THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES, AYURVEDIC AND UNANI TIBIA COLLEGE, DELHI versus THE STATE OF DELHI AND ANOTHER
Supreme Court of India | Decided 23 October 1961 | [1962] SUPP. 1 S.C.R. 156 | 1961 INSC 299
Key facts
- Decided
- 23 October 1961
- Bench
- BHUVNESHWAR PRASAD SINHA, S.K. DAS, A.K. SARKAR, N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR, J.R. MUDHOLKAR
- Bench size
- 5
- Case number
- WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) No. 96/1955
- Disposal
- Dismissed
- Citation
- [1962] SUPP. 1 S.C.R. 156
- Neutral citation
- 1961 INSC 299
Text of the judgment
156 BUPREiltE COC'RT RElQRTS [19f~] SUPP.
1111
T~E BOARD OF TRUSTEES, AYURVEDIC AND
OtttHtr 23.
UNANI TIBIA COLLEGE, DELHI
t'-
ti.
THE STATE OF DELHI AND ANOTHER
(B. P. SINHA, c. J., s. K. DAS, A. K. SARKAR,
N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR and
J. R. MuDHOLKAR, JJ.)
Registered Society-Wliether a corporation-Stat. enactment
dia.o/ving suclo aocir.ty and aelting up corporati-On in ita placeCo11.sti1utionaliry of-Tibbia College Act, 1962 (Delhi 6 of 1962).
-R•giarered Societies Act, 1860 (21of1860), s.. 6,6,7,!3,14Uot'trn'™11t of Part 0 Stat.a Act, 1961 J49 of /9fil), s.~O
Co111litution of b1dia, Ar~. U, 19(1)( ), JI and Srnmlh
Scl.edule, List 1 E11try 44, ,Liat JI Entry 32, Li81 Ill Entries
JO and !!8.
•
The Board of Trusteu, Ayurvedic and Unani Tibbia
College, Delhi wa• registered under the Societie9 Registration
Act, 1860. It ran the Tibbia College, Delhi and an attached
ho>tel and managed the Hindustani Dawakhana. The Delhi
State Legislature passed the Tibbia College Act, 1952, which
dissolved the Board, incorporated a new Board and vested all
the property and all the rights, powers and privileges of the
old Board in the new Board. The petitioners challenged the
validity of the Act on the grounds: (i) that the old Board was
a corporation whose objects were not confined to Delhi and
legiJlation with regard to it would fall under Entry 44 of List
I of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution and as such the
State Legislature was not competent to pa" the impugned
Act, (ii) that the setting up of a new Board as a corporation
wa• beyond the powen of the State Legislature, (iii) that the
Act violated Arts. 14,19 and 31 of the Constitution, (iv) that
the Act could not override the Societies Registration .Act, 1860
which was> Central Act, and (v) that the legblature a<:ted
mala fiM in passing the impugned Act.
Held, (per Sinha, C. J., Das, Sarkar and AyyaMpr,lJ.)
that the State Legislature was compelent to enact the
impugned Act. On ~tration under the Socie~ies ~egistration Act the old Board dtd not become a corporation 1n the
11ense of bei1111 incorporated within the meaninp; ofBntry 44 of
Li1t I; it continued to be an unincorporated IOCiety though
under the provisions of the Socictiea Registration Act it had
certain privikgcs analogous to those of corporations. The
provisions in the impugned Act relating to the dissolution of
the old Board fell within the second part of Entry 32 of List II
which included
unincorporated
societies. Though the
impugned Act while creating the new Board gave it a
corporate status, it confined its po1rers-and duties to institutions
•
..
(1)
s.c.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
107
in Delhi and limited its rights, powers and privileges to the
purposes for which it was created. The pr-0visions of the
impugned Act relating to the incorporation of the new Board
fell within the first part of Entry 32 of List II.
Taff Valt Railway v. .A.malgamakd Society of Railway
Servants, (1900) A.O. 426 and Bo11Aor v. Musicians' Union,
L.R. 1956 A.C. !04, referred to.
J
II
Krishnan v. Sundaram, (1940) 43 Bom. L.R. 562,
Boppana Ru,,,.inamma v. Maganti Vt11kata Ramadas, A.l.R.
1940 Mad. 946, M . .A.. Nullflitr v. Official Assignee, Madras,
A.I.R. 1951 Mad. 875 and Satyavart Sidhantalanl:ar v. Tht
Arya Samaj, Bombay, (1945) 48 Born. I .. R. 541, distinguished.
The Stroanl8 of India Society, Poona v. Tht Charity
Commissioner of Bombay, (1960) 63 Bom. L.R. 379, approved.
Htld, further, that the impugned Act did not violate
Arts. 14,19 or 31. The petitioner had failed to show that
there were other institutions similarly situated as the petitioner
and that the petitioner had been picked out for unequal treatment. Since the transfer of management was made by a valid
law there was no question of violation of Art. 31 (I); and since
the impugned Act did not provide for compulsory acquisition
of property Art. 31 (2), as it stood at the relevant time, had
no application. Neither the dissolved Board nor its members
had any right to hold the property of the dissolved Board and
there was no infringement af Art. 19(l}(f) involved in the Act
vesting the property in the new Board. Under the Societies
Registration Act, the members of a society did not acquire
any beneficial interest on the dissolution of the society; the
only right which they had was to determine as to which other
society the property should be given to for management.
This was not a right to property within the meaning of Art.
19(l}(f) and the taking away of such a right by the impugned
Act did not violate Art. 19( I) (f}.
Ohiranjit Lal Ohowdhuri v. Tht Union of India, [1950]
S.C.R. 869, relied on.
Mate of WEBI Bengal v. Subodh Gopal Bose, {1954] S.C.R.
587 and Dwarkadas 8hrini111U1 v. 'l'ke Sholapur Spinning and
Wea,ing Oo., Ltd. (1954] S.C.R. 674, distinguished.
Held, further, that there was no question of conflict between a law made by Parliament and a law made by the State
Legislature as the Societies Registration Act, 1860, was not a
law made by Parliamen1. The State Legislature had the power
either to amend the Societies Registratimt Act in rcsp«:t of unincorporated societies, or to make a law relating to a corpora-
tion provided its activities were confined to Delhi. The·Di!lh.
State Legislature did not transgress·any af its limitMIC>As·in
1'fl
Tlu.l1Hdllf
r_,_, Ayurr.iie
••••/. u...,.; r;n.
c.11.,••.D,J/ri
••
Thr &1"'6 •I D1hi
168 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1962] SUPP.
1"1
'l'lw Boni of
T nutm, A.1"'..&
and Unani Tibia
Colkt•. D1/M
v.
Th< 81011 of D1/hi
•·
enacting the impugned Act and no que.iion of mola jidu of
the legislature arose.
K.C. Gajapati .Varriyn Deo v. The State of Orissa, [1654]
S.C.R. l. relied on.
Per, Mudholkar, J., Though the old Board could not be
regarded as a corporation as the Societies Registration Act does
not provide for incorporation, it passessed some of the attributes of a corporation and it was a 'near corporation' or a 1 qua'ii
corporation'. It was a legal entity. The second part of Entry
32 of List II did not permit a law to be made which took away
from an existing legal catity its powers such as tho;e conferred
by the Societies Registration Act and which destroyed the
lr!(lll entity. The impugned Act could not be supported under
the first part of Entry 32 of List II as the objects of the Board
were not limited to the Delhi State. But Entries IO and 28
of List III permitted the State Legislature to make a law
di!S<Uv1ng a charitahle trust and transferring its property,
rights etc. to another institution and the i1npugned :\ct could
be sustained und'Cr these Entries.
Serr'(lnt• of IndifJ Soci'1y, Poona v. The Charity Comm;.,.
1ioner of Bombay, (I 960) 63 Born. L. R. 397, The Taff Vnl•
Rrzilu,'(1y Co. r. Th, Amalgamated Snriety nf Railuuz.y 1i)eria11t",
[IYOI] A.C. 426 and Bon«or '" Mu.<ioian.•' Union, [19j6] A.C.
104, referred to.
0RIOP-'IAJ. JURISDJCTJO:S: Petition No. 96 of
1955.
Petition und<>r Art. 32 of the Constitution of
India. for enforcement of Fundamental Rights.
Purushottam
Tricumdas, J. B. Dad11chauf,
R11vindra Narain and 0. C. Mathur, for tho petitioner.
S. K. Das J.
C. K. DaphtanJ, Solicitor-General of India,
B. R. L. Iyengar and T.M. Sen, for the respondent8.
1961. October 23. The Judgment of Sinha,
C. J., Das, Sarkar and Ayyangar, JJ., was delivered by Das, J. Mudholkar, J., delivered a separate
Judgment.
S. K. DAS, J.-This is a writ petition on
behalf of two petitioners. The first petitioner
is the Board of TruHtees, Ayurvedic and Unani
'fibbia College, Delhi, through Hakim Mohammed
Jamil Khan, stated to be its properly elected
Secretary. The Becond petitiJner is Hakim
.
(1) S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1511
l\:lohammad Jamil Khan himself, who states tbat
he is still one of the trustees or members of the said
Board. The petition was initially filed on behalf
of the first petitioner. Subsequ ntly, an amendment petition was moved which was allowed by us.
As a result of the amendments allowed petitipner
No. 2 was added as one of the petitioners, and
certain new grounds of attack were added in para.
14 of the petition. To these grounds we shall
advert later.
The short facts giving rise to the petition are
these. One Hakim Mohammad Ajmal Khan was a
physician (of Unani medicine) of all-India repute.
He lived in Delhi and started a pharmaceutical
institute in the town known as Hindustani Dawa·
khana in the year 1903.
He also established a medical college known
as the Tibbia College. He dfod in the year 1927.
But before his de1tth, in the year 1911, he along
with certain other persons formed a society styled
Anjuman-i-Tibbia and had it registered under the
Societies Registration Act, 1860 (Act XXI of 1860).
Tho name of the society was changed in 1915, and
it bemme known as the Board of Trustees, Ayurvedic and UQani Tibbia College, Delhi. For
convenience we shall refer to it .as the Board.
The Board ran the Tibbia College' and an attached
hostel. The pharmaceutical institute was also
managed by it, though at one stage petitioner
No. 2 claimed the institute as his private property.
Certain rules and regulations were made for the
functioning of the Board, which were amended
from time to time. The main objeets of. the Board
were thus stated in the rules :(a) to establish colleges for the purpose
of imparting higher education in the Unani
and Ayurvi;idic systems of medicine to the
inhabitants of India;
(b) to improve the indigenous systems of
medicine on scientific lines and for that
0
JIMJ
T/,,Boord•f
Trustees, Ayuniedit
~d Unaai Tibia
College, Delhi
v
The Stote of Delhi
S.K. D., J.
160 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1982) SUPP.
1151
TJ,, 8-'•f
f'nutu1, A;11Tw/k
and u1l41li rthia
Coilt11, Dtllti
Y.
n. Stau of V.lhi
S. A.DosJ,
,.
purpose to establish one or more phanna.ceutical institutes (dawakhanas); and
( c) to h!\ve medical books compiled and
tr1mslatf'd and to adopt other means which
might enbanoe the popularity of those systems
and add to the information of the people in
general on hygiene etc..
The maximum number of mt>mbers (callrd
trustees in the ruks) was ~5 to be elected from a.II
the then Provinoes of India. It was stated in
r. 5 that one-third of the membt•rs of the Board
should be Hakima and Vaid8. The financial yt>ar
of the Board was to be from April 1 to March 31
of each year, snd the annual au bscription to be
paid by a member of the Board was fixed at
Rs. J 2/- per annum payable in advance before
April 30 of each year. Rule 6 laid down the
circtJmstances in which the office of a mem her
should he deemed to be vacant, and one of such
ciicumstances was the failure of a member to
pay his annual sub8cription before the date fixed
for such p!\yment. There were also rules regarding (a) power of in~pection of the co liege, hoste 1
etc., ( b) ordinary meetings of the Board of Trustct•s
and (c) matters which could be dealt with by the
Boa.rd and its sub-committees. It is not necci:•ary
to state these rulea in detail. Rule 13 provided
for the formation of a Managing Committee consisting of nine mem hers and six officials for a
period of three years and the functions of the
Managing Committt>e were also prescribed in the
rules. The office-bearers of the Board and the
Managing Committee were to be the same and
consisted of (i) a President, (ii) a Senior Vice.
President, (iii) a Junior Vice-President, (iv) a
Secretary, ( v) a Financial Secretary, and (vi) a
Joint Secretary. It was la.id down in r. 26 that
the offioe, bearers of the Board were to be elected
for three years by the members. Thr rules also
la.id down the powers and duties of the President,
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•
(1) S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 161
JIMJ
Secretary, Financial Secretary and Joint Secretary.
One of the rules said that the office of the Secrel'MB..n of
A"'""""
tary of the Board shall, as far as possible, vest T"""''•
ond Unani Tibia
in the lineal descendants of Hakim Mohammad
c.u.,•• Dtlii
Ajmal Khan. Hakim Moh'l.mmad Jamil Khan, Tiii Stallv.of 1"
son of Hakim Mohammad Ajmal Khan and peti·
tioner no. 2 before us, was the first Secretary of S.K.DosJ.
the Board.
In the year 1948 Shri Rameshwar Dayal, the
then Collector of Delhi, and Dr. Yudhvir Singh
the then President of the Delhi Municipal Com·
mittee, and certain other persons were eleoted
as members of the Board. Dr. Yudhvir Singh
was elected President and one Shri Mool Chand
Gagerna was appointed Joint Secretary: Soon
after the
elections in 1948, a struggle
ensued
between
different
~oups
of
members for obtaining control of the Board
and the college,
and for posseBBion of
the Hindustani Dawakhana. Certain criminal
proceedinjls followed. On October 18, 1949, a suit
was brought in the court of the senior Subordinate
Judge, Delhi under s. 92 of the Code of Civil
Procedure against the Secretary and 31 members
of the Board. In. that suit an application was ma.de
for the appointment of a receiver and on October
19, 1949, the Subordinate Judge appointed two
local advocates as joint receivers with plenary
powers. These receivers took poBBession of the
Dawakhana and the college between October 19 and
23, 1949. When the suit was still pending, the Delhi
State Legislature passed an Act called the Tibbia
College Act, 1952 (Delhi Act No. 5 of 1952), herein·
after referred to as the impugned Act. This Act.
came into force on October 10, 1952. The constitu·
tional validity of the Act is the principal question
for decision on .this writ petition and we shall
presently refer to the provisions thereof. We may
only state here that by s. 9 of the impugned Act,
the Board stood diBBolved and all property, movable
and immovable, and all right.a, powel'B and privileges
-·
162 SUPREME OOURT REPORTS [1962] SUPP.
J96J
T,,;a-d of
Tnutus, .A_,.,.,&
•ti Unani Tibi1'
<AU.gt, DllJU
v.
T Ill St.z. of Dtllzi
S. I(. D .. J.
of the Board vested in a new Board constituted
under the Act. This new Board is called the Tibia.
College Board 1md we shall refer to it as the new
Board. After tho passing of the impugned Act,
the suit instituted before the Subordinate Judge,
Delhi was withdrawn. On t.he withdrawal of the
suit, an application was made for making over
possession of the properties to tho new Board. That
application was allowed in spite of the objection of
petitioner no. I. Petitioner no. I unsuccessfully
moved the High Court of Punjab against that
order.
Thereafter, petitioner no. I moved this Court
under Art. 32 of the Constitution for the issue of a
writ restraining the State of Delhi and the newly
constituted Board under the impugned Act, the
State from enforcing th9 provisions of the impugned
Act and the new Board from exercising any functions thereunder. The respondents to the petition
raised a. number of preliminary objections, and on
December 13, 1954, the writ petition was withdrawn.
This was followed by some amendments of the rules
of the Board and it is stated on behalf of the
petitioners that a fresh election was held in accordance with the amended rul011 on January 6, 1955.
On January 11, 1955, the Managing Committee
passed a. resolution authorising the Secretary to
institute a proceeding in this Court to enforce the
funds.mental rights of petitioner no. I. The prE>sent
petition was then filed on Mnrch 14, 1955, in pursuance of tha.t resolution. The petition wa.s subsequently a.mended in the manner already indicated
Ly us. The Sta.to of Delhi a.nd the new Boa.rd are
the respondents to the prcl!<'nt petition.
The lea.med Advocate for the petitioners has
challenged the validity of the Act on two ma.in
grounds. Bia first ground ia that the Delhi Stato
Legislature ha.d no legi~lative power or competence
to enact the impugned Act, which must on that
ground be declared invalid and inoperative. The
second ground proceeds on the footing that assuming
'.
•
(1) S.C.R.
•
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
163
the Delhi State Legislature had power to enact
the impugned Act, the Act is bad because its several
provisions violate the fundamental rights guaranteed to the petitioners under Arts. 14, 19 and 31 of
the Constitution. Two subsidiary points have also
been urged before us, one to the effect that the
Delhi State Legislature could not by the impugned
Act over-ride the provisions 1 of the Societies
Registration .Act, 1860 which is a Central Act, and
the other to the effect that the Delhi State Legislature acted mala fide in passing the impugned Act.
We shall presently deal with these arguments
in the order in which we have stated them. It is
necessary to state here, howtiver, that a preliminary
objection similar to the one urged against the'
·previous petition was also urged in respect of the
present petition. The learned Solicitor General
appearing on behalf of the respondents has urged
that by reason of the failure of the members to pay
the annual sub8cription in time, all of them ceased
to be members in 1950-1951; therefore, the elections
held in 1955 were of no effect there being no one
competent to elect; and the Board as a Board
ceased to exi3t before 1955 and neither petitioner
no. 1 nor petitioner no. 2 could maintain the
present writ petition. Some of the affidavits made
on behalf of the parties containlng averments with
regard to the payment or non-payment of subscription particularly in the years 1949-50 and 1950-51
were read, and Ex. B series which were the cash
books of the years 1951 to 1954 were also placed
before us. On one side there is the averment on
behalf of the respondents that no subscriptions were
paid before the due date for the years 1949-50 and
1950-51 by any of the members. As against this,
it is stated on behalf of the petitioners that
petitioner no. 2 and some of the other members
paid their subsc~iption to the Financial Secretary
for the years 1949-50 and 1950-51. An affidavit
made by the then Financial Secretary was also
placed before us. From a pemHal of the affidavits
-
1951
TluBoar4""
T mtees, A.J117Wdic
and Unani Tibia
Col/111, D1lhi
v.
PIN Slal1 of D1llii
S.K. D.,J,
164 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1962) SUPP.
1~1
and the documente filed it appeared to us that the
question being one of disputed facts could not be
Tnui.u,~
1a.tisfactorily decided on the materials placed before
U_,; Tobi•
O>U.g1, IH/Jti
us. We, therefore, thought it proper and convenient
to
consider the legal points urged as regards the
'l'M St.u of D.W
constitutional
validity of the impugned Act and of
S.K. DosJ.
the action taken thereon.
Now, we take up the first argument advanced
on behalf of the .petitioners. This argument has
been put in the following way. The State of Delhi
became a Part C State on the coming into force of
the Constitution of India.. Under Art. 239 of the
Constitution as itthen stood, a Part C State was to
, be administered by the President acting, to such
extent as he thought fit, through a Chief Corr.miss·
ioner or a Lieutenant-Governor to be appointed by
him or through the Government of a neighbouring
State. .Article 240 of the Constitution enabled
Parliament by law to create or continue for any
Part C State a body, whether nominated, elected or
partly nominated and partly elected, to fun<'tion as
a Legislature for the State. By virtue of the power
conferred by Art. 240, Parliament enacted the
Government of Part C States Act, 1951 (Central Act
49 of 1951 ), by which a Legislative Assembly was
constituted for some of the Part C States including
one for Delhi. Section 21 of the said Act laid down
the extent of legislative power of the Legislative
Assembly. This section said . inter alia that the
Legislative Assembly of a Part C State may make
laws for the whole or any part of the State with
respect to any of the matters enumerated in the
State List (List II) or in the Concurrent List (List
ill). There was an exception provided with regard
to the Legislative Assembly of the State of Delhi
in respect of public order, police etc., which is not
relevant for our purpOBe. Section 22 said that if
any provision of a law made by the Legislative
.Aseembly of a Part C State was repugnant to any
provision of a law made by Parliament, then the
71wB..,'•f
'°"
••
I
•
(1) S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
165
law made by Parliament, whether passed before or
after the law made by the Legislative Asst-mbly of
the State, shall prevail and the law made by the
Legislative Assembly of the State shall, to the
extent of the repugnancy, be void. There is an
Explanation to the section which is not 'relevant
for our purpose and need not be read. The point
which the learned Advoeate for the petitioners has
emphasised is that under s. 21 aforesaid, the extent
of the legislative power of the Delhi State Legislature was limited to the making of laws for the
whole or a,ny part of the Delhi State with respect
to any of the matters enumerated in the State Lis~
or in the Concurrent List of the Seventh Schedule
to the Constitution. Now, item 32 of the State
List (List U) is in these terms:
"32. In corporation, regulation and
winding up of corporations, other than those
specified in List I, and universities, un-ineorporated trading, literary, scientific, religious
and other societies and associations; co-opera·
tive societies."
Items 43 and 44 of the Union List (List I) are in
these terms:
"43. Incorporation, regulation and winding up of corporations, including banking,
insurance and financial corporations but not
including co-operative societies.
44. Incorporation, regulation and winding up of corporations, whether trading or
not, with object.a not confined to one State,
but not including universities."
The argument of the learned Advocate for the
petitioners is this. The old Board which was registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860
and is petitioner no. 1 before us, was a corporation,
whose objects were not confined to the State of
Delhi. Therefore, any legislation with regard to
it would fall under item 44 of List 1 and not under
1961
Tiu Board of
Trustees, A,yurvedic
ond Unani Tihia
College, Delhi
••
Thi State of Delhi
S.K.Da..J.
166 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [196:2) SUPP.
1P61
11't BatUdof
Tnutus, Aµt-tdic
and U""11i Tibia
Col,,,,, Dtllii
V.
TM Stat, of Delhi
S. IC DGJ J.
item 32 of List II. This argument consists of two
parts-first, tha.t the old Boa.rd was a cnrpuration,
and, secondly, that its objects were not. confined to
one State. The learned Advocate m;;vs that that
being the position, the Delhi State ]j,~islaturc ha<l
no legislative competence to make the impugned
legislation which went b~yond the cxlcnt of its
legislative power w1<lcr s. 21 of Act 40 uf HJ51. It
is worthy of note here that if the Board wore not
a corporation, then the impugned legislation would
not fa.II under item 44 of List I at all; alternatively,
if the Boa.rd were a. curporati•_in but its objects
were confined to only one Stak, viz. th.: ~tatc of
Delhi, then again item 44 would not be attracted.
On behalf of the respondents there is a threefold
reply to the argument stated above: firsLly, that
the Board was not a corporation; secondly, its
objects did not extrmd beyond the ~tale of Delhi;
and thirdly, the impugned lcgidL>tion is support,iblc
under item I I of List II rclatiniz to "E<luca.tion" and
item 28 of the Concurrent List (List III) relating to
"Charities and ~haritable institution".
The first and foremost question i • whether
the old Board was a corporation in the legal Bense
of that word. What is a Corporation? Corporations may he <lividL'<l into two main classeH, namely,
corporations a.ggrr,gatc and corporations sole. We
arc not concerned in the present case with corporation solP. "A Corprm•tion aggrcgaui bas been
defined a.a a collection of individual,; united into
one body under a. special denomination, having
perpetual succe&1ion under an artificial form, and
vested by the policy of the la.w with the capacity of
acting in several respects a.s an individual, particularly of ta.king and granting property, of contmcting obligations and of suing a.nd being sued, of
enjoying privileges and immunities in common,
and of exercising a variety of political rights, moro
or leBB extensive, according to the design of its
institution, or the powers conferred upon it, either
at the time of its croation or at l\ny subsequent
..
(1) S.C.R.
SUPREME OOURT REPORTS
167
period of its existence". (Halabury's Laws of
England, 3rd Edn. Vol. 9, p&ge 4.) A corporation
aggregate has therefore only one capacity, namely, its
corporate capacity. A corporation aggregate may be
a trading corporation or a non-trading corporation.
The usual examples of a trading corporation are
(1) charter companies, (2) companies incorporated
by special acts of parliament, (3) companies registered under the Companies Act, etc. Non-trading
corporations are illustrated by ( 1) municipal corporations, (2) district boards, (3) benevolent institutions, (4) universities etc. An essential element
in the legal conception of a corporation is that its
identity is continuous, that· is, that the original
member or memberR and his or their successors are
one. In law the individual corporators, or members,
of which it is composed are something wholly rlilfe.
rent from the corporation itself; for a corporation
is a legal persona just as much as an individual.
Thus, it has been held that a name is essential to a
corporation; that a corporation aggregate can, as a
general rule, only act or expreSB its will by deed
under its common seal; that at the present day in
England a corporation is created by one or
other of two methods, namely, by Royal Charter
of incorporation from the Crown or by the authority of Parliament that is to say, by or by virtue of
statute. There is authority of long standing for
saying that the e880nce of a corporation consists in
(!)lawful authority of incorporation, (2) the persons
to be incorporated, (3) a name by which the persons are incorporated, (4) a place, and (5) words
sufficient in law to show incorporation. No particular words are necessary for the creation of a corporation; any expreSBion showing an intention to
incorporate will be sufficient.
The learned Advocate for the petitioners has
referred us to various provisions of the Societies
Registration Act, 1860 and has contended that the
I!JdI
The Board of
T rustns, AywD1dic
and U""1ri TiMa
Coll1p, Delhi
v.
The State of D1lhi
S.Ir. D.,J.
168 SUPREME OOURT REPORTS [l!J62J SUPP.
1(;61
'1'/u B°"'d of
Tnutus, A._,urz:ttii'
nJ Und&i Tibia
C.U111, Drlhi
••
1M Sw. •f Dtlhi
B. Jr. D"' J.
result of these provisions wa.a to make tlic :Board a
corporation on registl'ation. It _is ncccssa.ry now
to rea.d some of the provisions of that Act. The
Act is entitled an Act for the registration of literary, scientific and charitable societies a.nd the
preamble states tha.t it wa.s enacted for improving
tho legal condition of societies established for the
promotion of literature, science, or the fine a.rte, or
for the diffusion of useful kno" ledge etc., or for
charitable purposes. Section l of the Act states
that any seven or more persona associated for :my
literary, scientific, or charitable purpose, or for any
such purpose as is described in e. :W of the Act
may, by subscribing their names to a memorandum
of allllociation a.n<l filing the same with the
Registrar of ,Joint-stock Companies form themselves into a. society under the Act. Section 2 lays
down that the memorandum of association shall
contain and one of the particulars it must contain
is "the objects of the society''. Section 3 dsals
with regi,iitration and the fees payable therefor.
Sections 5 and 6 a.re important for our purpose and
should be read in full.
"5. The property, movable and immovable,
belonging to a society registered under this
Aot, if not vested in trustees, shall be deemed
to be vested, for the time being, in the governing body of such society, and in all proceedinga, civil and criminal, may be described &11
the property of the governing body of such
society by their proper title.
"6. Every society registered under this Act
may sue or be sued in the name of the prcsi·
dent, chairman, or principal secretary, or
trustees, a.s shall be determined by the rull'll
and regulations of the society, and, ill
default of such determination, in the name of
suoh person as shall be appointed bv tho
governing body for the ocCDsion :
•
(1) S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
169
Provided that it shall be competent for
any person having a claim or demand against
the society, to sue the president or chairman,
or principal secretary of the trustees thereof,
if on an application to the governing body
some other officer or person be not nominated to be the defendant."
Section 7 provides for non-abatement of suits or
proceedings and the continua.nee of such suits or
proceedings in the name of or against the successor
of the person by or against whom the suit was
brought. Section 8 says that if a judgment is recovered against a person or officer named on behalf
of the society, such judgment shall not be put in
foroe against the property, movable or immovable,
or against the body of such person or officer, but
against the property of the society. Section IO
provid\ls that in certain circu.msta.nces mentioned
therein a member of the· society may be sued by
the society; but if the defendant shall be sucJessful
in any such suit brought at the instance of the
society and shall be adjudged to recover his costs,
he may elect to proceed to recover the same from
the officer in whose name the suit was· brought, or
from the society. Sections 13 and 14 provide for
dissolution of societies and the consequences of
such dissolution. These provisions have also
an important bearing on the questions before us
and are quoted in full.
"13. Any number not.less than three-fifths
of the members of any society may determine
that it shall be dissolved, and thereupon it
ahall be dissolved forthwith, or at the time
then agreed upon, and all necessary steps
shall be ta.ken for the disposal and settlement
of the property of the society, its claims and
liabilities, a.ooording to the rules of the said
society applicable thereto, if any, and, if not
then as the governing body shall find expedient, provided that, in the event of any
191<1
The B1wd of
Trustees, Ayurvedic
and Unani 'l'ibia
College, Delhi
v.
The State of Delhi
S. K. Das J.
170 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1962] SUPP.
Ifl'JI
Th. B-dof
1"nutu1, Ayu•vtilic
and VNJJ1i Tibi1J
Coll1~1, Dtlhi
v.
Th. S.a11 of Dtlhi
S. Jr. flu J.
dispute arising among the said governing body
or the members of the soeiety, the adjustment
of its affairs shall be referred to the principal
court of Original civil juriR<li..t inn of tho district in which the chief lmilding of the society
is ~ituat<J, and the Court shall make such
order in the matter as it shall deem requisite:
Provided that no society shall be diSBolved unless three-fifths of the members shall
have cxpr!'BBed a wish for such dissolution by
their vote~ delivered in person, or by proxy,
at a general meeting convened for the purpose:
Provided that whenever any Government
is a member of, or a contributor to, or otherwise interested in any society registered under this Act, such society shall not be dissolved, without tho consent of the Government
of the state of registration.
14. If upon the dissolution of any society
registered under this Act there shall remain,
after the l!Stisfaction of all its debts and
liabilities, any property whatsoever, the same
shall not be paid to or distributed among tho
members of the said society or any of them,
but shall be given to some ot,her society, to be
determined by tho votes of not less than throofifths of the members present personally or by
proxy at the time of the diMolution, or, in
default thereof, hy such Court as aforesaid:
Provided, however, that this clause ~hall
not apply to any society which shall have
been founded or established by the contributions of shareholders in the nature of a Jointstock Company."
Now, the question before us iii-regard being
had to the aforesaid provisions-was the Board a
corporation? Our conclusion is that it was not.
The most important point to be noticed in this
connection is that in the various provisions of the
(1) S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
171
Societies Registration Act, 1860, there are no
aufficient words to indicate an intention to incorporate , on the contrary, the provisions show that
th.ere was a.n absence of such intention. Section 2
no doubt provides for a name as also for the objects
of the society. Section 5, however states that the
property belonging to the society, if not vested in
trustees, shall be deemed to be vested in the
governing body of the society and in all proceedings,
civil and criminal, the property will be described as
the property of the governing body. The section
talks of property belonging f,o the society; but the
property is vested in the trustees or in the governing
body for the time being. Tlle expression "property
belonging to the society" does not give the society
a corporate status in the matter of holding or
acquiring property, it merely describes the property
which vests in the trustees or governing body for
the time being. Section 6 gives the society the
right to sue or be sued in the name of the president,
chairman etc. and s. 7 provides that no suit or
proceeding in a civil court shall abate by reason of
the death etc.' of the person by or against whom the
suit has been brought. Section 8 again says that
any judgment obtained in & suit brought by or
against the society shall b!l enforced against it. It
has been submitted before us that ss. 6, 7 a.nd 8
clothe the society with a legal personality and a
perpetual succession; and s. 10 enables the
members of the society to be sued as stra.ngers, in
certain circumstances, by the society, and the costs
awarded to the defendant in such a suit may be
recovered, at his election, from the officer in whose
na.me the snit was brought. Dealing with very
similar provisions (ss. 7, 8 and 9) of the English
Trade Union Act, 1871 (34 and 35 Viet, o. 31) Lord
Lindley said in the celebrated case of Taff Vale
Railway v. Amalgamated Society of Railway
Servants (').
(I) (1901] A. C. 426.
1961
TM Board of
Trwtus, AyurvedU
.tuI Unani Tibia
College, D1lhi
y,
The Stat1 of Delhi
S.K.DasJ.
l72 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1962) SUPP.
1161
TJo. Boa-« •f
'l'rwtu•, A.JUrt-edi.c
tttrtl f./nmri 1·thi•
Colu11, D1/lti
y,
Tiu Buu of Ddhi
S. Ir. DuJ.
"The Act does not in express terms say
what use is to be ma.de of tho name under
which the trade union is registered and by
which it is known. But a trade union which
is registered under the Act must hive a name
...... It may acquire property, but, not being
incorporated, recourse is had to the old wellknown machinery of trustees for acquiring and
holding such property, and for suing and
being sued in respect of it (88. 7, 8, !l). The
The property so held is, however, the property
of the union; the union is the beneficial owner.
...... The Act appears to me to indicate with
sufficient clearness that tho registered name
is one which may be used to denote the union
as an unincorporated society in legal proceed·
ings as ,,well a.s for businoSB and other
purposes.
In •Trade Union La.w' by N. A. Citrine (1950
edn.) to which the l~rned Advocate for the
petitioners ha.s referred, it is stated at p. 143 :
"The object of this section (s. 9) was to
provide a method of enabling legal prooeedings
to be brought in respect of the property of a
registered trade union. Since the legislature
had no intention of giving such unions
corporate status with power to hold property
and to sue and be sued in their registered
names, it was nooeBBary to provide for the
vesting of their property in trustees and to
permit them to bring or defend legal proceedings in respect of that property on the union's
behalf. 8ection 8 of this Act, having provided
for the vesting of the union's property in its
trustees, the present section supplements that
soction by empowering the trustees to bring
or defend, on the union's behalf, civil or
criminal proceedings concerning its property."
In Bonaor v. M'U8icia118' Union( 1) the position
(I) (L. R.) 1956 A. C. Jo+.
..
(1) S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
173
of a registered trade union in England came under
consideration of the House of Lords in :an appeal
from the Court of Appeal. On a review of earlier
decisions including the decision in Taff Vale Railway
v. Amalgamated Society of Railway Servant-'('),
Lord Macdermott, Lord KE•i1h of Avonholm and
Lord Somervell of Harrow held that a registered
· trade union was not a juristic person distinguishable
at any moment of time from the members of which
it was composed. After referrin<:?; to the various
provisions of the Trade Union Act, 1871 and some
of the earlier decisicns bearing on the question Lord
MacDermott said :
"I base this opinion primarily on the
statutes. The more closely they are examined
the clearer it seems to be that the legislature,
though minded to bestow upon registered
unions some of the gifts and attributes of legal
personality, had no intention of doing more
and was, indeed, averse to the idea of going
the whole length and making those unions
new creatures, distinct in law from their
membership, and fundamentally different
from the "combination" of persons which the
definition requires all trade unions to be."
Lord Morton of Henryton and Lord Porter, who
expressed the minority view, held that a registered
trade union though not an incorporated body, was
yet capable of entering into contracts and of being
sued as a legal entity, distinct from its individual
members.
It is clear from the aforesaid decisions that
provisions similar to the provisions of ss. 5, 6, 7
and 8 of the Societies Registration Act, 1860 were
· held not to show any intention to incorporate; on
the contrary, the very resort to the machinery of
trustees or the governing body for the time being
acquiring and holding the property showed that
there was no intention to incorporate the society or
(lJ [1901] A. C. 426.
1161
Th.Botndof
Trustees, AyurueJic
and Unani Tibia
College, Delhi
v.
The Stale of Del Iii
8. }(,Das J.
174 SUPREME OOURT REPORTS [l962J SUPP.
Illlll
union so 611 to give it a corporate oapacity for the
purpose of holding a.nd aoGuiring property. It
Tnultts, Ayurrtdic
appears
to us that the legal position is exactly the
ad Utfalli Tibia
Colle11, D1Uti
same with regard to the provisions in Bti. 5, 6, 7 and
••
8 of the Societies Registration Act, 1860. They do
Tk Sta11 of DtlAi
not show any intention to incorporate, though they
S. K. Dtu J.
confer certain privileges on a registered society,
which would be wholly unnecessary if the registered
society were a corporation. Sections 13 and
14 do not carry the matter any further in
favour of the petitioners. Section 13 provides
for dissolution of societies and adjustment of
their affairs. It says in effect that
on
diSBolution of .a. society neccBSary steps sha.11 be
taken for the disposa.l a.nd settlement of the property of the sooiety, its claims and liabilities,
according to the rules of the society; if there bo no
rules, then· as the govering body shall find it expedient provided that in the event of any dispute
arising among the said governing body or the
members of the ea.id society, the adjustment of the
affairs shall be referred to tho Court. Hert> again
the govering body is given a. legal power somewhat
distinct from that of the society itself; because
under s.16 the governing body shllll be the governors, council, directors, committee, trustees or other
body to whom by the rules and regulations of the
society the management of its a.lfairs is entrusted.
We have, therefore, come to the conclusion
that the provisions afroesaid rlo not establish the
main eSBential characteristic of a. corporation aggregate, namely, that of an intention to incorporate
the society. WI'< may further observe that the scheme
and provisions of the Societie,s Registration Act,1860
are very simila.r to those of the Friendly Societies
Act, 1896 (59 and 6') Viet. c. 25), as amended in
certain respects by subsequent enactments. It is
appropriate to quot.fl here what Dennis Lloyd has
said in his 'Law relating to Unincorporatcd ASBooiation' (1938 edn.) at page 59 in respect of the
71>1 Bo<ud of
•.
(1) S.C.R.
SUPREME OOuRT REPORTS
175
provisions of the Friendly Societies Act, 1896 as
modified by subsequent enactments. He has said :
"The modern legislation still maintains
the , policy of the older Aots in withholding
corporate status from friendly societies. Registration does not result in incorporation, but
merely entitles the society so registered to
enjoy the privileges conferred by the Act.
These privileges are of considerable importance and certain of them go a long way towards giving registered societies ...... a status
in many respects analogous tQ a corporation
strictly so-called, but without being technically
incorporated. Thus something in the nature of
perpetual succession is conceded by the provision that the society's property is to vest
in the trustees for the time being of the so·
ciety for the use and benefit of the society
and its members and of all persons claiming
through the members according to the society's
rules, and further (and this is the most noteworthy provision) that the property shall pass
to succeeding trustees without assignment or
transfer. In the same way, though th!l society,
being unincorporated, is unable to sue and be
sued in its own name, it is given the statutory
privilegA of suing and being sued in the name
of its trustees."
We think that these observations made with regard
to similar provisions of the Friendly Societies Act,
correctly and fuccinctly summarise the legal position
in respect of the several provisions of the Societies
Registration Act, 1860. Those provisions undoubtedly give certain privileges to a society registered
under that Act and the privileges are of considerable importance and some of those privileges are
analogous to the privileges enjoyed by a corporation, but there is r<'ally no incorporation in the
sense in which that word is legally understood.
1961
Tiu Board 4/
Trust11s. A.yurvedit
and Ur1cni Titia
Colltg~, lJtlhl
v.
The State of Delhi
s. K. l),a J.
176 SUPREME OOURT REPORTS [11162] SOPP.
1Hl
On behalf of the petitionel'8 relia.nce hae been
placed on tho decision in Krishnan v. 8undaram (')
Tr-.,Uts. Atuu:tdir. where Kania., J., (as he then was) said :
and U1W1I Tibia
Co/1111, Dtll i
"The position of a society regist.ered
••
The Sla11 of D1/hi
under the Societies Registration Act, 1860 is
like that of a club or a joint stock compa.ny."
S. If. Das J,
There was no discussion of the question of incorporation, and the decision cr.nnot be accepted as authoritatively laying down that a. society registered under
tho Societies Registration, Act is a corporation.
Thero was a similar observation without any dis·
cu8sion in Boppana Rulcminamma v. Maganli Venkata
Rumwl<1s (')and N. A. Nannier v. Officia/, A88ignee,
11/adra8 ('). There is, however, a fa.irlv full discUBeion of the question in Satyavart Sidhantalankar
v. The Arya Samaj, Bombay (') where Bhagwati, J.,
held that a society registered under the Societies,
Registration Act, 1860 was a legal entity apart
from the members constituting it, and it can suo and
be sued in its own name. The queation which fell
for decision in that case was not whether a society
registered under the Societies Registration Act was
'incorporate<!' as that term is legally understood.
The question there was whether such a society could
sue or be sued except in tho manner provided by
ss. 6 and 7. It was held that it could and the
reason given was thus expressed by the learned
Judge:
"I am of opinion that the provisions contained in ss. 6, 7 and 8 of the Societies Registration Act are not inconsistent with the user of
the regist.ered name of the society in connection
with legal prCJceedings. As Lord Lindley
observed in Taff Vale Ilailway Company's
case (supra), "I do not say that the use of the
name is compulsory but it is at 168.llt
permiBBive."
If this is the true legal position of a society
registered under the Societies Registration
Th.B-doj
(I)
11°40)43Bom.L.R.~!.
(S) A. I. R. 1951 Mad. IITS.
A.J.R.194f!Mad.!149.
(4) (194S) 48 Bom. I.. R. '41.
(1)
(I) S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
177
1961
Act, the objection ..•... that the plaintiffs
and the defendants are one and the same and
TheBoara of
A;urvtt!ic
that the suit as framed is not maintainable by Trusttes,
and U12ani Tibia
reason of the society being the plaintiffs as
College. Delhi
well as the defendants disappears. The plain- Th< SlateY. of D<lhi
tiffs are suing on behalf of themselves and a.II
S.K. DasJ.
the members of the society. The first defendant
is the president of the society and represents
the society. As I have already observed "the
society on its registration with the Registrar
of Joint Stock Companies becomes a. legal entity apart from its members; it would be
therefore idle to contend that the society are
the plaintiffs as well as the first defendant in
this action ..,
It is unnecessary for us to consider the correctness
or otherwise of the reason 1!iven; it is sufficient for
us to state that we do not think that the decision
proceeds on the footing that a society registered
underthe Societies Registration Act isa corporation
in the sense of being incorporated as.that term is
legally understood, but if it does, we are unable to
accept it as correct."
The precise question which has arisen before
~s arose in Sen;ants of India Society, POQfla v. The
Charity Commissioner of Bombay (1 ). The facts of
that case were these. The "Servants of India
Society" was an institution which was registered
under the Soci£ties Registration· Act, 1860. It
owned considerable movable and immovable
property both in the. State c,f Bombay
as well as in other parts of India. The State of
Bombay issued a notification under s. l (4) of the
Bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950 (Born. Act XXIX
of 1950) which applied the provisions of that Act to
a society formed for religious or charitable purposes
and re11-ietered under the Societies Registration Act.
An application was made under s.18(1) of the Bom·
bay Public Trusts Act, 1950 for registration of the
Servants of India Society. During an enquiry into
(I) (1960) 63 Bom. L. R. 379,
178 SUPREME OOURT REPORTS (1962) SUPP.
1961
'1'Jir Board of
T nt,tur, Ayuri-tdie
an,/ U'l'l!li 'Tibia
Colltgt, Dtlhi
v.
J7i~ S1at1 of Drlhi
S.K.D1S1·l.
that application an objection was taken that the
SP.rvants of India Society having been registered
under the Societies R~gistration Act was a corpora.
tion and had objects also outside the Bombay State
and therefore, a legiAlation purporting to regulate
the activities of such a society fell in entry 44 of
List I and consequently the State Legislature had
no power to make any law to regulate the affairs of
such a society. This objection wa.s dealt with first
by the Assistant Charity Commissioner and then
th" Charity Commissioner; thereafter, an "PPlie&tion was made under s. 72 of the Bombay Public
TruRts Act, 1950 to the Court of the Distriot Judge,
Poona. Tl:ien the matter was taken to the High
Court on appeal from the dMision of the District
Judge. Tho appeal came up for hearing before our
learned brother Mudholkar, J. (who was then a
,Judge of the Bombay High Court) and Patel, J.
After referring to several decisions including the
decision of Bhagwati, J. in Satyavart Sid1'antalankar
v. The Arya Samaj, Bombay(') our learned brother
held that the Servants of India Society registered
under the Societies Registration Act was a legal
entity and a qua.si.corporation. He further held
that entry 44 in List I and the first part of entry
:J2 in List II relating to 'Incorporation, regulation
and winding up of corporations' mus~ be given a
liberal construction and quasi.corporations would
come under tho!e entries. Blllling himself on a
parity of rea.soning relating to entry 7 in List III
which related to 'Contracts', ho said that if quaeicontracts would come under entry 7, quasi-corporation~ must also come under entries 43 and 44 of
List I and the first part of entry 32 of List Il.
Mr. Justice Patel took a different view. He said:
"A reference to entry 32 of the State
List shows that "incorporation, regulation and
winding up of corporations, other than those
specified in List I (Union List, entries 43 and
(ll (!!MS) 48 Bom. L. R. 341.
...
.
•
(l} S.C.R
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
179
44), and universities" are excepted from the
Union List. Further "unincorporated trading,
literary, scientific, religious and other societies and associations" and "co-operative
secieties" are also excepted from the Union
List. The emphasis would appear to be on
the word "unincorporated'' used in connection
with "trading, literary, scientific, religious and
other societies and associations".· If an
association or society is unincorporated, then
it may not fall within the Union List. The
question, therefore, that is pertinent to be
decided is not whether or not an association
-0r a society is a legal entity or a quasi-corporation, but whetht>r it is incorporated orunincorporated. If this is borne in mind, then it
is amply clear that entries 43 and 44 of the
Union List would cover only those societies
and associations which are incorporated; and
those which may have legal entity but which
are not incorpor~ted will not fall within the
Union List."
The matter was then referred to· a third Judge
(Gokhale, J.) who thus expre8aed his view:
"In my judgment, societies registered
under the Societies Registration Act are
neither corporations nor quasi-corporations,
but are unincorporated societies contemplated
under the second part of entry 32 of the
State List."
Mr. Justice Gokhale also expressed the view that
when considering the ambit of an express legislative
power in relation to an unspecified residuary power,
a. broad interpretation must be given to the former;
the case, however, is different where under the
Constitution there are two · complementary powers
each exp:ressed in precise and definite terms and in
such a case there is no1 justification for giving a
broader interpretation •to one power rather than to
th& other. We find oureelve1 in agreement with
1901
The Board of
Trustees, Ayurwdic
and Unani I ibia
Colk11, D1lhi
v.
Tk State of Delhi
S. K.DasJ.
180 SUPREME OOURT REPORTS [1962) SUPP.
1:1111
TMBoa•aof
"'"'°'&
T nutt~I,
tllld Urratti Ti6ia
CA/ltgt, D1lhi
••
TJ,. Si.It of D•llti
S. /C DOJ J.
this view. It seems clear to us that entries 43 and
44 of List I when they talk of 'incorporation, regulation and winding up of corporatioll!!' relate to such
legal entities as have been incorporated and are
corporations in the full sense of the term. Similarly,
the firat pa.rt of entry 32 of List II when it talks of
"incorporation, regulation and winding up of
corporations'" relates to such legal entities as are
incorporated. Tliis is furt!ier clarified by the second
part of entry 32 which talks of "unincorporated
trading. literary, scientific, religious and other
societies and association". In entry 32 there is a
dichotomy in the two parts thereof: the first pa.rt
relates to incorporated societies which are corporations in the true sense of that term, and the second
pa.rt relates to unincorporated societies. The juxtaposition is between incorporated !IOcietics and
unincorporated societies and there can be no doubt
as to which of the two parts in which a society
registered under the Societies Registration Aot,
1860 will fall, be it called a quasi-corporation or by
any other name. A society registered under the
Societies Registration Act may have characteristios
which are analogous to some of the characteristics
of a. corporation; yet it is not incorporated and
remains an unincorporated society. As soon as it
is held that it is an unincorporated society, it muet
come under the second part of entry 32 of List II.
In this view of the matter it is unnecesaa.ry to
decide the further questions as to (I) whether the
objects of the old Boa.rd extended beyond the State
of Delhi, and (2) if other entries such as entry 11 of
List II and entry 28 of List III can support the
impugned legislation. We may, however, observe
that if we had come to a diff.,rent conclusion on the
question whether the old Board was a. corporation
or not and it became neoe.esa.ry to decide question
no. (I) above, we might have heM that in view of
the rules governing the old Board, its objeota were
not confined to t lie State of Delhi only in the sense
Ol s.c.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
181
that it would not have been ultra 1Jires of the old
Board to have started colleges etc., outside the
State of Delhi. We should, however, add that the
activities of the old Board did not, as a matter of
fact, extend beyond the State of Delhi on the date
when the impugned Act was enacted.
There ia another aspect of the question which
has to be considered here. Section 3 of the impugned Act is in these terms:
"3. (1) With effect from such date as the
Chief Com.missioner may, by notification in
the Official Gazette, appoint. (hereinafter referred to in this Act as "the appointed day"),
the entire management and control of the
Ayurvedic and Unani Tibbi College, Delhi,
now vested in the Boa.rd of Trustees of the
Ayurvedic and Unani Tibbi College, Delhi,
shall be vested in a Board to be called "the
Tibbia. College Board".
(2) The Board shall be a body corporate
having perpetual succession and a common
seal and shall by the said name sue and be
sued.''
Sub-section (2) of s. 3 says in express terms that
the new Board constituted under the impugned
Act is given a corporate status; in other words, the
new Board is a corporation in the full sense of the
term. Does the impugned legislation still come
within entry 32 qf List II ? We think it does and
for these reasons. We have held that the old
Board was not a corporation, even though it wa11
registered under the Societies Registration Act.
When, therefore, the Delhi State Legislature passed
a law dissolving the old Board, it was really dealing with an unincorporated society or association.
By the impugned legislation, however, it gave the
new Board a corporate status, but at the same time
so delimited the powers and duties of the new
Board as to confine them to the State of Delhi
1961
T Ire Boa•d of
Trwttes, Ayurv1tlii
and Unani Tiiia
College, Delhi
v.
The Stau of Delhi
S. IC. D., J.
J82 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1962) SUPP.
1961
Tiu BOtJrti of
T rwtus, Ayurvedic
and UMni Tibia
Colltg•, D1ll1i
v.
Tiu Stai. of Delhi
S. If. Das J.
only. The impugned Act is entitled an "Act to
provide for transfer of the management of the
Ayurvedie and Unani Tibbi College, Delhi, founded
by the late Hakim Ajmal Khan from its present
trustees to a Board." In other words, the Act deals
only with the college in Delhi and the pharmaceutical institute attached to it. .-3cction 7 which gives
the powers and duties of the new Board is in thcso
terms:
"7. The Boa.rd shall exercise the following
powers and perform the following duties,
namely:(a) to maintain tho Ayurvcdic and lJna.ni
Tibbi CoUoge, Delhi with a. view to impart
higher education to men and women in the
Ayurvedic and Unani Systems of Medicine
and to promote and condnet research in the
same;
(b} to maintain and improve the Hindustani Dawa Kha.na. and Ra.sa.ya.na.sha.la.;
(c) to provide for studies to e1nble incorporation, where necessary of the principle of
the modern system of medicine and surgery in
order to help the scheme of studies for the
Ayurvedic and Unani systems according to
the exigencies of time;-(d) to help produce and publish books in
order to facilitate the carrying out of the
object.a specified in the clauses (a) to (c);
(e) to receive gifts, donations or benefactions from Government and to receive bequests, donations and transfer of movable
or immovable properties from trustees,
doners or transferors, as the case may be;
(f) to deal with any property belonging
to or vested in the Boa.rd in such manner as
the Board may deem fit for advancing the
object.a specified in clauB<'8 (n) to (dl;
•
(1) S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
183
(g) to do au sucn things as may be neces·
sary incidental or conducive to the attainment
of all or any of the subjects specified in clauses
(a) to (d)."
1961
Th.e Board of
TJ'usfees, A;yurvedic
and Unani Tibia
College, Delhi
y,
Unlike the rules governing the old Board which en·
a bled it to establish colleges outside Delhi for the
purpose of imparting higher education in the Unani
and Ayurvedic systems of medicine, s. 7 gives the
new Board powers and duties with regard to the
Ayurvedic and Unani Tibbi College at Delhi and
the pharma.ceutical institute and laboratory
attached to it. This is made further clear by the
definition of the word 'Board' in s. 2, incorporation
section, namely, s. 3, constitution of the Board
as laid down in s. 4, and the sections relating to the
power of the Chief Commissioner to supersede the
Board, to make rules to carry out the objects of
the Act and the power of the Board to make
regulations not inconsistent with the Act for carrying out the purposes thereof. None of the provi·
sions of the impugned legislation excepting s. 9 to
which we shall presently refer give the new Board
any powers or duties other than those connected
with the college, attached pharmaceutical institute
and laboratory, all situate in the Sta.te of Delhi.
We now come to s. 9 which is in these terms:
"9. (1) As from the appointed day, the
Board of Trustees of the Ayurvedic and
Unani Tibbi College, Delhi, a society
registered under the provisions of the Regis·
tration of Societies Act, 1860, on the 12th
day of August, 1911, by the name Anjuman-i
-Tibbia whose purpose, constitution and name
was amended on 25th November, 1915, shall
stand dissolved and all property, movable and
immovable, and all rights, powers and privileges of the said society which immediately
before the appointed day belonged to or were
vested in the said society shall vest in the
The State of Delhi
S.K. Da.J.
IS4
19GJ
'flit n,,.uf uj
T n11tr~s •.1;-urt't'die
attd L!11'l11i Tibia
Collt_!tt, Delhi
v.
'[ht Statt of Dtlhi
S. IC Dai J.
SUPREME COl'RT REPORTs [l!JG2j SUPP.
Board and shall lie applied for the purposes
for which
the Roan) is eo;istitule<l.
I
(2) .\s from the <1ppointc<l clay all <lcbts
<111cl lialiilities of the 8aid HO<;ictv ~hall stn,n<l
t ran~forre<l a.nd <ttta<;hcd to tho Boar<l and
thcrl'after lie dis<;harged and satisfictl hy the
Board.
(:I) ,\ny will, dcccl or other document wi1e·
thcr ma<I<- or cxcc11t<!<l before or after the commencement of thiH Act, which contains any bequests gifts, or trust in favour of the said
Hociety shall, as from the appointed day. be
construed a11 if the Board were thncin name<l
instead of tho said Society."
It 110 doubt says that all rights, po\\"<•rs am.I privileges which immediately before the appointc<l day
I cluugcd tu or wcro vested in the ol<l Board shall
vci;t in the new Board; but it adds that those rights,
]JOWer8 an<l
privileges shall Le applicable for the
purposes for which the new Board is constituted.
We must, therefore, reads. 9 as being subject to
the provisions of s. 7 of the Act. In tums s. 9 says
that the rights, powers and privileges of the old
Board .•hall be available t,o tlte new Board and Bhall
be applied /01' the purposes for which the new Board iB
conatituted. The words un<ler-Jined are important,
an<l show clearly enough that the right, powers an<l
privileges of the old Board arc available to the new
for a limited purpose only, namely, for the
purposes for which tho new lloar<l is «.onstituted.
If the purposes for which tho uew lloar<l is
constituto<l are confined to the institutions in Delhi,
then obviously the objects for which the new Huard
is incorporated <lo not extencl beyond the State of
Delhi.
The conclusions at which we have 1urivcd
may now be summarised &R followa:
(1) On
Registration
Societies
registration under tho
<litl not
Act,
the old Board
(1) S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 185
become a corporation in the sense of being
incorporated within the meaning
entry 44
of List I ; it remained and continued to
be an unincorporated society though under the
several provisions of the Societies Registration
Act, 1860 it had certain privileges, some of the
privileges being analogous to those of corporation;
(2) the impugned legislation while creating the
new Board has given it a corporate status, but has
confined its powers and duties to the college,
pharmaceutical institute and laboratory in Delhi
and while giving the new Board rights, powers and
privileges of the old Board has limited them to such
purposes for which the new Board is constituted;
(3) the impugned legislation, therefore, falls
under entry 32 of List II; so far as the dissolution of the old Board is concerned, under the second
part of the entry and so far as incorporation of the
new Board is concerned, under its first part.
That being the position, the impugned legislation was well within the legislative competenoo
and power of the Delhi State Legislature. We
must, therefore, overrule the first ground of attack
urged on behalf of the petitioners.
We now proceed to a consideration of the
second ground of attack. So far as the alleged
violation of Art. 14 is concerned, the petitioners
have stated in their petition :
"'!'here are various other institutions ...
where there have been actual allegations of
mismanagement but the State has picked out
the petitionAr. Aosuming, without admitting,
that there has been mismanagement by the
petitioner of its affairs, there is not the
slightest suggestion in the whole Act that it
is promulgated on the ground of any mismanagement on the part of the petitioner.
.. . .. . .. . .. .The said Act is an arbitrary piece
of legislation and there is no reasonable
1961
Tile Boord of
T rutttees, A,JU,.ueii.c
anti VMni Tihi11
Colleg11, Dellai
v.
Thi Slate of Delhi
S.K. DasJ.
.._
186 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1962) SUPP.
1961
Tiu Ikard of
1"rwltt1, Ayutttdic
an• UMlli ·ribia
C-Olltzt, Dtlhi
v.
Tiu Stou of Dtlhi
S. Ii. D., J.
classification whatsoever on which it can be
supported."
To this the reply of the respondents is that the
old Board was grossly misman~ging it.a affairs
they said.
"Before the said Act was passed, there
was a great deal of discontent among the
~tudents of the said institution and also the
general public and there was strong agitation
against gross mismanagement by the trustees
of the said Board. That owing to the gross
mismanagement of the Board's affairs by the
trustees the situation had so deteriorated
that early in 1949 there were constant
students' strikes, defalcation of funds and
frequent interruption in work and studies of
the institution."
In our view the petitioners have not ma.de
out any basis for the contention that (') there
were other institutions similarly situated, and (2)
petitioner No. I was picked out for unequal treatment. Tho names of no other institutions similarly situated have been disclosed. In the first Sholapur case Chiranjit Lal Chowdhw·i v. The Uni<m of
India(') it was held by a majority of Judges of
this Court that even one corporation, (in our case
one society) or a group of persons can be taken
as a class by itself for the purpose of legislation,
provided it exhibits some exceptional features
which arc not possessed by others.
"The courts should prinUJ f acie lean in
favour. of constitutionality and should support the legislation if it is possible to do so
on any reasonable ground, and it is for the
party who attacks the validity of the legislation to place all materials before the court
which would go to show th11t the selection is
arbitrary and unsupportable. Throwing out
of vague hints that there may be other
(I) [1950] S. C.R. 869,
~I~.
9lf.
(1) S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
187
instances of similar nature is not enough for
this purpose".
'
(per Mukherjea, J. at pp. 913-914 of the
report. These observations apply with equal
force to the present case and we are unable to
sustain the contention of the petitioners that any
right under Art. 14 of the Constitution has been
violated.
As to Art. 31 of the Constitution it seems clear
to us that cl. (2) of the said Article as it stood at
the rel<want time ha.s no application. The impugned legislation does not relate to nor does it
provide for, compulsory acquisition of property
for a public purpose. The impugned legislation
provided for the transfer of the management of the
Ayurvedic and Unani Tibbi College, Delhi, from
the old Board to a new Board and for that purpose the old Board was dissolved and a new Board
was created with certain rights, powers and privileges to be applied for the exercise of powers and
performance of duties as laid down ins. 7 of'the
Act. Such legislation does not fall under Art. 31(2)
and cannot be judged by the tests laid down therein.
As to cl. (1) of Art. 31 there is no, question of
any violation of that clause if the law by which the
transference of management has been made is valid
law. We have already held that the impugned
legislation was well within the legislative competence of the Delhi State Legislature. Now the
question is-is the impugnl'd legislation bad on the
ground that it violates the right of the petitioners
under Art. 19( l )( f)? The property for the protection
of which Art. 19(l)(f) is invoked belonged either to
the .Board or to the members composing the Board
at the date of the dissolution. In either event, on
the terms of s. 5 of the Societies Registration Act,
1860, the property was to be deemed to be vested
in the governing body of the Board. There could
be no doubt that if the Board was dissolved by
Th• Board of
Trruttes, Ayur~tlic
ani Unani Tiri•
Colt.1e, Delhi
v.
Tkd State of Delhi
S. IC. D.s J.
188
IHI
n,,soar••f
·1 TuJletJ, Ay1,,11et/i1
•n.J l.'1141fi 'Tiii•
Collttr. Drllu
v.
1·1u Sl•lt of Dt!hi
S. K. Dos J.
Sill'H.EME COURT REPoRTS (1962) SUPP.
competent legislative action, am! iu view of our
conclusions on the first point raised it must be held
that thiH had taken place, the Board would cease to
exist and having ceased to exist cann0t obviously
lay any claim to the property. This however may
not be sufficient to negative the contention urged
before us by the petitioners. If the legal owne1"8hip
of the property by the Board or the vesting of it in
the governing body was merely a method or
mechanism permitted by the law whereby the
members exorcised their rights quoad tho property,
the dissolution of the Board and with it of the
governing body thereof would merely result in the
emergence of the right of the members to that
property. It is, therefore, necessary to ascertain
the precise rights the members of the Board possess·
cd to see whether the changes effected by the
impugned Act amount to an infringement of their
rights within the meaning of Art. 19(l)(f). During
tho subsisten<',e of the society, the right of the
members was to ensure that the property was utilised
for the charitable objects set out in the memorandum
and these did not include any beneficial enjoyment.
Nor did the members of tho society acquire any
beneficial interest on the dissolution of the society;
for s. 14 of the Act, quoted earlier, expres~ly nega·
tived the right of tho mem hers to any distribution
of the assets of the dissolved body. In such an
event the property had to he given over to some
other society, i.e., for being mnnaged by some other
charitable organisation and to be utilised for like
purposes, and the only right of tho members was to
determine the society t.o whom the funds or property
might be transferred and this had to be done by not
less than three-fifths of the members present at the
meeting for the purpose and, in default of such
determination, by the civil court. The effect of the
impugned legislation is to vary or affect this privilege of the mem~•rs and to vest the property in a ;.
new body created by it enjoined to administer it so
ai; to serve the same purposes as the dissolved
•
•
(1) S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
189
society. The only question is whether the right to
determine the body which shall administer the
funds or property of the dissolved · society which
they had under the pre-existing Jaw is a right to
'acquire, hold and dispose of property' withi,n the
meaning of Art. l 9( I)( f), and if so whether the
legislation is not saved by Art. 19(5). We are clearly
of the opinion that that right is not a right of
property within the meaning of Art. 19( I )(f). In the
context in which the words 'to dispose of' occur in
Art. 19(l)(f), they denote that kind of property
whioh a citizen has a right to hold-the ri~ht to
dispose of being part of or being incidental to the
right to hold. Where however the citizen has no
right to hold the property, for on the terms of' s. 14
of the Societies Registration Act the members have
no right to 'hold' the property of the disolved
society, there is, in our opinion, no infringement of
any right to property within the meaning of
Art. 19( I )(f). In this view, the question as to whether
the impugned enactment satisfies the requirements
of Art. 19(5) does not fall to be determined.
The two decisions on which the learned Advooate for the petitioners has relied are the State of
Wut Bengal v. Subodh Gopal Bose (1) and Dwarkada8
Shrinivas v. The Sholapur Spinning. & Weaving Oo.
Ltd.('). We do not think that these decisions have
any applioa.tion in the present case. In the State
of West Bengal v. Subodh Gopal Bose(') this Court
was considering a piece of legislation which affected
the right of the first respondent therein who had
purchased a pa.rticular touzi at a revenue sale. As
such purchaser he acquired under s. 37 of the Benge.I
Revenue Sales Act, 1859, the right "to avoid and
awiul all under-tenures and forthwith to eject all
under-tenant" with certain exceptions. In exercise
of that right the respondent gave notices of ejeotment and brought a suit in 1946 to evict certain
tenants. The suit was decreed. When the appeal
(2) [J954] '!l. c. ll. 674,
(I) [1954] S.C.ll. 587.
1H1
n.B-dof
Tru.sttu, Apiitdie
""" u..,,; r;n.
Colkp, Delhi
••
Tit. SJ.11 ef D1/hi
S. K. D•s J.
190 SUPREME OOURT REPOR~ (1962) SuPP.
was pending, a new legislation was made which
took a.way the right of the first respondent which
Tnu tis, Ay.,o,die he had obtained by a decree of a court of law. In
•4 U1101'.i Tihia
these circumstances it was held that the right of the
Col/it•. D1lhi
v.
first
respondent under Art. 19(l)(f) was violated.
Tiu Stat1 of Dtilii
The facts of that case were wholly dissimilar and
B. K. Du J.
the respondent's right there did not depend on his
being a. member of a society. In the second Sholapur ease Dwarkadas Shrinivas v. The Stwlapur Spinning &: Weaving Go. Ltd.(•) a Controller was appointed
by Government to supervise the a.ff'airs of the mills
of a certain company under the Essential Supplies
Emergency Powt>rs Act, 1946. The ControllPr made
certain requisitions which the Directors refused to
comply with. The Govemor·General then made an
Ordinance which was followed by an Act. Under
the provisions of the Ordina.nce the Central Government d~legated all its powers to the Government of
Bombay. The Government of Bombay then
appointed certain Directors to take over
the assets and management of the mills.
These new Directors pa.seed a. resolution making
a call of Rs. 50/- on each of the preference shares
payable at the time stated in the resolution. The
appellent in that case was a preference shareholder
who was called upon to pay Rs. 1,62,000/- in pursuaTJcc of the resolution aforesaid on the preference
shares where which he held. The appellant then brought a suit challenging the validity of the Ordinance
and out of that suit appeal to this Court arose. It
was held by this Court that the impugned Ordinance and the Act replacing it authorised in effect a
deprivation of the property of the company within the meaning of Art. 31 without compenra.tion
and violated the fundament~I right of the appellant therein as a preference shareholder, who was
oalled Up<.•n to pay the moneys unpaid on his shares.
The point to be notioed a.s distinl!IJ.ishing that
oase from the case under our consideration is this
""
T1u s.,,., •f
(IJ (11154]5. C. ll. 6H.
-
(1) S.C.R.
SUPREME OOURT REPORTS
191
the Sholapur Spinning and Weaving Co. Ltd., which
was the company in that case, had not been dissolved or brought to an end by the impugned
Ordinance or the Act replacing it and the appellant
in that case · continued to be a preference · shareholder; not only did he continue to be a pret'erence
shareholder but he was called upon to pay the
moneys unpaid on his shares. It is obvious, therefore, that the appellant was entitled to complain
that by the impugned Ordina.nce he was being
deprived of his property without fulfilling the
requirements of Art. 31 of the Constitution. The
position in the case under our consideration is, as
pointed out already, entirely different.
In our view the impugned legislation does
not violate any fundamental right of the petitioners
under Arts. 14, 19 or 31 of the Constitution.
This disposes of the two ma.in grounds on which
the legislation in question has been impugned. We
now turn to the two subsidiary points. It has
been argued that some of the provisions of the
impugned Act are in conflict with the provisions
of the Societies Registration Act 1860 ; therefore
under s. 22 of the ·Government of part C States
Act, 1951 the provisions of the impugned Act, in
so far as they are repugnant to tl\.e provisions of the
Societies Registration Act, 1860, must be held to
be void.· The simple answer to this argument is
thats. 22, to which we had earlier referred in the
course of this judgment, has no application. Section 22 provides for inconsistency between laws
made by Parliament (in the sense in which the
word 'Parliament' is used in the Constitution of
India) and laws made by the Legislative Assembly
of a Part C State. The Societies Registration
Act 1860 was not a law made by Parliament;
the~efore s. 22 has no application in the present
case. We have already held, for reasons earlier
given, that the Delhi State Legislature had legislative competence or power either to amend the
1961
The Board of
Trustees, Ay11rvedic
and Unani Tibia
Co/left, Delhi
v.
The State of Dtlhi
S. K. D1.J.
192
Jiil
TluB-'•f
TnuUu, Apr.Ji:
""'
u-; T~c
r..,1u ,, Drllti
1
••
Tltt 81411 •f Delhi
8. IC. Das J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1962) SUPP.
Societies Registration Act, 1860 in respect of
unincorporated societies, or to make a law for a
particular unincorporated society, and even to
create a new corporate body provided its objects
were confined to the State of Delhi. In effect
the impugned legislation provides for a disolution
or the old Board which waa an unincorporated
society and for the creation of a new corporate
body for the management of the Ayurvedic and
Unani Tibbi College, Delhi. In this view of the
matter, no question of any conflict with the
Societies Registration Act, 1860 arises in this
C&le.
It has also bet>n argued that the impugned
legislation is a piece of oolourable legislation beoo.use
the Delhi State Legislature acted mala fide in
enacting it. This argument is completely answered by what this Court said in K. C. Gajapathi
Narayan Dw v. The State of Oriasa ('). Thia Court
said:
"It may be made clear at the outset
that the doctrine of colourable legislation does
not involve any question of bona /ides or
mala /ides on the part of the legislature.
The whole doctrine resolyes itself into the
question of competency of a particular Legislature to enact a particn\ar law.
If the
legislature is competent to pass a particular
law, the motives which impelled it tO" act a.re
really irrelevant. On the other hand, if the
legislature lacb competency, the question
motives does not arise at all .......... If the
constitution of a. State distributes the legislative powers amongst different bodies, which
have to a.ct within their respective spheres
marked out by apecific legislativt> entries, or
if there are limitations on the legislative
authority in the shape or fundamental rights,
questions do ariae aa to whether the legislature in a particular case has or has not, in
(I) [1954) S.C.R. I, 10. 11.
(l) S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
193
respect to the subject-matter of the statute
or in the method of enacting it, transgressed
the limits of its constitutional powers. Such
transgression may be pa.tent, manifest or
direct, but it may also be disguised, covert
and indirect and it is to this latter class of
cases that the expression "colourable legislation" has been applied Jin certain judicial
pronouncements. The idea conveyed by
the expression is that although apparently
a legislature in passing a statute purported
to act within the limit~ of its powers, yet
in _substance and in reality it transgressed
these powers, the transgression being veiled
by what appears, on proper examination, to
be a mere pretence or disguise."
From what we have said earlier it should be
manifestly clea.r that the Delhi State Legislature
did not transgress any of the limitations placed on
it, when it enacted the impugned legislation. There
being no transgress whatsoever, the further question of the transgression being veiled by a disguise
or pretence does not really arise. Nor is it
necessary for us to enquire into the motives which
led the Delhi State Legislature to enact the impugned legislation. In the affida.vi.ts filed on behalf
of the respondents enough materials have been
placed to show why the Delhi State Legislature
considered it necessary to dissolve the old Board
and transfer the management of the college to a
new Board. This was a matter for the Legislature to consider and not for this Court to investigate.
In the result we hold that there is no merit
in the petition whioh is accordingly dismissed with
costs.
MUDHOLKAR, J.-While I agree with my
brother Da• J., that the petition be dismissed I
would like to say a few words. This petition under
~· 32 of thti Constitution haa been preferred by
1961
Th.Board of
Trustees, Apwdie
and Unani Tibia
Collete, Delhi
••
Th. Sta« of Dtlhi
S.K. DasJ.
Mo4Mlkar J.
194 SUPREME OOURT REPORTS (1962) SUPP.
1961
Tho B""d of
Trusl/11, Ayurtitdic
~ Unani Tibia
Colftgt. Dtlhi
v.
Tht Stott of Dtlhi
Afudho/km J.
the Board of Trustees, Ayurvedio and Unani Tibia
College, through its Secretary, Hakim Mohammad
Jamil Khan.
B.v Act 5 of 1952 called thfl Tibia College
Act, 19.52 the erstwhile Delhi State Legislative
Assembly dissolved the Board of Trustees of the
Ayurvcdic and Unani Tibia College, incorporated
a Roard called 'Tibia1Col!ege Board' and transferr·
ed to that Board all the property, rights, powers
and privileges of the Board of Trustees of the
Ayurvedic and Unani Tibia College as also the
management and control of the Ayurvedic and
Unani Tibia College to the aforesaid Board. The
reason for doing so would appear from the Statement of objects and Reasons appended to the Bill
which are as follows :
"This Bill seeks to take powers for transferring
the management of the Ayurvedic and Unani Tibia
College, Delhi, from its present trustees to a Board
under the control of the Delhi State Government.
The College has been grossly mismanaged for some
time past with the result that its reputation is very
low today. In early 1949, the situation deteriorated to such an extent that there were students
strikes, defalcation of funds and frequent interruptions in scholastiC work. The Collector, Delhi
made an interim prayer to the Civil Court for the
appointment of receivers. This prayer was granted
~.nd three receivers appointed by the Civil Court
are at present in charge of the properties and
management of the institution. This arrangement,
which is good so far as it goes, is inevitably temporary and inadequate, and it seems desirable to
provide by legislation for the control and management of the College and the properties attached
thereto.'' (Statement of Objects and Reasons
published in the Gazette of India, Extraordinary,
Part II, s. 2, July 18, 1952).
The petitioner's complaint is tha,t its property
has been taken may without componsation and
•
(1) S.C.R. SUPREME OOURT REPORTS
-
195
1961
handed over to a Board in contravention of Art. 31
of the Constitution and that this has been done
The Board of
Ayurwdie
under a law which the Delhi legislature was not Trusle1s,
and Un~ni Tibia
competent to make.
College, Delhi
The following four contentions were raised by T7ie St.ie•• of Delhi
Mr. Purshotta.m Trikamdas on behalf of the
Mudho/kar J,
petitioner.
II) That the Delhi Legislative Assembly
was not competent to pass the impugned Act.
(2) Even assuming that it had legislative
competence the Act offends Arts. 14, 19
and 31.
(3) The Societies Registration Act under
which the Board of Trustees were registered
being a Central Act the Delhi legislative
assembly had no power to over-ride it.
(4) The law was enacted by the legislature mala. /ide.
I will confine my observations mainly to the
first and third points because, it is only with regard
to them that my view is somewhat different from
that taken by my learned brother.
The respondents point out that the petitioner
Board having been registered under the Societies
Registration Act, 1860. is nothing more than an
unincorporated society and that the ;Delhi State
legislature was competent to enact a law affecting
it under the latter part of Entry 32 of List II which
runs thus:
" ...................... unincorporated trading,
literary, scientific, religious and other societies and associations; co-operative societies".
According, however, to Mr. Purshottam, after
the BOl}rd of Trustees was registered as a Society
under the Societies Registration Aot it blossomed
into a corporation and since admittedly its objects
extend beyond the limits of the Delhi State th.,
State Assembly could not make any law affecting
196
!961
TM Bo<nd of
Trusltts, A)1ln11dic
and UncnJ Tibia
Colltgt, Dtlhi
v.
11it Stu/t of D1tl1i
Mudl1o:J.:ar J,
SUPREML COURT REPORTS [1962) SUPP.
it. Thi.a contention has been negatived by my learn.
ed brother. An alternati\•c contention was also
raised on b..Jialf of the petitioner on the basis of
certain decisions and my opinic•n in Servants of
India Society, l'omw v. 'l'he Charity Commi&Bioner
of liombay e) to the effect that upon registration
the Board Lecamo at least a quasi-corporation.
This contention has also been negatived by my
ll'arncd brother.
If, as tbe petitioner S.'\YH the Board, after
registro ti on undu the Societies H.Pgistration Act,
I 8fl0 was transformed into a corporation the Delhi
LPgislative assembly could not make a law with
rcspr:ct tu it under Entry 32 because though under
the firRt part thereof it can make a law affecting
corporations, its powers Cll!lnot reach a corporation,
the objects of which extend beyond the limits of
the Delhi State. But as mv learned brother baa
pointed out. and with which I respPctfully agree,
the essence of a corporation is its 'incorporation'
and as the Societies Registration Act does not
provide for incorporation the petitioner cannot be
regarded as a corporation. It is true that even
though it possesses some of the attributes of a corporation it is not a corporation but in my view it ia
a 'near corporation' or a'quasi-corporation'. This
is what I have held in the Sermnls of India Society's
case(') and I adhere to that view. There, relying
on some Indian decision and the decision in The
'l'nff I'ale Rni/?my Co. v. The Amalgamated Society
of Railway Sen·ant.~('l, I held that such a society
is a legal entity and that a State legislature cannot
make 1my law affer.ting it under the second part oC
Entry 32 of Li>t JI. Th" question whether a registered society which enjoyed more or less the
same powers as those under the Societies Registration Act is a legal entity fell for consideration by
the House of Lords in Bonsor v. Musicians' Union(•)
and there Lords Morton and Parker held that
(I)
(1960, 63 Born. L.R. 379, 381.
(2) [1901] A.C. 426.
(3) [1956] A. C. 104.
(1) S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
197
such a society is a legal entity though not a. corpo·
ration and thus accepted the position that there is
a.n intermediate semi-corporation status. Lord
Keith held that such a society is both a legal
entity and association of individuals, that is, it is
a quasi-corporation to the extent recognized by the
governing statute and a voluntary association for
other purposes. Lords McDermott and Somervell,
however, did not accept the position that there is
any intermediate semi-corporate status at all.
With respect, I think that the view taken by the
majority has much to commend itself. That this
is the better view is the opinion of Prof. Dennis
Lloyd (vide 1956 M. L. R. at p. 360) and of Dr.
Glanville Willia.ms (vide Salmond's Jurisprudence,
1957 ed. p. 356). I have not come across a contrary
opinion· in any recent treatise or article.
Now, under the Societies Registration Act,
1860, which was enacted by the Governor General
in Council upon registration a society is entitled to
sue and ca.n be sued in the name of its President,
Secretary etc., as shall he determined by its rules
or by its governing body. A suit by or against the
society would not abate by reason of the death of the
person through whom or against whom the suit had
been brought. A judgment obtained against a
person sued as representing a society shall not be
enforced against him but against the. property of
the 1ooiety. The society can sue any of its members
for arrear of subscription, damages etc. It can
also enter into contra.eta as an entity. Upon dissolution, its property cannot be distributed
amongst its members but must go to some other
sooiety.
All these are the characteristics of a separate
legal entity such as a corporation. If the law confers
on a body all the normal powers of a legit! person
it will be a corporation in all but name. A registered society, however, cannot hold property and tv
that extent it must be treated as a voluntary
1961
The Boarr/ of
Trusties, Ayurvedic
and Untmi Tibia
College, Delhi
y:
The State of Delhi
M udholkar J.
l9S SUPREME COURT REl'ORTS (Ig62) SUPP.
1161
Tly Board of
TrUJUtJ, AJU1vttlic
tsnd Unani -ribia
Colltge, D1/hi
••
Thi Siau of Delhi
M udMIJ;,,, J •
association, made up of its constituents. Therefore,
it can be regarded as a. quasi-corporation or, in the
words of Lords Morton and Porter, a "near-corporation". Now, a quasi-corporation or a near
corporation-whatever we may call itr-being a legal
entity at least for some purposes is not a mere
soci11ty made up of its constituents.
Tho question, therefore, must be considered
whether the latttir pa.rt of Entry 32 confers power
on the State legislature to le~islate about 'legal
entities.' Let us consider the scope of the latter
part of Entry 32. It permits the making of laws
concerning societies and associations which are not
incorporated. This would imply that thereunder
the legislature cannot provide for the 'incorporation' of a society or association. Ono of tho main
results of incorpor·1tion is to confer upon the thing
incorporated the status of a separate legal entity.
Even so, under this Entry the legislature has a.
wide discretion in the matter of conferral of powers
upon a. society. Hut can it confer such powers on it
as would alter its character a.s a. society and convert
it into a legal entity, may be only f.1r certain
purposes? By its very definition a society is a
voluntary association and can have no existence
separate from its constituents. It is thus not a
separate legal entity in any sense and for any
purpose. That Entry makes it clear by using the
word 'uninoorporated', that the power conferred by
it is confined to such societies and associations
only. 1"herefore, in my judgment the Entry does
not permit of any law being made which confers on
a 1100iety such powers as would constitute it into a
legal entity. A fortiorari, it does not permit a law
to be made which takes away from 11. society
already existing and which is a legal entity any of
the powers of that legal entity, such as those conferred by the Societies Registration Act, 1860, much
less can it destroy that entity. For doing so it
will have to take the aid of other entries, if any,
which permit legiijlation concerning !<>gal en tit irs.
•
'
t
.
(l)S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
199
The Board, as already stated, was registered
under the Societies Registration Act, 1860. That was
a law made by the Indian legislature under 24 & 25
Viet. ch. 67 passed in the year 1860. That law
conferred the power to make laws for the whole of
British India on the Governor-General-in-CounPil
the ambit of whose power is set out in s. 22 which
runs thus:
"'!'he Governor General in Council shall
have Power at Meetings for the Purpose of
making Laws and Regulations as aforesaid,
and subject to the Provisions herein contained,
to make Laws and Regulations for repealing,
amending, or altering any Laws or Regulations
whatever,now in force or hereafter to be in force
the Indian Territories now under the Dominion
of Her Majesty, and to make Laws and Regulations for all Persons, Whether British or
Native, Foreigners or others, and for all
Courts of Justice whatever, and for all Places
and Things whatever within the said Territories, and for all Servants of the Government
of India within the Uominions of Princes and
States in Alliance with Her Majesty; and the
Laws and Regulations so to be made by the
Governor General in Council shall control and
supersede and Laws and Regulations in anywise repugnant thereto which shall have been
made prior thereto by the Governors of the
Presidencies of Fort Saint George and Bombay
respectively in Council, or the Governor or
Lieutenant Governor in Uounoil of any Presidency or other territory for which a Council
may be appointed, with Power to make Laws
and Regulations, under and by virtue of this
Aot: Provided always, that the said Governor
General in Council shall not have the power
of making any Laws or Regulations which
shall repeal or in any way a:tfect any of the
Provisions of thil! Act:
1951
The Board of
Trustees, Ayurvei:lic and Unani Tibia·
Colkgt, Delhi
v.
The Stale of Delhi
M udholkar J.
200 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1962] SUPP.
1961
ThrBoadof
Trwtees, AflD'1Jtdic
ad UfllJlli Tibia
Co/Irv, Delhi
••
T/,, St41t of Dr/hi
MuJiw/k#r J.
Or any of the Provisions of the
Acts of the Third itnd l<'ourth Years
of King William the Fourth, Chapter
Eighty-five and the Sixteenth and Seventeenth
Yea.rs of Her Majesty, Chapter Ninety-five,
and of the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Years
of Hor Majesty, Chapter Seventy-seven, which
after tho paBBing of this Act shidl remain in
force: Or any Provisions of the Act of the
Twenty-first and Twonty-second Years of Hor
Majesty, Chapter One Hundred and Six entitled An Act for the better Government of
India; or of the Act of the Twenty-second and
Twenty-third years of Her Majesty, Chapter
Forty-one, to amend the same: Or of any
Act enabling the Secretary of State in Council
to raise Money in the United Kingdom for the
Government of India: Or of the Acts for
punishing Mutiny and Desertion in Her
Majesty's Army or in Her Majesty's Indian
Forces respectively; hut subject to the Provision e;ontained in the Act of tho Third and
Fourth Years of King William the Fourth,
Chapter Eighty-five, Section Seventy-three,
respecting the Indian Articles of War:
Or any Provisions of any Act paBSed in
this present SeBBion of Parliament, or hereafter to be passed, in anywise affecting Her
Majesty's India.n Territories, or the Inhabitant8
thereof:
Or which may affect the Authority of
Parliament, or the Constitution and Rights of
the East India Company, or any Part of the
unwritten Laws or Constitution of the United
Kingdom of Great Britain a.nd Ireland, whereon may depend in any Degree the Allegiance
of any Person to the Crown of the United
Kingdom, or the Sovereignty or Dominion of
the Crown over any Part of the said Territories."
'
(l) S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
201
This clearly shows that the Governor General
in Council was unhampered in the matter of
making laws by any legislative lists and thus
enjoyed plenary powers to make any klnd of law
on every conceivable topic whioh did not fall 'Yit~in
the excepted categories. Within the sphere of .bis
powers the Governor General in Council was and
could consequently make a law conferring upon a
society such powers as could transform it into a
legal entity either for all purposes or only some.
If he chose to confer all the powers of a corporation
upon a registered society, that society would become
a corporation in all but a name.
The position of the State legislature in the
matter of making laws is not the same as .that of
the Governor General in Council under the statute
of 1860. For, though it enjoys no less plenary
powers than the Governor General in Council, its
spheres of legislation are restricted by the legislative lists and it cannot overstep them by doing
something directly which is patently outside Lists
II and III.
The only entry in List II on which reliance
was placed on behalf of the respondents as conferring power on th'e Delhi legislature to make the
impugned law is the latter part of Entry 32, List
II. That entry speaks of societies, that is, of associations of individuals as distinct from' a legal
entity, from that which has a separate legal existence. Ail association has no such separate exis·
tence, that is, none apart from its members. That
entry, therefore, cculd not furnish the Delhi legis.
lature with the power to. make a law affecting a
separate legal entity such as the petitioner. Section
9 of the impugned Act dissolved the petitioner, a
legal entity and transfers its property, rights
Thus
etc., to a corporation cre.ited by it.
it deals with a legal entity and the rights of
that entity. This is wholly outside the ambit of
the latter part of Entry 32. It would have bOOD
lHl
TluB-d•f
Trustees, A)'&1n11dit
.nd UM.JO 7';6;.
C.ll•I'• Ddlti
v.
Tiu 8ta11 of D•lhi
M """""'1r J,
202 f:>UPltEME COURT REPORTS (1962) SUPP.
Jllfl
·r1u Bo.rd •f
T nultts, A_1111l'tiic
and UU11i Ti1'i•
Col/ere. Delhi
••
Tht Bi.te of Del/ii
lluiMl/w J.
possible for the state legislature to resort to the
first part of that Entry had the object of the society
been limited to the Delhi state but, as already
stated, the objects extent beyond. the Delhi State.
The reason why I think it would have been pos·
sible is that the entry is not restricted to 'incorporation' of a corporation but deals also with the
regulation or winding up of a corporation-which
would include a qu&ai-corpora.tion or any other
fictitious legal porson, and further because the
ell8ence of winding up ca.n be no different from that
of dissolution.
No doubt, ours is a. federal constitution and
the legislative fields of Parliament and of the state
logisla.turee a.re demarcated, In addition wo have
a concurrent field in wl:ich Parliament's legisla.tivo
power is exercisable and, subject to certain con di·
tions, also that of the state legislatures. But even
so, there is a certain amount of overlapping in the
entries in the three lists pertaining to these throe
legislative fields. Therefore, when a. law is
challenged on the ground of legislative competence
what one h&a to ascertain is its pith and substance.
It is well aettlod that if in pith and substance it is
found that tho legislature could make that law
under a particular entry, the mere fa.ct that it
incidentally trenches upou somo othor ontry, not
pertaining to the legislation, it cannot be struck
down as being beyond the compotcnco of the
legislature which made it.
For finding out its pith and substance, let us
examine the Act. It is comprised of 16 sections.
Section 3 deals with the incorporation of the Tibia
College Board and transferring to it the management and control of the Tibia College vested in the
petitioner-board. Section 9 deals with the dissolu·
tion and transfer of property of the Board of
Trustees of the Ayurvedic and Unani Tibia College
Delhi to the Tibia College Board and the remaining
sections deal with incidental matters suoh as
tll s.c.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
203
definitions, constitution of the Board, powers of
the Board and so on.
One of the conclusions rea.ohed by my leamed
brother is that so far ac the diuJolution of the old
Board is concerned the impugned law falls under the
second part of Entry 32 and so far u the incorporation of the new Board is concernEld under its first
part. It may be that a legislature may eeek to
derive its powers to enact a law oonoerning
different topics from various entries in its legislative List. But this aspect of & legislature's power
has no significance when, in a divided jurisdiction
its law is challenged on the ground of encrouchment
on a field not open to it. The question which would
then ariee for consideration would be 'what is the
pith and substance of the law?' The degree of
encroachment made by it on another field would
be a guide for ascertaining its pith and substance.
Here the impugned Act is aimed at dissolving the
petitioner-Boa.rd and transferring &II its property,
rights etc. No doubt, the transfer is to be in
favour of a corporation created by the Ac~. No
doubt also, that most of the provisions of th" Act,
apart from ss. 3 and 9, deal exclu1ively with
matters pertaining to the newly created entity.
But looking to the preamble a& well as ss. 3 and 9
of the Act, the creation of "' new Board and its
incorporation is not the pith and substance of the
Act. The sole reason for its creation is to transfer
to it what was, till then, with the petitioner-Board.
The new Board was thus to serve only a consequentia J purpose and its incorporation cannot be
said to be the pith and substance of the impugned
Act. The activitie:; of the petitioner were not confined to the state of Delhi. That Act cannot, there
fore, be sustained by reference to the first part of
Entry 32. The pith and substance of the law being
the dissolution of the petitioner Board, a legal
entity, and transference of its property and rights to
someone else, it cannot be sustained by reference to
the power conferred by the latter part o( Entry 32.
I#t
Tiu BHTI ef
T nulus. .4..JWV'i"re
..1u-i Title
C.lle11, Dllhi
v.
Thi St<11 •/ Dtllri
NlliAl/ka .T,
204 SUPREMli: COURT Rli:PORTS [1962] SUPP.
llill
Tiol lJfHUd of
Ttust1ts, Ayurl:1tlic
a11i Uttani Tihi1
Cill111, Dtlhi
••
TIM Stot< of Delhi
M aJ/iolJ.<r J.
.!<'or sustaining the law the learned Solicitor
General had placed relience al.so on Entries IO and
28 of List II I. What we have to see, therefore, is
whethrr the impugned law could be made by the
Delhi legislature under these entril's.
It is not disputed that the Petitioner-Board is
a trustee. It is also clear from the objects with
which the trust was established, (which have been
set out in the judgment of my learned brother) that
it was for a charita hie purpose. The petitioner is,
therefore, a charitable trust and the object of the
law is to dissolve it and transfer its property etc.
Entries 10 and 28 of List III run thus:
Entry 10: "Trust and Trustees".
Entry 28: "Charities and charitable in.stitutions,
charitable and religious endowments
and religious institutions".
The entries are not limited to trusts or charitable
institutions which are 'uninoorporated societies' as
is the latter part of Entry 32 of List II. Entry
10 clearly permits a law being made with regard to
a trust or trustee which is a separate legal entity.
Similarly Entry 32 permits a law to be made affecting charities and charitable institutions of every
kind, whether consisting of voluntary associations
of individuals or having a corporate or semicorporate character. l<'or, institutions may have a
corporate or a l!tlmi-corporate character as for
instance Hindu religious endowments and these are
plainly included in the Iatt.er Entry. The Delhi
legislature had, therefore, competence to make
a law dissolving a charitable trust and transferring
its property, rights etc., to another institution.
'l'he aforese.id two entries permit making a law of
this kind. No doubt these · entries are in the
concurrent field but since the impugned Act was
reserved for the assent of the President and was
assented to by him on September 12, 1952, it
(1) S.C.R. SUPREME OOURT REPORTS
205
IP61
cannot be called in question on the ground of repug'Ile IJ041d of
nancy with an 'existing law' or a law made by
Trustttr, .A)'flTlJtdk
Parliament.
and Uru.ni Tlbia
Collett, Delhi
I agree with the view taken by my learned
v.
brother on the second and the fourth points· 'urged The St.le of D1:hi
by Mr. Purshottam and have nothing to add.
Mudholkor J.
As regards the third point the•argurnent on
behalf of the petitioner is that's. 22 of,the Government of Part C States Act, 1951 (which created a
legislature for the Delhi State, t.hen a Part C State)
precluded the Delhi legislature from enacting a law
repugnant to an Act of Parliament and that as
the impugned Act contains provisions which are
repugnant to those of the Societies Regi~tration Art
1860, it is ultra vires. Apart from the fact that
what s. 22 prohibits is a repugnancy with a law
made by Parliament itself-the Societies Registration
Act is not one of such laws-the argument does not
really arise upon the view I have taken. The
petitioner-Board upon Registration under that Act
became a quasi-corporation a.nd thus a separate
legal entity. Even though it owed its existence to
the provisions of the Societies Registration Act, the
Delhi legislature was free to deal with it under its
powers under List III bec!l.use by doing so it did
not enaot a law repugnant to ~he .provisions of the
Societies Registration Act. That Act still retains its
full force and rigour apd is unaffected by the impu·
gned Act. The petitioner-Board may, by operation
of the impugned law, not be able to exercise any of
its powers under the Societies Registration Act but
that would be not because the provisions of that law
are abrogated in any sense but because the
petitioner-Board has ceased to exist as a legal
entity. The argument must,.therefore, be rejected.
The petition ia, therefore, diamiSBed with cost8.
Petition dismiased.
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