THE COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS, MADRAS versus NATHELLA SAMPATHU CHETTY AND ANOTHER
Supreme Court of India | Decided 25 September 1961 | [1962] 3 S.C.R. 786 | 1961 INSC 276
Key facts
- Decided
- 25 September 1961
- Bench
- BHUVNESHWAR PRASAD SINHA*, A.K. SARKAR, M. HIDAYATULLAH, N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR, J.R. MUDHOLKAR
- Bench size
- 5
- Case number
- CIVIL APPEAL No. 408/1960
- Disposal
- Case Partly allowed
- Citation
- [1962] 3 S.C.R. 786
- Neutral citation
- 1961 INSC 276
Text of the judgment
i86
1981
Jowohar Z..I
B"""""
v.
UniM of India
SL"PREME COURT REPORTS
[I !162]
accep~ tho appellant's argument that tho letter
was intended to make a substantial variation in
the contract by making the deposit. of security a.
condition precedent instead of a. condition subsequent.
.
In the result the appeal fails and is dismissed
ll01th costs.
4.
Appeal dismused.
'
1961
THE COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS, MADRAS
8t1l1f'lt011 2S.
t'.
NATHELLA SAMPATHU CHETTY AND
ANOTHER
(And connected cases)
(B.P. SINHA, c. J., A. K. SARKAR, M. HIDAYATULLA.H,
N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGA.R and
J. R. lllUDilOLKAR, JJ.)
Smuggl•d Gooda-Re&trictiona on imporration of goldS•izurt of gold on muonable bPlz°p/ that it UllU amuggl•~BarclM
of proof that it uaa not amuggled
peraon in ~
Conatitutional va/iJlity of enaclmeRt-Rfer..,.ce of statute in a
atconcl statute without incorporatiorr-Effut of modification. of
the firat •tatutP.-1'oreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947 (7 of
1947), sa. 2(/), 8(1), 23A-See Cuatoma Act, 1878 (8 of 1878),
u. 19, 167(8), 178A, 182-Conalitutio,.of Ind4a, Arta. 1', 19(1),
(/) and (g).
Un1er the powers conferred bys. 8( I) of the Foreign
Exchange Re~'\llation Act, 1947, the Central Government
issued a notification on August. 25, 1948, placing a ban
on the imp1>rtation of gold except with the permission
of the
Reserve Bank. Section 23A of the
Act,
which was introduced by an amendment in 1952, provided
that " .. the restrictions imposed by s. 8( I) .. shall be deemed
to have been imposed under s. 19 of the Sea Customs Act,
1878, and all the provi1ions of the Act shall have effect
accordi~gly .. " Section 19 of the Sea Custom• Act, 1878,
enabled the Central Government, by notification, to prohibit
or restrict the bringing goods of any specified description into
°"
.--
3 s.c.R. SUPREME OOURT REPORTS
78i
19/JI
India and, by reason of other provisions of that Act, goods
imported in contravention of the notification issued under
Thi Coll1ctor of
s. 19 were liable to confiscation. In 1955, the Sea Customs
Curtoms, Ma4ra1
v.
Act, 1878, was amended by the introduction of s. l 78A in that
Act, which provided, inter alia· that "where goods were seized Nath11/• Sampat""
ChttlJ
under that Act in the reasonable belief that they were
smuggled goods, the burden of proving that they were not
smuggled goods shall be on the person from whose posse!Sion
the goods were seized;"
On June 26, 1956, N, an employee of the respondent,
on alighting at the Central Station in Madras from Bombay
was intercepted by a Police Head Constable and, on a search
of his clothing, four blocks of gold weighing about a thousand
tolas were found in his possession. The officers of the customs
department interrogated him and, finding that he was unable
to produce any record for the purchase of the gold, seized
from him the blocks of gold. N admitted that he brought the
gold.for the respondent and enquiries were made to verify the
story narrated by him as to the source from which he obtained
the gold. Theroafter the Collector of Customs being prima
facie of the view that the gold seized had been smuggled,
issued notice to the respondent to show cause why the said
gold should not be confiscated. The respondent offered his
explanation but the Collector held that the respondent had
not discharged the onus of proving that the gold was not
smuggled, an onus which had been cast on him by s. l 78A of
the Sea Customs Act, 1878, and directed the confiscation of the
gold under s. 167 (8) of that Act.
The respondent challenged the legality of the action
taken by the Collector of Customs on the grounds, inter alia,
( 1) that s. l 78A of the Sea Cu.toms Act, 1878, was constitutionally invalid as it was an unreasonable restraint on the
citizen's rights to hold property or to do business guaranteed
by Art. 19(l)(f) and (g) of the Constitution of India and was
not saved by els. (5) and (6) respectively of Art. 19; (2) that
s.178A of the Sea Customs Act which was enacted in 1955 could
not be invoked in adjudicating a contravention of a notification
under the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act inasmuch as
s. 23A of the latter Act when enacted in 1952 in effect incorporated into that Act all the relevant provisions of the Sea
Customs Act as they stood in 1952 with the result that any
subsequent amendments to the Sea Customs Act could not
affect s. 23A; and (3) that the rule as to the burden of proof
under s. I 78A was not attracted to the present case because the
Customs Officer who effected the seizure did not, at the
moment of seizure, entertain a reasonable belief that the goods
seized were smuggled. The Collector of Customs besides
maintaining the legality of the order of confiscation, contended
that the question raised in the case as to the constitutional
788
1961
T/i, Colltt101 of
Cwtom.s, M atbu
v.
•V.iJwUa Sampatlm
Chttty
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1962]
validity of s. I i8A of the Sea Customs Act was concluded by
the drcision in Babu/al Amthalal Mehla v. The Collulor of
Custom&, Calcu!ta[l957J S.C.R. 1110.
Ileld: (I) that Babula! Amthalal Mehta v. The Collutor of
Cu•iomJJ, Calcu~, [19571 S. C.R. 1110, was a decision as to
the \'alidit:1 of s. I i8A of the Customs Act, 1878, with
reference to Art. 14 of the Con!litution of India onlv and that
the C]'JCstio·1 whether the said section \vas obnoxious to the
rights h"'aranteed by Art. 19(l)(f) and (g) was not considered
by that judrment.
(2) t 1at the object of s. 178A was the prevention and
eradktion of smuggling, intu alio, of gold which was widely
preva~ent 1 and in vie\ll of the fact that \vithout a La\\' in that
form and with that amplitude smuggling might not be possible
of heing efl'<:ctivcly checked, the restrictions imposed by that
s<".ction bein~ in the interests of the general public could not be
held to be violati\'e of the rights guaranteed by Art. 19(l)(f)
and (l:l, thcugh it might operate somewhat harshly on a small
section of the public. Accorclingly, s. I 7BA does not contravene Art. l~'(l)(f) and (g).
0
Stale of M!Jdra• '" V. G. Row, 119521 S.C.R. 597,
Manohar r.ol v. State _of Punjab, rl9611 2 S.C.R. 343 and
Ram Dhan DaJ• '" Stat• of Punjab, 119621 I S.C.R. 852,
relie<l on.
Puki<Nj Cl1ampalal Jain v, D.R. Koh1', (1~59) 61 Ilom.
L. R. 12.10, approved.
M. G. Abroi v. Amichand, (1960) 62 Born. L. R. 1043,
disappro,«d.
Nathr.'h Sa.,,.pathu CheUy '" Co/kctor of CW1tom.•. Madra.,
A. I. R. l!lo9 ~fad. 142, r<versed.
(3) th 1t a sr.izure to which s. l 78A wa.• applicable was
merely a preliminary to the proceedings before a qua~i-judicial
authoritv und~r s. 182 and that it was only \vhen the latter
authorit\: \,-a, satisfied that the seizure \\'CSS made "in the
reasonable belief that the goods seized were goods that had
been smug1:l~d" that the rule of evidence laid dov.·n by
s. 178.1\ canic into operation.
(1) that the wording of s. 21A of the Forei!p' . Exchange
Regulation A.ct, 1947, showed that the reference 1n 1t. to s. I~
of the Sea (~ustor.1s Act, 1878, \\·a~ merely for ren<ler1r.g notifications urder the named provisions of the Foreign Exchange
Regulation Act to operate as notifications under the Sea
Customs Act and that it cottld not have the effect of incor·
porating thr relevant provisions of the latter Act in the Act of
1947 and that consequently, When a notification issued under
'· 8(l) of th·: F~reign Exchange Regulation Act was deemed
for all purposes to be a notification issued under s. 19 of the
3 S.C.R.
)·
SUPREME COURT .REPORTS
789
1961
Sea Customs Act the contravention of the notification attracted
to it each and e~ery provision of the Sea Customs Act which · ' The Co!lettor of
was in force at the date of the notification.
Customs, Madras
The Secretary of State for India in Council v. Hindu•fan
Gocoperative Insurance Society Ltd., (1931) L. R. 58 I. A .. 259,
held inapplicabl,.
( 5) that, in the instant case, the circumstances present
at the moment when the gold was taken by the Customs
Officer at the Central Station did tend to raise a reasonable
suspicion that the gold seized had been obtained illicitly and
that this was sufficient to constitute in the words of the
'statute "a reasonable belief that the goods (gold) were
smuggled.''
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeals
Nos. 408 to 410 of 1960.
Appeals from the judgmen.t and order dated
September II, 1958, of the Madras High Court
in Writ Petition Nos. 384 .of 1957 and 660 of 1958.
WITH
Criminal Appeals. Nos. 38, 126 and 123 of
1959.
-,.
Appeals by special leave from the judgments
orders dated May 16, 1958, June 19, 1959 and April
14, 1959, of the Punjab High Conrt in Criminal
Revisions Nos. 290 of 1958 and 144 of 1959 and
Criminal Appeal No. 677 of 1958 respectively.
AND
Civil Appeal No. 511 of 1960.
Appeal from the judgment and order dated
March 20, 1959, of the Bombay High Court (Bench)
at Nagpur in Special Civil Application No. 322 of
1958.
AND
Petition No. 118 of 1958.
Petition under Art. 32 of the Constitution of
India for enforcement of Fundamental Rights.
G. K: Daphtary, Solicitor-General of India,
H.J. Umrigar and T. M. Sen, for the. appellant in
v.
Nothella Sampathu
Chetty
790
JIOJ
n. C<i/1-./
C.Ut.-i, JIM10J
v.
N.U.11• s_.tb•
Ott(!
.4,J;1•1•r J,
SUP.REME OOURT REPORTS
[1962)
C. Ae. ~os. 498 and 409 of 1960 and respondent in
C. A. No. 410 of 1960.
N. A. Palkhiva"la, S. R. Vakil, R. J. Joshi.
S. J. Sohr.11>ji, J. B. Dadachanji, S. N. Andley,
Rameshwar Nath and l'. L. Vohra, for the rcspon·
dents in C. Ae. Nos. 408 and 409 of 60and appe·
llant in C. A. No. 410 of 1960.
R. S. Narwla, for the appellant in Cr. A. No.
38 of 59.
C. K. Daphtary, Solicif,()1'.General of India,
N. S. llindr!l and D. Gupta, for the respondent in
Cr. A. No. :18 of 1950.
'J'. M. Sen, for Intervener No. I in Cr. A. No.
38 of 59.
K. N. Kuu:rmi, for inter>ener No. 2 in Cr. A.
No. 38 of 59.
I'.. S. Narula ancl R. L. Kohli, for the appellant
in Cr. A. No. 126 of 1959.
C. K. Daphtary, Solicitor-General, of India, H.J.
Umrigar ancl D. Gupta, for the respondPT1t in Cr. A.
No. 126 of 1959.
N. C. Cliatlerji, S. K. Kapur and Gcinp<tl Rai,
for the &p~lant in Cr. A. No. 126 of 1939.
A. S. Bodbe, Shankar Anand and Ganp"t Rai,
for the app~llant in C. A. No. 5ll of 1960.
C. K. Daphtary, Solicitor.General of Indi?•
JI. J. /;'mriaar a.nd 'J'. A-!. Sen, for the respondt>nt m
C. A. No. 5n of 1960.
8. VenkatakriRhnmt, for thA petitioner in Pctn.
Xo. 118 of 1958.
C. K. Daphtmy, Solicit-0r-Ue11eral of India,
II. J. Um.riuar a,1d R. JI. Dhelxtr, for the respondents
in Petn. Ne·. llE: of 1958.
J 961. Sept-0mber 25. The Judgment of the
Court was delivered by
AYYAtm.u:, J.-The Sea Customs Act, 1878
(Act 8 of 1878) (referred to hereinafter as the Act),
-.
~
~ s.c.R.
SuPREME COURT REPORTS
191
was amended bys. 14 of Act 21 of 1955 by the introduction of s. l 78A reading :
"178A. (1) Where any goods to which
this section applies are seized under this Act
in the reasonable belief that they arc
smuggled goods, the burden of proving that
they a.re not smuggled goods shull be on the
person from whose possession the goods were
seized.
(2) This section shall apply to gold, gold
manufactures, diamonds and other precious
stones, cigarattes and cosmetics and any other
goods which the Central Government may, by
notification in the Official Gazette, specify in
this behalf.
-
(3) Every notification issued under Subsection (2) shall be laid before both Houses
of Parliament as soon as may be after it is
issued."
It is the constitutional validity of this section
that is the common point which arises in these
several cases which have beiin heard together. We
have heard on the merits only Civil Appeals 408
to 410 of 1960 and the other cases were posted
before us in order that Counsel appearing for the
parties in them, might have an opportunity to be
heard upon the common question mentioned
earlier. We shall, therefore, refer only to the facts
of Civil Appeals 408 to 410 of 1960 in dealing with
these petitions.
Civil Appeals 480 to 410 :
These appeals come before us on a certificate
granted by the High Court of Madr1ts undPr
Arts.132(1) and 133(l)(c} of the Constitution and are
directed against the judgment and order of thf'
High Court in two Writ Petitions filed before it by
Nathella Sampathu Chetty-the sole proprietor of
a business in gold and silver, bullion, jewellery etc.
carried on in the name of Natholla Sampathu
1961
The Collector oj
Customs, MadraB
v.
Nathella Sampathu
A;vyangar ] .
+
792
1961
c.u,,,.,
T/,,
•f
Customs> Madras
v.
Jf.uitl/a Sam;alhu
Ch.117
Ayyongar J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[19621
Chetty & Sons (ref..rrcd to hereafter as the respondent).
The facts giving rise to tlwse appeals arc
briefly as follows : On the morning of Juno 26,
1956, one Nandgopal-an <'mploycc of tho respondent-alighted at the Ce1;tral ~talion in Madras
from the Bombay Express. Xandgopal was
interc"pted and questioned by a Head Constable of
the State Police Scr\'ice attached to the Prohibition
Intdligencc Department. Nandgopal admitted
that he was in possession of gold which he was
bringing for his firm-the respond!·nt-from Bombay.
The Head Constable immcdiatdy contaewd the
officerd of the Prevouti \·e Section of the Customs
Department who were on duty at tho Central
station who interrogated Nandgopal and wized
from him four blocks of gold weighing in a.II about
1,00(1 tolas. Enquiries were madl' to verify -ihe
story narrated by Nandgopal as to the source from
which he obtained the gold and thereafter the
Collector of Customs being prima f11cie of the view
that the gold seized had been ~muggled, issued
notice to the respondent to show cause why the said
gold should not bo confiscated. The respondent
offered his expla.na.tion but the Collector held that
the rt'Spondent had not discharged the onus of
proving that the gold was not smuggled-an onus
which had been cast on him by H. l 78A of the Sea.
Customs Act and directed the confiscation of the gold.
The respondent thereupon filed a petition (Writ Petition 3S-! of 1957) under Art. 2:26 of the Constitution
before the High Court of Madras for tho isaue of a
writ, of certi-Orari or other appropriate writ for
quashing the order of th~ Collector of Customs on
va.riou~ grounds to which we shall advert later,
including the constit11tional validity of s. I iSA.
While this writ petition was pending, the
respondent filed another petition (Writ Petition 660
of 1958) for a writ of ma11dam11s directing tho
Collector to return the gold seized and confiscated
by him.
•
..
.
-.-;
3 S.C.R. St.11.>REM:fll COUR'l' REPORTS
l
79.3
The two writ petitions were heard together
and by an order dated September 11, 1958, the
learned Judges of the High Court held, allowing
Writ Petition 384of1957, that s. 178A of the Sea
Customs Act was void under Art. 13 of the Constitution. They further held that even ifs. 178A
were valid, the condition precedent for invoking the
rule as to the burden of proof prescribed by the section
had not been complied with, in that the customs
officer who effected the seizure which preceded the
adjudication did not enterhin "a reasonable belief
that the gold was smuggled", with the result that
the order of confiscation was invalid. Besides, the
learned J11dges were also of the view that s. l 78A
of the Sea Customs Act could not be invoked in
adjudicating a contravention of a notification under
the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act which
imposed restrictions on the import of gold. Though
on these conclusions the order of the Collector
confiscating the gold was set aside, the learned
Judges held that the respondent was not entitled to
an order for the return of the gold, but only to a
direction to the Collector to he~r and determine the
question about the gold seized being smuggled gold
without reference to the rule as to onus of proof
enacted bys. 178A. The appellant, the Collector
of Customs, Madras, obtained leave from the High
Court under Arta. 132 and 133 of the Constitution
to appeal to this Court against the orders in wirt
Petition No. 384of1957 and No. 660 ofl958 (Civil
Appeals 408 and 409) and a similar order was passed
in an application for a certificate by the respondent
who felt aggrieved by the refusal of the Court in Writ
Petition No. 660 of 1958 to direct an immediate
return of the gold seized (Civil Appeal 410). The
three appeals have been consolidated as they arise
out of the same tnmsaction.
We shall first take up for consideration Civil
Appeals 408 and 409 of 1960 filed by the Collector
-0f Customs, because unless those appeals fail there
would be no need to decide the relief to which the
1Hl
The fJGl!tctor c,f
Customs, Madras
v.
}/atlulla SampatJ>u
Chetty
Ayyan~c;r J.
•
SUPRE?IIB CoURT REPORTs
TT-.. Co/Int•• •f
..
Cuato.l'flS Madraf
N.U..lla Samp.i/..,
C/wtty
.1'f.Yl"I"' J.
(1062 j
respondent would bo entitled in Civil Appeal 410
of 1960. In order to appreciat-0 the contentions
raised, it 1rnuld he n•,ccss1iry to set out t.ho statutory
provisi1ms which form the background of tho impugned pro\'ision -s. I i8A of the Sea Customs Act.
The Furoign Exchang<' Hegulation Act, 1947 (Act
7 of UJ.17), waR brouf!ht into force on March 25,
1947, by a notification issued by tlrn Central Government under s. 1(3) of that Act. Tho preamble to
the Act recites:
..
"It is expedient in the economic and
financial int-OrPsts of Inrlia to provide for tho
regulation of...... the import and export of
currency and bu Ilion."
Section 8 of this Ad refers to the import of goldthe eommodity with which these appeals n.re concerned. It enacts:
"8(1). The Central Govcrnm<>nt may, by
notification in the official Gazette, order that,
6ubjeet to such exemptions, if any, as may be
c-ontained in the notification, no person shall,
except with the general or special permission
of the Rescn•c Bank and on payment of tho
foe, if any, prescribed bring or send into India
any gold or silver or any currenc.v notes or
bank notes or coin whether Indian or foreign.
Explanation.-The bringing or S<.'nding
into any port or place in India of any such
article as aforesaid intended to ho taken out
of India without being removed from the ship
of conveyance in which it i~ being carrild
shall nonethelcsH be deemed to be a bringing,
or as the case may be sending, into India. of
that article for the purposes of this section."
Oold io defined ins. 2(f) of this Act thus:
" 'gold' includes gold in the form of coin,
whether legal tender or not, or in tho form of
bullion or ingot, whether refined or not and
_._....,
I"'.' ....
I
3S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
795
jewellery or articles made wholly or mainly
of gold."
).
-.
-
These provisions have to be read in conjunction
with the provisions of the Sea Customs Act which
form, as it were, integrated provisions in relation to
the import and export of, among other commodities,
gold, and s. 23A of the Foreign Exchange Regnlation Act which was introduced by an amendment of 1952 effects this co-ordination. This
section reads:
"23A. Without prejudice to the provisions
of section 23 or to any other provision contained in this Act the restrictions imposed by
sub-sections (1) and (2) of section 8, subsection ( 1) of section 12 and clause (a) of sub-section ( 1) of section 13 shall be deemed to have
been imposed under section 19 of the Sea
Customs Act, 1878, and all the provisions of
that Act shall have effect, aceordingly, exeept
that section 183 thereof shall have effect as
if for the word 'shall' therein the word 'mav'
were substituted."
"
Turning now to the Sea Customs Act. s. 167(8)
enacts:
"167. The offences mentioned in the first
column of the following schedule shall be
punishable to the extent mentioned in the third
column of the same with reference to such
offences respectively:Section of
this Act to
Offences
which offPenalties
ence has reference.
8. If any goods,
18 & 19
Such goods
the importation of
shall be liable
which is for the
to confiscation;
time being prohianq
~ited
or
reBtricted
'
'
. ..
1961
The Collwor of.
Cuuciin.S, Mtuftas
v.
N athel/a Su.ipatlw;
·
Chetty
Ayyan:ar J.
796
1gu
Tiu c.lim••f
Out....,, Mdr.,
v.
.,V¢1Atll'l Sa•;at4u
..._,,...,., ],
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
by or under Chapter IV of this Act,
be imported into or
exported from India
oontrary t-0 such
prohibition or restriction; or
if any attempt
be made so to import or export any
euch goode; or
if any such
goods be found in
any package produced to any officer
of Customs as containing no such
goods; or
if any eur.h
goods or any dutiable goods, be found
either before or
after landing or
shipment to have
been concealed in
any manner on
board of any vessel
within tho limits of
any port in India;
or
if any goods,
the exportation of
which is prohibited
or restricted as aforca&id, be brought to
any wharf in order
to be put on board
of any "l"essel for
exportation contrary to such prohibiiion or restriotiffil.
[1962]
any person
concerned in
any such offence sba II be
liable to a penalty not exceeding three
times the value
of tho goods,
or not exceeding one thousand rupees.
3 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
Section 19 referred to here reads :
"19. The Central Government may from
time to time, by notification in the Offidial
Gazette, prohibit or restrict the bringing or
taking by sea or by land goods of any specified
description into or out of India across any
customs frontier as defined by the Central
Government."
The other provisions which have a bearing
upon the points arising for discussion with reference to the validity of the impugned s. l 78A of
the Sea Customs Act are :
"s. l 78. Any thing liable to confiscation
under this Act may be seized in any place, in
India either upon land or water, or within
the Indian Customs waters, by any officer of
Customs or other person duly employed for
the prevention of smuggling."
"s. 181. When anything is seized, or any
person is arrested, under this Act, the officer
or other person making such seizure or arrest
shall, on demand of the person in charge of
the thing so seized, or of the person so arrested, give him a statement in writing of the
reason for .such seizure or arrest."
.
"s. 182 .. In every case, except the cases
mentioned in section 167, Nos. 26, 72 and 74
to 76, both inclusive, in which, under this
Act, anything is liable to confiscation or to
increased rates of duty;
or any person is liable to penalty,
such confiscation, increased rate of duty
or penalty may be adjudged(a) without limit, by a Deputy Commissioner or Deputy Collector of Customs,
or a Customs-co!lector;
(b) up to confiscation of goods not
exceeding two hundred and fifty rupees in
value, and imposition of penalty or incre~~ecj
ltll
Tht c.r1ec1o, •f
CustomM, MWa•
v.
Nathe/la S•,Yatlm
Chetty
AY.J"ntsr J
•
798
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1962]
duty, ~ot exceeding one hundred rupees, by
an Assistant Commissioner or Assistant Collector of Customs;
11111
71r Collrct" •!
Cust1ms, MairaJ
v.
,Yatlu/"2 SMC/NUJiu
(c) up to confiscation of goods not
exceeding fifty rupees in value, and imposition
of penalty or increased duty not exceeding
ten rupees, by such other subordinate officers
of customs 8:8 the ~ief Customs-authority
m'ly, from time to time, empower in that
br·half in virtue of their office:
Provided that the Chief Custom&authority may, in tho case of any officer performing the duties of a Customs-collector,
limit his powers to those indicated in clause
(b) or in clause (c) of this section, and may
confer on any offic~r, by name or in virtue
of his offi<~e. the powers indicated in clauses (a),
(b) or (c) of this section."
c1u11,,
A.v@gat' J·
,
'
and
"s. 183. Whenever confiscation is authorized by this Act, the officer adjudging it
shall gi vc the ow nor of the goods an option
to pay in lieu of confiscation such fine aa the
oflicer thinks fit."
Immediately the Foreign Exchange Regulation
Act came into forctl in March, 1947, a notification
was issued on 'March 25, 1947, under s. 8(1) placing
a ban on the importation of gold except with tho
permisFion of the Reserve Bank. This notification
was superseded and replaced by a fresh ono dated
Aug•ist 25, l!l~S. also issued under tho powers
conferred by sub-s. (1) of s. 8 of the Foreign Exch1inge Regulation Act and this_ is the notificat~on
which c1Jntinues in force up to this date and which
is relev;int to the proceedings against the respondent. The notification ran:
"(l) Restrictions on import of gold and
silver.In exercise of tho vowel"!! conferred b;r
,
3S.C.R.
-
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
799
sub-s. 1 of s. 8 of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947 (Act 7 of 1947) and in supersession of the notification of the Government
of India in the late Finance Department
No. 12(11) FI/47, dated the 25th March 1947,
the Central Government is pleased to direct
that except with the general or special permis'Sion of the Reserve Bank, no person shall
bring or send into India from any place
outside India(a) any gold coin, gold bullion, gold
sheets or gold ingot whether refined or not;
or
(b} any silver bullion ............ "
It would be noticed that on the law as it stood
upto 1952 before s. 23A was inserted in the Foreign
Exchange Regulation Act, the importation of gold
in contravention of the notification of August
1948issued under s. 8(1) of the Foreign Exchange
Regulation Act would have been an importation
contrary to s. 19 of the Sea Customs Act, with the
result that any person concerned in the act of
importation would have been liable to the penalties
specified in the third column of s. 167(8) and the
imported gold would have been liable to confiscation under the opening words of that column. The
gold being "a thing" liable to confiscation could
have been seized by any officer of the Customs
under s. 178 of the Sea Customs Act with an obligation on the officer effecting the seizure to give to,
the person from whom the gold was seized a
"statement in writing of the reason for such
seizure" (s. 181 ). Thereafter the officers specified
in s. 182 would have adjudged the confiscation of
these goods subject to the option mentioned in
s. 183 with the modification to this provision enacted by s. 23A of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act. It would further be manifest that at
that date before the gold seized was liable to be
de~lt with under t4e t4ird oolumn of s. 167(8) b;y
1961
The Col1-:tor of
CU6toms, Madraa
v.
Naihel/a Sampathu
Chet(Y
Ayyangar J.
800
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1962)
1901
a.n officer adjudicating on the matt<>r under s. 182,
the burden of proving that the gold was smuggled
la.v
upon the department and unless the adjudging
v.
N.u..Ila s.,.,.uw officer who was acting quasi-judicially was reasonGlut~
ably satisfied on that point, the confiscation or the
imposition of tho penalty could not have been
,j-'-"'"'"' J.
ordered.
The effect of thn imposition of the severe
restrictions on tho import of gold into this country
by the notifications under the Foreign Exchange
Regulation Act with a view to defend and
conserve the economy of the country in
conjunction with the circumqtn.nc~ that the internal
production of gold was very little, resulted in a
great disparity between tho prine of gold in India
and outside India i.e., in tho internntional markets.
This naturally gave a great incentive to smuggling
which bnsides depriving the Stiite of its revenue,
also posed a grave thl'cat t-0 ne.tion:il economy. It
is only necessary to add that gold wq,s not tho only
commodity which gavo rise to this problem. But
as thc>o appeals are concerned with gold, wo are
confining our examination to that article. Taking
these matters into account the Taxation Enquiry
Commission, which submitted its report to the
Government of India in 1954, rncommendcd a
tightening of the law in order effectively to prevent
smuggling. After dealing with the administrative
problems in regard to the levy and enforcement
of Customs duties in Ch. VII of the report the
Committee recommended inter alia the amendment
of the Sea Customs Act so as"( I) to mako smuggling a criminal offence,
and
(2) to transfer the onus of proof in respect
of offences relating to smuggling to the person
in whoso possoesion any dutia hie, restricted
or prohibit{)d goods are found."
In pursuance of these recommendations the Sea
Customs Aot was amended by ~ct 2l of 1955 and
Tlll c.l/ftt11 qf
Glat...,, Mair.,
• •
.
-
3 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
801
among others s. l 78A whose terms we have set out,
was introduced into it.
.
"
As the question of the constitutionality of
s. l 78A has been the subject of elaborate consideration in a few decided cases to which reference was
made during the arguments, we consider that it
would be convenient if we deal with them before
setting out and discussing the precise grounds on
which the challenge to the validity of the provision
was rested before us.
Very soon after s. l 78A was enacted its constitutional validity was challenged by an original
petition filed in this Court (Petition 98 of 1956)Babulal Amthalal Mehta v. The Collector of Customs,
Calcutta ('). The goods involved in the case were
diamonds. Four hundred and seventy-five diamond
pieces which had heen seized from the petitioner,
were directed to be confiscated holding them to be
smuggled, by the application of the burden of proof
laid down in s. l 78A. The validity of the confiscation was challenged before this Court on the ground
thats. l 78A was unconstitutional as being violative
of Art.14 of the Constitution and the contention was
rejected. It has been urged by the learned Solicitor.
General, for the appellant, that the points regarding the constitutional validity of s. l 78A raised in
the present appeal are concluded in his favour by
this judgment. We shall, therefore, have to examine
the exact scope of this decision in detail which we
shall do later, but for the present it is sufficient to
state that the case dealt mainly with an objection
based on a violation of Art. 14 of the Constitution
which the following extract from the headnote
would indica.te:
"Section l 78A of the Sea Customs Act
which places the burden of proving that any
of the goods mentioned in the section and
reasonably believed to be smuggled are not
really so on the person from whose possession
pl [1957] s.c.R. 1110,
1961
Tiu C l/«for of
Gust tJm
, .fru!raJ
v.
Natlul/a Sampathu
Clutty
4vyaazar ].
802
19GI
7"' Colltttor of
Cau uiins, M adr a;
v,
NaJ/i,/la SampGtiw
Ax)'angar J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
·[1962]
thoy are seized, is not discriminative in charac·ter and does not \"iolate equal proU>ction of
law guaranteed by Art.14 of the Constitution''.
The validity of the s!'ction was next attack1·d before
the Hid1 Court of Bombay in a Writ Peti1 ion filed
under Art. 226 of the Constitution on the ground
that it violatc:cl Art. 19( lXf) and(!.() of the Constitution: ,1[, G. Abrolv. Amichand('). The article involved
in that case was gold which had been seized from tho
petitioner and directed to be confisra.ted by an adjudicating officer under s. 18~ of the Sea Customs Act.
The case came up for hC'aring before K. T. Desai, J.,
and the lcarnl'd Judge held tlmt s. l 78A was
11ncon,tit11tional aH being an 1111r,•aRouable restriction 011 the citizens' right t.o hold property and to
trade; and also that enu assurnilli! the' provi~ion
to be constitutionally valid, thr rcquirem<'nts of
the section had not bcC'n compliC'd with in the case
before him inasmuch as the seizing oflic<·r had not,·
at the moment of seizure, "reasonable belirf that
the gold seized was smuggled". The next clecision
in ordl'r of date is that of the Bench of the Madras
High Court dated )farch 11, 19:>7, which is now
under appc,al· before us in Civil Appeals 408 to 410
of I !)60. The reasoning of the ll·a1·nccl ,JuJgPR uf the
Madras High Court is on the same lines aH that of
JCT. Desai; J., in the judgment jnst now r<'frrred.
Subseqnentlythe N:Lgpur Bench of the Bombay High
Court ha.cl to crlllsi<lcr the sam•' question and th<,ir
decision is repor!t·d in l'·ukhrnj Clwmpalal Jain v.
D. R. Kohli ('}. There the learned Jncl.!;eS dissC'nted
from the decioion ofJC. T. Desai. J., it1 JJ, G. Abrol
v. Arnir:han<l (') and of the Madras High Court. in
l'l'atlu;lla S<impathu Chrtty \'.The Collector "J Cu.~tom .. (').
It ma v be mentionBd tha.t the arguments of
the )e~rncd Solicitor-General on bchnJf of the appel·
)ant were in eubsta.nce the reasoning on which tho
decision of the Nagpur Bench r<'sta. To completo
(!) (1958) 62 Born. L.R. 1043 at P· 1046.
C2l 11959) 61 Born. L.R. 1210.
(31 A J.R. 1959 Mad. )tl,
••
>
-
-a s.c.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
803
the narrative it is only necessary to add that an
appeal was preferred by the Customs authorities
from the decision of K. T. Desiti, J. The appeal
however was dismissed on the (,lround that even if
s. l 78A were valid as held by th~t Court previously,
its terms were not attracted to the particular. case,
because of the non-fulfilment of an essential condition requisite for the application of the section
[See 11f. G. Abrol v. Arnichand (1)].
.,
\Ve shall now proceed to deal with the points
urged by learned Counsel for the respondent in
support of his ploa that the impugned provision
viola.tea the fundamental right to hold property
under Art. 19 ( 1 )(f) and the l'ight to carry on trade
or business under Art. 19( l)(g) and was not saved
by els. (5) & (6) respectively of Art. 19. Before we
do so, however, it is necessary to advert to the
points upon which learned Judges have, in the judgment under appeal, allowed the petition of the respondent, because in deciding these appeals we have
necessarily to pronounce upon them also. Besides
holding s. l 78A of the Sea Customs Act which was
called in aid by the Collector of Customs to
direct tho confiscation of the gold seized to be unconstitutional and therefore void under Art. 13, the
learned Judges also upheld two further contentions
urged on behalf of the respondent in support of
their petition : (I) that s. l 78A was not attr&cted
to the determination of a question raised in relation
to the confiscation of an article imported in contravention of a notification under s. 8( I) of the Foreign
Exchange Regulation Act, (2) that s. 178.A required as a pre-condition of its applicability, that the
goods which were the subject of adjudication must
have been seized "in the reasonable belief that they
are smuggled goods" and that in the instant case the
Customs Officer effecting the seizure did not or could
not entertain such a belief. We consider it would be
convenient if we deal with these two points after
e:x:amining the constitutional validity of s. l 78A.
(I) (1960) 62 Born. L.R. 1043.
1961
Tiu Collector of
Customa, Madras
v.
N ath1lla Sampatku
Chett)I
A,lYantar J.
S04
1961
Tilt Collect"' of
C11Jtotn1, Madra.r
v.
JVatluUa Sampathu
Chtt!J
~··J.
SUPRE?lrE COURT REP<'.>RTS
(196.2]
Before embarking on this enquiry it is necessary to deal with the argument of the learned
Solicitor-General that every point (1.bout the consti·
tutional validit.y of s. l 78A is concluded in his favour
by the judgment of this Court in Babu/al Amtlialal
Jifehta v. The Collector of Customs, Calcutta('). \Vo
have ·already extracted tho head-note of tho rnport
in the Supreme Court Reports which would appear
to indicate that this Court considered only the
impact of Art. 14 of the Constitution on the provision. Nevertheless, there are somo passages in thiA
judgmt•nt, which would be immediately referred to
on which reliance was placed by the learned SolicitorGcneral in support of his contention that this
judgml·nt is an authority for tho position not merely
thats. l78A docs not violate Art. 14 but that it
impliedly, if not expreesly decides that the restriction imposed by it on the right to hold property or
to engage in the business of dealing in gold was a.
reasonable restriction within Art. 19(5) & (6) of tho
Constitution. Wo will quote these passages in order
to examine whether this contention is made out.
That judgment after setting out a summary of the
provisions of the Sea Customs Act relating to
seizure, the adjudiction of confiscation, tho imposi ·
tion of penalties, appeals from tho orders of tho
Customs authorities to the higher revenue authori·
ties and tbs terms of s. 178, proceeds:
"No doubt the content and import of the
Rection are very wide. It applies not only to
the aotno.l smuggler from whose possession
the goods arc seized but also to thoso who
came into possession of the goods after having
purchased the same after the same has passed
through many hands or agencies. For example,
if the Customs authorities have a reasonable
belief that certain goods in the possession of
an innocent party aro smuggled goods and the
same is seized under the provisions of this
Act, then the person from whose posse8llion
(ll [1957) S. C.R. 1110.
•
••
.,,....
...r
3 $.C.R.
StJPREl\IB COURT REPORTS
805
1961
•
the goods were seized, however innocent be
The Collector of
may be, has to prove that the goods are not
Customs, Madros
smuggled articles. This is no dou~t a very
v.
Sampallw
heavy and onerous duty cast on an mnocent Nathella
Chetty
possessor who, for aught one knows, may
AY.Y""gar J.
have bona fide paid adequate consideration
for the purchase of the articles without knowing that the same has been smuggled. The
only pre-requisite for the application of the
section is the subjectivity of the Customsofficer in having a reasonable belief that the
goods are smuggled."
This passage is followed by an examination of the
matters with reference to Art. 14 expressing the
opinion that the petition did not show in what
manner there had been a violation of that Article,
and the judgment continues:
"But Mr. Chatterjee argues that tho burden of proof enunciated therein is opposed to
fundamental principles of natural justice, as
it gives an unrestricted arbitrary and naked
power to the customs authorities without laying down any standard or norm to be followed
for exercising powers under the section ........ .
It is a heavy burden to be laid upon the
shoulders of an innocent purchaser who might
have come into possession after the article
has changed many hands and this, it is alleged,
invokes discrimination between him and
other litigants and deprives him of the equal
protection of the law guaranteed by Art. 14
of the Constitution. A large number of cases
have been cited at the B11r in support of the
respective contentions of the parties."
This is followed by a citation from the decisions of
this Court in which the scope and content of
Art. 14 were discussed and in particular a passage in
the judgment in Budhan Chaudhury v. The
State of Bihar(') where the principle that Art. 14
<I> r1955J 1 s.c.R. 1045, 1048-1049.
806
19~1
TJ., Cliltc"1r of
Customs, Mad!as
v.
NoJht/lrl-Samf14tlu<
a,,,tl
-1-J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1962j
does not forbid classification on a reasonable and
ration-LI basis is ext.meted. The judgment proceeds:
"A cursory perusal of s. l 78A will at once
<lisclosc the well defined classification of
goods based on an intelligible diffcrentia. It
11pplies only to certain goods described in
hUb-s. (2) which are or can be easily smuggled.
The section applies only to those goods of the
specified kind which have been seized under
the Act and in the reasonable belief that they
are smuggled goods. It is only those goods
which answer the threefold description that
come under the operation of the section. The
object of the Act is to prevent smuggling.
The differentia on the basis of which the
goods have beon classified and the presumption
rnised by the section obviously have a rational
reh1tion to the object sought to he achieved
by the Act .................. The impugned section
cannot be struck down on the infirmity either
of discrimination or illegal classi.fioation."
\Ve arc therefore satisfied that the decision of this
Court considered the validity of s. l 78A only with
rcforcnce to Art. 14 and that it is not a decision
regarding the impugned legislation being or not
being obnoxious to Art. l9(l)(f) & (g). It is only
necessary to add that at the beginning of tho discussion, Govinda l\Icnon, J., specifically points out
that he was not considering any attack on s. l 78A
based on an infringement of Art. l9(l){f) & (g), for
he sai<l :
"Though Mr. Chatterjon faintly argued
that the provisions of Art. IO( l )( f) & (g) and
Art. 31 of the Constitution had been violated,
he did not seriously press those contentions.
The ma.in point of the attack was centered on
tho contention that s. l 78A was violative of
tho principles of equal protection of the laws
guaranteed under Art. 14 of the Constitution."
.·
i
3 s.c.n.
4ii(.
1H1
We cannot accept the further submission
either that, even if this Court did not in terms
The Colltct,r •f
consider the validity of 8. l 78A with reference to CuslDlnJ,v. Jl•lrcs
Art. 19 (1) (f) & (g), still the reasoning by which it N«tlvll• Samfloih•
Clvtty
rejected the contention that it violated Art. 14
would be sufficient to cover the former also. No
A.rJ""l"' ].
doubt, there are situations when the points regard·
ing a violation of Art; 14 and an objection that a
re&triction is not reasonable so as to conform to th@
requirements of Art. 19(5) or (6) may converge and
appear merely as presenting the same question
viewed from different angles. Such, for instance,
are cases when the denial of equality before the
Jaw is based on the ground that the power vested,
say, in an administrative authority to affect rights
guaranteed to a citizen is arbitrary, being unguided
or·uncanalised. The vesting of such a power would
also amount to the imposition of an unreasonable
restriction on the exercise of the guaranteed right
to trade or carry on a business etc. Where howeTer, there is guidance and the legislation is challenged on the ground tha. t the law with the definite
guidance for which it provides has outstepped the
limits of the Constitution by imposing a restraint
which is either uncalled for or unreasonable in the
circumstances, the scope and content of the enquiry
is far removed from the tests of conformity to
rational classification adopted for judging whether
the law has contravened the requirement of equal
protection under Art. 14.
It is therefore necessary for u~ to consider
whether s. l 78A is obnoxious to the rights guaranteed by Art. 19( l)(f) & (g) which is the ground upon
which the section has been held unconstitutional by
the judgment of the Madras High Court under
appeal. We have already set out what one might
term 'the historical background and the surrounding circumstances' which necessit.ated the enactment
of this provision. As already indicated, since the
commodity with which the presC'nt appeals are.
concerned is gold, we are referring to that in pa.rticufar, though the circumstances attendant on the
~
~~
<'
f
<
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
807
808
11191
Till Collutor ef
CiuUinu, M wiras
••
Nat/ulla SIJ1ll#ollsu
o..iv
A.17111\f.,. J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1962]
1
other commodities referred to in s. l 78A might be i
eimilar.
As pointed out already, the disparity between
the internal and external price o! gold became, by
I9-i8, eo great as to provide considerable incentive
to smuggling by making it very profitable. This
wae aeeisted by the very long coast-line which
India has, coupled with the extensive land frontiers
both on the east as well aa on the west, ignoring
for the moment the very small pockets of foreign
territory within the sub-continent. Notwithstand·
ing the efforts of the Custome authoritioa and tho
Preventive Staff of that department, a considerable
I
volume of the yellow metal did seep into the
country and efforts had therefore to be made to
tighten tho law in this regard. It wa1 in pursuance
of thi8 endeavour that s. l 78A wai introduced into
the Sea Customs Act in 1955. Ex faoie, the impugned provision enacts a rule of evidence and tho
ratio underlying it is not far t-0 seek; and it is
that the person in possession of the gold would,
with certainty in most cases, be in a better position
to pro,·e that it was legally within the country
than the Cast-Oms authorities. In this connection
reference may be made to the observations by Lord
Goddard, C. J ., in R. v. Fitzpatrick (' ). Speaking
of s. 259 of the U. K. Customs Consolidation Act,
1876, which enacted :
"If in any pr011eoution in respect of a.ny
goods seized for non-payment of duties, or
any other cause of forfeiture, or for the
recovering any penalty or penalties under the
Customs Acta, any diimute shall arise whether
the duties of customs Iave been paid in res- '
pect of such goods, or whether the same have
been lawfully imported or lawfully unshipped,
or concerning the place from whence ~uch
goods were brought, then and in every such 11
case the proof thereof shall be on the defon. f
dant in 1uoh pros!•cution."
~
1) [1948] 1 A!J. B.R. 769, 772.
3 S.C.R.
'
_,,..
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
so fl
the learned C. J. said:
"The onus is put on the defendant when
there is a dispute in the proceedings whether
duty has been paid or whether the goods were
lawfully imported. The obvious reasons for
this provision is that the facts must be within
the know ledge, and often within the exclusive
knowledge of the defendant. If, for instance,
it is found that he has dealt in prohibited
goods, if he can show that he acquired them
in the ordinary course of business obviously
he would not be guilty of dealing in them
with intent to avoid the prohibition. He can
prove the positive and, unless he had to
undertake the proof, the Crown would generally have to undertake the proof of a
negative."
Mr. Palkivala, learned Counsel for the reepondent, stated that if the impugned section,
s. l 78A, had contented itself with laying down the
principle enunciated in the above observations of
Goddard, C. J., he would not contend that it was
an unreasonable restraint on the citizen's rights to
hold property or on his right to do business guaranteed by Art. 19 (1) (f) & (g). His submission, however, was that the burden cast upon the person
from whom gold were seized transcended the limits
of what that person could reasonably be called
on to prove and that as the burden cast by s. l 78A
was impossible of being discharged, it amounted
not to a law laying down a rule of evidence, but
operated virtually to effect a confiscation of the
property of a citizen without affording him any
real opportunity to establish his right to it.
To appreciate properly this argument about
the real effect of the provision it is necessary to
set out a few facts relating to gold as an article of
trade in this country. Learned Counsel on either
side a.greed that the matters stated in relation to
gold and the trade in gold referred to in the following passage in the judgment of K. T. Desai, J.,
The Colltc?1r of
Cust1ms, Mflha
v.
N•tlull• Scn;•thu
Ch.tty
810
1901
Thi C./i«lor of
Clutoms, Madras
••
N"""ll• SampaU..
C!utty
An•1arJ.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1962]
correctly sums up the position. The learned Judge
summarised the position thus :
"It is common knowledge that India.
prod 10es very little gold a.nd that most of
tho gold a.vaila.ble in India. is imported p;old.
A statement has boon put in by consent showing the officia.l figures of India's imports and
cxports of gold from 1851 to 1956. It shows
a net import in tho country, after deducting
cxports, of 353 crores and three lakhs worth
of gold. Restrictions on tho import of gold
were for the first time introduced in India by
Fina.noo Department (C('ntra.l Rovcnucs)
Notification No. 53, dnted September 4, 1939.
By tha.t notification tho Contra.I Government
in the exercise of the powers conferred by s.19
of the Sea Customs Act prohibited the bringing or taking hy sea or land into British
India from any place other than Burma or
out of British India to any place other than
Burma. gold coin, gold bullion or gold ingots,
whether refined or not, except on the authority of a licence granted in that behalf by the
Rescrvo Bank of India ............Till April 1,
1946, gold remained duty frco. Thereafter
rluty waa levied on the import of gold bullion, gold pl11to, gold manufactures etc ....... ..
Gold besides being a store of value, is an
article of adornment a.nd investment. It is
ca.pa.hie of being split a.nd there can be a
fusion of diverse quantities or gold. It is
e,asily changeable in form, size and aha.po.
The gold available in tho market hardly bears
any identification mark. It is impossihlo for
any person looking at gold to say whether
duty has been paid thereon or not or whether
it has been smuggled. It is precisely the
difficulty experienced by tho cust-0ms officers
with the whole machinery of Government at
their disposal in proving that the gold ha.a
been smuggled which is itself made a. reason
for tbrowini the burden upon tho citizen•
••
38.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
811
to establish that the gold is not smuggled ......
Gold as such has no earmark. It is impossible
to identify gold in the possession of a person
with the gold mentioned in the Bill of Entry
of any importer of gold ......... Gold has been
imported through centuries into this country
and it is virtually impossible for a person to
establish that any particular quantity of gold
in his possession was the gold imported in
th!i country at a particular time without resort
to smuggling. The proof required pre.
supposes the existence of µ-old in an identifi.
able form from the time of its import to the
time of its ultimate sale to the person from
whose possession the same has been seized."
Mr. Palkivala, learned Counsel for the res·
pondent, explained to us the special features atta·
ching to gold as a commodity and as a store of
value, and of the difficulties, if not impossibility,
of identifying one piece of gold from another in
the absence of a requirement of marking, and bas·
ing himself on this factual position submitted six
grounds in support of his contention that the res·
triction imposed bys. 178 A was unreasonable and
we shall deal with these points in the same order :
( l) Section l 78A, no doubt, on its face
purports to be a rule of evidence, but in reality is
not so. The purpose of the enquiry by the adjudicating officer is to find out whether the gold seized
from a person had been smuggled, and in such
an enquiry the fact to be proved, viz., that the gold
had been smuggled is statutorily established not as
an inference from basic facts, which would indicate
the smuggled character of the Gold seized, but from
the mere belief of the seizing officer that the gold
aeized was smuggled,
(2) It was said on the other side that the
requirement in s. 178 A that the officer seizing the
gold must entertain "a reasonable belief" that the
gold was smuggled provided an adequate safeguard
Thi Colll<ttr oj
Customs, MudrGI
v.
Nalh<lla Samp"""'
Che1t;1
812
J9U
The C11/t'1.,. •f
Curtll'\S, Mairas
v.
N.i!u//o s...,athu
C/ul'.J
AE"'l"' ].
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1962]
to the p<irson affected which would render the
restriction imposed reasonable within els. (5) & (u)
of Art. 19. This argument is untenable. If the
reasonable belief was a matter for the subjective
satisfaction of the seizing officer, as seems to ho
implied from the obsorvations of this Court in
Babidai Amthalal Mehta v. The Collector of Cu13tom8,
Calcutta (1), it provides no safeguard at all for the
person from whom the gold is soizecl. Even if, on
the other hand, the test is objective, in the sense
that at the stage of the adjudication under s. 182
the grounds upon which the belief was entertained,
could be the subject matter of enquiry it furnishes
no safeguard either, because tlic "reasonahknl'ss''
of the belief regarding the smuggled character of
the gold would haTc to be judged by the adjudicat·
ing officer with n·fcrenee to the information which
the seizing officer h01d at the moment of seizure,
and that information must necessarily have been
obtained behind t.ho back of the person from whom
the gold had been seized and b<'foro the officer
commenced any cn<1uiry to ascertain th·' truth or
otherwise of the information com·cyed Lu him,
(:l) There is no reasonable or rational
connection between the fact to be proved, viz.,
that tho gol<i was smuggled and the fact from which
such an inference is permitted to be drawn by the
impugned provision, viz., the reasonable belief of
the officer effecting the seizure that the gold waR
smuggled. Thero is therefore no adequate basis
on which the provision could be sustained as a rulo
of eviclencc,
(4) The operation of s. liSA ib not restricted in point of timo or to persons actually suspected to be connected with the import but extends
also to persons who arc able to establish bona fide
acquisition of gold but who arc unable to prove
bow the person from whom they acquired, obtained the gold they sold,
(I) (1957] S.C.R. 1110.
•
--
3 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
813
1961
(5) A presumption of this sort might be
reaeonable in respect of goods which are dangerouB Thi Colleceor _of
or noxious per se, like firearms or poison, since Customs,v.Madras
ordinarily peoplo might be expected to be on their Nathell• Sampalhu, .
Cheµy
guard before obtaining such goods to ensure that
their acquisition was lawful and in accordance
Ayy•lll"' ] . •
with the formalities, if any prescribed by the
relevant statute or rule. Gold, however, is not
such a type of commodity. It is an innocuous
article of commerce and is under the law a aubject
of unrestricted trade within the country. The
burden of proof of the sort imposed by s. 178A, in
respect of such a commodity, is therefore unreasonable,
..
,
(6) The burden of proof cast by e. 178A is,
in most oases, impossible of being discharged because: (a) it extends to facts which would not be
in the possession of a bona fide purchaser and
would comprise matters which he never knew, or
could never know, (b) large quantities of gold
have been imported into India before restrictions
were imposed in 1939. The net imports upto 1939
are estimated at over 353 orores of rupees whioh at
the present price of gold would be over 2,000
crores of rupees. As gold which is sold in the
market is not identifiable, it would be impossible
for any purchaser to say whether the gold that he
was buying was that which had been imported
lawfully before 1939 or had come into the country
after 1939 after payment of duty or had been
smuggled into the country in violation of the
Foreign Exchange Control Regulations. '.Che section, therefore, practically prohibits all holding of
gold or trade in gold and subjects the holding of
and the trade in gold to the penalty of confiscation,
(c) indigenous gold has been produced in mines in
India both before and after 1939 and there is nothing to differentiate this from imported gold,
(d) it is a commodity which frequently changes
hands because of regular trade and widespread
814
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1962]
1161
use as ornaments etc., and finally (e) tho indentification of gold is impossible bel'ause of frequent
meltings and fusion of separate pieces and the
Y.
x.u..ii. s...,.u.u absence of any syst~m of compulsory marking.
Clull.J
We shall deal with each of those points and
.A_,,..,., J.
examine them in the light of the submissions maclc
by the learned Solicitor-General in answer.
Grounds I and 3 which we have set out earlier mav
be taken up together since they arc merely
different modes of expreRSing the same contention.
The point raised iR that there is no rational connection between the fact from which the statute raises
tho presumption and the fact which has to be
proved in order that the goods might he th<' RU bjcct
of confiscation. The argument is that the fact from
which the presumption is drawn is the reaRonable
belief of the officer effecting the Sl'iZure that the
artick seized is smuggled; while the fact which by
the terms of the statute it is held lo prove is that
the gold seized is 8muggled; with the result that
the practical effect of the provision is that th11re is
a statutory direction to the adjudicating officer to
treat the gold as smuggled so as to e11title him to
confiscate the same. It is only if learned Counsel
for th"' respondent is right that tho effect of the
1ection is as above that the several decisions of the
American Courts to which he invited our att€ntion,
could have any application. Learned Counsel
relied particularly on the decisions in Bailey v. State
of .Alabama ('), and Manley v. State of Georgia(').
The first of these was concerned with the validity
of a law of the State of Alabama by which refusal
without just cau1e, to perform the labour agreed
to be performed in a written contract of employment under which the C'mployee had obtained
money whiah ho did not refund was made prima
facie evidence of an intent to commit a fraud. The
Supremo Court hel<l the law invalid. Two grounds
were urged in support of the argument that the
legislat.ion was unconstitutional. The first was that
c.11,,,., •!
lWsflWll, M1drcs
TIM
(II (1911)219U•S.219'55L.Ed; 101.
(21 (1929) 279 U.S. I: 73 L. P.d; 5·~.
•.
3 S.C.R.
-
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
815
it was in violation of the 13th amendment against
"involuntary servitude except as punishment for
crime", the other that the law was in violation of
due 'process' clause contained in the 14th amendment. The Supreme Court upheld both these
contentions, but what is relevant to the present
context and on which learned Counsel relied was the
reason assigned for holding that the rule of evidence
enacted by the impugned statute violated the
requirement of due 'process'. Reliance was placed for
the State before the Supreme Court on the fact that
the presumption raised was not conclusive but was
open t,o rebuttal by the accused, but this was held
not to be of avail, because according to the rule of
evidence enforced by the Courts of Alabama, the
accused, for the purpose of rebutting the statutory
presumption, was not allowed to testify as to his
uncommunicated motives, purposes or intentions, so
that virtually it amounted to a conclusive presumption against the accused. The statute whoso
validity was attacked in the second American
decision referred to was one declaring that every
insolvency of a bank ahall be deemed fraudulent
and subjected the directors to imprisonment unless
they repelled the presumption of fraud by showing
that the affairs of the bank had been fairly and
legally administered. Head Note 1 to this case sums
up the American law on the subject of the constitutional validity with reference to the due 'process'
clause, of laws of evidence creating presumptions.
It rune:
"l. State legielation that proof of one
fact, or group of facts, shall constitute prirna
facie evidence of the main or ultimate fact in
iBsue, does not constitute a denial of due
process of law if there is a rational connection
between what is proof and what is to be
inferred, and the presumption is not unreasonable, and is not made conclusive of the
riirhts of the person against whom it is raised."
JUJ
l"lu C1llect•r of
Cust•ms, AIWl.S
y,
.N«thella S.m~'thu
Chdl;t
A.yJ~l'' J.
816
1961
Tiu C-01/t<t•' ~J
CuJtfmJ, A·lotl11ls
v.
.Y.tJ11ll• S•m~:itlw
Clwtty
SUPREME OOUR'r REPORTS
[1962)
fn rC'g&rd to th!'. American decisions of which
only n few WNe cited, including those just now
Bet 11ut, the principle underlying them is to be
found ~ummn.ri7,ed in Rott8l'haefcr'H C".-0nstitution&l
Law at. p. 835, where the learnc1l author saya:
"The power of a legislature to prescribC'
thP rul1 s of <·vidence is uni\·crsally recognised,
!mt it ill equally well est.ablished that du<'
process limits it in this matt<>r. It may
1·stablish rehutt.able presumptions only if therr
i' a rational conntictiun between what is
proHd and what is permitted to be inferred
therefrom."
It would be seen that the deci~ions proceed on the
application of the "due process·• clause of the
American Constitution.
Though the teetft o!
'reasonableness· laid down by els. (2} to(6} of Art.19
might in great part coincide with that for judging of 'due process', it must nut be assumed that
these are identical, for it has to be borne in mind
that the Constitution framers deliberately avoided
in this context the use o! the expression 'due
process· with its comprehensiveness, flexibility and
attendant. vagueness, in favour of a somewhat more
definite word "reasonable'', and caution has, thereforo to be exercised before the literal application o!
Americn.n dl'cisions. [n making these ob1ervation1
we arc merely rep 1ting a warning found in the
judgment of this Co :t in A. S. ](rishna v. The Stau
of Madra.~ ('), wlJrc Venkatarama Ayyar, J.,
epeaking with reference to the point now under
discussion after quoting the pa.i;sage already
extracted from Rottschaefer'.s treatise st.ated:
"The law would thus appear to be baaed
on the due proceAs clause. and it is extremely
doubtful whether it can have application
under our Const.itution."
With tbiB caution we shall proceed to en.mine
the submission of learned Counsel regarding the
(I)
[19~7] S.C.R. 399, 412.
...
3 S.C.R.
.ft ....
.;·
•
>
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
817
absence of any rational connection bet1l'een the fact
to be proved and the fact on which the presumption
is raised. An analysis of the arguments of the
learned Counsel shows that the real legal objection
to the provision lay in the sixth point urged by him,
viz., the impossibility of discharging the burden of
proof cast by s. l 78A, which thus virtually results
in a confiscation of property without a judicial
adjudication or condemnation. Pausing here we
might mention that two matters might be urged as
flowing from or as the necesgary result of the
impugned provision: (1) that even a bona fide
possessor of the goods might be deprived of his
property notwith~tanding that there was no basis
even for a suspicion that he was a party to the
smuggling or had any knowledge that the goods in
his possession were smuggled goods; and (2) that
the burden cast on the possessor to prove the
negative, namely, that the gold was not smuggled
cast an impossible burden upon the person from
whom the goods are seized as it virtually amounts
to a confiscation by tho law without any reaso'.lable
proof before a quasi-judicial authority that the gold
was smuggled. To this last, the sixth point, we
shall advert in its proper place, but what we are
concerned to point out at this stage is that apart
from the point about the impossibility of discharging
the onus of proof cast by the section, there is little
basis for the argument that there is lack of any
rational connection between the facts giving rise to
the presumption and the fact presumed, and .to this
we shall now proceed.
This question about the lack of rational
connection may be considered from two points of
view. First Mr. Palkivala does not impugn the
constitutional validity of ~. 106 of the Indian
Evidence Act or the legislative application of the
principle underlying it to any concrete case. It
need hardly be pointed out that in every case
without exception, the possessor of the gold would
be the person best acquainted with the manner of
1961
Tbe c.uect" •f
Cust•ms, M•ir•s
v.
Jil«thell• S•mi•thu
Chetty
818
IPll
Tiu C1ll«t1r •f
C11111m1, '1Urai
"
}{atlulltJ Stmt~tttfm
r.1ic11y
.Ayyan:•r }.
SUFREME CO'IJ'RT REPORTS
[1062]
his ncquisition and the circumstnnc<'s attendant on
or connected with that acquisition. It was part of
the learned Counsel's submission that he c•mld not
Ht1Cccssfully impugn tho validity of a provision on tho
terms of s. 259 of the C. K. Customs Consoli<l&tion
Act. Recalling the decrnion in R. v. Fitzpatrick('),
already referred to, we might mention that the
prosecution there was for a violation of s. 186 of
tho C. IC Customs Consolidation Act, 18i6, which,
so far as matorial, was iu substantially the same
terms as the relevant portion of s. l6i(8) of the Sea
Customs Act, l 8i8, tho essential ingredient of tho
offencn beiug indicated by the words "person
concerned in dealing with go(1ds the import of
which is prohibited or which arc liable to duty with
intent to dofraud His Majesty", and it was a violation of this section that Fitzpatrick was found
guilty of by the application of the rule as to onus
of proof prescribed by s. 259 extract-Od earlier. If
in a prosecution for dealing in smuggled goods tho
onus could with constitutional propriety be cast
upon the accused to prove that the goods were not
smuggled, it is difficult to soc any reasonable basis
for the contention that whore the offence charged
against a person is not dealing in but possession of
smuggled goods, there is a constitutional bar on the
burden being so laid.
Secondly, is learned Counsel correct in his
submission that under s. l 78A the onus is ca.st upon
tho poiscssor of the goods seized by reason only of
the reasonable belii;f of the seizing officer that the
goods seized by him &ro smuggled ? It is to be
noted that tho seizure by the officer in tho belief
that the goods are smuggled does not by itself
operate to effect the confiscation or deprive the
owner of his property in the goods. This result,
however, follows only on an order of an adjudicating officer who investigates into the complaint
regarding the defendant's possession of tho smuggled
goods. As we shall have occasion to point out
(11 [ 19-IB; I All. E, R. 769, 772.
'
3 S.C.R.
.. ,
<
1
<
,
~·
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
819
later the entira evidence in the possession of the
seizing officer would be and has to be before the
officer adjudicating the confiscation under s. 182 of
the Sea Customs Act. No doubt, on the language of
s. l 78A the presumption of the goods being smuggled
arises only when the seizure is made by an officer
entertaining a reasonable belief that the goods are
smuggled, and in that sense the reasonable belief of
the seizing officer is a pre-requisite for the statutory
onus to arise. It is also true that at the stage of
the adjudication the reasonableness of the belief of
the officer effecting the seizure that the goods are
smuggled would be the subject-matter ofinvestigation by the adjudicating officer. Nevertheless it is
manifest that at the stage of the adjudication (when
only the rule of evidence laid down by the section
comes into operation) the very facts which led the
seizing officer to effect the seizure, as rlistinguished
from their significance as affording a reasonable
belief for the seizing officer to hold that the goods
are smuggled are before the adjudicating officer.
These facts which justified the seizing officer to
reasonably believe that the goods were smuggled
would certainly impart a rational connection
between the facts on which the presumption is
raised and the fact to be proved, so that whatever
other constitutional infirmity might attach to the
impugned provision, the lack of rational connection
is not one of them. It appears to us therefore that
the argument regarding the lack of rational
connection has no substance. It is derived wholly
on a literal reading of s. 178 A and would not be
available if the provisions were read in the manner
we have just now indicated.
The second of the grounds urged by learned
Counsel was that the requirement of s. 178 A that the
belief of the officer seizing the goods should rest on
reasonable grounds provided no safeguard to the
citizen, as the seizing-officer who acts administratively entertains the belief on unproved information
gathered from sources which most often are not and
Th.1 Collector of
Cwtoms. Madras
v.
Nalhtlla Sampathu
Che tty
A.y,,wintlif J.
820
T!it Co/!tcl1r •f
Czut1wt1 • .V. 4Jr•J
v.
JV•:ht/!4 Svnl•lhu
Chttty
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1962]
in practico will not bo possiblo to bo discl~sed to
the party affected. In connection with this point
two alternative s11bmissions were made : ( l) that
the reasonable belief of the officer effecting the
seizure was one entirely for his subjective satisfaction and that this rendered the protection wholly
illusory and therefore patently unreasonable. This
was iidvanced on the basis of the passage in the
judgment of this Court in Babulal Amtl1alal Mehta
v. 'l'he CoUectur of Cuswms, Calcutta ('), already
e:i:tracted reading :
"the only pre-requisite for the application
of the section is tho subjectivity of tho
Customs OfficPr in hin·ing a reasonable belief
that the good~ are smuggled."
The learn~d Solicitor-General, on the other hand
poin!t-d out that this was not really part of the
decision, hut was jn~t an obsernition and that he
wonl•l not support it. The learned Solicitor-C'ri!neral
submitt<•cl that a sciz11re to which s. 178 A was
appli<'ablE was merely a preliminary to proceedings
bcfon· a quasi-judicial authority under s. 182. When
the matt-0 ~ comes before the latUir authority, and
anterior t•) that authority im•oking the presumption
raised by B. 178 A, it would, on tho terms of the
secti(•n, 1i,~ve to be satisfied that the seizure was
made "i11 tho reasonable belief that tho goods
8cizc1l were goods that had been smuggled". At
that 'tago the ·~nqniry is not and cannot be confined
all to whether the seizing-officer bona fido entertained th•• belief, but must necessarily o:i:tend to an
!'xamination of the grounds upon which that belief
was, nteriained with a view to ascertain whether
the lwli<'f was reasonable. It might he that the
cntin·t.y of the evidence which conceh·ably in
several <·asea consist of information commu11icated
hy informers might not bo made availahh• to the
person afTeeteJ, but still the adju<licating-officer
would ham to satisfy himself that the roquiremcnts
(L 11sn1 s. c. R. 1110.
~·
9 '·
>
•
•
-
3 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
821
of s. 178 A had been complied with before invoking
the presumption laid down by that section.
Mr. Palkivala's alternative submission was
that even if test of 'reasonable belief' was not
8Ubjective but was objective, in that the point as to
whether the belief was reasonable was open to
examination by the adjudicating-officer under
e. 182, still, this provided no sufficient safeguard,
because, if "information not tested by cross examination" could from the basis of "reasonable belief",
by applying the same tests, the adjudieating officer
would and must in moet cases reach the eame
conclusion.
It is, no doubt, true that in some cases there
might be pieces of information on the basis of
which the seizure was effected which might not be
capable of being disclosed to the affected party
because it might consist of information supplied by
customs informers, but if that information would
have to stand the test of scrutiny as to credibility
by an independent officer dealing with it in a quasijudicial capacity, it cannot be said that the
protection is illusory. It has also to be added that
at the stage of appeal or revision from the orders
. of the officer adjudging confiscation under s. 182 of
the Act each successive appellate or Revisional
authority has also to address itself to this requirement.
We ehall now pass on to the fourth of the
points urged by learned Counsel for the petitioner
that the onus of proof is unreasonable, in that it
was not restricted in point of time or to persons
connected with the import. 'l'he point suggested
may be expanded in these terms : What the party
affected has to prove is not that his acquisition hae
been bona fide, which of course he might be in a
position to prove and might properly be required
to prove, but that somebody else over whom he has
no control and of whose actions he would, in mo11t
eaees, be completely ignorant has similarly bona fide
1161
7 Ju Colltcljr •f
Customs, MaJra.r
v.
Ntllhtlla Sam;«thu
Ck tty
822
1!81
Tiu C11lut11r of
C'Mlll1'flJ,
.J.1.JtaJ
v.
_.\'o:Mll• SatY•thu
l'lutt;·
...'.1""l"1 ].
SUPRl<.:ME COURT REPORTS
(1962)
acquired tho gold without violating the law and so
on until onEl reached tho stage of the origin of the
gold which is the Rubject of seizure and of adjudication before tho Customs authority. It would ho
seen that this is really the argument upon which
the Rixth of the points urged by learned Counsel
rests nnd therefore it will be convenient to examine
the soundness <·f tho contention and tho answore
which have been made on the other 1ido aft{)r
dcalinf! with point No. 5.
The fifth p•Jint relat<'! to the fart that the
presuIT. ption raii;ecl by tho section is about the
possC'ssion cf an innocuous articlt> of property which
under the ls.w is the subject of unrestricted trade in
the open market as distinguished from articlee
which are inherently dangerous-such as firearms
or PoiBonoua drugs, in regard to which possession
11.nd de11.lin~ are l1>gitimately subject to severe
restri"tions. Learned Counsel is, no doubt, right
in hi8 subm.ssion that gold as a commodity is an
innocuous article of commerce, that articles made
of gold have been used as part of jewellery by the
middle and upper classes from the beginning of
tim11, thn.t it has served &s & store of value from
ancient times and that the very large number of
people in this cmmtry are in possessi1;n of gold for
the purposes jus•, now mentioned. nut that however is not any conclusive consideration in support
of the invalidity of a law which seeks to throw the
burden of establishing p0RSession a~ leg&! under the
law, upon tbe posse~or. It cannot be seriously
dispute< I that in most of tho cases tho possessor of
the gold would crrtn.inly be in a position to eBtablish
the mode of his acquisition (subject to tho last of the
point.~ nbout the burden of proof being impossible
to discharg1,), which would more often than not take
it out of the category of smuggled gold. It is o 1ly
in thoso cases whero rcaaonnble suspicion ex sts
that the gold in the possession of a person ha.s como
into the countrv bv illicit means, that there is po'ver
in an offiocr to ·effect the !eizure and in moet
.
"·
•
3S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
823
1961
-
•
of the cases the innocent possessor would he in a
Th< CollutM of
position to discharge the onus. It is therefore Customs,
Madrru
in cases where· a person is unable to prove how
v.
Saf!f/>dthu
he got into possession of the gold found with Nathti1a
Che tty
him or where his explanations are found to
Ay_.>antar J,
be false or unacceptable that in the large
majority of cases the section would normally be
invoked. Besides these, it would be applied also
in cases where a person is able to prove that his
acquisition was bona fide but that the persons from
whom he acquired or one higher up in the series
of prior owners is unable to explain satisfactorily
his possession, and it is only in these marginal or
extreme cases that the onus created by the section
might be contended to be harsh and unreasonable.
Learned Counsel is, therefore, not right in suggesting that s. l 78A operated, as it were, by itself to
confiscate the gold and gold ornaments in the
possession of the entire population of the country,
each individual being compelled before the restoration of the gold to him to strictly prove either
that the gold was of indigenous origin or had been
imported prior to 1939, or if imported subsequently
had either been permitted to be imported or had
paid duty, if such duty was leviable. We consider
that this is not the effect of the section and that
it does not, on any reasona hie construction, justify
this picture of its operation.
We shall now proceed to consider the last of
the points raised by learned Council in conjunction
with point No. 4 which we had reserved for being
examined along with it. This point learned Counsel
expanded in the following terms. The burden of
proof cast by the section is or is almost impossible
of discharge, because ( 1) it extends to facts which
would not be in the possession of bona fide purchaser at all, facts which he never knew and which
he could never reasonably ascertain ; (2) large
quantities of gold have been imported into this
country before the introduction of restrictions on
their importation by virtue of the legislation
824
1961
Till Colhrt"' of
Oustom3, MaJra.;
v:
NIJJ,,lla s.,.atk•
Cltttty
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1692)
brought
into
forco from 1939. In this
context, learned Counsel relied on tho sev<Jral
matters set out in the passage from the judgment
of IC T. Desai, J., extracted earlier and laid particu Jar <'ID phasig on the fact : (a) that gold was held
in myriarl forms and for di verse purposes by a
sizeable portion of the population of the country,
(b) that gold in its several forms was incapablo of
being id•'ntified aA indigenous or imported, or if
import<'d had paid duty or not. In view of these
circumst;rnees he urged that to rail upnn any person
tn prove <my thing mor·' than that his acquisition
of tlw golcl was bon•i fide and without violation of
the la•;;- woalcl Le to <':1st an impn~sible hurdcn upon
the p0ssessor. Learned Counsel furth<'r urged that. the
precise rnason for whic·h the burden had been thrown
upon the paS8cAsor was be<'ause nf th•: inability of
the State to et1tablish before the quasi-judicial authorities actil1g unrler s. 182 reasouablc proof that the
gold 'Pizcd was smuggled. He tht>rcfore submitted
that if Government with all its aclmini"trati,·c
machinery operating in sever11l field, was una.blo
to lea•! evidence which could satisfv th0- Collector
of Cu,toms that the golcl seized had" an illicit origin,
how could it ho reasonable to expect the indh·idual
posseHSor, who knew nothing beyond how he himself
camp by the gold, to establish the negative, viz.,
that the gold in his possession had not been smug·
glecl hut was lawfully within tho country.
Before considering these submissions it is
nece>sary to mention one point sugge•tecl in andwcr
by th~ Jearne<l Solicitor-G0neral which ha.s appa·
rently found favour with tho learned .Tudgrs of
the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court
in Pnkhra.j Champa/al .lain v. D. R. Kohli('). The
point was this: The Central Board of Revenuo
had issued certJ,in administrative' instructions as
r~gards the manner in which the Customs Officors
Rhoulcl regulate their procedure bf'f•:rc the goods
are adjurlgecl to be confiscated under t.ho provisions
of thu Sea Custom; Act. These a.re s 0 t ·mt at p. 124()
(ll (1959) GI Born. L.R. 123-0.
....
3 S.C.R.
.,.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
of the Report in 61 Bombay Law Reporter and
need not be repeated here. 'l'be learned SolicitorGeneral's argument was that as the section was
being administered subject to these safeguards,
tht: provision must be held to be a reasonable
restriction within<·!. (6) of Art. 19 of the Constitution. We are clearly of the opinion that the
argument about the relevance of this matter is
incorrect and must be rejected. vThis Court has
held in numerous rulings, to which it is unnecessary to refer, that the possibility of the abuse
of the powers under the provisions contained in
any statute is no ground for declaring the provision
to be unreasonable or void. Commenting on a
passage in the judgement of the Court of Appeal
of Northern Ireland which stated:
"If such powers are capable of being
exerci~ed reasonably it is impossible to say
that they may not also be exercised unreasonably"
and treating this as a ground for holding the statute
invalid Viscount Simonds obsbrved in Belfast
Corporation v. 0. D. Gommis.~ion('):
"It appears to me that the short answer
to this contention (and I hope its shortness
will not be regarded as disrespect) is that
the v'tlidity of a measure is not to be determined by its applic11tion to particular cases ...
.... . .... If it i8 not so exercised (i.e., if the
powers are abused) it is open to challenge
and there is no need for express provision for
its challeL1go in the statute".
The possibility of abuse of a statute otherwise
valid does not impart to it any element of invalidity.
The converse must also follow that a statute which
is otherwise invalid as being unreasonable cannot
be saved by its being a<lministered in a reasonable
manner. The constitutional validitv of the statute
would have to be determined on tqe b~sis of its
I) ~1960) A.C. 49~, 520-5~1.
11161
The Collectar of
Customs: Mttdras
v.
Nath.Ila Sampatl:u
Che tty
A;yangar ].
826
1flfl
Th. Cd/¥... •f
Customs, Madras
·v.
Notiotl/a Sampat""
Ch.tly
A»""l"' J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1962]
provisions and on the ambit of its operation as
reasonably construed. If so judged it passes tho
test of reaaonablencss, possibility of the powers
conferred being improperly used is no ground for
prononncing the law itself invalid and similarly if
the law properly interpreted and tesLcd in the light
of the requirements set out in Part III of the Con·
stitution does not pass the test. it cannot be pronounced valid merely because it is administered
in a manner which might not conflict with the
constitutional requirements. In saying this we
are not to be untlerstood as laying down that a
law which might operate harshly but still be constitutionally valid should be operated always with
harshness or that reasonableness and justness ought
not to guide the actual administration of such laws.
We shall now proceed to examine what in
effect is the central point in the argument of the
learned Counsel for the respondent which might
be split up into two beads: (I) Under s. 178-A the
burden of proof is ca.et upon a person from whom
the goods have been seized which is impossible for
him to discharge, with the consequence that though
in form the impugned section purports to be a rule
of evidence, it is virtually a law which per se effecte
confiscation in E•very case to which it is applicable.
(2) Is such a law a reasonable restriction on tho
right to bold property or on tho right to carry on
business within els. (5) & (6) of Art. 19, but they
may be considered together.
Section 178-A operates to cast the burden of
proof on the person from whose poseession goods
specifie<l in its sub-s. (:?) are seized to establish
that the goods l\r<l not smuggled. It mnst be
apparent that this will include, in several cases,
persons who are concerned in and are charged with
being concerned in the act of illicit importation.
In their case, as we have already pointed out,
lea.med Counsel admits that the onus is properly
shifted and that ~uoh a provision would be reasonable and so com1titutionally valid, though undoubtedly it mi_sht be possible for the State to prove
-
3 S.C.R.
-
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
827
its case even without the aid of the pre'sumption
raised by s. l 78A. Again there might be some
cases where goods are seized from a person who is
unable to account satisfactorily for his ownership
or possession. In such cases also we did not understand learned counsel for the petitioner to suggest
that the shifting of the burden of proof would be
unconstitutional, for surely the principle underlying s. 106 of the Evidence Act which, it is concederl, enunciates a just and reasonable principle
would serve to sustain the validity of the impugned
provision. The two classes of cases which we have
just set out would in themselves constitute most
of the cases in which suspicion or information of
the type which leads to seizure and the ensuing
proceedings would occur. Section 178A however
does not exhaust those classe11, and that is the
ground of complaint by the learned Counsel,
and it is precisely on this basis or for this reason
that learned Counsel contends that the entire provision JS constitutionally invalid. This analysis
would show that the provisions of the section are
constitutionally valid in the sense of being reasonable restrictions on the right to hold property or to
carry on trade or business in the large percentage of
cases to which the section would apply, and it is
only in the marginal cases already described that
it can, with any justification, be contended that the
restriction is unreasonable. From this position,
the question that arises is whether bc~ause of the
inclusion of this type of case the impugned provision should be held to be constitutionally invalid.
This has to be ta.ken in conjunction with what is
obviously correct, that any severance of the marginal cases and their exclusion from the operation of
the provision would greatly reduce its effectiveness
and provide innumerable loop-holes for easy
evasion. It is in this context that tha test for
ascertaining the "reasonableness" postulated of the
restrictions in els. (2) to (6) of Art. 19 assumes great.
relevance and crucial importance.
There are
several decisions of this Court in which the relevant
JU61
The Collector of
CusttJms, Madras
v.
N athel!a Sampat!iU
Chetty
Ayyangar ].
828
1911
T/:t Colltcl•' of
Customs, kladras
v.
Nat/,,/ia Samp.thu
C/,,tty
A.1J'G'ltar J.
SuPRE~rE COUR'r REPORTS
[1962j
critNi1i have bC'cn laid down hut we consider it
suflicient to refer to a pe~sage ill the judgment of
Patanjali Sastri, C. J., in State of .Madras v.
V. G'. Row<, 1). The learned Chief .Tustic« eaid at p. 607
of the Report:
"It is important ill thie cont.ext to bear
in mind that the test of rcnsonao!en<'~s, wherever prcsrribecl, should he applied to each
individual statute impugned, and no <ibstract
standard, or gerwrnl pattern of reasonableness
can ho laid down as applicable to all cases.
The natnrc of tho right allep;Pcl tu havo been
infringed, tho underlying ·purpose of the
restrictions imposed, the extellt and urgency
nf tho evil sought to he r<'mcdied thereby,
the disproportion of the imposition, the
prcvailillg conditions at tlw tim<» should all
enter into the judicial verdict."'
It would be apparent that this is in lint• with the
groat, principle underlying the structure of the rights
guaranteed by Art. HJ_. i-iz., a balaneing of the need
for individual liucrtv in the mattt•r inter ulia of the
right to hold property or of the right to trnde, with
the need for social control in onh·r that the freedoms guara.nt!'cd to the individual subservc the
larger ncods-moral, social, economic and political
-of the community and thus ensure orderly prog·
ress towards the goal indicated by the prt•amblc. It
would follow that the rcasonablenes8 of the restraint would have to he judged by the magnitude of
tho evil which it is the purpose of the restraint to
curb or eliminate.
The submission of the learned ::lolicitorGeneral was that the reasonab1Pllt'H8 of the impug·
ned provision had to be judged in the light
of the widespread smuggling in commodities
liko gold which if not checked was calculated
to destroy national
economy and hamper
economic stability and progress, and that no
(11 [1952] S. C.R. :i97, 607.
•
••
3 S.C.R.
-
SUPREME COURT REPOR'iS
829
reasonable alternative to the provision would
achieve the desired end. In this connection he
drew our attention to the Report of the Taxation
Enquiry Commiosion, 1953-54, which pointed
out the factual position regarding the existence
of widespread smuggling in certain commodities
including inter alia gold. They stated at p. 320 of
the Report:
"11. Smuggling now constitutes not only a
loophole for escaping duties but also a threat
to the effective fulfilment of the objectives of
foreign trade control. The existence of foreign
pockets in the country accentuates the
danger. The extent of the leakage of revenue
that takes place through this process cannot
be estimated even roughly, but, we understand, it is not unlikely that it is substantial.
Apart from its deleterious effect on legitimate
trade, it also entails the outlay of an appreciable amount of public funds on patrol
vessels along the sea coasts and permanent
works along the land border, and watch and
ward staff on a generous scale. It is, therefore, necessary, in our opinion, that stringent
measures, both legal and administrative should
be adopted with a view to minimising the
scope of this evil."
The deleterious effects of smuggling, as pointed out
in the extract from the Report, are real and it is
not in dispute that the prevention and eradication
of smuggling is a proper and legally attainable
objective and that this is sought to be achieved by
the relevant law. If therefore for the purpose of
achieving the desired objective and to ensure that
the intentions of Parliament shall not be defeated
a law is enacted which operates somewhat harshly
on a small section of the public, taken in conjunction
with the position that without a law in that form and
with that amplitude smuggling might not be possible of being effectively checked, the question arises
whether the law could be held to be violative of the
19~1
Tht Collector 1
Customs, .\tladros
v.
Nath~lla Samp'"lthu
C!:etty
4r1angar .].
830
19'1
Thi Coilu:w of
C11.Jtom1 1 Mtu/r(l.J
v.
No1/,,l/a Somj>oliw
Ch11ty
AY.)lantar ].
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[HJ62)
'.reedom guaranteed by Art. lO(l )(f) & (g) as imposmg an unrea.sonable restrain. That tht> restrictions
arc in the "interest of the general puhlic" is beyond
controversy. But is the social good to Le achieved
Ly the legislation so disproportionately small that
on balance it could be said that it has proceeded
b<·yond the limits of reasonablenrAs? \Ve would
answer this in the negative. \Ve would only add
that there is authority for the position that "act;;
innocent in themselves may be prohibited and the
restrictions in that regard would bP rPasonablP, if
the same were necessary to scc·urc t.he efficient
enforcc.>ment of valid provisions. The inclusion of
a reasonable margin to ensure effective enforcement
will not stamp a law otherwis<' valid as within
lt•gislative competence with the charact"r of uncon·
stitntionality as being unrPasonable" [vide Mmwh<P'
Lt1l v. St<ltP. nf T'u11jnli (') and Rmn JJ!um /Jass '"
State of T'1111jub (')). Having gi,•en thC' mattt-r our
best attention we have arrived at the condusion
that the impugned legislation has not ovorstPpped
the limits set by the Constitution and in saying
this wo have adoptPd the test laid down in Slate of
Jfadras v. V. 0. flow(') whos" lfTms we luwe
quoted at the start of this discussion.
Proceeding thl'refore on the lmsis that the
impugned provision was constitutionally valid we
have still to consider two further points on the
basis of which learned .Tudgos of the High Court
upheld the case of the reRpondent even on thu
assumption that s. I i8A was constitutionally valid.
The first of these grounds was th11t tho impugned
s. l 78A which had been introduced bv the Act of
l!l55 (Act 21 of 19<'55) is not attract~l to the prohi·
hitions enacted by s. 23A of tho Foreign Excha11ge
Regulation Act. The reasoning on which this
conclusion was reached was that s. 23A, whose
terms we have set out, when ('Dacted in Hl52 in
effect incorporated into the provisions of the
Poreign Exchange Regulation Act all ~he relevant
provisions of the Sea Customs Act, 1818, as that
(1) [1961] 2 S. C.R. 34~.
(2) [19,6;_11.s, C:. R. 852.
(3) [1952] S. C.R .. ,., 0<··
-~·
t
3 S.C.R.
-
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
831
enactment stood in 1952, with the result that any
subsequent amendments to the Sea Customs Act did
not and could not affect, modify or enlarge the
scope of the incorporated Sea Customs Act which
had become part of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act. In support of this conclusion the learned
Judges of the High Court have relied largely on the
decision of the Privy Council in 1'he Secr~tary of
State for India in Council v. Hindustan Co-operative
Insurance Society Ltd. (1). We consider that the
legislation regarding which the Privy Council
rendered the decision bears no resemblance, whatever to the matter now on hand and that the ruling
in The Secretary of State for India 'in Council v.
Hindustan Co-operative Insurance Society Ltd. (1),
cannot therefore furnish any guidance or authority
applicable to the interpretation of s. 23A of the
Jf'oreign Exchange Regulation Act. To consider
that the decision of the Privy Council has any
relevance to the construction of the legal effect of
the terms of Ii. 23A of the Foreign Exchange Hegulation Act is to ignore the distinction between a
mere reference to or a citation of one statute in
another and an incorporation which in effect means
the bodily lifting of the provisions of one enactment
and making it part of another so much so that the
repeal of the former leaves the latter wholly untouched. In the case, however, of a reference or a
citation of one enactment by another without
incorporation, the effect of a repeal of the one
"referred to" is that set out in s. 8( 1) of the General
Clauses Act :
"8. (1) Where this Act, or any Central
Act or Hegnlation made after the commencement of this Act, repeals and re-enacts, with
or without modification, any provision of a
former enactment, then references in any
other enactment or in any instrument to the
provision so repealed sllall, unless a different
(ii [1931] L.R. 58 LA. 259,
1961
The Collector 1J
Customs, Madras
v,
}llathtUa Sampalhu
Che Uy
.A_yyangcr ].
8UP!tEME CUURT REPORTS
Tk CQ//tcl()r uj
Cwl4m.s, .•fod-ns
v.
./l"alhtlla Sampatlw
Chet17
AJYOntar J.
[ J!Jtii)
intention appears : be construed as i•tiferences
to the provision RO re-enacted."
On the other hancl, the effect of incorporation
is as stated by Brctt, L. J., in Clarke v. Bradlaugh(' ):
''Where a statute is incorp'>rated, by
reference, into a second statute the repeal of
the first statute by a third does not affect tho
second".
This is analogous to, though not identical with the
principle embodier! in s. 6A of the General Clauses
Act .. nacted to i!Pfine the effect of repeals effected
by rnpcaling ancl anwnding Atta which runs in these
terms:
"6A. Whore anv Cf.'ntral Act or Re~ula·
tion made after tllc commencement
this
Aet repc>als any t'!lactmcnt by which the
text of any Central Act or RPgulation was
amended by the cxprPss omission, insertion or
substitution of any matter, then.. unless a
different intention appears, thc 1cpeal shall
not affect the continuanre of any such amendment made Ly the enactmc>nt so repealed and
in operation at the time of such repeal."
We say 'not identical' because in the class of cases
contemplated by s. fiA of the General Clauses Act,
the function of the incorporating legislation is
almost wholly to effect the incorporation and when
that is accomplished, they die as it were a natural
death which is formally l'ffocted by their repeal. In
cases, however, dealt with by Brett, L. J., the legislation from which provisione are absorbed continue
to retain their efficacy and usefulness and their
indep•~ndent operation even after the incorporation
is effected.
\Ve consider that on the language of the pro·
visions in the two At·ts-s. 19 of the Sea Customs
Act and s. 23A of the Foreign Exchange Regulation
Act-there is no scope for any argument that there
ot
(I) ( 1881) 8 Q. B. D. 63.
3 ~.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
833
has been any incorporation of the provisions of the
earlier statute in the later. We shall repeat the
terms of s. 19 of the Sea Customs Act which
runs:
+.
,._."
-
"19. The Central Government may from
time to time, by notification in the Official
Gazette, prohibit or restri0t the bringing or
taking by sea or by land goods uf any specified description into or out of India across any
customs frontier as defined by the Central
Government."
Section 8(1) of the Foreign Exchange Regulation
Act enables similar notifications by the Central
Government in these terms:
"8. (I) The Central Government may, by
notification in the Official Gazette, order that
subject to such exemptions, if any, as may be
contained in the notification, no person shall,
except with the general or special permission
of the Reserve Bank and on payment of the
fee, if any, prescribed bring or send into India
any gold or silver or any currency notes or
bank notes or coin whether Indian or
foreign.
Explanation.-The bringing or sending
into any port or place in India of any such
article as aforesaid intended to be taken out
of India without being removed from the ship
or conveyance in which it is being carried
shall nonetheless be deemed to be a bringing,
or as the case may be, sending, into India of
that article for the purposes of this section."
In this situation s. 23A of the Foreign Exchange
Regulation Act enacts:
" ............ the restrictions imposed by subsection ( l )............ of section 8 ........... .shall
be deemed to have been imposed under section 19
1981
The CollettM of
Customs, ltfadras
v:
N atlulla SampaJhu
C/utty
AJ!Yangar J
834
1961
Tiu CoJlect<>r of
Customs, Jf 1;,{rtu
v.
.\reJhtlla Sct¥0llm
Chilly
.i_>·7antlfT J,
80PREME COURT REPORTS
fHJ62J
of the :)ua Customs Aet, 1878, 1tnd all tho
provisions of that Act shall have <>ffect
aecord ingly ............ "
The offcct, therefore, of d. 23A i$ to treat the text
of tho notification bv the Central Government undor
s. 8(1) as if it had bOen issued under s. 19 of the Sea
Customs Act with the title and the recital of the
sourco of power appropriate to it by the creation of
a h·gal fiction. It would be obvious that in tho
context and on the language hero employed, ifs. !!}
uf the Sea. Customs Act wero repealed thl'ro would
no longer bn any legal found:ition fur invoking tho
pcn;d provisions of tho Sea Customs Act to a
contravention of a notification under s. 8(1) of tho
Foreign Exchange Regulation Act.
This conclusion is reinforcecl by a comparison
of the usual and normal or recognized formulae
genera.Uy employed to effect incorporation, suoh
that changes in or even repeal uf the incorporated
statuk is n0t intended per 8e to affect the operation
of the incorporating legislation. It is sufficient to
pick out a few of tho well-known formulae employ.
eel which would indicate that normally the draftsman does not lenvo his intent.ions in doubt. For
instanc:e, in s. 20 of 53 and fi4 Viet. Ch. iO- -Housing
of tho \Vorking Classes Act, 18UO, the words used
\\'Crc:
"shall, for that purpose, be doemecl to
form part of this Act in the samo manner as
if thoy wero enacted in the bocly thereof;".
In !i-! and 55 Viet. Ch. I!l, s. !(:~). the language
employed was :
"The pro\·isions o f s. I:H of tho said Act
(set out in tho schedule) shall apply as if they
wne herein re-enacted."
To take more modern instnnce8, IO and 11 Georgo
VI Ch. 51, (the Town and Country Planning Act,
HH 7), s. 44( 1) enacts :
.~
•
"
3 S.C.R.
•
835
19~1
"Sections 19 to 30 of the Act of 1944
which provide for the disposal and appropriaThe Col/1ctor of
Custom.t,
M aJras
tion by local Planning Authorities of land acv.
quired or appropriated under Part l of that Natherla Sampathu
ChtUy ,
Act, for the carrying out by such authorities of
development of such land, and for other
A)'yangar J.
matters arising in relation to the acr1uisition
of land in that part shall, except so far as
repealed by this Act, be incorporated with this
part of this Act, subject to the amendments
specified in the second column of the 8th
Schedule of this Act and of the following
provision of this section".
6 & 7 Eliz. 2 Ch. 63 (the Park Lane Improvement
Act, 1958), s. 5 reads:
"The Land Clauses Act (other than the
excepted provision); so far as they are a pplicable for the purposes of this Act and arf' not
inconsistent with the provisions thereof, are
hereby incorporated with this Act."
A comparison of the formulae with the text of
s. 23A shows that the reference in it to s. 19 of tho
Sea Customs Act is merely for rendering notifications
under the named provisions of the Foreign Exchange Regulations Act to operate as notifications
under the Sea Customs Act, and that it cannot have
the effect of incorporating t.he relevant provisions
of the earlier Act into the Act of 194 7, so aA to
attract the rule formulated by Brett, L. J., in Clarke
v. Bradlaugh already quoted.
A close examinat.ion of the decision of the
Privy Council in The Secretary of 8tate for India in
Council v. Hindustan Co-operative Insurance Society
Ltd. (1) would show that the incorporation effected
in the statute there under consideration-the Calcutta Improvement Trust Act, 1911-referred to by
their Lordship as the "Local Act" was in oxpress
terms and in the form illustrated by 54 & 55 Viet.,
Ch. 19, just now referred to. The "Local Act" in
( 11
•
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1931) L.R. 58 I.A. 259.
836
/961
11w Coll"'" of
Cu.slim!, Madras
Y.
NaJhrlla SampaJ\u
ChtltJ
AJJ'""l"" J.
SUPREME COVRT REPORTS
[1962]
dealing with tho acquisition of Land for the purposes designated by it, made provision for the
acquisition under the Land Acquisition Act, and the
pro\·isions of the Land Act Acquisition were subjected to numerous modifications which wero sot out in
tho Schedu]t,, so that in C'fTcct the "Local Act"
was held to be the enactment cf a Special Law
for the acquisition of l:tnd for the sp<•cial purpose. It waR in the context of these and several
otho:· provi~ions which point<'tl to the absorption of certain of the provisions of the Land
A<'quisition Act into the "Local A('t" with \·ital
modifications thnt thPir Lorcl,hips ~tat•'d:
"But their Lordships think that there are
other and perhaps more cogent objcctiLns to
this contention of tho Secretary of State, and
thoir Lordships are not prepared to hold that
the sub-section in que8tion, which was not
enacted till 1!)21, can be n·gardP.cl as incorporated in the Local Act of 191 l. ft was not
part of the Land Arquisition Act \dH'n the
local Act was passed, nor in atlopting the
provisions of the Land Acquisition Act is
there anything to suggest that the Bengal
Legislature intended to bind thl'mscl vcs to
any future additions \~hich might he mado to
that Act. It is at least conceivable that new
provisions might have been aclclrd to the
Land Acquisitic.;n Act which woulrl be wholly
unsuitable to the local coc!P. Nor ag,1in, docs
Act XIX of 1021 contain any provision that
the amendments ena<1tcd by it are to be treated 88 in nny way retrospective, er are to be
regarded as affecting any otlwr enactment
than the Land Acquisition Act itself. Their
Lord.ships regarcl the local Act as doing
nothiJJg more than incurpornting certain
provisions from and existing Act, and for convenience of tlrafting doing so by reference
to thnt Act, in~tcad of setting out for itscl f
at length tho provisiong whicl} it was desired
to ad opt. "
•
3 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
837
It was for thie, among other reasons, that the
Judicial Committee held that rights of appeal
created by amendments effected to the Land
Acquisition Act subsequent to the enactment of
the Local Act were not attracted to the incorporated provisions in the "Local Act". We consider
that there is no analogy between the provisions
held to be incorporated in the Calcutta Improvement Trust Act 1911 dealt with by the Privy
Council and s. 23.A of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act now under discussion. 'Ve hold therefore that when a notification issued under s. 8( 1)
of the Foreign Exchange Regula.ti on Act is deemed
for all purposes to be a notification issued under
s. 19 of the Sea Customs Act, the contravention
of the notification attracts to it each and every
provision of the Sea Customs Act which is in force
at the date of the notification.
The other ground upon which the learned
Judges upheld the responnent's contention that
the rule as to the burden of proof enunciated in
s.178 A was not attracted to the present case was
based on the finding that the Customs Officer who
effected the seizure did not, at the moment of
seizure, entertain a reasonable belief that the
goods seized were smuggled. The learned SolicitorGeneral who contested the correctness of this
finding did not urge that the words in s. l 78A
"in the reasonable belief that they are smuggled
goods" did not prescribe a, condition precedent
to the applicability of that provision whieh had
to be satisfied before the provision could be
invoked against the affected party. As we have
already pointed out, his further submission was that
such a reasonable belief must not onlv be entertained by the seizing officer and besides that the
question whether the officer had done so or not,
was a matter which could objMtively be determined by the adjudicating authority acting under
s. 182. And these submissions he made, as aids
to J:i,iB µi.ail). con tent ion that the burden of proof
1961
The Collector of
Cu.rt911U, MaJrllS
v.
N athella S ampathu
C/,,tty
A.yyangar J.
SUPHE.t'\f.E COURT REPORTS
838
1961
1'ht Coll1ctor of
Cu.stont5, ,v.mas
v•
.'\lathtlla s,mpa1fn4
ChLtt;·
~i:yanear ].
(1962]
imposed was reasonable. We are pointing this
out beoause before the learned Judges of the High
Court the argument apparently advanood was that
the test was tho subjecth·o bolief of tho seizing
officer which could only Le disproved hy tLe esta.Lli~hment cf circumstances in which no such belief
could over honestly or reasonably be entertained
hased on tho refen•nce to "the subjectivity of the
officer" in tlw judgment of th is Court in Babu/al
Amthalal Metlui v.
c.•lcutla (
The
Col/eel-Or
of
Ou.~toms,
It was by approa .. hing the problelll
oven from this very narrow stand point that tho
l('arned ,Judges re11.ched a conclusion on this pa.rt
of the case f1woumhle to the respondent.
1).
For the decision of thi.s point it is necessary
to C•\n vass :he fads which occurred at tho moment
of seizure in some detail. As narrated at the commt•ne<•rnent of this .TudgmPnt, ~andgopal, the
i<ecoml rt>~pondcnt-tht1 employce of the first
n·spondent Wi\8 intercept<•d first Ly the He11.d
Constable <·ft he Madras 8tato Prohibition Intelligeuce DepartmPnt and his clothing wa~ searched
anrl the fo1r gold-hhicks wcif!hing about a thou•aud tolas wcr" seized by the Head Const<tble.
Tlw Prohi.Jition Crirne branch has a Criminal
[m·cstig&tion Dt-partment and the seized gold m\s
handt•d ovor by the Head Constable to the Inspector of Police' Criminal r .. vcstigation DPpartment
on the sam•~ day. It was this Ji1spcctor (C. l{ajamani"kam) that forwardecl thegolcl to tlw Inspector
of Customs (Special Division) with a Iott.er in theso
,
;._1
terms:
"I scrid herewith I ,000 (One thousand)
tolas •Jf gold in 4 (four) blocks seized from
U. Nandgupal, Clerk, ~i/s. Xathclla Samp;itlrn
Chetty, ~[adms, No. l 77, :"\. S. C. Boso
!toad: The passenger came from Bombay
to Madras in ~. Y. Bomhav ~fail on 2Gth
June I 956, at fl A. )!.
has no records
He
' s.c.R. 1110.
•:) [1957;
"-"'"
3 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
839
of any kind for the purchase of gold. Hence
the gold was seized and he was arrested
under a mahazar.
-
The passenger and gold are forwarded
for further action under Customs Act."
It would be seen that up to this point there had
been no seizure by an officer acting under the Sea
Customs Act within s. l 78A of the Act. It has
also to be noticed that Nandgopal had in his possession admittedly no receipt of any kind for the
purchase of the gold ; further he had on him the
letter addressed by the first respondent to Mathuradas Gopalakrishnayya & Co., Bullion merchants,
Bombay intimating that cash to the extent of
rupees one lakh was being sent through the representative, which obviously could not possibly
remain in the possession of Nandgopal if h1s story
about his taking cash to that addressee and the
purchase of the gold from him were true. It was
in these circumstances that the Inspector (SpAcial
Division) Customs House recorded :
"Detained four blocks of gold said to
weigh about 1,000 tolas from Shri Nandgopal, representative of Nathella Sampathu
Chetty & Sons for further investigation''.
There are two views possible of the exact import of
this note by the Customs Inspector : ( 1) that it wa.s a
"detention'' preliminary to a seizure which would
be effected after the further investigation, and
(2) that which found favour with the learned
Judges of the High Court that it was itself the
seizure. In support of the first of the above constructions attention mav be drawn to the fact that
the events narrated·· earlier took place before
8 O'clock in the morning and that immediately thereafter Nandgopal was taken to the Customs House
and was examined there at about 8.30 and in the
course of his examination he made several statements which were obviously incorrect ·and whose
error was capable of being detected then and there.
1961
The Collector of
Custams, .1f adras
v.
l•lathdla ,·ampa!hu
Chetty
A):vangnr ].
840
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1962]
1961
Th Colltcf()f of
Cuslams, Mad1a3
v,
: · athtlla Scvnpatliu
Ch,t/Y
A.1.)"1'z_~ar
].
(I) Ho stated that the golrl had bePn bought from
)1/~. ~fathnra<las Gop.alakrishnayya & Co. h:iving
pai'l th'.·m the Hum of rupees mw lakh which was
refrrred to in the letter seized from him, but
obYiously if the gol<I had been purchased from
that firm the lettnr could not remain with :N'andgopal and this <li~<'repancy he was unablt> to explain at that stage, for he said "I <'annot account
for the presence of this letter on me which sh"uld
ha\'O been given to the firm in Bombay". (2)
~andgopa.l who spok<' to having recein-d gold
and th,.n sreretcrl it. in the inner side pockets of
his waist coat and stitched it statc<I, th•1t the gold
was rnoosa gold and it was found tlrn.t the gold
seized from him was not that ,-ariety. It is really
a.ftN this statem .. nt was record"d at tho Custo1t1s
House that the "iuvcstigati"n" began. It is therefore possible to take the view that tho detention
resulted in a seizure after tho statement was
recorded. There was ample material at that
stage on the basis of which it could be said that
a reasonable bcli('f could ht> entertainl'd that the
golcl seized was Rmugglcd.
Evon taking the record of the detention in
the mahazar prepared at the Ccntrnl station as
"thP seizure" we do not agrel' with the learned
.Judges of the Hi~h C.rnrt th:•t the seizing-oflkl·r
could not entertain a wasonablt' belief that the
gold sl·ized was smuggled. The rl'asonableness of
the belief has to be judged by :di the circumstances
app<'aring at that monH·nt. In the presl'nt case,
tho quantity of gold in the possession of Nandgopal-of the valun of over one lakh of rupeeswas certainly a Vl'l'Y relevant factor to be taken
into account an<l which could be considered in
judging thti matter. No doub.t, such a qu~ntity
could bo the subject of booo fide purchase m the
course of normal trade, particularly whPn the
pernon in possession was. the repreSi•Dta.tive of a.
·::ell-known firm of hulhon <lealors.
But ono
. •
•
3 S.C.R.
-- ...
•
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
8~1
would also normally expect that the representative would have secured a bill or voucher to evidence the purchase. In other words: (I) it was not
a case of a fow trinkets of gold or small quantity
purchased for domestic or personal use but a considerable amount for purposes of business, (2) the
undelivered letter addressed to M/s. Mathuradas
Gopalakrishnayya and Co., which admittedly had
a bearing upon the purchase of gold in the possession ofNandgopal necessarily drew an amount of
suspicion on the theory of a bona fide purchase.
These circumstances, in our opinion, which were
admittedly present at the moment when the gold
was taken bv the Customs Officer at the Central
Station did tend to raise a reasonable suspicion that
the gold seized had been obtained illicitly and this
was sufficient to constitL1te, in the words of the
statute, "a reasonable belief that the goods (gold)
\Vere smuggled".
-
'
We are therefore of opinion (I} that s.l78A
was constitutionally valid, (2) that the rule as to
the burden of pro~f enacted by that section applies
to a contravention of a notification under s. 8(1) of
the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, ID4 7, by
virtue of its bein-; deemed to lie a contravention
of a notification under s. 19 of the Sea Customs
Act, ( 3) that the preliminary requirement of s. I 78A
that the officer seizing should entertain "a reasonable belief that the goods seized were smuggled"
was satisfied in the present case. The result therefore is that the petitions under Art. 226 of the
Constitution filed by the respondent before the
High Court should have been dismissed. We
accordingly allow appeals 408 and 409 with costs
throughout (one set of hearing fees), the writ
petitions filed by the respondent being directed
to be dismissed. Iu view of our decision in appeals
408 and 409, the points raised by the respondent
in appeal 410 of 19o0 do not require to be decided.
That appeal fails and is dismissed. There will
however, be no order as to costs.
1961
The f",,'olleclor of
Customs, Jfadras
v.
J.la 1hella Sampath1'
Chetty
A_Y)'' nr.;ar ].
842
111!1
Tiu Colltclor of
Cwtoms, M.adrtu
v.
N .ih.lla Sampalhu
Cllltty
AJ7an1ar ].
SUPREME OOURT REPORTS
[1962]
Criminal Appoals No. 33 of 1959, No. 126 of
1959, No. 123 of 1959, Civil Appeal No. 5ll of
1960 and Writ Petition No. ll8 of 1958 were not
heard on the merits and wo havo not oxamined
the_f~cta of any of those cases. Those appeals and
petitions should, therofore, be posted for hearing
in the usual oourse.
Appeals ooa. 408 ond 40~ alloww.
.
Appeal 110. 410 dism1'.ssed.
HMI
RAKAL PAPERS (P) LTD., AND OTHERS
S1Jltmber 25.
v.
THE UNIOX OF INDIA
(B. P. SINHA, c. J., A.K. SARKAR, K.C.DASGUPTA,
N. RA.JAGOPAJ,A AYYA:<'OAR and J. R. MunHOLKAH,
JJ.)
Fundatnmtal Right-Fretdom of •puch-Statut. rti}ulating
number of pag'8 in ntw•paper according to price charg<dGo1...titutio114lity of-N•w•paper (I'ri" and /'a~e) Act, 1956
(46 of 1966)-Daily New•paper (Priu and Page) Ord'", 1960Co .... tittition of India, Art. 19 (1) (a).
•
The Newspaper (Price and Page) Act, 1956, empowered
the Central Government to regulate the prices of newspapers
in relation to their pagec; and sizes and to regulate the allocation of space for advertising matter. u~der this Act the
Central Government marle the Daily Ncw,papers (Price and
Page) Order, 1960, thereby fixing the maximum number of
pages that might be published by a newspaper according to
the price charged and prescribing the number of >upplements
that could be issued. The petitioner challenged the Act and
the order as contravening Art. 1q (1) (a) of the Constitution.
1/i/4, that the Act and the Order were void as they
violated Art I 9(1) (a) of the Constitution and v.ere not saved
by Art. 19(2). The freedom of speech and expression guaranteed by Art. 19(1) (a) included the freedom of the prm. For
propagating his ideas a citiz~n had the right to publish them,
to di.5$emlnate them and to circulate them, either by word of
mouth or by writing. The right extended not merely to the
matter which he was entitled to circulate but also to the
• .....,_
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