ALL INDIA BANK EMPLOYEES' ASSOCIATION versus NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL & OTHERS
Supreme Court of India | Decided 28 August 1961 | [1962] 3 S.C.R. 269 | 1961 INSC 248
Key facts
- Decided
- 28 August 1961
- Bench
- BHUVNESHWAR PRASAD SINHA*, S.K. DAS, A.K. SARKAR, N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR, J.R. MUDHOLKAR
- Bench size
- 5
- Case number
- CIVIL APPEAL No. 154/1961
- Disposal
- Dismissed
- Citation
- [1962] 3 S.C.R. 269
- Neutral citation
- 1961 INSC 248
Text of the judgment
3 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPOR'.l'S
269
should do something in the discharge of his own
duty and thereby obtain a valuable thing or pecuniary advantage.
These observations dispose of the present
appeal and it must be held that there is no merit
in the contentions raised in support of the appeal.
As the only point raised in support of the appeal
fails, it is accordingly dismissed.
1961
Dhane81twar
Na rain Saxen•
v.
The Delhi
~4dminiatratio11
Sinha C. J.
Appeal dismissed.
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ALL INDIA BANK EMPLOYEES' ASSOCIATION
1961
NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL & OTHERS
(And Connected Petitions)
(B. P. SINHA, c. J., s. K. DAS, A. K. SARKAR,
N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR and
J. R. MunHOLKAR, JJ.)
•
Fundamental Right-Right to form association or unionScope of-Stature protecting Banks from disclosure of information
regarding secret reserves etc.-Oonstitutionality of-Bankinll
Companies Act, 1949 (X of 1949), s. 34-A-Oonstitution of
India, Arts. 14, 19(1)(c).
Section 34-A of the Banking Companies Act, I 949, introduced in 1960, provides that no banking company shall be
compelled to produce or give inspection of its books of account
or other document or furnish or disclose any statement or information which the company claims to be of a confidential
4
nature and the production etc., of which would involve di•closure of information relating to any reserves not sho\crn as
suc_h in its published balance sheet or any particulars not shown
therein in respect of provisions made for bad and doubtful
debts and other usual or necessary provisions. Sub-section (2) of
'· 34-A provides that any authority, before whom the question
as to whether any amount out of such reserves or provisions
should be taken into account, may refer the question to the
Reserve Bank and the Reserve Bank shall furni•h to the authority a certificate stating that the authority shall or shall not take
-~ •-into account the amount specified therein. Sub-section (3)
makes s. 34-A applicable to only such banking companies whose
operations extend beyond one State. The Appellant contended
~UP~~
270
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l:!bJ
All India Bank
Employets'
AsDociation
v ••
Naiional Industrial
~ V'ibunal
COPRJ REPOR~S
[1962J
that s. 34-A c.;mtravened the fundamental tight guaranteed to
trade unions.by Art. 19( l')(c)' of the Constitution as it prevented
them .from effectively lxefcising the concomitent fight of
collective bargaining in
respect of \vages, bonus etc.
befOre Industria,l Trjbunals by shutting out important a11d re~
levant evidence and that thC Section violated Art. 14 of the
Constitution as it' was n6t mad.er applicable to all the banking·
•
co~panies.
r·
Held, thats. 34-A of the Banking Companies Act, 1949,
was constitutionally valid and did not'offend eitl)tr Art. 19( 1)( c)
or Art. 14 of the Constitution.
•
The right guarant~ed by Art. !9(l)(c) of the Constitution
does not carry \Vith· it a concomitant right that unions fC?rmed
for protecting the interests of labour shall achieve their object
such that any interference to such achievement by any law
wotild ,])e.uncl\rlstitution'af i.11\less' it could k>e 'justified ,under
Art. 1\1(4) as being in the interests of Public order or morality.
'.The right under Art, 19(l)(cJ extends only to the. formation of
an a's~9~i.afipn Of \lnion ap~ i~Ef:Jf¥ ,as ,the f\Ctixities 0( the jlS~O
ciation or union a.re con,csrl).i;d or ,as regards ~qe steps which
the union might take to acl{i.eve its otiject, they are subjec~ to
such laws as may be ffamed !and: suCh .la\\'S cannot be: tested
under Art. ll)(+) . . i;;e~pon 31-A was i;nacted to effect a reconciliation bet,veen lhf. confli~~n~ interest .of labour to obtain
p1opcr relief in. !nc!usir1a1 arLiLi'ation, a'Ila the beed to prc~ervc
and maintain the delicate fabrit of the credit structure of the
country by strengthening the t1eal as well as the appatent credit
w,orthiness of banks 'op'erating in •the country.· It preserved
industiial adjudication in' respect 'cf'disputes between the banks
and their employees by entrusting the duty of determining the
surplus res,rve :-rhich, <:ould be tal\~\1 iP~.o l''<;ount as a part of
the asse~s for determining t!'i~ir cap~city to pay to t4e l\.cservc
Bank,
·
Rome•h-fI'hdpparN.>State of .Madras (1950) S.C.R". 594
Ezpreas Newspapers (P.) Ltd: v. Unio1'oj lndid, ( 1959JS.C.R. 12,
Re. The f(erala Education Bill, ·(·1959) S.C.R. 995, National
A'8ociationjor the advan,,.ment of colcuredpeople v. Alabama, 2
Law. Ed. Second 1488; BatM·v. Little Rdck, 4 Law Ed. Seconsl
480, h'ational Labour Relation• Board ,v. Jones &> Lauqhlin
Steel Oorpofation, 81. Law: Ed. 893· and AmalgamalP.d Utility
WorHra v. Oonsolidatea.·1 Edi§cm Oo,,.pany of ·'New York,
84 Law. Ed. 738, referred io.
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TP,ougjt t}iere wi;re ccriail}, Ip,anks whic~ were not entitled
to~he pro(\'.9~~on.of s. 34.,.,. ~hat,'\'~·no ground for holding that
the. se9tii;m offenped. Ar,t. \ t· Tre co"1p,1,aint was not.made by
the b'!11ks w\J.o Vfere,no! g1ven,~he p~oteptmn. A'.lmi)t;:!)ly, 95,%.
of¢he ..b,anking };>}ljif\es~. in t!/e; .cgµntry; v.:as· iJ:t t\ie ·h#,?-,s pf
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3 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT HEPORTS
271
1961
banks to whom s. 34-A applied and they employed 80,000 out
of the 90,000 bank employees. The injury to the credit strucAll India Bank
ture will only be by the disclosure of the reserve etc. of the banks
Employees'
of this class and there is sufficient rational connection and basis
Association
v.
for the classification to justify the differenciation. The exclusion
Industrial
of the Reserve Bank from the operation of s. 34-A (2) also does Natio11al
Tribunal
not amount to discrimination; in the very nature of things and
on the scherne of the provision the reserve Bank could not but
be excluded.
CIVIL APrELLAT~ JumsnrcTION: Civil Appeal
No. 154 of 1961.
Appeal by special leave from the judgment
and order dated October 31, 1960, of the National
Industrial Tribunal (Bank Disputes), Bombay, in
Reference No. 1 of 1960.
•
WITH
Petitions Nos. 70, 80 and 82 of 1961.
Petitions Under Article 32 of the Constitution
_.
of India for enforcement of Fundamental Rights.
A. S R. Chari, V. G. Raw, D. P. Singh,
Jr[. K. Ramamurthi. R. K. Gm·g and S. C. Agaru·al,
for the appellant and the petition (in Petn. No. 80
of 61).
JI[. C. Setalvad, Attorney-General of India,
N. V. Phadke, K. H. Bhabha, J. B. Dadachanj-i,
S. N. Andley, Rameshwar Nath and P. L. Vohra, for
respondents Nos. 2-17 and 19-34 (In appeal and
Petn. No. 80 of 61).
J. B. Dadachanji, S. N. Andley, R1imeshwarNath
and P. L. Vohra, for respondents Nos. 41-49 (In
appeal and Petn. 80 of 1961).
_.
Anand Prakash, for Respdts. Nos. 35-40 (In
' Petn. No. 80 of 61).
A. V. Viswanatha Sastri, D. P. Singh,
Jlf. I(. Ramamurthi, R. K. Garg and S. C. Agaru·al,
for Intervener No. 2.
D.S. Nargolkar and K. R. Choudhri, for Petitioners Nos. 70 and 82 of 61).
1rf. C. Setalvad, Attorney-General of India,
__ C.K. Daphtary, Solicitor-General of India, H.N. San11ol,
"- Additional Solicitor-General of Indio, J.B. Dadachanji,
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272
1961
All /nt.Jia 1Ja1~k
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SUPREME COVRT REPORTS
[HJ6;.; J
S. N. Andley, Rameshu:ar Sath and P. /,. Vohm,
for Rcspdt No. 2 (In Pctns. Xos. 70 and 82 of GI).
Employet~'
As"ociat,'011
v.
National in'ftu;trial
Triliunal
Naunit Lul, for intcn·pner 1\o. :l.
JI. C. Set<ilrnd, Attomey-Geneml of lndi<i awl
1'. JI. Sen, for Intervener Xo. I.
1961. August :!8. The Judgment of the Court
was delivered hy
~yya11gar J.
AYYA::\GAH, J.-Civil ApJoeal No. l:;.1 of 1061
has been filed on special le•l\'c obtai11ed from thi~
Court against an order of K. T. l>cs<Li, J., funetioning as the Xational lndustriJ.l Tribunal (Hanks
Disputes) Bombay dated October :11, IOtlO. Tho
point arising for decision in the appeal i,; as reg11rds
the constitutional validity of s.34A of the B1inking
Companies Act, 194~) which was enacted un August
26, 1960 as an amendment to the 11<1.rcnt Act
(Aet X of 1949). The appellant before this Court is
the All India Bank Employees' Assot'iation whit'h is
;1 trade union urganization of Hank Employees of
several banks operating in India. The Punjab Xational
Bank Employees' Union, which is a trade union
with similar objecte has been permitted to intervene in this apveal in support of the appellant
union. _ The three other_ \Vrit Petitions are hy
other Bank Employees' Unions whose description
woul<l be apparent from the cause title and all
these cases have been heard together because in the
writ petitions also the point raised is identical,
r-iz., the validity of s.34A of the Banking Com.
panics Act, which will be referred to hereafter as
the impugned provision.
Section 34A whcse validity is tho matter in
dispute in these proceedings runs in tho following
terms:"34A. (1)
Kotwitl1stan<ling anything
containecl in section 11 of the lndustria l
Disputes Act, 1947, or any other law for tho
time being in force, no hanking company
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3S.C.R.
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SUPREllfE COURT REPORTS
27-3
shall, in any proceeding under the said Act
or in any appeal or other proceeding arising
thArefrom or connected therewith, be Com pelled by any authority before which such
proceeding is pending to producr, or give
inspection of, any of its books of account or
other document or furnish or disclose any
statement or information, when the banking
company claims ·that such document, statement or information is of a confidential
nature and that the production or inspection
of such document or the furnishing or disclousure of such statement or information
would involve disclosure of information relating to:
(a) any reserves not shown as such in
its published balance sheet ; or
(bl any particulars not shown therein in
respect of provisions made for bad and
doubtful debts and other usual or necessary
provisions.
(2) If, in any such proceeding in relation
to any banking company other than the
Reserve Bank of India, any question arises
as to whether any amount out of the reserves
or provisions referred to in sub-section (1)
should be taken into account by the authority
before which such proceeding is pending,
the authority may, if it so thinks fit, refer
the question to the Reserve Bank and the
Reserve Bank shall after taking into accont
principles of sound banking and all relevant
circumstances concerning the banking company, furnish to the authrity a certificate
stating that the authority shall not take into
account any amount as such reserves and
provisions of the banking company or may
take them into account only to the extent
of the amonnt specified by it in the certificate,
and the certificate of the Reserve Bank on
1961
Alt India Bank.
EmployeeH'
Associntion
v.
, · alinnal I ndustriat
Tribunal
Ay?}anqar J.
214.
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StJPRE:iIE COURT REPORTS
(1962]
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such question shall be final and shall not be
i.' call!jd in question in any such proceeding.
.f.:!c'.~r;:~
> . · ': (3) For. the ·purpos~s .of this section,
NaJJ,nal"jnau.irial.: '";·''.?~liking 'co~1i1;any'; ·shall.have the meaning
AU ltwia Bank
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assigned to 1t in the Industrial Disputes Act,
Tribunal
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··;Before commencing the examination of the 1ioints
in controversy and the grounds on which the legality
. 'oLthe: above provisio1Lis impugned .• It would be
i, 'helDful for a lietter. apvreciatioil of the: problem if
·'we set 'out, in very•biief· ciutlme,'the history of the
:steps which led to the enactment in dispute. .There
, ... was a Jong standing : practice. in England of· Banking
- · Companies, ·as distinguishcd~·from companies carry. ing ·on other commercial etc. activities/ not to
· disclose, . in their balance sheets and Profit & Loss
aiicouiits;· bad and doubtfol ;debts and the provision
. made therefore, · as w:ell as the secret reserves crcat' '.cd. and held midervariotis'items.,..:a practice which
'·received 'judicial"recognition·'by Buckley; L., J. in
'.'Newton v; Binrii1ig!ia'm Small AT1ns Co .. Ltd.' (1) This
practice was followed by, several banks in India and
,-. questions arose from:time to time as'to how far the
":'.practice was-consistent with the' statutory provisions
· ···as to disclosure contained in the several Companies·
' Acts. enacted from tiinc. to time.· ··,Ve shall, how.'· l ,ever,' add 'that the desirability and even the legality
-,.,··of this practice• has not• gone· without· challenge,
. :;:though there has been a co'nsideralJle body of opinion
·;.,"which· has held: this' to .b_o salutary: and necessary
•1 i fcir the preservation _and pr.ogress· 'of a .credit institu;
tation like a bank. We are' not now concerned with the
· ndeairability or ethics 'ofnthe ·practice which is a
. ·r1 matter;:.for the.:consideration of the; legisfature but
r<! as·.to the steps'bywhich'accord was established bet""·Weeri the'practice and the lll.w: · , .·; • · . _- · b·-"·
,r. .,_~',.
""'C?"'
:pie. I~dfo.n,~,()ompa'uies Act' of: ISQ6-;drew no .
. '..distinction between, the contents. of.balance· sheets
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";,· of·bariking-eompanies
as distmguished
from
those. of
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l!(I (l):·;(l906]2Ch.378• ._,. "" •>; •. · :1: ... '::.'; I·;;.
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3 S.C.R.
275
1961 ll!!'i .
other companies and both were required to disclose
a list of debts owing to the concern which were conAll lndia ]Jank
Emplo1Jee/$'
sidered barl or doubtful. Provisions on the same
Association
lines, ·i. e., without any distinction between Banking
v.
lnduBtrial,
and other companies, were copied and continued by 1Yatiorml
Tribunal
the Indian Companies Act of 1882. When, how.·lyya11gar ,T.
ever, the Companies Act of 1913 was enacted,
Form •F' to the 3r<l.'lchedule to the Act contained
a note in respect of the sub-heading 'book debts'
under the head 'I'roperty & Assets' in the balance
sheet, readi .1g :
"distinguishing in the case of a bank bet- ·
ween those considered good and in respect
of which the bank is fully secured and those .
considered good for which the bank holds no
security other than the debtor's personal security; and distinguishing in all cases between
debts considered good and debts considered
doubtful or bad. Debts due by directors or
other officers of the company or any of them
either severally or jointly with any other persons to be separately stated in all cases."
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SUPREJ\ffi COURT REPORTS.
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It would be seen that by reason of this note the
obligations imposed upon banks as regards the classification of their assets and the information to be
disclosed became slightly more detailed than in the
case of other companies. The practice, however,
of bankers to which we adverted earlier not to dis·
close or not to disclose to the full extent, bad and ·
doubtful debts but to make provision for thetn by
setting aside under other heads, sufficient moneys
which would operate as secret reserves, so that the
credit of the institution would not be affected while
its financial stability would remain unimpaired, was
continued notwithstanding this change in the form.
The Central Bank of India Limited in its published
balance-sheets of the year 1925 adopted the above
practice which, however, was not obviously in strict
conformity with the requirements of Form 'F' to
the third schedule read with the note. The
SUPRE:\IE COURT REPORTS
1961
All Jnrl ia 8111,k
J;mployr.ro'
Aasla~latio11
v•
•\"aiiuMI lndu.~iriul
Tribunal
Ayya11!}ar J.
[l 91l21
m:maging·clircetor of the bank was pnmecutcd bv
one Shamdasani wbo was a shareholuPr of tho ban·k
for "filing anu publishing Statements which ll'Crl' false
in material p1;rticulars"', an offence punishable under
8. 282 of the Indian Companies Act. The ~fa"istratc
acquitted the accused on the ground tlmt ti~· Lala.
ncc·shect "·as i11 accoruancc with tl11• u;ual practice
of bankPrS and that the resCr\"CS of tlW Cum pam·
which were shown UIJ(ler various head,; thou"h m;t
aR ;i specific provision fo1· bad and douLtful '\Iebts
l"OVered the possible luHses several times. An application for revision was filpcJ beforu the High Court
of Born hay and Fawcett, ,J. allowed it holding that.
"a declared pro1·ision or the form cannot be allowed
to he whit.tlecl down by vencra.l c01rnidorntions as tu
the object of a b.'\hmcc-shcct." This jud!,.'Il!ent was
rendered on February 28, 192i (vide Shamdc1srwi
v. Pocltkamc·dr1 (') and very soon thereafter tho
Government of fnnia intnvcned hr a notification
dated !llnrch :W, l!J27 under R. Iii! oi" the companies
Act HJI:I amending form 'F' and as amended bank:;
were excluded from the requirement of disclosing the reservo for had and doubtful debts under
the heading 'Capital and Liabilities' in the lefthand sido of the halance·sheet, and in the right-hand
column "hook debts which wcro hau and doubtful
for which prol'ision had been made to the satiHfac~
ti on of the auditors", were not required tu be shown
as part of the property and assets of n Ba11k.
The provisionR of the Companies Act of l!l 13
underwent numerous changes by the amending Act
of 1936 which included 1:nter alia one whcrPby tho
change effected by the Xotifica.tion, di~terl ~farch 2!J,
1927, in Form 'F' were omitted and Form 'F' was
ma.de to retain tho note which aecompanicd it under
the Act of 1913 without the exception in favour of
banks effedcd hy tho Notification. This was poi;sibly unintended, because on the day after the amcnuing Act came into operation, the Central Go1·crnme11t published a Notification on January Hi, 1937
\I) A.l.R. 1927 Bom. 414: 29 llom. LR. 722.
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
2i7
1961
again under s.151 of the Companies Act restoring
the alterations in the balancf'.sheet Form 'F' as hf~d All Indi'.a Bank
Employees•
been effected by the prior Notification of March
Association
1927. The validity of this Notification w.as quesv.
Induatrial
tioned as being beyond the powers of the Central 1'.tational
1 ribunal
Government by Sha!lldasani who filed a complaint
Ayyangar J.
against the Central Bank of India Limited and its
directors charging them with having issued a false
balance-sheet for the year ending December 31,1939,
a balance-sheet which was in conformity with the
form as modified by the Notification. The Magistrate
upheld the validity of the Notification and aquitted
the accused. Shamdasani preferred a revision to
the High Court and a full Bench of the Bombay
Hi!i:h Court held that the Notification was beyond
the powers of the Central Government, though the
order of acquittal was affirmed upholding the plea
of the accused that their act was bona fide in that they
believed the alteration in the form to be valid (Vide
Shamdasani v. The Central Bank of India Ltd.( 1 )
Immediately after this judgment the Central legislature passed Act XXX of 1943 with retrospective
effect validating the Notification and amendinQ'. the
relevant sections of the Companies Act. (ss. 132,151,
Art. 107) so as to empqwer the Government to
effect changes in the form of the balance-sheet in
the manner in which they had done in January
1937.
The next event in order of date relevant to
to the present cotext is the report of the Company
Law Amendment Commitee of the United Kingdom
presided over by Mr. Justice Cohen where the entire
question of undisclosed reserves was fully discussed.
The pros and cons of the question were elaborately
considered by the Committee and it is sufficient to
refer in this connection to a short passage in the
report. In paragraph IOI the problem is thus set
out:
"The chief matter which has aroused controversy is the question of undisclosed or, as
(i)l.L. R.1944Bom. 302.
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· :· 'ves .. · An u;idisclosed reserVe iS commonly crea- ·
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;• 7 )heyare frequently called,"secret orimierreser"
All Iodia Ba,k
v
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' ,_ ted by using profits to write. aown more' than
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is riecessarj such' assets as investments, freehold r
xai:on;,~fi::ff',ia1 ·- i- .'iindle~sehold ·property for plant and ·machi- • ·
., ."-nery; by ~reiiting. excessiVe p:fovisfons for bad.··
Ayy•nlf;ii'J:
; . ~debts 'of"~th11!°: co.nt!~gencies by charging
capi- .
. · tal ··expenditure: to -revenue; ·or by. under-'
; 1v;i)uing :stock'in .trade; .. ·NorinalTy the object
-~of.creating all undisclosed reserve is to enable ·
; ,, :i ci:rmpany to avoid: violent fluctuations in its •.
; ·-·'published profits ·or
dividends.'~ . :'
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The Committee made· number· of recommendations
severarcifwhich were:.adopted'jn the
K. Compa•·'
nies·, Act of 1!148; _and· those relevant Jo the point ·
undet,"discussiori _served to.brin·g:· the 'law as .to the'
contents of ri. oalarice-sheet of'iL Banking Company .
intidine with tho practice of sou'~d and well managed, 1
banks., Tri.India; 'special legislation· in relation to ·
Bankini . Ocimp:mies .·embodying . several of these.,.
recominendatioris ·was .'enacted 'in the shape of the·
Bankin~·.companies~Act ,1949'JAct:Xfof 1949). Section
29 cif .the Act,'lri.id-.do\vn ''.tile. lmv in "reg3rd · to
requfrements' of the contents :of the balance-sheets.
of.: banks: · The balance-sheet,, arid Profit· & Loss
account w~re to' be in the'fcirtn set out in' the 3rd
schedule to that and sub-s: (3) of that section' exem ...
pted . Banking Companies fro~ the requirements of '
conform fog_ to the forni of balance-sheet and Profit
& Loss ··apcount 9f cq~panfos · 'registered · under the .
Irid\an Companies Act; and t!ie·Central G<ivernment. ·
empowered by'sub'.s. (4) to-amend the form set .
out. in' the schedule by Notifications published in the .
offiCial '.Gazette: '"In Form 'A' which provided thee.·
morJel' of a balancii-sheet · ai:id Pr'ofit & Loss account .,
in tlie':c:\se .of banks_,' t~1~re·was: not much c~angll' ,s
compared to•the reCjmrements :·of tho prc:v10us law
except. that in tlif/ Pro~it & Loss account (Form :'B'
of the. tl\ird _schedulA) the prtl"7ision for bad and
rloubfful ·debts was permittild to:-be exchlded from the
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3 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
279
income so that the am1unt of bad and doubtful
debts did not figure separately on the income side
of the profit & loss account. The income as required
to be shown was "income (!es" provision made
during the year for bad and doubtful debts)". This
last item was modified by a Notification issued under
the power conferred by s.29(4) of\he Act in December
1951, so that after amendment the heading
"Income" in the Profit & Loss Account ran: "Income
(less provision made during the year for bad and
doubtful debts and other usual and necessary provisions''). Thus so far as sh'lreholders of Banks and
the general public inclurling tho customers of the
bank were concerned, hanks were relie,-cd from the
obligation of disclosing the entirety of their reserves
as s•1ch and also of the extent of had or doubtful
debts and the provision made therefor.
f
Whil~ th~ law wns in thh stat" dkp11t0s aro~"'
between the employees of banks ali over India and
the respective banks with regarrl to wages, conditions of work etc. which were referred by the Central Government in June 1949 to an ad hoc Tribun'l.I with Shri K. C. Sen, a retired Judge of the
Bombay High Court as Chairmnn. The Tribunal
passed an award but its validity was Huccessfully
challenged in this Court in April l!J51 on the ground
that all the members of the Tribunal who passed
th" award were not those who had all inquired into
the dispute. Thereafter a fresh Tribunal was
appointed in January 1952 with Shri S. Panchapagesa Sastri, a retired ,Judge of the High Court
of Madras as Chairman. The award of this Tribunal
was published in April, Hlfi:i, but it is not necessary
to state its terms. Appeals against the award were
preferr"cl to the Labour Appellate 'l'ribunal bQth
by th" banks as woll as hy worknwn The Appellate Tribunal which heard the appeal consisted• of
three members with Shri J eejeehhoy as president.
The claim of the workers in the appeal bdore
the Appellate Tribunal in great part related to a
1;161
All India Bank
E 1nployee8'.
ARsociation
v.
.Yil.!ional JnduJ?frial
'1'1il.Ju11al
280
1961
All I11din /Jarik
J.:tnpfoyttG'
.1s~OC{Qliun
v.
1'.'ahorml lrululifri(Jl
Tribute al
SUPRE~IE COURT REPORTS
(1962]
dcmaml for increased wages and salaries and the
main clcff'nce of thn banks was that they had not
the capil.r:ity to pay anything he~·on<l what. the
Sastry 'l ribunal had granted. The Jcejecbhoy
Tribunal set out their difficulties in assessing tlic
pleri of incapncit.y raised by the banks in the co11text of the provisions of the Banking Companies
Act an<l the form of balance·shcet prescribed thereunder in the follo\l·ing terms :"At the verv outset there is an initial
difficulty in arrh;ing at a correct e~timate of
the financial position of banks. There are two
circ·umstanccs which militate against our securing a prop<'r insight into the finandal stato of
banks. ·w., rcfor in particular to (a} the
un<lisrloscd or HCC'l"et reserves and (b} to the
mamwr in which it is permissible in law for a
bankiiig •·ompany to exhibit its balance sheet.
It is not in dispute that hank do hM·c
undiFclosecl or sc·cret r<'sen·C's which they
aequire i11 11 number t•f ways, and such umlisclosed rescrvC's can11ot be ascertained from the
balance sheet ............................... : ......... .
x
x
x
The other difficulty with which we are
confronted at the out~et is the manner in
which a bank is permitted to present its
profit &. loss account. On the income side ~he
form originally prescribed by the Rankmg
Companies Aet required the hanks to declnre
"Income Jpgs provision macle during thl· year
for bad an<! <loubtfnl d~bt~)"" ; this has now
heen altered bv an aml·ndment made by the
Cl'n:ral Govcrnm~nt in <'Xercise of the powers
eonforred under suh-Rection 4 of section 29 of
the Banking Companies Act to read "Income
(less provigion made during the yt•ar fur bad
and doubtful debts and other usual or necessary provisions)". The effect of this altera·
tion is that the profits as shown for any
. '
-·-·
3 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1961
particular year are first shown not only of
All India Ban'
bad and doubtful debts but also of 'other
Employeea•
usual or necessary provisions' before being
Association
v.
shown in the balance sheet ....................... .
Nation •l Indmtrial
Tribunal
It mav be that these 'other usual or necessary "provisions' have been passed by the
Ayyangar J.
Board of Directors, and by the auditors of the
concern and may even have been scrutinized
by the Reserve Bank of India ; but it is our
duty and function to decide the question of
the capacity of a bank to pay, and in the
absence of important information of this
character our estimate of the capacity of &
concern to pay must necessarily be incomplete ........................ Banks feel that they
now have the form of the Banking Companies
Act to shield themselves against an enquiry on
the subject; but insofar as we are concerned
we consider these undisclosed reserves and
these appropriations relevant for the purposes
of our investigation and in their absence we
would have to decide as best as we could from
the other materials before us and draw such
inferences as justified."
It was the contention of the workmen that an
Industrial Tribunal had the right in law to compel
hanks to disclose their secret reserves as well as the
amount of "the bad and doubtful debts and other
necessary provisions" which had been excluded
under the h'ead "income" in tho Profit & Loss
Account of banks. This matter was agitated by them
before this Court in Stite Bank of India and others
v. Their Workmen (1) being an appeal against the
decision of the Labour Appellate Tribunal. In view,
however, of the conclusion reached by this Court on
other parts of the case it refrained from pronouncing upon the correctness or otherwise of this claim
by the workmen.
The diputes between the employees of banks
0
*
•
\
281
(I) (1959), 2 L.~L. J. 205.
282
i!ICJ
All Indirs Bank
Employtt•'
.Auocialion
v.
• ./'lati-OMJ Inctustrial
1"ribunal
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1962]
...
11.nd the managements, however, continued with the
result thR,t on March 21, 1960 the Central Government in exorcise of the powors conferred on it by
sub-a. (I A) of s. I 0 of the Industrial Disputes Act
referred the dispute which related to several
matters to the NR,timml Tribunal constituted bv &
Xotification of Govrrnment or the snm" c1:1te,
K. T. Desai, J. was the Tribunid so nppointnd. :.'\Inst
of the rnnjor banks in tho country were nrnd" parties
to the reft>rence including tho Reserve Bank and
State Rank of Imlia. A ft.er the Tribunal started
functioninir and after the parties formulated their
respeotivo contentions, applications were filed by
the Bank Employees Association on June 9, 1960,
for directing the respondent-banks to produoe
before the Tribunal for the purpoHcs of adjudication
several documents listc<l in the applications. Among
the items in reHpe<'t 0 f which production was thus
sought were (I) st.atements ~howing "the s1•cret
reserves in any fonn" of each bank from 19.'i~ right
upto December 31, 195!l ; and ( 2) statements showing the provision made "for bad and doubtful debts
and other usual and necessary provisions" during •
tho years 195c! to 195() and tho total amounts
outstanding in such items in each bank in tho said
years. The banks filed their reply on July Hi, l!l60.
The production of the. doeumonts and tho information called for on se\·era\ of the matt .. rs including
the above two was resisted hy the Indian BankR
Association {being an aHsoriation of employers) on
the ground that th{'Y were by Jaw exempted from
disclosure in th" interest. of the in<lnHtry aml the
public and claimed abHoluto privil<'ge from making
the disclosure.
It was at this stage that the impugned provision was enacted by Parliament as an aml'mlment
to tho Ranking Comvanics Act. A~ several of the
•
banks relied upon th;i impugned provisions in.support..,..
of their plea that they could not he compelled to
disclose either the quantum of their secret reserves
or their naturo, or as regards the provision made in
...
3 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
283
~
the several years for "bad and doubtful debts and
for other reasonable and necessary provision", the
bank employees association challenged the constitutional validity of s. 34A of the Banking Companies
Act, whieh, if' valid, could have afforded a 2ufficient
answer to the demand for production of the docu)- ments in relation to these matters. This objection
was argued before the National Tribunal which
upheld the validity of the section. As we have
stated earlier, Civil Appeal No . .154 is directed
against and challenges the correctness of this decision. The Writ Petitions have been filed by Bank
Employees Associations which were not parties to
the application for production before the National
-> Tribunal and are intended to support the plea of the
appellant in Civil Appeal No. 154 of 1961.
The foregoing narrative would show that the
Banking Companies Act, as it stood before t,he
amendment now challenged, had brought the law as
to the disclosure of secret reserves and the provision for bad and doubtful debts etc. Into accord
• with the usual practice of Bankers, and harl protected these items from being compulsorily disclosed to
the shareholders of the respective companies and
to the general public. There had been a controversy
as to whether the workmen of these establishments
were or were not entitled to be placed on a different
position from the shareholders because of the bear.. ing of these undisclosed items on the determination
· ' of the quantum of their wage etc. and on their
conditions of work having financial implications.
Parliament had, by the impugned legislation,
extended the protection from eornpulsory diRclosure
to the workmen as well, but with a safeguard in
their case that the Reserve Bank would cletermine
the amount of reserves etc. which cou Id be taken
,. into account in the course of industrial adjudication.
""The question before us is, is this attempt iit some
approximation of the position of tbe workmen to
that of shareholders etc. unconstitutional ?
1961
All India Bank
Employees'
Association
v.
National Industrial
Tribunal
Ayyangar J.
284
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1962)
. . ~fr. Chari, foarnerl Counsel for the appellant,..
m Civil Appeal No. 154 arlclressed to us the main
arguments in the case and these were supplev.
mented by learned Counsel appearing for the petiNalior111l lndu.rlrial
tioners in the several writ petitions and also by
·rrJJunril
learned Counsel on behalf of the Tntervencrs both
Ayyungur J.
in the appeal as well as in the potitiom. Though
tho arguments before us ranged O\•er a vPr>· wicle .;
fiel<l, the attack on the validitv of the )Pgislation
was rested on two main gro'iinds : (I) that th('
impugned legislation contravened the fun<lamcntal
right guarant.cc<I to "trade unions" h>• tl1C' proYision contained in sub-cl. (c) of cl. (I) of Art. HI; an<!
(2)"that it violated the freedom of rguality guaranteed by Art. 14 of the Constitution.
1981
All India Bank
r;mployte•'
Aa8ocial j 011
We shall consider these two points in that
order : First as to the impugned provision being
obnoxious~to, or in·~,·.ontravention of sub-cl.(c) of
cl. (!)'of Art.•19·of the~ Constitution. This Article
runs, to quote only t.ho relevant words :
"Article 19. (l) All citizens shall have thl'I
ri"bt:._
•
0
(a) ........................................... ..
(h) ............................................ .
(c) to form association:-; or 11nions.; "
The right is subject to tlw gualifiPation Pontaim·d in
cl.(4), reading:
..
"( 4 ). Nothing in sub-clause (c) of th<;
said clause shall affect the operation of a.n.v
existing law insofar as it imposes, or prPvm1t.
the Stat~ from making any law imposinµ-, in
the interests of public order or morality,
reasonable restrictions on tho excrciRe of the
right conferred by the said sub-clauRP."'
It is not the contention of any of the learned Conljjo- •
sel that the right of workm(m to form 1mionB or
associations which is the right guaranteed· by
sub-cl. (c) of cl. (l) of Art. 19 on its literal reading has
3 s.c.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
285
JV61
.peen denied by the impugned legislation. The
All India Bank
argument, however, was that it would not be a proEmployees'
per construction of the content of this guaranteed
Association
freedom to read the text literally but that the freev.
Industrial
dom should be so understood as to cover not merely .National
Tribunal
a right to form an union in the sense of getting
Ayyangar J.
their union registered so as to function as an union,
i.e., of placing no impediments or restrictions on
>their formation which could not be justified as
dictated by pablic order or morality but that it
extended to confer upon unions so formed a right
to effectively function as an instrument for agitating and negotiating and by collective bargaining
secure, uphold or enforce the demands of workmen
in respect of their wages, prospects or conditions of
work. It was further submitted that unless the
-"' guaranteed right comprehended these, the right to
foim an union would be most illusory. To understand the implications of learned Counsel's submission in their proper perspective the several steps
in the reasoning might be set out as follows :
•
(l) 'fhe Constitution guarantees, by sub cl.(c)
•of cl. (l) of Art. 19, to citizens in general and to
workers in particular the right to form unions. In
this context it was pointed out that the expression
'union' in addition to the word 'association' found
in the Article refers to associations formed by workmen for "trade union" purposes ; the word 'union'
being specially chosen to designate labour or Trade
"'unions
.
•
(2) The right to "form an union" in the sense
of forming a body carries with it as a concomitant
right a guarantee that such unions shall achieve ·the
object for which they were formed. If this concomitant right were not conceded, the right guaranteed
to form an union would be an idle right, an empty
shadow lacking all substance.
rl
-
(3) The object for which labour unions are
brought into being and exist is to ensure collective
286
19Gl
All India Bank
F.mplo;JtC$'
A3aoC•at!·on
v.
Nativnal lndu1/rial
Tribunal
l(>yangar J.
SUPREME COURT f:.EPOHTS
(1062)
bargaining by labour with the employers.
The
necessity for this has arisen from an ineapaciti~
stemming from tho handicap of poverty and come:
qucnt lack of bargaining power in workmen a.~
compared with employers which is the reason d'etre
for the existence of labour organizations. Collective
bargaining in order to bo effective must bo enforceable labour withdrawing its co-operation from the
omploycr am! there is consequently a fumlamcntal .;
right to strike a right which is thus a natural deduction from tho right to form unions guaranteed by
sub-cl. (o) of cl.( I) of Art. 19. As strikes, ho\1'c\·cr,
produce economic dislocation of varying intensity or
magnitude, a system has been devised by which
compulsory industrial adjudication is substituted for
the right to strike. This is the ratio underlying tho
provisions of tho Industrial Disputes Act l !J.1 i undor"which Governmont is empowered in tho event of an
industrial tlisputo which may ultimately lead to a
strike or lock-out or when such strikes or lock-outs
occur, to refer the dispute to an imparti;\I 'l'riuuiw.l
for adjudication with a provision banning arnl nm.king illegal strikes or lock-outs during the pcndcucy
of the adjudication proceedings. The pro\·ision o'9
a.n alternative to a strike in the shape uf industrial
adjudication is a restriction on the fundamental
right to strike and it would be ron~onable and
vs.lid only if it were an effective Bubstitute.
(4) For an adjudication to snti8fy the tests of
rea.sona.blenoss and effectiveness two conditions arc
necessary : (a) that the ndjudicator should
enabled to have before hint all the materials which
a.ro necessary for pronouncing upon tho matt-0r in
controversy before him; and (b) that tho adjudicator by whom tho controversy between the parties
should be decided should be an impartial person
or body who would render the decision or award
after fully hearing the parties, and that no rnatt-0r
in controversy should be the subject of ex patle ~
decision by an interested party or without tho
disputants having an opportunity to know the
u:
3 S.C.R.
>,
•
•
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
287
materials on which the decision is reached, as also
an opportunity to place their case with reference to
such material.
(5) In regard to the right of la hour unions to
function effectively and to achieve the object of their
existence as set out earlier, by negotiated settlement or by compulsory adjudication, the only limitatio,ns permitted to be imposed by law are those set
out in cl.(4) of Art. 19 and unless, therefore, either
the objects of tho association or the manner of
achieving them are contrary to, or transgress public
order or morality, for which reason alone reasonable
restrictions might be imposed upon the guaranteed
right, the freedom gnarar,teed is absolute.
(6) The lcgislat~on now impugned withdraws
as it were a vital issue in dispute between the parties before the adjudicator, viz., the capacity of the
industry to pay, from his cognisance and vests the
power of deciding that issue in the Reserve Bank
which is a biased and interested party, the decision
itself being rnndered ex parte, the trade unions
being deprived even of the knowledge of facts which
lead to the decision .
It was on this line of reasoning that learned
Counsel submitted that the impugned enactment
violated the freedom guaranteed by sub-cl. (c) of
cl. (1) of Art. 19 .
We shall now proceed to consider the soundness and tenability of the steps in the reasoning. It
is not necessary to discuss in any detail the first
step as sub-cl. (c) of cl. (l) of Art. 1!1 does guarantee
to all citizens the right "to from associations". It
matters little whether or not learned Counsel is
right in his submission that the expression 'union'
in the clause has reference particularly to Trade
Unions or whether the term is used in a generic
sense to designate any association formed for any
legitimate purpose and merely as a variant of the
expression "Association" for comprehending every
body of persons so formed. It is not controverted
1961
AU India Bank
Employees'
Association
v.
National Industrial
Tribunal
Ayyangar J.
288
SUPREME COURT REPOHTl:i
1961
AU lndi.a Ba11k
J:mployttJ'
:lsJocialiori
v.
Nalio1tal Industrial
'Tribunal
that workmen have a right to form "associations or
unions" aud that any Jogal impediment in the way
?ft.he format.ion of such unions imposed directly or
~directly which does not satisfy the tests laid down
m ~I. (4) would be unconstitutional as contravening
a right guaranteed by Pa.rt III of the Constitution.
It is the second step in the argument of the
learned Counsel, viz., that the right guaranteed ·to
form "an union" carries with it a concomitant right
that the achievement of the object for which the
union is formed shall not be restricted by legislation
unless such restriction were imposed in the intcr<>st
of public order or morality, that calls for critical
examination. We shall be referring a little Inter to
the authorities on which learned Counsel rested his
arguments under this htad, but before doing so we
consider it would be proper to discuss the matter on
principle and on the construction of the constitutional provision and then examine how far tho
authorities support or contradict the conclusion
reached.
The point for discussion could u" funuulated
thus : When sub-cl. (c) of cl. (I) of A rt. l!J guarantees the right to form associations, is n guarantee
also implied that the fulfilment of cv<'ry object of
an association so formed is also a prokcte<l right,
with the result that there is a constitutional guarantee that ovcry association shall effectively achieve
tho purpose for which it was formed without intc-rference by law except on grounds relevant to the
presel"l'ation of public order or morality set out in
cl. (4) of Art. 19? Putting aside for the moment
the case of Labour Unions to which wo shall refer
le.ter, if an &SBociation were formed, let us say for
carrying on a lawful business such a8 a joint.stock
company or a partnership, does the guarant-00 by
sub-ol.(o) of the freedom to form tho association, carry
with it a. further guaranteed right to tho company or
the partnership to pursue its trade and achieve its
profit-making object 1md that the only limitations
...
3 S.C.R.
•
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
289
1961
which the law could impose on the activity of the
a5sociation or in the way of regulating its business
All India Bank
Employees•
activity would be those based on public order and
As8ociation
morality under ol. (4) of Art. 19? We are clearly of the
v.
Industrial
opinion that this has to be answered in the negative. Nat-ional
Tribunal
An affirmative answer would be contradictory of
Ayyangar .7.
the scheme underlying the text and the frame of the
several fundamental rights which are guaranteed by
Part III and particularly by the scheme of the
seven freedoms or groups of freedoms guaranteed
by sub-els. (a) to (g) of cl. (1) of Art. 19. The
acceptance of any such argument would mean that
while in the case of an individual citizen to whom a
right to carry on a trade or busincsa or pursue an
occupation is guaranteed by sub-cl. (g) of cl. (1) of
Art. 19, the validity of a law which imposes any
restriction on this guaranteed right would have to
be tested by the criteria laid down by cl. (6) of
Art. 19., if however he associated with another and
carried on the same activity-say as a partnership, or
as a company etc., he obtains larger rights of a different content and with different characteristics which
include the right to have the validity of legislation ·
restricting his activities tested by different standards, viz., those laid down in cl. (4) of Art. 19.
This would itself be sufficient to demonstrate that
the construction which the learned Counsel for the
appellant contends is incorrect, but this position is
rendered clearer by the fact that Art. 19-as contrasted with certain other Articles like Arts. 26, 29 and
30-grants rights to the citizen as such, and assocfations can lay claim to the fundamental rights
guaranteed by that Article solely on the basis of their
being an aggregation of citizens, i.e., in right of the
citizens composing the body. As the stream can
rise no higher than the source, associations of
citizens cannot lay claim to rights not open to
citizens, or claim freedom from restrictions to which
the citizens composing it are subject.
The resulting position may be illustrated thus :
Ir an association were formed for the purpose of
-, .
,
SUPHfillE COURT REl'OltTS·
!WO
'[Hl62J
carrying on business, the right to form it w.ould be
guaranteed by sub-cl. (o) of cl. (I) of Art.19 subject
All India Ba11k
· Ernployee.s'
to' any law reRtricting that right conforming to
Association,
cl: (!) of Art. 19. · As regards it& business activities,
v.
~·at ional Indutilrial
however;
and the. achievement of the objects for
Tribunal
Twhich it was brought into existence, its rights ~ould
JJ:J'OllQ1T J ...
be· those. t,'llaranteed by sub-cl. (g) -of cLll} of_
Art; 19 subject to any relevant :Jaw on· the· matter
.---- conforming to cl. (6) of Art. 19 ; while the property
which the associatioil acquires or·possesses would be
protected by sub-cl. (f) of cl. (1) of Art. 19 subj6ct to
legislation within the limits laid down by. cl. (5}. of ·
Art.il9.
.:; .
. ~. . ..
1961
.
'
.
·•
•..
.
I
-
.
'-
'
'
.:' · ,'\Ve.consider it unnecessary to multiply. ·examples· to further·illustrate the1ioint. · Applying w~t
\ve have stated earlier to the case of a Jabour union
Uie positiori,would be, this: while_ the right: to form
an union is guaranteed by sub-cl. (c}, the right of
the. mew hers of the associatioir to meet ,foul<l be
i,riiaranteed_by sub-cl. (b), their right to uiove from
place to'place within India by sub-c!.(d), their ,right
to discuss their 'problems' and to propagate ·their
vi<.l\vs by~ sub-cl; (a), "their right' to hold property
-would be that guaranteed by sub-CJ. (f) and so on-,
each;of these'freediims beillg subject to such restrictions as might properly he imposed by' C!s: (2) to
.(6) of Art. 19 as might be appropriate in the: context. · It is cine thing to interpret each of the free: '
doms guaranteed by the several Articles in°Part III
in a 'fair and liberal sense, it is quite another to read
·eaclr guaranteed right.
involving or including
. eonoomitant rights nece6Sitry to achieve the. object
'which might be supposed ,to under lie the grant: of
·. ·each' of those rights; for that construction would, .
"" . by' a series of ever . expanding concentric circles in
· '·the shape '--of· rights·.. concomitant to concomitant ·rights· and so on, lead. to _au almost grotesque. result,
as
iL;·~i::·
·;~.;_:-
'.;,-··,1·,"··,,: . . . • ' ..
:
·
'"'·
·
There is no doubt. that Ill the context of the .
. -. principles .underlying .• the Constitution arid the
.!_\_l'1)_,.,:;•:;l;__;;,:.._,·
m'anner in which its
Part III ,has
been framed the
,.,·.-"';,.
. .
----••r·.,:.
·•
_,;
. . .,
3 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT B,EPOH,TS
•
•
291
guarantees embodied in it are to be interpreted in a
liberal way so as to subserve the purpose for which
the constitution-makers intended them and not in
any pedantic or narrow sense, but this however
does not imply that the Court is at liberty to give
an unnatural and artificial meaning to the expressions used based on ideological considerations. Besides it may bo pointed out that both under the
Trade Unions act as well as under the Industrial
Disputes Act the e:iqiression 'union' signifies not
merely a union of workers but includes also unions
of employers. If the fulfilment of every object for
which an union of workmen was formed were held
to be a guaranteed right, it would logically follow
that a similar content ought to be given to the same
freedom when applied to an union of employers
which would result in an absurdity. We are pointing this out not as any conclusive answer, but to
indicate that the theory of learned Counsel that a
right to form unions guaranteed by sub-cl. (c) of
cl.(l) of Art.19 carries with it a fundamental right in
the union so formed to achieve every object for
which it was formed with tne legal consequence that
any legislation not falling within cl. (4) of Art. 19
which might in any way hamper the fulfilment of
those objects, should be declared unconstitutional
and void under Art, 13 of the Constitution, is not a
proposition which could be acoepted as correct.
Besides the qualification subject to whiuh the
right under sub-cl. (c) is guaranteed, viz., the coi1tents of cl. (4) of Art. 19 throw considerable light
upon the scope of -the freedom, for the significance
·and contents of the grants of the Constitution are
best understood and read in the light of the restrictions imposed. If the right guaranteed included not
merely that which would flow on a literal reading
of the Article, but every right which is necessary in
order that the association brought into existence
fulfils every object for which it is formed, the qualifications therefor would be not merely those in
ol.(4) of Art. 19, but would be more numerous and
1961
All India Bank
b'mployees'
Associatio11
v.
l\'alional lndustri-al
1-ribu11al
Ayyangar J.
2!12
' .
\
·\ SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[l!l62[
1961
very different, restrictions - which bore u11on and
took
into account the several fields in which associaEmpl-Oyees'
Association
tions or unions of citizens might leiritimately engage
v.
l\Icrely by way of illustration we
;.YtJl ional Ind us! rial themselves.
Tribunal
inight ·point out that learned Counsel admitted that
though the freedom guaranteed. to workmen to forrn
.rl!Jyangar J.
)aliour unions carried with it the concomitant right
to collective . bargaining together with the right to
strike, still.the.provision in the Industri'll Disputes
•.\ct forbidding strikes in the protected industries as
well as in the event of a reference of the dispute to
adjudication under s. 10 'of the Industrial Disputes Act was conceded to be a reasonable restriction on
the ri;jht guaranteed by sub-cl.(c) of c!.(l) of Art. I!!.
It· would -be seen - that ·if the -right to strike
were by implication a right guaranteed by sub-cl. (c)
•
of cl. (1) of Art.· l!l;thcn the restriction-mi tliat
right in t]ie interests of the-general· public, i·iz.,-of
national economy while perfectly legitiniate if tested by the criteria in cl. (6) of Art. l!I, might not be
capable. of being sustained as : a reasonable restiction ,iniposed for ·reasons of morality or public
order; ·On' the construction of the Article, there.. fore; apart from the authorities to which we shall
refer presently,
have reached the conclusion that
everi a very liberal interpretation . of sub-cl. (c) of
cl.' (1) of'Art. l!I cannot lead to the conclusion that
,the trade· unions have· 'guaranteed right to. an
~effective collective_ bargaining or to strike, either as
' •part of collective bargaining or .. otherwise. .The
right to strike_ or the right to declare a lock-out may
t be-controlled or restricted by appropriate industrial
legislation, and the validity of such legislation would
have to be'tested not with reference to the criteria
laid down, in cl.(4) o,f Art. l!I b1,1t by totally different
· consid!,lrations. ·
,.
.
' i , ,\Ve shall rio\v·proceed to consider the authori·ties relied on by .the lea~ed Counsel in support of
this, theory of "concomitant right'' to collective
ba.rgairiing . guaranteed to labour unions. First as
regards the decisions of this Court on which learned
..1tl India Ban~
we
a
- -" i
•
3 S.C.R.
SUPRE!VIE COURT REPORTS
293
Counsel relied, Ramesh Thappar v. The State of
ivfadras('} was the earliest case referred to and learned
counsel placed reliance in particular on the following
pass,tge in the judgment of the learned Chief
Justice :
"Turning now to the merits, there can be
no doubt that freedom of speech and expression includes freedom of propagation of ideas,
and that freedom is ensured by the freedom
of circulation. 'Liberty of circulation is as
essential to that freedom as the liberty of
publication. Indeed, without circulation the
publication would be of little value' : Ex parte
Jackson, 96 U.S. 727".
Based on this, learned Counsel submitted that
if the phrase 'freedom of speeoh and expression' in
sub-cl. (a) of ol. (l) of Art. 19 were given this liberal
construction so as to effectuate the object for which
the freedom was conferred, a similar construction
ought to be adopted of the content of the freedom
guaranteed by sub-cl. (cl of cl. (1) of Art. 19. We
are, however, unable to discern any analogy between tlie two cases. It is obvious th<it "freedom
of speech" mea"ns freedom to speak so as to be
heard by others, and therefore to conve~, one's ideas
to others. Similarly the very idea of freedom of
expression necessarily connotes that what one has a
right to express may be communicated to others.
Unless therefore the freedom.guaranteed by sub-cl.( a)
of ol. (1) of Art. l9 were read as confined to the
right to speak to oneself or to express his idPas to
himself, which obviously they could not mean, the
guaranteed freedom would mean freedom to addres5
others, and of conveying to others one's ideas by
printed word, viz., freedom of circulation. We do
· not see, t,herefore, any analogy between the case
which was considered
by
this Court in
Homesh Thappar's (') case and the one before us.
(ll 1950 s:c.R. 594 In A.
1961
All India Bank
Employees'
.Issociat-ion
v.
National
Industrial
Tribunal
Ayyangar J.
294
1961
All Tnclii Ba11k
F.rnplo~ttll'
..
Asaoci(ltion
,\"utio11af [11dtutriol
Trilitoml
A;yungar J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1962)
The obRervations in t,he jurlgment ofBhagwati, J.
in Express Neu·.•papers (Prirntc) ltd. v. Ur>ion nf
ln1f.ia.( 1) on which Conmcl relier!, in regard to the
content of tho 'fru<'rlom of speech and expression'
that. th<>y "inclurlc within its ~cope the freedom of
the press", for tho press with the nrintc<l word is
merely the mechanism hy which the freedom is
P.Xl'rr·ised do not really cnrr~· the matter any further.
We were next referrer1 to the observations of
Das C.•T. in thfl arlvisorv ciriinion Re the Kerala
Ednrati'on Bill('). Thf' que~t ion, which Wlls hPing
considered in the passage r<'lied on, rl'latcd tci the
scope anrl content of cl. (l) of Art. 30 which guaranteca to ll!l minorities a right to est:thliRh anrl administer e<lucational institutions of their choice.
The question dchated lwforo this Court was,
whetlwr the nroYision in tho Kerala Education Bill
which rlenieil recognition h~· Government to educational institutions run by minoritif's contr:n-ened
thi.'l frrPrlom gnarantcc<l ·to them ? DC'aling with
thiR Das C..J. s.iirl :
''Without recognition, therC'forc, the cducntionnl inRtitution8 csta~ishcd or to bo
establi•hcrl hy the minorit;v communities cannot fulfil the real objects of their choicn and
the rightsurnlnr Art. 30(1) cannot be effectively
exerciserl. The right to establish c<lurational
inBt.itutions of t.Jieir choico must, therefore,
menn the ril!ht to establish real institutions
whioh woul<l cffectiv!'IV ~Prvc the nerd~ of
their communit.v and th'e srholars who r!'sort
t0 thl'ir educational institutions. There is, no
doubt, no ~uch thin!:! as fundamental right to
recognition by the Stato but to deny rccogni1ion to the cilucationa.1 institutions excep~
upon terms tantamount to tlw Hllrr1>n<ler of
their constit11tion:1l rirht. of ndministrat ion <'f
th" <'<l•ll':>tinn:tl institntions of thrir rhoirr iR
'I l !9595.C.R. 12.
•
A
'
....
3 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
...
295
1961
in truth and in effect to deprive them of their
All India, Bank
rights under Art. 30 (l)."
Eniployees'
Association
We do not consider that these observations
and ·this construction of cl. (I) of Art. 30 a,ssist J.lafional v.Industrial
learned Counsel in his submisdon as regards the
Tribunal
theory of concomitant rights flowing from the free·
Axranqar J.
dom guaranteed by sub.cl. (cl of cl. (1) of Art. 19.
The observations of the learned Chief Justice and
the conclusions drawn are in relation to the con·
struction of Art. 30 and cannot be divorced from
the context. They do not purport to lay down any
general rule of construction for the freedoms guaran·
teed under the several sub-heads of cl. {l) of Art. 19,
and, indeed, what we have pointed out earlier
should suffice to indicate the impossibility of
upholding any such construction of the freedoms
guaranteed by the Ia.tter Article.
· L8arned CounsP l also referred us to certain
passages in two judgments of the Supreme Court of
the United States : N at-ional Association for the
advancement of c~lored people v. Alabama,( 1 )and B1ife8
v. L'ittle Rock( 2 )in which'the~Court held that freedom
of speech and assembly which wPre fundamental
rights guaranteed by the Constitution would be
abrogated or improperly encroached upon by legislation which compelled the disclosure to public
authorities of the membership rolls. In the two
decisions the facts were that the associations in
question were for the P-rotection of coloured persons
and the requirement of disclosure"of the names of
members was inserted in the law for the purpose of
putting a pressure upon these associations so as to
dissuade people from joining them. The aq:(ument
of learned Counsel before us was based on the dicta
in these two decisions that the right to form an
association which followe<l by reason of the 'clue
process' clause in the 14th amendment carried with
it the right to ensure that the associations were able
to maintain themselves as associations. In the two
(I) 2 Law. Ed. Second 1488.
(21 4 Law. Ed. Second 480.
291i
1961
Alf !nd!a Bank
},'mpln1•,u'
.-t.~.voc :·,lfi 911
v.
.\"nlinmil lmlustrial
'Tril>11>mf
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1962]
decisions referred to, the leamod Judges of the
Supreme Court of the Uniterl States were not
constrnini? the eontent of n proviRion on the lines of
Art. 19(1)1e), for in America, the right of association is not anv specificallv guaranteerl right, hut has
been derived hy jurlirial interpret:i.tion of the due
nrocess cl.1use of tho 14th Amendment. But apart
from this tho ]('gislation thne impugned was on<'
which direct.Iv affected the formation of the association nnd in that sens" mav he hit by the terms of
sub-cl.(c) of cJ.(l) of Art. i9 if st1itutes with similar
purpose were 1macted in Tnrlia. The rlecisions
cited are no authoritv for the second step in the
arg-ument for \vhich thev wne cited.
Leam11d Counsel also referred us to two other
dicisions of the i'iuprnme Court of the UnitPd Stat<•s
in which the right of emolovees to self-organization,
to form, join anrl assist labour organisatinns and to
bargain collectively throu!!h representatives of their
own choice anrl to engage in concerted activities for
the purrose of collective bargaininf or oth"cr mutual
aid has lll•en"reforr<>d to -ns "a fundamental right"
(videNatiomu Labor R11lation.,- Board \' . .Tones anrl
La1tqMin Sit.eel Corporatinn and ors.,( 1) and Amalgamated Utilil 11 W orkn.• v. Con.~olidated Edi8on Company
of Sew York) ('). We rlo not consirlor the inference
sought t.o bc> drawn well-founded. What. the )(',arn.
ed .Turlgcs of tho Sunreme Court wore refrrring to
ns a fundam<'ntal ri~ht was not with reference to a.
fnndament.a.I right 11s reeou-nit.cd or guaranteed hy
the Constitution, but in the m>nse of a right of the
unions which cnaclorl law recognizer! or rrspec•ecl,
a.ml as nthor decision"' of the United St<ites' Supreme
Court Rhow, waR suhiect to regulation by tho l<'gislaturc('). Wo have, t.hcr!'fore, reach<'d th.e'conclusion
that t.he righr.·~11mranteNI hv ~Rub-cl.(c) of cl.(1' of
Art. 19 rloPs not <'arry with it a concomitant right
(I) RI
t~)
Law. Fd. RQ1, QnQ_
R.J LAu•. Erl
7~R.
7-'J.
'."; Vide \Ve1ver (',)n~titl1li "''l:tl L:i.w !101 its Adniinis 1ra1ion ! 19!t\l p. 505,
r··ferring rn n(1rchy i:. Kan<:as 272 L'. S. 306: 71 I.. Ed. 2J8 "Neither
-~c c0mmon law nor 1he I ·~th :\rrendmtnt confers the absolute right
10 -,rr;lcc."
•
A
"
3 S.C.R.
-
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
297
"- that the unions formed for protecting the interests
of labour shall achieve the purpose for which they
were brought into existence, such that any interference, to such achivement by the law of the land
would be unconstitutional unless the same could be
justified as in the interests of public order or morality. Tn our opinion, the right guaranteed under
sub-cl. (c) of cl. (1) of Art. 19 extends to the forma} tion of an association and insofar as the activities of
the association are concerned or as regards the steps
which the union might take to achieve the purpose
of its creation, they are subject to such laws as
might be framed and that the validity of such laws
is not to be tested by reference to the criteria to be
found in cl. (4) of Art. 19 of the Constitution.
In this view it is not necessary to consider the
other steps in the argument of learned Counsel all
of which proceed upon the correctness of the sten
which we have just now dispos'·d of. Nevertheless we consider it proper to deal with thf1 submission that the impugned legislation (a) withdraws
an essential part of the dispute between the pa1 ties
from the jurisdiction of ·an impartial adjudicator
and vests the same in the Reserve Bank of India
which is a biased body ; and (b) that the adjudiP~tor
is left without proper materials to discharge his
duties by withdrawing the proper materials from
•
his cognizance.
A complaint that the impugned provision
withdraws the dispute from the adjudication of an
impartial arbitrator and leaves it to the decision of
another body is an obvious over-statement of the
position. The dispute between the parties in
relation either to wages, bonus or other amenities
or perquisites which involve financial obligations on
the part of the employer remain even after the
impugned provision was enacted, with the adjudicator and he alone determines the rights of the
parties subject to the provisions of the Industrial
law or other relevant legislation, and the relief
which he could award to the employees remains
1961
All India Bank
Emplayees'
Association
v.
Nat-ional Industrial
Tribunal
Ayyangar J.
298
1961
.All India Ba11k
Employee•'
A1sociatio11
v.
/t'ational JnduAfr ·al
'1' riltutla!
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1962)
the same. The adjudicator alone determines thP
capa<:ity of tho industry to pay 01· to bear tho ,a
<'nhanccd cost. The only result of s. :l4 A is that in
regard to two itmes, 1:iz., secret resen·es and tho
proYi~ion made by banks "for bad and doubtful
debts and other necessary provisions'', the reasonable
quantum which would he available for being taken
into account hy the adjudicator would he cstimated
arnl determined by an expert body which is a governmental authority or prnctically a department of
Go,·emment, viz., the Reserve Bank of India which
is entrusted by law with duty of maintaining lho
en•dit st111cture of tho country.
From what we have statecl carli<>r as the
genesis of tho legislation now impugned, it would be
apparent that Govorrum•nt h1icl to effect a reconciliation between two conflicting interrst~ : one was
the need to preserve and maintain the clelicate
fabric of the credit structure of the country by
Rtrengthening the real ae wtJI! as the apparent. credit
worthiness of banks operating in tho country. It
was really this principlo which iM vit~•l to the
economic life of the COl)1mUnity that has been
reHponsible for the changes that have been made
from 1927 onwards as regards tho form of balance~heet and of the Pro.fit & Loss accounts of banking
companies as distinguished fro1n other trading and
industrial organit:ations. There was urgent need to
prot<>ct from disclosur!' cntain of the itt•ms of
appropriation by banks in order to pres<'rve th<'m
ao creclit. institutions. On the other hand, there was
the need-an equally urgent need fur enabling the
workers in these iusti tut ions not to be <lf'niecl a
propN wage and other emolumellts and proper
conditions of service. The question was how far
information which in the interests uf national
eeonomv the banks were entitkd to withhold from
their ~h~reholders and tho general public, was to b<'
made a vaila.ble for determining thn capacity of th c
b:rnks to pay their employees. H was in these
~ircumstances that the impugned legislation was
.
'
3 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
299
1"' enacted which while preserving industrial adjudi-
}
•
..,
.
cation in respect of disputes between the banks and
their employees, entrusted the duty of determining the surplus reserve which could be taken into
account as part of the assets for determining
capacity to pay, to the Reserve Bank. Thus unrlerstood there doe> not appear to be anything unreasonable in the solution which the impugned legislation has effected.
We do not also consider that thPre is any
substance in the complaint that the R~serve Bank
of India is a biased body. If it was not the Reserve
Bank of India, the only other authority that could
be entrusted with the function would be the
Finance Ministry of the Government of India and
that department would necessarily be guided by the
Reserve Bank having regard to the intimate knowledge which the Reserve Bank has of the banking
structure of the countrv as a whole and of the
affairs of each bank in particular. In the circumstance therefore it matters little from the point of
view of the present argument whether it is ~he
Finance Ministry that was vested with the power
to determine the matters set up ins. 34-A or whether it is the Reserve Bank that does so, as under
the impugned enactment.
.
Learned Counsel made a further submisRion
that the impui;ned enactment was a piece of
colourable b~islathn, and th'tt thf'l purported
objective of securing secrecy from disclosure was
really a device adopted for deprpssing wageB and
for denying to workmen employed in banks th,,ir
legitimate rights. It was urged that the preanihle
to the amending Act sought to make out that the
real purpose behind the legislation WAS the ensuring
of s~crecy from disclosure of the resPrves held by
the banks and of the bad and doubtful. debts wR.ich
arose in the course. of business and the provision
made for these losses and proceeded on the ratio
th at such disdosure would hurt the credit of the
1961
All India Bank
Employees•
Assoeiation
v.
NatifJnal Ind 1slr1al
Trilunal
Ayyanga'f', J.
300
1961
AU India Bank
.F.mpfo)tts'
.1.fsOr i4t ion
v.
,,Vatirmal lwlusfrir.l
Tribunal
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1962)
banks which would have repercussions not morely
on the individual bank but also on the banking
structure of the country as a whole. This, it was
submittP<i, was not tho.real but onlv the colourable
object and purposo underlying the legislation. In
this connection it was stressed that s. 21 of the
Industrial Disputes Act and r. 30 of the Industrial
Disputes Rules had made ample provision for
securing secrecy to the affairs of ev<>ry concern in
regard to which disclosure would not bo in public
interest. We are satisfied that this submisi;i\Jn has
no basis in fact and besides even if made out does
not affect the validity of tho legislation. As wo han~
pointed out already, the impugnod legislation merely
carries out to its logir,al eonelusion the effc"t of the
changes in the form of the balance-sheet and Profit
and Loss accounts of Ranks which starting in I !l2i
culminated in the notification datecl December 2:!,
l\l;il under s. 29 (.i) of the Hanking Companies Act
:i.me11ding the Forms :i ppendrd to that Al't. If the
constmction of the "right to form union:;" under
sub-cl. (c) of el.(!) of Art. l!J put forward b~· learned
('ounsel for impugning the -;alidity of the enactmrnt
i;; negatived, then subject to the point ahout A1t. I!
which we shall examine presently, lt·gislatil'O
eom pct <'nc:e being conceded there could he no l<'gal
objection to it.s validity. Objections based on
colourahle legislation have relevance only in situa·
tioa8 when the power of the legislature is restricted
to particular topics, and au attempt iR made to
csmpe legal fetters imposed on its powers hy
r<•sorting to forms of legislation ca lculat.!'cl to mask
the real subject-matter. Xo such problem <'XiRtH in
the present eaAe and it is common ground that once
tht• lcgi.,]ation passes the t-0Rt of the fundameut:i.I
rights gua.nnteed by Part JII, legislatiYe competence not being in dispute, its vafidity is beyon<l
cadl. The question whether the secrecy assmed
by s. 21 of Industrial DiRputes Act is or is not
sullirient to protect the interests of the Banks, is a
matt.er of legislative policy-and is for Parliament
L
M
..
3 S.C.R.
'
SUPREME COURT REPORT8
:.lOl
alone-and even the fact that the Court coulu be
.... persuaded that the existing law is sufficient would
be no ground for invalidating the impugned legislation. When the end which the legislature seeks
to achieve, viz ., secrecv is competent, the enquiry
as to ultra vires stops. Whether less th;m what
was done might have been enough, whether more
drastic provision was made than occasion
} demanued, whether the same purposes could have
been achieved by provisions differently framed or
by other means, these are wholly irrelevant considerations for testing the validity of the Jaw. They
do not touch or concern the ambit of the power
but only the manner . of its exercise, and once the
provisions of Part III of the Constitution are out
, of the way, the validity of the legislation is not
-r
open to challenge.
The next point urged was that the impugned
provision was in violation of Art. 14; though the
several learned Counsel who appeared in support
of the case of the workers were not all agreed as to
the precise grounds upon which it could.be held
that the impugned provision violated Art. 14.
It was first submi~ted that the provision was
rendered invalid because it vested an arbitrary
power in banks which were parties to a dispute
under the Industrial Disputes Act, to claim or not
to claim the privilege of not producing the documents and that no criterion had been indicated as
to the circumstances in which Banks could decide
to ma.ke the claim. But this, however, is answered
by the provision itself which runs :
"When the banking company claims that
such document, statement or information is
of a confidential nature and that the production or inspection of such document ...... would
involve disclosure of information relating to
the matters set not-the matters set out in
sub·clauses (a) and (b)."
•
1961
Aft India Bank
E1nployus'
Assoc6ati'.on
v.
National Industrial
Tribunal
Ayyfi.ngar J.
30~
SUPREME COUHT REPORTS
[1002)
It was also submitted that ~ub-el. (b) of ,;.
sub-s. (I) was vague, in that a rl•forcncc was made to
Employu.•'
"provision marlc for bacl and doubtful debtR aud
AsMJciation
ot.her usual or necessary prrn·isions". We do not
v.
National lndr.utrial soc any sub,;umcc in this point eith<'r, IH'causc these
Ttihunal
words arc taken from the form under the Bauking
"-yyangar J.
Compunies Act and their meaning is dl':tr in banking
circles. In fact, in the application which the
employee asRoeiations made before tho adjudicnte>r ·-I
to direct the production of information and (]ocuments from the banks this phrase was UA(•d am! it
is apparent that (Wen the Bank Employees'
Associations understood it aA haviug a definit.c
connotation.
It was next submitl<:d on behalf of some of the
inten·cners thats. 34A(l) and (2) violatecl Art. 14
~
in that the classification contained in it waH
impermissible as not being basod on rational
grounds. It was said (1) that the protection acrainst
0
a disclosure applied only to adjudications under the industrial Disputes Act. and not to olhor
adjudications ; (2) that it a ppliod only to certain
banking companies and not to all banking
companies; and (3) that by reason of ~. 34A (2) •
tho provisions of the impugned C'llactment were
applied in a discriminatory manner to all banks
other than the Reservo Bank. The first two points
cover the same ground and arise out of the fact
that tho impugned provision by its 3rd sub-soction
defines a "banking company" reforrod to in it _.
and to which its provisions apply, as meaning a '
"Banking Company" wider the Industria.I DisputC'H
Act, 1947. The Indmtrial Disputes Act. ddinC's a
"Banking Company" in s. 2(b) as follows:
"Banking Company means a banki11g company as defined in s. 5 of the Banking Companies Act, 1949, having branches or other establishments in more than one State and include•
the State Bank of India and tho Reserve
Bank of India."
1961
AU India Bank
....
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
-
.L
'~
•
303
1961
It would thus be seen that though the Bank·
ing Companies Act applied to every banking comAll India Bank
Employei&'
pany, it is only those banks whose operations ex·
Assoeiation
tended beyond one State were brought within the
v.
Industrial
scope of the definitions of a "banking company" Nat,ional
Tribunal
under the Industrial Disputes Act. The result of
Ayyangar J.
that was that Banking Companies not having branches in more than one State would be an industry
so as to be within the Industrial . Disputes Act but
not "a banking company" within its definition. In
the circumstances learned Counsel is right in . his
submission that such banking companies as are
not within the definition of "a banking company"
undior the Industrial Disputes Act would not be
entitled to claim the protection from disclosure conferred on "banking companies" by the impugned
provision. This, however, is no ground for holding the legislation invalid. In the first place, the
complaint of discrimination is not by the banks
who are not on the terms of s. 34A entitled to the
protection from disclosure of their reserves etc.
Secondly it is common ground that 95% of the
banking business in this country is in the hands
of Banks which at\J within the definition of "bank·
ing companies" under s. 2(b) (b) of the Industrial
Disputes Act. Besides, these banks employ over
80,0JO out of the 90,000 bank-employees. In the
circumstances and seeing that the injury to the ere·
dit structure will only be by the disclosure of the
reserves etc., of the banks of this class, there is
sufficient rational connection and basis for classifi.
cation to justify the differentiation. The fact that
the legislation does not cover every banking· company is therefore no ground for holding the pro·
vision to be discriminatory within Art. 14.
1'he last point about the exclusion of the
!~eserve Bank ofindia from the operation of s. 34A (2)
has also· no ·substanc
In the very nature of things
and 011 the scheme of the provision the Reserve
Bank could not but be excluded from sub-s. (3)
of the impugned provision. In determining
e.
0
304
All lndia Bank
Emplo!JU8
A81t0Ciatiot1,
v.
J.Vational lntluatr~ul
Tribunal
Ayyatagar J.
SUPREME COURT REPOilTS
[106:.>j
what reson·es could properly be t1Lkcn into account, ti'<
the Reserve Rank would be discharging not any
quasi judicial but only an administrative function,
determining this matter with rcfor<'nce to uniform
business principles and it therefore appears to us
that there is no ·impropriety in its findings being
final even in regard to itself. A submissio:i on
similar lines about biaR was also made in relation to
the impact of tho impugned pro\·isiou insofar as it
related to the industrial <lioputc between the
State Bank of India and· its "mplo~•ccs. It "·as
pointed out to us tliat the Hcson·o Bank of India
owned practically the entirety of the sh:1rccapital of
the State Bank of India, with the result that the
Reserve Bank was peeun.iarily and vitally interested
in supporting the State Bank as against the latter's
employees in any industrial dispute and that the
element of bias which the situation involved would
invalidate the impugned provision. We consider
this argument without force. If, as we have held,
the impugned provision is ,·alid and does not violate
any of the freedoms guaranteed by Part III of the
Constitution in regard to the employees of the
Reserve Bank, the challenge to the impugned provision cannot obviously be successful in the case of
the employees of the State Bank.
As we have stated earlier, though the arguments before us ranged on a very wide ground, we
have not thought it necessary to deal with all of
them because in view of our conclusions on the
crucial points in the case the others whioh wore
subject of debate before us did not arise for consideration.
Tho appeal foils and is dismissed with costs.
The petitions also fail and are dismissed with costs.
(one hearing fee)
Appeal and Petitions dismissed .
. ..
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