CHANDRAKANT KRISHNARAO PRADHAN AND ANOTHER versus THE COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS, BOMBAY AND OTHERS
Supreme Court of India | Decided 11 August 1961 | [1962] 3 S.C.R. 108 | 1961 INSC 238
Key facts
- Decided
- 11 August 1961
- Bench
- P.B. GAJENDRAGADKAR*, K. SUBBA RAO*, M. HIDAYATULLAH, J.C. SHAH, RAGHUBAR DAYAL
- Bench size
- 5
- Case number
- CIVIL APPEAL No. 80/1960
- Disposal
- Dismissed
- Citation
- [1962] 3 S.C.R. 108
- Neutral citation
- 1961 INSC 238
Text of the judgment
108
1901
·r1ie Cominiati~ntr
oJJn~-tax1
ft! odraa
v.
S.A.S.
JI arim~hu }{adar
/{ idayatu ll ah J.
1961
A ugu1t JI.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1962]
daily in onli.nary Jifo. There is also equity (if
equitable considerat.ions can be taken into aocount
in a taxing Act) in giving earned income relief to
a person who has to pay tax on income whioh
belongs to another but which he has himself earned.
In our opinion, the section can only be read u
enacting that for purposes of earned income relief,
"such income" will be included which, though it is
the income of another person, has been earned by
the assessee, or, in the case of a firm, whore the
u.ssessee is a partner, by his being actively engaged
as part.ncr in the conduct of the business. The
wordH "where the assessee is a partner" must be
giv<'n dft>ct to, even when the income of the minor
or the wife is considered under the latter part, and
they also point to the same conclusion. In reading
the definition in this way, no violence is done to
the language of it. The condition that tho
asscssee must have worked actively as a partner
is thns applicable also to tho latter part of tho
rlefinition. In our opinion, the High Court waa
right in the answer which it gave.
The appeals foil, and are dismissed with costs.
Appeals di8missed.
CHA'NDRAKA.J.'{T KRISHNARAO PRADHAN
AND ANOTHER
v.
THE COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS, BOMBAY
AND OTHERS
(P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, K. SunBA RAo,
:\I. HIDAYAT'CiLLAH, J.C. SH.AH and
RAGHUBAR DAYAr,, JJ.)
Cu~tom House .4.gent8-Lictncl-R'fllP,.s governin{l granU
tliere<if-1 alidily-Agent'a liability for •hart collection of cu.lama
dutie.!-Cmtam Hau•< Agents licensing Rule8, 1960,
rr. 4, 6(a), 6(b), 6(c), 8, 9\2) (p), JO (1) (C), 11, 15 (g), J5(k),
12, 17, 19, 22 Form• C. D.-Sea Ouslama Act, 1878 (8 of 1878),
as amended by Act 21of1955, ss.4, !1,39 (/), 202-Conalilulia•
of Jndit1, Aris. 19 (I)(g) 19 (6).
The petitioners were working as Dakils at New Qum>~
j'·
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
109
H-0use, Bombay, under licences issued under s.202 of the Sea:
Customs Act, 1878. In 1955 by an amending Act, s. 202
was substituted by another section and by sub-s. (I) of s. 202
it was enacted: "no pe1Son shall act as an agent for the .transa:crlon of any business relating to the entrance or clearance of
vessel or the import or export of goods or baggage in any
cuitom house unless such person holds a licence granted in
this behalf in accordance with the rules made under
sub-section (2)". By sub-s.(2) the Chief Customs-authority was
empowered to make rules for the purpose of carrying out the
provisicJns of the section. Section 4 provided that "when any
person was .... authorised by the owner of the goods to be his
agent in respect of such goods for all or any of the purpose,
of this Act .... such person shall, for such purposes, be deemed
to be the owner of such goods". The petitioners who, after
the enactment of the new s. 202, had to apply for licences to
be .granted in accordance with the rules framed under
sub-s.(2), challenged the validity of certain of the rules on the
ground that they contravened Arts. 14 and 19 of the Constitution of India and also that they were in excess of the rulemaking power conferred by s.202 (2). In particular, they.
questioned the validity or r. 12 under which inter alia the
agtnt was required to enter into a bond in Form C by which
he was made liable for short collection of customs duty under
s. 39 and also to furnish security which might be increased or
decreased by the Customs-collector.
He/,d : (I) that the rules in question though they were
headed as framed under s. 202 of the Sea Customs Act, 1878,
cannot be impugned on the ground that some of them go
beyond the special purposes of that 'ection and seek to further
some of the general purposes of other parts of the Act, since
the Chief ·custom• authority is also empowered under s. 9 of
the Act to make rules consistent with the Act "generally to
carry out the provisions of the Act."
(2) that rr. 4 and 8 under which the Customs-collector
could limit the number of licences to be granted at the Customs
House and applications could only be made if the Customscollector published a notice inviting applications, do not
contravene Art. 19 of the Constitution, as they are only
derigned to advance public iriterest.
(3) that rr. 6(a) and 6(b) which require the applicant to furnish to the Customs-collector satisfactory evidence
as to his respectability, reliability and financial status and
that· he would be in a position to muster sufficient clientele
Chandra!.:ant
Kriahnarao
Pradha-n
v.
The Collector oj
Customs, Bomba•,
ilo
1961
Chottdraka11t
Kri1hnarao
Pradhan
v.
·rM Colltdor of
Ct.taloml, Bombay
St.Jt>REME COURT REPOR'l'S
and business in the event of his being granted the li('Cl).cell,
are reasonable rcstric1ions wi1hin the meaning of Art, 1!1(6}
and are valid.
(4) that cl. (p) of r. 9(2) which requires \he Iic~n$1!e
to have a working knowledge of the procedure in the matter
of refund of clainos, appeals and revision petitions \lndet.the
Sea Customs Act, is valid, since it is nece.sary where an ·agent
handles goods of the principal.
(5) that r. IO (l)(c) which gives the Customs-collector
a wide discretion lo reject an application for the grant of ii
licence, if he considers the applicant to be not suitable, i~
an unreasonable restriction upon the right of the successfu I
randidate to carry on his avocation, and is invalid. If a
candidate is found fit under the other rules and has ·succe.ifully passed the examination, he should only be rejected
under a rule which requires the Customs-collector to state
his reasons for the rejection, and the rules must provide for
an appeal against the order.
(6} that r. 11, in so far as it prescribes a renewal fee 9f
Rs. 50, is invalid inasmuch as it has thereby provided not
for a fee but for a tax to raise revenue. It would be open
to the Government to frame a rule in which the renewal .
fee to be charged is reasonable in the circumstances.
(7) that rr. 15(g}. 15(k), 17 and 19, are designed to
have a control over agents, including firms which act as
agents, who stand in a fiduciary capacity both in regard to
their own clients and the Government, and arc valid.
..
(8) that r. 22 which enables the Customs-collector to
cancel a licence for non-compliance by the agent with the
other rules or for misconduct on the part of the agent, wh,ich
in the opinion of the Customs-collector, renders him unlit' Jo
transact business in the Custom House, is within the rulcmak.ing power of the Customs-authorities and is valid.
(9) that the words "the person cha.rgcable with the
duty or charge" ins. 39(1) of the Act are wide enough .In
their ambit to take in, not only the real owner but .
also a "deemed owner" 'vithin the meaning of s.4 of. the
Act.
(10) that on ils true construction of s.39(1) lt is onlythe goods of the defaulting owner in respect of which the '
agent is also the deemed owner that would suffer" the·
penalty of detention, but not the goods of a different owner,
3S.d.R.
SUPRiElME COURT REPORTS
111
evm though the agent may be authorised to deal on his
behalf.
(11) that r. 12 ;ead with Form C which makes an agent
liable for short collection of customs duties under. s. 39, is
valid and the rule is not invalid on the ground that it enables
the Customs-authorities to make a proper adjustment of the
security to be obtained from each individual agent commensurate with the volume and type of business which he might
transact.
Held, further (Subba Rao, J. dissenting,) that r. 6(c),
which requires the . applicant to produce an income-tax
clearance certificate, is connected with the enquiry into his
respectability and financial status to find out if he can be
trusted with other persons' money and goods, and is valid.
K. Raman and Go. v. State of Madras, A. I. R. 19.'i3
Mad. 84, distinguished.
t
Per Subba Rao, ].-Non-production of an income-tax
clearance certificate is not germane to the issue of a licence
under the Custom H~use Agents Licensing Rules, 1960, and·
the principle in K. Raman and Go. v. Siate of Madras, A. LR.
· 1953 Mad. 84, is applicable. Accordingly, r. 6(c) constitutes
an unreasonable restriction on the right of an applicant to
do business as Custom-house agent, and is invalid.
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Petitions Nos. 80, 80A.
81 and 116 to 213 of 1960.
Petitions under Art. 32 of the Constitution
of India for enforcement of Fundamental Rights.
S. V. Gupta, M. G. Bhandare, S. N. Andley,
Rameshwar Nath and P. L. Vohra, for the
petitioners. ·
H. N. Sanyal, Additional Solicitor-General of
India, D. N. Mukherjee and P. D. Menon, for the
respondents.
•
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Porus A. illehta, J. R. Gagrat, and G. Gopala-
L krishnan, for the. interveners.
1961. August 11.
The
jud!IDlent of
Gajendragadkar, Hid~yatullah, Shah and Raghubar
Dayal, JJ., was ~ehvered by Hidayatullah, J ..
Subba Rao, J., delivered a separate judgmflrlt.
1961
Ghandrakant
KrishnO,Ciro
Pra.dhqri
v.
."The Collutor <;>f.
Cust'?m.s, B.o.'o/'~Y
iiz
1961
or.andrakanJ
Kriahnarrio
Pradhan
v.
The Coll<otor of
Ctuk>m8, Bombay
Hidayatullah J.
stJPREME COURT REPoRts
(19~2j
IIIDAYAT"C"LLAH, .T.-These
writ petitions
raise identical questions, and a common argument
was addressed to the Court in all of them. Petitions Nos. 80 and 80A of 1960 have been fikd bj•.
two petitioners. One petitioner holdg a 'permanent'
licence and the other, a 'temporary' licence renew-.
able trienially, to work as Dr£lals at New Customs
Houso, Bombay. In the other petitions also,
petitioners N'os. I to f>O hold permanent licences,
and petitioners Nos. 51 to 99 hold temporary but·
r<>newable licences. Some of tho permanent licericea.
were issued in I !l36, and some of the temporary
licences were issued as far back as l!l44. These
licences, whether permanent or temporary,· were
issued under s.202 of the Sea Customs Act, 1878, prior
to its amendment by the Sea Customs (Amendment)
Act, 195f> (Act 21 of l!l55). They were issued
after a brief enquiry and subject to the fulfilment
by tile applicant of the following conditions :
"(l) He must produce at least 2 certificates of character each from a Justice of
Peace or other persons of known respectability.
(2) He must certify that he has not been
convicted of any criminal offence.
(3) He must declare that he will have
no claim to any accommodation in the
Custom House.
.' ·
(4) He must also give ii"· security or'
Rs. 2000 in cash or Govern,ment paper having
an equivalent market value and execute a
Bond for Rs. 2000 on A. fifteen rupees Stamp
Paper in the attached form."
In 195f>, by the amending Act, s.202 wae
substituted by another section. The section now
reads:
"202. (1) With effect from such date
as the Central Government may, by notifica·
tion in the Official Gazette specify, no persbn
shall act as an agent for the transaction of
&ny buaine&B relating to the entrance 01·
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SUPREME dOURT REPORTS
113
clearance of any vessel or the import or
export of goods or baggage in any Customhouse unless such person holds a licence
granted in this behalf in accordance with the
rules made under sub-section (2).
(2} The Chief Customs-authority may
make rules for the purpose of carrying on t
the provisions of this section and in particular such rules may provide for(a) the authority by which a licence
may be granted under this section and
the period of validity of any such licence;
(b) the form of the licence and the
)
fees payable therefor ;
'"
(c) the qualifications of persons
who may apply for a licence ;
(d) the restrictions and conditions
(including the furnishing of a security
by the licencee) for his faithful behaviour
as regards the custom-house regulations
and officers) subject to which a licence
may be granted;
(e) the circumstances in which a
licence may be suspended or revoked ;
and
(f) the appeals, if any, against an
order of suspension or revocation of a
licence, and the period within which such
appeals shall be filed."
As a result of the enactment of this section,
the original licence, whether permanent or temporary, would have become ineffective after the
date to be specified by the Central Government.
It became necessary for the petitioners and others
. . to apply for licences granted in accordance with
the rules framed under sub-s. 12). These rules
were framed, and public notices were issued in.viting applications ; but the dates were postponed
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3 S.C.J}.
1961
Ghandrakant
Krishnarao
Pradhan
v.
Tiw Collector of
Customs, Bom~ay
Hidayatullon J.
1i4
1961
Chandrakan>
}i·rishnar(J/)
PradW.
v.
Tht CcU ecl(l'f of
cii.,tcma, Bombay
Hidayalullah J.
SuPRE~JE cotJiiT REPORTS
[1962J
till the rules were published in the Gazett-0 on
llfay 14, HJ60. It is not ncecssary to refet to tl.Je
prior history of thl'se rules and to the many
representations that were made, as they are not
relevant. On June 18, 1960, a public notice (No. Si)
was issued fixing June 25, 1900 as the last date
for making applications for the new licences, and
the persons affected were informed that the operation of the new licences under the rules would
commence on ,July 14, 1960. On .rune 27, 1960,
Writ Petitions NoB. 80 and 80A of 1900 were
filed, followed by Writ Petitions Nos. 81 and 116
to 213 of 1960 filed on July l:l, 196(1, An ex·parte ad
interim stay oft ho revocation of the existing licences
was obtained from this Court, and subsequently,
the respondentli undertook to issue to the pctitiqnen; special temporary licences renewable yearly
till the disposal of these petitions.
Prior to the Custom House Agents Licensing
Rules, 1960, there were four classeR of Agel\ts.
They were (l) Clearing Agents, (2) Dalals, (3) Muc·
cadams and (4) Baggage Clearing Agenta. According to the petitioners, there wore 100 licensed
Clearing Agents, 200 licensed Dalals, 270 Muccadams and about 15 Baggage Clearing Agenta.
Tho duties and functions of these four classes of
agents were different. Whether th~s'" distinctions
\\'Cf<' always maint;iined and whether they grew
out of r<'gnlations or usage iR hardly nccess:iry to
cnquii·<'. By the Rules of I !)()0, these cl~sees wcro
merged into one, and all licensed agents were
placed on an Pqual footing. fo other words,
there is t.o be hereafter ono l']aHH of agents.
Though the petitioners holding 'permanent.'
licences and the petitioners holding 'temporary'
licences with a term to run out ha>e relied upon
the fact th11t their licences arc still valid, there was 4
no serious attempt to deny that under s. 202(1) they
\l·oul<l be rendered ineffective after the date to be
fixed by Go,·ernmcnt. The 'perrnaiwnt' licencll8
3 S.C.R.
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SUPREME COURT REPOR'IS
115
also are not in a favourable position in this regard.
If the first sub-section requires that fresh licences
to work as Custom House Agents be obtained, the
distinction between permanent and temporary
licences ceases to be material. No part of s.202
was challenged as being void or ultra vires. In
these petitions, only the Rules are challenged as
in breach of the fundamental rights under Arts. 14
and 19 of the Constitu ;ion and also as being in
excess. of the rule-ma dng power conferred by
s.ub-s. (2) of s. 202. Ft rm 'C' prescribed under the
Rules for taking security from the approved agents
is also questioned as being in excess of the power
to make rules and contrary, in certain respects, to
the Sea Customs Act itself. It may be mentioned
that the petitioners in all the Writ Petitions are
Dalals; but at the hearing, certain Clearing Agents
obtained permission to intervene, and were also
heard.
Since the Sea Customs Act, in general and
s. 202, in particular were not challenged in the
petitions, we must start with the premise that
the authority to insist on fresh licences under the
Rules in the case of all the operators was properly
exercised. The first question to consider is whether
the Rules, speaking generally, were validly framed
and the next question to consider is whether any
of the Rules individually challenged, goes beyond
the Se'l Customs .Act, or offends against the Constitution.
In questioning the Rules generally, the
petitioners submit that these Rules could only be
framed for the purpose of carrying out the purposes
of s.202 [vide sub-s. (1) ], or to provide for the
matters mentioned in els. (a) to (f) of s. 202(2).
Some of the Rules. it is submitted, go beyond
the general purpose of the section, which is to
license agents and the special topics mentioned
there, and seek to further some of the purposes of
other parts of the Act. Mention in this connection
1961
GhmidrDJtan·t~
KrUhnar4D
Pf'ad-han
v.
Th~ Collector of
CUatom1, Bombay
HidaJalu!la1' J.
..
ii6
11161
Chandrakant
Kria""4rao
Pradlwr
v.
1 ftt Cotltcior of
(.\ulc""', /Jombay
llidayatttllah J.
SUPREME COURT REi>ORTs
[1962J
is made specially of Form 'C' prescribed by the
Hules, under which the r.gents personally a.nd the
~ecurity furnished by them have been made li:i.blo
for sh0rt collection of Customs duty, etc. Tho
question whether the agents arn liable, in any
l'vent, for such short collert.ion under s, 39 is a
question, which will ha\·e to be examined on
merits separately, but for repelling the argument
in its present from, it is sufficient to say that it is
robbed of all its force bys. 9 of the Sea Customs
Act. l' nder s. 202(2), the Chief Customs-authority
is empowered to mako rules for the purposes of
that section. That purpose is the licensing of
agents and the regnlation of their conduct and
functions. But the Chief Customs-authority is also
empowered by s. 9 to make rules consiEtent with
the Sea Customs Act "grnicrally to carry out jhe
provisions of this Act". The power to make rules
under s. 202 is not the only power which the Chief
Customs-authority can exercise, and it is only too
clear that power can also be deri,·cd from s. 9, if
there be need. Thus, if it is necessary that tho
agents must carry out certain provisions of the Aet,
a rule <"an bo made in the exercise of the two
powers together. Though the impugned Rules ar'l
headed as framer! under s.202 of the Sea Customs
Act, they cannot be questioned, if they carry out
11ot only the special purposl's of s.20:! but also
ecrt.ain other purposes of the Act, because the two
powers will concur to sustain them. It is only
when a rule or rules arc pointed out, which sub.
Herve neither the spccia,J purpose of the section nor
the general purposes of the Act that they can be
succcssfu lly questionl'd. In short, therefore, the
petitioners' case on the individual Rules alone
remains to consider.
The first cont€ntion is that uncler the impugn,
er! Rules, the- number of lic<'nces to be granted at
the Customs House can be limited bv the Customscollector, and .that applications can °only be .made,
if the Customs-collector publishes a notice inviting'
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
117
applications. ·This restriction, it is contended, is
unconstitutional, :Ls it interferes with the right of
all the petitioners to carry on their profession or
a vocation freely as contemplated by Art. 19. The
Rules ber1ring upon these mattern are rr.4 and
8, The latter -Rule says that the number of licences
to be granted would be fixed by the Customscollector, havin~ regard to the volume of import and
export business transacted through the Customs
House, and the number is capable of being revised
from time to time. The former empowers the
Customs-collector to invite applications, as and
when he considers it necessary. It cannot be said
that the Rules are not designed to advance public
interest, because even a professions or trade has
sometimes to be limited in the public interest,
Wben we pointed out to Mr. Gupte that this kind
of limitation on the number of persons allowed to
hold licences ie common, as, for example, porters
in a railway station, taxicab drivers and so on, he
stated that at least during the transitional period,
the old 0perators might have been given licences
on production of proof that th.ey held licences
previously. The argument is really not one based
upon the interests of the public but upon the
interests of the present holders of the licences.
Public interests in the context must override
private interests. It cannot be said that all the
present operators are equally desirable, and if
their number exceeds the requirement of the
·Customs House, it is obvious that some retrenchment in their numbers may legitimately be made.
Every one has an equal chance of applying for the
existing vacancies, but he must stand in competition with the others. There is no limitation on
the number of applications that can be made, and
thus, every operator will get a ehance to have his
case examined. It is to be expected that the most
experienced and the most efficient will get preference,. and no claim can be made on behalf of the
~noom:p-etent a,qq tqe inefficient that the;v should
>
1961
· Chandrakant
· KriBhnarao
Pradhan
. v.
.
The Collector of
Ousto1ns, Bombay
Hidayatullah J.
'
118
19GJ
Cluwi rol;ont
ItrWui.orao
Pradhan
v.
n., C./lt<lor of
Cu.•toms, Bombay
Hidayatullah .I.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1962]
receive equal treatment. Once the number is
limit€d to the requirements of the business, it is
manifest that the Customs-collector will invite
applications onl_v, as and when occasion demands.
These Rules, in our opinion, cmmot be said t6
offend against the Constitution.
The next contention is about rr.6(a), (b)
and (c), which require the applicant to furnish to the
Customs-collector satisfactory evidence as to J:iis
respectability, reliability and financial status, and
that he would be in a position to muster sufficient
clientcle and business in the event of his being gran.
ted the licence. The applicant has also to furnish an
inconw-tA.x clearance c<:rtificate. These conditions
are challenged as being unreasonable restrictions
upon the right to carry on a profession or avocation. Serious attempt was not made to establish
that the condition about respectability and reliability was unconstitutional. It was, however, pointed out that evidence about financial status created
11 class barrier between the rich and the poor and
only the rich were to be preferred. Ry the words
"financial status'' is not meant that the applicant
must be n wealthy person; what is required is that
he should not be financially embarrassed, and proof
that he is in easy circumstances. It is obvious
that the agents under the Act deal with vast sums
of money and valuable articles, and it may be
necessary to scrutinise the financia I position of the
applicant to find out whether or not he would be
exposed to temptations. A person heavily indebted
or insolvent cannot be trusted in the same way as a
person who is not so emba1Tassed, and an enquiry
into financial status is so much in the public
interest, that we cannot say that the condition
must 11Pcessarily be unreasonable. Similarly, the
A.rgument that new entrants would find it difficult
to assure that they would have sufficient clicntele
and business and would thus be discriminated
against, is not correct. The Customs House i& not
a place where persons Gan be allowed to learn a
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3S.C.R.
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
Ill)
profession or to take a chance. The movement of
goods, the due performance, of the duties and functions under the Sea Customs Act and ohsorvance of
the regulations are not easy matters for a person,
who is not sufficiently experienced and who has not
got the backing of a certain amount of business
and the experience which such business affords.
It may be necessary for a person to apprentice
himself for some time to get to know the importers
and exporters, and to prove to the Customsauthority that by reason of his apprenticeship
and his business connections he would be in a
position to handle the work in the Custqms House
from the moment he is licensed. The Rule is
designed to avoid entry into the Customs House
premises of persons who, being there, arc unable
to do business, and merely add to the number of
persons present.
'fhe last condition is the production of an
income-tax clearance certificate. The petitioners
rely upon a decision of the Madras High Court
reported in K. Raman and Co. v. Stale of Mcidras (1 ).
In that case, it was held that the fact that a pers011
was in arrears of income-tax was not germane to
the issue of a licence under the Yarn Dealers
Control Ordor, and that the insistence on the production of an income-tax clearance certificate was
extraneous to the carrying on of the business.
The position of an agent who handles other persons'
moneys and goods is different from that of a dealer
who deals with goods on his own behalf. As part
of an enquiry into an applicant's respectability,
reliability and financial status, an enquiry can also
be made to see whether he has discharged his
debts to the State. If a person is liable to incometax and pays it punctually, he would have no difficulty in proving it. If, however, for some good
reason the payment has been delayed, there would
be nothing to prevent him from proving it. The
(1) A.I.R. 1953 Mad. SA.
19U
ChlJJIJl.rakant
Kf'ishnarao
Pradhan
.,
The Collector of
Ct1.stoma, Bombay
Hida)'atullah J.
•
120
1911
CIUwiralcan t
Xr/1/mtlrao
Pradhan
v.
-Tht Collector of
.Cuat~.t,
Rombay
W•layalullah J.
SUPREME OOURT REPORTS
[1962)
insistpnce upon the production of the certifioate is,
in our opinion, connected wit.Ji the enquiry into his
respectability and financial status to find out if
he can be trusted with other persons' money
and goods.
The next Ruic which is questioned is r, 9,
which provides for an cxaminntion of the applicant.
This cx:aminntion follows a scrutiny of tho appJi.
cation under the otht>r Rules, and embraces questions
on various subjects. The duties of the agents
requirn them to Jurncllc goods, and the examination
is designed to find out whether a c:inrlidatc knows
the cfemcnts of th" law relating to the arrival,
entry and clearance of \'essels and goods. Objection
is not raised to the cx:imination as a whole hut
only to cl. (p) of r. !l (~) under which a c~ndidat-0
is supposed to know the proc<>dure in the matter
of r!'fund of claims, :ippeals and revision petitions
under the Soa Customs Act. It is contended that
these arc matt.NS in which nn agent is not interested
as an agent, but arc matters for the owner and the
Customs-authorities to know. It is true that the
curriculum for tho examination is somewhat extensive ; hut it is also elear that what is expected
of the candidate is knowledge, not necessarily
exhaustive but sufficient, of the laws relating to
the arrival, ontry and cloarancc of vessels and
!!oods. \Vo do not think that it is wrong for tho
;\uthorities to insist upon at least a working knowll'dgc of the laws applicable to the kind of work
the a(7ents arc reqairctl to do. When licences are
issued under other laws, a candidate is sometimes
required to answm· questions relating to the law
under which the ]iPcncc is issued. One well-known
example is the questioning of a candidate about
the rul"s of the road when ho is issued a licence
to drive a 1ncchanieally-propellcd vehicle. Those
Hules advance efficiency, and the additional knowledge about refunds, appeals and revisions under
the Act mav Le necessary where an agent handles
'
.
·(.
'
3S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
121
goods of a principal, who is himself not present to
file appeals or revisions or to claim refunds. Tbe
Rule, in our opinion, is perfectly valid.
.
-)
Rule 10 is the next subject of attack. It provides that the Customs-collector shall reject an
application for the grant of a licence (a) if the
candidate fails to pass the examination, or (b) the
number of vacancies do not justify the grant of
such licence, or (c) the applicant is not otherwise
considered suitable. Objection is taken to cl. (c).
It is said to confer a very wide discretion on the
Customs-collector, and reference is made to sub-r.(2),
in which it is provided that no appeal shall lie
from the or<ler of the Customs-collector rejecting
an application. It is further pointed out that in
July, 1960, the Rules were amended by the addition
of r. 25, under which an appeal is to lie to the
Chief Customs-authority against every order of the
Customs-collector-(i) rejecting an application for
the renewal of a licence granted under these Rules;
(ii) rejecting a fresh application made in accordance
-with r. 17; and (iii) refusing the gran~ or renewal
of a special temporary licence under r. 24. It is
argued that even though an appeal has been provided for these matters, no appeal has been provided for the rejection under r. lO(l)(c). No doubt,
other reasons may exist for rejecting the application
of a candidate, as for example, when he is found to
be a leper or an epileptic ; but one would expect
that an order of this kind would be backed bv
reasons to be recorded in writing. It must be
remembered that there is first a scrutiny of the
application and an enquiry into the respectability,
reliability and financial status of the candidate.
Then follows an examination. If a candidate
satisfies all the above conditions, there would
hardly be any ground left for rejecting his appli&ation, except probably his physical,unfitness tq
do the work. The Rule which is framed is so
general tqat it )e~ves t9 the discretjoli Qf the
=--
Clmd~atant
IJ(ri,tAmzrcw
•·Pradhan
·. v." .
·T1ie Col.l!Clor of
'buato}hs;•"!ll""'bay
~
li>aoyaf'ii11an' J.
122
. 19'1
.
C~t
/(',..,.,...
Pro4"""
••
77w C.U•clo• of
°""""'• Bombay
H;day ...llah .T.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1962]
Custom8·collector to reject :>. candidate for a trumpery rca.~on (which he need not state), even though
the candidate may IH' othrrwisc suitnhlP. In our
opinion, if a candidate i~ found fit undPr tlw other
Itnlcs and h:y; succcgsfnlly passer] the examination,
he should only he rejected umler a rule which
requires the Customs.collector to state his reasons
for the rejection, and the rules must provide for an
appeal against that ordrr, as they do in the other
casrs. As the Ruic stands, it cannot be considered
to he a reasonahle restriction upon the right of th<>
successful can<lidatc to carry on his avocation.
'!'he next Ruic which is <(Hestioncd is r. I l,
which enjoins the payment of a fre of Rs. iiO both for
a fresh application as well as renewal of the licence.
In so for as the fee for t.he grant of a licence in the
first instance is concerned, it cannot be said that
the charge is exorbitant. It is not disputed that a
fo<· is an amount collected to reimburse the Government for the expenses of licensing. It must
reasonably be meaAnre<l against the cost which
may be entailed in the proccs.~ of granting licences.
rn the initial stage. the CuAtoms·authorities have
to scrutinise applirations, subject the candidates to
an examination, and provide them with liccnceR to
carry on thl'il' work. A fee of Rs. fiO initi:illy may
not be considered unreasonable, regard being had to
the Aerl'ices involved. The same, however, cannot be
said in the case of renewals. It is pointed out in
the petition that formerly the charge was only
50 nP. It is averred in the petition that all that the
licensing authority does. iA t,o mnke an endorsement on the licence that it is renewed for a further
period. It has been ruled in this Court that under
the guise of a foe there must not be an attempt to
raise revenue for the general funds of the State.
In our opinion, a renewa 1 foe of Rs. !iO does not
entail services which can be reasonably said to
measure against the charge. It may be pointed out
that, though this avenuent was Illade in the petition,
-
,
-·
3S.C.R.
)
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
123
no attempt was made by the answering respondents
to traverse it. In our judgment the renewal fee
of Rs. 50 ceasr.H to he a fee, anrl is, in its nature, a
tax to raise revenue. Such :m impost cannot be
justified as a fee, and we. accordingly, hold that
this charge is improper. It would, however, be
open to the Government to frame a rule in which
the renewal fee to be charged is reasonable in the
circumstances.
The next objection is to sub-r.(g) and sub-r.(k)
of Rs. 15. Sub-rule (g) requires a Custom House
_ Agent to pay over to Government all sums received
for payment and to account to his client for monies
in his hands. Sub-rule (k) requires him to maintain
accounts in such form and manner as may be
directed from time to time by the Customs-collector,
·and submit them for inspection to the Customscollector or an officer authorised by him. No exception can be taken to snb-r.(g), which only states what
must be regarded as an inevitable obligation on
the part of the agent. Sub-rule (k) is said to be
excessive control on t.he part of the Customs-al1tho.
rities of the way in which the agent may keep his
own account. The licensing of an agent creates
an assurance in the minds of the prospective
clients, and the Rule is designed to ensure that the
monies which the agents handle are properly
accounted for. In our. opinion, these Rules are
salutary, and further the control over the agents,
who stand in a fiduciary capacity both in regard
to their own clients and the Government.
Rule, 17, which enjoins upon a firm which acts
as a licensee to report to the Customs collector as
early as possible and, in any event, within a period
of three days of a change in the constitution of the
firm, is next challenged. It is said that the periorl
of three days is too short ; but it must be rernern.
bered that a large number of transactions may go
through without. the licensing authority being awar1 ·
that the constitution of a firm has changed. Thn
~ule i~ des~ned tQ brin~ promptly to the notice
1961
Chandrak""t
Krishnaroo
I'radhan
v.
The C•llector of
CuBtom8, Bombay
Hiiayatullah J,
124
1961
chandralehnt
Kri1hnarao
Pradhan
·v.
Tht Colltetor of
Cu•foirt•~ B()flfbay
0
•
· ft;J;;;i~iah J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1962]
of the Customs-collector the change in the constitution of the firm, so that lw may bl: in a position
to decide for himself whether the licence in the
changed circumstances should be allowed to operate
or hc suspended or revoked. In our judgment,
this Rule cannot he questioned.
:\Ir. Porus .Mehta who argued the case on
hclrnlf of the Clearing Agents, stated that the newly
constitutecl firm is required to make a fresh appli·
cation which is to be dealt with in accordance with
the provisions of rr. 6 to 13. According to
him, every change in tho constitution of the firm
requirPs tho firm to go throup-h the ent.ire process
of scrntinv and examination, which he t-0rms
unnecessary. The rule is designed to ensure that the
new members of firm answer the requirements which
have been laid down is Rules G to 13, and these
requirements may be necessary, if new entrants come
in. It is to be noticed that pending the disposal of the
application, the Customs-collector is authorised by
the rule in hia dis<lrction to allow the existing firm
to carry on the business of Custom Hous<' Agents.
This softens the rigour of the rule, because the
work of the agents in proper casPs wonlcl not be
hampered, and the application would stand -01'er
for dispoMI to a later date.
Rule 19 which also enjoins the maintenance
nncl inspection of accounts by a firm was critiCised
in th<' samo manner as was r. 15, and for the
reasons which we have given, we hold it to be
eorulucive to the proper control of the financial
activities of a firm as licensee.
Rule 22 den la with the ca11ePllation of the
1icencc for failure of the agent to c·omply with any
eonditions of the bond executed \,y him unclcr the
Rules, for failure to comply with ~n~· of the prov-i·
sions of the Rules and for misconduct on his part
which, in the opinion of the Customs-collect-Or,
render~ him llllfit to trnnllllct J!\l~jness in ·ti\~
J
-
. _,
-
-
StJPnEMl!.: COURT REPORTS
125
Customs House. It is contended that the rules
are so exhaustive and numerous that no agent
would ever be able to keep out, of the operation
of that Rule, and that he would be perpetually
exposed to the penalty of suspension or rcvoc'.1tion
of his licence. Ru !es arc made for comphanro
and not for breach, and even though striet, they are
all designed to ensure efficient and proper working
on the part of tho agents. A rulP insisting upon
such compli1tncie with the other rules on pain of
penalty cannot ·he said to be outside the rulemaking power of the Customs-authorities. Every
order of suspension or revocation is subject to
appeal, and there is thus room for interference if
the Customs-collector acts arbitrarily or perversely.
In our opinion, with the existence of an appeal,
the rigour of the rule, if any, is taken away except
in those flagrant cases, where suspension or revocation. of the licence would be merited.
Lastly, it is contended that the Rules control
a licensed agent in a manner which makes him an
'unpaid servant' of the Customs-authorities. This
is one way of looking at tho m>1tter. The right
way to look at it is that a profession is being regulated, and the prof, ssion is one in which an agent
deals with the property of another and by the law
is deemed to be owner of the property. A person
in such a high fiduciary position must, of necessity,
be subjected to strict control, and the licensing
authority in holding him forth to the prospective
principals as a reliable and trustworthy person
must see that persons acting on the faith of the
assurance of the licence are in no way damnified.
The Rules, therefore, subserve a very s<ilutary and
necessary prin'cipk, ;.nd, in our judgment,, are
designed to advance public interest and cannot be
~ questioned, unless a person wishes to act dishonestly and wants to avoid control. It is wellknown that many underhand practices are common
at Customs Houses, and the Customs-authorities
J
-
:j S.C.R.
1961
Chandrakatit
Krtalinarao
Pradhan,
v.
'l'he OoU"tor of
Cu~toms,. Bombay
Hirla'fjatullaft J.
126
Cha•drakard
1\riehltarao
Pradhan
Y.
TJo, ColluiM of
CUlro,..,B~
RidayaluUah J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1962]
have tu b<' vigilant in preventing them. They
must, therefore, seP that thev do not license the
wrong type of persons; and in the interests of the
Revonue and more so, in the interests of persons
who employ licensetl agents, these Rules have been
framed. Looking at the Rules generally, we are
of opinion that though they a.re strict, they are
absolutely necessary, and their strictness would
he felt only by persons, who a.re not otherwise
honest.
The ma.in ar~ument in the case is upon r. 12
read with From 'C , which is tho bond which every
applicant has to cxecu:e in favour of the PreRident
"f India, anri itH Pnforccmcnt. against thP applicant
under certain cin·11mstance~. Pnder r. 12, it is
provided that b!'fore a licence iH granted undor the
Rules, the Customs·•·ollector shall require the appli"ant to enter into a bond in Form 'C' for the du!'
observance of thesP Rules and the conditions of
his licence and al~u to furniBh a 6ccurity of
n~. 3,000 in C'ash or socuritics and a solvent
Hll!'ety for a sum of Rs. 2,000. 'fl1f' surety is
required to execut!' a separate bond in Form 'D'. A
provi8o addccl lo the Rulo say8 that the security
may he increaKen or dccrea.setl by the Cust-Oms·
collector at anv time, Hhould he consider it
1tece8sary to dos~. having regard to the volume
and t~·pe of th" busincs• which the applicant will
transaC't as Custom House Agent. It may bf'
mentioned here that the four classes of a.gent~
which had grown in the past have now been fused
in to one, and an agent under the HuleH may not
1·onfinc hi" activities to those of any one or more
nf the four classes previously existing. Objection,
however, is taken to the basic figure of the security
and particularly, the cash security of Ra. 3,000,
which are innovations under the present Rules.
Reference is made to the provision~ of Form 'C', in
which it is provided as follows :
••
3 s.C.R. SUPREME couttr REPORTS
j_'
'r
l
)
t
121
"It is also agreed and declared that the
President of India may apply the above snm
of Rs .......... in making good wholly or in part
any short collection of duty or other charges
in respect of any transactions made by the
said ...... an behalf of importers in the event
of such sums remaining unpaid, even after
issue of demands under section 39 of the
Sea Customs Act."
The petitioners contend that the increased
security, particularly, in cash, puts an unreasonable
restriction upon the right to, carry on the profession
or avocation. They point to the fact that in the
past a. security of Rs. 2,000 had been considered
adequate, and from 1937 onwards, that security
alone was demanded. They also contend that as
Dalals they arc only required to present the shipping bills and the assessment or appraisement of
the customs duty is the function of the Customs
Officer. If any mistakes are made, due to an error
on the part of the Customs-authority, or even due
to a wrong declaration of the real value of the
goods by the importer, the collection of duty should
be made from the owner of the goods and not from
them. They also contend that this is the.meaning
and intent of s. 3!l, which, iu terms, makes the
owner of the goods liable to make up for the short
"ollections and puts no responsibility on the agents.
They further contend that the last clause of the bond, quoted earlier, makes the agent liable for
payment of the balance of the duty before any
attempt is marle to recover it from the owner or
importer.
The last point need not detain us long,
because it is raised on the existence of the word
"even" in the clause "even after issue of demands
under section 39 of the Sea Customs Act". The
word "even" does not _mean that the agent's
security can be touched before the notice is given.
It rather indicates that the security would be
utilised to make up the deficit only when a notice
Chandraknnt
Krishnarao
Prad/iat1,
v.
The Collector of '
OuBtome,- Bombay
llidayatullah J.
·-
128
1961
Chandt!lka,1t.
Krishnarao
•
Prallilln.
v,
1'he Coll<elor of
Gu.toms Bombay
Hidoyutullah J.
SUPltEM]; couwr Rl!:PORTs
(19~:lj .
b givcli and if cvPn >tfter notic'<' there is 110
cumpli rncc. This wCJuid indicate that before the
'ecu:ity .is so utilised, a notice must go to the agent
or his prmc1pal, am! the bond makes the notice a
8ine qua non of an action to recoup the deficit duty
from the security amount.
•
The larger question whether the agent can
ht: m,1dc rcsponsibk for the short collection of duty
under s.3!J may lw deferred for th<> moment.
Previous to the promulgation of the Rules, there
were, as already stated, four classes of Agents, and
their duties, by custom and usage, wero also
different. It is now contemplated to make a single
class of agents and also to restrict the number of
such agents. It is quite clear, therefore, that the
amount of business which would be done by the
agents who arc licen~ed, would grow signiffoantly.
Also, each agent would be entitled t-0 do all kinds
of businesses which were handled Reparately.
This justifies the demand for increased security,
and it should be noticed that there is room for
tho reduction of the dutv in individual cases, if
the amount of businesii which the agent would
carry on, would be Arnall. Similarly, there is
provision for demanding increased security from
a persqn who does o!· is expected ,to do a much
larger amount of busmetlS as an agent. There
is thus no room for a proper adjustment of tho
amount of securitv to be obtained from each
individual licensed agent, commenllUratc with the
volum~ and type of busin<'s~ which he will transact.
We do not, therefore, consider that r. 12 is
defective on this ground.
Before we deal with s. 30, it is necessary to
review certain other sections of the Sea CustomB
Act. Under the Sc·a CustomH Act, it is not
obliga.tory upon a principal to appoint a
licensed agent. An importer or exporter, as
tho OMO may be, can also appoint any person
with the appro,val of the CUlltoms-qo.Ucctor ,.~
~
t -
..
,....,
•
a s.c.:R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
i.29
his agent, .who need not be a licensed agent. (R.3).
The Rules are meant to control action of agents,
particularly the licensed agents. Under the Act,
the position of an agent, whether licensed or not,
is indicated in s. 4, which reads :
"When any person is expressly or impliedly authorized by the owner of any goods to
be his agent in respect of such goods for all
or any of the purposes of this Act, and such
authorization is approved by the Customscollector, such person shall, for such purposes
be deemed to be the owner of such goods."
r
...1
...
One of the duties of the owner of the goods is to
make a declaration of the real value of the goods
in a bill of entry or shipping bill. Under s. 29, on
the importation into, or exportation from, any
customs-port of any goods, whether liable to duty
or not, t.he owner of such goods must, in his bill of
entry or shipping bill as the case may . be, state the
real value, quantity and description of such goods
to the best of his knowledge and belief, and must
subscribe a declaration of the truth of such statement at the foot of such bill. Under the same
section, the Customs-collector may require the
production of invoices, broker's note, policy of
insurance or other document to satisfy himself
about the real value, quantity or description of
such goods. The Customs-Collector is also authorized to inspect the goods for the same purpose.
Under ss. 29A and 29B, there may be an assessment
of duty prior to the examination of the goods and
a provisional assessment of duty and its payment
even prior to the production of the documents
above mentioned or the inspection of the goods.
_ Section 30 of the Act defines "real value" and that
is the value on which the assessment of the goodH
takes place. That section is not dependent upon the
declaration of the owner, but defines "real value" in
terms of a formula which, on its application determines the real value, apart from any declaration.
1961
Chandr,a1canf
Krishnarao
Pradhan
v.
Th£ Collectar of
Custo~; ·Bombay
··~·
•
l3o
1961
(,hatdrakanl
J(ri1hnarao
Pradhan
v.
·nae Colleaor of
(,'u.tom.a, BcJmbay
//idayatullah J.
SUPRE!lfE COURT REPORTS
•
[1962]
8cction 31 provi<lcH for the examinafio11 of
ad mloreui goods, and if the real value of such
goods i~ correctly stated i11 the bill of cntrv or
shipping bill, the goods aro asses.,rcl i11 acC'ordance
therewith. Section :l:! provid<>s for the procrdurc,
if it appears that such goods are properly c:harj.(eable
with a higher rato or amount of duty than that to
which they were subject according to the v•tlUP
stated in the bill of entry or shipping hill. The
Officer may then dC1tain tho goods and collect the
proper duty. Sections 33, :HA and :l5 deal with
abatoment allowed or disallowed under certain
circumstances. Sections :rn, 37 and :l8 deal with
the alteration of impo1t and export duties or tariff
yaluations. When the proper duty has been paid
according to the checks and inspections, if "ny,
the goods are allowed to he cleared.
Section :rn, as the margi11al note sh~w6
correctly, deals with payment of duties not levier!,
short-levied or erroneously refunded. The first eubscction provides as follows :
"( l) When c11Btoms-duties or charges have
not been levied or have been short-lovicd
through inadvertence, error, or collusiou o.r
misconstruction on the part of the Officers of
Customs, or through mis-statement as to roal
value, quantity or description on the part of
the owner,
or when any such duty or charge, after
havi11g been levied, or has been, owing to any
such cause, erroneously refunded,
the person cl1argeablc with the duty or
charge which has not been levied or which has
been so short-levied or to whom such ref11nd
has erroneously been made, shall pay the duty
or charge or the deficiency or repay the amount
paid to him in excess, on a notice of demand
being iss11ed to him within three months from
the relevant date as defined in sub-section ( 2);
.-•
..
3 s.d.:R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
and the Customs-collector may refuse to
pass any goods belonging to such person until
the said duties or charges or the said deficiency
or excess be paid or repaid."
The second sub-section need not be quoted, beeause
it does not bear upon the controversy.
)
The contention of the petitioners is that
although in the first paragraph of s. 39( 1) the word
"owner" may comprehend an agent who is deemed
to be an owner, if authorised under the Act, the
section does not use the word "owner" in the latter
part, and speaks of "the person chargeable with the
duty", meaning thereby 8 change over to the real
owner of the goods in contradistinction to the agent.
They urge that this is even more apparent from the
words of the fourth paragraph of the first subsection which authorises the Customs-collector to
reftise to pass any goods belonging to "such person"
which must mean the goods belonging to the real
owner; who is properly chargeable with the duty.
It is contended, therefore, that as the agent is not
within the reach of s. 39, the demand of dut'V from
him cannot be made, and that the provisions· of the
bond by which. the agent and his security are made
liable, are beyond the provisions of s. 39 and thus
invalid.
One thing is clear that the Customs-authorities
may have no dealing with the real owner of the
goods where the agent has been authorised to deal
with them for the purposes of the Sea Customs Act
or any of its provisions. Section 4 clearly lays
down a fiction, that if the agent is authorised by
the real owner in respect of any of the matte1·s in
the Act, the Customs-authorities would deal with
the agent as if he were the owner. The effect of the
fiction is, therefore, to make an agent answerable
to the Customs-authorities within the four corners
of his authorisation. The fiction operates only
within those limits. ·An agent may be authorised
1961
Chandralcant
Kriahnarao
Pradhan
v.
'[!he Collector of
Cu1:1tomfJ;--Bombay
H,idqyatullah J,
t
132
1~~1
~
ChaJViz4kat1t
Kria/uJ,orao
Pratlha"
v,
Tiu CaUe.cfor of
":'11.n"oml, Bomb"aJ·
TJidaya1ull4h .J.
Sttl>REM.E_dOUR1' REPORfS
to declare the real value and to pay th11
customs duty or other <'harges. If an agent is
authorised in this manner, under the fi<'linn created
by F. 4 he would be regard<>d as th<' owner and
would be rlealt "-ith as eur·h. ln· the 0ustomsauthorities.
·
ft has alrea1ly bPcn pointed out that the reaJ
,·alue, quantity and description of the goodH h:ivc
to hr· declared in the hill nf Pntr~· or the shipping
!,ill. A form "-as shown to us at the hearing in
which the declaration has to he made either by the
real owner or the agent. Th" form emphasis also
that all responsibility for t ht> deelaration and for
the payment of the proper duty and charges may ha
taken by an agent. Onn· an agent haA made a
rleclaration am\ h:u; also been authorised to pa~·
the r\ut\" etl'., it is to him that- th<' Cnstomsauthoritie,;i woulcl look for payment or additional
payment, and it is. to him that refunds would bf'
made. The Uu~toms-authoritie' would not deal
"'it.h the real owner, and that ii; the S('hemu of the
Act.
t: -
When s. :l\J sa.v~ that where customs duties or
c:hal'ges have not been leviPd or h:we beon short.
lovied through ina1h-ertcnce, error. eollusion or mis·
construction on the part of the ofliccrs of Customs,
or through mis-statement as to real value, quantity
or <iPseription on the part of the owner, it refers
not only to the l'l'al own<'r, hut abo to an agent,
if the latter can he dcenll'rl to be the owner. 'l'his
is, indeed, conceded by the pctitioncr8. The question .then arises, wlmt does the sectio11 mean when
it speaks .of "the person chargeable with the duty
or charge which has not been levied or which has
bePn so short.-levied, or to whom such refund has
erroncouslv been made"? Obviously enough, thc
pernon to Le chargl·cl, iJ1 so t'ar as the Customs- -41
authorities arc concerned, is not the real 01mor
but the agent, a fictional ow1icr of the goods. If
a 'fictional owner' can be read into the first part
I
3 S.C.R.
1
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
133
of the section, there is no reason why the words
"the person chargeable with duty" cannot also be
applied to him, In the circ11mstances in which the
agent makes a declaration with authorisation from
the real owner, the agent is the person chargeable
with the duty. Otherwise, for the duty chargeable
in the first instance the agent would be the person
chargeable with the duty, and for any short payment he would cease to be such a person and the
Customs-authorities would have to deal with the
real owner, who mad0 no declaration or payment.
The words "the person chargeab1e with the duty ... ",
therefore, have advisedly heen used not to exclude
the agent hut to describe in a neutral way the
person from whom such a demand can lie marle.
They are wide enough in their ambit to take in,
not only the real owner but also a "deemed owner"
under the Act. So far, there is no difficulty, and
the objection of tho learned coullRol for the petitioners that a simpler metho<l would have been to
use the word "ownN" in this part of the section,
is· without substance, because the legislature may
express its meaning and intention ~n differt'nt ways.
The critical argument, howeYer, is on the
fourth paragraph of s. 39(1). There, it is provided
that if the excess charge is not paid, "the Customs:
collector may refuse to pass any goods be longing
to 'such person' until the said duties or charges or
the said deficiency or excess be paid or repaid".
It is contended that an agent deals with numerous
owners at the same time, and if this paragraph is
applied literally, then the Customs-collector would
be entitled to refuse to pass the goods belonging to
other 01Vncrs, handled by the same agent. This
argument, in our opinion, does not represent the
true state of the law. An agent, when he works
for
different
owners
with
authorisation,
. undoubtedly becomes a fictional owner of the goods
)t.. belonging to them; but he does not become a
, single. owner in respect of the goods . belonging tQ
1961
OhanW!alw.nt
Kri8hiiaiao
Pradlian
v.
The Collector of
CuBtumtt, Bombay
Hidiryatu!lah J.
'
134
1961
GMlllrakant
K'ri6hn'lrao
PY.ad/um
v.
The Colltctor of
~t,,...,./Jombay
Hid<Jll"lullah J.
SUPREME OOURT REPORTS
\
(1962)
different olient.e. He becomes an owner quoad ca-0h
client, and his owno1'Ship of the goods is diversified ~ and is not one. The agent, therefore, stands in
the shoes of several persons at the same time,
and is himself a multitude of owners. It is only
when short payment has been made in his capacity
as one fictiomd owner, that he can be asked to pay
that which he ought to have paid in the first
instance. He is exposed to tho penalty of having .A
hiA goods detained in the same <'.apaeity as owner
q1wad his defaulting client, and the goo<lH within
his control for the same client will be detained
until tho duty luis been paid. It is only tho goods
of tho defaulting owner in respect of which he is
also the deemed owner, that would suffer the
penalty of detention but not tho goods of a {
different owner, oven though the agent may be
\.
authorised to deal on his behalf. It is in this way
that the section must be read without contradiction
in its several parts, because to read it as suggested
by the petitioners, creates a contradiction between
the first paragraph and the other paragraphs that
follow. An authorised agent is an owner for all
purposes of the Act (including payment of duty). ~·
If one were to say that in the other paragraphs of ~
s. 39(1) he is not included, then the fiction which is
created bys.· 4 would cease to be worked out to itll
logical limits. Once it is held that the words "the
person chargeable with the duty ......... " are apt to
describe not onlv the real owner but also his
authorised agent (ancl there is no reason why thCBe
words should be restricted), the fourth paragraph
falls in lino with tho others, and the ownership of
the agent is, thcreforo, limitccl to one client at a
time, and the goods of that client of which the
agent is also the deemed owner, are exposed to the
penalty of detention. It must be remembered that
the Aot makes the 'goods' liable to duty and the
payment of duty by owners clears tho goods. The
law goes further, and says that other goods of the ~
awner.are also liable for any deficit, if the ~ood~
-
3 S.C.R.
SUPREMEOOURT REPORTS
135
liable to duty are 'cleared' before the full duty has
b~en paid.·
' ' The condition in tile bond is limited by the
operation of s. 39 to the transactions of one
constituent at a time, and the forfeiture of security
is also limited to the constituent in default. The
bond prescribes for recouping of the deficiency in
the customs duty or charges from the security, even
after notice is given. This notice must he given
withil1 three months from the relevant date as
defined in the section. The limit of three months
also applies to the agent as the deemed owner in
the same way as it does to the real owner. If no
notice is given, then the bond, on its own terms,
cannot be ·enforced. In our opinion, the contentions of the petitioners are not sustainable.
In the result, the petitions must fail except to
the extent that we declare r. lO(c) to be an unreason'1ble restraint upon the right of the petitioners to
carry on their avocation, and r. II when it prescribes
a renewal fee of Rs. 50, invalid inasmuch as it has
provided not for a fee but for a tax. Subject to
this, the petitions are dismissed. The petitioners
will pay the costs of the other side (one set only), as
they have lost substantially.
SUBBA RAO, J.-I have had the advantage
of perusing the judgment prepared by my learned
brother, Hidayatullah, J. I agree with him exeept
in regard to r. 6(c) of 'the Custom House Agents
Licensing Rules, 1960 (hereinafter called the Rules).
Rule 6(c) sRys: "An applicant for a licence shall
furnish an income-ta:x: clearance certificate." The
Rules were made to regulate the conduct of the
clearing agents so that they may discharge their
duties to the satisfaction of not only the Customs
Authorities but also the public. In my view, the
production of income-tax clearance certificate is
e:x:traneous to the issue of a licence to a customs
house agent. How cloes the production of such a
certificate improve the credentials of an appli9ant
·1961
Chandrakant
K.riahpo,rao
Pradh<in
v.
The CoUeetor of
Omloini, Bombay
Hidayatullah J.
Subba I ao.T.
l3G
1961
Chi:andrak.ot1t
K,.i4Jincwno
Pr!Ulhu11
v.
The C-Olltelcr of
l'u.ttoms, Bombay
Subha Rao .T,
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1962
for selection as a customs house agent ? An
applicant may be financially sound and also
otherwise duly (1ualified; he may have discharged
all his debtil, an<l paid all his taxes except a small
portion of his income-tax : he may not have paid
the income-t.1X for good reasons. Yet, if he docs
not produce the income-tax clearance certificate,
he is disqualified. What is the reasonable nexus
Let\rncn the production of such a. certificate and a
person's right to rlo business as a. clearing agent ?
Ther1• is none, except a remote md fanciful
presumption that a man who pays the income-tax
may also pay the dues payable to the Customs
Authorities. In](. Raman & Co., Tellicherry v. State
of Jfodms ('), in the context of issue of a licence
under the Yarn Dealers Control Order, as Judge of
the Madras High Court, I have held,
(
-
''The fact that a person is in 1•rrears of
income-tax is not germane to the issue of a
licence under the Yam Dealers Control Order.
It is a cireumsfance extraneous to the
petitioner's right to carry on his business.
The Income-tax Act provides an adequate
machinery for realising the arrears due from
an asscsscc. I am of the view that the
restriction imposed is unreasonable an<l is not
in the interests of thl' general public."
I still udhero tu that view .. Every taxing Act has
a machinery for collecting the tax imposed by it,
but the said rule, in effect 11.ncl substance, provides
for an additional machinery for collection of
income-tax. I would, therefore, hold that the nonproduction of an income-tax clearance certificate
is not germane to the issue of a licence under the
said Rules. I would therefore strike out r.6( c) of
the Rules on the ground that it constitutes an
unreasonable restriction on the right of an
appli'cant to do business as customs house a$ent.
(IJ,A.I.R, 1953 Mad. 84-:
...
J
3·'S.C;R.
..
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
137
BY COURT : In accordance with the
opinidn · of th~ majority, the petitions must fail
except to the ext"Jnt that we declare r.10 (c) to be
an unreasonable restraint upon the right of the
petitioners to carry on thei.r avocation, and r. ll,
when it prescribes a renewal fee of Rs. 50, invalid
inasmuch as it has provided not for a fee but for a
tax. Subject to this, the petitions are. dismissed. The
petitioners will pay the costs of the other side (one
set only), as they have lost substantially.
Petitions dismissed except for sl·ight mod·ifi·
cation.
COMMIS8IONER OF INC0.\1E-TAX, KERALA
AND COIMBATORE
v.
PUTHIYA PONMANICHINTAKAM WAKF
MANAGER P. P. AYESHA BI BI
(P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, K. SuBBA RAO and
M. H!DAYATULLAH, JJ.)
Income Tax-Wakf-AssesBment-If must be in tlte status
of individual or as association of persons-llfut(J;waU.i, 1j a
trustee-Indian Income-tax Act, 1922(11of1922), s. 41(1), First
proviso-MuBBalman WakfValidating Act, 1913 (6 of 1913), ss ..3,4.
The question for determination in the appeal was whether
the wakfin question should be assessed to tax under s.41(1) of
the Indian Income-tax Act. 1922, through the manager as
individual or as an association of persons at the maximum rate
under the first proviso to that section on the ground that the
individual shares of the beneficiaries were indeterminate and
unknown.
The wakf deed directed the mutawalli to do acts
necessary for charitable purposes and to meet the maintenance
expenses of the wakif's children, grand-children, the female
children born in the future and the male children born to the
said female children and after payment of taxes and meeting of
expenses for repairs and maintenance of properties, to utilise the
l!alance of the income for daily necessary expenses of the house
and for food for purchasing dresses and other necessities for the
male and female members of the tarwad, for conducting specified
~eremonies, for feeding the poor and for meet_ing such. other
necessary expenses and thereafter to utilise lhe balance, if any,
in acquiring properties yielding good income.
1961
Chandra/cant
K rishnarao .
P'l'ad,ha,n
v.
The Colledo'I' of
Customs, Bombay
Suliba Rao J.
1961
AUifUst 14.
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