BHAGWAN DAYAL versus MST. REOTI DEVI
Supreme Court of India | Decided 4 September 1961 | [1962] 3 S.C.R. 440 | 1961 INSC 256
Key facts
- Decided
- 4 September 1961
- Bench
- P.B. GAJENDRAGADKAR*, K. SUBBA RAO, M. HIDAYATULLAH
- Bench size
- 3
- Case number
- CIVIL APPEAL No. 448/1958
- Disposal
- Dismissed
- Citation
- [1962] 3 S.C.R. 440
- Neutral citation
- 1961 INSC 256
Text of the judgment
..
440
]'~]
SriUia s.....
N~igation Co. W.
v.
Uniun of India
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1~2)
BY CouRT : In accordance with the judgmP-nt
of the majority of the Court, the appeal fails and
is dismissed with costs.
Appeal dismissed.
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)
Suolw HM 7.
BHAG\VAN DAYAL
IHI
l!.
MST. REOTI DEVI
(P. B. GAJENDRAGADK.lR, K. SrrBRA R•o 11nd
M. Hl:I>AYATUI.LAH, J.T.)
R<aJvd1cata-Suit in Ret•""" Court-Queation of propri-
•tary title referred lo Civil Gourt--Decru-Subsequent auit in'Cit'il
Court for declaration of title--Whether decrr£ of Revenue Court
op•rntt.< aa re• jwiiwta -Code of Citil Prowlurr, 1908 (Act V of
11108), 1. II.
!Fnd" T.aw-.Toint family-Prwimption ,... to joinl1te1118tparation-Re-union, proof of-lrhelh<r m•mb•r> of different
bra,.che" can acquir. prop•rly a1joinl llindufamily property.
One I. \V&S living voith his sons K and J in the village.
lie was not in affluent circurnstances. K left the ancestral
home; he first joined military service and then police
srrvice. He gave up service and started a business with
his savings. He brought his nephews R (husband of the
respondent) and B (appellant) at different limes and allowed
them to take part in the bminess. At his death K left a
will bequeathing all his prope11ies to his two nephews.
After the death of R, his widow, the respondent, filed a
suit againc;c B, the appellant in a Revenue Court under
the U.P. Tenancv Act, for a half share of the inco:ne of
•ome of the villages left by K. As a dispute aro<e as to
proprietary title the Revenue Court framed an issue there
on and referred it to the Civil Court a< required by the Act.
The Civil Court held that the respondenr had a half share in
the vilhl.ges and on the bac;is of this finding the Revenue
Court decreed the suit. Thoreafter, l~e ap~ellant filed the
present suit in a Civil Court for a declaration that he was
the absolute owner of all the properties io suit. His case wru
that L, his sons and descen<lanrs constituted a joint f{iudu
family, that there \\'a'i never any partition in the family, that
K, R and B jointly started a business and thev joinrly acquired
.some properties during the lire time of K, some after the
death of Kand some after the death of R, that the said properties were joint family properties and chat he as the survivor
was the absolute owner of all the propertie;. Alternatively,
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SUPREME'OOURT: REPOR'lfS
ho·pleaded~hat even if· there·wa• a partition in the· family of
L, a-reunion should be· inferred ·rrom the>cond11et of K, Rand
Jl;'d'ln'ing-the llfcrime· ofK and' thereafter. The- respondent
oo"tMdcd that the family of L was divided, that K started
the business with the aid of his-self acquisitions and purchased
properties out' ahhe iricome thereof; that after the death of K
the two brothers R and 'B'• got· his properties under his will,
than they joimly aaquired·.furthm· properties out of the focome
ofthe·busine111,.tluu after tlte" dcalhof R, the appellannu<ceeded to .the half share• of R anG! th.at the c!ecree o£Jhe
Revenue Court operated as res judicata.
Held, that •the suit was not barred; by re&-judk,ataz by the
jw:lgmeat of the Revenue·. Court. . The present suit wa.uwt
within the exclU&ive jurisdiction of ,tM1 · Revenue Court and was
maintainable in the Civil Court amd as such s. 11 of the·Code
of Civil Procedure was attracted. The judgment of the Revenue
Court on. the- issue• of pr9prictaw title couJd not operate as
, reajudicata a&·the·Revenue Court \Vas: not competent to try
the subsequent suit,.
Venkatarama Rao v. Venkayya•; A. I. R. l 954•MacL 783,
approved.
Held, further, that there was a partition of the family
during the lifetime of L. Every Hindtt-. family kpresunred,to
be jqint unless the contrary fa Proved; but thi~ presumption
can be.rebu_tted by direct evidence of partition or by course of
_...,, conduct leadjng to an inference 0£ partition. There is _no presumption that when one meinber separates fiom-the others the
latter remain united; Whether-the latter remain united or not
must be decipecl orr the facts'o~'ea~h case, In the caoe of old
transactions When' no contemporaneoui decuments
,'
af'C1 main..
tained and when most of the active participants 0£ the,tran•
sactions .have pa!Sed .a.way, though. the burden still remains on
the person who asserts separation, it is permissible to fill .up
gaps more readily by reasonable inferences thari in cases where_..
the--evmnce i> not ob1itera<tecLby passage.ofitr.n.,. The· conducf
of the parties for about 50 years wa" consistent. with their
separation rather than with their jointness.
Hekl, furt~r. that it was not establiShed that there wa
any reunion hl"'tween K and hiil. nephews·. Reunion must.· be
!trictly proved. To constitute reul'l.ion tlR-remust be am. intention.of the parties to reunite in estate_ and interest. It i!
implicit in the concept of a. reunion that there shall be an
agreement between the-· parties to reunite· iii: estatcr w.ith an
~intention to _revert. to their form_er. status of a joint Hindu
family. ·It is not necessary that there shouid· be·a,formal and
f'xpress agfecmentc' fu·teuhite;· snch an·agreement·cat11.be,esta-
blished by clear evidence of conduct incapable of explanation
lfl/Jl
Bhagwan Daytil
y,.
M:st. R1oti D1ui
442
1961
Bha1wan Dayal
v.
Msf, Rtoti Dtri
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1962
on any other footing. In the plaint it was not alleged that a-,
reunion had taken place by agreement but the court was asked
to hold that there was reunion on the ground that the conduct
of part~cs amou~tcd to a ~eunion. The conduct of the parties
spreadmg.over :iO years .ct1d not •how that Kand his nephews
had consciously entered mto an agreement to reunite and become members of a joint Hindu family.
Palani Ammal v. Muthuvenkatacharla Maniagar, (1924)
L.R. 52 I.A. 83, Venkataramayya v. Tatsna, A.l.R. 1943 ).
Mad, 538 and Ramadin v. Gokulpraaad, A.l.R. 1959 M.P.
25 1, referred to.
It is not possible under the Hindu law for some
members only belonging to different branches or even to a
single branch of a family to constitute a subordinate joint
Hindu family. Any property jointly acquired by such members cannot become joint family property and would be
governed by the terms of the agreemr:nt b~tween them under ....
'"·hich it was acquired. The principle of joint tenancy is 1
unkno,vn to Hindu Ja\v except in the case of the joint property
of an undivided Hindu family governed by the Mitakshata law
which under that law passes by survivorship.
Sundaraman Maistri v. Sara.•imhulu Maistri, ( 1902)
I.LR. 25 Mad. 149, ChakreKannan v. Kunhi l'okkar, (1916)
J.L.R. 39 Mad. 317, The Official Assignee v. l.l'ulambal Ammal
(1933) 65 M.L..J. 798, llimmat Bahadur v. Bhau:ani Kumar,
(1908) l.L.R. 30 AU. 352, Jogeshwar Narain Deo '"Ram Chun;.
Dutt, ( 1896) L.R. 23 I.A. 37 and Babu Rani,., Rajendra Bak.!1' ..
•'ingh (1933) L.R. 60 I.A. 95, approved.
l.l'athlL Lal v. Babu Ram, (1936) l..R. 63 I.A. 155 and
Rampraahad Tewarry v. Sheochuran Doss, (1866) 10 M.I.A.
490 referred to.
Sham Narain v. Th• Court of Ward• (1873) 20 W.R.
197, overruled.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil
Appea.l
N'o. 448 of 1958.
Appeal from the judgment and decree dated
May 7, 1944, of the Allahiibad High Court in First
Appeal ll:o. 486 of 1944.
M. C. Setali-ad, Attorney-General for India and
B. ]). Sharma, for the appellant.
A. V. Viswanatha Sastri, S.N . .A.ndley. Rameshwar
Nath and P.i.V. Vohra, for the respondent.
3 S.C.R.
143
. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1961. September 4. The judgment of the court
was delivered by
SuBBA RAO, J. -This is an appeal by certificate granted by the High Court at Allahabad against
its judgment dated May 7, 1954 settin~ aside
the decree made by the Civil Jndge, Agra, in a suit
filed by the appellant for a declaration that the
properties more particularly mentioned in Schedules B, C and D annexed to the plaint, were his
absoh1te properties.
To appreciate the facts and the contentions
of the parties, the following relevant part of the
genealogy will be useful.
Pt. Lachhman Pras&d
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Pt. Kashi Ram
I ..
Pt. Jwala Prasad
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Mst. Batashi
I
Raghubar
Dayal
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Banwari Bhagwan Ram
Lal
Dayal
Lal
Mst. Reoti Devi
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}fat. Dayavati
Ajudhia Prasad
The date of death of Lachhman Prasad
does not appear in the record. Jwala Prasad
died in 1908; Kashi Ram, in 1924; Ram Lal,
in 1914; Banwari Lal, in 1914; and Raghubar
Dayal, in 1933. The ancestral house of the
family was in village Naugaien, district Farrukhabad. The plaintiff's case is that Lachhman
Prasad, his sons and descendants constituted a
joint Hindu family, that there was never a partition in the family, that three of the members of the
said family, namely, Kashi Ram, Raghnbar Dayal
and Bhagwan Dayal, jointly started a business at
Agra, that they jointly acquired some ·properties
and houses during the lifetime of Kashi Ram, some
1981
Bhagwan Dayal
v.
M1t. Reoti rfvi
Sultia Rao],
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SUPBEME:COURT REPORTS
1941
BMcu""' Da:fO/
v.
, st. /{1oti Droi
SMila_RaoJ.
[l962]
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afUir h'is death, and others aftlir the death of
Raghubar Dayal, and that the said p_roperties were
the jGint family properties of tho Raid members,
under the Hindu ld.w. His fort.her <'.a.Be is that after
th6' death of Kaehi Ram, the litisiness ·and' the properties acquired. dming his life f.ime devolved upon
the plaintiff and· RagJombaT Dayal by survivorship,
and. that after the death of' RaghubaT Dayal tho
said prop.ertis; aloog with' t!Jle.propertics acquired
<luring tho lifetime of Raghubar Dayal passed on
by survivorship 'exclusively to tlie plaintiff: The
properties deecri!Jed in Scliednle A are the ancestral properties; those desCTibed irr Schcc:lufo ·B are
the propnrtiesi acquired jointly by the said three
members during the life-time of Kashi Ram; these
dt•scribed in Schedule C arc properties acquired by
Raghubar Dayal and the plaintiff after ilie deiLtbi
of Kashi Ram; and the ]) Schedule properties are
those acquired by the plaintiff after tho death of
Raghu bar Dayal.
. Alternatively, it is alleged that even on the
assumption that there was a partition in the family
of Lachhmrm Prasad, a reunion should be inferred
from the conduct of the said three members dndn~
tho lifetime of Kashi Ham and thcreaft.,r. It is
further aUcged.that the defendant, tho widow of
Raghubar Dayal, filed suits in the Revenue-Court
under the pro?isions of.the U: P. Tenancy Act for•
half a Rharo ill'the income ofmauza CJia.oli, Chak
Soyam Nag la Kasheroo and .mauza Chak. Chs.haram
Talab Firoz Khan, that the said Revenue Court,
framed an issue raising .the question of titlo to the
sR.id properties and sent thf\ same for decision to
the Civil Com-t, as it should do under the prodsions of the said Act, that the learned· District
Munsif held in Suit No. 15 of 1939, a suit filed in
respect of mauza Chaoli, that the plaintiff therein
had title to I\ half share in. the said village, that
the Revenue Cburf, on the basis of tho said finding,
gave a decree- in her favour· i9 rei!pect ofh~lf a
share· of the focome of the said village and that
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the ~aid decree· wa;s1 taken on appeal to the District
Court ;a,nd also, on further appeal, to the High
Bhagwon Day«l
v.
.
Court,rbnt withcrut .lfl'll.coess i.e., the· decree of the
Mst.' Reoti Devi
District Mnnsif was confirmed, and that the suits in
Subh• Ra• J.
respect . of ot.her v¥11ages •are StHl pending. The
plaintiff (appell&nt he<rein) says that the said. finding · of ·rthe Rev!lflue Court does -not operate as
re8 judiC&ta in thll' present suit, anl:l·that he is entitled
to reagitate the ·matter. On ·those allegations the
present•.suit was filed mthe court of the Civil Judge,
Agra, for a 'Cleclaration of the plaintiff's title to the.
properties described in ,Schedules B, C and D
annexed to the plaint and for11permanent injunction. restTa,ining the defendant· from executing the
decree1in Suit No. 15 ofl9'39.
'The defendant (r!lllpondeBt herein) .in her
written-statement alleges that the family of Lach-.
hman Prasa,d was divided, that Jushi Ram started
a business in Agra only. ,with t.he. aid of his selfMquisitions and purchased properties out of the income- 'de:i-ived ·therefrom, .that .after the death of
Kashi'Ram the two'brothers, Raghubar Da.ya.l a.nd
Bhagwan Dayal (plaintiff), got his. pl'.operties 111nde:r
a will executed by him, that thl)y jointly .acquired
further properties 'from and out of the income .of
the business started by Kashi Ram, and that after
the death of Raghubar Dayal the defendant succeeded to. the interest of Raghubar Day.al. and· that, .
~therefore, .she .was ·entitled• to an equal share .in B,
C·aJI.dD Schedule properties alongcwith the plain ..
tiff. She further .pleads that. the deeision<if.the
Revenue Court in. Suit No. 15 of 1939, hold.ii;Jig that
the brothers were not members ofa joint family
and that, therjlfore, .she .succeeded· to the,inliereste
of.h!Jr Jmsband, R~h\lbar DayaJ, Jin the joint properties, ·optirated· 1:as . res judi,rata , in. respect .of the
plaintiffs entire claim.
'The suit was tried by the Civil Judge, Agra,
. alid'the lear.ne<l'Ju'dge,gave the following finding~: i
( l) the judgment and decree of the Revenue Court
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446
J9{iJ
Bhagwari Dayal
v.
Msl. Rroti Dr! i
s~Wbo Rao].
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1962)
in Suit No. IG of 1939 operated as res judirnta on
the question of title of the defendant only in
respect of the half share claimed by her in mauza
Chaoli ; (2) there was a. partition of the larger
family, and that KaEhi Ram, Raghubar Dayal and
Bhagwan Dayal were the divided mombers of the
said joint family; (3) there was no reunion
between the said members; (4) Kashi Ram had
validly bequeathed his properties under a will to
his two nephews; and (fl) there was a reunion
between Raghnbar Dayal and Bhagwan Dayal and,
therefore, on the death of Raghubar Daya.I,
Bhgwan Dayal acquired hie interest in the plaint
schedule prcperties by survivorship. On the said
findings the Civil Judge declared the plaintiff's
absolute title to the properties described in
Schedules B, C and D, except in regard to a half
share in mauza Chaoli. The defendant preferred
an appeal against that decree to the High Court ;
and the plaintiff preferred cross-objections in
respect of his claim disallowed by the Cfril Judge.
The appeal was heard by a. division bench of that
Court consisting of Agarwala and Gurtu, JJ. The
two learned Judges gave different findings but
ca.me to the same conclusion in holding against t.hc
plaintiff.
Briefly stated, the findings of Aga.rwala, J.,
are as follows : ( 1) The evidence on the record iB
11ot sufficient to establish partition in the family.
(2) Though as a matter of law two or more members
of a larger Hindu family not belonging to the same
branch can form a smaller joint family and acquire
properties with all the attributes of a joint Hindu
family property, in the instant case the evidence
doos not establish that Kashi Ram, Raghubar
Dayal and Bhagwan Dayal oonstitut~d such a unit
and acquired the properties ; the pt'operties
were the self.acquired properties of Kashi Ram,
but were bequeathed by him in equal shares to
Raghubar Daya.I and Bhagwan Dayal, and after
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1M1
his death they held those properties and those
1" acquired subsequently only as co-tenants and not Bhagwan Dayal
v.
as members of a joint Hindu family. (3) The Mst. Rtot!
Dtvi ·
finding of the Revenue Court in Suit No. 15 of
Subia Rao J.
1939 does not operate as res judicata in respeet of
any properties in the suit. In the result, the
lca.rned Judge held that the properties describEd in
Schedules B, C and D were owned by the plaintiff
-< and the defandant in equal shares.
Gurtu, J., gave the following findings : (1)
There was a separation between Kashi Ram and
Jwala Prasad and also between the sons of Jwala
Prasad. (2) Two brothers out of four and an uncle
cannot in law form a distinct corporate family .
~
with the incidents of a joint family and acquire
properties for that unit. (3) Kashi Ram could
' never reunite with his nephews as a matter of law,
because Kashi Ram had separated from Jwala
Prasad when Raghubar Dayal and Bhagwa.n Dayal
were not even born ; nor did he unite with them
a.s a matter of fact. (4) The judgment of the
Revenue Court in regard to the question of title
would operate as res judfoata in rsspect of the
. ~ plaintiff's entire claim to the estate of Raghubar
Dayal. And (5) the plaintiff and Raghubar Dayal
held the properties only as co-tenants. The learned
Judge, though for different reasons, agreed with
the conclusion arrived at by Agarwala, J. In the
result, the High Court allowed the appeal filed by
the defendant and dismissed the cross-objections
1 filed by the plaintiff : the suit of the plaintiff wa1
dismissed with costs throughout. Hence the present
appeal.
We shall first take the question whether the
judgment of the Revenue Court passed on the findings recorded by the District Munsif in Suit No. 15
of 1939 operates as res judicata in the present suit
in respect of the plaintiff's right to succeed to the
•. share of her husband, R~ghubar Dayal, in the joint
properties. Some of the facts relevant to the
448
1961
Bhagu;an J)nyal
v.
.\l.it.Jltoti L'nli
Sulia Rau J.
SUPREME COURT. REPORTS
[ 1ll6-2j
question JruliY be rccapitulat.cd. The- reopondent Reoti
Devi filed Suit No. 15 of 1939.in· the .Revonuu Court 1'
for, recovery of..her sha.rerof profits of village Chao Ii
against Bhagwru1 Dayal in ro!ijlcc.t. of•l343, J34.4
and 1315 f&sli 011 th~ .grom1d that..ahe Wl\lhW,cosharer. The present appellant, who wa.s the defon-.
dant· in that suit, contested the .suit, int~1'. lliia on
tho wo=d thatlte•and his deceased brot.ber •consti-.
tutcd members of a joint Hindu family and• that 'Gll .
his brother's death his interest in the entire joint
family proj}6I't-y devolved ·011 him by right uf sun·ivorahip. ~s ·tit€ · defe?Idant raised the question of
title, the ·H.a'.•t,'!JUO Court framed an issue -011' the
~tion of•:title raised, in· the pleatlings and rcfrn'ci'l.
the·BMRe w•tfte Crvil·Ccmrt for decieio111mdt•r"s. 271
of.the !Agra Tenancy Act, 1026 (hereinafter callctl
the Act). The•leametl ·Distri<lt ;\fonsif decided· the
issue agai.Mt,tl1e appellant herei11, with the !'esult
that t~ Revocmie•Oew-t made a Hecrce 011 ihc basis
of-that finding·mlfovour of the ·respondent ·ltcrein.
Ag.a.inst t.he- said del'R'ee,• the ·appellant preferred ·an
a.ppcab tNo•05 of 194t)• to the Distriet Court; Agra
but 'tha11 appeal was dismissed. The second 11ppe:tl
fiioed by frim ·in die High 0w.irt of 'Alhiha1'ad·,vas
also dismissed. The ·resnlt of that litigatron was
taat.a decree <wM•given !u•favunl' of the TPBpondoot
herein for. rcGovery of· hm· share of thc·prdfits Of
village Ohaoli .. ll'he question is whether the said·
decree opera hid ·&S res"judioou1 in the Jlresent !!Uit.
The learned Judges of the 1High Court-llifferetl on
the question -of·'l'es jw.lioota ; ~garwnla, J., ·held that
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tho •iiaid ·Giioision · M the ·Revenue Court ·in Suit
'
No. 15,ofl939 ditl not Oflerate-as re;J jwiicata miUc
Gnrtu, J., held that it did.
Learned Attorney-General conum<l.cd that the
decision in -Suit No: l5 of 1939 l\·ot.ild not operate
as re.~ judionta on· the present suit for two rea&0ns,
namaly, (I) in the previouEJ-8Uit, the question of title
was decided by a Cit·H Court .and, therefore, ij. ll
of •the C~e of 'E:idl ,procedure iti terms. }~a.s
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Mr. 1.A:·V. Viswanatha'Sastti, Iearne<,l cciµnsel ,,
for' the reiq)bii.deht, 'on' the' cith{lr hand,,ccnitendeg .
that, though' the' question' of title was decided by.
a' Civil Court; ;the 'fin.aI"aecision wa'.s'thiit 6f the
Revenue 'Court; tliat."the subject 7malter: (if the.,.,
present suit was Within 'the 'exclusive jilriBdicti<in o(' ':
that Com:t' anil that~ ther'efore,' the' present suit was .. -..
not maintainable. That apart, he conterideu that·
as ,the subject-ma~tei- of ,the pri:isen.t suit .was .within
the, exclusiv~_,_. jµrisdicti9n of the ,Revenmh Court,_
the_ decisiru;i of JhatCourt on.the question o£title. L
would be r~s .judica_ta in the, present suit ,not ; under.. ·
s.ll of . the.. Code of .Civil.Procedure but under the c,
general p.l'fucjples.or' i:es. judicat.a,;,rfcir, .it ',is. said,,,
that in the case of a decision of a Court· of
exclusive . jurisdiction:· s: 11 is· not applroable ' and
therefore, under the general·.• principles 'of
res'judicata>the c6nditicin..fhat the c'cikt }Vhich decid-'
. ed the preVicniirauit shciiHd'bi'competent.tci try the
subsequent sUit need not'oe. Qomplica witii. · -. :..
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LU•-•:
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, ·..... Befo~e,,a,d~e~~g' ourselve~ '.~tp., ~he,, question
ra1s,f!d, it would be necessary· to notice ~ome.of the
relevant
prcivisicins'oftlie':Act.''.'
·; ··· •..· ·~:, ·; .. ,
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.~~--~.:::.·1-_.... -__;
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, · , Sectian. 227"'1(1} 1A-cot&h3.!e_r•may:'sn6- an~"-·'" ·
•1. other ::for 1a.·' settlement .of;accounts;and for ·"'"
".,f :his share of the.profifa, oflaimahal,: or-of• any.· -.·
part thereof.
.·. L ..• -'"'·"'
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(2) ..- In any such suit' when it . is · proved
or. admitted:Ahat 'either party has,made col- ,,_,_ .
Jections:the amount~of•which ds ;in :issue,: he•. ·
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attracted; !J.nd, as. that Court was.not competent to"''"' 1961 ·
try the pr!'sent suit, the.·.deoision .therein:would not: .~n,,&W«" D9d":~'
operate a~ .r:.esJuqicata ;; (2) even ifthe, original: suit. : , ~r,.. ~;,i;Dni\ .. ·,.,.
must be deemed to have been decided·.bva.Revenue .•. - - - . -:· ,..
Court, that Court had no exclusive jurisdiction to
s,,;1,11uy_ •' ·,;:'
decide: the present suit and,;·therefore,•any decision
therein would.Jnot:l operate :•as -resjudirota 0n the ,,.
present suit ,for., the :same• reason;•:11iz., «that the;
Court .was l,lOt;coinpetent ,to' try, the preiient: suit.,'
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,
.
.SUPREllIE,COURT nE1'0RTS.'.' ;449: --
3.s.c.n.
450:
Ilfl
B""r,... Day.·
••
Ms,..· R1tNi .D11i .
S"6la &.J.
St'l'REME COURT REPORTS
(I !'62]
shall ·be bound to fumish a true account of
such collections. If he fails to do so the court
may make any presumption against him which
· it considers reasonable.
Section 230 : Subject to the prov1s10ns
of section 2i I all suits and applications
o£ the nature specified in the Fourth Schedule shall be heard and determined by the
revenue courts, and no Courts other than a
revenue Court shall except by way of appeal
or revision as provided in this Act, take
cognizance of any suit or application, or of
any suit or application based on a cause of
action id respect of which relief could be
obtained· by means of any such suit or application.
,
•
Explanation.-If the cause of action is
one in roapect of which relief might be granted by the revenue court, it is immaterial
that tho relief asked from the civil courts
may not be identical with that which the
revenue court could have granted.
Sectwn 2r1. (1) If (i) ....................... .
(b) in any euit instituted under
Chapter XIV the defendant pleads that
the plaintiff' has not got the proprietary
right entitling him to institute the suit,
and such question of proprietary right
hae not been already determined by a court
of competent jurisdiction, the revenue court
shall frame an iBBuo on the question of pro.prietary eight and submit the record to tho
competent civil court for the decision of that
issue only.
(2) The· civil court, after re-framing
the issue, if neoeSBary, shall decide that issue
only and return the record together with it 8
..
3 s.c.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
451 .
finding on that issue to the revenue court
which submitted it.
(3) The revenue court shall then proceed to decide the suit, accepting the finding
of the civil court on the issue referred to it. ·
Every decree of 11. revenue court
passed in a suit in which an issue involving
a question of proprietary right has been decided by a civil court under sub·section (2) of
this section shall (a) if the question of proprietary
right is in issue also in appeal, be .. applicable to the civil court which has jurisdiction to hear appeals from. the court
to which the issue of proprietary right
has been referred ;
(b) if the question of proprietary
right is not in issue in appeal be appli·
cable to the revenue court. ·
(4)
The Fourth Sched'lde-Group A-S'Uit8·
·•
~
I
Serial No.
Section
of
Act.
15.
227
......
Description of suit
a
By a co-sharer agai11st.
co-sharer .for a. settJement .of accounts and
his share of .t~e profits
of the ma.ha.I, or of any
part thereof:
Section 264. The provision~ ofthe Code of
Civil Procedure, 1908, except :..:.. '
· .
'
'
. (~) p:ovisions inconsistent with any·
thmg m this Act, so d'a.r as the inconaiitency extends,
1961
BJipg,... p.,_.
Y.
.Mst. Reoti Devi
S!'ih• Rao.J, .
452
19~1
BluztUJ4Jt D~Jtsl
v.
MJI. ~toli Dtn
SulkilM ]
SUPREl\~ COURT REPORTS
[19~]
{b) proviBi:ons app~icable o~ly tc
special suits or procccdmgs outs1de the
scope of this Act, and
· · (c) the pro~isions contained in list
I of the Second Schedule,
shall a!Jply to . all suits and other proceedings under this Act, subject to the modifications contained in list II of the Second
Schedule.
. The gist of the said provif':Ons may be stated
thus: One of the co-sharers can file. a. suit against
another co-sharer for settlement of a<--counts and •
for his share of the profits of a mahal or any part
thereof. If the defendant denies the plaintiff"s
proprietary right an issue on the question of title
is raised and sent to the civil conrt for decision.
The revenue court shall accept the finding of the
civil court and decide tho suit accordingly. An
appeal would lie against that decree to a court
which luw juri£diction to hear appeals from the
court w which the question WM Teferred. The
Revenue Court has exclusive jurisdiction to decide
suit& of the .nature described in Fourth Schedule.
One of the suits mentioned in the Fourth Schedule
is a suit by a co-sharer against a co-sharer for &
settlement of accounts and his share of the profits
oC th~ mahal, or of any part thereof. No other
court shall take cognizance based upon a cause
of action in respect of which relief can be obtailled
by any such ttuit.
·
The first ql)Cl'Y is whet.her the present suit is
ba.sed au a cause of action in re~;pect of which relief
cau be obtained by means of a suit specified in the
.Fourth Sehedula to the Act. Tite prt'tit:nt &uit is
for a ded:uation of the plaintiff's title to the plaint
I!C~d\llo propertietS and for a!l injunction restrainlng the exeeutWu Qf the decree obt&ined by the
de~endan~ in the Rev~nue Con£t. The ple.intiff
cla1ms htle to the sutt properties on the ground
'. 3 S.C;R.
453
CSOPRElIE CCHJRTLREPORTS.
·that he7 was• a •member; of af: jomt·.:Hinuu family' .· · ~
alcing·with his deeeased·brother- ltnd;ttherefo:OO, he .. ,•'..i!A.ir-D.;,i
succeeded to his share. by ''right.· of'"surV:ivu:f!l;~ip·:~ :iJ.tst. i~i Ji.,;
•. Th~. qt1estion:is whether·SU~ a suit is,in the ria_tur~ •·; .. :__ .,
. ;.otsuits . .specified· in tJ:e.•J?.qurth,.fl11hedule. ,to ·the" "•SuJ/JaRMJ. ·
, Ant.. ,'.I:he,s:iidSch~uhi.d()es~ not ,p.rovideJor any
. ~it .by.a p~fsOJ~ claiini~,tq !Je the .. ,proprietor of a
.. p.i;operty. ,an~ in" possessjon .. thereof ..,Fraying f ?r a ·
declaration .o.f: his t~tle 1t!ld for ~.injunct~on agamst
another who IS trying to interfere '!ith his title. If
so, under s; 230 of the Act,'the Revenue Court has
. :no excliisivejurisdietion·tor . entertain: :suit of the
tiafare thafis before us.::· If it is :i:wt · 'i'iiuit•of that
nature; under that'·sectionr·the...'civil ·court's juris~
dictioniis riot·ouSted. ,·A'fu!l:berich of the .Madras
High Conrt·hacl:occasion1to•con2ider a•similar question arisingiUriderthe :l!adras•Estates:.Land Act,
, .1908 in· .Ve11katarama,Rao., V;; V enkayya{~).., ..There,
ce'rfain:tenants.;filed a petition ,,i.irider.. ;S.'1:0.of , the
l\fadras:Estate:iLa~d..A,Ct;. ·"1908~., in,,'.- the., .r1.wenue
court. for:~plln.utation '!f re~t':aga~s(th~ j landho~. 'ders.;: The,:landholders, r:used,,the.plca that. the
rillagq .ill ;which the· petitioners'.'.lands ;Wei~ situated
WaS not
estate and;tliere:fore;,-~he'..'p'etitiQD •WILS
n.ot maintainable in thti. 'ievelllle' .. court. 'The
1
Revenue DiviSional Officer' held that it was. not an
estate and; ozi th3.t 'finding,': dismtsseil 'the petition..
TJie,ina.t~er ,.va~ t1,1~~n.u,p'()#'~j>p~aL,tci'·:the D~strict .
· Court and thereafter td 'the: H1gfi:-Court; without
. success. "Subse'q'tien't!Y, 'the landlords' filed suit in .
. : ·. the'Ciy~ ..Q~Urt againSt'.ih~J~~ant,f!.'f~r ~~- injUnction
. , restra,m1:ig.th~~. f~o,m. re~O,VI!!g .~~:. pag?y, c.rops
standing on the smt lands until the rent was·pa1d to
them; . ·The« Jaji.Cl.holders : raiaed.the'plea'' that the
decision of the re~e:imthfoiiit 'hoidii:ig that the vil. lage•was not'an estate ·was·binding 1'on:'the.Ci'vil
court~ •.'.·The·full: bench' of the l!ailra.ff Hlgli Court
held• that' the;: 'Said• finding.'. was ·not« binding on
the ·civi!I• ciJurt: :1 Adverting to··s.•189(.3} of the
•£A-~
-, -_-.,; •. ;~.1,~··1r·~·:-·....';,:_:.-1:, ,1[ __ ;,,-;.._;.'):,_ ..f.:i, :. :..
(I)-~-~· I:~:,~·.I9J,~.:~P~·.:?~~~··:!.
~;-j~;z_~.-:-~!·-~.--~,;.· 0·:_\ ~;:.'._/;;:
~
a
an
a:
..
·
· {;
...
454
1161
BMtwon Daydl
v.
his:. Rtoti .Ditti
~l•iu..].
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1962]
..,
Madras Estates Land Act, which corresponds to
s. 230 of the present Act, the learned Judges
observed thus at p. 790 :
"Therefore, it is ckar that it is only in respect of such disputes or matters as arc covered
by the suits or applications specified in s.189(1)
tbat the revenue court can be said to have ).
exclusive jurisdktion, that is, jurisdiction
to the exclusion of a civil court.
x
x
x
x
x
x
If a particular mattff is one which does
not fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
revenue court, then a decision of a revenue
court on such a matter, which might be incidentally gi\·en hy the revenue court, cannot '
be binding on the parties in a civil court."
We agree with the s!l.id observations. On the same
analogy, the present suit was not within the exclusive jurisdiction of the revenue court and, therefore
the suit in the civil court was maintainable. If so,
s. l l of the Code of Civil Procedure is immediately
attracted to the present suit. The relevant part of .•
s . .II of the Code reads :
"No Court shall try any suit or issue in
which the matter directly and substantially in
issue has been directly and substantially in
issue in a former suit between the same parties
or bf tween parties under whom they or any of .
them claim. litigating under the same title, in •
a Court competent to try such subsequent suit
01 the suit in which such issue has bel'n subseque11tly raised, and has been heard and
finally decided by such Court."
In this case the title to properties now put in issue
was tried in the revenue court. Rut that court is
not competent to try the present suit in which the
same issoo is raised. It follows that in terms of·
B.11 of the Code, the decision on the said issue in
the revenue court could not operate as res judicata
-
38.C.R.
SUPREMECOURT REPORTS
.455
for the necesgary condition of competency of that
court to try the present suit is lacking.
In this view, it is not necessary to consider
the differences between the scope of the principle of
res judicata covered by s.11 of the Code of Civil
Procedure and that of the principle of res judiC1.1ta
de hors the said section. Nor is it necessary to express our view on the question whether the decision
on the question of title in the previous suit was
that of a revenue court or of a civil court. We,
therefore, reject the .plea of res judicata.
-
)
We shall next take the question of partition
in the larger family. Learned Attorney General
contends that the finding of Agarwala, .J., that there
was a partition of the larger family is correct and is
supported by evidence in the case. Mr. Viswanatha
Sastri, learned counsel for the respondent.
contests the correctness of both the legal and
factual submissions made by the learned Attorney
General. His argument may be briefly snmmarized
thus : The members of the family were villagers.
the ancestral property owned by them was insignificant, its income was small, the partition must
h1we taken place long ago, and in these. circumstances neither documentary evidence · nor . the
evidence of the elders is available but there is suG.
cient evidence on the record to sustain the· finding
of partition given by the learned Civil Judge and
Gurtu, J.
The general principle is that every Hindu
family is presumed to l;)e joint unless the contrary
is proved ; but this presumption can be rebutted by
direct evidence or by course of conduct. It is also
settled that there is no presumption that when one
member separates from others that the latter remain
united ; whether the latter remain united or
not must be decided on the facts of each
case. . To these it may be added that in the case of
old transactions when no contemporaneous documents are maintained and when·most bf. the active
19~1
Bi"'l- 1!ayal
v.
Msl. Rroti. 'D1vi
. Subb•Ra• ].
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
:ZIIl
~D!SJd
"·
M•t. Rtoti D,;
[1962]
participants in the transactions have passed away,
thougl- the burden still remains on the person who
asserts that there was a partition, it is permissible
to fill up gaps more readily by reasonable infert·nces
than in a case whero the evidence i~ not ohliterated
by passage of time.
From this standpoint let us first look at the
admitted facts in the case. It is common case that
Lachhman Prasad was living with his sons in
village Na.ugaien.
He was not in affluent
circum:;tances. The particulars of the ancestral
property are given in Schedule A ; it comprised
certain lands a.nd houses in village Nauga.ien.
Bhagwan Dayal, the plaintiff..'lppellant, in his
deposition n.dmits tho.t the income of the lund was
about Rs.80/- per yenr, thou~h subsequently it was
euhanced to a sum of Rs.IOO/· per year. Hd a.d:Jlits
that they (meaning thereby Kashi &l.m, Raghnbar
Dayal and Bhagwan Dayal) used to get a sum of
Rs.5/· or Rs 10/- a. year from tho land. It. is clear
from this that they were getting not the ent.ire
income from the land but only a. part of it.
'·
)
i'
There ia no evidence to show when Lachhman
PrAMd died; but it is not disputed that Kashi Ram
left the ancestral home long ago and had joined
military services at Gwalior and thereafter police
,.ervice in or about 1895. He gave up tho service
and came to Agm and started a buainesa with his
84vingR. .Thero ia nothing on the rrcord, except
tbe a.tt~~rt10n made by Bhs.~wan Dayal in hia
depOSltlOn, to show that KR.shi na.m as manacrer
either received the ontire income from the ancest~al
property or paid any taxes in respect thereof.
Ra.ghu~r D~yal says that rent of tho said holdings
was enhrelr m tho accounts maintained bv Kashi
Ram; but they wore not produced. Kasbi Ram
e:recu~d a will on September 13, 1919. Under
that w1ll he gave · the entire properties to his two
nephews, and it cannot be suggested that it was
;!
·i
li
F
,., l
r
.
'38.C.R .
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
executed to defraud any person. There is a faint
suggestion that the said will was executed to ·bar
the claim of his daughter. In that document he
does not say that he was a member -0f a joint Hindu
family. The assertion that he was a member of a
joint Hindu.family would ha\Te barred the claims of
his daughter more effectively if that was his inten-' tion in executing the document. Be it as it may,
the will, which, in our view, was an honest attempt
on the part of the testator to give his properties to
his nephews, does not contain any assertiou that
he was a member of a joint Hindu family. A
number of documents were executed by ·or in his
favour during .his lifetime, but in none of the
>-· documents there is a recital that he was a member
~ of a joint Hindu lii.mily. This consistent conduct
also indicates that Kashi Ram never considered
himself to be rt member of auy .undivided Hindu
family.
-
Bhagwttn Dayal wdmit!! in his evidence that
Ram Lal, his youngeRt brother, who was killed in
tb.e War in Hll4, did not live with him and that
his family and the family of Ram Lal were
separate from eaeh. other and were not joint. He
also concedes that Banwari Lal, his elder brother,
who died in the year 1914, was also s.epar.ate from
him. There is nothing on record t0 show that
these two brothers alone separated from the main
family before 1914. The concession that they were
separate members . supports, to a large extent, the
theory that there must have been .a partition in the
larger family.
Rooti !Devi, the defendant-respondent, in her
evidence says that her marriage took plaee about
30· years .ago. Her eviden<Je discloses that her
fs&laor-in-law, Jwakt Prasad, was alive at the time
-, Oifher mvriage. She.says that when she came to
" her blirst>and's house,· K111~hi Ram and her fat:her-inla.w lived eepsratety ii:t 'Na~aief\, that. t'hey were
cultivating sepamte~y and tha't therea:fter· he went
1961
Bhazwan. Dayal
v.
Mst, Reoti D1ui
Suhba R.1 J.
··-
...~---··
SOPRE1'1'1E COURT REPORTS
1~{
Bhq.,,.,, Da;-aJ
v.
Af,t. R1oti D1lli
' .. ...w..;. -~
~
[1962]
away to Gwalior to serve in the army. Tho 1evidonce of this witness is not very helpful as
regards die particulars of the partition; but it
discloses that tho brothers were living separately
and earning their livelihood. This evidence is
further reinforced by tho fact that in regard to
the ancestral property tho names of tho different
members 6f the family, including Rcoti Devi, are >
entered in the Government accounts against
difforent portions of tho said property. Lastly,
there was.never any dispute between Kashi Ram
and the sons of Jwala Prasad, or between the four
brothers in respect of the income from the ancestral
land. That could be explained only on tho
hypothesis that the said property was divided and •
the members of the family were getting their share
of the income therefrom. This conduct of the '
parties for about 50 years was consistent with their
partition rather than their joint status. On the
whole, on a consideration of tho material placed
before us, we cannot say that tho finding given by
the learned Civil Judge and accepted by Gurtu, J.,
is not supported by evidence. We accept the said
...
finding.
'
The next question is whether there was &
reunion between Kashi Ram, Raghubar Dayal and
Bhagwa.n Dayal. Tho learned Attorney-General
~1
contends that on the assumption that there was a
partition of the family, tho. consistent conduct of
the parties for a period of 50 yea.rs unambiguously '..
establishes that there was a reunion between Kashi
Ram, Raghubar Dayal and Bhagwan Dayal during
tho lifetime of Kashi Ram, or at anv rate there was
a reunion after the death of Kashi Ram bet\vecn P.aghubar Dayal . and Bhagwan Daya.I.
1\Ir. Viswanath& Sa5tri, on tho other hand, argues
that when thero was a partition in the family, tho
members of the family who allege a reunion must
.strictly prove the same, a.nd that the documentary ...
evidence ijled in this c&Bc spread over a. long pel'iod
of time is<lestructive of any such claim .
3$.!J.R.
SUPREME.COURT REPORTS
459
For the correct approach to this question, it
would be convenient. to quote at the outset the
observations of the Judicial Committee in Palani
Ammal v. Muthuvenkataoharla Moniagar(') :
"It is also quite clear that if a joint Hindu
family separates, the family or any members
of it may agree to reunite as a joint Hindu
family, but such a reuniting is for obvious
reasons, which would apply in many cases
under the law of the Mitakshara, of very rare
occurrence, and when it happens it must be
strictly proved as any other disputed fact is
proved. The leading authority for that last proposition is Balabux Ladhuram v. Rukhmabai(')".
It is also well settled that to constitute a reunion
there must be an intention of the parties to reunite
in estate and intorest. It is implicit in the concept
of a reunion that there shall be an agreement
between the parties to reunite in estate with an
intention to revert to their former status of mem•
hers of a joint Hindu family. Such an agreement
lieed not be express, but may be implied from the
conduct of the parties alleged to have reunited.
But the conduct must be of such an incontrovertible
oharacter that an agreement of reunion must be
necessarily implied therefrom. As the burden is
heavy on a party asserting reunion, ambiguous
pieces of conduct equally consistent with a reunion
or ordinary joint enjoyment cannot sustain a plea
of reunion. The legal position has been ne&tly
summarized in Mayne's Hindu Law, 11th edn., thus
at p. 569:
"As the presumption is in favour of union
until a partition is made out, so after a partition the presumption would be against a
reunion. To establish it, it is necessary to
show, not only that th!l parties already
(I)
(19UI L.R. 52. I.A. 83, 86.
(2) (1903) L.R. 30 I.A. 190.
IHI
--.
/Jhatw•rt Dayal
v.
Mst. Rtoti Deui
Suhh• Rao J.
- -i-
460
lHl
•.
Bharzoan Dayal
Mst. Rroti D1oi
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1932)
divide\!, lived or traded' together, but tflat they
did so with the intention of thereby altering
their ,,tat1l8 and of farming a joint estate with
all it,, mma.1 incidents. It requires very cogent
evidence to satisfy the burden of establishing
that. by agreement between them, the divided
members of a joint Hindu family h.a ve succeeded in so altering their status as to bring
themselves within <ill tho rights and obligations
that follow from the fresh formation of a joint
undivided Hindu family."
As Wl' give our full assent to these observations,
we need not pursue the matter with further citations
except to consider two decisions stron~ly relied
upon by the learned Attorney General. Venkataramayya v, 'l'aiayya (') is a decision of a division
bench of tho l\fadras High Court. It was pointed
out.there that "mero jointness in residence, food or
worship or a mere trading together cannot bring
about the conversion of the divided status into a
joint one with all the usual incidents of jointnesa
in estate and interest unless .an intention to become
reunited in .the sense of tho Hindu law is clearly
established, Tho said proposition is unexceptionable, and indeed that is the well settled law. But
on the fact& of that case, the learned Judges ea.mt'
to the conclusion that there was a reunion. The
paTtition there was effected between a father and
hill sons by the ~rst wife. Ono of the sons was a
minor. The quest.ion was :whether there was a
reunion between the brothers soon aftc1 the alleged
partition. The learned Judges helcl that as botwoon
the sons there was never any reason for separation
inter se and that (lie evidence disclosed that on
their conduct no explanation other than reunion was
poBSible. They. also pointed out that. though at the
time of partition one of the brothers wa.s a minor,
after he att&ned majori~; he accepted the position
of reunion., The observations relied upon by the
learned Attorney Geneml read thus :
(I) A.l.R. 1943 Mad. 538.
.,.
.
'
I .
·~
a s.c.R.
f
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
461
"In our view, it is not necessary tha.t there
should be a formal a12d express agreement to
re·unite. Such an a.greement can be established. by 0lear evidence of conduct incapabl<i
of explanation on any other footing."
This principle also· is unexception"Lble. But the
facts of that case are entirely different from those
in the present case, and the conclusion arrived at
by the learned Judges cannot help us in arriving 11.t
a. finding in the instant case.
Nor does the decision of the Madhya Pradesh
High Court in Ramadin v. Golculprasad (1 ) carry
the matter further. Therein the learned Judges
restated the correct principle, namely, that in order
to constitute a reunion there must be ah agreement,
express or implied, on the part of the members who
separate, to reunite in estate and interest, and that
in the absence of a registered document, the agreement has to be inferred from subsequent conduct
of the parties. On the facts of the case before
them, the learned Judges came to the conclusion
that there was a reunion. This case only restates
a well se.ttled pri..'1ciple; and the court's finding
cannot help us in decitfing the present case.
Before we consider the evidence, we would like
to make some general observations. In the plaint,
the case of reunion is mentioned as an alternative
ca2e ; further the plaint does not give the date
of the alleged agreement to reunite or even the
neCllssm:y and relevant particulars. The plea is
liiated in the following words :
"That even if it were assumed against
facts strictly without prejudice to any plea
herein taken, that there was separation between Pandit Lachhman Prasad's issues after
his death, still in view of the conduct of
Pandit ·Kash! Ram and Raghubar Dayal during
their lifetime, and the fact that the plaintiff,
(1) A.I.R. 1959 M.P. 251.
19~1
Bhagwan D'1yal
v.
Mst. Reoti Devi
Subba Rao J.
...,,,
462
1961
Bharwan Doyal
v.
Mll. R,oli Dtt-i
S.-ii• Rtfo ].
..
-'~
.
;...•.
-.......
- .,.._. -_,... ..... ..
.
.....
SUPREME OOURT REPORTS
... ...__,
,
-· .. -.
· [1962]
Pandit Raghu bar Dayal and Pandit Kashi Ram
(and aftor the latter's death the first two) worked jointly and lived and messed together and
acquired, 0'\\11ed and possessed the entire properties jointly by their joint labour, which amounted to reunion, the plaintiff would still be the
8ole owner of the entire property in any view
of tho case.··
The plaintiff's case is that there was no partition
of the larger family at all ; and on that case no
question of reunion aris<'s. Further, he does not
say that a reunion has tiiken place by agreement ;
but he asks the court to hold that thore was a
reunion on ,the ground that the conduct of the
parties amounted to a reunion. Tho plea, to siiy
the least, indicates that the plaintiff himself is
not clear of his case.
•
The next circumstance is that neither Kashi
Ham uor Ragh11 bar Dayal and Bhagwan Dayal bring
in any joint family property either to start the business or to make joint acquisitions. On the other hand,
the entire capital for the business was furnished by
Kashi Ram ; and, under those circnmstancos, it
is not likely that there would have been any conscious act of reunion between the members of the
divided family ..
Further, the business was started in 1885, and
it is in evidence that Haghubar Dayal joined
Kashi Ram in the said business in 188!j and
Bhagwan Dayal between 1893 and I 002. Raghubar
Dayal in his e'l'idence says that when he came to
Agra, he was about 8 or 9 years old. If so, it
follows that there could not have been auy reunion
boforo he attained majority. In Revcnuo Appeal
No. f.i5 of l!l4l, it was not disputed that Haghubar
Dayal was also a minor when Kashi ]~am started
his business. It is not clear from the record
whon Raglrnbar Dayal became major. He could
not have reunited with Kalihi Ham before he
attained majority.
I..
,, •
'
3 S.C.R.
The first set of documents pertaining to the
first period are I 0 sale deeds whereunder properties were acquired in the joint names of Kashi
Ram, Raghubar Dayal and Bhagwan Dayal. As
the relevant recitals in all these documents are
similar, it would be sufficient if we look at the
._ earliest document, Ex. 58, dated August 24, 1903
and the last, Ex. 33, dated November 27, 1916.
" Under Ex. 58 ~he property mention.ed therein was
purchased from one Shyam Lal. The relevant
recitals described the vandees thus :
" ............... Kashi Kam, son of Lachhman
Prasad, Raghubar Dayal and Bhagwan Dayal,
sons of Jawala Prasad ................ "
-<l It
records that· consideration was received
from the said there persons. Ex. 33 is als~ a sale
deed, and the vendors and vendees are the same
&B in Ex. 58. Here also the vendees are described
in the same ma~ner. Their occupation is given as
"money· lenders'. The eastern boundary of the
property sold is described as "Walls of the shops
_}, and shop of Pandit. Kashi Ram''. There i~ a recital in the body of the document that the vendor
had no coparcener. One prominent feature that
atands out in the document is that neither Kashi
Ram is described as manager of the joint family
nor Kashi Ram and his nephews as members of a joint
Hindu family. In the second document the vendor in
describing himself says that he has no coparcener,
-\.,but in describing the vendees he does not describe
tpem as coparceners, and in giving one of the
I(
-
'
46:l
The evidence may be considered in the
f" following three parts : ( 1) the period between
1885, when Kashi Ram started the business, and
1924, when he died; (2) the period between 1924
and 1933 i. e., from the year when Kashi Ram
died to the year when Raghubar Dayal died; and (3)
the period between 1933 and 1939 when the dispute
between the parties came to the forefront.
'
·~
SUPitEME' COURT REPOR'.l'S
-
1181
Bi..,w.,. Dayal
v.
Mst. R1ati D1oi
SubbcRu J.
46!- . · SUl'REMECOURT.REPORTS·
liUl' ·
. [1962]
boundaries :of, the. property sold 'he· gives: it only
•
as the shop of Kasbi Ram . alone. · H really Kashi ·
Mst.;;;.,iD.vi. ' Ram and his. nephews constituted .. members of, a .
. , joint.Hindu family, . one could., expect; a recital to_·:', : that effect.. Tlie absence of such a. recital.' goes a .
-long,wa.y:to·support. the contention ·that• they,
never · considered. themselves as. members;. of ... a.
·joint Hindu family ... During the. same'. period
there were 13, mortgage deeds executed by third
. parties in favour of Kasbi Ram and bis two' nephews,
'Ex:· 6 is. the first of these mortgages and is dated
February 20,'I903;:and Ex; 39 is the last of them:·
dated November 2, 1918. -· Iri both the documents, '.'.
.. the mortgagees are described,. in the same terms as.
•
those found in the· sale deeds. ·Our' remarks made'·
in respect of the sale deeds would. equally appiy, to - ·
these documents:· During this penod moneys were· ·
. advanced by these three persons· to · others- under·
bonds. The· earliest. of· them· is. EX:·· 7 dated
September 20, 1904 · an·d the last of therii'is Ex; 78 ''
dated January_. 5,, 1923, KashL,Ram .. and- his
two ,nephews are . described in these· documents
in the san:ie·' way.as. they are•. described in the
sale deeds' and the , mortgages. Them do not
· carry the matter further. . There . are . ·seven · .'
decrees duri:i:tg the period_:_the: earliest is Ex. 11 ' :•
dated '.Tune. 19; 1903 .and the l:i.st is Er; 27 'dated "
•
Mays; 1917 .. The first of the. suits which ended ·-·
in the decree was filed by Kashi Ram and the t'wo -_:
nephews,: and. the others . by· Kashi Ram and · · ~
Bhagwan Dayal.'. . Er. 3_.was a rent deed executed .
"'by, one Chandi 'Prasad in favom; of Kashi Ram ...
· and bis two nephews in·· respect of a shop own.ed· ·..
--by: them.. · Er. 23 dated Apnl 14; 1916 is the · · ·
receipt
possession· of the land taken by: Kashi·, '
· Ram ancLhiS two nephews in execution of a decree .· :
obtained' by- them;· EL ·,56 'dated Nciveinber-.7,':-_:;
1909 and'Ex: 59 dated February '26, 'l!JI2 'aretWo :' ·
sale deeds executed by· Kil.shr Ram. arid; his two ''
nephews ·conveying certain property · fu · favo~r "of''': •
third parties; In Ex. 56 it is stated that•· 'the' ·
Bhazwan.Dayal
. .
for
' .
3 S.C.R.
'
J
SUPREME .COURT REPOR'JIS
~
vendori>.. have been in. proprietary p08session. and
o.ccupation of the property and that "there is
no co-sharer or co-partner of us who may stand in
th;i way of ma.king any sort of transfer''. In.
Ex:. 59 a similar recital is · made. These two
documenta proceeded on the basis that the property
was jointly acquired by the executants, and not
only there is no mention that the executants
belonged to a ioint Hindu family, but the reci.ta!s
that there is no co-sharer or co-partner indicate a
consciousness on their part that they did not belong to a joint family. The documentary evidence
we have .so far considered does not establish that
there was any reunion between Ka.shi Ram and
his two nephews. Indeed, at its best, it only shows
that the three of them owned the said propierties
jointly. If the properties. were joint family pro·
perties, it is not possible. to visualize why not
even in one of these dooumenta sprea"1ing over a
long period no mention is made that they belonged
to· a joint Hindu family. It ill commOJ11. knowledge that in executing documents for and on;
be:lialf of a joint family or in purchasing properties for and on behalf of a joi.Dt ·family, th3 &cuments ar ~ ordinarily executed by or im, fa.vour of
the manager of the joint family ; at a.ny mte,
the executants or the purchasel'8. of the ]ll'OpertiY',
86 the case may be, .a.re described as lllembera. G>f
a joint Hindu family. Whatever. ambiguity there
may have been in thelle'decument.e, it is dispelled by
two important documenti executed by Kaahl Ram.
Ex. U dated . October 41, 1009 iB a deed. of agreementexecuted by Kaishi .Ram in favour of h.i$ nephe:w
RagbQba.r Dayal, whose .son he had ta.kep in
adoption. In that document he cleady siilites.
that all the properties are self-acquired propwties.
He also prC>vid.es in_ that document that, in case
he died. before the .adopted boy attained majority,
Raghubal.' Dayal s:lwuld be his gua.11dian. There
is- a:M!o a statement therein that the. a.dopted ion
shall be the' owner of hisi self-acquired properti.I»
iw.~
B/oq,,,o;;-Dg.i.
v.
Mst. R1eli .D1rti.,
..
... .
466
- Dayil
IJ,,.,_
..
Md: R/~11' f? 1,;
s.'6.0 :Ito• J.
[SWRE~m OOURT REPORTS
[1962]
and none of his relations shall have any right
whatsoever with respect to his personal or ancestral properties. It is not suggcstrd that in J909
there were ai1y disputes between Kashi Ram and
his nepllews. Indeed, the document was executed
at a time when Raghubar Dayal's son was taken
in adoption. The fact that Ra!!hubar Dayal was
appointed his· guardian is also very significant.
In these circumstances, this document deserves the
greatest credence and tho recitals must be accepted as tn1e. 'fho recitals show that Kashi Ram
at any rate treated all his properties as his selfacquisitions, and Raghubar Dayal and Bhagwan
Dayal accepted that position.
The next dccument Eir. 5 is also a very
important document in the case. It is a will
executed by Kashi Ram bequeathing his properties. It appears that the adopted son died soon
after the adoption and Kashi ·Ram, who was 80
years old, executed a will bequeathing his properties to his two nephews. He asserts in the document that all his properties are his self-acquisitions.
He describos. thereunder the circumstances under
which he brought up his nephews and says that
both of them arc co-partners~.in his money-lending
business. He gives all hiN properties in equal
shares to them. This document is destructive of
the plaintiff's case. It is not, and cannot be,
suggested that this document was executed to
defraud third parties, It is faintly suggested that
the document was executed to stifle any claim that
the daughter of Kashi Ram might prefer to his
properties on his death. Such a contemplated
claim could have been more effectively prevented
by asserting that the properties were joint family
properties ; hut in the document the testator
asserts that thoy are his self-ll.l)quisitions, and
directs that •his two nephews shall take the properties jointly under tho said. will. It is not neceseary to consider whether this will would operate
.•
•
•
y
··a s.c.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
467
upon the shares of the two nephews in the properties jointly acquired by all the three of them. But
the recitals are decisive of the question that Kashi
Ram was . not a member of a joint Hindu family
and that the parties never considered themselves
as members of a joint Hindu family.
Now we shall proceed to consider the documents that came into existence between 1924 and
1933. During this period the two brothers, who
inherited the business from Kashi Ram, carried on
the same jointly and purchased properties under
14 sale deeds. The earlie,at of them is Ex. 85 dated
January 15, 1926 and the last of them is Ex. 72
dated February 19, 1933. In Ex. 85 the following
recital is found:
1
::/'
"l have received the said amount from
Pandit Raghubar .Dlloyal and Pandit Bhagwan
Dayal, 'Zamindl).rs', 80n8 of Pandit Jwala
Prasad, resident of Sadar Bazar, Agra, a.nd
have transferred the house aforesaid."
This document does not describe Raghubar Daya.I
as mimager of the joint family or that the brothers
are members of a joint Hindu family. So too; in
Ex; 72 a similar recital is found. The recitals in
the other sale · deeds also follow the same line.
Strong reliance is placed upon the proceedings of
certain suits, which are marked as Exs. 43, 44 and
14. Ex. 43 is a copy of the plaint in suit No. 311
of 1927 filed by Raghubar Dayal and Bhagwan
Dayal against one Khushali. In paragraph 4 of
the said plaint it is stated:
·'
1
"Kashi Ram, one of the .plaintiffs, is
dead, the plaintiffs .are his nephews and
surviving coparceners of his joint family.
They are competent to recover the . .aid
debt." .
'(
'
• ·Ex. 13, the decree passed in the aforesaid suit
shows that the suit wa1 deoreed ex parte. Ex. 44 is ~
. 1f61
•h<flWtllt Dj,',i
"·
.
Mst. l!t.U bioi
s••;. hl:J.
.
468
... - ....
Bhqw=Dayal
;,
Alrt. Rn:i Eti-i
~.t:-
Suhbrr .llrlo ].
~
-·
.
. SUPREME COURT HEPORTS
[1962]
copy of another plaint in Suit No. 306 of 1929
filed by tlic two brothers against another debtor.
In the plaint it is stated that Kashi Ram is dead
and that the plaintiffP. arc his survivin" heirs.
Ex-. 14 is tho decree made therein. The "recitals
in Ex. 44 arc ambiguous; bat the recital in Ex. 43
clearly says that the brothers arc the survidng
coparccners of the joinL family. '!be suits were
filed for small amount;i. It is obvi(lus that those
alJEgations were made to avoid tho necessity of
prodwcing sµcceision ccitificates. As. a matter of
f-&ct .the two brothers got the proµertics under a
will, and in the circumstances tho attitude of the
brother-s in tho BUits. can easily be understood a..nd
rea&Jnahly be attribnted to their anxiety to save
some money by a1·oiding the noce<>sity to get
succession certificates.
The next series of documents rc·late to the
period between rn:m, ·1md 1939 tlmt is, from the year
of the death of Raghubar Daya} to the y<'ar when
disputes arose between the plain tiff and the de fen·
d~t. During this period there were 5 sale deeds in
favour o1Bhagwan Dayal. The first of them is
Ex. 89 date.cl Ma.y 23', 1933 and the last is Ex. 88
datecii-June 20, 1936. There is no recital in Ex. 89
to. indicate the status of Rhagwan Dayal. The
document shows that on.e of the co-vendccs is
Ajudhia Prasad, sun of Ram Lal, one of tho
brothers of Bhagwa.n Dayal. It is not suggested,
and indeed it is not the case of the appellant, that
he woo· a. member oi a joint Hindu family along
with 'Aju<lhia. Prasad. It may have been that
Bhagwan !Jayal had taken Ajudhia Prallad as
par~nllll .in the business, and that is consistent with
the ca.se of the def<>nda.nt. Ex. 88 also does not
gil-1111 any iudication ti.at: .Bhagwan Dayal was a
member o{ the joint family along with his uncle,
and thereafter with his brother. Ex. 83 ia. a sale
deed whercundcr Bhagwan Dayal exchanged a
property pur!!h.ased 1J1 hin alrog wiih his brotker
'
•
y
-
3 S.C.R.
1
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
469
for 1motlaer proper~y owBed by a :, tlaird . par~y.
There is no .assertion in .this docqm.ent that , the
property was the soint family property ofJhe
b]){)thers ; nor is there any evidence. to .. indicate
t,hat the widow of Raghubar Dayal had. knowledg.e
of ·the ea.me. Bhagwan Dayal also executed .certa.in
sale deeds, the first of them dated Ap151 j}, ~934'
and the last of them dated April 3, 1942 i. e.,, after
the filh;i,g of the suit. Ex. 8(1 is a sale deed,.: in
which fGli.· the fiillst time we find the recital that the
exeellltant and Ragbubar Dayal lived together
jointly and the entire business w:a.s, ()atried on. Jc;>iritly in the name of both of them and that after
Raghubar Dayal's death the executant had been
the manager, Karta and Mukhia of his joint family
upto that time.. There is nothing to show that: tn:e
defendant h~.d knowledge of this ·document. That
apart, ' the recital that Bhagwan Dayal wa.s the
manager of his joint family in 1934 may ·'!rot be
ina-0curate, for he was Jiving jointly with sons. >In
any view, this recital, appearing for •the first. time
after about 50 yeare and made behim!l. the 1baok nf
the defendant, would -0nly be a self~servinrg
statement.
PUttu Lal is the brother of Reoti Devi .. 'He
r.ays in his evidenoe that Kashi Ram liltai;ted.the
business, and that Kashi Ram, R11ghubar' Dayal
and Bhagwan Dayal usedto live in Agra in, one
and the same house and were joint in mess. His
knowledge of the.family 'affairs goes back .only . to
the year 19 l 0 and even his alleged admission does
not indicate any joint status. Ex. 35 'is the aale
certificate issued to Raghubar Dayal in respect of
a property pnrcrhas.ed by, him. · Therein. he. is
described as the proprietor of the. firm styled ;ii
"Pandit Kashi Ram Bha.gwan Dayal'.'. It \s suggf¥!ted by the respondent that the said deseriphion..'i,s
a mistake. Bµt assuming it to be .correct, .lt ·. <lliiy
. ~hows thllt they were doing b,usiness jointly aiui.
firm. Ex. 36 is a delivery receipt of the property
·'''~;~···.··
~~.~gW:::':Day~l.
Mst. R10ti Da"i
·-~-.
Suhba Rao J.
- -··- ~
'
470
Ill/
Rhfl"""' D•J•I
v,
-
i\lst. R11ti Dni
.si.11. RH J.
,_,.,..,..,
..........-.._, .......... -......, __ ....,. ·-·-·---
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1962]
coTered by the sale certificate, Ex. 35. This only
shows that Bhagwan Dayal took delivery of tho
property purchased on behalf of tho firm. Ex. 84
is a sale deed executed by one Raja Ram in favour
of Raghubar Dayal and Bhagwan Dayal. This
property, though purchased by both the brothers,
was subsequently given in exchange by Bha.gwa.n
Dayal alone to Raja Ram for another. These
statements onlv show that the two brothers had
a joint mess "1ond that a property purchased by
both of them was disposed of by Bhagwan Dayal
subsequent to the death of Raghubar Dayal. There
i.e nothing to show that the widow had knowledge
of it.
Strong reliance is placed upon certain statements
alleged to have been made by the respondent and
her brother admitting the joint family status of tho
brothers. Ex. 45 in the statt1ment made by tho
respondent in Suit No. 19i of 1933 on the file of tho
Court of the l'llunsif, Agra. That wns a suit filed
by Bhagwan Dayal against one Har Lal for
recovery of some money. She stated therein that
her husband used to live jointly with the plaintiff,
that the husineSB was also joint, and that the
money-lending business was anc<'stral in their family.
In the eroo-examination she went back on her statement made in the oxamination-in·chief, for she
stated therein that she had interest in the money left
by hor husband that she had power of disposal over
the said money and that she and Bhagwan Dayal
were the owners of it. ThcEe inconsistent statements in a short deposition indicate that sho was not
clear about the legal terminology used by her when
in the examination-in.chief she said that her husband and Bba~an Daya.I were living jointly and
that the bueiness was ancestral in their house, for
immediately when pointed questions were put a.s
regards tho title to the properties, she stated that
ahe and Bhagwan Dayal were both owners. In
the pr111ent auit ahe deposed that she made those
,.
+
"
...
I.
y
-
3 S.C.R.
·r
.
)
;;
'""')
"""'
:"'*"
--..,_~ .,,
SUPREME OO(JRT REPORTS
!71
statements at the request of Har Lal. That apart, it
is not disputed that· after the death of Raghubar
Dayal till the year 1939 she was living .with
Bhagwan Dayal and that Bhagwan Dayal was
managing the entire properties and giviqg her small
amounts towards her maintenance. Any st.~tement
made by her when she was undel'. the control of
Bha~wan Dayal cannot be of 1my evidentiary yalue
particularly when her statements are also.inconsia·
tent with one another. On Decem)Jer 22, 1937 she
made another statement in Suit No. 1013 of 1937.
That was a suit filed by Bhagwan Dayal against
one Ram Lal and others. In' th-it suit Bhagwap.
Dayal represented himself to be the manager of
the joint family. In the statement filed by the
respondent, she stated that Bhagwan .Dayal filed
the suit as the managing agent of the family .with
her consent. To that statement the thumb-impres·
sion of the respondent was affixed... Ex. 52 is a
plaint dated August 27,1937 in Suit No.. 506 of 1939
filed by Bhagwan Dayal against third parties to
enforce a mortgage deed. In pangraph 2. of that
plaint it was stated that both the mortgagfes were
full brothers and members of a joint Hindu family
of the Mitakshara school, that the mortgage debt
was advanced by them as such, and that. Raghubar
Dayal died in February 19il7 leaving the plaintiff as
the surviving coparcener. In that suit the respondent gave vakalat to an Advocate to look after
her interest. Ex. 2 is a copy of the judgment in
that suit. One of the issues was whether a succes·
sion certificate was necessarv in order to enable the
plaintiff to file the suit. In that case, the mortgagor,
being a stranger, did not put in evidence to show
that Bhagwan Dayal was not a member of a . joint
family along with Raghubar Dayal. Applying the
presumption of law, the learned Munsifheld that the
brothers were joint and that the suit was maintain·
able without a succession certificate. It is obvious that
the allegations in the plaint in tbat.$Uitwertf made
to avoid ·the productio!1 of a succe1>sion certificate.
-·-··-
BlitijWan-DllJal
' " v. ,,
Alst. RtOti D,11i
....
472
1H1
Bio.fwci Da;·al
v.
'Mjt. R1oti D1ui
S1bba Rao J.
.... ;., -
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1962]
The respondent could not have had knowledge of these allegations in the plaint nor of the
implication of the statements. She roust have signed
the vaka.lat .at the in8ta.nce of :Bhagwan Daya.I and
gi,·en it to the Advocate engaged by him. Ex. 51 is
a. copy of the plaint in another suit filed by Bha.gwan
Dayal on August 17, 1933. Therein it is alleged that
Bhagwan Dayal and Raghubar Dayal were brothers
of a joint Hindu family and that the plaintiff as the
surviving copar.ccner of the said joint family brougnt
that suit. It was conducted by him in that capacity
and a decree was obtained. This allegation in the suit
was presumably made to avoid the necessity of
getting a succession certificate. These recitals and
assertions in the suits tl1at Bhagwan Dayal was a
mcm her of a joint family along with his brother,
Rnghubar Dayal, coula not have any evidcnti:ny
value agaiirnt the respondent, for one thing there is
nothing to show that she had knowledge of the suibl
and for th~ o'ehcr that the recitals were made for a
particular purpose to avoid th<' expenditure for
obtaining a sucoeBBi.c:m certificate.
..
R~oe is placed upon Um evidence given by
her in Suit No. 15 of 1939 which is m~ked aa Ex. W
in dae pres(Jl).t 0&8e. Under the streae of cross4!-xe.uMnation aert.&iu facts were elicited fr<Jro her.
She et.o.ted thlt the uncle and the two nephem
were living together, that, whoo Kashi Rem was
a:live, he and the two nephews used to write
accounts, and that they used to live as family
mem'bers; but .at the 8&me time she also said tha.t
she did not !mow what was mea.nt by "family" a.n<i
that everyone was the liead of his own family. No
seriou• at-gnment can be planed upon hor vague
evidence in support of the ca.ae of joint family.
But the oonduct c,f the plaintiff aft-0r the
death of.his brether, Raghubar Dayal, is of more
evidentia.ry v.aluc on the question of joint family
th.a.a tba.t of the ignorant wid.ow; for unlike.tlre
respondent, he roust have certainly known his legal
...
.- ,.
~
·~
'
3 S.0.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
473
rights. Schedule A shows thr1t some of the alleged
ancestral properties were recorded in the name of
the respondent, Reoti Devi. The plaintiff also
admits in the plaint that there was a mutation of
the respondent's name in the revenue recordo in
place of her deceased husband, but asserts that it
does not clothe her with 11ny legal title. The.
mirious explanation he gives is that it was at the
very best a gratuitous submission on the part of the
plaintiff just out of affection and regard for the.
feelings of the defendant. The evidence discloses
tha,t after the death· of her husband, the respondent
was given only petty amounts, and it does not indicate any affection or rega.rd towards the widow.
Ex. R, the Khewat of village Chaoli, shows that in
respect of that village Reoti Devi's name was
mutated for that of her husband. Ex. S, the
Khewat of village Chak Soem, and Ex. T, the
Khewat of village Chaharum, contain recitals show-.
ing the name of Reoti Devi in the place of h.er
husband. Exs. C, N and M are some of the orders.
"'hereunder Reoti Devi's name was mutated in
phwe of her husband. The explanation offered by
the plaintiff in the plaint is unconvincing. Her
husband's name must have been entered in the
revenue records without any objection by the plaintiff, as he was conscious that she and her husdand
were not members of a joint family and she was
entitled to succeed to her husband's share.
From the aforesaid evidence the following
facts emerge : In 1885 Kashi Ram started a
business at Agra from and out of his self-acquisitions. He brought his nephews at different points
of time and allowed them to take part in the business. It may also be that he had taken them as
p:trtners in the business and also purchased the
properties in their joint names; but there is not a
single document during his lifetime wherein Kashi
Ram either admitted that he was a member of a
joint family along with his nephews or the nephews
asserted any joint status along with him. Indeed,
1961
Bhapan Day.t
V;
Mst. ReBti D111
Suboa~uJ.
474
Bh'fwdli Da.'Ja/
v.
Mst. Rt1ti Du1
SulO.Ra• J.
SUPREME OOURT REPORTS
[Hl62)
on the two occasions when it became necessarv to
set. up hie claims, that is, when he execute<l ·the
adoption <lccd and the will, Kashi Ram clearly
stated that all his properties were his ~elf-acquisi
tions. The documents that came into existence
after the death of Kashi Ram also do not contain
any allegations that the brothers were members of
a joint Hindu family during Kashi Ram's lifetime
or that they were members of a joint family after his
death. The self-serving statements· made hy
Bhagwan Dayal after the death of hi~ brother,
Raghubar Dayal, in 1933 were made to enable him
to file suits without obtaining succession certificates.
The alleged statements made by the widow of
Raghnbar Dayal have no eviclentiary value, for she
was admittedly under the control of the plaintiff
and even the alleged admissions wero ambiguous.
On the other ham!, the respondent, soon after the
death of her husband, got her name mutated in
respect of her husband's share in the properties ;
and this conduct is an unambiguous piece of evidence which indicates the consciousness on the part
of tho plaintiff that the defendant's husband was
not a member of the joint family along with his
brother or uncle. The fact that the brothers and
the uncle lived together and <lid business together
is consistent with their relationship of uncle and
nephew, and the fact that they purchased or sol<l
properties jointl:v is alRo conRistent with their being
mere partners or co·sharers. The recitals in soms
of the <locumonts describing the nephews as CfJpartner~ also show th~t they wore trea!R.d onl.r
as co-sharers. Whatever ambiguity there may he,
the adoption deed, the "·ill and the mutation of the
nam'' of the wirlow in place of her hmband in the
rcvonue records <!ispell it. From this conduct,
spreading over about 50 years, it is not possible to
hold that the uncle and the nephews consciously
ent-0red into an agreement to reunite and beeon111
members of a joint Hindu family.
'
y
.-
S.C.R.
SUPREMECOURT REPORTS
475
This finding is enough to dispose of the
1 appeal. But, as the evidence on the question of
partition of the family is not as satisfactory as it
should be, we propose to consider the alternative
contention put forward by the appellant.
The learned Attorney-General, appearing for
the appellant, contends that in a joint Hindu family
if sm:rte members belonging to different branches or
even to a single branch acquire property, they hold
the property as members of a joint Hindu family
and that that property vis-a-vis the said members
will be joint family property.
,
...
On the other hand. Mr. A. V. Viswanatha Sastri
contends that it is not possible under the Hindu
law for some members only belonging to different
branches or even to '.t single branch of a family to
c">nstitute a subordinate joint Hindu family and,
therefore, any property acquired jointly by them
would be governed only by the terms of the agreement between them whereunder the said property
is pnrchased.
This question raises an interesting point of
law and requires scrutiny of some of the decisions
cikd at the Bar. The legal impossibility under
Hindu law of members of different branches of a
joint Hindu family to constitute a subordinate joint
Hindu family was pointed out by Bashyam
Ayyangar in Sudarsanam Maistri v. Narasimhulu.
llfoistri( 1). There, one V and his ihree elder sons
lived apart from his two younger sons and were in
possession of some ancestral property. The two
youngest sons acquired property from the funds of
a business which had been carried on by them
jointly, One of the questions raised was whether
they acquired the property as members of the joint
Hindu family. Bhashyam Ayyangar, .T., in rejecting the contention discussed the principle governing the constitution of joint families and the
(I) ( 1902) I. L. R. 25 Mad. 1~9.
1961
llhagwan Day•l
••
Mst. Reoti Der.ii
SuO• Rao].
476
1961
Bhaztt:an D9a/
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1962]
properties acquired by the said familiQs ariu made
the following pregnant observations at p. 154 :
Y,
Mst. Reoli Dni
MlaR11].
'
. "The :i\Iitakshara doctrine of joint family
is founded upon the existence of an undivided
family, as a corporate body ............ and the
possession of property by such corporate body.
The first requisite therefore is the family unit ;
and the possession by it of property is· tlie
Rccond requisite ............ the conception of a
Hindu family is a common male ancestor with
his lineal descendnnts in tho male lino, and so
long ns tlrnt family is in its normal condition,
t:iz., the undivi(kd Btate-it forms a corporate
body, such corporate body, with its heritage, is
pure].}' a creature of lnw and eannot be created
by act of partios, save in so far that, by adoption, a stranger may be affiliated as a member
of that corporate family."
Adverting to the nature of the property owned by
such a family, the learned Judge proceeded to
st&te :
"As regards the property of such famil.v,
the 'unobstructed heritage' de1•olving on such
family, with its accretions, is owned by the
family as a corporate body, and one or more
branches of that family, each forming a corporate bo<ly within a larger corporate bod.v.
may possess separate 'unohstruct{)d hcrit~ge'
whirh, with its accretions, may be exclusively
owned by such branch as a corporate body."
Thrn dealing with the problem whether two or
morn members of different branehes, or of one :me!
the $ame branch, of a family can acquire a property
with tho incidents of a joint family prop~rty, surh
as right by birth etc., the learned Judge observed
thus at. p. 155 :
But so long as a family romains an undivided unit, two or more m~mbcrs thereof
.
\"
-
---·-i.~-->.
S S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
477
whether they be members of ·different
branches or of one and the same branch of
the family-can have no legal existence as a
separate independent unit; but if they comprise all the members of a branch, or of a subbranch, they can form a distinct and separate
corporate unit within the larger corporatli
unit and hold property as such."
The above passages clearly lay down the principle
behind the rule. Hindu law recognizes only the
entire joint family or one or more branches of that
family as a corporate unit or units and that the
property acquired by that unit in the manner recognized by law would be considered as joint family
property. But in the case of two or more members of a joint Hindu family belonging to different
branches or even to the same branch, they do not
acquire the property as a corporate unit or for the
corporate unit and, therefore, they are only governed by the terms of the con tract, e:iqiress or implied, whereunder they have acquired the property.
The same principle bas been applied by a Full
Bench of the Madras High Court in Ohakra Kannan
T. Kunhi Fokker(') to a Marumakkattayam tarwad.
Dealing with tavazhi, which corresponds to a
bran oh of a. joint Hindu family under the Hindu law
Sdriivasa Ayyangar, J., observed thus at p. 336:
"These groups cannot of course be created by agreement of parties. The tavazhis or
the subordinate groups constituting the tarwad are, I thi,nk, capable of holding proper.tie• as corporate units with the incidents of
tarwad property, at the same time retaining
their joint interest in the properties of the
main tarwad, just as branches and sub-branches in a Mitakshara joint Hindu family are
capable of holding properties with the incidents of joint Hindu family property. I am
(I) (1916) 1.L.R. S9 Mad. 317.
·, 1961
Bhatwan Dayal
·V,
Mst. Reoti Dtvi
Suiba Ra~ J.
• Iii •
~78
J.96/
Bha1waJ1 Dayal
v.
,\fJt. Utoli Dtvi
SuJ,;, Rao].
SUPRE.ME COURT REPORTS
[1962]
also of opinion that some only of tho members of a tavazhi cannot form a corporate unit
capable of holding property as such."
This decision also recognizes the legal concq:,tion
that only a joint family and its branches or subbranches can he corporate units capable of acquiring property, and that on!:; two or more members
belonging to different branches or e\·cn to one and
the same branch cannot constitute such a unit and
thcrefon,, cannot acquire property with the incidents of joint Hiudu family property.
A division bench of the Madras High Court
elaborated the same theme in '/'he Offir,ial Assignee
v. Neelambal Ammal (') and canw to tlw conclusion
that it is not possible for two members of an undivided Hindu family to deal with the property acquired by them in such a way as to impress 11 pon it
the incidents of a joint family property for themselves and their descendants. Hcilly, J ., observed
at p. 803 thus:
"As I understand t11e matter, & Hindu
joint family firm is a Rpecial form of partnership, the members of which must be eithPr
the whole of a joint family or tht• whole of a
branch of a joint family."
The learned Judge prnctically adoptC'd the reasoning of Bhashyam Ayyangar, J., m Swlarsanfmt
illai8tri v. Nara8h11lwfo Mr•istri (') so too, the Allahabad High Court in Himmat flahudur v. BJ/(Juw1i
Ku.nimr (') accepted
th<> view exprrnsccl by
Bhashyam Ayyangar, J.
The Judicial Committee in .fvg,·8u·ar Xurain
Dco v. Ram Chund Dutt(') clearly ruled that "the
priuciple of joint tcnanc:y is unknown to Hindu law
except 111 the case of the joint property of an
unclividcd Hindu family governed by the Mitakaharn law which under that law passes by survivorship". Tl1e same principle was restated by the
I I I (193JJ 65 M.L.J. 798.
(31 ( 1901) I.LR. 30 All. 352.
12) (190lJ I.L.R. 25 Mad. B9.
(4) (l~!)l>J t.R. 23 I.A. 37.
..
•
.-
3 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
479
Judicial Committee in Bahu Rani v. Rajendra
Balchsh Singh (1 ). If two or more members of
different branches or of the same branch;of a joint
Hindu family cannot acquire a joint property
impressed with the· incidents of joint family prof perty nnd if the Hindu law does not otherwise sanctfon acquisition of property by them as joint tenants
as understood in the English law, their rights and
liabilities can only be governed by the. terms of the
agreement under which they purchased the property.
Now let-us look at some of the decisions cited on
behalf of the appellant in support of the contention
that there can be a joint acquisition by such members giving rise to the right of survivorship though
not right of birth.. Strong reliance is placed upon
the decision of the Judicial Committee in Nathu Lal
v. Babu Ram (2 ). There, on the death of one of
two brothers, who were members of a Hindu family
the surviving brother claimed that he had been
joint with his brother and that the whole of the
property passed by survivorship to him so that the
widow of his deceased brother took nothing by
inheritance. The dispute was referred to arbitrators, who found that the two brothers had been
joint, and . divided the joint property between the
parties in certain unequal proportions. The widow
subsequently executed a deed of gift of part of the
property awarded to her in favour of one of her
daughters. On the death of the daughter, four sonii
of another daughter of the widow, claiming to be
reversioners of their grandfather obtained possession of the property passed by the deed of gift.
The nephew-in-law of the deceased daughter and a
purchaser from him sued to recover possession of
the property on the ground that the widow had
held an absolute estate and had by the deed of gift
conveyed an absolute estate in the property to her
d1tughter. The Judicial Committee held that on the
(I) (1933) L. ll. 60 I. A. 95.
(2) (1935) L. R. 63.1. A. 155.
19~1
· Bha1w•n Dayal
v.
.Ms t, Reoti Devi
Subia Rao J.
480
1901
Rhagwan !Jayal
V.
}.!st. Rtofi D,oi
Subba Rao ,7
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1962J
death of the <laught-er the property passed by survivorship to the surviving brother and not by inhcri·
tanco to the widow; but that upon the true construe·
tion of tho award, tho widow was given an absolute
interest. On that finding tho suit WM decreed.
But a scrntinv of !he facts shows that one Bud<lhi
had three s;;ns, Ram Sahai, Ji Sukh Ram and
Sita Ram, and that Buddhi and one of his sons, Sita
Ram left the family and the remaining two brothers
Ham Sahai aml .Ji Sukh Ram, continued to be
members of tho joint family. The .Tmlieial Committee rightly held that the propcrti"s purchased for
the family by the two brothers constituting the
joint family were joint family properties. It is
not a caso of some members of different brancl1es
or some members of tho same lm:nch purchasing
properties jointly, but a case of all thf' members
of a joint Hindu family purchasing properties for
the family.
Nor does the decision in Simm Xrirain v. 'l'hc
Court of Wards, on /Jehalf <!f Jung Buhadoo,. (')
afford any real assistance to t}w a ppcllant. There,
two Hindu brothers, who held ancestral estat-e in
common with a t1lird brother, acquired other property jointly, the learned Judges held, on the
evidence, that the property was held by tho two
brothers as members of a joint Hin<lu family. The
learned Judges held that the principle of blending
of a separate property with the joint family property ancl the principle of acquisition of property
bv •rnitcd membcrn of a diYid0d familr would
equally apply to an acquisition of pror;erty by
two of three brothers of 11 joint Hindu family,
Bhash}am Ayyangar, J ., in Sudarsan.am ~faistri v.
Xarasimhulu .llfaistri (') criticised that judgement
and observed that he should have no hesitation in
dissenting from t.he said decision. Tho learned
Judges missed the real point, namely, that some
m~mbl'rB of diffen•nt branches of a joint Hindu
(IJ (1873) 20W.R.
1"7.
(2) (1902) 1.L.R. 2~Mad. 149.
-
v
3 s:c.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
481
family cannot from a. corporate unit. In our view,
that decision is wrong and must be overruled.
Nor does the decision of the Judicial Committee
in Rainpershad Tewarry v. Sheovhurn Doss (') support the contention of the appellant. In that case
one of the five brothers constituting an undivided
Hindu family acquired personal property. With
that money and with the aid of bis brothers he
established and carried on banking business at five
different places. The Judicial Committee held that
the property so acquired was joint family property
,in which the brothers were entitled to share. A
perusal of the judgment shows that all the
brothers were members of an undivided Hindu
family and there was a nucleus of ancestral
property.and that all of them together acquired
the property jointly, though the banking business
was started with the help of the self-acquisitions
of one of the brothers. This again is a case of all
the members of a joint Hindu family acquiring
property for the family.
In Mayne's Hindu law, 11th edn., the legal
position has been neatly stated thus at p. 347 :
"So long as a family remains an undivided family, two or more members of it,
whether they be members of different branches or of one and the same branch of the
family, can have no legal existence as a
separate independent unit; but all the members ofa branch, or of a sub-branch, can form
a distinct and separate corporate unit within
the larger corporate family and hold property
as such. Such property will be joint family
property of the members of the branch inter se,
but will be separate property of that branch in
relation to the larger family.
The principle of joint tenancy is unknown
to Hindu law except in the case of the joint
(1)(1866) IO M.J.A. ~90.
J961
Bhqwan Dayal
v.
Mst. &oti.Qevi
Suhlo R.. J.
....
482
1901
Bha~DayQl
v.
-Alu. R10ti Dtvi
Swi;b• RGI>].
'SUPREl'lfE COURT REPORTS
[1962]
property of an undivided Hindu family govern.e<l by tho .!\fitakshara law."
The . legal pos1t1011 may be stated thus : Coparccn:1ry is a creat urc of Hindu law and cannot be
created by agreement of parti<'s except in the case
of reunion. It is a corporate body or a family unit.
The law also..recognizes a branch of the family a8 a
subordinate corporate body. The said family unit,
whether the larger one or the subordinate one, can
acquire, hold and dispose of family property subject
to tbe limitations laid down bv
. law. Ordinarilv. ,
the manager, or by consent, express or implied,
of tho members of the family, any other member
or members can carry im business or acquire property, subject to the limitations laid clown by the
said .law, for or on behalf of the family. Such
business or property would be the business or property uf tho family. The identity of the members
of the family is not complctcl.v last in the family.
One or more members of that family can start a
business or acquire property without the aid of the
joint family property, but such business or acquisi·
tion would be his or their acquisition. The business :so started or property so acquired can be
thrown into the. common stock or blended with
the joint family property in which case the said
.property becomes the estate of the joint family.
But ho or thoy need not <lo so, in which case the
said property would Lo hiR or their self-acquisition,
and succession to such property would be governed
not by the law of joint family but only by the law
of· inheri!;anoo. In such a cage, if a property was
jointly acquired by th·~m. it would not be governed
by the law of joint family ; for Hindu law doe8 not
.recognize some of the members of a joint family
belonging to· different, branches, or even to a single
branch, a.> 1t corporat~ unit. Therefore, tho rights
tnter se between the members who have acq11ired
the said property would be subject to the terms
of the agreement \\•hereunder it was acquired.
..
3 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
{
The concept of joint tenancy known to Ehglish
law .with the right of survivorship is unknown to
Hindu law except in regard to cases specially recognized by it. In the present case, the uncle and
the two nephews did not belong to the same
branch. The acquisitions made by them jointly
could not be impressed with the incidents of joint
family property. They can only be co-sharers or
co-tenants, with the result that their properties
passed by inheritance and not by survivorship.
In the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed
with costs.
Appeal dismiss~d.
;961
Bluizwan D'J14l
v•
•\f.st. '.Beo# Der1i
Subia 11., J.
MST. GULAB BAI
1P61
v.
S1;temher a.
.MANPHOOL BAI
(B. P. SINHA, C. J., P. B. GAJENDRAGADJLl.R and
RAGHUBAR DAYAL, JJ.)
Res Judicata-'Suit', Meaning of-If can denote part
of a suit or an issue in it-Code of Oi.~l Procedure, 1908
(Act V of 1908), s. 11. ·
The respondent had sued the appellant 2 on a rent note
in the Munsiff's court for recovery of Rs. 700/- as arrears of
rent and' ejectment. That suit was dismissed on the preliminary objection of defect of party as appellant 1, a co· lessor
in the rent note, had not been made a party. The respondent
then brought the present suit in the Civil Judge's court for
recovery of Rs. 2400 as arrears of rent from and for ejectment
of appellant 2, maki.ng appellant 1 a pro-forma defendant in
the suit. The appellant 2 pleaded that the su:t was barred
by res judicata and could not be decreed since appellant l
had not joined 'the responclenc in the clai1n. The High
Court, iri finally decreeing the suit in second app~al, .held·
that it was not barred by res judicata since the Munsiff had
not the pecuniary jurisdiction to try the suit and that
appellant I on a true construction of the. rent note, .was not a
a co-lessor with the respondent. It was urged on behalf of
the appellants in this Court that the word 'suit' in s. 11 of
the Code of Civil Procedure should be liberally, and not
literally, construed so as to include part of the suit or an issue
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