RAGHUBAR DAYAL JAI PRAKASH versus THE UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS
Supreme Court of India | Decided 12 September 1961 | [1962] 3 S.C.R. 547 | 1961 INSC 260
Key facts
- Decided
- 12 September 1961
- Bench
- P.B. GAJENDRAGADKAR*, A.K. SARKAR, K.N. WANCHOO, K.C. DAS GUPTA, N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR
- Bench size
- 5
- Case number
- WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) No. 22/1959
- Disposal
- Dismissed
- Citation
- [1962] 3 S.C.R. 547
- Neutral citation
- 1961 INSC 260
Text of the judgment
3 S.C.R.
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SUPREME OOURT REPORTS
547
RAGHUBAR DAYAL JAI PRAKASH
1'.
THE UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS
(P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, A. K. SARKAR,
K. N. WANOHOO, K. C. DAs GUPTA and
N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR, JJ.)
Forward Contracts-Law to regulate such contracta-Ruognition of G!&Ociations-Constitutional validity of enactm~nt
Forward Contract• (Regulation) Act, 1952 (74 of 1952), sa.2(j),
5, 6, 10, 15, 16, 17, 20, 2I(e) & (f)-Con,,titution of India, Arl1
14, 19(1)(!), 19(1)(g), 19(5), 19(6).
Tradt"rs like the petitioner combined to,gether to form an
association the objects of \Vhich were to regulate forward
transactions in the sale and purchase of gur and other commo-~ dities entered into between the n1embers -of the association, as
also to declare the rates at which the contracts vvere to be
settled on the dates fixed for delivery. The petitioner had
entered into forward contracts of purchase . of gur at certain
rates and had also deposited as the buyer the amount as well a1
the special margin required to be deposited under the bye-laws
of the association. Contracts entered into by him were outstand·
ing on February 11, 1959, when on that date the Central
Government isliued a notification under s.15 of the Forward
Contracts (Regulation) Act, 1952, under which every forward
contract for the sale of purchase of any goods specified in the
~ notification which vvas entered into in the area specified therein
otherwi5c than betv\.'een members of a recognised association
or through or with any such member, shall be illegal. The
association in question of which the petitioner was a me111ber,
was not on the date of the notification dated February 11, 1959
recoKnised by the Central Governn1ent under s. 6 of the ~A.ct, as
a result of which the forwar.::1 contracts entered into by him
'
became illrgal and void. The further consequence of the
.).- notification was that under s. 16 the transactions entered into
by the petitionrr and others situated similarly like him which
remained to be performed after the said date were to be
deemed to be clo~ed out on that date and the differences arising
out of the contract \\'ere to be payable not at the rate originally
stipulated by the contracting parties but at the rates specified
in the notification. The petitioner challenged the validity of
the provi•ions of the Act on the grounds inter alia (I) that
ss. 5 and 6 relating to the recognition of associations by the
) Central Government and s. l 0 which enabled it to direct rules
to be made and, in case the recognised as~ociation failed to
\;\ke li\Ction, to them•clve• make the rules, infringed the frecdolll
1961
Stptembar 12.
548
1961
Ra~huhar Daynl
Jai Prakash
v.
Thi l:'niori of India
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
'
[1962]
guaranteed by Art. 19(1)(c) of the Constitution of India,
(2) thats. 15 infringed Arts. 14, 19(1)(f) and 19(l)(g), and
(3) that s.16 in so far as it enabled the Government to fix the
ratr:; at which thr. differences payable by or.e party to the other,
without giving any indication of the principles underlying the
fixation of the price, conferred an unguided power and offended
Art. 14.
Held: (I) that ss. 5, 6 and 10 and other provisions in
Ch. III of the Forwards Contracts (Regulation) Act, 1%2,
f'
proceeded on the basis that or_ganisations of tradesmen might
be ~ntrusted with the task of regulating these tran'.liactions, so
that while legitimate trade might be furthered the evil consequence< of undesirable speculation might be a\·oided, and they
were enacted with the object of ensuring effective control over
the mechanism of forward trading. 1\ccordingly, thi: provisions
in Ch. III of the Act do not contravene Art. 19(1)'.r) of the
Constitution.
....
(2) that on a proper comtruction of s.15 the recognition
of an association under the provisions of the Act \vas not an
e!~ential pre.requisite before a notification could be issued under
the section, and that the issue of such a notification \\·as not
an unreasonable restriction on the right of the petitioners to
carry on business within the meaning of Art. I9(G) of the
Con~tinttion of In<lia.
(3) that the selection of the commodity for the regulation of forward trading in it or of prohibition of <uch trading
could only be left to the Government and the purposes for
\\·hich the pow("r 'vas to be used and the machinery created for
the investigation furnished sufficient guidance; consequently,
s.15 did not confer an unguided anci arbitrary po,,·er and did
not infringe Art. 14.
(4) that the rc<trictions impo<ed by s.15 of the Act were
reasonable within Art. 19(5) and (6) and did not contravene
Art. 19(1)(£) and (g).
(5) that s.16 of the Act could noL be challenged as
eith("r a piece of exccssh·e delegation or offended Art. 14.
0HJGIXAL .TvRTSDICTIOX : Petitions Nos.
22
to '.!G and 42 of Ul50 ..
Petitions under Art. 32 of the Con~titution of
Inrli<i for the enforcement of fun<lamentnl rights.
Jf. K. Nmnbza.r, E. Udnyamthnmn, Rwnesh1cm
Nath and S. S. Slmk/11, for the petitioners (In
Petn. ~Oil. 22 and 23 of 50).
S. C. Chatterjee, R. C. G11pta, E. Udr,yurathnmn
ancl S. S. Sh1tkfo, for the pctitionerB (In Petn.
Nos. 24 and 25 of 50).
R. Udayamthna.m and S. S. Sh1ikla, for the
petitioners (In Pctn. No. 26 of 50).
(
3 S.C.R.
549
S. T. Desai and S. S. Sh,uklc!, for the peti1§61
tioners (In Petn. No. 42 of 59).
Ra,ghubar DaJ'lrl
G. ]{, Daphtary, Solicitor-General of I ndili,
Jai Prakash
v,
B. Sen, R. H. Dhebar and T . .irl. Sen, for the ·The Union
of lniia
respondent No. 1 (In all the petitions).
B. P. Jffa}ieshwari, for respondent No. 2 (In
Petn. Nos. 22 and 25 of 1959) .
•G. C. "lfothur, for respondent No. 2 (In
Pet11 Nos. 26 and 42of1959).
R. L. Agwwala and P. G. Agarwala, for the
Intervcners.
1961. September 12. The Judgment of the
Court was delivered by
Ayyangar ].
AYYANGAR, J.-These
six petitions filed
under Art. 32 of the Constitution raise for
consideration three points: ( l) the constitutional
validity of the operative provisions of the Forward
Contracts (Regulation) Act (Act LXXIV of 1952) (to
be referred to hereafter as the Act), (2) the validity
of a notification dated February 11, 1959, issued
under s. 15 of the Act by which gur was brought
within the purview of the enactment with
immediate el'tect, and (3) the validity of another
notification of the Central Government issued
simultaneously fi:idng the price at which Forward
Contracts subsisting on February 11, 1959, was
directed to be settled. For the purpose of understanding the points raised and the effect of the impugned
notifications on the rights of the petitioners it
is sufficient to refer to the facts of Petition No. 23
). of 1959 which is typical of the eases before us.
The petitioner-Raghubar Dayal Jai Prakash
is a firm carrying on the business of purchase and
sale of gur and other. commodities inter alia at
l\Ieerut. Traders like the petitioner had combined
togNher to form a company regi8tered under the
Indian Companies Act under the name 'Kaisergunj
Beopar Co. (P) Ltd'., Meerut. The function of this
\ incorporated b~dy ~vas, inter alia, to regulate
- forward transact10ns m the sale and purchase of gur
and other commodities entered into between the
members of the Society, as also to dec]<J,re the rates
at which the contracts were to be settled on the
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1161
Rathubm Dnyai
Jai Pr•ka.Jh
V.
Tiu UniMi of India
A)yan.~a1 ].
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1962]
dates fixed for deliverv.
This incorporated f"
company has Leen impleadccl as a second
respondent to the petition. This association or
company, howe\'er, was not, on the date of the
impugned notification, "recognised"' by the Central
Government under the provisions of the Act to
which we shall presently ad\'ert., in respect of
de·dings in gur with which alone· thcso petitions arc
oo!lccrned. The petitioner had entered into forward
contracts of purchase of gur at crrtain rates and
he had also deposited n.s the Luyor the amount as
well as the specin.I margin required to be deposited
under the Lyo-laws of this association. Contracts
entered into by him wJ.iC'h were <'ntatanding on
February II, 1959. were in rcln.tion to 29,600
maunds. While so, Government published a
notification under e. I ii of the Act on February 11,
1959, applying th" provisionR of that section to gur
118 a result of which the
forward contracts entered
into in gur by the petitioner became illegal and
void.
The further l\'gal consequence o! the
notification was that tho transactions entered into
by the petitioner and othern situated similarly like
him were to be docmcd to be elost'd out on
February I I, I 95!l-tho dato of tho notification
and tho differences arising out of the contract woro
to be payable not at tho rat(\ origi1mlly stipulated
by tho contracting parties but at the rates specified
in tho notification. If the petitionn had to settle
hia outstanding contracts at the rnte determined bv
the Contra! Government ho would suffer a loss
Re. 48,000. Ho therefore challen11es in this petition
the validity of the provisions of the Act which enabled the notifications to be issued as also tho
notifications themselves on ground• to th<l detail• of
which we shall advert later.
Before setting out thcso details, it would be
eonvenient and tend to tho proµor appreciation of I
the problems im·olverl, if we briefly indicate the ·
economic implications of forward trading in
commodities, the nood for tho regulatio11 of such
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551
irt.ding; as well as the history of the measures
it.ken from time to time to exercise control on
forward trading in gur prior to the issue of the
impugned notifications in Febru!lry 19.39.
The expert committee to which the Bill which
beet.me· the Act (Act 74 of 1952) was referred,
explained in their report the function of forward
tr&ding in these terms:
"Forwa.rd trading involves specula.tion
&bout the future, but not all forms of forward
trading could be considered as either unnecesEary or undesirable for the efficient functioning
of anything but the most primitive economy ...
............ To the extent to which forward trading enableg producer•, manufacturers and
traders to protect themselveR against the
uncertainties of the future, and enables all th~
relevant f'tctors, whether actual or anticipated,
local or international, to exercise their due
influence on prices, it confers a. definite boon
on the community, because, to that extent, it
minimises the riFks of production and distribution and makes for greater stability of prices
and supplies. It thus plays a useful role in
modern business. At the same time, it must
be admitted that this is an activity in which a
great many individuals with small means and
inadequate knowledge of the market often
participate, in the hope of quick or easy gains
t.nd consequently, forward trading often
assumes unhealthy dimensions,
thereby
increasing, instead of minimising, the risks of
business. There are forms of forward trading
for example,
options, which facilitate
participation by persons with small mean• and
inadequate knowledge ............ It is, therefore,
necessary to eliminate certain forms of
forward trading, and permit others under
carefully regulated conditions, in o.rder to
ensure that, while producers, manufactwrera
1H1
Ra_;huhar Dayal
]tJi l'rak.ash
v.
The Union:oJ India
AyJ""l" ].
552
J9{jJ
Ra1luJJar Dayal
Joi Pralc4.Jh
v.
Tiu Union of l ntlia
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1962]
and traders will ha.,•c the facilities they need
for the sa.tisfaetory condud of their business
the wider intcreRts of t.hc community, and
particularly, the interests of consumers, will
be adequately safeguarded against any abuse
of such facilities by 'Jthers.
The Essential Supplios (Temporary
Powers) Act, I !J-Hl, docs not. empower the
Central Govcmmcnt to regulate forward trading in any commodity other than an 'essential
commodity' within the meaning of that Act.
Action may be needed not only for prohibiting
forward trading in commodities in which it is
still taking place, but also for reopening forward trading under regulated conditions and if
circumstances are favourable to such a course,
in commodities in which it is now prohibited.
The arrangements must be such as will
enable speedy and effective action to ho taken
in emergencies, and mnst at the same timo
provide sufficient sa.foguards against arbitrary
or ill-informed action."
It 1vas with these objects and with provisions
calculated to carry out these suggostions that tho
Act was enacted. And now a short resume of the
history of tho provisions relating to forwa.rd trading
in gur which preceded the impugnecl notifications:
After the end of the war, a ban on forward
tradinµ in gur was imposed by the Sugar & Cur
(Future Trading) Prohibition Order, Hl51, issued
under the E8Scntial Supplies (Temporary Powers)
Act, 1!)46. This ban was however removed by a
notification dated January i, l!J;>4. The Forward
Contracts (Regulation) Act, Hlii2, was nut applied
to gur with the result that from January, 1951, all
c011tracts in relation to gur remained free and outside the regulatory provisions of the Act. The Forward Markets Cmnmission took up the consideration
of the question regarding the advisability of imposing regulations on forward trading in this
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commodity. The Commission considered, first, the
question whether gur wa~ a suitable commodity for
forward trading and whether there was a.ny need of
bringing forward trading, which was still then free
in that commodity, within the regulatory provisions
of the Act. 'l heir conclusion was that gur was a
commodity in respect of which the production was
large enough for not being cornered by any group
of traders; and that the forces of supply and
demand in respect of the commodity were uncertain
ao as to require a continuous assessment of their
changing relationships through the medium of a
futures market. They also were of the opinion that
the fluctuations in the price of gur were wide
enough to a.ttract speculators and to ensure holders
of ready stocks against risks arising from the
fluctuations consequent upon speculation it was
necessary to bring trade in the commodity within
the scope of the Act. In these circumstances by
their report which was submitted to the Government
in May, 1957, they recommended (l} that Government might accord recognition to certa.in associations after the necessary formalities had been
completed, and ( i) to issue simultaneously a
notification under s. 15 of the Act illegalising forward trading in the commodity except through the
associations or through the mem hers of such
associations, as set out in ·S. 15 of the Act. The
Government however by their resolution dated
January 17, 1958, recorded:
"The main recommendations of the
Commission arc that the regulatory provisions
of the Forward Contracts (Regulation) Act,
1952, be applied to gur and that forward trading be conducted through associatione to be
recognized under the said Act.
The Government ofTndia have carefullv
considered the recommendations made by the
Commission .and have come to the conclusion
that there is. no strong justification .or special
1961
RaghubiJ.r ·v11yal
Jai Prakash
·'·
The Union of India
Ayyangar J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1161
Ra1_J.uha1 DtJ;al
Jai fraktJJh
••
Tlw Union •f India
Ay;·cniar ].
[1962)
need for the time bcin!( to bring gur under the
purview of the Forward Contracta (Regulation)
Act, 19.52."
Subsequently however by a notifiPation daud
February I 1, I !l5fl, the C<·ntral Governm~nt
declared that s. 15 of the Act shall apply to the
whole of the territories to which the Act exte1:ds.
The circumstances which led to this thange in the
view of Government is thus expressed in !!8. l 05 to
l 97 of the Annual Report of the Forward l\farkets
Commission for the year W59. ft is there statod:
") 95. The Commission in its Report on
the Recognition of Associations in respect of
Forward Contracts in Gur submitted in llfay
1957 had recommended that Gur be brought
under the regu!at0ry provisions of the Forward Contract3 (Regulation} Act, W52, and
that recognised futures markets be established
at Hapur, Meerut, Agra, Muzalfarnagar and
Delhi for the purpose. The Government of
India, however, ?ecidcd not to bring gur
under the purvicw of the Forward Contracts
(Regulation) Act, Hl52 for the time being, a1
a result, forward trading in gur, continued to
be unregulated. The prico situation in gur
markets at the end of 1958, however, took a
very serious turn on account of hectic speculative activity in these markets. For example,
the gur prices, at Ha.pur, rose during tho three
months from the middle of November to the
middle of February 1959, by 37 per cent as
oompe.rcd to the rise of 0.15 per cent in sugar
- & controlled commodity-and 1.5 per cent in
khe.ndsari, forward trading in which had been
br.nncd.
196. These developments neoeasitatcd a
reconsideration ol tho earlier decision to keep
the commodity out of tho purview of the Act
and tho Government of India, on the advice
of the Commission, applied aection 15 of tho
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Forward Contracts (Regulation) Act, 195.2, to
gur, all over the country on the 11th Feb1uary
l!J59.
197. The application of section 15 of the
Aot also necessitated fixation of the rate under
section 16 at which all forward contracts outstanding as on that day, could be closed out.
The Government of India, after taking into
account all the relevant factors closed the out'1tanding contracts at the average of the closing rates during the preceding three months."
The notifications which brought this about read:
"In exercise of the powers conferred by
cl&use (a) of section 16 of the said Act the
average of the closing rates prevailing in the
respective forward markets during the period
of thrco months immediately preceding the
date of this notification, as the rate at which
any forward contract for the sale or purchase
of gur entered into on or before the said date
and remaining to be performed after the said
date shall be deemed to be closed."
No associations had been granted recognition before
the date of this notification dated February 11,
1959, but on the same date another notification was
itsued by the Govern~ent reading:
"They have al8o decided that regulated
futures markets in respect of gur should be
established in due course &t Hapur, Meerut,
Agra, Muzzafarnagar and Delhi, ·and that
recognition should be granted under section 6
of the s11id Act.................. "
In accordance with what was stated here exi8ting
associations in the places mentioned were irooorded
recognition after an enquiry as to whether 'they
conformed to the requirements of the Act. Likewise other associations which were formed subsequently were also recognised after similar enquiries.
The petitivners before us are members of these
1961
Raghubar Dayal
J ai Pr al.ash
v.
The Union of lndi~
-
Ayyanza.r J.
556
SUPREJl.lE C0URT REPORTS
(1962)
associations- those in Petitions 22, 23 and 25 b<·ing
mcmhern
rcspt•ctively of tho three asHO<:iations
Rag~~·;no.>:nl
Jai PraJ.:41.Ji
named in the notification extrn<-tcd above and the
v.
TM li1:W11 of Indio pctiti"m·rs in Pctitio11s 24, 26 am! 42 of <1,suciations
subsequently brought into cxi,tene"· The formaAJ_J,;,;g;,7 J.
lities preceding the recognition, however, took some
little time and recognition to all thc8C associations
wa.s granted iu June 105\l or then·abouts.
In oder to appreciate the submissions made
to us, it is necessary tu set out briefly tho provi. sions of tho Act whose validity is challcngod. Tho
preamble to tho Act reads that it is an Act to provide for tho n•gulation of certain mattPrS relating
to forward contracts, the prohibition of options in
goods and for other matters connected therewith.
\Ve are not now concerned with the second part
of the objeoti,·c, viz., the prohibition of options in
goods, but only with those provisions which deal
with the regulation of matters relating to forward
contracts. Section 2 which contains the statutory
definitions defines "an association" as "a body of
individuals, whothPr ineorported or' not, constituted
for tho purpose of regulating and controlling tho
busiw,ss of tho sale or purchase of any goods"
while sub-cl. (j) defines "<1 rocognised association"
as meaning "an association which is for tho time
being recognised by the Central Government under s. ()". Chapter II is entitled "The Forward
Marketa Oo=ission" and makes provision, in
tho two sections which constitut-0 the Chapter, first
for the establishment and constitution of a Forward
Markets Commission which iti a body of independent exports (s. 3), the other (s. 4) detailing tho
functions of tho Commission which include the
ta.ak of "advising tho Central .Government in respect of the .recognition -0f 8ll8ociations", And "in
respect of any other matter arising out of the admini~tration of tho Act", "to keep forward markets
under observ<1tion" and inform Government of developments taking place .in it and finally t-0 make
rccvmmcndations with a view to improving ·the
organisation and working of forward markets.
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Chnpter III which is headed "Recognised asso<'iations" contains some of the sections which validity was challenged in th·e petitions before us. Bafore an association could be recognised, s. 5 requires
the body to make an application to the Central Government furnishing the details and partiCulars
~pecified in s. 5(2). The Government might make
such enquiry as might be necessary and after obtaining such further information as may be required were empowered to grant recognition to associations under s.6 and such recognition was to specify tho goods or classes of goods with respect to
which forward contracts may be entered into between members of such associations or through or
with any such member. Section 6(2) contaimi conditions which ought to be complied with by associations before recognition was granted amd 'provision was made in s. 6(3) for the rules of the associ·
ation not being amended except with the approval
of the Central Government. Complementary to this
was the provision contained in s. 10 which empowers the Central Government to direct rules to be
made, with power in case the recognised association
fails to take action to comply with the order of the
Government, to themselves make the rules in the
forms specified by that order. The recognition
had to be published in the· Gazette of India and
in the r,fficial G:ozette of the State in which the
principal office of the association is situated s.G (4).
Sections 6 and 10 were the principal subject of attack among tho fasciculus of sections relating to
"recognised associations" in Ch. III, but we shall
revert to the grounds of att,-ick after setting out
the other provisions of the Act whose validity
was also the subject of challenge. They were
ss.15 ·~nd 16 under which the notifications now impu·
gned were made. They run in these terms :
"15. Forward contract8 in noti-Jied goods
illegal or mid .in certain circumstances.
( 1) The Centra:l GovernmQnt may, by
notification in the Official Gazette declare
IJ61
R• ~hubar D{zy4f
Jai Prakash
v. .
Thl Unior1 ~!India
A_YyaltgaT J.
658
Jiil
Ratf.uhar Dt1yal
J gi Pralca.slt
v.
T_Ju Union of bub'a
.4yy~«r ~'.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
this section to apply to such goods or claM
of goods and in such areas as may be speci.
lied in the notification, and thereupon,
subject to the provisions contained in section
18, every forward contract, for the sale or
purchase of any goods specified in the notificl\.
tion which is entered into the area specified
therein otherwise than between mem-bers of
a recognised association or through or with
e.ny such member, shall be illegal.
(2) Any forward contract in goods entered into pursuance of sub.section (I) which
is in contrnvention of any of the bye.Jaws
specified in this behalf under clause (a) of
111b-section (3) of section II shall be void:( i) &8 respects the rights of any
member of the recogniser! association
who has entered into such contract in
contravention of :my such bye-law, and
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(ii) && reBpcct1 the rights of any
other person who has knowingly participated in the transaction entailing such
contravention.
*
(3) NQthing.in sub-section (2) shall affect
the right of any pors•m other th1m a mcm bt'r
of a. recognised association to enforce any
euch contract or to recovl•r any sum uncfor or
in respect of such contract :
Provided that such person hid no knowledge that 1uch transaction was in contravention of any of the bye-laws specified undn
cl&use (a) or Hub-section (3) of section I I.
(4') No member of a r1>cogniscd nss~cia.
tion ghall, in respect or any goods specified
in the notification under sub-section (!),
enter into any contract on his own account
with any perscn other than a member of the
recogniwed association, unless he had secured
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1961
l
the consent or authority of such person arid
discloses in the note, memorandum or agreement of sale or purchase that he has bought
or sold the goods, as the case may be, in his
own acceunt :
Provided that where the member has
secured the consent or authority of such person
otherwise than in writing he shall secure n
written confirmation by such person of such
consent or authority within three days from
the date of such contract :
Provided further thflt in respect of ~ny
outstanding contract entered into by a
member with a person other than a member
of the recognised association. no consent or
authority of such person shall be necessary
for closing out in accordance with the bye.
laws the outstanding contract, if the member
discloses in the note, memorandum or agreement of sale or purchase in respect of such
closing out that he has bought or sold the
goods, as the case may be, on his own account.
16. Consequences of not!fication under
3ection 15.-Where a notification has been
issued under section 15, then notwithstanding
anything contained in any other law for the
time being in force or in any custom, usage
or practice of the trade or the terms of any
contract or the bye-laws of any association
concerned relating to any contract(a) every forward contract for the
sale or purchase of any goods specified
in the notification, entered into before
the date of the notification and remaining to be performed after the mid date
· and which is not in conformity with the
provisions of section 15, shall be deemed
to be closed out at such rate as the
· Central Government may fix in this
Raghubar Dayal
Jai Prakash
v.
The Union of Indi•
Ayyangar ].
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,~
560
SUPRE\TE COURT REPORTS
[1962)
behalf; and different rates may ·be fixed
for different classes of such contracts ;
lf.a~h.ubar Dayal ·
Jai Prakash
(b)
differences 'arising. out of
v.
.
any
contract
so deemed· to be closed
Tht linion of~~~~'!____ .
out
shall
be
payable on the basis of
.{vyangar J. -'.
the rate fixed nnder clause (a) and the ,
seller
shall not l:ie bound to give and
-----tho buyer shall not be · bound to take
delivery of the goods."
· In cases where mere regulation of the trade
was not considered sufficient Government were
empowered to prohibit for\vard trading and s. 17
of ;the Act enacted.
.. - . "17. Power to prohibit forward contracts in
certain cases.-( 1) The Central Government may,
by· notification in the Official Gazette, declare
that no person shall, save with the permission
of thci Central Government, enter into any.
forward contract for the sale or purchase of
any goods . or class of goods specified in the
notificatfon.and to which the provisions of
section· 15 have not .been wade applicable,
expect' to the extent and in tho manner, if
'·
any, as may be specified in the notification.
(2) All forward contracts in contravaticn
of tho provisions of sub-section (1) entered
into after .the date of. publication of the
notification thereunder shall be illegaL
(3) 'Where a notification has been issued
_under sub-section (1), the provisions of section
16 shall, in the absence of anything to the
contrary in the notification, apply to all
forward contracts for the Bale or purchase
of any goods specified· in the notification
entered into before the date of the notification· and remaining to be performed after
the said. date as they apply ·to all forward
contracts for the sale or purchase of any
goods specified : in the notification under
section 15."
1961
\
..
all
!
l
.I
!
I
l
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•
3 S.C.R.
'
)
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-
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
561
There a.re two more sections to which reference
they are s. 20-which
might be made and
imposes penalties for contravention of certain pro·
visions of Ch. IV-ands. 2l(e) & (f) which run in
these terms :
"21. Penalty for owning or keeping
place used for entering into forward contract•
in goods.-Any person who
(e) not being a member of recognised
association or his agent authorised as
such under the rules or bye-laws of such
associa.tion; canvasses, advertises or touts
in any manner, either for himself or on
behalf of any other person, for auy business connected with forward contractil
in contravention of any of the provision•
of this Act, or
(f) joins, gathers, or assists in gathering at any place, other than the place
of business specified in the bye-laws of
a recognised asaociation, any pernon or
persons for making hidH or offers or for
entering into or making or performing,
whether wholly or in part, any forward
contracts in contravention of any of the
provisions of this Act, or".
It would be noticed that the two latter are
intended to carry out tho object nnrt purposes of
the Act and make effective the powers vested under
the other provisions to which refrrence has bet·n
made.
We shall now proeeed to consider the ground8
of attack upon each of these provisions and
examine the correctness of the contentions urged
by learned Counsel :
Section.• 5, 6 and 10 :
It wa8 urged by Mr. Nambiar, and in this he was
supported by the other learned Counsel appearing
11~1
-
Rathu.iar Dt'.l't1.1
Jai Praka.·h
v.
The Union o} !11dia
562
1961
Raghuimr J)aJ"Gl
Jai p,aJ:.,uh
v.
Tht CJnio11 of India
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(196~]
in' the case, particularly by llfr. ·- S. T. Desai, '
that these sections infringod the freedom guaranteed by sub· cl. ( c) of cl. (1) of Art. 19 of the Constitution. Sub-clauso (c) of cl. (1) of Art. 19 runs
in these terms :
"!!). (I) All citizens shall have the
rights-
.............................. ............................ .
. .
(c) to form associations or unions;"
The freedom, however, is subject to tho provisions
of cl. ( 4) of Art. 19 reading :
"19. (4). Nothing in sub.clause (c) of
the said ela.uso shall affect the operation of -'.;
any existing law in so far as it imposes, or
prevent the State from making any law
imposing, in the interests of public order or
morality, reasonahlo restrictions on tho
exercise of the right conferred by the said
sub·clause."
Briefly stated, the argument regarding these
pro\·isions infringing the freedom to "form associ·
ations" was as follows: Tho Constitution gull.ran- •
toes to ey!'ry citizen the right to form an
association. The only limitation which might
legally be imposed on this right to form an
usociation is that set out in cl. (4) of Art. 19, viz.,
bye-laws which phce restrictions based on public
order or morality. \Vhere the object of the
:issociation is lawful, the citizen, through that "as.q"ciation, anrl the association itself are entitled,
by virtue of the guarantocd right, to freedom from
legi~lative interference in tho achievement of its
object except on grounds germane to public order
or morality. In other words, the freedom
guaranteed should be read aa extending not meroly
to tho formation of the association as such, but to
the effective functioning of the association so as
to enable it to achieve its lawful objects. Unless
eub·cl. (cl of cl. (1) of Art. 19 were so read the
t
-
-
3 S.C.R. SUPREi\fE COURT REPORTS
freedom guaranteed would be illusory and the
.Court should, in construing a freedom guaranteed
to the citizen, so read it, as to give him an effective
right which could be used for the purpose for
which the Constitution.framers intended. The
fort.her submission, which was in the nature of a
corollary from tho above was that the freedom
gm1ranteed by sub-cl. (c} of cl. (1) of Art. 19
carried with it a right in the association
to determine its internal arrangements in
the matter of selecting the personnel who shall
manage it, the framing of the bye-laws and regulations which shall govern the relationship between
the association and its members as also between
its members without any interference by the State
unless the law providing for such interference were
grounded on morality or public order. In effect
the submission was that the right guaranteed under
sub-cl. (c) of cl. (1) of Art. 19 was not merely, as
its text would indicate, the right to form an
association but would incfode the functioning of
the association without any restraints not _dictated
by the need for preserving order or the interests
of morality. On these premises it was urged that
while the Constitution had guaranteed the freedom
to form an association-including inter alia one
for fostering or regulating forward trading, still
the Central Government had taken upon themselves the right to determine the rules and byelaws under which the association could function
and had, by the provisions in Ch. III of the Act,
in every way interfered in the matter of internal
ma.nagement 1md it was urged that this was
violative of the right guaranteed by sub-cl. (o} of
cl. ( 1) of Art. 19 since the restrictions in Ch. III
_of the Act could not be held to have been dictated
on grounds of public order or morality.
-
-·
~
We consider this argument iH without force .
.In the first place, the restriction imposed by s. 6
of the Act is for the purpose of recognition and no
19~1
Raghubar Day(ll
Jai Prakarh
v.
The Union of India
Ay;•an:•r J.
•
__
564-
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1962]
association is compelled to apply to the Govern· ~
ment for recognitivn ~mder that Act. An applicat~on for "t1w reCOg!J.ition of the· association for the
v.
The Union of India purpose of functioning imdeF the enactment is a,
voluntary act on the part of the association and
A;v)'angar J.
if the. statute imposes conditions suoject to which
alone rcicognition could be accorded or continued,
it is a little difficult to see how the freedom to -{
form the association is affected unless, of course,
that freedom implies or involves a guaranteed
right to recognition afao, Could _it be contended
that there iR a right in the a~sociation guaranteed
by the Constitution to obtain recognition? It
was not disputed before us -that forward trading
might sobrntimes assume undesirable forms and
b.ecome akin to gambling which might have
deleterious consequences on lawful trade and on
the general public by caus"ing violent fluctuations
in prices. It would folfow that the control of
forwar<!- tradfog is a legitimate subject of legislative interforcnce and regulati.on And we might
add 1hat this "'a,s not disputed .before us. The
manner in which this regulation is effected and
•
the machinery employed for achieving it are r::
matters of legislll.tive policy which could be determined 011ly by taking in to account tlre organisation
of the market, the manner of trading ana other
relevant factors. The impugned enactment in
its Ch. III proceeds on the basis that organisations
of tradesmen might be entrusted with the task of .
regulating tbese transactions, so that while legiti- -4'
mate trade would be furthered, the evil consequences of undesirable· speculation might be avoided.
It was, theri:fore, necessary that the instrument
chosen should be subj9ct to control so as effectively
to further tho policy of the scheme of regulation
and that fo tlie ratio underlying the provisions in
s. 6 of the Act and those which follow it in Ch, III./,,
In this connection it is necessary to add that the.c
restrictions whiqh are impugned :ts unconstitutional
~re· imposed
only on "recognised" aasooiatiQll.S,
1961 ,
Raghubar Dayal
Jai Prakash
s·
'
'
-
1
l
i
~
...
>
-
3 S.C.R. SUPREME OOURT REPORTS
)
565
1961
Parliament could well have chosen to effect the
Dayal
regulation directly through an official agency R.aghubar
]ai Prakash
v
instead of through th0 medium of a vohmta1·y
The Union of India
association. In such an event, neither the traders
A;:yangar J.
nor their associations could complain of any
violation of the law. The mere fact therefore
that Parliament choHe to utilise the machinery of
voluntary trades associations for the purpose of
enforcing regulatory control could not invalidate
the provision of laws which are designed to ensure
effective control over tho mechanism of forward
trading.
So far we have dealt with the argument about
eub-cl. (c) of cl. ( 1) of Art. 19 in relation to the
trades associations under the Act. As regards the
wider question argued before us regarding the scope
of sub-cl. (c) of cl. (1) of Art. 19, this Court has, in
All India ft:ink Employees' Association v. National
Industrial Tribunal (1 ), examined the ccntent
of this "freedom of association" in the light of the
other freedoms guaranteed by the other sub-clauses
of cl. (1) of Art. 19, in which judgment has been
rendered recently and it is therefore unnecessary to
go over the ground again.
We have no hesitation in rejecting the argument that the provisions in Ch. III of the impugned
Act, and in particular those which we have set out
above, infringe, in any manner, the freedom
guaranteed by sub-cl. (c) of cl. (1) of Art. 19.
The next provision of the Act whose validity
was challenged was s. 15 but before stating the
grounds upon which this challenge was made it
would be convenient to dispose of a contention
raised by Mr. Chatterjee-learned Counsel for the
petitioners in Writ Petitions 24 and 25 turning on
the construction of the section. His submission
was thats. 15 proceeded on the basis of there bein[(
"a recognised association" through which trading
in the notified commodity could be conducted
(1)(1962] 3 S.C.R. 269,
506
Ra1huhor Tlaya/
Jci Pr.;kash
v.
Tlv Union of India
AXf""l"' J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
f1962)
-
before the ban under a. 15( l) could be imposed. The (
argument was based upon the words "otherwiso
than between members of a recognised association
or through or with any such member" occurring
towards the last portion of s.15(1). It was urged
that under the scheme of the Act the Central
Government had first to recognise an association of
traders in the commodity, fonvard trading in which i
waa to be regulated, and that it was only after the
recognition of such an assoeialion under s. (j that
they could under s. Hi( l) prohibit trading otherwise
•
than through such an association or its members.
It WB.11 pointed out that the expert commit.tee on gur
had itself indicated that such a procedure should be
_.
followed and that m the easo of cert.ain othor ~
oommodities liko poppor and castorseed which were
notified under s.15 the recognition of associations
through which forward trading was permitted to be
conducted either prec~docl or was RimuTtancous with
the notification.
-
Learned Counsel is, no doubt, right in the
aubmission regarding the recommendation of the
Forward Markets Commission in its report on gur,
as also in the other instances rc·forn·d to by him,
but the question still for consideration is w'hcthcr
on a proper construction of the relevant provisions
of Ch. III read in conjunction with s. 15 the existence of a recognised association 1s a lPgal prerequisite for the issue of a notification unrlor s.15(1).
It need hardly be pointed out and it was not the
argument of learned CounRel that s. Iii( l) in express
terms posits the oxistenco of a recognised association
as a condition precedent to the issue of a notification under s. 15(1). But is such a condition implicit
from the section or does it necessarily flow from
its terms ? The implication cannot obviously be
raised by reference to the hardship which might .c...
otherwise be caused but must surely rost on more "'
secure and legally satisfactory grounds.
-
....
-
'
3 0.C.R.
SUPREME OOURT REPORTS
567
The Central Government has, no doubt, under
s. 17, the power to prohibit all forward contracts
in a particular commodity, if the mere regulation
of the transactions is considered not adequate to
protect public interests, and learned Counsel is right
in his submission that when a notification is issued
under s. 15(1 ), the Central Government are not
exercising their power to lay a complete ban, and
that consequently the validity of a notification
intended merely to regulate cannot be upheld by
reference to the power to prohibit. But the scheme
of the Act in Ch. III envisages only the formation
of voluntary associations and their seeking and
being accorded recognition by the Government on
fulfilment of the requisite conditions. In other
words, the Act does not contemplate the Central
Government itself setting up associations to discharge the function of "a recognised association"
under the Act. There might, therefore, conceivably,
be cases where the traders do not or refuse to orga·
nise themselves into an association which could
apply for and obtain recognition under Ch. III. It
is manifest that the provisions of the Act cannot be
defeated and the exercise of the regulatory power
of Government nullified by traders in a commodity
not forming an association which could be recognised under Ch. III. Similarly the power conferred
on Government bys. 15(1) of the Act, cannot be
made dependent on such voluntary associations
satisfying the requirements for recognition, such
that if the associations refuse to do so the power
does not emerge. No doubt, when there are associations whose bye-laws and regulations conform to
the requirements of the law the recognitions of such
associations either before or simultaneously with
the issue of a notification under s. 15 wo'.lld enable the
forward trading to be conducted without a break.
:But this is not the same thing as the submission
that on a proper construction of s. 15 the recognition of an association for the purpose of forward
1961
Rafhubar Dayal
Jai Prakash
v.
The Uni•n of India
Ayyantar J,
568
19~1
ka.i:~ubar 1J1qcl
Jai Pr.Jkasl1
v.
-nu Uni-Jn of lr.dw
A;y.mgar J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1962)
trading in a. commorlity is an csscnfo1.l pre-requisite
hcfure <l. notification under s. 15 could he issued.
It was m'xt contcn<lcd that c>vc>n if on a proper
con:itruction of H. I;; of the Act, the existence of a
re,·ognisecl asn<JCiation authoris!'<l to n·gulate deali11gH in a particular eomrno<lit~· was not a prerequisite for the iss1w of a notification under the
Bectiou in respect of that commodity, still the issue
uf th<· notification without an assoc·iatiun being
recognisl'd was constitutionally im·alid as an unreusu1mule restriction on thn right of the petitioners
to trad(• and carry on business. \Ve are unable to
uphold this argument either. The need for regulating
forward trading could not be and was not disputed
before us. '\\' o Rha II bo considering later the contention that s. 15 of the Act is iti;clf invalid as violating the freedom to trade guaranteed
under
Art. l!.l( I ){g). The very narrow question which is raised
by the> poiut now under discussion is this : Assuming
that forward trading requires regulation and that
rc((u lat ion through recognised associations which
am subject to control and guidance in their activitiei<
by the lioverrum·nt is justified by the necessities of
the Hituation and assuming also that it was not
legally incumbent on Government to recognise an
association for den.ling in a commodity before forward trndin{! in s•1ch commodity could be brought
within thl' scope of thn Act, woulcl the action taken
uncln s. 15(1) in tho present case have to bo held
invalid as not being a reasonable restriction withiu
cl. (ti) of Art. l!l ? In situations like those hero the
reasu1mblem·ss of tho restriction has nccessarilv
to l)(' tested by tho degree of urgency which rcquirc;l
the i11tcrvt'11tion of Government. That would be
larg..Jy 11. question of fact, and we have already
extrncted paragraphs 195 to Hl7 of the Annual Report
of tho Forward llfarkcts Commission for 1959 ill
which the situation which necessitated the impugn·
ed uotifications is dest'ribod. It is plain enough
that enquiries which had to precede the recog11ition
...
-
SuPREME COURT REPORTS
-
.
-
-
56!)
I) of associations under Ch. III do take some time,
and in fact in the present case the rec0gnitions
were accorded in June 1950, and if emergent action
was required to control a situation which thrnatened to worsen rapidly, we do not c0nsider that
the action of the Government in stepping in even
before the recognition of as8ocia.tions eould in
the circumstances be characterised as unreasonable.
After all, it is a question of balancing ic.dividtial
rights and the profits which coald be reaped by
individuals under an existing state of the hw against
the public benefit a.rising from the exercising of
control, a.nd if Government considered that the
latter would be best served by immediate action
under a valid provision of the law, an-1 the circumstances reasonablj warranted that opinion, we hold
that in the absence of my proof of mala fides, and
there is none here, the action of the Government
cannot be held to violate the constitutional limits
set by cl. (6) of Art. 19.
We shall now proceed to consider the challenge
to the constitutional validity of s. 15 itself. Tha
attack was
based on the section infringing
Arts.14,19(l)(f) and 19(l)(g)ofthcConstitution and
in respect of the last two as not being protected by
els. (5) and (6) of Art. 19.
In regard to Art. 14; the argument was that
e. 15 conferred an unguided and arbitrary power
upon the Central Government to choose any commodity it liked and bring the Act into operation in
respect of the commodity chosen, at any time it
pleased by notification, the effect of thA notification
being vitally to affect the interests of traders bv
rendering illegal a contract which was perfectly
legal when it was entered into. We consider that
there is no substance in this submission: We hav«ii
already extracted relevant portions from the report
of the expert committee on the bill which became
the Act dealing with the economic implications of
forwu.rd trading and for the necessity for regulating
1961
Raghubar Dayal ..
J ai Prakash '
v.
The Union of [1,J:a
Ayyanza' }.
1
70
IHI
R•.f!nJba~ Dayal
Jai Prnkaslr
v.
Tiu linion •f /,zl/ia
AyyMt•r ].
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[!962)
such contracts in particular goods. It is not for·
ward trading in every commodity that requires
regulation under the Act. The suitability of a
commodity for forward trading depends on factors
which are far from static and similarly the need for
bringing forward trading within the regulatory prodsions of the Act depends on factors which a.re
subject to variation over periods of time. Besides,
tho nature of the commodity, tho size of its produc·
tion, the scale of tho demand for it in relation to
the supply and the domand itself being not quantitatively fixed but changing so as to require a continuo<IS assessment through the medium of futures
market are all elements that necessitate regulation
and these are variable. We have not attempted to
be oxhaustive in wiming tho several factors but
these are some of the characteristics which call for
and make possible, effective regulation. It would
therefore, follow that the commodities which would
satisfy these tests or requirements can only be ascer·
taincd from time to time after enquiry and investi·
gation. They cannot obviously be specified in a
statute. It is because of these considerations and
the need for expert opinion and guidance on the
m1itt-0r that the Act has, by its Ch. II., provided
for the constitution of a Forward Markets Commission on whom has been laid tho duty of advising
Government on the situation 118 it exists from time
to time and· make recommendations in that regard.
In our opinion, the selection of the commodity for
the regulation of forward trading in it or of prohibition of such trading can only be left to tho Government and the purposes for wbich the power is
to be used and the machinery created for tho investigation furnish sufficient guidance as to preclude
any challenge on tho ground of a violation of
Art. 14. What we have ju3t now said as regards the
selection of the commodity would suffice to answer
the argument regarding the selection of tho time
at which the notification under s. 15 (l} might t:ake
nlace.
•
A
p
3 S.C.R.
- l
_,
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
511
We need only repeat what we have pointed
out earlier that though the Forward Markets Commission in its report of may, 1957, rect•mmende<l
that gur might be brought within the scope of the
re,iulatory provisions of. tho Act with immediate
eft'ect, the Government did not accept that recommendation and it was only when Government considered that a situation developed rendering the
price-situation in the gur forward market very critical and that speculative activity in the commodity
indulged in by powerful operators had raised prices
to an unreasonable figure that Government intervened by the notification now impugned.
The next submission of Mr. Nambiar was
that s. 15 was constitutionally invalid as violating
the freedoms guaranteed by sub-cls. (f) and (g) of
cl. ( 1) of Art. 19. As regards sub-cl. (f) of cl. (1) of
Art. 19. it was urged that the right to the benefits
arising under a contract which was lawful when
entered into was in the nature of property and
that s. 15, by empowering a notification to be
issued which rendered such a contract illegal was an
unreasonabte restriction on the right to the holding
or enjoyment of that property. It was further
urged that whether or not the right to the benefit
of a contract was property within Art. 19( 1)( f) it
was a right intimately bound up with the right to
carry on a trade or business within sub-cl. (g) of
cl. (1) of Art. 19 and it was broadly contended that
&ny retrospective. invalidation of that contract
would not be a reasonable ·res_triction within cl. (6)
of Art. 19.
In view of the nature of these submissions the
challenge under both sub-cl. (f) & (g) might be. considered .together. Before we do so, however, we
might dispose of a subsidiary argument based on
the words we are italicising in s. 15 (1) "and
thereupon ...... every . fol'ward contract, for the
aale or purchase of any goods specified in the
notification which is entered into in the area
1961
RoghuliaY: Dayal
J ai Pr.skas.~
v.
The Union of /ndi«_
A/Y~t•rJ,
•
572
SUPREME COURT REPOHTS
[196~)
1961
Rajoi,ubar Dayal
a1 PraJ.ash
v.
Tlr# Unfon of India
AJJanto.r J1
sp<>cifkd therein ............ etc." It was urged that by
r<'ason of lh<'se \\'ords the Govc1 nmrnt was empowered to issue a notifiration whiC'h would have effect
in relation to contracts which were entered into
aft.er t_hat ~a.fr, and that tho impugned notificati~
which mvahdated contracts tnter~d into eal'lier subsisting on the date of tho notification was therefore
ultrn vires. Wo cornidcr this submission as without force. The expression "is entered into" is at the
worst ambiguous and is capablo of meaning either
only tho8c rntcrtd into after the date of the notification, or as meaning "is or has been entered into"
i. e., ir.eluding a cr.ntract which having been entered
into before is subsisting on that date. But that it is
used in the latter sense is made clear bv the terms
of s. Hi( a) "every fo1ward contract for. the sale or
purchase of any goods specified in tho notification,
cntcrrd into before the date of the notification and
remaining to be performed after the said elate ...... "
Sections 15 and 16 have to be read togcthor as being intimately connected, the later provision setting out the consequences of tho action taken under
the earlier and so read, we consider that there is
no scopo for the argument addressed to us.
Now to revert to tho discussion , of the
attack on the prnvisions based on a voilation
of Art. 19(1) (f) & (g), the question is whether
tho giving of retrospective effect to an enactment dealing with contracts so as to modify
the terms of or even put an end to sub3isting cont·
ract is per se unreasonable so as to amount to 11
violation of the guarantee under sub.els. (f) & (g)
assuming learned Counsel is right in contending
that 11 right to the benefit of a contr'1ct is in the
nature of a right to property-an assumption 11s
regards the correctneEs of which we say nothing.
In support of bis submission learned Counsel relied
on the obsorvations in the judgment of this Court
f· -
-
-
'"''
3 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
573
in Stat~ of West Bengal v. Subodlt Gopal Bose and
Ors., (1 ) where it was observed that the fact that
the statute was being given retrospective operation
may properly be taken into consideration in determining the reasonableness of the restriction impo·
sed-an observation which was cited in the decision
of this Court in Express Newspapers Private. Ltd.
v. Union of India ('). The decisions referred to and
others to a like effect.are authorities merely for the
position that the retrospective effect of a statute
would be an element to be taken into account for
determining the . reasonableness of. the restriction.
imposed . but these observations do not carry learned Counsel to the full extent needed to sustain
the proposition he seeks to establish~ viz., that the
retrospective invalidation of. a contract ·is not a
permissible restriction that could be imposed by
cl. (6) of Art. 19. .
·
·
Raghuhar Day:.zf
Jai Prakash. -
v.
The Union of India
Learned Counsel referred us to some decisions
of the Supreme Court of the United States but to
these we do not consider it necessary to advert.
Article I, 8!)ction'l0 (1), of the American Constitution lays a ban on the enactment by· the States of
inter alia "any ex· post-facto Iri.w or bw im·pairinl! ·
the obligation of contracts, or grant any title of
nobility". Our Constitution-makers while: making
provision against "ex.post-facto laws".in;Art. 20(1)
and "against titles" in Art .. .18(1), studiously
refrained from including a· guarantee regarding the·
imp'lirment of obligations of contracts. There is
. therefore no scope for the argument thn,t a law
which affects or varies rights under a contract is
for that reason constitutionally invalid as., an
unreasonable restriction on the · right either to
property or to carry on trade or business. It may
be pointed out that even in the United States the
recent decisions have mado such inroads upon that
doctrine that it had been .stated by-Prof. Corwin
that "The protection afforded by this clause does
•
I
I
1961
•
(I) f195~J S.C.R. 5871 626..
(2) r1959J S.C.R. 12, .139,
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574
. .19d~
Rq!a.btu. D"J'G/
J a(Prkruh
v.
TJu ll•i4n..of b1dia
A)'.?«JilGT. J .
g{jpREl\IE COURT REPORTS
Cl9'62J
not today go much, if at all, boyond that afforded
by Section I of the Fourteenth Amendmont (against
d(•privation of life, liberty or property without due
process of Jaw)". The learned an0ther proce<:iding
to quote from the decision in Atlantic Coast Line
Co. v. Goldsboro(') continues:
'·In the words of the Court: 'It is settled
that noither the contract clnusc nor the due
process clause has the effect of overriding the
power of the S~te to ostablieh all regulations
that n.re reai;onably necessary to securo the
health, safety, good order, comfort, or general
welfare of thu community'-in short, its
police power. And what is 'reasonably necessary' for these purposes is today a question
ultimately for the Supreme Court.; and the
present disposition <•f the Court is to put the
bunion of proof upon any person who challenges State action as not 'rt>asonably
necrssarv,.
adding: ·
"Till after the Civil W11r th•) principal
source from which cases stemmed challenging
the validity of State legislation, the 'obliga.
tion of contracts' clause is today of negligiblo
importanc~, :ind migl!t well be stricken fmm
the Constitution. For most practical purposes,
in faot, it has b(•cn."
(Vidc Constitution and what it means
today, I 2th Edn., p. 84).
If th11t is the position in Americ.i where tho
Constitution contains a guarantee aµ-ainst tho
impairment of obligations arising from contracts,
the pr1sition under our Constitution must a fortiori
he so. Atfocting a subsisti1~ contract by modifying
its t,.rms cannot ipso jure be treated as outside
the pcrmi~siblc limits bid by cl. {5) or (6) of
Art. ll.J. The "reasonableness'' of the provisions
0f a statute are not to be judged by a priori
standards unrelated to the facts and circumstances
(I)
(1941l 232U.S.548; SSL. Ed. 721.
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It
:f's.C.R.
SUPREME eotJRT REPORTS
57i
of a situation which occasioned the · legislation.
·In an oft-quoted passa,ge Patanjali Sastri, C. J.,
observed in State of Madras v. V. G. Row('):
"It is important in this context to bear
in mind that the test of reasonableness,
wherever prescribed, should be applied to
each individual statute impugned, and no
abstract standard, or general pattern of
reasonableness can be laid down as applicable
to all cases. The nature of the right alleged
to have been infringed, the underlying
purpose of the restrictions imposed, tl>e
extent and urgency of the evil sought to be
rern·3died thereby, the disproportion of the
imposition, the prevailing conditions at
the time, should all enter into the judicial
verdict."
It cannot be therefore predicated cff-hand
&!l'i as a matter of law that every restriction which
operates with retrospective effect and affects rights
obtained under the pre-existing law, is unconstitutional as obnoxious to the freedom guaranteed by
sub·cls. (f} or (g) of cl. (1) of Ait. ID. It might,
in particular cases, even be necessary to completely
efface a sub3isting contract but in the present case
that is not what was done bilt only to vary its
terms so that it would bo settled out at the prices
determined b v the other notification. Learned
Counsel cha\ t"enged the validity of the provision
for price-fix.ition under s. 16 and of the actual
prices determined under the notification issued
under s. 16, but these we shall consider later. We
hold that s. 15 is n,mstit11tionally valid. It is
only necessary t,o adll that it is manifest that
the restriction on trading is in the interest of the
general public since the public have a vital interest
in the availability of an essential commodity like
gnr at reasonable and relatively stable prices and
the only question for determination for the
(l) [1952] S.C. R. 597, 507.
1961
Rathubar D•µl
Jai Praka1h
v.
The Union of lniill
AyyatJ{Of J,
576
]P6J
l c~hubnr DaJr·l
.Tai Prcl:uh
v.
11.t l 'nio1: oj lflfi·,,
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
application of els. (5) or (6) of Art. 19 would be
the reason'tblcness of th<> measures contemplated
by the law. Tqking into account the machinery
crratl·d in Ch. II of the Act in the way of an
l'xpert body to furnish Government with advice
011 such a oomplex problem am! the functions of
the committee, \Ve arc clearly of the viC'w that
the rcst.rictions imposed by s. Hi of the Act arc
rrasonable and pasg tbe tests for a valid law under
dH. (.'i) and (6) of Art. 19.
Learned Counsel's next submission related to
tl.e v<i.li<lity of H, JG whi{'h rleals with the conacqu<'nees of a notification. These consequ('nces
ar" three : (I) All forward contracts subsisting on
the lhtc of the notification unrler s. 15 11ot entered
into J,y or through a recognize<! associatio11 are
deenwd to bP closed out, (2) The rates at which
tho euntracts have to he settled arc thosn to be
fixed by the Central Governnwnt, and (:: ) In
rpspPct of the forward contracts so closed out
thn buyer is not entilkd to ask for delivery of
t}ie goods and similarly the selll'r is not entit1"d to
inRist on delivery being taktll1. In couside1 ing the
,-alidity of s. l:i and the arguments addrcBscd to
us in that behalf wo have alre·uly comidernd the
fir,;t consequence, viz., subsisting fonrnrd contracts
bning deemed to be closed on the day of the
notifi~,'1.tion.
LParne<l Counsel do<'S not impugn
the \•nlidity of the pro\·ision in cl. (h) of s. 16 under
which tho obligation to demand delivery or insist
on delivery being taken is Jl"Ovided agninst. Tho
attack on s. 16 was confin()d to the vnlidity of
veAling a power in the Central Government to fix
the rates at whil'h the differ()nCPS pnyahlc by one
pnrty to the othc-r should be determined on tho
clnsin~ out of the contrnct by operation of thB
notification. It was urged that tho provision
<'ntrusting the Govornment with power to fix the
prioos without Rpccifying tho basis th?rofor vestod in
them an arbitrary power to fix any prioe that they
liked, that the 1tatute had not given any imlicatiol}
•
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577.;
of the .principles underlying the fixation of the price,
with the result .th:i.t the· relevant· portion ·of s. "16.
was either a ~piece of ex:cessive ·delegation · or·
offended Art. 14 by conferring an unguided power
. . ·
.
in Government.
."
. · ·Before .dealing with .the -constit~tionalobjec·:
tion which was sought to . be supported by constrasting these provisions with analogous Indian legislation
wherein the price payable was ·fixed 'by the .Act
itself to which we shall advert a little later, it'
might ·be usefoll to narrate ·the circumstances in
which the price at which the closing out was to be·
.settled was fixed by the Central Government 'in
the impu~ed no.tification. Tho circum~tances _are.thus described m the counter-affidavit ·filed on
.behalf of the State · to these petitions : ·On July 17,
1958, the Government of India issued a notification
under s. I 7 of the Act banning forward ·contracts of
minor foodgrains and a similar notification followed
on the next day'banning forward contracts in Khandsari sugar; The closur·e of these markets increased
the speculative activity in the ·forward ·market
in gur. .The price situation in respect 'of gur became critical in the. last .week of December 1958
when bull operators acting in concert started to- .
rig up the prices. Contracts were ·entered. into at ...·
these excessive prices in the belief that ·even if •
Government intervened and· took drastic . steps
.of dosing out the contracts by a notification•under
.s. 15, the benefits of the l_iigh •prices ·on :t1ie out.standing contracts would, in-.accordance-With:·past
practice, be available ·to the bull· operators. ·-On a
review .<if the situation cxsisting as aforesaid, the ·
Government found that at ·:Hapur ·which was
representatiVe market, tho rate for gur futures
prices rose from ·Rs. IL98 per maund on ·January:
17, 1958, to Rs.16.27 per ·maund on February II;
'19G9, and the :Government considered that ·these .
.forward prices were exerting a very unhealthy
.!J:lflu.enoe 0!1 the SpOt:prices oftl!e ·CO!llIBOdity. Iv.
-a
.
.
.
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57s' '
SUPREME OOUR'I'- ;REPORTS . · · (1962J
..
i~I
11.;""~" D.,,oi · ~s: ·in :tiies~ ~i~cnmst~n~~s t~~~: in the iinpug-
p~1ce a~ ._ which the ..forward
i::.ontract should be closed out~ was fixed at the
. TM 1!~"':, of lniic. -average of the closirig". "rates . prevailing'. .iri'""the
:4;:;;;;-J~· , forward markets during the period of three months
. immediately preceding the date .of the notification.
The qu'estioll .now for consideration is .. wb,e~
ther on the scheme of the Act read in conjunction
with the p01icy iinderlying it and the purposes for
which.it is.enacted there could be .found a guidanc~
as to .the principles on ,which the price . of. settling
put could be fixed by the Government ? - I~ : this
· connection we might usefully refer ti:i the provisions
of the Essential Commodities Act; 1955; under which
Government. is. vested with ··power. to determine
·-·'
the prices at which essential commodities ·may
-be bought or sold. Under s. 3(2) of the Essential Commodities Act 1955, the Central Government IS em·
.powered by order made under the Act to provide
:for controlling tJ:ie price at ·which. any essential
commodity. be. bought and sold. The confrol_under
-.that enactment, as the one now under. considera.- .
tion, is to be exercised for ensuring that the ·price
· fixed shall ,be reasonable having. regard to the·.
cost of production and the general. level· of prices·
·prevailing of other Hke commodities which are
the subject of legitimate and proper trade. In the
very nature _of things it is not possiblefor the legisb. ture to determine beforehand the· price at ·which
a commodity may be sold or at which contracts in
relation_ thereto might be entered into. The. pdce
· must be dependent upon factors varying from time to
time and cannot, th_erefore;be always a proper ~ub
ject of legislative determination. Any. fixation_~£
prices either by naming a figrire or -by reference to the
market price ruling on a partic'ular date, must.be
,.·productive of_ hardship ,both by reason -__of being
"mechanical and therefore . ctit cif _tune with the
varying .factors _whirh might:. obtain_ from ·time
to time, as also of" beiiig liable to Dianipulatfoil
- Jai FraltUia
. -,
• · ned , not1ficat1on .the.
.:'T•
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
519
by uns<irupulous traders as in the situation described
by the 'Government in regard to gur futures in
the passage just now extracted.
Nor is it any defect in the Act that it does not
in so many terms lay down the principles for the
fixation of the price. In view of what we have stated
earlier, the only guidance which the Parliament could
have given was to direct that the price fixed be
reasonable taking into acoount the relevant factors
we have enumerated earlier, and this we consider is
implicit in the provision in s. 16 of the Act as much
as in s. 3 of the Essential Commodities Act.
No doubt, learned Counsel pointed out the
Raw Jute
Act (Act XXV of 1948), the Jute Goods Act V of
1950 and the Bombay Forward Markets Contracts
Act (Act LXIV of 19i5), in which in respect of closing out of contracts which were illegalised on the
coming . into force of the enactment, the price at
which the contracts co11ld be settled was fixed as
the spot-price of the closing day. In normal' circumstances that might have been a fair rule to adopt,
but from these precedents no rule of law c~n be
derived that a fixation of a price on any other basis
is either improper, unjust or unconstitutional. It is
patent that if prices are artificially rigged up and
inflated as a rosult of excessive speculation and
unhealthy trade practices, the spot- price prevailing
on the closing day would not represent the reasonable price at which contract should be closed out.
And this was precisely the case of the respondentState as the reasons which compelled it to depart
from the principle of fixation on the basis of the
spot·price on the closing day. We see, therefore, no
sufficient ground for holding that the power conferred on tbe Central Government to fix the price
at which contracts could be closed out is either
legislatively incompetent or constitutionally invalid.
What we stated earlier should suffice to show that
~qe actual price at which tlfe CO!) tracts were re~uired
provision~ cqntained in tho West Bengal
,,
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1961
...;.,
Raglwbar Dqj>IJJ
Jai P~akaah
v,
The Union of lndi'a
-·-·
A;yanzar J.
•
580
19eI
Rag/wbar D<11•l
Jai l'Jaush
v.
TM Union of lndi4
AYJOlllar J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1962j
to be settled ont fixed in the impugned notification •. ~
conformed to the requirement of reasonalifoness in
~rt. liJ (6) and that undel'lying the relevant provi&1ons of tho statute,
Tho petitions fail and aro dismissed with costs on<' •mt of hearing-fees.
Petitions diamissea.
-
TORI SINGH
IHI
v.
THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH
(K. ~- WA:>CHoo, K. C. DAS GUPTA and
J. C.SUAJI, JJ.)
Crim;naT Tril71-~k,fch Map-Marks placed on ba.ti8 of
nf ,,.,'fnol!'"P.' to ~ulJ-lMpr:c'1Jr-Adm1'ssibility of
rod, o{Crim1°nal Proc<-l1m, 1898. (I' of 1898), •· 162.
,.1a1,,,,,,,,1.t
Jfurdtr-SmfnC'--Son killing at in•ligation of fatht.r
,C:en!enr.e'oj flPOth, if inappropna/t.
The d•c•a•ed was i:oini:r to his field and passed by a
ph•form on which T and his fathrr B were sittinl!'., T carrying
a pi<tol with him. A• he passed bv the platform B instiir.ited
T to shoot the derease~ dnwn and T shot him. T and B were
trie<l for the murder and were convicted on the ba.<is of the
tcstimonv of eye witnesses and the dying d•claration of the
deceas•d. B was 'entenced to imprisonm•nt for· life and T
wa< sentenced to death. The app•llant contended that if the
dcreased was at the spot marked by the Sub-Inspector on the
~ketch map he coulrl not have received the injuries ac; stated
by the eye witn"'5es. It was further urged that the sentence
of T should be rrduced to imprisonment for life as he had
,acted under the influence of his father.
llel.cl, that, the mark! made on the sketch map by the
Suh-Inspector on the b.sis of statements made by witnesses
to him were inadmi<sible unJer s. 162 Code of Criminal Procedure and the appellant could not use them to found any
ar~umcnt as to the improbability of the deceased being hit in
the manner stated by the witncues if he was standing at the
sp<>t marked on the •ketch map.
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