
P. M. Nilakant•
Iyer
GajenJragadkar J,
214 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1962] SUPP.
1961
l. Janakirama lyn
v.
P. M. Nilakan!a
!)·tr
Oajentiragadl;ar .} ,
parties a.nd was barred by time. Tho respectivo
aliences pleaded that the tran8fers in their favour
were valid and bindin~. Dofl.'nd;;nt 7 specifically
urged that he was not guilty of any br<)ach of trust;
and a plea was also raised that the creditors who
had filed thu present suit bad acqui('seed in some
of the dealiHg.;. Defendant 12 resisted the plaintiffs'
case that he had intermeddled in tho management
of the trust csta.te and was therefore liable as a
trustee de sun tort. An object.ion was raiBed about
the proper valuation of tho suit and it was urged
that the proper court fee ha.d not been paid. It
was denied that sale deeds executed by only
two out of the three trustees were invalid.
On these pleadings twenty nine issues were
framed by the learned trial judge.
In substance the trial judge rejected the
plaintiffs' claim for account, but he passo<l a decree
declaring that the properties described in schedules
I to III, V, VII, VII.A and VIII continued to be
impressod with the trust imposed upon them
by the truatces. The decree directed the removal
of defendant 7 and the appointment of two ad.
voeates inst(ad as administrators. It further
directed defendants 12, 13, 14, 16 and 17 to deliver
posseseion of the properties in their respective
poseessi<>n and asked the administrators to re-sell
the said properties and distribute the proceeds
amongst the creditors and to pay the surpluB, if
any, to defendants l to t3. Under the decree defendants 12, 13, 14 and 16 were held entitled to
receive the respective consideration of the sales and
mortgages together with interest and they were
also liable to render accoWlt for profits of the properties in their poeseseion.
Thie decree gave rise to three appeals before
the High Court. Appeal A. S. No. 720 of 1949
was filed by defendant 14 and his sons defendants
18 to 24. Appeal A. S. No. 731 of 1949 was filed by
defendants 12, 13 and 16; and Appeal A. S. No. 21
f
(lJ S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
215
of 1950 by defendants 8,9,JOand 17. Insubstance the High Court has confirmed the decref'
passed by the trial court and dismissed all the
three appeals. The High Court has, however,
modified the trial court's decree in regard to the
interest which the decree had ordered to be paid
to the alienees. The High Court took the view
th1tt in adjusting equities between the alienees,
the alienations in whose favour were found to be
invalid, and the trust, the contract rate of interest
need not be awarded. Subject to the modifications
made in regard to the payment of interest thP rest
of the decree has been confirmed. Defendants 8,
9 and 10 and the legal representative of defendant
17 who died pending the proceedings before the
High Court have not challenged the decree passed
by the High Court in their Appeal A. S. No. 21 of
1950. Defendants 14 and 18 to 24 as well as defendants 12, 13 and l6 have, however, challenged the
decision of the High Court and have obtained a
certificate from the said High Court in that behalf.
It would thus be seen that in t\10
two appeals before this Court we are concerned with six transactions-Ex. B-94 which is
executed in favour of defendant 14, Ex. B-90
which is executed in favour of defendant 12, Exs.
B. 37 and B. 79 which are executed in favour of
defendant 13 and Exs. B-104 and R-105 which are
executed in favour of defendant 16. Broadly stated
both the Courts below have found that all these
alienations were effected for inadequate consideration. It has also been found that Exs. B-94 and
B-37 are invalid for the reason that they have been
executed by only two out of the three trustees,
whereas the transfers under Exs. B-12, B-13 and
B-Hl are held to be invalid as they are transfers in
favour of the relations of one of the trustees
Veerabahu. It has further been found that defen·
dant 12 intermeddled with the estate of the trust
and must therefore be regarded as trustee de son
tort and therefore the transfer made to him is
1961
L. J anakirama Iyer
••
P. ft!, Nilakanta
Iyer
Gajendraga.dkar J.
216 SUPREME OOURT ItEPOHTS [1962) SUPP.
19''il
L. J onol:irama /;'tr
v.
P. M. Nilakc.n112
lyt'
Gajen.Jr12ttull:dr J.
1
invalid as a matt-er of law. Hoth the Courts have
rejected the plea of ru judicata and limitation
raised by the defendants. There are some of tho
points of law which are common to both the a.ppea.18
and it would be convenient to deal with them in
the order in which they have been raised before us.
'l'he first point argued before us by the learned Attorney-Genera.I on behalf of the appellants in
Civil Appeal No. 62 of 1959 (defendants 14 and
I IS to 24) is one of Jimitatiou. He contends that
on a fair and reasonable construction the present
suit attracts the application of Art. 120 and is
therefore barre<l. On the other hand, Mr. Viswanatha Sa.stri, for the plaintiffs, contends that the
plaint clearly shows that the plaintiffs arc not asking merely for a declaration but they are also
claiming that a new administrator should be
appointed and a direction should be issued that the
property in question should ho delivcre<l to him.
Such & claim, according to him, obviously attracts
Art. 134. It is common-ground that if Art. 120
applies the suit is beyond time, whereas if
Art. 134 is applicable the suit is within time.
The decision of this question would n'lturally
depend upon the construction of the plaint. Is the
claim ma.de in the plaint one of declaration, or is it a
claim for posseB11ion of immovable properties? The
plaint sets out aJl the material facts which constitute
the background to the present litigation, marks
material alle~ations in respect of a.II the alienations
impeached m the plaint, and by paragraph :J5 it
prays, inkr alia, that schedules I to VII-A and
VIII should be adjudged as still impressed as trust
imposed on them by the deed of August 26, 1936,
and direct their re.sale. That is cl. (c) of paragraph 35. By cl. (d) it iR prayed that the Court
should order the administr"tion of the trust by removing defendant 7 if need be and appointing an
administrator or officer of court ( l) to realise the
•
I
-
(1) S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
217
amounts mentioned in cl. (a), (2) to recover possession and re-sell the properties referred to in paragraph (c), (3) to distribute the proceeds rateably
amongst the unsi>cured creditors and perform such
other acts and functions as may be necessary to
eft'ectuate the trust in question. The learned
Attorney General contends that cl. (c) asks for
adjudication or declaration that the properties in
question are impressed with the trust and that is no
more than a declaration, and according to him
cl.( d) prays for the appointment of an administrator
to realise the amounts and to recover possession of
the properties and re-sell them. He suggests that
on a fair construction of cl. (d) all that the plaintiffs pray for is the removal of defendant 7 and the
appointment of an administrator with power to
realise the amounts specified and to recover posses·
sion of the properties indicated and to re-sell them.
This is not a claim that possession should be delivered to the administrator in the present suit.
It may be coneeded that if read by itself alone
cl.(d) may be capable of the construction which the
learned Attorney-General seeks to put on it; but in
construing the plaint we must have regard to all the
relevant allegations made in the plaint and must
look at the substance of the matter and not its form.
It is significant that the plaintiffs have valued the
suit for the purpose of court fee and jurisdiction at
Rs. 23, 745 and this valuation includes several items
in respect of different properties valued under
s. 7(5) of the Court Fees Act. The valuation made in
respect of the different items of propertiea under
s. 7(5) is obviously and clearly valuation made on the
footing that a claim for possession is made. In
fact the plaint specifically avers that the plaintiffs
va~ued the
suit for possession covered by
reliefs C and D-2 under s. 7(5) its indicated in
the plaint. Thus there can be no doubt that the
plaint has been valued on the basis that a
claim for possession of the properties covered
by the schedules is intended to be made. Besides,
19Sl
L. Jt1Mkir.,.. /ytr
••
P. It. N i/.Jcont•
lµr
G~mb.,.sklU J.
218
1961
L. Jan.akirama fJ·er
v
P. }.f. 1''itaka'fl:i
lyu
Gajnulr1gadkar J.
SUPREME COURT HEPORTS (1962] SUPP.
it is also significant that in regard to the claim
made by the plaintiffs in respect of the transfer in
favour of defendant 14 his sons <l<:fendant8 18 to 24
have been joined specifically on the ground that
since the plaintiffs clnim poss<:ssion of the said
property the said defendants arc necessary parties
as it is found that they arc in possession of the said
properties. In
other words, the joindcr of
defendants 18 to 24 to the present suit. is based
solely on thn ground that a claim for possession is
made in tho plaint and defendants 18 to 24 being
in possession are necessary parties to the suit.
Therefore, in our opinion, reading the plaint as a
whole it would be unreasonable to construe cl. (d)
in paragraph 35 in the manner suggested by tho
learned Attorney-General. The prayer which tho
clause really purports to make is that an administrator should be appointed and that an order
should be passed against the re3pective defendants
asking them to deliver posession of the properties
to the said administrator. If that we so the plaint
cannot be construed as one in which a mere claim
for declaration is made. It is a plaint in which a
declaration is no doubt claimed but based on tho
said declaration or adjudication a further claim
for possession to the administrator is also made.
Tho result, therefore, is that the argument that the
prayer made in the pla.int attracts Art. 120 must
be rcjccred.
The next contention urged is that the plaintiffs cannot suo for poBBession but must confine
themselves only to a claim for declaration. It is
not disputed by the le;une<l Attorney-General that
in rngard to public charitablo trusts tho beneficiaries are entitled to sue for setting aside alienations
of the trust properties improperly effected by the
trust.cos, and to ask for the restoration of possession of ttie said trust properties to the trustees
'1.owly appointed. Indeed, there is ample judicial
1
-
(I) S.C.R.
SUPREME OOURT REPORTS
219
authority in support of this position. In A. Subramania Iyer v. P Nagarathna Naicker (1), it was
held by the Madras High Court that in a
suit by the worshippers of a temple to have the
alienation of the trust property by some of the
defendants, trustees, to the other defendants declared invalid and for possession to the trustees,
the proper decree to be made if the Court be of the
opinion that the alienation is invalid is to decree
possession to those defendants who are trustees.
It was further held that the trustees need not be
referred to a separate suit for the purpose. In
llfasjid Shahid Ganj v. Shiromani Gurdwara
Parbandhak Committee, Amritsar (2 ), the Privy
Council has recognised this right in these words:
"The right of a Muslim worshipper may be regarded
as an individual right, but what is the nature of the
right? It is not a sort of easement in gross, but an element in the general right of a beneficiary to have
the waqfproperty recovered by its proper custodians
and applied to its proper purpose. Such an individual may, if he sues in time, procure the ejectment
of a trespasser and have the property delivered into
the possession of the Mutawali or of some other
person for the purposes of the waqf".
The argument, however, is that in regard to
private trusts which are governed by the Indian
Trusts Act such a course is not open to the beneficiary because of the provisions of s. 63 of the
Trusts Act. Section 63 provides that where truotproperty comes into the hands of a third person inconsistently with the trust, the beneficiary may
require him to admit formally, or may institute a
suit for a declaration, that the property is comprised in the trust. The learned Attorney-General
contends that the only remedy available to a beneficiary under a private trust is that prescribed by
s.63 and no other. He can either require the alienec
to admit that the property is comprised in the trust,
or if the alienee refuses to make the admission the
(I) ( 19IO) 20 Mad. L. 1. 151.
(2) (194-0) L. R. 67 I. A. 251, 267,
1961
L. J a11akirama /ytr
v.
.
P . .\1. Nitakanla
IJ'tr
OajendragadkO.r ·J.
220 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1962) SUPP.
IHI
L. J 111Ukir.nt4 lytr
v.
P. M. NilW.ot•
1y,,
GejtnJra1.ak4r ,T.
benficiary m'.iy bring a suit for a declaration in that
behalf. In support of this contention strong re. Hance has been placed on tho deci~ion of the Privy
Council in Rani Chhatra Kuroori Devi v. Prince
Mohan Bikram Shah('). In that case the respondent
had claimed title to the properties as owner in
various ways and had sued as the proprietor of the
properties covered by the aotion. All these
grounds were rejected and it was held that
the respondent could claim no title as a proprietor
at all. Even so, while dealing whith the question
of limitation the Privy Council made certain ob·
servations and it is those observations which are
pressed into service by the learned Attorney·
General. Article 144 on which the respondent
relied in that case, it has been held, is applicable
only to a poseeseory suit by the owner of the pro·
perty claimed against a per~on holding adversely
to him without title, and the plea made by the
respondent that he was the °'vner on several
grounds was rejected; hut in the course of its
judgment the Privy Council assumed that by reason
of the contract pleaded by the respondent the
properties wore impressed with the continuing tmst
in favour of the respondent, and observed that
even so their Lordships were unable to hold that
"this would entitle him to sue for poseession as
owner". Sir Georg6 Lowndes, who delivered the
judgment of the Board, referred to the faot that
"the Indian law does not recognise legal and
equitable estates. By that law, there can be but
one owner, and where the property is vested in a
trustee, the owner must, their Lordships think, be
the trustee, and so the right of a beneficiary is, in
a proper case, to ea.II upon the trustee to convey
to him". It is in that connection that Sir George
Lowndes further observed that "the enforoAment
of this right would, their Lordships think, be barred
after six yea.rs under Art. 120 of the Limitation
Act, and if the beneficiary has allowed this period
(l) (1931) I. L. R. lOPat. 851.
't
(1) S.C.R.
\
SUPREME OOURT REPORT
221
to expire without suing he cannot afterwards file
a posseesory suit, as until conveyance he is not the
owner. It is clear that such a trust as is relied
upon in the present case would not fall within
s.10 of th6 Limitation Act as it would be impossible
to hold that the properties which vested in the
appellant under the terms of the wills which have
been proved were so vested for the specific purpose
of making them over to the respondent". It would
thus be seen that these observations mean no more
than this that the beneficiary under a private trust
cannot claim to recover possession of the property
from the trustee so as to attract the application of
Art. 144 of the Limitation Act. He can make the
claim for a declaration which would be governed by
Art. 120. It is quite clear that the question as
to whether in a proper case the beneficiary cannot apply for the removal of the trustee, for
for the appoinment of a new trustee, and for
the delivery to the new trustee of the property
improperly alienated by the previous trustee did
not fall to be considered in that case. All that
the Privy Council was called upon to consider
was whether a beneficiary can bring a suit for
possession against a trustee and whether such a
suit can be governed by art. 144; and in holding
that such a suit cannot be brought by the beneficiary the Privy Council pointed out that Art. 144
postulates a suit by the owner and a beneficiary
is not an owner under the Indian Law of Trusts.
We are, therefore, satisfied that the observations
on which reliance is placed by the learned'AttorneyGeneral cannot be said to amount to a decision
that in no case C!ln a beneficiary claim that the
trustee appointed under the trust should be removed anti new trustee should be appointed anQ. the
trust properties improperly alienated by the
previous trustee should be ordered to be delivered
into the possession of the new trustee. Section. 63
no doubt provides for the two remedies which
are avaliable to the benetlciary, but in our opinion
lllfJ
L, J anakir""'4 ly"
v.
P. M. Nil•k..,ta
1,,,
IJ'fientlra:dku J,
222
IllOI
!.. JanukiT111n~ lnr
v.
P .•\1. Nit11kanta
/;·tr
Gajt"IJra.rodkar .T.
SUPREME OOURT REPORTS [1962) SUPP.
s. 63 ca.nnot bo treated as exhaustive on tho l'Ubject and so it cannot be urged that a claim for constructive possession like the one made in the
present suit is prohibited bys. 63. Prima facie
s. IO of the Limitation Act seems to contemplate
an action by a beneficiary under a true.t to which
s. 10 applies and provide• that in such an action
the beneficiary may follow the property and ask
for a proper order as to the delivery of the said
property to the new trustee. If that be so, the
provisions of s. IO would suggest that the remedies
pr<'.seribcd by s. 63 are not exhaustive.
Besides, it would be relevant to observe
that if s. 63 is held to be exhaustive 11s to the
remedies available to r. beneficiary it would
lead to very anomolous result,<i. If a trustee improperly alienates the trust property the only
remedy which would on that view be available to
the beneficiarv is to obtain a declaration. How
wou Id this declaration be effective to bring back
to tho trust the property improperly alienated?
Strictly and literally contsrued s. 63 docs not refer
to the remrdy for tho appointment of a new trustee
either, so that on a litenl construction of s. 63
even that remedy may be outside its purview; but
assuming that a beneficiary can ask for a declaration that the property alienated is comprisecl in
the trust and also add a prayer for the appointment of a new trustee that only means that after
the new trustee is appointed he will have to sue
the alienee for possession and very often this suit
would be <ll'foa.ted by the alieneo's plea of adverse
posses~ion. It is hardly neceBSary to emphasise
that wh•~n the beneficiary sues for a declaration as
required by s. 63 and the alieneo resists the said
suit the adverse possession of tho alieneo is emphatically brought out and the pendency of the beneficiary's suit wonld not affect that position so that
on tho view that s. 63 is exhaustive more often
than not tho beneficiary's claim would in subetanco
be defeated by the adverse posse88ion of the ahenee.
(l} S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
223
In Subbaiya Pandaram v. MahamadMustapha Mara·
wyar (' ), this is exactly what happened. In
the presence of the purchaser it was declared that the
trust had been valirlly created and that the property was in fact a trust property. Their Lordships pointed out that "at the moment when the
said decree. was passed the possession of the property was adverse and the declaration that the
property had been properly made subject to the
trust disposition, and therefore ought not to have
been seized, \lid not disturb or affect the quality
of hie poaaession; it merely emphasised the fact
that it was adverse. No further step was taken
in consequence of that declaration until the present
proceedings were instituted when it was too late."
We would like to add that if for bringing back to
the trust the properties improperly alienated by
the trustees two suits are required to be filed we
apprehend that the second suit by the newly
appointed trustee for obtaining possession of the
properties would almost always be too late, and
so s. 63 cannot be read as exhaustively dealing
with all the remedies available to the beneficiary.
We must, therefore, reject the argument that the
suit for possession in the form in which the prayer
has been made by the phintiffs is incompetent.
That takes us to the question of re.• judiwta.
The argument is that on general grounds of res
judicata the dismissal of the .suit (0. S. No. 30 of
1943) filed by defendants 1 to 6 should 'preclude
the trial of the present suit. It has been fairly
conceded that in terms s. 11 of the Code cannot
apply because. the present suit is filed by the creditors defendants 1 to 6 in their representative
character and is conducted as a representative suit
under O. 1, r. 8; and it cannot be said that defen.
dant~ 1 to 6 who were plaintiffs in the earlier suit
and the creditors who have brought the present
suit are the same parties or parties who claim
(I) [1923] L.R
SO I.A. 295.
1961'
L .. Jan'lkirama Iyer
••
P. M. Nilakan:..
l_rtr
Gajtnd..egatlkar J.
,.,
L.J-"0--{1«
,,.,••
I'. N. Nil•bnt•
224
SUP)E~IE COURT REPORTS
[1962) SUPP.
through each other. Where 11. 11 is thus inapplicable it would not be penniseible to rely upon the
general doctrine of res judicata. We are dealing
with a suit and the only ground on which res jwUcata can be urged against such a suit can be the
proTiaions of 11. 11 and no other. In our opinion
therefore, there ill no 1ub11t&nce in the ground that
the present auit i1 barred by re1 jwlicata.
The next question which falls to be considered is the most important question in these appeals.
We have already seen that three trustees were
appointed under the trust deed executed by
defendants l tQ 6 and two of the impugned sale
deeds hr.ve been executed by only two out of the
said three trustees. The Courts below have held
that two out of the three trustees could not convey
a valid title and so on that ground alone the two
transfers are invalid. It is urged before us that
this conclusion is not justified on a fair and reasonable construction of cl. 23 of the trust deed. Before considering this point it is neressa.ry to state
the legal position in the matter under the Trusts
Act.
Section 48 of the Trusts Act provides that.
when there are more trustees than one, all must
join in the execution of the trust, except where
the instrument of trust otherwise provides. It is
thus clear that all acts which the trustee~ intend
to take for exer.uting tha trust must he taken by
all of tht-m acting together. Therefore, there
can be no doubt that if the validity of the alienations efferted by the trustees falls to be considered
only in the light of a. 48 the fact that out of the
three trustees only two have executed the i.ale
deeds would by itself make the transactions invalid
and would not convey title to the alienees. Thie
position i1 not in doubt.
Lewin on "Trusts" hu observed that "in
the case of co-tru1tee1 the office is a joint one.
Where tbe administration of the trust ia vested' in
'
(1) S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REroRTS
225
J961
co-trllSteeti they all form as it were but one collective trustee, and therefore mUBt execute the duties L, J anakirama IJ•er
v,
of the office in their joint capacity. It is not P;, M. Nilukanta
uncommon to hear one of several trustees spoken
Iy1r
of as the acting trustee but the Court knows no GoJendragadkar J.
such distinctions, all who accept the office are in the
eyes of the law acting trustees. If anyone refuses
or be incapable to join, it is not competent for
the others to proceed without him, but the administration of the trust must in that case devolve upon
the Court. However, the a.ct of one trustee done
with the sanction and approval of a co-trustee
may be regarded as the act of both. But such
sanction or approval must be strictly proved (')".
If one of the trust,ees refuses to join in the exe.
cution of the trust, under the Indian law s. 34
of the Trusts Act provides for the remedy. The.
other ~rustees can apply to the Court as contemplated by s. 34 and the trust may accordingly be
executed.
As we have seen s. 48 contemplates that its
provisions will.not apply where the instrument of
trust otherwise provides. In other words, if a
trust deed under which more trustees than one are
appointed expressly provides that the execution
of the trust may be carried out not by all but
by one or more then o_f course the matter would be
governed by the special provision of the trust deed.
The argument urged by the learned Attorney·
General is that cl. 23 of the trust deed in suit
makes such a provision. Both the Courls below
have rejected this plea but it is. urged that tlie
said conclusion is based on a misconstruction
of the relevant clause.
Clause 23 has been thus translated by the
High Court: "In all the proceedings to be taken
in connection with this estate, you three, either
unanimously or according to the decision of. the
majority, shall act". In the earlier litigation stated
by defendants I to 6 this clause was thus translated:
(I)
Lewin on trusts, 15th ed., p. 190.
•.
226 SUPREME OOURT REPORTS [1962] SUPP.
19G1
"All the steps to be taken in connection with this
l. Ja111l·i1a·n~ Tytr
v.
estate should bo :>ccording to tho unanimous opinion
of ·a.II the threo of you or all decided by tho
ma.jorty". The learned trial judge has made this translation of the clause in the present proceedings: "In
all the proceedings to be ta.ken in connection with
the" estate all the three should act either unanimously or according to the decision of the majority".
The learned Attorney-General has supplied
us with the literal translation of the clauso
which readR thus: "In connection with this
estate, in all proceedings to be taken you three
unanimously or according to the decision of the
majority shall act". We have carofolly compared
all the trnnslations, and we feel no difficulty in
holding that the translation supplied in tho earlier
. litigation is somewhat inaccurate, whereas all the
three translations made in tho present proceedings
substantially agree. Taking tho tra.nslat.ion supplied
by the learned Attorney-General it is cfoar that
what this clause requires is that tho three trnstces
shall act, and it provides that they shall act according to the decisic•n which may be reached either unanimously or by majority. "Yon three," thqt is to
say the three trustees, is the subject of the predicate
"shall act"; and the words between tho subject and
the predicate indicate how the decision has hcen
reached. Reading the clause as a whole it is difficult to accept the argument that this clause allows
two of the three trustees to act without joining the
third trusteo in the actual action to be taken in the
·execution of tho trust. It is not neces!!ary under
tho clause that in the ma.tt<>r of executing the trust
ovory decision must be unanimous. The cJquse
recognises that in somn matters decision may be
by majority; but
nc\·crtholess it requires
that once a decision is reached either un·
a.nimously or by majority, in gh·ing effect to the
dcoision and in taking any given action in the execution of tho trust all the three must act. Thus
read this clause conforms to the statutory provision
P. \{ . .Vi(at:J Ua
!;1tr
"
I
r
(1) S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
227
contained in s. 48 of the Indinn Trusts Act and is not
intended to provide for an exception to the said
provisions at all. It is urged that if no departure
was intended to be made from the principles laid
down in s. 48 the clause need not have been added
at all. This argument is wholly inconclusive. There
are several other clauses in the trust deed which
also bring out provisions corresponding to the relevant provisions of the Trusts Act and this argument
may apply to the said clauses as well. The authors
of the trust, while creating the trust, have made
elaborate provisions in respect of the trust, while
creating the trust, have made elaborate provisions
in respect of the several matters concerning the execution of the trust, and the whole scheme of the
trust deed is consistent with the operative cl. 23 in
that it seems to require all the trustees to act together even though the decisions which they seek
to give effect to may have been majority decisions
and not unanimous decisions. Therefore, in ·our
opinion, the Courts below were right in holding that
cl. 23, like the main provision of s. 48, requires
that all the trustees should have joined in the execution of the sale deeds in question. That being
so, Exs. Il-94 and B-37 which are respectively executed in favour of defendant 14 and defendant 13
are invalid and can pass no title to the alienees on
the ground that only two out of the three trustees
have executed them [Vide : Lala Man lrfohan Das
v, Janki Prasad (')].
In support of the validity of these transfers
an alternative argument has been urged before us.
It is pointed out that according to Lewin on Trusts,
if the act to the two trustees has been done with
the sanction and approval of the third trustee then
it may be regarded as an act of the three trustees,
and it is urged that in the present case the third
trustee had.consented and shown his approval to
the transactions in quest.ion. The two sale deeds
have been executed by defendant 7 and Veerabahu
(61 [1944] L, R. 72 I. A. 39.
1.61
L. J11naldrarna ly1r
v.
P. M, Ni/akanta
lytr
Gajendragadkar J.
228 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1962) SUPP.
111111
L. JonUirmna lrtt
••
P. JI. Nilal.anla
/ytr
Goj111tlrqailk~ J.
Pillai, and.they do not bear the eigne.tureof Nara.ya.
na Pillai but this alternative contention proceeds on
the aeeumption that though Narayan& Pillai did not
sign the document (Ex. B-94) he had in fact consented to it and had shown hie approval to the transaction. This argument, however, cannot be accepted
having regard to the concurrent finding recorded by
the Cou~te below on this point. Dealing with this
question the trial court has referred to the liscrepant versions given for Narayan& Pillai not joining
in the execution of the sale deed. He points out
that no mention is made in the sale deed as regards
the circumstances under which the third trustee did
not join. Then he examines the evidence given by
defendant 7 and points out the infirmities in the
said evidence. He compares the evidence given by
defendant 13 in the previous suit. and observes that
the explanations given are inconsistent. One of the
explanations was that Narayan& Pillai declined to
come to the Sub-Registrar's office as he was heavily
involved and that people would think that he W&8
selling his property. The other explanation was that
Na.rayana Pillai wanted some accommodation, and
when his co-trustees refused to agree he declined to
jointhe execution of the document. The trial court
has observed that there was nothing to show that
Narayana Pillai W&8 financially involved at the relevant time, and he points out that in fact Na.rayana
Pillai had gone to the Sub-Registrar's office near
about that time in connection with another transaction. That is how the trial court bas rejected the
argument that Narayana Pillai was a consenting
party to the transaction in question. The High
Court has concurred with this conclusion. In dealin~ with this question the High Court has preferred
to believe the evidence of the first defendant that
Narayan& Pilla.i conRidered the prices fixed for
Ex. B-!M as very low and for tha.t reaaon refused to
be a party to it. It has contrasted this reason with
the other reasons given on behalf of the alienees,
and it has recorded its conclusions in these words :
•
(1) S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
229
1981
"Whatever may be the reason it is certain that
Narayana Pillai was not a consenting party to the l. Janal;iram• lyer
v.
.
transaction and there being no ·other evidence by P. M. Nilakanta
way of minutes of any meeting of the trustees had
rwr
decided with the knowledge of Narayana Pillai, Gq::ndtagatlkar J.
though he had dissented, we are unable to hold that
there has been such a decision of the majority as
would bind the dissenting trustee". It does appear
the original draft of Ex. B·94 was made on the
assumption that all the trustees would join in the .
execution of the document but the hope and anticipation formed by the two trustees was believed
and so the doucument was ultimately executed by
two of them without Naraya.na Pillai joining. We
have considered the evidence to which our attention
was invited in this connection, and we see no reaton
to interfere with the concurrent conclusion recorded by the Courts below that Narayana Pillai was
not a consenting party to the transfer in q11estion.
'.rhat being so, the alternative ground made in
suppnrt of Ex. B-94 fails. If the transfers in favour
of defendant 14 (Ex. B-94) as well as Ex. B-37 in
fa:Your of defendant 13 fail o~ this ground it is really not necessary to consider the further question as
to whether both the said tran.~fers were effected for
grossly inadequate consideration.
The next question which has been raised on
behalf of defendant 14 is In regard to the amendment ma.de by the High Court in its decretal order.
It is urged that this amendment was made after the
appeals to this Court had been admitted and so
it is without jurisdiction. It appears that the certificate was granted by the High Court to the respective defendants who have come to this Court as
appellants on November 26, 1954, and the appeals
were admitted on December 4, 1955, whereas the
amendment has been made after the appeals were
admitted. The application for the amendment in
question was made under ss. 151 and 152 of the
Code; and it became necessary because the decretal
order drawn in the High Court referred to the profits
'.-
- \
..
.._---·;--,·,,,-- -
;
: 230 SUPREME COURT REPORTS. [1962] SUPP.
of which . aCCO)lnts •Were ·directed as mesne profits.
I-Jantzkirama Iyer The use of the words.<'mesne, profits" would .. have
v.
inevitably brought in the period of three .year~ beP. M. -Nilakanta
yond which acccounts could not be claimed. By
Iyer
. their application the plaintiffs alleged that the use
of '.'mrsne ·profits'.' in the decretal order was inconsistent with the judgment which had directed accounts
:.of the net profits ·and so they claimed that the
decretal order should be corrected in cl. III, sub-cl.(3).
According to .the prayer thus made it was sug.; gested that the clause. should read as. follows "that
·,the defendants 12, 13 and 14 are liable for the net
, profits of the properties purchased by them under
. schedule V, schedule II and schedule. I respectively".
, , The .. word·· "net profit'.'. ·was used· in , the place of
,, "mesne profits":originally introduced ,in the .order.
· .: When this application for ·amendment was argued
.. before the High Court the defendants pleaded· that
,, . the use of the words ·~mesne, profits" was proper : ·and should not be changed. · It .was urged on· their
. behalf that in' its judgment the High Court had
. ;•.introduced· the words .."mcsne. profits'.' deliberai.tely and.· so the: decretal :order was· perfectly
:· correct. . This, contention has •been nrgatived by
: the High Court, . and. in ; our· opinion ·rightly. It
appears that in the earlier portion..of.. his judgment
Krishnaswami Naidu, J., summarised . in one para- ·
'. graph the. effect of the' decree' passed ' by the trial
'court; and in giving this sunimary' he' observed that
~.under the decree.defendants 12, 13, 14 and 16 were
' 'held entitled to be paid the respective considerations
\',of the sales and ·_mortgages- together with interest
··'they being liable to. accoun~ for mesne profits as
· per the terms of the decree. Tw:o 'things are clear.
, Th' .l part of the judgment does not cont1in the decision of the High Court . at all. It is. really concerned with the narration of the relevant facts and
it purports to summarise the effect "of the decree
··and nothing.more. _·Besides, the use of the words
'.'mesne profits" in _the context is obviously the
·result of inadvertence -because the decree of the
1981
•
'
i
.
I
_j
.\
'
11
'
.
(l) S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
231
trial court had in the relevant clause used the words
"net profits" and not "mesne profits". Thus, there
can be no doubt that the decretal order drawn in
the High Court through error introduced the words
"mesne profits" and such an error could be corrected by the High Court under ss. 15 l and 152 of the
Code even though the appeals may have been
admitted in this Court before the date of correction.
But apart from this technical argument about
tho jurisdiction of the High Court to make the
correction the point in question has been raised on
the merits before us; and it is urged that the
plaintiffs are not entitled to anything more than
three years' profits from the respective defendants.
The argument is that Art. 109 of the Limitation Act
applies to such a claim and the claim is confined to
three years under that article. Article 109 deals with
claims for profits of immovable property belonging
to the plaintiffs which have been wrongfully receiv·
ed by the defendants and it prescribes three years'
period of limitation commencing from the time
when the profits were received. Normally there
is no doubt that a successful plaintiff would be
entitled to mesne profits for three years and not
more; but in the present case we are dealing with a
claim made by the plaintiffs on behalf of the trust
and the decision in their favour has rendered it
necessary to adjust equities batween the trust and
the respective alienees · alienations in whose
favour have been. set aside as invalid. We have
already seen that having set aside the alienations
in favour of defendant 14 and others the Courts
below have direuted that the alienees should get
the amounts due to them from the trust. It bas
also been directed that interest at the rate awarded
by the decree should be paid to them on the said
amounts. This clearly is an equitable relief granted
to the alienees. Having held that the alienees
should get interest on the amounts due to them
from the dates of their respective mortgages or
1961
L. J anakiram• /ytr
v.
P. M. Nilakanta
Iyer
Gaj1ndragadkar J,
232 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1962) SUPP.
1961
i. Jon.akirama l.J11
v.
P. M. NiUzlc01tla
1.,.,
'1ajtml•qaikar J.
sales the Courts in fairness have directed that the
alienees in turn should give an account of the net
profits of the properties which were wrongfully in
their. possession commencing with the date when
they got possession. If the technical argument
based on Art. 109 is upheld as a matter of law there
would be no scope for giving equitable relief to the
alienees at all and they may b~ driven to file fresh
actions ta recover their claims and such actions
would have to face the possible plea of limitation.
That is why the High Court has observed that the
question about the net profits awardable to the
trust and interest awardable to the alienees involves
considerations of equitable adjustment, and it is by
way of an equitable adjustment that the relevant
directions have been issued by the decree. It is
not disputed that the Court had jurisdiction to
make such. an equitable adjustment. Indeed, in
many cases of this type Courts have made equitable
adjustments between rival parties [Vide: Satgur
Prasad v. llar Narain Das (1 ); Bliagu-at Dayal Singh
v. Debi Dayal Sahu (')]. The principal and interest
ordered to be p:tid to defendant 14 and the profits
ordered to be paid by him are thus iuteJr11.l parts
of an equitable adjustment between the plaintiffs
and defendant 14.
It is also urged on behalf of defendant 14
that the High Court was in error in modifying the
decree passed by the tri11J Court by changing 10i%
interest at compound rate to IO!% simple interest
in favour of defendant 14. The aontention is that
under the mortgage executed in favour of defendant
14 (Ex. B-95) the contract rate was lot% compound
interest and as mortgag_ee defendant 14 was entitled
to that rate. In support of this argument reliance
is placed on the decision of the Privy Council in
Jagannath Prasad Singh Chowdhury v. Surajmal
Jalal ('). In that case the Privy Council has held
(I)
(1932) L.R.59 1..1.147.
(3J
(2)
-
•
)I
...
(1908)L. R.351.A.48,59.
(1~261L.R.54 I. A. 1.
..
(1) S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
23S
that on a preliminary decree for foreclosure or sale
under 0. XXXIV, rr. 2, 4 of the Code, a mortgagee
is entitled to interest at the rate and with the
rests stipulated in the mortgage, down to the date
fixed for redemption by the decree. This position
cannot be disputOO.; but the answer to the plea is
that the present decree is not passed in an action
instituted by defendant 14 as a mortgagee. The
present decree is passed while adjusting equities
between defendant 14 the alienation in whose
favour is set aside; his rights as mortgagee aFe
equitably recognised and thereby fm·ther litigation
is avoided. Since the decree by which defendant
14 is allowed to recover his mortgage dues has
been passed for giving him equitable relief it was
open to the High Court to consider whether compound interest should be paid to him or not. As
the High Court has pointed out, while adjusting
equities between the parties the mortgage does not
become revived as such but the relief granted to
the 14th defendant is based on equity and justice,
and so the High Court thought that the interests
of justice would be met if he is paid out of the
sale proceeds the principal amount of the mortgage
with simple interest 'l,t 10!%. We have carefully
considered the contention raised .by the learned
Attorney-General in this behalf but we do not
think that we would be justified in interfering with
the modification made by the High Court in the
decree passed by the trial court. In the result
Civil Appeal No. 62 of 1959 filed by defendants 14
and 18 to 24 fails and is dismissed with costs.
We now turn to Civil Appeal No. 77 of 1959
fi,led by defendants 12# 13 and 16. We will take
the case of defendant 12 first. We ha.ye already
seen that in favour of defendant 12 a sale deed has
been executed on November 7, 1941 (Ex. B-90).
This sale deed has been set aside on two groundsone that it is executed in favour of a person who
by intermeddling with the estate of the trust has
1961
L. J anokir«na l.>·er
••
P. M. Nilallanta
Iyer
Gajendr•gadlcar J.
234 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1962) SUPP.
Iffl
L, JanaAiramo ~w
••
P. M. Nilakanta
1;-v
Gaj mdr•tadkar J,
become trustee de son tort, and second that the
properties covered by the document have been
sold for idadequate consideration. It is conceded
by Mr. Ganapathy Iyer that if we confirm the
finding recorded by the Courts below against
defendant 12 on the first point that itself would
invalidate the transfer in his favour. He has,
however, argued that the said finding is erroneous.
Having carefully considered the relevant material
we see no reason to interfere with the finding in
question. In this connection it would be enough
if we briefly refor to the relevant evidence bearing
on this point. Defendant 12 wrote to Pichu Ayyar
Avergal, defendant 15, who was a clnk of the trust
estate on August :20, 1936, in these words: "I
request you that Pathai properties may be checked,
that Piramanayakam Pillai coming (there) may be
consulted with regard to all matters and settlement
made and that you may also come here on Monday
morning and render necessary assistance". The
tone of the communication and its contents are
significant. It is not the language of a person who
is merely assisting the trustee. He is issuing
directions to the clerk of the trust. Defendant 12
was a creditor of defendants 1 to 6. It is, however,
common-ground that when sale deed (Ex. B-12)
was executed in favour of def.indant 13 on
December 19, 1936, defendant 13 who is no other
than the brother of defendant 12 had undertaken
to satisfy defendant 12's debt and so as from that
date defendant 12 had ceased to be a creditor of
the estate. Even so, he was intermeddling with
the estate throughout. On October 14-, 1938, he
wrote to the Agent of the Travanoore National and
Quilon Bank suggesting that he would pay a sum
of Rs. 10,000 for the entire amount pa.ye.hie to the
bank by the clebtors and he requested the Bank to
have the debt discharged in that manner. Then
he added that "na the price of the lands have gone
down very much owing to conditions at the present
time" he requested that the sum of Rs, 10,000 may
-
"
•
(1) S.C.R. SUPREME OOUH.T REPORTS
235
1161
be received and that the entire debt should
thus be discharged. It. would be noticed that L. Janokirama I) e
v.
at this date defendant 12 was not a creditor of the
P. M. JVilak•nla
estate and he had, therefore, no business to write to
Iyer
the Bank. This letter, like the earlier one which Gajendrogatlkar J
we have already seen, clearly indicates that defendant 12 had taken it upon himself to administer the
tsust.. To the same effect is another letter written
by him to the Official Liquidator of the said Bank
,on January 9, 1939. In this letter defendant 12
says that "the trustees are arranging for several
settlements in deference to the wishes of Mr. Ayyah
Sastri, but owing to the nature of time the matter
stands unsettled even though both are agrAed
willingly'". Then he refers to the proposal to settle
all the debts and promises that "the matter will be
finally settled if the trustees meet you personally".
"!, therefore, request you". says defendant 12,
to kindly excuse the little delay and pray to fulfil
the great task", and ho adds "I am also coming
there''. Then followed a suit by the Bank, No. 12
of 1939, to which defendants 12 and 13 were impleaded; and in this suit defendants 12 and 13
entered into a compromise with the plaintiff Bank
and obtained a compromise decree. It is unnecessary to refer to the terms of the compromise decree.
What is material is the conduct of defendant 12 in
entering into compromise with the Bank. Defendant 13 may have been justified in entering into
tlie compromise but defendant 12 could have done
so only as an intermeddler. This decree was
passed on February 14, 1941. Ex. P-7 is also
relevant on this point. This is a notice issued to
defendant 12 by one of the creditors of the estate.
It appears that this creditor had given to defendant
12 a receipt signed by him in order to enable
defendant 12 to draw the amount.from defendant
14 to be paid to the said creditor. The notice
furj;her recites that "it now transpires that about
the middle of July, 1937, you drew the said amount
of Rs.425 from the said Janakirama Iyer and have
236 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1962] SUPP.
1961
..
:. J .,,.i,;,.,..
1,,,.
P. M. Nilakanla
lajtntlragadUr J.
failed till now to account for the same to my
client". In other words, this notice shows that
defendant 12 had promised to pay to the creditor
Rs.425 due to him from the estate and had failed
to do so. The result was the suit by the creditor
(Small Cause Suit No. 58 of 1940). This suit again
was compromised by defendant 12.
There is yet another document Ex-121 which
shows how defcndaDt 12 was intermeddling with.
the estate. This is a receipt paBBed hy the clerk of
the estate to one Subbayyar Avergal on March 9,
1937. It reads thus: "According to the order
directed by defendant 12 I have received from you
on this date Rs. 400 from the sale of the current
Pisanam paddy produce from the estate of M. R.
Ry. P.S. KrishnaswamiAyyar Avergal vagaira, Kalakkadu Pannai". It is clear that the clerk of the estate
Pichandi Ayyar who passed the receipt had been
directed by defendant 12 to receive Rs.400 from
Subbayyar Avcrgal. He had accordingly recived
that amount and passed . a receipt in that
behalf. Now, if defendant 12 directed the clerk of
the estate to receive a certain amount for and on
behalf of the C8tate it clearly amounte to intermedding with the estate and it makes him trustee
de son wrt. Defendant 12 had given evidence in
the earlier litigation in which he had stated that
he, defendant 13 and Veerabahu Pillai were members of an undivided family. In the present
proceedings defendant 12 has gone back upon his
admiBBion that he and his brothers constituted an
undivided family. The trial court has accepted
this latter plea and the High Court has not differed
from it; but that apart, the several statements
made by defendant 12 in the said evidence clearly
show that he was taking as mn~h active part in
the affairs of the trust as his brother Veerabahu.
There is yet another fact to which reference
may be made. As the High Court has pointed out,
the sale in favour of defendant 12 was executed on
..
(l) S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
237
November 7, 1941, and yet the properties covered by
the said document appear to have been put in his
possession as early as 1937. In other words, defend·
ant 12 entered into possession of the properties nearly
four years before the sale was executed in his
favour. It is in the light of these facts that the
.Courts below have held that defendant 12 is a
trustee de son tort. As is observed in •'Williams
on Executors and Administrators" (1) "a very slight
act of intermeddling with the goods of the deceased
will make a person executor de son toft". In the
present case the acts of intermeddling by defendant
12 spread over a fairly long period and cannot in
any sense be regarded as minor and insignificant.
We would accordingly hold that defendant 12 is in
the position of trustee de son tort and so the sale
deed executed in his favour (Ex.B-90) is bad on
that account alone.
In regard to defendant 13 there are two
transactions in his favour, Ex. B-37 and Ex.B-79.
Ex. B-37, as we have already seen, is invalid for
the reason that it has, been executed by two out of
the three trustees. That leaves E;x. B-79; but
before we deal with that transaction it would be
relevant to refer to a general consideration which
applies to all the transfers in favour of defendants
12, 13 and 16. Defendants 12 and 13 are the stepbrothers of Veerabahu and defen<lant 16 is the sonin-law of defendant 13. It is quite clear that under
s. 52 of the Trusts Act "no trustee whose duty it
is to sell trust-property, and no agent employed by
such trustee for the purpose of the sale, may,
directly or indirectly, buy the same or any interest
therein, on his own account or as agent for a third
person". This position is thus stated by Lewin
on Trust: "A trustee is absolutely and entirely
disabled from purchasing the trust property whether it be. real estate or a chattel personal, land, or
a ground rent, ill . reversion or possession, whether
the p11rchase be made in the trustee's own name or
(I}
Williams of Executars and Administrators, 14th ed., Vol. I, P. 28.
1961
L. ,J,,nakirama 1)-,r
v.
P. M. Nilakanta
Iyer
Gajerid1agadk'lr J.
238 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [196!l] SUPP.
in the name of a trustee for him, directly or indiI .. J nnakiTama l,Jtr rectly, as to a purchaser upon a contract or unv.
derstanding (amounting to more than mere expectaP. M . .Vi/ali,.ta
tion) that the purchaser shall re-sell to the trustee,
ly1r
Gajtnt!razat!kar .T.
by private contract or public auction, from himself
as the single trusteo, or with the sanction of his cotrustees( 1)". Thus, the alienations by the trustees
in favour of the near-relatives of one of the trustees
would be bad for this reason. Besides, under
s. 47 of the Indian Trusts Act a trustee cannot delegate his office or any of his duties either to a co·
trustee or to a stranger, unless the instrument of
trust so provides, or the delegation is in the regu Jar
course of business, or the delegation is nece88ary,
or the beneficiary, being competent to contract,
consents to the delegation. The trust did impose
upon the trustees the obligation to sell the properties of the trust at the highest price recoverable
and to distribute the sale proceeds amongst the
creditors of the authors of the tru it. Tho documonts in favour of defondants 13 and HJ seem t-0
leave it to the respective purchasera to pay tho
d.:bts and that may be another infirmity in t.hc
transaction.
Going back to Ex. B-79 which is a transfer in
favour of defendant 13 it is evident th'l.t this
transaction is inevitably conneted with another
transact.ion Ex. B-25. Ex. B.79 has been executed
for a consideration of Rs. 2,000 and odd and it
relates to 3 acres and 14 cents of schedule VIII
property. It appears that defendant 13 had
obtained another sale deed Ex. B.25 on April 19,
1937. This sale deed consisted of 51 items of
property belonging to the trust which had spread
over five villages. These items consisted of housesitcs and lands. The sale deed was for Rs. 5,000.
D(·fcndant 13 in his turn prooeeded to sell the said
property by different lots to respective buyers.
Amongst the creditors of the estate was Lak8hmi
!Kl
(I)
Lewin on Trusts, llth ed., p. 797.
..
•
(1) s.c.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
239
1961
Ammal to whom Rs. 800 was payable on the basis
IJtT
of 50% of return of debt. Defendant sold to L. Jonakirama
v.
Lakshmi Ammal 6i cents out of the lands purchas- P, M. Ni/akanfa
/;·er
ed by him under Ex. B.25. . It, however, appears
that in respect of the 3 acres and 14 cents which Oajt1ulragadkar J.
was the subject-matter of Ex. B-25. Original
Suit No. 32 of 1941 was instituted Ly persons who
claimed title to the said property. To that suit
Lakshmi Ammal was impleaded as to defendant
and so was defendant 13. Ultimately the said suit
was decreed and the property in question was held
to belong to the plaintiffs in that suit and not to
the estate of defendants 1 to &. It was as a result
of this decree that Ex. B-79 came to be passed in
favour of defendant 13. This document purports
to convey 3 acres and 14 cents of another property
to make good the loss to him by reason of the
decree in Suit No. 32 o{ 1941. Thus, it would be
seen that tl:.e transaction evidenced by Ex. B-79 can
stand only if the transaction by evidenced by Ex. B-25
is valid and not otherwise. The Courts below have
held that this latter transaction is obviouslv and
patently invalid. In our opinion, this conciusion
is right. It is true that Ex. B-25 is not directly
challenged in the present suit because the properties covered by it have been sold to different
purchasers by d"lfendant 13 and they have not been
impleaded. Even so, since Ex. B-25 is the very
foundation of Ex. B-79 it is open to the plaintiffs to
contend that the validity of Ex. B-25 Rhould be
considered for determining the validity of Ex. B-79,
and that is what the Courts below have done.
Now, one has merely to look at the broad features
of Ex. ~-25 to be satisfied that it is an invalid
transaction. It is patent that no attempt was made
to value the properties individually. The properties
numbering 51 and spread over five villages were
all grouped together and sold for Rs. 5,000 without
making any serious efforts to determine the value
24.0 SUPREME OOURT REPORTS [1962) SuPP.
JIBJ
L. J auAirama lyv
••
P. M. Jri/akan14
lytt
GajtttJratatl1ar J.
of the l'lt. The purchaser was told to sell the proper·
ties to the respective creditors of the estate e.nd thus
satisfy them. Th~ in subste.noe is delegation of
the functions of the trustees which they could not
delegate to defendant 13. The stamp paper for the
so.le deed Ex. B-25 stands in the name of Veerabe.hu
Pillai e.nd defendant 13 was unable to explain how
the stamp paper came to be in that name. Defendant 13 admitted that he did not inspect the proper·
ty before its purchase and that he had no idea
a.bout its value. As the trial court he.d observed,
the transaction cannot be regarded "as e. bona fide
sale because the property consists of odd a"8ortment
of punj:i. lands e.nd house sites in Pe.thi, Pe.dmaneri
and Sivalpuri villages". Therefore, we have no
difficulty whatever in agreeing with the conclusion
of the Courts below that Ex. B-25 was invalid; if
that be so Ex. B-79 must be held to be invalid for
that reason alone. Incidentally, we may refer to
the fact that defendant 13 admitted in the earlier
suit that he had not refunded the purchase money
to Lakshmi Ammo.I and that substantially destroys
the be.sis of Ex. B-79 because defendant 13 not he.v·
ing paid anything to Lakshmi Ammal had no right
to rote.in the property conveyed to him.
The le.st transactions which have yet to be examined a.re those in favour of defendant 16. In
regard to these transactions the trio.I court has
found that evidence adduced by the plaintiffs shows
that the consideration for which properties were
sold were grossly inadequate. The vendee, defen·
dant 16, did not care to
examine himself.
Besides, e.s we have already pointed out he is e.
close relation of defendants 12 and 13. The High
Court has concurred with the trial court's conclusion. The only point which was attempted to be
me.de by Mr. Pattabhire.man in challenging the
correctness of this concurrent conclusion is that the
Courts appear to have e.ssumed that the agricultural
lands conveyed to defendant 16 were all dou hie
crop lands. On this assumption he suggested that
(1) S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
241
the calculation made about the true value of the
said properties errs on the side of overstatement.
It is not disputed that of the lands conveyed 3
acres and 24 cents are single crop while approximately 3~ acres are double crop. On looking at the
judgments of both the Courts below, however, we
are satisfied that the argument is misconceived because neither. judgment proceeds on the assumption
that the whole of the agricultural property is double
crop land. In fact the discussion in the judgment
of the trial court on Issue No. 27 quite clearly negatives the assumption made by Mr. Pattabhiraman.
that being so, as the Courts below have observed,
evidence led by the plaintiffs in support of their
case that the transfers were efi'ected for grossly
inadequate price has -remained unrebutted. The
quest;on about the value of the property has been
determined on the evidence, documentary and oral,
led in the case, and both th'3 Courts have found in
favour of tb.e plaintiffs and against the alienees.
Incidentally, we may point out that Mr. Viswanatha
Sastri appears to be right when he suggests that
schedule VII refers to the properties both at Thirukurunkudi as well as Padmaneri though the heading
of the schedule refers only to. Thirukurunkudi.
In the result Civil Appeal No. 77 of 1959 preferred
by defendants 12, 13 and 16 fails and is dismissed
with costs.
Appeals dismissed.
L. J arurkirama. IJI'
v.
P. M. Nilakanta
Y"
Gajerrdragadkar J.
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