PROMOD CHANDRA DEB AND OTHERS versus THE STATE OF ORISSA AND OTHERS
Supreme Court of India | Decided 16 October 1961 | [1962] SUPP. 1 S.C.R. 405 | 1961 INSC 294
Key facts
- Decided
- 16 October 1961
- Bench
- BHUVNESHWAR PRASAD SINHA*, S.K. DAS, A.K. SARKAR, N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR, J.R. MUDHOLKAR
- Bench size
- 5
- Case number
- WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) No. 79/1957
- Disposal
- Case Partly allowed
- Citation
- [1962] SUPP. 1 S.C.R. 405
- Neutral citation
- 1961 INSC 294
Text of the judgment
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
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1961
in such a case may be to make a comprehensive reference of the di8pute to the competent industrial Bidi, Bidi ltavtt and
A1 erchants'
tribunal and invite the tribunal to make a proper Tobacco
.Association
award in that behalf. We are, therefore, inclined to
v.
take the view that cls.3 to 7 which form an integral The State of Bomb•y
scheme are outside the purview of the powers con- G•jendr apndkar J.
ferred on the respondent by s. 5 of the Act and must
therefore be declared to be ultra vires. It is
common-ground that these clauses are severable
from els. l and 2 and that their invalidity does not
affect the validity of the said two clauRes.
In the result Civil Appeals Nos. 415 and 417
are allowed and Civil Appeals Nos. 416 and 418 are
dismissed. Respondent to pay the costs of the
petitioners in Civil Appeals Nos. 415 and 417. One
set of hearing costs.
O. A. Nos. 415, 417 allowed.
O. A. Nos. 416, 418 dismissed .
PROMOD CHANDRA DEB AND OTHERS
1961
v.
October ltl
THE STATE OF ORISSA AND OTHERS
(B. P. SINHA, c. J., s. IC DAS, A. K. SARKAR
N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR and J. l{. J\IuDHOLK~R,
JJ.)
Khor Posh Grant-Maintenance allowance granted by ExRuler of State-Merger of State with the Dominion of lndiaAbrogation of grant by executive act.ion-if an act of StateOonstitutiona/ Validity-Constitution of India, Arts. 14, 19(1)
(/), 31-Extra Provincial J,,risdiction Act, 1947(47 of 1947)
ss. 3, 4, 5-Administration of Ori.,a States Order, 1948, Para'.
4(b)-8tates' M.rger (Governors' Pmvinces) Order, 1949, ss. 3.
4,-Government of India Act, 1935 (26 Geo. 5, ch. 2) s. 299 ( l).
The petitioners, who were holders of Khor Posh grants
from the Rulers of Talcher, Bamra and Kalahandi before
these states merged with the Dominion of India, chall"n.~ed
the constitutional validity of certain orders passed by the State
406 SUPREME COURT REroRTS (1962] SUPP.
of Orissa and the Union of India annulling those grants which
, the Petitioners claimed were ba~ed on the law and custom
l'r•moi Chatlr• Deb
prevailing in these states relating to maintenance of the junior
v.
Tiu Slat1 of Oris so members of the Ruling family. The grant in controversy in
Petition No. 79 of 1957, made by the Ruler ofTalcher under
Order 31 of the Rules and Regulations of the State ofTalcher,
1937, originally of land but converted in 1944 into money
grant, was regularly paid till April 1949. The grant in
Petition No. 167 of 1958, made by the Ruler of Bainra prior
to January I, 1948, was annulled on June 8, 1949, by the
Government of Orissa as the delegate of the Governmcn t of
India under. s. 4 of the Extra Provincial Jurisdiction Act 1947.
The petitioner in Petition 168 of 1958 was the same as in the
previous petition. He was granted an increased allowance by
the Ruler of Bamra on December 8, 1947. The grant was
recognised on June 11, 1949, but paid at a reduced rate from
April I, 1948, to July 1, 1957, and was annulled by a state·
ment made on June 29, 1957, hy tho Chief .Minister of Orissa
in Legislature. The allowance in favour of the first petitionr.r
in Petition No. 4 of I 9'1!J; tho widow of the late Maharaj a of
Kalahandi, fixed by the Political Department of tlte Government of India in l~l39, and the a11owance granted to the second
petitioner by the Ruler, were paid till they were annulled by
the aforesaid statement of the Chief Minister of 01 issa. By
the Merger Agreements signed by the Rulers on or after
December 14, 1947, Sovereignty over these States vested in
the Dominion of India before January I, 1948, and in exercise
of its powers under s. 3(2) of the Extra Provincial Jurisdiction
Act, 1947, which came into effect on December 24, 1949, the
Central Government delegated its powers to the Government
of Orissa to administtr the States. On January I, 1948, the
Government of Orissa in exercise of its powers under s. 4 of
that Act made an order called the Administration of Orissa
States Order, 1948, para. 4(b) of which provided, inter alia,
that all prior Jaws, which included Rules, Regulations, byclaws and orders, whether based on custom or u•age, would
continue in force until altered or amended by an order under
the Extra Provincial Jurisdiccion Act, 1947. Bys. 3 of the
States' Merger (Governors' Provinces) Order, 1949, which
caine into cft'ect on August I, 1949, these States became parts
of the Province of Orissa. Section 4 of the Order.provided
that all laws Jn force in a merged State before that day includ·
ing orders made under ss. 3 or 4 of the Extra Provincial Jurisdiction Act, 1947, would continue in force until repcalr.d
modified or amended by a competent legislature or other com·
pctent authority. The case of the petitioners was that by these
provisions the grants were recognised by the new sovereign and
their abrOjfoltion by executive action aniounted to Infringement
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
407
1961
of fundamental rights guaranteed by, Arts. 14, 19(l)(f) '!nd 31'
of tbe Constitution A preliminary objection \vas taken on Promod Cltandta D1b
behalf of the respondents in the fir•t two Petitions that the
grants in questipn having been annulled prior to the Constitu.. Tl.1 Stall of Orissa
tion, no writs could issue thereunder and it was urged, that
in any view of the. matter, the orders annullirig the grants
11-mounted to acts of state and their legality could not be
canvassed in a Municipal Court.
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Held, that the prelin,>ina1y objection 1.ad no substance
and must faiJ. Since the grants at the time they werC annulled had ctased to be grants of land and been converted to
money allo~ances, payabJe, periodically at regular interyals,
every perioSic deprivation gave the petitioners the right to
approach the court. and, it was not 11ntil 1957 that the protracted correspondence betl\·een the parties for the rcvisiOn of
'- ,the impugned Orders came to an end.
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·The expression. 'act" of state! means the arqui!dtion
sovrreigllty hy a state ,o.Jer. forfign ,territor·y by cofiquest,
treaty, c~ssion or otl,erv...ise. That act may t'ake place on a
parlicular date or by a gradual process.but sovereign power,,
incluaing the _right to legislate for and adniinistef the ac~uire,d
territory, may be acquired ~before che merger. No Municipal
Couft has, however, the-. power .to_ judge "the -propriety or
legality of such an act 'relating either t6"public or private righta
nor can it enforce obe.dience to ordinary principles of Inter·
national la·.v-·relating to rights of private property which a new
!"ov&"eign' is presumed to res\Ject: Iudl~idual citizr:ns canµot
enforce such rights even .thdugh they may be pNtected by .the
treaty since'they are no parties to the 5tipulations. It is oriJ.y
when the new sovereign recognhes the Municipal Courts that
they can have the po,ver and jurisdiction to investigate and
ascertain only such rights as it chooses to i:_ecognise either by
legislatipn or agreement or other\yjse. RCcognition .may, be
express_ or impped from it.; ,dcailng with those 'rights. Such
recognition, however, is al mattel' '"ithin the jurisdiction of
the Municipal Cour(s, but the onus or proving it IUJ.!St be on
the claimant.
·
Secretary of State of India v. ·Mamachee Boye Sahaba,
(1859) M.T.A. 476, Cook
Sir James Gordon Sprigg; [1899)
A.O. 572, Secretary of Stale for India v. Bai //ajbai, tJ915)
L.R. 42 I.A. 229, Vajesingjj Joravtsrsingji v. Secretaty of State
Jo• Tndia in Council, (1924) L.R. '51 I.A. 357, Datlatraya
Krishna Rao Kane v. Seci·,ta1y of .~tqte for India, (1930) L.R.
57 I.A. 318, Secretary of State v. s.,rilar.Ru.<tarn. Khan, (191'!)
L.R. 68 I.A. 109, State of Saurashtra ,v.;Mfnqf Haji lsmail
Haji, [1960] 1 S.C.R. 537 andJagannathAgai~a v, Stat. of
Oriasa, [1962] 1 S.C.R. 205, referred to.
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408
SUPRE~m COURT REPORTS [1962] SUPP.
19~1
Judged in the light of these principles, there could be
no
doubt
that Order 31 . of the Rules and Regulations of the
Promod Chandra Deb
State of Talcher, 1937, had the effect of law, having been
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continued in force by sub-para. (b) of Para. 4 of the adminisThi State oJOri.1s~
tration of · Orissa ·States Order, 19~8. in the absence of any
legislation to the contrary under the Extra Provincial Jurisdiction Act, 1947.- The said Rules and Regulations were existing
··Jaw within the meaning of Art. 327 of the constitution. It
was wholly immaterial whether the grant by the former Ruler
waS a legislative or an executive act.
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. Madharao Phalke v. The State of Madhya Bharat, [1961]
I S.C.R. 957, Thakur Amar Singhji v. State of Rajasthan,
(1955] 2 S.C.R. 303 and M/s. Dalmia Dadri Cement Go. v. The
. Commissioner of Income-tax, (1959] S.C.R. 729, relied. on.
The wide language of sub-par. (b) of para. (4) of
the Order of 1948, read with the Explanation, left no manner
. of doubt that the new sovereign by that Order had recognised
the Khorposh grant made to the petitioner.
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, It was not correct to say that the impugned order annulling the grant coald be sustained under"· 3(1) and (5) of the
Extra Provincial Jurisdiction Act, 1947. Section 3(1),. properly
con!trued, could not overrides. 4 of the Act and an order
made thereunder by a competent authority could be superseded only by another under the section itself. Section 5 of
the Act could not be so construed as to authorise the abrogatio11; of a ]a\v continued in force by s. 4 or an order passed
. thereunder. The entire Act must be read harmoniously so as
to give effect to each one of its provisions. It must, therefore,
be held that the annulment by executive. action was not
· justified.
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It was -not, therefore, necessary for disposing Of this
matter to consider whether· the petitioner wa• entitled to the
protection of s. 299(1) of the Government of India Act, 1935.
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Johnstone_v. Pedlar, (19_21) L:R. 2 A.C. 262, considered.
Since the order impugned by Petition No. -167 of 1953
was made in terms qf s. 4 of the Extra Provincial Jurisdiction
Act, 1947, it had the effect of law, and was not open to
investigation by this Court.
· The right of the petitioner in Petition No. 16B. of 1958,
having been recognised on June 11, 1949, in modification of the
grant by 'the Ex-Ruler and implemented, it could not be
abrogated by a mere executive fiat.
.The orders of annulment in Petition 4of1939 must also
. for the same reasons be held to be unjustified.
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS 409
1961
Per Sarkar and Mudholkar, JJ .-Section 299( I) of the
Government of India Act 1935 could be of no help to the Promod Chaodra DdJ
grantee from an Ex-Ruler u;,less his right had beed recognised
Y,
by the new sovereign so a. to enable him to establish the same Th S1a11 of llrissa
in its municipal courts. That section could only protect such
rights as the new citizen had at the moment of his becoming a
citizen of the Dominion of India. It did neither enlarge his
rii:hts nor cure any infirmity in them.
State of Gujarat v. J amadar M akomed Abdulla [1962]
3 S.C.R. 970, referred to.
ORIGINAL JuruSDIOTION: Petitions Nos. 79 of
1~57, 167 and 168 of 1958 and 4 of 1959.
Petition under Art. 32 of the Constitution of
India for enforcement of Fundamental Rights.
A. V. Viswanatha Sastri and K.R. Ohoudhri, for
the petitioner (In Petn. No. 79 of 1957).
Purushottam Trilcamdas and R. Patnaik, for
the Petitioners (In Petns. Nos. 167 of 58 and 4 of
59).
N. O. Oltatterjee and R. Patnaik, for the petitioner (In Petn. No. 168 of 1958).
0. K. Daphtary, Solicitor-General of India,
B. R. L. Iyengar and T. M. Sen, for the respondents.
1961. October 16. The Judgment of Sinha,
C. J., Das and Ayyangar, JJ., was delivered by Sinha,
C.J., and the Judgment of Sarkar and Mudholkar, JJ.,
was delivered by Mudholkar, J.
SINHA, C. J.-The Petitioners in these Writ
Petitions, under Art. 32 of the Constitution, complain of interference with their rights under the several Khor Posh grants, and pray for writs of certiorari
or mandamus and further orders or directions to
the respondents for the enforcement of their alleged
rights. In Writ Petition No. 79 of 1957, the first
respondent is the State of Orissa, and the Union
of India is the second respondent. In all the other
Writ Petitions, the State of Oris11a is the sole r.ispondent. As rr.ost of the questions of law relating
to the interpretation of the Constitution, or other
Sinlra C. J.
410 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1962] SUPP.
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Pr"""'4 C!zan4,• D16
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laws hereinafter to bo referred to, are common, the
C&Scs have been heard together. But in order to
appreciate the points arising in these cases, it is
necessary to state the facts of each case separately.
I. Writ Petition No. 79 of 1957.
In Writ Petition 79 of rn57, the petitioner is
the younger brother of the present Itaja of Talcher,
which was an indopendent sovereign State before
its merger. It was later incorporated in the State
of Orissa. The Talcher State was a sovereign State
of the Rajabahadur ofTalcher, under the paramountcy of the British Govcmment, before India
attained Independence. As sueh a sovereign, tha
Rajah had a.bsolut11 powers of disposal of the properties comprised in the State. The RueccsRion to
the Rulership of the State is governed by the Mitakshara law, accorrling to the rule of lineal primogeniture. Tho petitioner is a citizen of India am] is the
only youngn brother of the present Raja of Tak-her.
The petitioner's father, the previous Ruler of Talcher, died in 1945 and was succeeded by the petitioner's cider brother, tho present Raja of Talcher,
According to immemorial and long· established
custom of the State, as alRo according to the Hindu
Law of lineal primogeniture, the junior members
of the family of the l{ulers, for the time being, were
entitled to and were provided with suitable maintenance, either land or in money, to enable them
to maintain themselves in accordance with their
status as members of the Ruler's family. The
grants of land, or its equivalent in money, or partly
in ,la.n.d and partly in money, used t'> be called
Khanja or Khor posh grants, and the grantees wero
known as Khanjadars or Khorposhdars. The nature
and conditions of such grants have been laid down in
Order 31 of the Rules, Regulations and Privileges of
Khanjadars and Khorposhd.ara. Those "rules, regulations of Ta.lcher etc. ( 1937)" state the law of the State.
In acoordance with the law aforesaid, the Khorposh
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1961
grants made by the Ruler, for the time being,
became the absolute private property of the grantee, Promod Chandra l>tb
being a male or a female member of the family of TMStat1••ofOrissa
the grantor.
Sin/wJ C. J,
The petitioner was born in 1903, and in the
same year the petitioner's father, who was then
Ruler of the State of Talcher, made a grant in perpe·
tuity to the petitioner of 5 villages specified in the
Schedule to the petition. The said grant conveyed
to the petitioner full proprietary rights in the villages
aforesaid. By an order, dated Mach 31, 1912, the
Ruler aforesaid passed an order to the effect that
the income of the 5 villages granted to the petitioner, as aforesaid, be collected by the State OfficipJs and deposited in the St1tte Treasury, and the
petitioner should be paid in cash the equivalent
of the income from the villages aforesaid, amounting to Rs. 5926 odd. By a subsequent order, dated
September 8, 1929, the Ruler aforesaid directed the
Settlement Officer, who was in charge of making
the record• up to date, to keep the aforesaid grant
yielding a cash income of Rs. 5926 odd intact, to
be enjoyed by the petitioner "in perpetuity under
hereditary rights". The Ruler of the State, aft11r
making the necesaary enquiries, directed, by his
Order dated March 16, 1944, that the petitioner
should be paid Rs. 6200 a year, as & cash allowance
out of the State Treasury in lieu of the income
from the villages granted to the petitioner, as aforesaid. Since then the petitioner was being paid
regularly the allowance at the rate of Rs. 500 per
month, till April 1949.
Going a little backwards, it is necessary
to complete the narrative of events by stating that in August 1947, the present Raja of
Ta.lcher, the petitioner's elder brother, entered
into an agreement with the Dominion of India
, after its formation after the Independence .Act
of 1947, and e:11:ecuted an Instrument of Accession,
412 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1962] SUPP.
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l'romrxl Clutnd<a Dtb
v.
Tlit Stak of Orissa
SinlM C. J.
which was in tho form as it appears in Appendix VIII at page l6!l of the Whiti> Pap~r on Indian
States. Another agreement, in form appearing in
Appendix IX at pngo 173 of the 'Vhitl) paper, was
also entere<l into between the Ruler of Talcher and
the Dominion of India. On December 14, 1947,
o.n agreemC'nt, called the 'Merger Agreement', in
the same form as Appendix XI at page 178 of the
Whito Paper, was entered into between the Governor-General of India and the Raja of Talcher. The
terms and effect of these transactions will have to be
examined in detail l:iter. On Jannary I, l!l48, the
State of Talchor mNged in the Dominion of India
in accordance with the Merger Agreement aforesaid.
Tho petitioner claims that the Khorposh grant made
to him, as aforesaid, was fully and unequivocally
recognized by tho State and that even without such
recognition his rights before the merger of the State of
Talch!'r in Orissa r<>maincd intact., and neither the
Central Government nor tho State Government could
question or ignore those rights. As the petiiioner did
not receive his Khorposh allowance due for the
month of April, l!l4!l ho entered into correspondence with the Government of Orissa. Io answer
he received a letter, dated l\lay 26, I !l49, from the
Sub-Di\·isional i\Iagistrate of Talcher informing
him that the payment of allowanco in question
could not be made until further instruction• were
received from the Government. Aa a n•sult of
further correspondent between the pctitil)ner and
the Governmont of Orissa, the petitioner received
a letter, on June 22, l 9!!l, to the following effect:
"With reference to your letter No. Nil
dated 7th June, I !l4!l, on the subject mentioned above, I am directed to say that as
you have extensive landed property and are
well off in Jifo, Government of India have
not allowed any monthly cash allowance.
The decision of the Government of India i$
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
413
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final in this matter and cannot be reconsiderPromcd Chandra D&
ed."
v.
It is this order of the Government which the The State of Oria.sa
petitioner challenges as invalid and interfering with
Sinha C. J,
his property rights. After entering into further
correspondence with the Government of India, the
petitioner receieved on September 7, 1956, a copy
of the letter dated March 26, l 955, to the following effect:
"The Government of India are advised
that the alleged grant of maintenance allowance to you by the Ruler of Talcher was
never recognized by the Govt. of India or
the State Govt. of Orissa. After. the merger
therefore no claim for payment of the said
allowance can be enforced against either the
State Govt. of Orissa or the Central Govt.
The Govt. of India are further advised that
even if, according to the law applicable to
the members of the ruling Family of Talcher
you had a right to be maintained, that was
rights against the Ruler of Talcher which is
not legally enforceable against either the
Govt. of Orissa or the Central Govt. who
have not inherited or undertaken Bny obligation in the behalf.
As regards your contention ba~ed on the
provisions of Articles 2 and 4 of the Merger
Agreement signed by the Ruler of Talcher
I am directed to say that the Govt. of Indi~
do not consider that these have the effect of
placing an obligation on the Government
to continue your allowance."
The correctness and validity of the statements
of fact and law contained in the letter aforesaid of
the Government of India is challenged by this
petition on the grounds that that Government's
order aforesaid amount to an infringement of
414 StJPREME lOURT REPORTS [1962] StJPP.
INl
Pra<Md 0""1tJra Deb
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the petitioner's fundamental rights under Arts.
19( I )(f) and 31 of the Constitution and are also
discriminatory, thus violating Art. 14 of the Constitution inasmuch as tho other Klwrposh grantees
have been allowed to continue enjoying their
similar rights. It was on these allegations that
the petitioner moved this Court and. obtained the
Rule,
II. Writ Petition No. 161of1958.
The petitioner in this caae is the younger
brother of the Rajll of what was previously known
as the State of Bamra, one of the native States !n
Orissn. The Ruler of Bamra possessed and exercised absolute rights-legislative, executive and
judicial-in his territory, subject to tho paramountcy of the British Government. The Ruler of
Bamra also, like tho other ruler similary situated,
acceded to the Dominion of India by an Instrument of Accession executed between him and the
Governor-General of India on or about the 15th
of August, 1947, in terms similar to the form
appearing in Appendix VII of the White Paper,
at page 165. There arc similar allegations, as in
the previous ca.se, about the law and custom governing the grant of /(horposh to the members of tho
Ruling Family. Iu accordance with tho law aforesaid
and in exercise of his sovereign powrre, the Ruler
made tho following 4 grants in favour of the petitioner.
Land Revenue hereditary grant of
Re. 10,000 per annum out of the Revenue
income of the village Balanda and 24 others
in llamra State granted by the Ruler on
24-3-47.
"l.
2. Land Revenue hereditary kharposh
Mafi grant of Rii. 2,400 per year out of the
income of village Nenei and 6 othf'rs granted
by the ruler on 15-9-45.
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
415
3. Forest grant of Panguli and Prabhasuni reserve forests for reclaiming 1500
acres granted by Ruler on 27th December,
1947.
4. Tank at Deogarh granted by Ruler
on 22-9-47. All these properties have been
duly recorded in Revenue registers."
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After the grants aforesaid had been made
in favour of the petitioner, who is the only surviving younger brother of the Ruler, the latter executed, on- the December 30,1947, the Agreement
of Merger by which he transferred to the Dominion
Government authority, jurisdiction and power for
and in relation to the governance of Bamra
State and also agreed to transfer the administration of the State on January 1, 1948. On June 8,
1949, the Government of Orissa, purporting to
act in exercise of its powers under s. 4 of the Extra
Provincial Jurisdiction Act (XLVII of 1947), read
with Notification dated March 23, 1948, issued
directions to the Bffect that the commitments,
specified in the Schedule to the Notification, made
by the Ruler of Bamra were not reasonable and
bonafide in the opinion of the Provincial Govern:
ment and were declared null and void and not
binding on them, and shall stand annulled as from
the date of the said commitments and that no
Court shall have jurisdiction to call into question
the validity of the Order. The Schedule to the
Notification aforeseid also made reference to the
grants made in favour of the petitioner. Then
the petition goes to make allegations &a to why
the petitioner was discriminated against on grounds
of political bias. The petitioner also challenged
the authority of the Government of Orissa, or of
Central Government, to annul the said grants, and
characterised the annulment as wholly void. As
the petitioner's memorial and petition requesting th11 Orissa Government"to annual their Order
1961
PromoJ Chandra lhb
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Sinha C. J.
416
1951
Prornt>d ~"J D1b
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Tlw S1aJ1 of Orissa
Sinha C, J.
stJl'R:F:ME COURT R~PORTS (1962] SUPP.
of June 8, 1949, aforesaid had proved unavailing,
as would appear from th11 Government'• letter
dated Jmw 26, 1957, tho petitioner had no option
left but to move this Court. The Orders aforesaid of the Government are challenged as null
and void and ultm i-ires the powers of the Government, as violative of Arts. I9 and 3I of the Constitution.
III. Writ Petition 168of1958.
The petitioner in this case is the same as the
petitioner in the Writ Petition 167 of 1958. After
making allegations similar to those in the previous
petition, he goes on to state that the Ruler of the
Bamra State made the following Order on December 8, 1947.
"Bamra Darbar
Order
As my brother Barakumar Pratap Ganga
Deb is going to marry soon and as tho present
maintenance grant will be insufficient to
maintain himself and his family befitting
his status and position, the present maintenance grant of Rs. 600 p. m. is increased
to Rs. IOOO (one thousand) per month with
effect from the Ist of December I947.
Sd-B.C. Tribhuban Deb.
8th Dec., 1947.
Raja & Ruler, Bamra Statf!."
Tho petitioner goes on to state that, not withstanding the protest of the petitioner, the increased
a.mount of maintenance at Rs. 1000 per month, as
11ranted· by the Ruler, as aforesaid, was reduced
by Mr. D. V. Rege, the Adviser to the OriBsa State,
by his letter dated June I I, 1949 to the following
effect:"Dear Bara Kumar Sahib,
With the approval of Government of
India your allowance has been increased
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417
1961
from Rs. 7200 to Rs. 9600 per annum from
1·4-1948.
"•""" Chandr• Dtl
v.
Your sincerely,
Tiu State-nfOrissa
Sd. D. V. Rege"
Sinha r:. J.
This
reduced
amount
of
maintenance
at the rate of Rs. 800 per month continued
be to paid to the petitioner from April
1, 1948 till July I, 1957. But after the
passing of the Budget for 1957-58, during the
discussion on the Orissa Appropriation Bill (II of
1957) on June 29, 1957, the then ChiefMinister of
Orissa, Dr. Hare Krishna Mahtab, suddenly, for
political reasons, made a statement in the Assembly
to the following effect:
"Government have decided that on princi•
pies and on grounds of expediency all allowances to relatives of the Rulers should be
annulled with effect from 1st July, 1957, and
the fact should be communicated to the
Government of India, subject to the following
conditions:(1) The existing allowances should be
continued in respect of widowed Rajmatas and
other widows subject to a maximum limit of
Rs. 500 per month.
(2) If, ~s a result of annulment of these
allowances, any hardship is caused to anybody,
he or she may represent to Government for
consideration of his or her case and Government after proper enquiry about the actual
conditions and income of the representationist
and at"ter being satisfied about the genuineness
of the grievance, may, in suitable cases, grant
allowances to anybody upto a maximum limit
of Rs. 500 p.m."
The result of this statement was that the petition1>r's
allowance was annulled. The petitioner's memorials
and petitions to the State Government and to the
418 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1962] SUPP.
1961
ProtMd ~ra Deb
v.
Tiu Stott ofOrissa
Centeral Government authorities proved fruitless;
hence the writ petition in respect of the annulment
aforesaid.
SmAaC.J.
IV. Writ Petition .\'n. 4 of 19.59.
The petitioners in this case are the mother
and younger brother of the present l\Iaharaja· of tho
State of Kalahandi, previously known as the State
of Kalabandi, one of the native Statos in Orissa.
After the death of the late l\faharnja Braja l\Iohan
Deo of Kalahandi in 1fl3!J at the age of 43, the
maintenance allowance of Rs. 1200 per month was
fixed for the first petitioner by the Political Depart·
ment of the Government of India. She continued
to get the allowance even after the merger of the
State of Kalahandi with the Province of Orissa. The
petitioner No. 2, as the younger brother of the Ruler
of Kalahandi and in accordance with the law and
custom prevailing in that area, was granted by the
then Ruler, his brother, H.H. :llaharaja P. K. Dcu
a maintenance allowance of l~s. 1200 per month.
After the merger of the State in the State of Orissa
and on the recommendation of Shri Rege, I.C.S.,
a maintenance allowance of Rs. !000 per month was
fixed for the petitioner in consultation with the
Government of India. As a result of the statement
made by the then Chief Minister of Orissa, dated
June 28,1957, quoted above, the petitioners havo
been deprived of their juRt claims to maintenance in
accordance with the law. The petitioners' memo·
rials to the State Government and to the authorities
of the Central Government have produced no results;
hence the Writ Petition against the stopping of
the payment of allowances to the petitioners with
effect from July 1, 195i.
In support of these petitions, three separate
arguments have been addressed to us, and have
covered a very wide field. Shri Viswanatha Sastri
appeared in support of petition No. i9 of 1957; 8hri
Purshottam Trikamdass appeared in support of
..
.......
'·
I
(1) S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
419
1961
pPtition No. 167 of 1958 and No. 4 of 1959, and
Shri N. C. Chatterjee appeared in support of the Promod Chandra Deb
petition No. 168 of 1958. Though the arguments TiuSta:~JOrissa
have been overlapping and not always consistent,
.
SillhaC.J.
the points urged on behalf of the petitioners m
eRch case may be summarised as follows. The
grants made by the Rulers in eaeh case were in
respect of the .khorposh rights of the membt;rs of
their family, which the Rulers, under the law both
statutory and customary, reco~nised as the rights of
the junior members of the family which is governed
by the rule of Lineal Primogeniture. Generally the
grants took the shape of landed property but very
often the usufruct of the property was taken over
by the State in lieu of a cash allowance. Whether
the Khorposk grant took the form of land or of
money, it was made by a sovereign Ruler. Every
act of the Ruler, whether executive, legislative or
judicial in character, with reference to modern
democratic ideas of separation of power, has the
force of law. In the hands of the Ruler for the
time being, these distinctions did not hold good.
Whatever they said or did in refotion to the affairs
of the State was law for the time being, which the
Ruler could abrogate or modify according to his
absolute power. But after the disappearance of the
Rulers' sovereign powers, the succeeding power,
whether it was the Government of India or the
Province, and later the State of Orissa, was not
competent to abrogate the orders granting maintenance to the junior members of the family, according to the law of the land, without recourse to legislation by a competent body. In this connection
reliance was pla~ed on the decisions in the case of
Director of Endowments, Government of Hyderabai!. v.
Akram Ali (1) and Madhaorao PhaZke v. The State of
Madhya Bharat('). Hence the Government of India
had to get the Parliament to make the ne<.'essary
legislation, if it intended to do away with the rights
(I) A. I. R. ( 1956) S. C. 60
(2) [1961] ls. c. It. 957.
.(20 SUPREME COlIBT REPORTS [1962] SUPP.
1961
Promo/ c.i...lta l>t&
••
Tlw S1.u of Orl11a
Sinha C. J.
to KhorpoBh created by the previous Rulers of the
States concerned. It was also contended that there
was no entry either in List I or in Li.st III, of the
Constitution, which could authorise the Central
Legislature to make a l&w abrogating those grants.
It was further contended that in respect of some of
tho grants at least, tho Government of India had
recognised the rights of the grantees and had been
making payments through the State of Orrisa, in
pursuance of those recognised rights. In the case of
the petitioners in Writ Petition 168 of 1958 and 4
of 1959, it was further argued that the payments
had been made to. the grantees until June 1957.
It was only in July, 1957, that the payments were
stopped arbitrarily as a result of the statement
made by the Chief Minister of Orissa, as statml
a hove.
-
)II
The learned Solicitor General, who appeared on
behalf of the respondents, first raised a preliminary
objection in respect of the first case (Writ Petition
79 of 1957) relating to the grant by the Ruler of
Talcher. His contention was that it was the admit·
ted case of the parties that the payment to the
petitioner was stopped in April, 1949, and the petitioner was informed by the Government's order
<lated June 22, 1949 that the Government's decision
to stop the payment was final and could not be
reconsidered. That being so, the rights guaranteed
by the Constitution could not be founderl upon, in
respect of a cause of action which arose before the
Constitution. In the second case, namely Writ
Petition 167 of 19()8, the right, if any, haa been
abrogated by the Government's Notification dated
June 8, 1949, hence in this case also the preliminary
objootion, if it has any force, applies. Tho other arguments,of the Solicitor General, which apply to all
the cases, were to the effect that the grant, if any,
was not grant of land but of money, and, therefore,
was not a grant properly so called; that there may
~
i
•
(1) S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
421
1961
•
have been a law relating to the making of Klwrposh Promod Chandra Deb
grants to junior members of the family of the
v.
Rulers governed by the Rule of Lineal Primogeni- The Slotf of Orisso_.
ture, but the act of making ea.ch individual grant
Sinha C. J,
could not properly be characterised, as enacting a
Jaw; it could, at best, be an order in exercise of the
powers of the Ruler giving effect to the law in question. Alternatively, it was argued that whether or
nqf, the making of a grant was enacting a law, and
whatever its nature, it could be abrogated by the
succeeding sovereign power, without recourse to
legislation. It was further argued that the matter in
controversy would be governed by the provisions of
the Extra Provincial Jurisdiction Act (XLVII of
1947), which came into effect on December 24, 1947.
Reliance was placed upon s. 3 of the Act which lays
down that it "shall be lawful for the Central
Government to exercise extra provincial jurisdiction
in such manner as it thinks fit". It was pointed out
that under sub. s.(2) of s. 3 of the Act, the Central
Government had been authorised to delegate its
jurisdiction, and this power the Government exercised in favour of the Provincial Government of
Orissa. The terms of s. 4(1) to the effect that the
Central Government may make such order as may
seem to it expedient for the effective t>xercise of
its jurisdiction under the Act, were also relied
upon as the source of the authority for cancelling the Khorposh allowance in favour of the
petitioners made by the ex- Rulers. It was further
contended that s. 5 of the Act validated the
impugned orders of the Government, and whether
or not they were legal, thay "shall be valid
as if they had been done according to the local
law then in force in that area". And lastly,
it was urged that, in any view of the matter, the
orders impugned by the petitioners in these cases
were acts of State, the legality of which could not
be canvassed in a Municipal Court.
422 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1962) SUPP.
I
1961
Before dealing with the arguments on the
Pr.,... Chandra
Deb merits of the controversy, it is convenient first to
v.
Tht St.t~ <'f OriHo
su.1.. c. J.
deal with the preliminary objection raised with
reference to the first two petitions, on behalf of
the respondents, to the effect that the or<lers
pa.Siied before the coming into em~ct of the Constitution could not be challenged in a writ petition
because no \\Tit could be iSBue<l in respect of orders
p888ed before the Constitution came into force. If
the grants were in the shape of land, and if the
Government bad deprived the petitioners of those
lands, it could have been argued with a good deal
of force that the disposseSBion from the lands took
place at a time when the Constitution was not in
force. But it appears that in these cases the grants
ultimately aSBumed the shape of money allowances
payable at regular intervals. They were to be paid
periodically. Hence, every periodic deprivation
of the money allowance would give the petitioners
a right to approach this Court for relief. It appears
from the pleadings of the parties that the petitioners entered into prolonged correspondence insisting upon their righta under the grants by the former
Rulers and trying to impress upon the Government
the justnellll of their demands. It was only in 1957
that the petitioners realised that they had no hopes
of any revision by the Government of the policy
which they had adopted of cancelling those grants.
In our opinion, therefore, the preliminary objection
has to be overruled.
In order to determine the controverAy on its
merits, it is necessary to trace the history of the
relationship between the Rulers and the Government
of India before the territories concerned became a
pa.rt of the territory of India. During the British
regime, the Rulers of the Indian States (then called
native States) enjoyed certain amount of sovereign
powers, which were not uniform. The extent of
their sovereignty under the suzerainty or the
)-•
(lJS.C.R.
SUPREME COURT HEPOI~TS
423
paramount authority of the British Government
depended upon the several agreements between
them. ThP position is thus described in the White
Paper on Indian States (page 32, para 71 }:
19•1
Pum1od Cluaulra Deb
v.
Tht State of Orissa
Sinha C. J.
"Till the lapse of Pararuountcy, the
Crown as represented by and opera Ung through
the Political authorities provided the nexus
between the Indian S tatcs and the Central
and Provincial Governments. The pivot of
this arrangement was the Viceroy, who as
Crown Representative represented to the
Indian States the suzeraintv uf the British
Crown while at the same time he was, in
relation to British India, the head of the
Government as Governor-General. '.1'110 Indian
Independence Act, 1947, rcleasc'd the States
from all their obligations to the Crown".
After the coming into effect of the Indian Independence Act and the establishment of the Indian
Dominion, as a result of negotiation between the
Dominion of India and the Indian States, certain
steps were taken towards the integration of those
States with India. The first step was the accession
of these States in accordance with the Instruments
of Accession, which appear in Appendices VII and
VIII at pages 165 to 173 of the White Paper. As a
result of the accession, the three States with which
we are now concerned-the States of '.l'alcher, Bamra
and Kalaliantli-acceded to the Dominion of India
"with the intent that the Governor-General of India
the Dominion, Legislature, the Federal Court and
any other Dominion authority established for the
purposes of the Dominion shall, by virtue of this
Instrument of Accession but subject always to the
terms thereof, and for the purposes only of the
Dominion, exercise in relation to the States ... such
functions as may be vested in them by or under the
Government of India Act, 1935, as in force in the
Dominion of India on the 15th day of August,
424 SUPREME COURT ItEPORTS [1962) SUPP.
1'1r11u1ti Chandra Dei
v.
'J11t Stale of Orisia
fiinha C. J.
194 7". This accession did not affect the continuance of tho sovereignty of the Rufors entering into
the agreomcnt, save as provided by or under t.ho
Instrument of Accession. It, however, provided
that in respect of such matters as are specified in
the Schedule annexed to tile Instrument, which may
he compendiously described as "Defence, External
Affairs and Communicaticms·•, the Dominion Legislature may make laws which shall apply to the
acceding States also. IL is not neCCll83.ry to notice
the difference between the Instrument. of Accession
as contained in Appendix VII and that cont.ained in
Appendix VIII for the })Urposes of these cases.
The second step was the signing of what has been
termed "Standstill Agreement", the form of which
appe.ars in Appendix IX at pages li3-74 of the
White Puper. The acceding States signed ·this
"Standstill Agreement" which provided for the
continuance for the time being of a.II subsisting
agreements and administrative arrangcmunts in
matters of common concern hetwecn the States and
the Dominion of India. The first phase of the
process of integration of tho Indian States into the
Indian Dominion was the acCCBBion of the States as
a forosaid. The second phase followed •Jn the
merger of these States into the Dominion of India
as a result of the 'llierger Agreement', in terms
appearing in Appen<lix XI at pages 178-179 of the
White Paper. In December 1947, these States
merged with the Dominion of India by virtue of
the Agreement.a of Merger, whereby the States ceded
"to tho Dominion Government full and exclusive
authority, jurisdiction and powers for and in relation to the governa.noo of the States and agreed to
transfer the administration of the State to the
Dominion Government on the lat day of January
1948". As a result of the 'Merger Agreement' signed by the Rulers of these States on or after the 14th
of December, 1947, lmt before the lat of January,
1
(!) s.c.R.
SUPREME COUR'r .REPORTS
425
l!J48, the Dominion of India was vested with sovereign autlJOrity aud the ex-Rulers were left only Promod Chandra /!ch
with their priv1ite property and their annual Privy The Statev.of Orisja
Purne. As these States which merged with the
Sinha C. J,
Domiuion of India, as aforesaid, di<l not become
part of the Province of Orissa until a much later
<late, it became necessary to provide for the administration of these States. Thus came into existence
the Act, called the J<~xtra Provin0ial Jurisdiction Act
(XLVII of 1947). The Act authorised the Central
Government, by itself or through its delegate, to
exercise extra provincial jurisdiction in respect of
areas outside a Province, which were ~cquired by
the Central Government by treaty, agreement,
grant, usage, etc., as recited in the Preamble to tho
Act. In pursuance of the powers given to the
Central Government under s. 3(2) of this Act, the
Central Government delegated its power to the
Government of Orissa to administer the territories
which had acceded, as aforesaid, including the
three States with which we are now concerned.
This state of affairs continued until the coming into
effect of the States' Merger (Governors' Provinces)
Order, 1949, which came into effect on the first of
August, 1949. Section 3 of the Order provides that
as from the appointed day, namely, August 1, 1949,
the States in question shall be administered in ull
respects as if they formed part of the Province of
Orissa. Section 4 provides that all laws in force
in a merged State before that day, including Orders
made under s. 3 or s. 4 of the Extra Provincial
Jurisdiction Act, 1947, shall continue in force until
repealed, modified or amended by a· competent
legislature or other competent authority. ·Hence,
any orders passed by the Central Government or its
delegate, the Government of Orissa; under Act
XLVII of 1947, shall have the effect of law, ·even
though until the lat of August, J 949, theae States
did not form part of the Province of Orissa. It
426
SUPRKME COURT REl'ORT8 (l!J62] SlJl'I'.
fl>6/
will,' thus, appear that the sovereignty, whatever
p 11,m1,c/ f 'ham)ro De/1
it was, of the Ru )era of the States in question ocasecl on the execution of the Merger Agreement on or
after the 14t.It of D<'cemb<'r, l!J47, and before the
1st of Janu.iry, 1948. Thereafter, on the 1st of
January, 1!148, the Hovcrcignty in those States
vested in the Central Government. The question,
therefore, arises: Ho\\' far the Central Government
or its delegate, the Government of Orissa, until
the morger of the territories in the Province of
OriBsa, as afure1111id, were bound by the laws prevailing in those Statp;; during the regime of the
Hulers, who had gone out.
v.
'flit Stnlr <!,/ 01iHa
It ha.8 hccn strenuously argued on behalf of
the respondents that the acts wmplained of by the
petitioners were actH of State, into the legality of
which t.he ;)fonieipal Courts had no jurisdiction to
examine. The yucstion of the nature and effect of
what are characterised as acts of State hn.s hcen
discussed in a number of CIU:les, which went up to
the Privy Council, and later in cases whfoh came
up to this Court. In the case of the Secretary of
State of India v. Kamachee B01Je Saltaba ('), their
Lordships of the Privy Council stated the law in
these terms :
'"The trani;actions of independent Statt·s
between each other are governed by other
laws than those whieh Municipal Courts
administer; suoh Courts have neither the
means of deciding what is right., nor the power
of enforcing any decision which they may
make".
In that case, the Raja of 'l'anjore, an indcpcn<leut
sovereign Chief, who, by virtue of Treaties, was
under the protection of the East India Company,
died without leaving male isaue. Thereupon the
East India Company, in exercise of their sovereign
(II (1859) 7 M. I. A. 47G.
1
..
(1) S.C.R. SUPREME OOURT REPORTS
427
1961
power, seized the Raj of Tanjore on the ground
that the dignity of the Raj was at Stake for want Promod Cltandra Dei
of male heir. It was held by the Privy Council The Statev.of Orissa
that as the seizure was made by the British GovernSinha C. J.
ment, acting as a sovereign power, through its
delegate the East India. Company, it was an act of
State, and that, therefore, a Municipal Court had no
jurisdiction to enquire into the property or legality
of the transaction. In the course of the judgment,
Lord Kingsdown further observed "that acts <lone
in the execution of these sovereign powers were not
subject to the control of the Municipal Courts,
either of India or Great Britain, was sufficiently
established by the cases of the Nabob of Arcot v.
The East India Company, in the Court of Chancery,
in the year 1793; and The East India Company v.
Syed Ally, before the Privy Council in 1827". In
that case, au argument was advanced before the
Privy Council, that the seizuro of the Raj might be
justified as an act of State, but the seizure of the
private property of the Raja was not so justifiable.
In dealing with that argument, their Lordships of
the Privy Council made the following very significant observations:
"But then, it is contended, that there is a
distinction between the public .and private
property of a Hindoo Sovereign, and that
although during his life, if he be an absolute
Monarch, he may dispose of all a.like, yet on
his death some portions of his property, termed his private property, will go to one set of
heirs, and the Raj with that portion of the
property which is called public, will go to the
succeeding Rajah.
It is very probable that this may be so;
the general rule of Hindoo inheritance is partibility, the succession of one heir, as in the
case of a Raj, is the exception. But assuming
428
19GJ
l'tcwiorl Chanrlra Dei
v.
·rht St.att of OriJsa
Sitalta C. J.
SUPREME CUUR'l' REPORTS [1002] :)lJl'l'.
this, if the Company, in the exercise of their
Sovereign power, have thought fit to 11CiZe the
whole property of the latn Rajah, private as
well as p11blic, does that circumstance give
any jurisdiction over their ac•.s to the Court
at .!\Iadras? If the Court cannot enquire into
the acts at all because it is in act ofStak, how
can it inquire into any part of it, or afford
relief on the ground that the Sovereign power
had been ~xercised t.o an extent which.Municipal law will not sanction?".
This decision of the Privy Couneil was followed in
the case of Cook v. Sir Jcm1CI; Gordon Sprigg(').
That was a case in which the appellant claimed
right to certain concessions relating to minerals,
forest!!, trading and other rights, ete., in Ea.stem
Pondoland, granted to them by the paramount
chief of Pondoland. The suit was eucccssfu lly
defended on the bround that the grant did not bind
the Imperial or the Colonial British Government to
recognise tho said concessions. The Lord Chancellor,
delivering the judgment of the Judicial Committee,
observed as follows, and almost adopted the language of Lord Kingsdown:
'"l'he taking possession by Her Majesty,
whether by cession or by any other means by
which sovereignty can be acquired, was an act
of State and treating Sigcau as an independent
Sovereign-which the appellants are compelled
to do in deriving title from him. It is a wellestablished principle of law that the transactions of independent States between each other
are governed by other laws than those which
municipal courts adminiskr.
It i1 no 1m11wer to say that by tho
ordinary principles of internatimial law pri\·ak
property is resper·wd liy the sovereign which
accepts the oession and assumeH the duties
(I) Ll899J A.C. ;72.
,
(1) S.C.R1
SUPREM:E COURT REPORTS 429
and legal obligations of the former sovereign
with reRpect to such private property within
the ceded territory. All tlmt can be properly
meant by such a proposition is that aceording
to the well-understood rules of interm:tional
law a chtmge of sovereignty by ceEsion ought
not to affect private propert~, but no municipal tribunal has authority to enforce sur•h an
obligation."
A similar question arose before their Lordships
of the Privy Council in a case from India, reported
as Secretary of State for Ind·ia "· Bai Rajbai('). In
that case, the plaintiffs sued for a declaration of
their rights to certain property and they questioned
the orders of the Government of Bombay to the
effect that they had no indefeasible rights in the
property as claimed by them. The property was
situate in the District of Ahmedahad, which was
ceded by the Gaekwar to the British Government
in the year 1817. The plaintiffs (respondents before
the Privy Council) claimed the title to the property
in the right of a grantee from the Mogul Emperors.
While examining the question as to what was the
precise relations in which the respondents stood to
the Bombay Government at the time of cession of
the territory, as aforesaid, and as to what were the
legal rights enforceable in the tribunals of the new
sovereign, their Lordships stat<'d the legal position
as follows:
"The relation in which they stood to their
native sovereigns before this cession, and the
legal rights they enjoyed m1der them, are,
save in one respect, entirely irrelevant matters.
They could not carry in under the new regime
the legal rights, if any, which they might
have enjoyed under the old. The only legal
enforceable rights they could have as against
their new sovereign were those, and only
those, which that new sovereign, by agreement
(I) (1915) L, R. 42 I, A, 229.
'
1961
Promcd Chandra Deb
v.
Tht Stale of 01issa
Sinha C. J.
430 SUPREME OOURT REPORTS (1962] SUPP.
/36]
Prninod Chmtdra Dth
v.
Tlie St11te of Orint1
Sinha c·. J.
expressed or implied, or by legislation; chose
to confer upon them. Of course this implied
agreement might be proved by circumstantial
evidence, such as the modo of dealing with
them which the new sovereign adopted, his recognition of their old rights, and express or
implied election to respect them and bo hound
by thi!m, and it is only for the purpose of determining whether and to what extent the new
sovereign has recognised thoHc anti-cession
rights of the kasbat.is, and has p]ectcd or
agreed to be hound by them, that the con~i
deration of the existence, nature, or extent of
these rights becomes a relevant subject for
inquiry in this case. This principle is well
established, though it scarcely seems to have
been kept steadily in view in the lower Courts
in the present case. It is only necessary to
refer to two authoriti<·s •mt.he point, namely,
the ea.se of Secretary of State for India '"
Kamachee Boye Sahaba, decided in the year
18{i!l, :ind Cook \', Sprigg, dccirlNl in the yPar
1899."
Their Lordships also observed that iu deciding the
question as to whether or not the new Government
had recognised the prr.-existing rights and, if so, to
what extent, the burden of proof rested upon those
who ma<lc such claims.
In a later decision of the .Jnrlicial Committee
of tho Privy Council in the ca.se of Vrijesing:ji
Jorarnrsinyji v. Secref<ir,11 of State fot /11di<i in
rouuri/( '), the questionA as to the significance of
'act of State' and a~ to the rights of the inhahita1its
of the territory a.frer it has been acquired by a new
sovereign, whether by conquest, treaty or othenvi80
hnve been diecus.~ed by Lord Dunedin. In the
course of his judgmr.nt, afk'r reforring to the previous
II) 11924\ L.R. 51 l.A. 357.
(1) S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT .REPORTS
431
authorities bearing on the questions, he made tP"
foilowing observations, which put,in a nutshell tht
entire legal position.
"But a summary of the matter is this:
when a territory is acquired by a sovereign
state for the first time that is an act of State.
It matters not how the acquisition has been
brought about. It may be by conquest, it
may be by cession following on treaty, it may
be by occupation of territory hitherto unoccupied by a recognised ruler. In all eases
the result is the same. Any inhabitant of the
territory can make good in the municipal
Courts established by the new sovereign only
such rights as that sovereign has, through his
officers, recognised. Such rights as he had
under t.he rules of predecessors avail him
nothing. Nay more, even if in a treaty of
cession it is stipulated that certain inhabitants
should enjoy certain rights, that does not give
a title to those inhabitants to enforce these
stipulations in the municipal Courts. The
right to enforce remains only with the high
contracting parties. This is made quite clear
by Lora Atkinson when, citing the Pongoland
case of Cook v. Sprigg he•says : "It was helcl
that tJie annexation of territory made an act
of state a~ that any obligation assured under
the treaty with the ceding state either to the
sovereign or the inclividuals is not one which
municipal Courts are authorised to enforce."
In that case the Privy Council was called upon to
determine the rights of the plaintiffs as Taluqdars in
respect ofland in the Panch Ma.hals, which were in the
domain of the Scindia. of Gwalior until December 12,
1860, when the Ruler ceded that territory to the
British Government by a treaty. The paintiffs in
that case clairned proprietary rights in the Taluqs,
whereas the Secretary of State for India, who was
l'romod Chaudra Deb
,v.
TheState ofOri·Ja
Sinha C. J.
I
432 SUPRE:\IE COURT REPORTS [1962) ~UPP.
19Ul
the contesting respondent; asserted that they "·ere
ordinary lessees holding their lands at the·pl~asure
v.
of the Government. In that case it had been argued
1k State of Orissa
before the Judicial. Committe.e that. the plea of act
Sinha C. J.
of St.ate not having been specifically taken in tho
. Courts.below, that plea should not have been given
, ..effect to. This argument was met by their Lord~
·ships 9f the. Privy Council by observing that no
.such specific plea using the :words 'act of S.tate' was
.necessary inasmuch as the plaintiffs. themselves had
admitted in the plaint that. the territory had been
ceded by the previous Ruler, the Scind.ia of Gwalior,
·to tho British Government... The plaintiff- had the
. onus CL]-st on them. of showing·: the acts of acknowledgment of their. rights;, whicJ:. they claime(i, by the
mew sovereign. Another argument raised on.behalf
.of the paintiffs was that· one of, the. terms of the
treaty was that old rights. shall .. be recognised and
that; therefore, their rights as proprietors still sub'
sisted. On· this part, of. the case,: their Lordships
."observed that such a general; statement in. a proclamation only means this that the new. government
recoITTlise such rights as upon investigation by
Hs.. officers it found thos.e rights, substantiated. The
. new: Government had not . thereby renounced its
:right to recognise only such' titles as it'considered
fit and proper to recognise, and the Municipal Courts
.were not thereby. empowcre~l to. investigate the
.rights .claimed.. ,
Promod Chandra Deb
,,vm
c
·•'' · Where territory has been annexed to a new sovereign bJtreaty; conquest, cession or" otherwise, the
position in law is clear. But where. there is no com' plete; cessiori• of territory but' only the grant ofpov er
mi.d jurisdiction wherepy !lovereign authority is vested
in'another State, ther questfori has arisen whether
the latter State h'as the.right to legislate on matters
'which are already governed by law promulgated
by 'the State .in which the. territory still 'remains
vested. '·That question was rairnd in' the' case of
.- ..~' _ .. >':
·~--
--~
··-
: .... ~ - ·--
. --
~
.....· .· •.. _,·_. __..~-
(1) S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
433
1961
•
i
Dnttatraya Krishna Rao Kane v. Secretary of State for
Deb
India (1). The r,ase related to what is known as the Promod Chandra
v.
Berar, now forming part of the State of Maharash- The State o/Oris1a
tra. By the treaty of 1853, H. H. The Nizam of
Sinha C. J.
Hydra.bad had assigned to the British Government
the districts collectively called the Berar, in lieu of
certain expenses relating to the, army, etc. As a
result of the arrangement, H. H.' the Nizam leased
in perpetuity to the British Government that
territory. The territory formed the subject matter
of subsequent treaties in 1860 and 1920, whereby full
sovereignty over the assigned J.istricts was re11,ffinn ·
ed in favour of the British Government. The British
Government was to continue to have full aud exclusive jurisdiction and authority over the assigned
districts and the power to administer them as the
British Government thought fit and proper. In
pursuance of the Foreign Jurisdiction Act, 1890 (53
& 54 Viet. c. 57) an Order in Council was made in
1902 authorising the Governor-General of India in
Council to deal with those territories, on behalf of
His Majesty. In pursuance of that power, the impugned law (The Berar Alienated Villages Tenancy
Law, 1921) was enacted in 1921 it was held by
their Lordsliips of the Judicial Committee repelling
the appellant's contention that the enactment of
1921 was ultra vires that the Law of 1921, aforesaid, promnlgated by the Governor-General in
Council, was a valid piece of legislation and was
effective to interfere with pre-existing rights.
The still later decision of their Lordships of
the Judicial Committee in the case of Secretary of
.Bt,ate v. Bardar Rust,am Khan (') is also very instructive in so far as it reviewed the older decisions and
reiterated the law as summarised by Lord Dunedin
in the decision just noticed in the case of Vajesingji
Joravarsingji v. Becref,ary of State(•). In that case
their Lordships had to consider the e:ffect of the
Treaty of 1903 between the Khan of Kalat and the
(I)
(1930] L.R. S1 I.A. 318.
(2) (1941] L.R. 68 I.A. 109.
(3) (1924] L.R. SI I.A. 357.
l
434
1961
Promod Chandra DeO
v.
Tiu State ofOrissa
Sinha C. J. ·
SUPRE~IE COURT REPORTS_JI962} SUPP
Government of India whereby the former ceded in
perpetuity to the la.tter, in consideration of the
payment of an annual rent, a certain- territory. It
was held that the transaction was, in fact, a perpetual lease of the territory at a quit rent and that
the territory itself did not become part of the British
Dominions, _though the Khan of Ka.lat had made
over the whole of his ·sovereign rights. In this case,·
their Lordships had also •to consider the effect. of
the provisions of the Foreign Jurisdiction Act, 1890 ·
(53 & 54 Viet. c. 37). Their Lordships held that by
virtue of the Treaty ·and the provisions of the
Foreign Jurisdiction Act, the Government of India
had acquired full sovereign rights and had, therefore, the right to recognise or not to recognise existing titles to land, thus completely ousting the jurifidiction of the Municipal · Courts to investigate
and to pronounce upon claims to those rights.
The decisiOns referred to above. have been
noticed with approval by this Court in the cases of
Thakur Amar Singhji v. State of Raja8than (1), Jlfs.
Dalmia Dadri Cement Co. v. The Commissioner of
Income-tax ('), The State of Saurashtra v. _J1Iemon
Haji Ismail Haji (3 ) and in Jagannath .-Agarwala v.
State of Orissa (')·
·
On an examination of the authorities-discu~sed
or referred to above, the following propositions
emerge. (1) ·•Act of State' is the taking over of
sovereign powers by a State in respect of territory
which. was not till then a part of its territory, either
by . conquest,. treaty or cession, or otherwise, and
may be.said to have taken place on a particular
date, if there is a proclamation or other public declaration of such taking over. (2) _But. the taking
over. full sovereign . powers may be spread over a
_number_ of years, as a result of a historical process.·
(3) Sovereign power, including the.right to legislate·
(I) [1955] 2 S. C.R. 303, 335, 336.
(3) [1960] 1 S. C.R. 53 7.
(2) [1959] S. C. R; 729, 739,-744.
(4) [1962J 1 S. C.R. 205.
•
(1) S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
•
•
435
1161
for that territory and to administer it, may be
acquired without the territory itself merging in the Promod Chandra D1b
new State, as illustrated in the case of Dattatraya Thi 81.~;oJOrissa
Ki·ishna Rao Kane v. Secretary of State for
Sinha C,J,
India in Council ('). (4) Where the territory has not become a part of the State
the necessary authority to legislate in respect of
that territory may be obtained by a legislation of
the nature of Foreign Jurisdiction Act. (5) As an
act of State derives its authority not from a municipal law but from ultra-legal or supra-legal means,
Municipal Courts have no power to examine the
propriety or legality of an act which comes within
the ambit of 'act of State'. (6) Whether the act of
State has reference to public rights or to private
rights, the result is the same, namely, that it is
beyond the jurisdiction of Municipal Courts to investigate the rights and wrongs of the transaction
and to pronounce upon them and, that, therefore,
such a Court cannot enforce its decisions, if any.
It may be that the presumption is that the pre-existing laws of the newly acquired territory continue,
and that according to ordinary principles of International Law private property of the citizens is
respected by the new sovereign, but Municipal
Courts have no jurisdiction to enforce such international obligations. (7) Similarly, by virtue of the
treaty by which the new territory has been acquired
it may have been stipulated that the pre-cession
rights of old inhabitants shall be respected, but
such stipulations cannot be enforced by individual
citizens because they are no parties to those stipulations. (8) The Municipal Courts recognised by the
new sovereign have the power and the jurisdiction
to investigate and aocertain only such rights as the
new sovereign has chosen to recognise or acknowledge by legislation, agreement or otherwise. (9)
Such an agreement or recognition may be either express or may be implied from circumstances and
(I) (1930) L. R. 57 I. A. 318.
436 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1962) SUPP.
IDOI
Promod Clumdra D1b
v.
Tht Stalt of OriJJa
Sinha C. J.
evidence ttppearing from the mode of dealing with
those rights by the new sovereign. Hence, the
Municipal Courts have the jurisdiction to find out
whether the new SO\'ereign has or hns not recognised or acknowlerlged the ri!rhts in que~tion,
either expressly or by implication, as aforeRaid. (10) In any controversy as to the existence of
the right claimed against
the
new sovereign, the burden of proof lies on the claimant to establish that the new sovereign had rerognised or ncknowledgecl the right in question.
Applying those principles to each of the rnses
in hand, the position appears to he as follows. In
Writ Petition 79. of 1957, the Ta.lcher Sta.te morgen
in the territory of India with effect from January,
1, IH48. Whatever rights the ex.Ruler of Talcher
ma.y have conferred upon the petitioner, those
rights could be enforced against the respondents
only in so far a.s they have been recognised or acknowledged by the new sovereign, tho Government
of India, the question therefore arises whether the
rights claimed by the petitioner in this case had
been recognised by the Government of India
by legislat.ion or otherwise. It has already
been observed that the i:itatc of Talcher
become part of the territory of India. certainly
with effect from the first of January, 1948, as a
result of the Merger Agreement, as a.foresa.id. There
is also no doubt that the grant mado by the ruler
of Talcher in favour of the petitioner continul"d to
be effpctive until the lllerger. The nature and conditions of such grant of Khorpo.sh arc governed by
the provisions of the laws of that State as embodied in order 31 of the "Rules and Regulations of
Talcher, 1937". Under the laws of Talchcr, the
petitioner had been enjoying hiR [(horposh rights
until the cash grant, as it became converted in
1943-44 as aforesaid, was stopped by the State of
Oris~a, in April, 1949. On the first of January,
1948, the petitioner her,ame a subject of the
•
(1) S.C.R. SUPREME COUR'l' REPORTS
437
1961
Dominion of India, on his territory merging in the
territory of India. It has been argued on behalf of Promod Chandra Deb
the petitioner by Shri Viswanatha Sastri that as The SttJtev.of Orissa
from the 1st of January, 1948, on the merger, there
Sinha C. J.
was a complete change over of sovereignty and
the Dominion of India got full and exclusive authority, jurisdiction and power in relation to the erstwhile territory of Talcher State; and that as soon as
that happened, the Constitution Act of India then
in force (Government.of India Act 1935 dS amended
by the Indian Independence Act) became applicable
to the inhabitants of Talcher also. That being so,
they also became entitled to the benefit of s. 299(1) of
the Constitution Act of 1935, which reads that "no
person shall be deprived of his property save by
authority of law". He relied upon the decision of the
House of Lords in the case ofJohnstone v. Pedlar (1 )
in which the plaintiff's claim for damages brought by
a friendly alien, resident in the United Kingdom
against an officer of the Crown in respect of wrongful
seizure and detention of his property was decreed.
It was further held that the defendant's plea that the
property had been detained by direction of the
Crown as an act of State was not a good defence
to the action. In that case Viscount Cave stated
the proposition of law and his opinion on thB.t
proposition in these words:"My Lords, counsel for the appellant
contended for the broad proposition that,
where the personal property of an alien friend
resident in this country is seized and detained
by an officer of the Crown, and his act is
adopted and ratified by the Crown as an act
of State, the alien is without legal remedy.
In my opinion this proposition cannot be
sustained.
When a wrong has been done by the
King's officer to a British subject, the person
wronged has no legal remedy against the
(I) (1921) L.R. 2 A.C. 262.
438 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1962) SUPP.
1961
Promod C..Mnbo Dth
v,
Tht Sl4tt of Orissa'
Si,\a C. J.
Sovereign, for 'the King can do no wrong';
but he may suo the King's officers for the
tortious act, and the latter cannot plead the
authority of the Sovereign, for "from the
maxim that the King cannot do wrong it
follows, ae a necessary consequence, that the
King cannot authorize wrong".
ln the course of hie Judgment in that case Lord
Atkinson made the following observations with
reference to the decision of J..ord Halsbury in the
case of Cook v. Sprigg(').
"The last words of Lord Halsbury's judgment clearly suggest that the Government of
this country cannot assert as a defenoe against
one of their own subjects that an act done to
the letter's injury was an act of State, since
such a subject clearly could not rely on his
own 1iovcreign bringing diplomatic pressure
against himself to right the subject's wrong.
In conformity with this principle it was held
in Walker v. Baird ( (1892)A.C.491) thatwhero
the plaintiffs are British subject in an action
for trespass committed within British territory
in time of peace it is no answer that th'l tre8pasa wru1 an act of State, and that thereby the
jurisidiction of the Municipal Courts was
ousted".
Lord Sumner, in the course of his opinion, referred
to the argument based upon the case of Bu1'0'1I v.
Denman(') that the executive has, as against aliens,
a general right to commit by ite agents what would
be an actionable wrong in private persons. With
reference to that argument, Lord Sumner made the
following observations:
"My Lordi, the speculation is intereating
but, as I think, fallacius. Buron v. Denman
(2 Ex. 167) is a oase rather of the inability of
the Court than of the disability of the suitor.
(I) [1899] A. C. 572.
(2) 2 &. 167,
l;;
I
•
'
(1) S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
439
1961
Municipal Courts do not take it upon themselves to review the dealings of State with state Promod Chandra Dei
or of Sovereign with Sovereign. They do not Tiu StateY.of Orissa
control the acts of a foreign State done within
Sinha C. J.
it.~ own territory, in the execution
of
sovereign powers so as to criticise their legality
or to require their jastification ... ".
Lord Phillimore, in the course of his opinion, while
dealing with the defence set up by the official of the
Crown, made the following observations:
"The defence set up in the present case is
sometimes called the defence of an act of
State. As regards this way of looking at it,
I cannot put the matter better or more tersely
than as I found it put in one of the reasons
given by the successful plaintiffs in their case
as respondents before the Privy Council in
Walker v. Baird ( (1892) A.C. 491, 494): "Because between Her Majesty and one of her
subjects there clln be no such thing as an act
of State". And this proposition was finally
accepted in the case of Walker v. Baird".
Lord Phillimore, after discussing a number of authorities and the propositions laid down by them,
concluded his opinion in these words : "]from these propositions it would seem
to fo!lo:W that an. _alien ami complaining of a
tort is m the pos1t1on of an ordinary subject,
and that no more against him than against
any other subject, can it be pleaded that the
wrong complained of was, if a wrong, done
by command of the King or was a so-called
act of State."
Relying upon those observations, the learned
counsel for the petitioner contended, in the first
instance, that when the Government of India, or
its delegate the Government of Orissa, deprived
4-10 SUPRI<JME OOURT REPORTS [1962) SUPP.
19GI
l'rcmod aandra Deh
V.
Tiu St11te of Orisw
Sinha C. J.
the petitioner of his allowance in 1949, as aforesaid,
it infringed the constitutional guarantee contained
in s. 299 (I) of the C'..onstitution Act of 1935, and
that the reliance upon act of State by way of
defence was not tenable because, it was further
argued, the sovereign cannot exercise an act of
State against his own subject. The argument is
very plausible and attractive, but we need not
pronounce upon it in view of our conclusion, as will
presently appear, with rcforcnce to his alternative
argument based upon recognition. The argument
is that the inhabitant.s of a territory acquired by a
new sovereign by conquest, cession or otherwise can
make goo·l in the municipal courts such rights as
have been recognised hy the new sovereign. In
this connection, reliance was placed upon the provisions of sub-para (b} of paragraph 4 of the Administration of Orissa Staws Order, 1948 (which we shall
for the sake of brevity call tho Order of 1948). It
has to be recalled that on the lst of January 1948,
the Government ofOrissa made the Order of 1948.
This order was made by the Government of Orissa
in exercise of tho powers conferred by s. 4 of the
Extra Provincial Jurisdiction Act, 104 7, as a
delegate of the Government of India. Paragraph
4 of the Order of 1948 reads as follows:"4. Laws to be applied-( a) The enactments specified in the first column of the
Schedule hereto annexed shall, so far as
circumstances admit and subject to any
amendments to which the enactments are for
the time being generally subject, in the
territories to which they extend, apply to all
Ori&!& States and any provision of any law in
force,· whether substantive or procedural
and whether based on custom and usage or
statues, in any of tho Orissa States, whiGh
is repugnant to any provision of any of the
said enactmentij shall, to tho extent of tho
(I) S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
441
1961
repugnancy, cease to effect from the date of p,.,,,od Chandra Deb
commencement of this Order:
•·
The Slate off?r;s;a
Provided that the further modifications
Si•ha C. J.
and restrictions set forth in the said Schedule
shall be made in the enactments applied :
Provided further that for. the purposes
of facilitating the application of the said
enactments any court having jurisdiction in
the Orissa States may construe the pro·
visions thereof and notifications, orders,
rules, regulations, forms or bye-laws made
or issued thereunder, with such alt.erations
not affecting the substance as may be
necessary or proper tp adopt them to the
matter before the Court:
Provided further that in the enactments
as so applied (except where the context or
modifications hereinbefore referred to otherwise require). reference to "British India"
and "Central Government" shall be construed
as references to "all the provinces of India
and Orissa States" and "the Provincial Government" respectively.
(b) As respects to those matters which
are not covered by the enactments applied
to the Orissa States under sub-paragaph (a),
all laws in force in any of th& Orissa States
prior to the commencement of this Order,
whether substantive or procedural and whe·
ther based on custom and usage of statutes,
shall, subject to the provisions of this Order,
continue to remain in force until altered or
amended by an Order under the Extra-Provincial Jurisdiction Act, 1947 (XLVII of
1947).
Provided that the rowers that were exercised by the Ruler o each such State under
.J.12 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1962] SUPP.
l!M/
/1' mt1d C/landra Dtb
v.
The Staft oj Ori Ha
Si11l,a C. J.
any of those laws prior to the commencement
of thiA Order shall be exercised by the Provincial Government or any other officer specially
empowered in this behalf by that Government.
ExplAnation-In this sub.paragraph the
expression "la.wa" includes rules, regulations,
bye-laws and orders.
(c) As respects those matters regarding
which the enactments applied under sub-paragraph (a) or the laws continued in force
under sub-para.graph (b) are inapplicable,
civil. criminal and revenue jurisdiction in the
Orissa States shall be exercised in accordance
with tho principles of justice, equity and good
.
'.
cunscienec
Under sub-para (a) certain enactments speci·
ficd in the first column of the Schedule annexed tu
the Order of 1948 were applied to the Orissa States
inch1ding Talchcr, subject to certain amendments
not ma.wrial in this connection. The enactments
so specified in the Schedule did not in any way affect
the custom or the law under which the grant in
favour of the petitioner ha.d been ma.de, and under
sub-para. (b) the law of the State of Talcher, as contained in the Regulations aforesaid 1937 continued
in operation, subject, of course, tu the provisions
of the order until altered or amended by an order
under the Extra Provincial Jurisdiction Act, 1947.
It is contended on behalf of the petitioner that by
virtue of the operation of sub-para.graph (b) of
paragraph 4 of the Order of 1948, the new sovereign recognised the legal right of the petitioner
to receive hiB maintenance allowance under the
grant by the previous Ruler of Talcher.
In this connection we may notico the 'lrgumcnt advanced by the learned Solicitor-General on
behalf of the respondents thl\t there waA no changeover of de jure sovereignty on the I lit of J Mtuary,
1948, as contended on behalf of the petitioner, and
~
(
l
(I) S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
443
1961
that such a change-over could not be deemed to
have taken place until July 27, 1949, when, as a Promod r:handra D,;b
result of the promulgation of the Order known as The Statev, oj Orissa
the States' Merger (Governors' Provinces) Order,
SinM C, J.
1949 (Appendix XLIV, page 297 of the White
Paper), the Orissa 'States, including Talcher, were
int'3grated in the Province of Orissa. In our opinion
there is 210 substance in this contention for the
simple reason that the question is not whether or
when Talcher ·became a part of the Provi11ce of
Orissa, or subsequently of the State of Orissa, 011
the advent of the Constitution. The question
in really is on what date can the State
of Talcher be said to have completely merged
the Dominion of India within the meaning of s. 5
of the amended Government of India Act, 1935.
Under that section, the Dominion of India comprised not only the Provinces, called "Governors'
Provinces", or Chief Commissioners' Provinces, but
also "the Indian States acceding to the Dominion
of India in the manner hereinafter provided" (s.5(c)).
We have already pointed out, while tracing the
relationship between the people of the Indian
States and the Dominion of India, and later the
Union of India, that as a result of the Merger
Agreements, referred to above, those States, including the State of Taloher, completely merged
in the Dominion of India on the l'st of January
1948.
But then it was argued by the learned Solicitor-General that, alternatively, assuming that
Talcher bad become a part of the Dominion of
India in Ja11uary, 1948, the grant made in favour
of the petitioner was not a law, and was neither
recognised nor continued in force by virtue of subpara. (b) of paragraph 4 of the Order of1948. It
is, therefore, necessary to consider whether the
grant in favour of the petitioner had itself the
foroe of law in the State of Talcher. In our
44·1 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1962] SIJPP.
l"GJ
..
Prornod (.J1nmf1u Dtb
TJ,, Staft oJOriH•
Sinha C. J.
,
opinion, tho deci~ions of this Court, particularly
(I) 'l'liakur Amar 8inghj-i v. State of Rajasthan ('):
(2) Jf/s. Dalmia Dadri Cement Co., Ltd. v. The
Commissioner of I ncome-'l'ax (') and 1lfadharao
Plialke v. 'l'he State of ,)fadh}J_" Bhamt (') fully
support tho conclusion that whether the act of
the former rulors in making tho grant partook of
the character of legislative, or executive action, it
had tho effect of law, and, secondly, that the rules
contained in Order 31 of tho Rules and Regulations
of the State of Talchcr, 193i, had the effect
of law and had been continued in force, in the
absence of any legislation to the contrary. The
last mentioned case is particularly opposit-0
to the facts and circumstances of this ca8e.
The Order 31 of tho Rules ar.d Regulatio11s
aforesaid of the Sta to of l'alcher stand on tho Ramo
footing as the Kalambandis which wore the subject
matter of tl.ie decision in that case. The Rules and
Regulations, even as the Kalambandis in that case,
have the force of law and would be existing law
within the meaning of Art. 327 of the Constitution.
The provisions of sub.para. (b) of para. 4 of the
Order of 1948, therefore, clearly applied and tho
ltegulations of 1937 continued in force. The
explanation to the sub-paragraph (b) says in express
terms that the expression "laws" includes rules,
regulations, bye.Jaws and orders. In view of tho
width and amplitude of tho provisions of
sub-para. (b) of paragraph 4, the conclusion is irresistible that the new sovereign, by the legislative
Order of 1948, had recognised the oustomary grant
in favour of the Khorposkdhars of Talcber, including
the petitioner. Of course, the recognition is subject
to the reservations, namely, ( l) to the provisions
of tho Order of Hl48, and (2) to any alterntion or
amendment of the Order by any legislation under
the Extra Provinoial Jurisdiction Act of 1947.
(I) ,19!">5J 2 S. C.R. 30J.J35, 336.
t2J [1959] S.C.R. 1'l9, 739, 744.
(3J [!961] IS. C.R. 957.
..
(I} S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
445
1961
In this connection, we may here notice the
further argument advanced by the learned Solicitor- Promod Chandra Deb
General tba.t even if the petitioner were entitled to Tlr.e State••of Orissa
take advantage of the provisions of sub-para. (b} of
Sinha C J,
paragraph 4 of the Order of 19!8, the impugned
order stopping th~ grant could be supported with
reference to the provisions of ss. 3 (l) and (5) of the
Extra Provincial Jurisdiction Act of 1947. Section
3(1:') is in general terms and provides that "it shall
be lawful for the Central Government to exercise
extra provincial jurisdiction in such manner as it
thinks fit". This provision, which is in general
terms, authorises the Central Government to exercise extra provincial jurisdiction iu suoh manner as
it thinks fit, which means, in accordance with the
subsequent provisions of the Act,. or orders passed
under the provisions of the Act. Those sections,
ss. 3(1) and 4, have to be read harmoniously so as
not to make the provisions of s. 4 nugatory. Subsection (2) of s. 4 enables the Central Government
to make any "order" in respect of matters specified
in els. (a), (b), (c) and (d) therein ; and where an
"order" has already been ma.de by a competent
author-ity under s. 4 of the Act, that order can be
superseded only by another valid order under that
very section. Section 3( l) cannot, therefore, be
construed so as to override the provisions of s. 4.
With reference to the provisions of s. 5 of the
Act, which reads,
"Every a.ct and thing done whether before
or after the commencement of this Act, in
pursuance of any extra provincial jurisdiction
of the Central Government in an area outside
the Provinces shall be as valid as if it had been
done according to the local law then in force
in that area",
it has to be remembered that the Act was
enacted with a view to arming the Central
446. SUPREME OOURT REPORTS [1962) SUPP.
llMl
Promotl r:hitnd1a D16
v.
The State ofOrissa
Sinha C. J.
Government with powers to make provision for the
administration of such areas a.a came into the Domi·
nion of Ind in as a result of the. process of integration
as discusser! n.bove, and which areas were not within
the ambit of any Governors' or Chief Commissioners'
Provinces. In order, therefore, to fill the legal
vacuum for the time being, the Act was passed to
rrgularise every act and thing done even l>E-fore the
enactment, as if it had been done according to the
local law then in force in that area. Anything
could be done in such a local area according to the
laws of that area by authorities empowered to do
so, but the functionaries of the Government of India
or of its delegate, would have no jurisdiction so to
function except by virtue of the provision• of s. 5.
The section, thuR, clothed such functionaries with
legal authority in reRpe!"t of an act or thing done,
which otll!'rwise would have been illegal. llut this
section cannot be construed 80 as to mean that
those functionaries had been empowered to abrogate
the Jaws which had been continued in force by vir·
tue of s. 4 of the Act, or by virtue of an order made
in accordance with the provisions of s. 4 of the Act.
In other words, s. 5 cannot be read so as, to make
the provisions of s. 4, or of orders passed under
that section, otiose. All the sections of the Act
have tu ho read, it muet be repeated, in a harmonious way so as to give full elfeC"t to each one of the
provisions oC the Act. It must, therefore, be held
that 8. 5 did not authorise the functionarira of the
Government of India., or of its delegate, to infringe
the Jaws which had been continued in force by
virtue of s. 4, using the word "l11wa" iu their most
comprehensive sense, in accordance with the provisions of the Act itself. As a result of these considerations, it must be held that the respondents have no
justification for stopping the grant. The application must, therefore, be allowed, ancl a writ issued
diroctin~ tho Government to continue the 11,llowance
(1) S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
447
as from the date on which it was withheld. The
petitioner is entitled to his costs.
In the second case (Writ Petition 167 of
1958), it must be held, in accordance with
the decision in the case just decided, that the peti.
tioner had the right claimed by him. But this case
is met by the Order dated June 8, 1949, which
was in terms made under s. 4 of the Extra
Provincial Jurisdiction Act of 1947. Such an order
has the effect of law and was not a mere executive
fiat, as contended on behalf of the petitioner. By
an order made under the provisions of the Act
aforesaid, the Central Government cltJarly indicated itS intention of annulling the grant. The
Order passed under the Act has ,in terms been
characterised M of a legislative character; hence
it has the effect of abrogating the grant so far as
the petitioner was concerned. Whether that order
of annulment was proper or improper, just or unjust, is not a matter which this Court can investigate and pronounce upon. It has not been contended before us that the order annulling the grant
was ultra vires the provisions of the Act, and,
therefore, of no effect. It must, therefore, be held
that the rights claimed by the petitioner in this
case have been validly terminated by the respon.
dents. This application must, therefore, be dismissed, but, in the circumstances, without costs.
In the third case (Writ Petition No. 168
of 1958) in which the petitioner is the same as in
the second case , the position is different, because
by the order dated June 11, 1949, the Government
recognised the right to a maintenance at Rs. 800
per month, in modification of the previous grant.
Not only was this grant recognised, but the right
thus recognised was given effect to, because it is
common ground that payment continued to be
made till July l, 1957. The payment was stopped
1961
Prom1d Chandra Deb
v.
The StateofOriss•
Sinha c. J,
448 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1962] SUPP.
]961
Pron1od Chandra Deb
••
The Stalt of Orissa
Shiha C..1.
Mudho/kar J.
only as a• r.esult of the statement made by the
Chief Minister in the Legislative Assembly on June
29, 1957. As the right claimed in this case had
been recognised by the Government, and implemented, it could not be stopped by a mere' fiat of
tho Govo;rnment. The petitioner, therefore, is
entitled to. the declaration that llis right is intact
and to a \vrit of mandamus to the respondent to
carry out its obligatiops.
,
In the fourth· case (Writ Petition 4 of 1959),
the position is the same as in .the third ease, just
disposed of. In this ease also, the petitioners'
rights were recognised in respects of maintenance
allowance of Rs. 1200 per- mensem for the
first petitioner and the reduced maintenance',
allowance of !ts. 1000 per mensem for the second
petitioner. These allowance.a. continued to be paid
until thoy were stoppea as a result.of the statement
aforesaid. '.I'he· petitioners,· therefore, are entitled
to the same rylitif.as, in·the previous 'Case (Writ I'etition 168 of 1958). ThC'-pet_itionom in Writ Petition
Hi& of 1958 and Writ Petition 4.o£ 1959,are entitled
to their costa.
.·
Mi:rDHOr.tG\R, .J.-We apee. We c'ou1d, howev;er, like to add a few words. In "the: cq'ursc of
his argument Mr. Viswa.na.tha 'Sastri stated that
since the Talcher State was merged in the Dominion
of India 'on January ·1, 1948, there was complete
change over pf sovereignty, that ~s ·from that date
the residents thereof became. entitled to the benefit
of s. 299 (1) of the C<;>n&ti~ution Act, .1935, that
the Act of the Orissa ·Governll'.!~nt ip..iiepriving the
petitiol}er in W.P, 79 .Qf J957 of qis maintenance
grn.nt in the year 1949 was_ in violation.pf that
provjsion aµd ·tha,t c9nsequeHtly th!!· Order Illa.de in
that behalf was unconstitutional. He also contended
that the actio~.ofthe Qri.F.sa ~!JVernmcnt coulQnot
be regarded as ~n aot of State b\)eause tP,{lre ean be
(1) s.c.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
449
11111
no act of state by sovereign against his own subject.
Referring to this argument My Lord the- Chief ""-~ CMoo!m .11#
Justice in his judgment has observed: "The argu· TltaBkl<o/Grim
ment is very plausible and attractive, but we need
MllilMl1w .J.
not pronounce upon it in view of our conclusion,
as will presently appear, with reference to his
alternative argument based upon recognition."
The learned Chief Justice went on to deal with the
alternative argument advanced by Mr. Viswanatha
Sastri and accepted it.
.•.
•
While we agreee with the conclusions reached
by My Lord the Chief Justice on the alternative
argument of Mr. Viswanatha Sastri and also agree
with. what My Lord has said with regard to the
other writ petitions, we would like to state our
view on the first point urged by Mr. Viswanatha
Sastri. In our opinion s. 299( l) of the Constitutfon
Act of 1935 did not help grantees from the former
rules whose rights had not been recognized by his
new sovereign in the matter of establishing their
rights in the municipal courts of the new sovereign
because that provision only protected such rights
as the new citizen had at the moment of his becoming a citizen -or'the Indian Dominion. It did
not enlarge his rights nor did it cure any infirmity
in the rights of that citizen: This is the view which
we have taken in our judgme11t in State of Gujarat
v. Jamadar Mahomed Abdulla ('). In that case the
rights of the grantees from the former ruler of Juna.gadh were 11ot recognised at any time by tho
Dominion of fodia and so we held that even after
becoming citize11s of the Indian Dominion they
could not assert those rights in the municipal
courts of the Dominion of India. We adhere to
that view and reject the first argument of Mr.
Viswanatha Sastri. Since we agree with the rest
(I)
[i962]3S.C.R.970.
450 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1962) SUPP.
U6I
l'r""'uil Chandra Dt6
v.
Tiu Sui. o/Orissa
M udllollau J.
of the judgment there is nothing more that we
need say.
Petitions 79 of 1957
168 of 1958 arnl
4 of 1959 allowed.
Petition 167 of 1958 dismissed.
MANOHAR LAL CHOPRA
t•.
1961
RAT BAHADUR RAO RAJA SETH HIRALAL
Nofltmbtr 16.
(K. N. WANCHOO, K. c. DAS GUPTA, .T. c. SHA!(
and RAOHUBAR DAYAL, JJ.)
Civil Procedure-Inherenl pou'<rB nf courl..-Temporary
Injunction-Restraining parly from procuding with •uit in
anothar State-l.egality and propriety of-Code of Cid/ Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), ss. 94(c) 151 : 0. 39 r. 1.
M filed a suit at Asansol against H for recovery of
money. Later, H filed a counter suit at Indore againtst M
for recovery of money. In the Asansol suit one of the
defences rai•ed by H was that the A.ansol court had no
jurisdiction to entertain the suit. H applied to the Asansol
court to stay the suit but the court refused the prayer. An
appeal to the Calcutta High Court against the refusal to
stay was dismissed with the direction that the preliminary
issue of juri•diction should be disposed of by the trial
court immediately. Thereupon, H applied to the Indore
court for an injunction to ttstrain M from proceeding with
the Asansol suit pending the disposal of the Indore suit and
the court purporting to act under 0. 39 Code of Civil Procedure granted 1he injunction. M appealed to the Madhya
Bharat High Court which dismissed the appeal holding that
though 0. 39 was not applicable to the case the 01 der of
injunction could be made undrr the inhrrent powers of the
court under s. 151 Code of Civil Procedure.
Held, that the order of injunction was wrongly granted
and should be vacated.
Per, Wanchoo, Das Gupta, and Dayal,.D.-The Civil
courts had inherent power to issue temporary injunctions in
cases which were not covered by the provisions of 0. 39 Civil
Procedure Code. The provisions of the Code wrre not
I
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