MANNALAL JAIN versus THE STATE OF ASSAM AND OTHERS
Supreme Court of India | Decided 29 September 1961 | [1962] 3 S.C.R. 936 | 1961 INSC 282
Key facts
- Decided
- 29 September 1961
- Bench
- BHUVNESHWAR PRASAD SINHA*, S.K. DAS, A.K. SARKAR, N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR, J.R. MUDHOLKAR
- Bench size
- 5
- Case number
- WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) No. 303/1960
- Disposal
- Case Allowed
- Citation
- [1962] 3 S.C.R. 936
- Neutral citation
- 1961 INSC 282
Text of the judgment
•
936
1961
JI rs. Dossibai
X. B. Juj11blw.J
v.
Khl1TKl&and GorU111Ql
Das Gupta J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1962)
under s. 6 (1) of tho Rent Act the provision of
part II of the Act, apply.
The Trial Court nnd the High Court wer•
therefore right in holding that the City Civil Court,
Bombay, had 'no jurisdiction to try the suitll.
Tho a ppeale arc accordin~ly dismil!&'cl with
costs. Thero will be one 1et of hearing fee for th•
four appeals.
r
Ap~nl di.<miased.
MANNALAL JAIN
1961
t'.
Septnnbtr 29.
TIIF. RTATF. OF ASSAM A?-.J) OTHERS.
(R. T'. 81NRA, c. J., R. K. DAS, A. TC SARIU.R,
N. RA.JAGOPALA AYYANGAR nnd
.T. R. MUDl!OLKAR, .T.T.)
'°'
Foo,/ Cnntro/-T.ire•r•
U"ho/,.alt dealing in rir• anii
Orda pre10-ibing co"'1itinna Jnr g,ant of
licP111:R--Stal1, r'r0t"rnml'nt ia~uing inatructionR lo lictnaing
auf.1,oritif'8 to qranf licenceJ to co·oP'rative ~ocielit1 01ily-Propriety of---Grant of licl'nttt to ro-operative .!Dcittit11 and rtfttaal (()
othm-1.egalilf/ ~f-E,.ential Commodili'6 .A<I, 1955, (IO of
195.5), "· 3 mul 6-·-A•ROm FoodgraiM (Lir.<n•;ng and Co11trol)
nrd<r, IP61, cl. 5.
In exercise of the powers ronf<rred by s. 3 of the Ew.ntial O>mmodities Ar.t, 1955, the Assam Government made the
A"am Foo<lizrains (Licensing anrl Control) Order, 1961. This
padd.:1-l.icm'1°flfl
Order providt"d that no person could do bu~ine~s in foodgrains
including ric.- and parlrly, in \\•holcsal~ quantities except under
a licenc' i"ued thereunder. Clause 5 of the Order laid down
in suh-ds. (a) to (e) matters which the licensin<r authority
!l}•all, among otht'r matters, have rejrard to in granting
or refusing a license; sub-cl. (e) bring "whether the
applicant is a co-operative society". In 1959, directions had
he.n issued to aU liccnsing authoritieo by the Government that
the rights of monopoly procurement had been given to Apex
Co-operative Society. The petitioner applied for a licence but
was ref115'd in view of the provisions of sub-cl. (e) of cl. 5 of
the Order. The petitioner challenged the order refusing the
licence on the grounds: (1) that sub-clause :el wu u/trg viua
•
-..--. "
:l S.C.R. SUPRElllE COURT REPORTS
+
937
as it was beyond the powers granted to the S~ate Goyernment
under s. 3 read with s. 5 of the Act, and (n) !hat sub;cl· (e)
had been applied in a discriminatory manner with .a v1~~ to
create a monopoly in favour of the Apex Co-operative Society.
He'd, (per C.J., Das and Ayyangar, JJ.), that sub-cl. (e)
of cl. 5 of the Order was not ultra vires s. 3 read wit~ s._ 5 of
the Act, but the impugned order rejecting the apphca'.'?n of
the petitioner was bad as it infringed the rights of the petuwner
guaranteed under Arts. Hand 19 of the Constitution.
Section 3 of the Act authorised the making of an order
to achieve two objects, for maintaining or increa~ing supplies
of essential commodities and for securing their equitable di~tri
bution and availability at fair prices. Sub-clause (e) of cl. 5 of
the Control Order, 1961, which enabled the licensing authority
to prefer a co-operative society in certain circumstances in th~
matter of granting a licence, was not unrelated to the objects
mentioned in s. 3 of the Act. A co-operative society may, by
reason of the place which it occupies in the village economy of
a particular area, be in a better position for maintaining or
increasing- supplies of rice and paddy and even for securing
their eq~itable 'distribution and availability at fair prices.
Ramanlal Nagardas v. JJ[. 8. Palnitkar, A.LR. 1961,
Guj. 38, distinguished,
)
-._. _
r
Sub·clause (e) permitted the licensing authority to give
preference to co-operative societjes in certain cases but it did
not have the effect of creating a monopoly in favour of
co-operatiVe societ:es. In the present case the licensing authority
refused lir.f'nce to the petitioner for the onJy reason and
purpose of granting a monopoly to co-operative societies; it
had administered
Jaw in a discriminatory manner and for
the purpose of achieving the ulterior object of creating a monopoly in favour of co-operative1_; which object was not within
sub-cl. (e). The licensini>: authoritv was influenced, not by
considerations mentioned in cl. 5 of the Order, but by the
instructions issued by the State Government to grant Iicencci
to co-operatives only. It \vas not proper for the Government
to issue instructions to the licensing authorities when they were
required to act according to the provisions of law.
•1e
Per Sarkar and Mudholkar,JJ, Sub-clause (e) of cl. 5 of
the Order served the object of s. 3 of the Act to maintain or
increase the supplies of essential commodities and to secure
their equitab]e di<1tribution and availability at fair prices and
,--y-- was not ultra vires. Even if the Order a1lowed only one
.class, namely, co-operative societies, to do the business and
prohibited others, it would still advance the objects of the Act;
and the prohibition of the others doing the business would
amount to reasonable restrictions under Art. 19(6).
J,961
Marmalal Jain
v.
'The Stare of Assam
+
938
11'1
11.-1.i J.;,,
v:
TM 5,.,, •f Asscm
~UPft.EME COURT REPORTS
[1962)
N1mndra Kumar v. Tht, U11io1t of Ifldia, [19601 2 S.C.R.
375 and GU... C'*"'rM Importtr1 d: U1e<s' A•socialion v. Th•
U ..ion of India, (W.P_ 65 of 1959, unreported), relied on.
The licensing authority had not exercised its power under
sub·cl. (e) in a discriminatory manner in the present case.
The authority was entitled to give preference to a co-operative
society and that is what it has done. Though the result of
this preference was to prevent the petitioner from carrying on
his busine", it was in the circumstances, a rcuonablc rCltric·
tion on hi• right "" it was nrcessary for securing foodgrains at
reasonable prices and in adequate quantities. There 'vere no
directions given by the State Government in 1961 to licensing
authorities to grant licence~ only to co-operative societies and
it could not be said that the licensing authority had only
carried out the directions of the Government and had not
acted independently. In fact, the Order itself carried a
direction in sub-cl. (e) to give preference to co-operative
socicties. The co...aperative societies formed a class by themselves and a provision giving preference to s·Jch a clan better
served the objects of the Act, and had a clear nexus with the
object of the Act and did not offend Art. 14.
-·
•
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION : Petition No. 303 of
1960.
S. l;. n,, J.
Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India
for the enforcement of Fundamental Rights.
C. K. Daphtary, Solicitor-Geneml of India,
N. Sharma, S. C. Nath and R. Gopal<lkrishnan, for
the Petitioner.
M. C. Setalvad, Attorney·Genernl!or India and
Naunit Lal, for the Respondents.
I 061. September 29. The Judi,'lilent of Sinha
C ..J., S. K. Das and Rajagopala Ayyangar waa
delivered by
S. K. DAS, ,J.-This writ potition by one
Mannalal Ja.in was originally filed on October 17,
1960, and the ordor eompla.ined of was dated
September 13, 1960. This was an order made by
the Deputy Commissioner, Kamrup, Ga.uha.ti, rejcc.
ting an application made by the petitioner ~or t~c
grant of a license for the year l!l60 for d~l.mg m
rioe a.nd paddy under the relevant prov1s1olll! of
the Assam Fooclgraine (Licensing and Control)
Order, 1960. This writ petition was put up for
'
3 S.C.R.
,,
•
~-
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
9311
hearing in this Court on February 2, 1961. The
hearing was, however, adjourned sine die, because
it was stated before us that the period of licence
for 1960 had already expired and a fresh application would have to be made for a license for 1961.
A fresh application was accordingly made by the
petitioner on February 4, 1961. But before that
date a fresh Assam Foodgrains (Licensing and
Control) Order, 1961 was made by the Governor of
Assam and the application made by the petitioner
had to be' dealt with under the new Order. No
order having been made on this fresh application
by the Deputy Commissioner, the petitioner moved
this Court by means of a petition (C.M.P. No. 850 of
1961) asking for certain reliefs, one of which was
that the respondents, namely, the licensing authorities, should be directed to consider the application
of the petitioner and grant him a license. On
April 11, 1961 an order was made rejecting the
application of the petitioner. This order which is
impugned before us was in these terms.
"H-.ving regard to the existing licenses
in these areas (Mangaldai and Gauhati), and
the quantity of foedgrains available therein,
any further license would be superfluous."
When the petition was again put up for hearing on
May 1, 1961 the petitioner asked for time to amend
his original petition which related to the order
refusing to grant him a license for 1960. Thia
amendment became necessary by reason of the
subsequent order passed on April 11, 1961, quoted
earlier, by which the petitioner's application for a
license for 1961 was rejectPd. This amendment
wa~ allowed. Therefore, we have now to deal with
the writ petition as amended by the petition dated
May 5, 1961 (C.M.P. No. 1140 of 1961).
It is necessary now to state the relevant facts
out of which the petition has arisen. The petitioner
states that he is an Indian citizen carrying on a
business dealing in rice and paddy in the district of
1961
Mann•lal Jain
v.
Tiu Sl.te of Assam
S.K.Das J.
940
SUPREME COGRT REPORTS
[1962]
1
.\/mmolal .!r1i11
"·
7 /u Staft 9f .4JJam
~.k.lJ,,6
J.
\amrnp in the State of Assam.
Jn I!l55 W<l.B
enacted the Essential CommoditiPs Act, I 055 (Act JO
of l!Jii5). In exflrcise of tho powers eonfcrrccl by
s. ~ of the said Act, reacl with ;i notification by
which t.he said powers were dcl1,gatccl by the
Central Government to tho Govcmrncnt of Assam,
the latter Gornrnrncnt made nu Ord('r callccl the
As11am Foodgrnins (Licensing and Cuntrnl) Order,
1958. The result of this was that no dealing in
rice and paddy in wholesale quantities was permissible unless the petitioner obtain!'d a license
from the relevant licensing authority. The petitioner
states that he obtained such a license in l!J:i8.
This license expired on Decrmht•r :;i, l 9:i8. The
case of tho' petitioner is that in J\J5D also he carried
on his business though there is some dispute as to
whether he obtained a license for that yi,ar. On
K"'·embcr :?G, ID.'i!I, the petitioner received a letter
from the office of the Doputy Din·ctor of Supply,
Gnuhati, which said that his lice1rne woulcl not bo
renewed after December 31, W5D. This communication, it is stated, was the result of it decision taken
by the Government of Assam on t lw !l.dviee of a.
body called the Food Advisory Council to gi,·c a.
right of monopoly procurement of paddy to a cooperative society in the district of Kamrup known
as the Aasam Co· operative Apex ?i!ark,.ting Society
Ltd. (re~ponclent Ku. 6 beforn us). In a lotter dated
No\'cmbor 13, ID5D, tho Director of Supply, Assam,
indicated the policy to be followed to give <'lfoct to
the dC"cision aforesaid in these terms :
"The right of monopoly procurement in
respect of Kamrup clistrict including ~fangaldai
Suh·division, Taxpur Sub.division, Cachar
district, :Nowgong district including United
,\Jikir and )forth Caehar Hills and North
Lakhimpur 8ub.dh·ision has been given to
the Co· operative Apex Marknting Society. The
Society will procure paddy from the growers
through vario11s service Cu.operative Societies
,prcad ovN the district or suh-diTision. They
,
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....-.-,,,.
3 S.C.R.
,+
f'
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
941
will procure all available surplus paddy and
deliver to Supply Department the quantity
required for the buffer stock for those areas.
Any paddy procured by them which is uot
required by us may be delivered to the mills."
A copy of the letter was forwarded to all licensing
authorities. On January Li, 1960, the Assam Foodgrains (Licensing and Control) Order, 1960, came
into force. This replaced the earlier Order of 195~.
Clause 0 of the 1960 Order was in these terms:
"5. Mailers to be taken into consideruti:on
for granting a license.-In granting or refusing
a license under this Order, the licensing
authority shall among other matters have
regard to the following, namely:(a} the stock of foodgrains available in
the locality for which the licen~e is required;
have
1 b) the number of persons who
applied for and/or boon granted licenses in
respect of the foodgrains under thi~ Order in
the locality ;
( c) the business ordinarily carried 011 by
the applicant; and
(d) the past activities of the applicant
as a licensee or business man/firm :
Provided that the State Government may
from time to time modify the conditions for
granting a license."
On January 28, 1960 the petitioner made his application for a license for the year HJGO. This application was rejected by an order dated February 17,
1960. The reason given for the rojection was in
these terms:
"You are hereby informed that as the
Co-operative Apex Marketing Society bas been
given the right of monopoly purchase in the
Kamrup district this year, your case cannot
be considered for issue of the license."
1961
Mannalal Jain
v.
The State of ABsam
S;K;Das J.
!J42
-
Ji!RI
JI tu11ttJi., l ,I ain
v.
Tht Statt •f AJ.Hfm
S.K. /iatt J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(Hl62)
This reaaoa was obviously baaed on the decision as
to monopoly procurement which the Government
of Assam had adopted.
Against this order the petitioner moved the
High Court of Asaam by means of a writ petition
under Art. 226 of the Constitution. The High
Court allowed the petition mainly on the ground
that the application of the petitioner for a. license '
for tho year 1960 was not coDBi<lorecl on merits by
the liceneilljl: authority in accordance with tho provisious of ol. 5 of the Assam Foodgrains (Licensing
and Control) Order, 1960. The High Court did not go
into the larger question whether the State could or
conld not create a monopoly in the matter of procurement of paddy under the said provisions by means •
of executive instructions issued to the licensing
authoritits. It, however, qu&ahed tho order dat-0d
February 17, 1960 and iBSued a writ of mandamus
directing the licensing authority to consider the
application of the petitioner on merits and in
accordance with the provisions of the aforesaid
Control Order. Till June 7, l!J60 no order was
passcl1 by tho licensing authority, and on that date
'
the petitioner rnado two applications to tho High
Court, one for directing tho licensing authority to
gmn t him a liceru;e for l!J60 and the other for
taking action for contempt of court. A notice of
thoso applications, it is stated, was served on tho
rcspondenUI. On June 8, 1960 the licensing authority made another order refusing to grant a licenso
to the petitioner. '.Jlhis order stated that "as the
Assam Co-operative Apex Marketing Society Ltd.,
had already been grant-0d a license to deal in rice
and paddy, with its branches spread all over the
district, it was considered unncc•lSSary to grant
further dealing licenses to individual dealers for the
same area". On June !J, l!J60 the applications
earlier macie by the petitioner to the High Court on --..-~
Jun<' 7, 1960 were withdrawn and a fresh application was made on Juno 15, 1960, which was directed
against tho order dated Jm1e 8, 1960. On
-
-
3 8.C.R.
.+
'
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
943
August lO, 1960 the High Court again set aside the
order and directed the licensing authority to act independently of instructions received from the Government and to apply its mind to the merits of the
.application and decide it in accordance with the
relevant provisions of the Assam Foodgrains
(Licensing and Control) Order, 1960. Again, no
orders were made by the licensing authority till
September 8, 1960 in accordance with the directions
of the High Court, and the petitioner made two
applications on that date: one for enforcing the
direction of the High Court, and the other for
initiating proceedings in contempt. These applications were admitted and it is stated that notices
were served on the respondents, including the
licensing authority, on that very date. On Septem·
ber 13, 1960 tl1e licensing authority made another
order, again rejecting the application of the
petitioner. This order stated inter alia:
"For the areas for which the applications
have been made the Assam Co-operative Apex
Marketing Society Ltd., has earlier applied
for and has been granted !iceme. This is a
relevant consideration under Clause 5 (b) of
the AssamFoodgrains (Licensing and Control)
Order, 1960. The stock of foodgrains available in the area can easily be procured by the
party already given license. Being a cfloperative, it has better facility in this respect.
As such, I do not find it necessary to
grant license to the applicant. The petition
is, therefore, rejected".
This time instead of going to the High Court
of Assam, the petitioner came here and filed his
wl'it petitic·n on October 17, 1960 (Writ Petition
No. 303 of 1960). Thereafter, certain proceedings
took place in this Court to which we have earlier
referred in the first paragraph of this judgment.
The amended writ petition as it now stands is
directed against the order of the licensing authority
dated April II, 1961, by which it rejected tho
1961
Msnnirlal J ~in
\'l
Tiu 3tirte 6/ Assam
S. K' Dar J.
!l44
19~/
A-laf'llfJJksJ Jain
.
v.
Thi Stale of AsJam
S .. 1..:. Dt1s J.
SUPRE~m COURT REPORTS
[l!JG!?
aµplieatiou of the petitioner for a lioense for l!l61.
The provisions of the Assam Foodgraine (Licensing
and Control) Order, 1000, Bre no lo.nger relevant,
because a fresh Order called the Asoam Foodgrains
(Licen>ing and Control) Order, l!J6l, was made by
the Gon~rnor of Assam. We shall hereinafter call
this the Control Order, 1961. It is necessarv to
:·ead here cl. 5 of the Control Order, 1961.
•
"5. ~falters to be token into consideration
jUJ" granting n license.-Iu granting or refusing
a license under this Order, the licensing
authority shall, among other matters, have
regard to tho following, namely:(a) the stock of foodgrailrn available in
the locality for which tho license is required;
(bl the number of per~ons who have
applied for and those who have been granted
li"ensfs in respect of the foougrains under this
Order in the lorality;
(c) the business ordinarily carried on
by the applicant;
(d) the past activities of the applicant
as a licensee or business man/firm; and
(c) whether the applicant is a CO·
operative society."
It should be noticed that the pr01·iso to old el. 5
was omitted and a. nc'" snb·el. (e) was added.
This snb·cla.use enables the licensing authority, in
granting or refusing a license, to have regard to the
<'onsidcration whether the applicant is a co.operative society. To complete the statement of facts,
it ru11y ]><~rhapB be obsc1:ved that on Nove~bcr ~0,
l!HiO, tho High Court reJected the applic:i.t10n for
procreding against the opposite parties by way of
contempt, mainly on the ground that the ?rder
made on Scptt•mbcr rn, J!)(iO, was not before 1t.
On behalf of the petitioner the order dated
April 11, l!J(il, has been impugned on tlvo main
....
•
3 S.C.R.
.+
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-
SUPREME COURT HEPORTS
grounds. The first ground of attack is tl1at su1'-cl.(e)
of cl. 5 of the Control Order, 1961 is ultra vires,
because it goes beyond the powers granted . to the
State Government under s. 3 read with s. 5 of the
Essential Commodities Act, 1955. The second
ground of attack is that even if sub-cl. (e) of cl. 5 of
tho Control Order, 1961, is intra vires being within
the powers granted to the State Government, it
merely allows the licensing authority to take into
consideration, among other relevant matters, the
circumstance that the applicant for a licence is a
co-operative society; it docs not say that a monopoly right of procurement should be given in
favour of a co-operative society by excluding all
others; therefore, it was not open to the licensing
authority to proceed on the footing as if that subclause had created a right of monopoly in favour
of co-operatives. Tho argument is that in the
present case the licensing authority instead of
applying its mind to the provisions of cl. 5 of the
Control Order, 1961, went by the instructions issued
by the State Government to grant a right of
monopoly to co-operative societies and based its
order on such instructions, in spite of directions to
tho contrary given by the High Court on earlier
applications made by the petitioner. In other
words, it is contended t.hat the impugned order was
a mere colourable exercise of P'.•Wer in tho si·nse
that instead of exercising tho powers in accordance
with the provisions of law by which the licensing
authority had to be guided, it acted in accordance
with the instructions of the State Government and
granted a monopoly in favour of co-operative societies, such monopoly not being contemplated by the
provisions of cl. 5 of tho Control Order, 1961; therefore, the impugned order was bad being without any
legal authority or jurisdiction, and as it took away
the right of the petitioner to carry on his trade,
and furthermore made a discrimination against him
for the purpose of granting a monopoly to respondent
No. 6 not contempla.ted by law, it violated the
\
1961
Manna/al Jain
v.
TM Stille of AsJ·am
S.lf.·Das J.
-!HG
1961
JI an114'4J J aiti
v.
Tlw StaU of As.sam
S. K. Das].
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
fI 962]
petitiouer'd rights unl·Jr Arts. 14 and llJ of the
Constitution. He is accordingly cntitlod to come to
this Court under Art. 32 of the Constitution to havo
the order qua.shed. The petitioner has also elaimed
that for the same reasons, the grant of a licenso in
favour of respondent Xo. ti should also be quashed.
On behalf of the respondents, the' State of
Assam, its officers, and the Assam Co-operative Apex
Marketing Society Ltd. (respondent No. 6), it has
been urged that neither of the aforesaid t'vo grounds
of attack is valid. On their behalf tho argument is
that sub-e!.(e) of cl. 5 of tho Control Order, 1961, is
within the authority and power granted to the ::>ta.to
Government undor s. :~read withs. 5 of the Essential
Commodities Act, 1955. Secondly, it is contended
that 110 monopoly has boen granted to the A881lm
Co-operative Apex .Marketing ::locicty Ltd., and the
order of the licensing authority datod April 11, 19Gl
is baaed on the considerations referred to in sub.els.
(a) ancl (b) of cl. 5 of the Control Order, 1961, a.nd
cannot be assailed on a petition under Art. 32 of the
Constitution.
We proceed now to a consideration of the
grounds of attack and the replies thereto. As to the
first ground of attack it must be made clear at the
very outset that the vires of the Essential Commodities Act, i!l55 have not been challenged before us.
What has been contended before us is that s.3 of
the Act gives certain powers to the Central
Government, which powers the Central Govcrnm('lnt
has delegated the State Government of Assam.
Theso powers it iR contended, do not authorise the
insertion of sub·cl. (c) of cl. 5 of the Control Order,
1961; in other wor<ls the argument is that whether
the applicant for a licence is a co-operative Society or
not has no relova1rnc \Yhatsoever to the objects fur
which s. 3 grimts tho powers to the Centrnl Govern.
mont or its delegate to make certain Orders.
Sub.section ( 1) of s. 3 is relevant to this argument
and reads:
,
•
3 S.C.R.
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SUPREMECOURT REPORTS
947
· "3 (l} If the Central Government is of
opinion .that it is necessary or expedient so
to do for maintaining or increasing supplies of
1my essential commodity or for securing their
equitable distribution and availability at fair
prices, it may by order, provide for regulating
or prohibiting the production, supply and
distribution thereof and trade and commerce
therein."
Sub-section (2) of s. 3 which we need not read
enumerates the various categories of Orders which
can be made in exercise of the powers conferred by
8ub-s.(l), but without prejudice to the generality
of those powers. Now, the argument before us 1s
that the powers under s. 3 can be exercised when
the Central Government or its delegate is of opinion
that it is necessary or expedient to exercise the
powers to achieve two objects: (a) for maintaining
or increasing supplies of any essential commodity,
or (b) for securing their equitable distribution and
availability at fair prices. It is contended that the
circumstance whether the applicant for a licence is
a co·operative society or not has no connection
whatsover with the aforesaid two objects and
therefore, sub-cl. (e} of cl.5 of the Control Order, 1961
is not within the powers granted by s. 3 of the Act.
We cannot accept this a.grument in the very
broad terms in which it has been stated. Weare
satisfied that cl. 5 of the Control Order, 1961
does not provide for a monopoly in favour of cooperative societieA. The clause enumerates five
matters and states that the licensing authority
shall have regard to those matters in granting or
refusing a license. The fore matters enumerated
in the C'lause are not exhaustive of the matters
which the licensing authority may consider;
because the clause says that the matters enumerated
therein a.re five "among other matters" which the
licensing a'.lthority may consider.
Obviously
enough it is open to the licensing authority to
1961
Afanrul/,,J Jain
v.
The Stale of A.seam
S. K. Das J.
948
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1962)
l~S-1
consid~r all matters relevant to the grant or refusal
.\/ •M•i•I ]On
v.
Tiu Statt •/ A•,•m
of a license and the five matters enumerated in
the clause merely highlight some of those matters.
All that can be said is that sub-cl. (e) enables the
licensing authority to prefer a co-operative sociotv
in certain ciroumstanccs in the matter of grantin;.,
a li;onsc; in other words, there mav be cases o~
localitiea where the considerations· set out in
sub·cl. (e) may override other considerations in the
matter of granting a license. We do not think that
su h- cl. (t>) has any more far reaching effect. Indeed
the learned Attorney-G~meral appearing for the
respondents conceded that sub-cl. (e) of cl. 5 did
not have the effect of creating a monopoly in
favour of co-operative societies.
S. K. D<s J.
Proceeding, therefore, on the footing that
sub-cl. (e) of cl. 5 does not provide for the creation of a monopoly, can it be said that it is outside the powers conferred on the Stnte Government by s. 3 of the Essential Commodities
Act, 1\l55 ? It is not disputed before us that
sub-ch. (a) to (d) fall within the powers conferred
by s. 3. lllattcra such as the stock of foodgrains
available in the locality for which the license is
require<!, the numb<>r of persons who have applied
for and those who have been granted licem!ls in
the loc1'1ity, the business ordinarily carried on by
the applicant, and the past activities of the applicant as a licensee or busin08sman, aro undoubtedly
matters whioh have relation to the two objoctll
mentioned in a. 3. Can it be said that tho fifth
matter mentione<I in sub-cl. (e) viz., whether the
applicant is & co·operative society is completely
unrelatrd to those two objects? We aro m1ablo to
say that it is. In tho counter-affidavit filed on
behalf of the respondents it has beon stated that
co-opernti..-o 1ocieties have better facilities for
procuring foodgraina and are in a position to ensure
scheduled prioes to the farmers who grow paddy.
It has beon further statod that amongst the cooperative socictioe are primary societies which
'
'
~:
•
I
3 S.C.R.
SUPREllIE COURT -REPORTS
1981
consist of the growers of paddy; there are .also
}Janna/al Jafo
.co-operative societies called supply co-operatives,
·- .-,.v; -.- '·'
which are in a position to eliminate middle-man's Th~ State of .4.fsam
' . . ..
profits. · In para- 4 it was stated that the National
Development Council decided that the 'State should
take over wholesale trade in foodgrains with a
view to maintaining ·price leveh which are. fair
to the producer and the consumer and reduce to
the minimum · the disparity between the ·prices
received by the farmer ·and the prices paid. by. _the
consumer throughout the year. It was also decided
that an adequate number -of primary marketing
societies should be set up and linked with -village
co-operatives which should serve as agencies for
collection P.nd sale of foodgrains at assured prices
at the vii' 5e level. The affidavit the_n stated :
In view of the decision of :the National
De~ ,lopment Council, the -_ Go_vernment _of
Assam in consultation with their State Food
Advisory Council decided that in making
procurement of rice and paddy in the State,
preference should be given to the co-operative societies wherevei; they have resources
and facilities."
'We are of the view that by reason of. the. position
which co-operative societies may occupy in _the
village economy of a. particular area, it cannot
be laid down as a general proposition that sub-cl.( e)
of cl. 5 of of the Control Order, 1!!61, is- unrcla- ted to the objects mentioned ins. 3 of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955. There may be places
or areas where co-operative societies a.re in· a better
position for maintaining or increasing supplies of
rice and paddy and even for securing their equit- able distribution and availability at fair prices. We
must, therefore, repel the very broadly stated
contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner
that sub-cl. (e) of el. 5 of the Control Order,- 1961,
can have no relation whatsoever to the two objects
mentioned- in s. 3 of the Essential Commodities
Act,1955.
On behalf oC the petiticiner reliance
950
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1962)
was placed on the decision in - Ramanlal Nagard~s
v. 1l!. S. Palnitkar (1) • • That· was a case m
A-lil1Ulal11l Jain
v.
which the validity of State action in entrusThe State •f Amm _ ting wholesale distribution of
sugar which is
s.-K-,v-., j.
an essential commodity under the Essential Commodities Act, 195.5, to Co-operative Societies
only and excluding other dealers holding similar
licenses like the co-operative societies from -such
distribution, was challenged and arose for consideration. It was held that a State -could .make
a classification for the purpose of achieving parti·
. cular legislative objects but the classification must './'
-satisfy two conditions : (1) it· must be founded on
intelligible differentia, and (2) the differentia
- must have a rational relation to the objects sought
to be achieved. The question was considered from
the - point of view of Art. 14 of the Constitution
and it was held that the action of the State Govern. ment in entrusting wholesale distribution of sugar
to co-operative societies to the exclusion of other
licence-holders amounted ·to a discrimination
which violated the right guaranteed under Art. 14.
The principles underlying Art. 14 of the Constitution are now well-settled and have been enunciated
and explained in a number of decisions of this
Court and we consider it unnecessary to refer to
those principles in detail. In the case under our
consideration no discrimination has been made
-between one class of license-holders and another
class of license-holders as in the case of Ramanlal
Nagardas v. M. S. Palnitkar (1 ). What has happened
in the present ·case is that licenses have been
·granted only to co-operative societies and a license
has been denied to the petitioner, the lict-nsing
authority proceeding on the footing that a monopo. ly must be created in - favour of CO· operative
societies. A discrimination has indeed . taken place as against the petitioner, a discrimination
· which is not justified by the provisions of cl. - 5 of
the Control Order, 1961.
In dealing with the
application of the petitioner tho licen&ing authority ~
..
- - (I)
A. I. R. 1961 Guj. 38.
3 S.C.R.
SUPREME.COURT REBORTS
951
19ff
has made. & discriminationwhich. is- not justified·
by cl. t;, That would take us to the second argu•
.1.11 Qflnralol Jaia
v.
ment of the learned counsel for the petitioner, Tht Stalt.of
..,~.ssmn
but on his first argument the decision in: RamainS. K, Das J,
lal Nagardas v. M. S. Palnitkar (1) is of no assis'
tance. Sub-clause (e) of cl. 5, we have already
stated, enables the licensing authority to give
preference to a co-operative society in cel'tain
crioumstances; but it does not create a monopolyi ·
in favour of co-operative societies. The preference given has a reasonable relation to the objects
of the legislation set out ins. 3 of the Act; therCL
fore, sub-cl. (e) of cl. 5 of the Control Order, 1961,
cannot be held to be bad on the ground of class
legislation, but the passing of an order. under the
sub-clause for a purposs not contemplated by it
will amount to discrimination and denial ofthe
guarantee of equal protection of the law.
This brings us to the second argument urged
on behalf of the petitioner and here we think that
the learned counsel for the petitioner is on much
surer ground. It was open to the licensing. authority to give preference to co-operative societies, if
it was of the opinion that granting a license to a
co.operative society in a particular locaJity would
facilitate the objects of s. 3 of the Act. This is
not what the licensing authority did. He repeatedly refused a license to the p3titioner, for the only
reason and purpose of granting a monopoly
to co-operative societies. In other words, the discrimination .that has been made by the licensing
authority is really in the administration of the
law. It has been administered in a discriminatory manner and for the purpose of achieving an
ulterior· object, namely, the creation of a monopoly
in favour of co-operatives, an object which, clearly
enough, is not within sub-cl. (e) of cl. 5 of the
Control Orner, 1961. We have quoted- earlier
the varrious orders which the licensing authority
had paesed. Those orders clearly show that the
licensing authority refused a licence to the
(I) A.I.R.. J!Hil Guj. 38.
952 '
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[H.102)
petitioner not on ~ounds referred to in aub-cls.(a)
and (b) of cl. 5 but - on the ground that the
v.
TM Stal1 of .A.Jsam State Government had decided to introduce · a
right of monopoly procurement of paddy in favour
S.K. DasJ.
of co-operative societies and therefore, no licenses
should be granted - to individual dealers other
_than co.-operath'e societies. ·Judged against the
background of facts to which we,' have earlier
referred :in this Judgment, the impugned order
dated April II, l!J61 appears to us to have ·been
based on the same ground, namely, the creation
of a monopoly in favour. of co-operatives, even
though the order refers to existing licenses and
the quantity of foodgrains available iii the lcicality.
- In the course of the hearing before us, the case
was adjourned in order to give the parties an
i'
opportunity of filing necessary affidavits to 'show
whether individual dealers other than co-operatfres have been completely excluded in the whole
of the State in tho matter of dealing in paddy. The
affidavits show that private dealers have been
completely excluded. In the affidavit filed on
behalf of respondent No. I, it has been stated in
-para. 4: .
·
·
"It is not denied that in the year 1961
licenses for the procurement of paddy have
been issued to the co-operatives in all the
paddy producing districts· in Assam."
To · show however that no - monopoly ha!
been created in favour of a particular co-operative
society. like respondent No. 6, it has been stated
that a number of co-operative societies_ have been
or are being granted licenses for the procurement
of paddy. In our view these statements in tho affidavits filed on behalf of the respondents show
only one and one object viz., creation of a monopoly in favour of co-operatives. To achieve that
object the State Government has resorted to _an
indirect ; method. Instead of making an· Order
authorising - such monopoly (if. the State was
.,._
..
I
1961
}.!annaltd Jain
•
'
·•
..
3 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
953
' +
competent to make such an Order under the Essential
Commodities Act, 1955, as to which we express
no opinion), it has chosen to adopt the indirect
method of issuing instructions to the licensing
authorities in all the districts to grant licenses to
co-operatives only. The vice of the impugned order
lies in the licensing authority accepting such ins·
tructions mid passing an order in accordance therewith. The duty of the licensing authority was to
pass orders in accordance with cl. 5 of the Control
Order, 1961. Instead of doing that, it passed an order
in accordance with the instruotions given to it on
behalf of the State Government, instructions which
appear to us to be not in consonance withsub-cl.(e)
of cl. 5; because sub-cl. (e) contemplates a prefe·
rence to co-operative societies in certain circum·
stances, but not a monopoly in their favour.
We accordingly hold that the impugned order
is bad as violating the rights of the petitioner
guaranteed under Arts. 14and19 of the Constitution.
We must, therefore, quash the order of the licensing
authority dated April 11, 1961. We must also
qua.sh the order by which the licensing authority
granted a licence in favour of respondent No. 6.
The licensing authority must now consider the
application of the petitioner for a license for the
year 1961 on merits along with the applicatic•n of
respondent No. 6 and such other applications as
may be still pending. In dealing with these applications the licensing authority must have regard
to the provisions of cl. 5 of the Control Order,
11:161, and such other provisions of law as have
a bearing on them, in the light of the observations
made in this judgment. It would be the duty of
the licensing authority to ignore all instructions
which are not in consonance with the provisions
of law by which it is to be guided. As the year 1961
will come to an end within a few months, the
applications should be dealt with as expeditiously
al pO!lsiDie so that the right of· the petitioner may
1961
Mannalal Jain
v.
Tiu St•fe of Assam
S. K. flas 7.
!)54,
l!MI
MMtUlalJ•in
v
Thi 8141; of ,foam
S.K. DasJ.
SUPREME COURl' REPORTS
[19621
not be rcnd~red infrnctuous by reason of the d~la.y
made in di"osing of tho applications.
.
Befor~ we part with this case wo · expreM our
<loop conoom over tho manner in which the State·
Governmen~ or its officers havo issued instruction!
in the ma.ttijr <if granting of licenses, instructions
which clearfy enough are not in consona.noo with the
provisions of law governing the grnnt of such
licenHcs. We doubt the wisdom of issuing executive
instructions in matters which a.ro governed by provisions of law; on•n if it be consi<;lered necessnry
to issue instructions in such n. matter, the instructions cannc;it be so framed or utilised as to o,·erri<lc tho Pi·.,visions of ll\w. Such a method will
destroy the very basi~ of the rule of law and
strike at tho Vl'ry root of orderly administration
of Jaw. We have thought it necessary to refer to
this matter because we feel that the instructions
which the State Government or its officer.a have
issued in the matt"'r of gmnti.ng of licenses for tho
procurement of paddy are not in consonance with
the provisions of ol. 5 of tho Control Otder 1961.
•
•
In t•e result the petition is allowed with
costi; and the necessary orders should no\v iasuo
ru1 directed above.
·
Stukar J.
-
s.uUUR ,J.-The petitioner is a ci~izen of India
an<l carri~ on bu.~int1ss as dealer in rice and paddy
in the Sta.te of Assam. Siner. 1958, dealing. in rice
and paddy was controlled in that State by Orders
made by tho State Government frniµ timo to th,ne
undor theEssential Commodities Act, 1955 by virtne
of powers delegated to it by the Central Go"\'ernmont under s. 5 of that Ac-. These Ordtirs hereafter co.lleci LicPlll!ing Orders, provided qiat no
person. could engage in any business involving
purchaso,.salo or storage for so.lo of any foi)dgte.ins,
which inc,J.uded rice and paddy, in wholesale quanti~
ti68 exoegt under and in: &0eorda.nce with the terms
and conCiitiona of a licence illsued thereunder.
Purahaae..o.r aal• in·wholeale quanti~iea waa defined
•
•I
:i i:.:>.c:. i ..
SUPREME COURT'R!EP'OR'T~
'955
as purchase or sale of quautitics Axceeding ten
maunds in any one transaction. The pedtinner had
obtained a license to deal in paddy for the .'
1958. It is not clear whether he hitd obtained a
license to do so for 1959. With these years,
however, this case is not concerned.
.•
On January 28, 1960, the petitioner h11.d
a pp lied under the Licensing Order then in force for
a license to deal in paddy in Kamrup district of
Assam for the year 1960. His application was
refused by an order made on February 17, 1960 on
the ground that it could not be considered as.'[the
Co-operative Apex Marketing Society had been given
the right of monopoly purchase in Kamrup district.
The petitioner then moved the High Court of Assam
under Art. 226 of the Constitution to quash this
order. On April 27, 1960, the High Court delivered
judgment quashing the order on the ground that the
authority concerned was bound to consider the
petitioner's application for licence and had failed to
do so. The High Court issued a writ of mandamus
directing that the petitioner's application be considered on its merits. As the licensing authority
did not consider the petitioner's application till
June 7, l9GO, the latter on that date moved the
High Court. again for enforcement of the writ issued.
On receipt ofihe notice this motion, tho licensing
authority passed an order on June 8, 1960 again
refusing to grant the petitioner the licence. This
order stated, "Your petition is considered. As the
Assam Co·OJl>erative Marketing Society has already
been granted a licence to deal in rice and paddy
with branches spread all over this district,
it is considered unnecessary to grant further
dealing licences to individual. dealers for the
same aFea. Hence the petition is rejected."
The petitioner thereupon' dropped his motion
to the H;gh Court of Assam of June 7, 1960 and
!no"ted tlie High Court;' afresh tinder Axt,' 226 against
the order of lJune 8, 1960 refusing him the licence
.961
.td.anna/al Jtzirl
v.
The State of AsscmSarkar J,
966
11161
Jl-1.Jjain
v.
Tiit Stak of AJJom
Sarka:].
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1962]
and the High Court on August 8, 1960, quashed it
on the ground that the licensing authority had to
act in a quaE-judicial capacity and tl1at it had decided
the case on the in8tructions of tho Stato Government without considering for itself the merits of the
case in terms of the Licensing Order. The authority was again directed to decide the case in a quasijuclicial capacity.
The licensing authority not having taken up
for decision the petitioner's caso for thcJ grant of
Jiccnco as directed by tho High Court, he moved
the High Court on September 8, HJGO for appropriate reliof1. On receipt of the notico of this motion
the licensing authority passed an order on
September 13, 1960, again refusing to grant lieonoo
tu the petit.ioncr and certain other private dealers.
The order stated, "For the areas for which the
applications have been ma.de the As sam Co-oporath-e Apex Marketing Socioty has carlior applied for
and has been granted licence. This is a relevant
consideration under cl. 5(b) of the Assam Foodgrains
(Licensing and Control) Order, lOGO. The stock of
foodgra.ins available in the area can caHily be procured by the party already given the licence. Being
a Co-operative Society it has better facility in this
respect. As such I do not find it necessary to grant
licence to those applicants. The petitions are htereforo rejected". Thereupon tho High Court on
:November 10, l!l60, made an order on tho petitioner's a.forosaid motion of September 8, 1960
discharging the rule as the order asked for had
boon mad<l. It obscr-red that the order of
September 13, 1960 was not before it and it waa
competent to say whether that order was in consonance with its order of August 8, 1960. It also
observed that it did not find sufficient reason to
take any action against the licensing . authority for
the dl·lay in the matter of the disposal of the
application for licence. · . .
Before proceeding furth<lr I would J.We tp point
out that the Assam Foodgrains (Licensing ~nd
.
I
,,
3 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
· !J57
Control) Order; 1960 being the Licensing Order by
which the petitioner's application for licence for
1960 was governed did not contain any· provision
enabling any preference to be given to a co-operative society in the matter of the grant of licence.
I now come to the present petition. _It was
moved in this Court by the petitioner under Art. 32
of the Constitution challenging the validity of tho
order of the Licensing authority dated September
13, 1960, and asking that the licence granted to the
Assam Co-operative Apex .Marketing .Society be
declared illegal and for an order directing the ..
licensing authority to consider the applications for
licences according to the provisions of the Licensing
Order. 1960. - Tho petition came up for hearing on
February 2, 1961. By that date the year for which ·the petitioner had asked for a licence had expired
and tho Licensing Order, 19GO had been replaced.
by another Order of 1961. In the result the
petition had become substantially infructuous. The
petitioner, therefore, suggested to this Court that
he would make an application for a licence for the
year 1961 and in the meantime the petition might
stand adjourned. An order was thereupon made
adjourning the petition sine die.
Thereafter the petitioner on J!'ebruary 4, 1961,
made a fresh application for licence for dealing in
paddy for the year 1961. An order was made by
the licensing authority on this application on April
l l, 1961, in tl1ese terms : "Having regard to the
existing licences in these areas (.M1mgaldai and
GauhatiJ, and tho quantity of food grains available therein any further licences would .. be . super·
fluous." In the result the petitioner was refused
licence for the year 1961. Thereafter, the petitioner under orders obtained from this Court
amended his petition and now seeks to challenge
the order of April II, 1961. The respondents to
this petition arc the State of Assam and some of _
ite officers including the licensing authority -
1961
Alannalal Jain
v.
The Stele of Assam
Sark11r J.
958 ;
'
llH
Jl-..141 J•in
v.
Tit, S'41e of
A,,.,.
Sarlwu ].
SUPREME COURT'R'EPORTS
[l!l62)
concer~e<l, 'as a.!so
llfarketmg
Society.
the Assam Co-operative apex
Soc1cty, hereafter called the Apex
As I have alroady sni<l, the application for
.
l1ccneo for 1961 was goYerned by the Licensing
Or<ler, 1961. Tho <lisputo in this case mainly
turns on cl. (e) of paraJraph 5 of this Order. That
paragraph ia in these terms:
«In granting or refusing a licenco under
this Order, the licensing authority shall,
among other matters, have regard to the
following, namely :(a) the stock of foodgrai.ns available in the locality for which tho liocnce
is required;
(b) the number of persons who
havo applied for and those who have
beon granted licences in respect of the
foodgrnins undor this Order in the locality;
(t•) tho buiiinoss ordinarily carried
on by tho applicant;
(d) the past activities of the applieant as a licensee or bu.qincss man/firm;
...
-,
,
•
and
(e) whether the appliuant is a cooperative society."
It is not in dispute that in the areas to which
the Licensing Order 1961, had been applied, licence~ to deal in paddy had been given to various
Co-operative Societies which were subsidiarios · of
tho Apex Society and no licence had been given to
any private dealer.
The respondents say that
these grants were duly made under cl. (e) of paragraph 5 of tho Licensin~ Orde~, Hl_ul. It is ·this
actiGn which forms tho mam grievance of the
petitioner. He puts his cont-ention on two grounds.
F!rst, ~e says that cl. (c) of p9.~~~raph. 5 of •the
L1censmg 9rder l!l~ l 1s ultra vire.~ M 1t has no
..............
3 s:C.R.
-
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
959
relation to the object of the Essential Commodities
Act under which it was made. Secondly, he says
that .in any event the Order has been applied in a
discriminatory manner and with a view to create
a monopoly in favour of the Apex Society to deal
in paddy and the petitioner's fundamental rights
under Arts. 19(l)(g) and 14 have thereby been
violated.
It does not seem to me that either of these
two contentions is well founded. I shall first
consider whether paragraph 5(e) of the Order is
ultra vires the Act. Now it is important to note
that the validity of the Act is not challenged. It
would follow that if the Order made under the Act
is not ultra vires, it would be perfectly valid. It is
s. 3 of the Act which enables the Orders to be
made. That section so far as relevant is in these
terms:
S. 3 (1).-If the Central Government is
of opinion that it is necessary or expedient
so to do for maintaining or increasing supplies
of any essential commodity or for securing
their equitable distribution and availability
at fair prices, it may, by order, provide for
regulating or prohibiting the production, sup·
ply and distribution thereof and trade and
commerce therein.
The object of the Act, therefore, is to maintain or increase the supplies of essential commodities which include foodgrains and to secure their
equitable distribution and availability at fair prices.
Clause (e) of paragraph 5 of the Licensing Order,
1961 certainly allows a co-operative society to be
preferred in the matter of ii grant of licence. The
question then is, would the' object of the Act be
achieved if the trade in paddy is given to co-operative societies ? I think it would. A co.operative
society is one which has as its object the promotion
of the economic interests of its members in accordance with co-operative principles : see s. 4 of the
11161
Mannalal Jain
v.
The Stau •f .i=m
Sarlesr J,
960
J~61
MtWt4/a/ Jain
Y,
Tlit St4Jt of A t1am
S•rl>or J.
StJPREME COURT REPORTS
[1062]
Co-operative Societies Act, 1912. A society carries
on businOSB in aocordanco with co-operative prmc1ples when it trades with its own members, tho
profit motive not be:ing paramount in such business. When, therefore, a licenco to purohe.se paddy
is gfren to & co-operative society of growers, what
happens is that tho seller sells to a body of which
he is a member. The result is the virtual elimination of tho middleman and a consequential rcdu<>tion in the price. Tho following observations
from the judgment of this Court in iVaremlra ](umar
v. The Union of India(') are, to my mind, very
apposite in the present context :
"That middleman's profitl! increase the
price of goods which the consumer has to pay
is axiomatic." (p. 389). "It has therefore
been the endeaYour at least in modern time11
for those responsible for social control to keep
middlemen's activities to the minimum and to
replaoe them largely by co.operative sale
societies of producers and co-operative sale
societies of the consumers." (p. 390).
Therefore, I feel no doubt that if tho purchase
of paddy is left to growers co-operatives-and that
is what cl. (e) of paragraph 5 aims at-rice, which ill
husked paddy, can reasonably be expected to be
made available to the consumers at a fair price.
That would servo the object of the Act and the clause
c,annot, therefore, be said to be ultra viru the Act.
Tlwn it is said that cl. (e) of paragraph 5 would
result in creating a monopoly in favour of co-operative societies and that would be illegal and also
outside tho object of the Aot. This cont<intion also
seems to me to be ill founded. It seem8 to me that
if parngra.ph 5 had cunt1•incd only cl. (e) dir(!cti:ng
preference being gi\·en to co-operative societies in
tho matter of grant of licences - and that is tho
basis on which the present contention is advancedthat would not. have made ·it bad. The question
.
(11
li 960] 2 S. C.R. 375.
1
3 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
961
of creating a monopoly does not really arise in
such a case. The Order may then allow one class
only, namely, co-operative societies, to do the
business. That would, as I have already stated,
advance the object of the Act. It would also however amount to a prohibition of others doing the
business. The only questjon then would be whether such prohibition would be reasonable under
Art. 19(6). That is how the matter appears to
have been considered by this Court in two cases to
which I will now refer.
The first is the case of Narendra Kumar( 1)
earlier mentioned. There an order called the
"Non-ferrous Metal Control Order, 1~58" had been
issued under s. :3 of the Essential Commodities Act, as
the Licensing Order now under consideration also was
Clause (4) of the order there considered provided
that no person could acquire any non-ferrous metal
except under a permit issued by the Controller in
accordance with such principles as the Central
Government might from time to time specify. Subsequently, the Central Government enunciated certain
principles for the grant of these permits in a
certain communication to the Chief Industrial
Adviser. Under these principles, no permit could
be issued to a dealer but it could only be issued to
certain manufacturers. The result was that the
dealer's trade was totally prohibited and only
certain manufacturers were eligible for permits to
carry on the trade of selling non-ferrous metals.
Certain dealers moved this Court under Art. a2 for
a declaration that cl. (4) rea.d with the principles
formulated by the Government was bad as
offending Art. 19( I )(f) and (g). rhis Court held
that (p. 387):
..
"It is reasonable to think that the
makers of the Constitution considered the
word "restriction" to be sufficiently wide to
save laws 'inconsistent' with Art. 19(1), or
'taking away the rights' conferred by the
(1) [1960] 2 S. C, R. 375,
1~61
MannalalJain
Y.
The State of As.ram
Sarkar J,
062
I~•l
N(11fnal•l J•in
v,
Tht Stall of .{H•m
Barker].
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[!1962]
Article, provided this incm1sistcncy or taking
away was reasonable in the interest.s of tho
different matters mentioned in the clause.
There can be no <l.oubt therefore that they
intended the word 'restriction' to include
cases of 'prohibition' also. The contention
that a law prohibiting the exercise of a fundamental right is in no case saved, cannot thoroforo bo accepted."
Haviug considered the facts of tho case, the Court
et•me to the conclllsion that cl. ( :~) of the Order,
tho legality of which aloo had been challenged, and
cl. (4) were valid provisions. It observed that,
'
(p. 390):
"It must therefore be held that cl. 3 of
the Order even though it results in the eliminination of the dealer from the trade. ia
a reasonable restriction in the interests of the
gerniral public. Clause 4 read with the
priliaiplcs specified must also ho hold for
the same reason to oo a reasonable restriction."
I ought here to point out that the principles
enunciated by tho Government worn held to be of
no effect 111 thoy had not been issued in complianoo
with sub-BS. (5) and (6) of s. ~of the Essential
Commodities Act and on that basis petition w&s
allowed and a writ was issued restraining tho Union
from giving effect to cl. ·i of the order so long as
the principlos governing the iBl!uc of pormits were
not duly epocified. This however does not affect
the force of the observations that I have earlier
read from tho judgment in tho case.
It seems to me that these observations fullv
qpply to tho present case. '!'he order read with
t'hc policy statement though it rosulted in a
complete prohibition in trading by dealer~ and in
the creation of what· the· •petitioner would oall a
monopoly in favour of certain manufacturers was
held to be good as a reasonable rostriCJtion on tho
•
•
3s.c.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
963
1901
dealer's right· to trade under Art. 19(6) and the
wriil was issued only because the formalities required for specifying the policy statement had not
been complied with. There is no defect in the issue
of the Licensing Order, 1961, with which the
present case is concerned. Therefore, the only
question would be whether such a prohibition of
the trade of tho dealers like the petitioner, if any,
by the Licensing Order, 1961 would be reasonable
in the circumstances of this case.
Tho other case to which I wish to refer is
Glass Ohatons I inporters d: User's Association v. The
Union of India (1 ) decided by this Court on April
10, 1961. That case arose out of a petition under
Art. 32 by certain importers of glass chatons.
There, the Central Government had issued an order
under the Import and Export (Control) Act, 1947,
called the Imports (Control) Order, 1955, prohibiting the import of glass chatons except under a
licence. Paragraph 6 of the Order laid down a
number of grounds on which the Central Government or the Chief Controller of Imports and
ilxpeTts might refuse to grant a licenoe or direct
any other licensin~ authority not to grant a licence.
The ground mentioned in cl. (h) of this paragraph
was "if the licensing authority decide to canalwe
imports and the distribution thereof through special
or specialised agencies or channels." It appears
that since 1958, licences had been granted to the
Sta.te Trading Corporation. No applications for
licences ha.d been made by the . petitioners or any
other trader at any time since 1957. It was
however contended tha.t so long as paragraph 6(h)
of the Order remained, it was useless for the
private traders to apply for licences. The argui.:wnt advanced on behalf of the petitioners was
that para.graph 6(h) was void being in contravention
of Art. 19(l)(f) and (g). In regard to this argument
thia Court observed:
(I) (W. P. 65of1959, unrepoTted).
Mannalal Jain
v.
The Stat_t of Assam
Sarkar J.
.,
.,,
984
1~1
Jlan1crlal Jain
v.
TArt Sielt of A.uam
Sarkor ].
SUPM.ME OOURT R:ti:PORTS
'
[ 1962)
"Iii is obvious that if a decision has been
made that imports shall be by particular
agenciee or channels the granting of licence
to an1 applicant outside the agency or
channel would frustrate tho implementation
of that deci~ion. If therefore a canalization
of imports is in tho interests of the general
public the refusal of imports licences to
applicants outside the agencies or channels
docided upon must nooessarily be held also
in tho interests of tho genera.I public. Tho
rPal question theroforo is : Is the canalization
through special or specialized agencies
or channels in the interests of the general
public."
The Court held that it was unable to accept
the argument that a decision that imports shall be
canalised is per se not a reasonable restriction on
the right to trade. On the facts of the case, the
Court took the view that a decision to canaliae
imports of glass chatons was in the interest of tho
general public. In this case, it had been contended
that the Government was creating a monopoly in
favour of tltc State Trading Corporation. The
Court held tilat the period of permits granted to
the State Trading Corporation having alroady
expired, the (jUestion did not really arise. But,
ns would have been noticed earlier, tho Court
really dealt with the same contention in deciding
the validity of para.graph G(h) of the Order. This
decision londt eqm~lly strong support to the view
that preferl'nco directed to be given by cl. ( e) of
paragraph 5 of the J,iconsing Order with which we
are concerned to co·operntive societies would not
necessarily render it invalid.
I feel no doubt on the facts. of the prcsellt
case that a preference to co-operative sooietieB. e1'Ml.
if th'e.t resufted in the deniers being prevented
altogothcr from dealing in paddy, would ~ '
reasonable rstriction on the Ia.tter's right of tra.dc.
Asaam is a deficit State in foodgrains. It ii the
I
•
,..
..,
'1'
3S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1961
duty of the State Government to see that the people
living within it~ boundaries are supplied with
M annal al Jain
adequate foodgrains and that at a reasonable price. The Statev. ef Assam
If paddy is procured for the use of the consumers
SarkarJ.
in the State through a co-operative society, there
is good reason, as already stated, to think that rice
at a reasonable price would be available to the
piiople of Assam. I will later in detail discuss the
structure and the activities of the co-operative
societies to whom licences had been granted. What
I will have to say there will amply establish that
it was a reasonable step to have taken to put the
trade in charge solely of the co-operative societies.
I turn now to the petitioner's second contention, namely, that cl.(e) of paragraph 5 has been
worked in a discriminatory manner so as to create
a monopoly in favour of the Apex Society. The
first thing that I wish to observe is that licences
have not been given for the year 1961 to the Apex
Society but they have been given to a large number
of primary co-operative societies of growers. I find
it difficult, in any case, to appreciate how this can
be sa.id to create a monopoly. It may amount to
a prohibition of trade by some persons. That
however is a different matter with which I have
already dealt. I may state here that it appears
that in 1960 the licences had been issued to the
Apex Society, but that is not the situation now.
Whether what was done in 1960 was strictly legal
or not is not a question that now arises, f:>r we are
no longer concerned with the licences for 1960.
.
Before proceeding further, I think it right to
say a few things about the co-operative societies
with whioh we are concerned. About 1957, the
Assam Government sponsored the formation of the
Apex Society. I would like to remind here that
it is one of the directive principles of the
Constitution that co-operative societies should be
emiottraged. Now, the structure of the Apex
Society ii like a pyr&mid~ It appears to have three
tiers. On the top is the Apex Society. Under it
+
SUPREME COUR'.r REPORTS
lHI
M.,...1,/Jrn
v.
n. S1w of .-4H.-n
Stnkt11 .T.
[1962)
come va.!'i.ous primary marketing co-op&a.tivo
societies. At the bottom rung a.re a. large number
of primary co-operativo secvico societies. Tho
membership of tho markoting. societies co11Bists
mostly of cultivators anq service sociuties, and of
the servico societies, m9stly of cultivators. 'The
function of the Apex Society appears to be to coordinate the working of tho subsidiary socioties and
to obtain moneys from theCo-operativo Apox Bank
an<l thereo11t mako advances to the cultivators
through the subsidiary societies, to help them in
thoir cultivation. The sorvice societies procure
from the growers tho paddy grown by them which
they can spa.re and realiso tho moneys advanced to
them out of tho price of the paddy purchased. The
money rAaliBed is duly passed on to the Apex
Society. The paddy collected is sold by the service
societies to the marketing soci!lties. The ma.rketing
societies in tlicir turn delii-or part of the paddy to·
the Government for creating a buffer atook and the.
rem&<ining qva.ntity to mill11 for milling inoo rice, irr
both cases · &<Joording to the direction~ of the
Government. Tho benefits dorivod from the whole
scheme are obviously very large. The middlem~n
are oliminM!ld. Tho grow61'1 being themselves
members of the 11ocietie11, participa.te in their proftts
'vha.tever they are. This helpe to keep down the
price becam1e e. sorvico •ociety in p888ing on the
pa.ddy to the marketing society charges v~ry little
by way of profit and thnt profit is shared by the
growors who are its mombera. This cn1tblee the
growers to sell at a comparativoly lower priee. The
growers ha.v, further the adva.Dta.ge of loans. from
the Apex Society to holp them in the \vork of
ouitivation; -'h!llle loans can bo easily advanocd a.nd
011 liberal terms.boca.uso their repayment is aec.nrod
by the prn<>e118 of purchase of the produce through
the sPrvice eocietios. It would be roMona.ble to
think that "1is would encourage cultivation a,nd
ro1ult in l~er quanti.ties of foodgraina being
produced. ~ would also help to aehiovG tbo
•
•
a s.c.R.
-
__...__.
~\
__ ..,
SUPREME OOURT REPORTS
9f)7
object of the Act. It may further be pointed out
that each of these societies is a body corporate: .see
s.18 of the Co-operative Societies Act, 1912. The
societies form a net work over the entire surplus
grain producing area of Assam, each working in its
own area. A vast number of growers of foodgrains
are the members of the primary marketing and
service societies. It is to these societies that the
licences had been issued of which a grievancP is
being made by the petitioner.
It appears that after the Apex and the subsidiary societies had been formed, the State Government with the concurrence of the Central Government decided on a policy of procuring paddy in
certain specified areas only through these societies.
The State Government thereupon issued instructions
to certain officers at the ·end of 1959 that procurement of paddy for the Kharif year 1959-60 would
be made throu~h the co-operative societies. It
may be that it was for this reason that the licensing
authority had stated in its order of February 17,
1930, earlier mentioned, that the petitioner's applica.
tion for a licence could not he considered. I have
now to remind that the Licensing Order, 1960 did
not contain any provision enabling preference being
given to a co-operative society in the grant of a
licence. This case however is not concerned any
more with regard to a licence for the year 1960 or
the validity of any order of the licensing authority
refusing to grant the petitioner any licence for
that year.
Returning to the contention that the power
under paragraph 5 (e) of the Licensing Order had
been exercised in a discriminatory manner, I wish
first to observe that under the Order which I have
already held to be good, the authority concerned
in granting the licences was entitled to prefer a
co-operative society, and this is what it has done.
Though the result may have been to ·prevent the
petitioner from carrying on the trade of purchasing
and selling paddy, that in my view is, in the
1961
Mannatal Jain
v.
'The State ·of Assam
Sark 1r J.
968
1!>61
Mannoi 11J Jain
v.
T~ S1ctt of A_15111n
Surkar .].
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1962)
circumstances of this case, a reasonablo restriction
on hiR right to tra.rle for that was necessary to secure
for the people of Assam supply of foodgrains at n
reasonable price anrl in adequate quantities.
f ha\•e Very grave doubtR if the licensing authrl'ity waR intended to act in a quasi-judicial capacity
in the matter of granting licences. It haR to be
romemhcrcd that the question before it was not so
much of tho comp,•ting right8 of various applicants
or of :my lis between an :i.pplicant :ind the State.
The duty of the lic,•nsing authority was to ad\·ance
the object of t.hc Act in terms of the Lict>nsing
Order. Its main consi1foration has to be to f!1•e that
tho liC<·nc<>B granted h~· it helped to mako focdgrains
available at a fair price to the people of AaR!'ID. Tho
Act ga1·e tho po,,..crs for that purpost>. ft ii because
this pmpose is l<'gitimato that tlH' reRultant prohibition of trading by pri,·atc dealers is also legitimate.
I belicrn that tlw two caaes I have carlior mentioned
proceeded on the basis that the licensing authority
was not a quasi-judicial officer. It is not necessl\fy
for me however to pronounce finally on this question.
It wa.q contcnclecl that the licensing authoritv
in granting the licence to tho co-operative societ.},
had only carried out the directions of the Government ancl had not actor! independently. I find no
basis fur this contention apart from tho bald allrgation of the petitioners which is dcni<'d by the rcspond•·nt. No directions by tho Assam Governmt•nt
for the year 19t31 have been procl11cecl. The instrn0tions to which I have oRrlicr refcrrecl r<•quiring thP
licence to be given to the co-operative societies
were confined to tho yel\r l!l5!l-GO. That had no
force in regard to the year l!l61 with which we arc
concerned. Those instructions cannot be taken as
opcmting for all time to com" for then t.he licensing
authority's order granting licences to a co-opcrativt·
society in future years will always ha\•e to ho held
to have boen made under these inRtruetions. I am
unable to take such a view of tho matter. As
,
3 S.C.R.
'
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
969
19<1
already stated, the High Court had by its Order of'
August LO, 1960 asked the licensing authority to
Jlannaltil Jain
proceed in a quasi-judicial manner. There is no" Thi Statev.of Assam
reason to think that the licensing authority had not
Sark4r :.
observed this direction of the High Court.
It also seems to me reasonable to think that
the Assam Government inserted cl. (e) in paragrarih
5 of the Licensing Order, 1961 in view of the judg- ·
ments of the High Court of Assam to which I have
earlier referred. The Assam Government obviously
intended thA.t the licensing authority wonld in view
of cl. (e) give preference to the co-operative societies.
Furthermore, s. 4 of the Act provides that an order
made under s. 3 conferring powers on any officer or
authority may contain directions to him as to the
exercise of such powers. In my view, for the
reasons earlier stated, a direction in the Licensing
Order to give preference to co-operative societies
would not be bad. It seems to me that cl. (e) of
paragraph 5 of the Licensing Order, 1961 really
amounts to such a direction. It was not necessary
after the Licensing Order, 1961 for the Government
of Assii.m therefore to give any other direction to
the licensing authority.
I do not think any question of violation of'
Art. 14 can be seriously pressed. If the duty of the
licensing authority was quasi-judicial in its nature,
then it is difficult to appreciate how it can be said
that it~ decision would offend Art. 14. In anv case, it
seems to me quite clear that the co-operative societies form a class by themselves and a provision
giving preference to such a class, would be a good
provision because the object of the Act would be
better served thereby for the reasons earlier
mentioned; such provision would have a clear
next1s with the object of the Act and therefore
satisfy the test of Art. 14.
Looking at the matter from any point of view
it seems to me that the Order of the licensing
authority giving preference to the co-operative
•
9i0
1'61
SUPREME COl"'RT REPORTS
[1962)
~ocieties is not open to any objection.
In my vi°'"
that
was
a
1air
Order
to
luwo
been
made
in the
0
v.
circumstances
of
thi11
case.
Tht Stott nf Assam
I would for these roasons dismiss this pctiSmltor .!.
ti on.
M1ulhollcar ].
MuDHOI.KAH, .J.-I agree with the judgment
<loliv<'red by Sarkar, J.
BY CovRT-ln accordance with the opinion
of thP- majority thi8 Writ Petition is allowed with
costs.
A-fann.Jal .J cin
Petition allowed.
IIU
October 3.
STATE OF SAURASHTRA
v.
JA:llADAR i\fOHA~IAD ABDULLA AND ORS.
(B. P. SINHA, c. J., s. K. DAS, A. K. SAHKAR,
N. RAJAGOPALA AYYA~GAR and
J. R. l\Iun110LKAH, JJ.)
Art of Sf(Jte-Junag,zdh State----When integrated into lndial'olitical Queation-RPjerence to Government for opinion-Grant&
by :Ya.,<W-Re.mmplion hy Adinini•tra/,or-lf en bt challeng•d
in Municipal courts Government of India Act J9,J6 (26 Geo v.
Ch .. 2;, "· 5, Ii, 2!19(!).
The Nawab ofjunagadh State made gt ants of properties
in favC>ur of the respondents before I9l7. After India attained
independence the Nawab fled the country. At the request
of the Nawab's Council the Government of India took over the
administration of the State and on :\ovember 9, 1947 the
Rt'gional Commissioner assumed charge of the administration
on behalf of the Government of India. The Regional Commissionc1· appointed an Admini>trator of Junagadh State. In
•
December 1948, the elected representatives of Junagadh and
certain other neighbouring States recommended to the Govern·
ment of India and to the United State that of Saurashtra that
the States be integrated. Thereafter, the administration of
.Juna~adh State was integrated with the United State of
Saurashtra on January 20, 1949. On different dates between·......November 9. 1947, and January 20, 1949, the Administrator
passrd ordOJs cancelling the grants in favour of the respondents
and took pl'Sleuion of the properties. The respondents filed
civil suits for the recovery of the properties on the ground that
1
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