THE STATE OF BOMBAY versus KATHI KALU OGHAD AND OTHERS
Supreme Court of India | Decided 4 August 1961 | [1962] 3 S.C.R. 10 | 1961 INSC 229
Key facts
- Decided
- 4 August 1961
- Bench
- BHUVNESHWAR PRASAD SINHA*, SYED JAFFER IMAM*, S.K. DAS, P.B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, A.K. SARKAR, K. SUBBA RAO, K.N. WANCHOO, K.C. DAS GUPTA, RAGHUBAR DAYAL, N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR, J.R. MUDHOLKAR
- Bench size
- 11
- Case number
- CRIMINAL APPEAL No. 146/1958
- Citation
- [1962] 3 S.C.R. 10
- Neutral citation
- 1961 INSC 229
Text of the judgment
lo
19&1
'I'll.1 .Marni,tment of
!itar/11~ lloltl
v.
The 1Vorkmrn
Wancl100 J.
StPREME COl1RT RRPORTS
[1962]
is i11 accorrlanr(' with the prrseot scale. Tho
workmen \l'l'I'C demanding HB. :J5, but the Tribunal
has fixed Rs. 20 per month anrl has pro\•idcd that
where a workman takes his meals at the hotel the
amount will be reduced by Rs. 15; but where he
lives in accommodation provided by the hotel but
docs not talw his meals there the amount will be
reduced by R~. 5; further whnr he both li,·es and
trtkPs his meals in the hotPI there will be no
dearness allowance paicl to him. We see no reason
to dis.igree with the view taken by the Tribunal
in thiR b(•half, particularly when it is ir. accordance
with what was prcrnlent in the hotel from before
according to tlw aware! of Sh1·i Dulat of .May 17,
1950.
The appeal therefore fail:; ('Xecpt in the
mntt<'r of the modification in the casual.cum·
siekneHs leave as indicated above and it is hereby
dismissed with (·osts.
•
-
Appeal dinni88Cd enept for slight modification.
THE STATE OF BOMBAY
1961
"·
KATHI KALU OGHAD AND OTHERS
c. J.. s. ,J. IMAM, s. K. DAS,
P. R. GAJE);DRAGADKAR, A. IC SAHKAR,
K. Si::HHA RAO, K. K. WAXCHOO,
(B. P. SINHA,
c.
K.
DAS GUPTA, RAGHUBAR
DAYAL, N. RAJAGOPALA AYYAXGAR
and ,T. R. MUllHOLKAR, JJ.)
'l'estimonial Compulsion -(Jbtai1iing «q.>ecimen u·riting and
thumb i1npreasion j1·om G('CUAP.d- Statenient of accWied in Pol1·ce
custody U.'Jl!d in et·ideru:t-lf confrca·enf ron.'ttitutional guaranteeConslitulion of India, Art. 20(8).
Section 73 of the Indian Evidence Act empowers the
to obtain specimen ,,·riting or signatw·e and finger
imprcs~ions of an accused person for purposes of comparison.
court
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
3 S.C.R.
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11
1961
Sections 5 and 6 of the Identification of Prisoners Act empower
a Magistrate to obtain the photograph or measurements of an Th. Stat• of Bombay
accused person. Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act
permits the reception in evidence of statc1nen ts made by an
accused person in police custody which lead to a discovery.
It was contended by the accused persons that the obtaining
of evidence in any of these ways amounted to compelling the
person accused of an offence "to be a witness against himself"
in contravention of Art. 20(3) of the Constitution. It was
further contended that it was implicit in the fact that the
accused was in police custody when the specimen signatures
or thumb impressions etc. were obtained that compulsion
was used.
¥
IlPld, that there was no infringement of Art. 20(3) of
the Constitution in compelling an accused person to give his
specimen handwriting or signature, or impressions of his
thumb, fingers, palm or foot to the investigating officer or
under orders of a court for the purposes of comparison.
Held, further, that the provisions of s. 27 of the Indian
Evidence Act did not offend Art. 20(3) unless compulsion was
used in obtaining the information. Compulsion was not
inherent in the receipt of information from an accused person
in the custody of a police officer; it will be a question of fact
in each case to be determined by the court on the evidence
before it whether compulsion had been used in obtaining the
information.
M.P. Sharma v. Satish Chandra, (1954) S.C.R. 1077,
re~considered.
Per Sinha, C.J., Imam, Gajendragadkar, Subba Rao,
Wanchoo, R aghubar Dayal, Rajagopala Ayyangar and
Mudholkar, JJ. The correct position with respect to the
guarantee under Art. 20(3) is that-
(i)
the guarantee includes not only oral testimony
given in court or out of court but also statements in
,vriting which incriminate the n1aker when figuring as an
accused person;
(ii)
the words "to be a witness" in Art. 20(3) do
not include the giving of thumb 1n1pression or impression
of palm, foot or fingers or specimen writing or exposing a
part of the body by an accused person for identification;
{iii) "self-incrimination" means conveying informa..
tion based upon the personal knowledge of the giver and
does
not
include
the
n1ere
mechanical process of
v.
Kathi K"Ct-lu Oghad
12
1961
Th< Stat• of
Bcmbay •
v.
Kathi Kalu Oghad
SUl'REM}j; COtJllT REPORTS
[1962)
producing documents in court which do not contain any
statement of the accused based on his personal
knowledge;
-
(iv) in order to come within the prohibition of
Art. 20(3) the testimony must be of such a character
that by itself it should have the tendency to incriminate
the accused; and
(v) to avail of the protection of Art. 20(3) the
person must have stood in the character of an accused
person at the time he made the statement.
Per S.K. Das, Sarkar and Das Gupta,JJ.(i) The protection afforded b)· Art. 20(3) is not
merely in respect of testimonial compulsion in the court
room but extends also to compelled testimony previously
obtained fron1 the accused.
(ii) The words "to be a witness" in Art. 20(3)
tncan "to furnish evidence" anc.l cannot he confined to
imparting personal kno\\·ledge; such evidence can be
furnished through lips or by production of a thing or of
a document or in other modes.
(iii) An accused person furnishes evidence v..·hen
he gives his spcciincn handwriting or impressions of his
fingers or palm or foot.
(iv) But in doing so the accused docs not furnish
evidence against himself as by themselves these specimens
or impressions do not incriminate or cv~n tcn<l to incri·
minate the accused and 1,. cannot be said to be compelled
"to be a witness against himself" v..·hen he is compelled
to give the SJ>'Cimcn or impression.
CRill!INAL APPEI,I,ATE JURISDICTION: Criminal
Appeal No. 146 of 1958.
Appeal by special leave from tho judgment
and order dated April 14, l!l57, of tho Bombay
High Court at Rajkot in Criminal (jail) Appeal
No. 73 of 1956.
AND
Criminal Appeal Ko. 174 of 19iJ!J.
Appoal by special leave from the judgment
and order dated June 4, l!J59, of the Calcutta High
Court in Criminal Revision No. 623 of 1958.
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3 S.C.R.
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1
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
13
H. R. Khanna and T. M. Sen, for the appellant
~in Cr. A. No. 146 of 1958. Specimen handwritings
ThlStauof
Bombay
of the accused had been taken during investigation
•• Oghad
while the accused was in police custody. These Kathi Kalu
have been excluded from consideration by the
Courts below on the ground that obtaining of such
signatures offended Art. 20 (3), the courts holding
that an element of compulsion was implicit in the
accused being in police custody at the time the
handwritings were taken. The mere fact that the
accused was in police custody does not by itself
imply that compulsion was used for obtaining the
specimen handwritings. Even if there is compulsion, it does not amount to testimonial compulsion.
Action taken under ss. 94 and 96 Criminal Procedure Code to secure production of documents
though search warrants, does not amount to
compulsion within the meaning of Art. 20 (3).
Section 73, Evidence Act also contemplates the
obtaining of specimen handwriting. If a person gives
the specimen handwriting voluntarily, it cannot be
said that he was compelled to give it. If the police
merely requests the accused, then it does not
amount to compulsion, but if it directs the accused
to write and if physical force is used or if there is
any show of force or threat, then alone would it be
compulsion. Inducement is not compulsion. I.L.R.
1957 Mad. 66, (1960) 3 S.C.R. 116, A.I.R. 1961
S.C. 29, A.I.R. 1959 Born. 865, I.L.R. (1952) 2
Cal. 106, A.I.R. 1955 Cal. 247, I.J,.R. 1952 Tr. Co.
447, A.I.R. 1958 All. 119. Refers to Willis on
Constitutional Law dealing with self-incrimination.
In A. I. R. 1960 S. C. 1125 s. 27 of the Evidence
Act has been held to be constitutional.
M.G. Setalvad, Attorney General of India, B. Sen
and T. M. Sen, for Intervener No. I. There are
four elements in Art. 20(3) which must be satisfied
before a person can claim the protection of
Art. 20(3), namely (i) he must be accused, (ii) he
must have been compelled, (iii) he must have
14
1961
Th< SIGI< of
. Bombay
v.
Kat hi Kalu Ogl1acl
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1962]
been compelled to be a witness and (iv)
his witnessing must be against himself. There
must be an clement of compulsion, a voluntary
act is not compulsion. Coercion is an clement
of compulsion.
In inducement or moral
compulsion, the mind is not free. There was
nothing in England which prc1•ented a Yoluntary
stat-0ment. (1054) S.C.R. l0i7 and (1960) ;3
S.C R. I JG, 12/'i. The fact whet-her a person has
been eompclle'l dops not rest solely on the effect
which the presence of a poli~c oflicer might hav<'
on the mind of t-hc person. I.L.R. (1952) 2
Cal. IOG, '\"\yillis p. G24, A.I.H. Ifl55 Cal. 24i.
E1·c1111 dirC'elion under s. i:l, E1·icknec Act 'rnuld
not amount to <'Ompulsion. A.LR. l!lli8 All. I HI,
160 '(;.S. 31i5: ·10 L.Ed, -1:i4. Merely because a
person who makes a statement i~ in police custody
it cannot be inferred that compulsion has been
used. \Villis p. ii~I. Obscryations in Sharma's c8sc
with regard to the words "to be a witncEF" are
excessh•e. It would be useful to see what is the
American fifth amendment. To be a witness means
that- a person either says something or writes
something which he lu10ws. He m11st depose or
write as to something of which he has knowledge.
In giving a thumb impr<'ssion or specimen writing
a person doc~ not S>t}' or write anything against
himself.
S. ill. Sikri Adi:orafr-Genera/, Punjab, N. S.
Bindra and D. (fupf(I., for respondent i11 Cr. As. Kos.
llO and I 11 of 58. Sectio11 5 of the Identification
of PriSOll(•rs Act., 1!)20, permits the obtaining of
finger print8 of an accused pc-rson b~· order of 11
Magistrate. This is not hit by Art. 20 (:3). Artie)('
20 (3) docs 11ol apply to the stage of im·<'Eti)!ation.
It on!~· prohibits the compulsory examination or
furnishiug of ineriminatm_,. stakment..' or "omm1111ication bY the accused. It does not i11"111dc the
compulso~y production
of documents. Even if
Art. 20 (3) prohibits the compulsory productio11 of
\ioeumepts, it does not prohibit the compulsory
.
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3S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
15
lUUl
examination of the body of the accused or any
part of it. In order to test whether there has been
The f$tal4 of
· 'J]ombuy
compulsion or not it is the nature of the action of
v.
the authority or court that determines the question Ka!l;i K~lu Qghad
and not the state of mind of the accused. The
privilege granted to an accused person under
Art. 20 (3) is by its nature capable of waiver and if
there is no protest, it is deemed to have been
waived, The Article deals with the stage of
conviction. Wigmore vol. 8, p. 276, 3V4, 317 and
319. 53 L.Ed. 97,199, 54 L.Ed. 1021 and 1030.
The word "witnesses" should be given its natural
interpretation. The original rule in England was
that you will not be put in i;ourt and compelled to
give evidence against yourself and referred only
to testimony given in court. Article 20 (3) gives
the same guarantee. Wigmore vol. 8, p. 623,
Phipson on Evidence, 9th Edition, p. 214. It protects
ex:traction of incriminatory statements or communications, but not the exhibition of. body or any
part of it for examination. Merely handing over
of a document is not covered by the guarantee as
it does not amount to communication. 29 L.Ed. 746.
There is no compulsion if the witness or accused
does not object. 87 L.Ed. 376, 76 L.Ed.211, 71 L.Ed.
560, Wigmore vol. 8, p. 399.
•
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•
S. M. Bose Advocate-General for the State of
West Bengal, B. Sen, and P. K. Bose, for appellant
in Cr. A.No. 174of1959. The question concerned
in Cr. ~· No. 174 o~ .1959 is whether the obtaining
of spemmen handwritmg under s. 73 of the Evidence
Act amounts to testimonial compulsion. Decisions
which hold that it is so are : A. I. R. 1957 l\f. P. 73,
A. I. R. 1959 M. P. 4l1; A. I. R. 1960 Ker. 392;
A. I. R. 1959 Mad. 396. Willoughby vol. 2, para
720, 29 L.Ed. 746. Testimonial compulsion means
that you cannot make a witness sav what he does
not want to say in court. Section 118, Evidence
Act indicates that "testify" means to make statements in Court anq pot stat\lJ'.llllnts outsjcl!J court.
16
.J»I
TM Stal• of
Bomb<iy
v.
KQIAi Koh• Oglwld
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1962]
I. L. R. l Rang. 750. Article 20( 3) applies only
to oral statements macle before the court.
S. I'. F ernw, for rPspondcnt in Cr. A. Ko.
146/1058. Sharma's caso puts the right conRtntction
on Art. 20( 3). The question of inconvenience should
not be taken into consideration. 350 U.S. 422: 100
L.Ed. 511. Artirle 20(3) could he split up into (i
components, i.e. (i) No person, (ii) accused of an
offence, (iii) shall bo compcll<•d, (iv) to he, (v) to
be a witness, and (vi) to be a witncs~ against himself. In the pn'scnt case it is not necessary to
discuss (i). (ii) in<licateR a timo whenever incrimination is imminent and the guarantee comes into play.
"Accused of an offence" is merely dcscripth·e of
the person. Wlwnever 11 person is accused; nothing
obtained from him by compulsion can be used
against him. 340 U.S. 332; 9:j L.Ed. 306; 2GH U.S.
34; 69 J,. F..d. lli8. "Accused of an offence" docs not
mean accused at the timo when a person is compclkd
to provido evidence. A. I. R. 1960 S.C. 1125. (iii) In
case of police custocly there is irrebutable presumption of compulsion. A. I. R. 1960 Cal. 318. In
other cases it may be a question of fact whether
there was compulsion or not.. Compulsion means
an act which is i1woluntarv, uncler threat, coercion
or inducement. It has to he seen what has moti,·at.
ed the act. Compulsion mean~ any non-voluntary
positive act not. of frcP yolition. (iv) The words
used arc "to bo'' and not "to appear". This brings
in the idea of all kinds of testimo1.y (evidence) and
removes all rcstrictic;ns as to time and place. (v) Tc
be a witr.c~a, means to furniRh C\'idencc. 'Vigmor<·
8th vol. p.362. Best on Eviclence p. II:?. Phipson,
p. 2. A.I.H. l!l60 Ker. 392; 1()9 E.R. 909. American
Jurisprudence, vol. 58, p. 57. (vi). To be a witnesR
against himself means to do a pnsiti\'c art which
would incriminate him. A. LR 195G 1\fa<l. Hifi.
Compelling the production of any sort of eyic)entiary
document which is likely to help the prosecnticm,
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3 S.C.R.
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SUPREME COURT REPOR'l'S
17
1961
is hit by the guarantee. The object of the guarantee
_, is not to let a person degrade himself. l!J58 Cal.
682; I.L.R. 1957 Cutt. 200.
The State nf
Bombay
v.
Kathi Kalu Oghad
R. G. Datta, for Intervener No. 3.
P. S. Safeer and R. S. Gheba, for appellant in
Cr. As. Nos. 110 and 111of1958. The words used in
Art. 20(3) are not "appear as a witness against
~ himself." It covers the stage of investigation also
and protects all action of an accused person that
may be used against him at the trial. Section 6 of
the Prisoners Identification Act makes a person
" who
refused to give his photograph or measurement,
guilty of an offence. No person can waive the
fundamental right guaranteed under Art. 20(3).
A.LR. 1959 S. C. l 4!J. Any part of the evidence
contributed to by the accused under compulsion is
hit by the guarantee.
¥
H. R. Khanna in reply. Sections 1, IlS,132
and 139 of the Evidence Act show that the words
"to be a witness" means giving evidence in court
and must be restricted to judicial proceedings.
> The mere fact that an accused person is in police
custody does not raise any presumption that
compulsion has been used.
1961. August 4. The ,Judgment of Sinha C. •T.,
Imam, Gajendragadkar, Subba Rao, Wanchoo,
Raghubar Dayal, Rajagopala Ayyangar and
Mudholkar JJ., was deliverPcl hy
SINHA C..J.-These appeals have been heard
together only insofar as they involve substantial
questions of law as to the interpretation of the
Constitution, with particular reference to cl. (3)
of Art. 20. This larger Bench was constituted in
order to re-examine some of the propositions of
law laid down by this (!)ourt in the case of M. P.
~Sharma v. Satiah Chandra('), because when one of
these cases was heard by five of us, we felt that
'
(I)
(I 954] S. C.R. 10771
.
'
Sinha G. J.
·SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1961
The Stat.e of
Bombay
v.
Kathi Kalu Oghad
Sinha C. J.
[1962)
some of the propositions therein laid do\vn may ...
have \been too widely stated, and, therefore, required
to be re-a.tat\ld with more particularity. We have
not heard counsel for ]he _par-ties pn the merits of
the orders passed by the Courts below, but have
'coufined the discussions at the Bar, insofar as they
had any bearing on the questions of law relating
to' the· interpretation of cl. (3) of Art. 20 of the °"'"
Constitution.
J
.It is not necessary to state in any detail
the facts of each of the case~ now before us. We
shall, pherefore, sfyl.te only so much of the facts
as have occasioned calling in aid of the provisions
of' cl. (3) of Art. 20 of the Con·stitution. In the ,
first case, namely,, Criminal Appeal 146 of 1958,
the State of Bombay is the appellant.
The
respondent was charged, along" ith another person,
under s. 302, read with s. 34 of the I. P. C., as
also under s. 19( e) of the Indian Arms Act
(XI of 1878). The Trial Court found him guilty of
those charges and sentenced him to imprisonment
for life under s. 302, read with s. 34 of the I.P .C.
and to a term of-two years rigorous imprisonment z_
for the offence under the Arms Act. At the trial
the 'identification of the respondent, as one of ihe
two alleged culprits, was the most important
quost{o:q to be doci<led by the Court.
Besides
~
other evidence, .the prosecution adduced in evidence
•
j
a chit-Ex. 5-a11eged to be in his handwriting and
said to hM·e been given by him. In order to prove _.
·that Ex. q was in tho handwriting of. the
.respondtint, the police had obtained frcm him,
during the investigation, th1:cc specimen handwritings .of his on three separate sheets of paper
which were marked as Exs. 27, 28 and 29. Th,.
disputed document, namely, Ex. 5 was .compar€d
with tlie admitted handwritings on Exs. 27, 28 and
..J
29 by the Haridwriting Expert whose evidence~l
''vas td the:. eff~ct that ~hey are all writ.in gs by the
'
·s::tme'p~·rson. 'At the trial and i11.the. ]!igh. Qourt,
I
I
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3 S.C.R.
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
19
1961
the question was raised as to the admissibility of
the specimen writings contained in Exs. 27, 28
· The Stal• of
Bombay
and 29, in view of the provisions of Art. 20(3) of
v.
the Constitution. It is an admitted fact that Kathi Kalu Oghad
those specimen writings of the 81cused had been
Sinha O. J.
taken by the police while he was in l'olice custody,
but it was disputed whether the acer - d had been
compelled to give those writings withh. the meaning
of cl. (3) of Art. 20. The plea of the accused
that he was forced by the Deputy Superintendent
of Police to give those writings has not been
accepted by the learned Trial Judge. But those
documents have been excluded from consideration,
as· inadmissible evidence, on the ground that
though there was no threat or force used by the
police in obtaining those writings fr·1m the accused
person, yet in the view of the Court "the element
of compulsion was implicit in his being at that
time in police custody." In this conclusion both
the Trial Judge and the High Court have agreed.
The identification of the accused person was also
sought to be proved by the evidence of witnesses,
who identified him at an identification parade.
But the holding of the identification parade ·has
not been sought to be brought within the
prohibition of cl. (3) of Art. 20.
After
eliminating the Exs. 27, 28 and 29 from their
consicler'ltion, the High Court, on a consideration of
the other evidence in the case, came to the conclusion that the identity of the respondent had not
been established beyond a reasonable doubt. Hence,
giving him the benefit of doubt, they acquitted him.
The State of Bombay moved this Court and
obtained special leave to appeal from the Judgment
and Order of acquittal, passed by the High Court.
On these facts, the only questions of constitutional
importance that this Bench has to determine are;
(1) whether by the production of the specimen
handwritings-Exs. 27, 28, and 29-the accused
could be said to have been 'a witness against
himself' within the meaning of Art. 20(3.) of the
20
1911
n .. s1o1tof
Bombay
v.
Kathi Kalu Ogl1ad
Sinha C. J.
[19()2]
SUPRKUE OOUR'l' REPORTS
Constitution; and (2) whether the mere fact that
when those specimen haudwriti11gH ha<! been giveu,
the accused person was in police custody could, by
itself, amow1t tu compulsion, apart from any other
circumslanees 11·hi\·h coui<l be 11rg«1l as vitiatii1g the
consent of th<· accm;rd in /":.,i,·in"
.:".) those R™'Cinwn
handwritings. Thi' Bench is not concerned with
the further question whether in all the circumstances
disclosed by the e\·idcnce in this case, the ar;cused
could be said to have' been com1wllc<l, as a matter
of fact, to giv<' those spe«inwns.
1·~
In Criminal Appeals 110 and 111 of Hl58,
which arose out of the sanie H<'t ,of facts the
accused person has been convicted b~· th(' Courts
below under ss. 380 and 45i of the I.P.C., as also
under s. 19( f) of the Indian Arms Aet. The facts
of the case necessary for bringing out the points in
controversy ar~ that a 8hop in Hissar in Punjab
was burgled. In th<· eournc of t.hc burglary four
double-barrelled giurn, one single-barre lier! gun and
a rifle were stolen. During his iutcrrogation by
the police at the iiwestigation stagl', the appellant
is alleged to have gi,·en the information that out
of the arms stolen from the shop at Hissar he had
buried one .22 bon' rifle, two .12 bore douhlebarrelled guns arnl 011e .18 singlc·harr.. lled gun at
a certain place. It is alleged that as a consec1iwnce
of the infom1ation thus gi\·en b~· t.hc ae<,use<l and
on his pointing out the exact loeat ion where these
buriecl articles could be found, the rifk~ and guns
were actually reciwered. During the inwstigation
the police had t'lken possession of 1·<·rtain glass
panes and phials from the hurgle<l shop which bore
some palm and finger impressions ( Exs. PI 0 to
Pl.'.!). In onler to compare the impressions on
those glass panes anrl phials with tho,;e of the
accused. the invPstigating police officPI' got the
imprPssions of the palms and fingers of the accused
taken in the presence of a Magistrate. On the
evidence adduced by the prosecution, including the
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3 s.c.:R.
SUPREME COU:rtT REPORTS
21
1961
fact of the recovery of the firearms and the
evidence of the identity of the imprPssions of the
T Ire State of
Bombay
accused taken as aforesaid, he was convicted and
v.
sentenced by the Courts below to certain terms of Kathi Kalu Oghcvl
imprisonment and was also ordered to pay a fine
SinhaO. J.
of one thousand rupees. On appeal, the sentence
of fine and imprisonment was modified by the
Court of Appeal. In revision in the High Court,
both the revisional applications were dismissed.
The convicted person prayed for and obtained the
necessary certificate of fitness under Art. 134( 1) (c)
of the Constitution from the High Court of Punjab .
The points raised in this Court were; ( 1) that s. 27
of the Indian Evidence Act is violative of Art. 14
of the Constitution; and (2) the impressions of the
appellant'e palms and fingers taken from him after
his arrest, which were compared with the
impressions on the glass panes and phials, were not
admissible evidence in view of the provisions of
Art. 20(3) of the Constitution. Though the provisions of ss. 5 and 6 of the Identification of
Prisoners Act, 1920, (XXXIII of 1920) have not
in terms been attacked as ultra vires Art. 20( 3) of
the Constitution, the effect .of the argument based
on that article is to bring into controversy the
constitutionality of ss. 5 and 6 of the Act.
As a matter of fact, one of the propositions of law
to be urged in support of the appeals is stated in
these terms; "that ss. 5 and 6 of the Identification
of Prisoners Act, 1920, read with Art. 20(3) of the
Constitution render the evidence of measurements
to be inadmissible".
In the last case, Criminal Appeal 174 of 1959,
the State of West Bengal has preferred this appeal
by special leave granted by this Court under
Art. 136( 1) of the Constitution against the judgment
and order of the High Court at Calcutta dated
June 4, 1959, passed in its revisional jurisdiction,
against an order of the Magistrate, First Class,
Howrah, directing the respondent to give his
·---,.-.··;,.',,.----:·:"':
... ...t.
. \
22
'
. ~- ~
'~-
",.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[l!lG::]
1961
specimen writing '1nd signature, under s. 73 of the
Indian Evidence Act. It is only necessary to state
B0 ":_•Y
the following facts in order to bring out the
KathiKalu Oghad
questions of law bearing on the interpretation of
Sinl.a C. J ~. -., c_ the Constitution. During the investigation of a
criminal case relating to trafficking in contraband
opium, the respondent's residence was searched
and ·certain quantity - of contraband opium
was alleged to have been found in his possession.
The respondent, along with ai10ther
person,' was produced before a Magistrate of the
Ist Class at Howrah and was later released on bail.
From tile materials and __ statements obtained
during the investigation of the case by the· police,
_it was - considered that there were ·_reasonable
grounds to believe that the endorsement on the
back of certain railway receipts for consignment
of goods seized at Howrah Railway Station was in
the handwriting of the respondent, and it was,
therefore, necessary to take his specimen writing
aud signature for the purpose of comparison and
verification. \Vhcu the accused were produced
before the i\Iagistrate, the Investigating Officer
made a prayer to the Magistrate for taking specimen
writing and signature of the respondent. On an
adjourned date when the accused persons, including
the respondent, were present in the Court of the
Magistrate, the respondent declined to give his
specimen writing and signature, contending that
Art. 20 (3) of the Constitution prohibited any such
specimens being taken against the will of the
accused. After hearing th'} parties, the learned.
Magistrate overruled the objection on behalf of the
accused and allowed the prayer by the prosecution
for taking the specimen writing and signature of
the respondent. _ The respondent moved tbe
High Court at Calcutta under s. 43!J of the Cr. P.O.
and Art. 227. of the Constitution. The case was
heard by a Division Bench consisting of J.P. l\Iitter
and Bhattacharyya, JJ, on July 2 and 3, 1958,
but the judgment was not delivered until the
Th• State of·.
o
A
-
'
•
3 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
23
~
1961
4th of June, 1959. The Court held that tho prohibition
contained in Art. 20 (3) of the Constitution applied
The State of
Bombay
to the case of writing and signature to bo taken,
v.
as directed by tho learned Magistrate. The Court Kathi Kalu Oghad
relied upon the decision of this Court in
Sinha 0. J.
111.P. i:Jharma's case.(') In coming to this conclusion,
the Division Bench disagreed with tho previous
• decision of another Division Bench of that
Court in the case of Sailendra Nath Sinha v.
The State('), which had laid down that a mere direction under s.73 of the Evidence Act to a person
accused of an offence to give his specimen writing
did not come within the prohibition of Art. 20 (3)
of tho Constitution. Tho earlier Bench further
held that the decision of this Court in Sharma's
case('), referred to above, did not govern the case of
direction given by the Court m1der s. 73 of the
Evidence Act for giving specimen writing. Instead
of referring the question to a larger Brmch, the
later Division Bench took upon itself to pronounce
against tho considered view of that Court in the
earlier decision.
The State of West Bengal
,• naturally had to come up to this Court to get the
constitutional issues determined because the issues
raised were of far-reaching importance in the
investigation and trial of criminal cases. The main
question which a.rises for determination in this
appeal is whether a direction given by a Court to
an accused person present in Court to give his
• specimen writing and signature for the purpose of
comparison under the provisions of s. 73 of the
Indian Evidence Act infringes the fundamental
right enshrined in Art. 20 (3) of the Constitution.
Tho arguments at tho Bar may be classified
as taking three distinct lines. The first line, on the
one extreme, may bo said to have been taken by
..: l\Ir. Sikri, the Advocate General of Punjab, and
which may be characterised as a narrow view,
(I) [1954) S. C.R. 1077.
(2) [l955J A. I. R. Cal. 247.
24
1961
The Stale of
Bcmf.,ay
.....
K 'l~h i K al u OglKJd
Sinha C. J.
SUPREME COt:RT REPORTS
[1962
runs ai; follows : Cl. (:!) aforcsai<l, in view of its
scttiug, its hii;tory anrl the policy underlying, the
privilege accorded by the Constitution to an
accused pnson, ohould not lw applied at
the i;titge of inw~stigation of an offence. It
should be confinf'rl to caoes of compulsory
extraction of ineriminating st.'llf'ments or communications by an accused person in Court, the expression
'compelled to be ;t witnoss' being understood as
meaning 'bci11g compt•llcd to gil'e oral testimony'. 1t
docs not inelud<' th<• <'ompulsor:· production of dot:unwnts. Rimilarly, it dor" uot prohibit the compulsory
exhibit.ion or examination of th:• bodr of the ;wcusecl, or any part <Jf it, or the taking of' specimen writing, thumb impression, impression of the palm or
the foet or the fin!!crn of an arcusccJ. Wl1cthcr or
not there has h<'.'<'I~ compulsion shoukl be judged by
the nature t>f the action t11ken by tho authority,
or the Court that determines the controvcrsv, and
not tho Rtate of minrl of the accused.
"
On the other cxtn'me is the argument by
Mr. S.P. Varma, for the acl'usccl in the firnt cai;c,
who cont<:nclcd that the clause afor,,said of the
Constituti011 gi\·es ccompkte ym,\t·dion of th(• widest
amplitudt• to an accused p(•rno11, irrcsp<'cti\·e of the
time am! place and of the nature of tho tn·idcnce,
whethC'r it is oral or documentary or material. Tho
extr<'mc form, which his argument took can best be
stated in hi;; own words as follows : "Anything
caused, by any kiml of thrl'at or inducement, to
be said or done, by a pcrnon, accuHcd or likely to
be accused of any offence, by non-voluntary
positi\'C act or speech of that person which furthers
the ca,.se of ~my prost·cution against him or which
results 01· is lik<'lv to result in the incrimination of
that person qud any offence, is violative of the
fundamc11t.al right
guarantc:rl under cl. (3)
of Art. 20 of the Co11stilution of India".
According to his argument, if an accused person
makes any statement or any discovery, there
•
3 S.C.R.
..
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
25
is not only a rebuttable presumption tha,t he had
been compelled to do so, but that it should bo
taken as a conclusive proof of that inferential
fact. Any kind of inducement, according to him,
is also included in the expression 'compulsion'
by the police or elsewhere. The test, according
to him, is not the volition of the accused but the
incriminatory nature of the statement or communication. Hence, any statement made to a police
officer, while m police custody, brings the same
within the prohibitory ambit of tho clause of the
Constitution. On the face of them, the propositiorrn
propounded by Mr. Varma are much too brondly
and widely stated to be accepted.
'l'h e third view, which may be characterised :ts
an intermediate view, was advoca.ted by the learned
Attorney General, 'lppearing for the Union.
According to him, a person seeking protPction
under the clause must satisfy <tll the four constituent elements contained in cl. (3) of Art. 20,
namely, (1) he must be an accused person ; (2) he
must hn,ve been compelled; (3) the compulsion
must be to be a witness; and (4) against himself.
Compulsion, according to him, means coercion or
constraint and does not include mere asking by
the police to do a certain thing or the direction
by a court tu give a thumb impression or specimen
writing. In other words, compulsion has to be
equated tu wh'lt has been sometimes chHacterised
as "third degree" methods to extort confessional
statements. "To be a witness" is an expression
which must be understood m consonance with
the existing law of evidence and criminal procedure,
e.g. ss. 27 and 73 of, the Evidence Act and ss. 94
and 96 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, Though,
according to English Law, the expression is confined to oral testimony, he was prepared to go to
the length of conceding that any statement,
whether oral or in writing by an accused person,
transmitting his knowledge disclosing relevant
1961
The State of
Bombay
v.
Kat hi Kalu Oghad
Sinha 0. J.
26
1961
The Strik of
Bombay
v.
Kathi Kalu Og/11Jd
Si11lKJ C. J.
SlJPREllIE COURT REPORTS
[1962]
facts of which he was aware, woulcl amount to
'bri11g a witness' ag~inst himself. nut mere
production of some material evidence, by itsPll;
wouhl not come within the nm bit of the expression
'to be a witness'.
The se\'cral questions for decision arisi11g
out of this bakh of ease~ ha\'e to be answered with
reference to the provisions of cl. (:!) of •.\rt. 20 of
the Constitution which is in these terms : "!\o person nccuscd of any off<,ncf' shall
he compclletl to be a witness against himself."
These proYisions came up for cousiclcration Ly the
Full Court in the ease of Jl. l'. Sh-:1rnw v. Sai-i8h
Clumdra. (') Though the question clirnctly arising
for clecision i11 that case was whether a search aml
seizure of documents uwlcr the proYisio11s of ss. !.J4
and !l(i of the Colle of Criminal Procedure came
within the ambit of the prohibition of cl. (3) of
Art. :!O of the Constitution, this Court eoyered a
much wider field, l~esides laying down that the
8carch autl seizure complained of in that case were
not within tho prohibition, this Court exnminc<l
the origin and scope of the doctrine of protection
:>gainst self-incrimination with reference to English
Law and the Constitution of the 'Cnitcd States of
America, with particular reforcnce to the Fourth and
Fifth Amendments. On an examination of the case
law in England and America a.nd the standard text
hooks on Evidence, liko Phipson and Wigmore,
a.nd other authorities, this Court obser\'ed as
follows:"Broadly
stated the guarantee in
Art.20(3) is against "testimonial compulsion".
It is suggested that this is confined to the
ornl <'vitlence of a person standing his trial
for an offence when called to tho witness·
stand, 'Vo can sec no reason to confine the
content of the constitutional guarantee to
this barely literal import. So to limit it would
<1) Ll954J s.c.R.
ion:
..
.
--
-
:~
l'.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
27
be to rob the guarantee of its substantial
purpose and to miss the substance for the
sound as stated in certain American decisions.
The phrase used in article 20(3) is "to be a
wit1wss". A person can "be a witness" not
merely by giving oral evidence but also by
producing documents or making intelligible ges·
tures as in the case of a dumb witness (see section 119 of the Evidence Act) or the like. "To
be a witness" is nothing more than "to furnish evidence", and such evidence can be
furnished through lips or by production of
a thing or of a document or in other modes.
So far as production of documents is concerned, no doubt section 139 of the Evidence
Act says that a person producing a document
But that
on summons is not a witness.
section is meant to regulate the right of crossexamination. It is not a guide to the connotation of the word "witness", which must be
understood in its natural sense, i.e., as
referring to a person who furnishes evidence.
Indeed, every positive volitional act which
furnishes evidence is testimony, and testimonial compulsio>1 connotes coercion which
procures the positive volitional cvidentiary
acts of the person, as opposed to the negative
attitude of silence or submission on his part.
Nor is there any reason to think that the
protection in respect of the evidence so
procured is confined to what transpires at
the trial in the court room. Th~ phrase used in
article 20(3) is "to be a witness" and not to
"appear as a witness" : It follows that the
protection afforded to an accused in so far
as it is related to the phrase "to be a witness"
is not merely in respect of testimonial compulsion in the court room but may well
extend to compelled testimony previously
obtained from him. It is available therefore
to a person against whom a formal accusation
196'1
The State of
Bombay
v.
J{athi J(alu .Oghcui
Sinha C. J.
sb:PREME cou'Rir REPo:R'i's
1961
•.,
The State of
Bombay
Kathi Kalu. Oghad
SinJW 0. J.
[1962j.
relating to the commission of an offence has
been levelled which in.the normal course may
result in prosecution. Whether it is ava.ilable to other persons in other situations does
not call for decision in this case."
This Court did not accept the contention
that the guarantee against testimonial compulsion
is to be confined to oral testimony at the witness
stand when standing trial for an offence. The
guarantee was, thus, held to include not only oral
testimony given in court or out of court, but also
to statements in writing which incriminated the
maker when figuring as an accused person. After
having heard elaborate argument£ for and against
the views thus expressed by this Court after full
d!Jliberation, we do~not find any good reasons for
departing from those view&. But the Court went
on to observe that "to be a witness" means "to
furnish evidence" and!includes not only oral testimony or statements in writing of .the accused but
also production of a thing or of evidence by other
modes. It may be that this Court did not intend
to lay down-certainly it was not under discussion
of the Court as a point directly arising for decision
-that calling upon a person accused of an offence
to give bis thumb impression, his impression of
palm or fingers or of sa!'.Ilple handwriting or signature comes within the-ambit of "to be a witness"
which has been equated to "to furnjsh evidence".
Whether or not this Court intended to lay down
.the rule of law in those wide .terms. has been the
subject matter of decisions in the different High
Courts- in this country. Those decisions are, by no
means, uniform ; and~ conflicting views have been
expressed even in the same High Court on different
occasions. It will serve no i useful purpose to
examine those decisions in detail. It is enough to
point out that the most recent .decision, to which
.our attention was called, is of a FulrBench of the
Kerala High Court in the case1 of State of Kerala
•
•
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--1
3 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
29
v. K.K. Sankaran Nair( 1 ). In that case, Ansari C. J.,
who delivered the opinion of the Court, has made
reference to and examined in detail the pronouncements of the different High Courts. Ultimately he
came to the conclusion that the decision of this
Court in Sharrna's case(') also covered the case of
a specimen har.dwriting given by an accused person,
under compulsion.
"To be a witness" may be equivalent to
"furnishing evidence" in the sense of making oral
or written statements, but not in the larger sense
of the expression so as to include giving of thumb
impression or impression of palm or foot or fingers
or specimen writing or exposing a part of the body
by an accused person for purpose of identification.
"Furnishing evidence" in the latter sense could not
have been within the contemplation of the Constitution-makers for the simple reason that-though
they may have intended to protect an accused person
from the hazards of self-incrimination, in the light
of the English Law on the subject-they could not
have intended to put obstacles in the way of
efficient and effective investigation into crime and
of bringing criminals to justice. The taking of
impressions or parts of the body of 'ln accused
person very often becomes necessary to help the
investigation of a crime. It is as much necessary
to protect an accused person against being compelled to incriminate himself, as to arm the agents
of law and the law courts with legitimafo powers
to bring offenders to justice. Further more it must
be assumed that the Constitution-makC'rs were aware
of the existing law, for example, s. 73 of the
Evidence Act or ss. 5 and 6 of the Identification
of Prisoners Act (XXXIII of 1920). Section 5
authorises a Magistrate to direct any person to
allow his measurements or photographs to be
(I) A. J. R. 1960 Kerala 392.
(2) [1954] s.c.R,. ion.
1961
TM Stale of
Bombay
v.
K a<hi K alu Oghad
Sinha a. J.
30
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1962]
taken, if he is satisfied tha~ it is, expedient for the
purposeR of any investigation or proceeding under
the Code of Criminal Procedure to do so : 'Measurev.
Kaihi, l{alu·Oghnd ments' , include finger impressions and foot-print
impressions. If any such person who is directed
.S1'n1ia 0. J.
by a Magistrate, under s. 5 of the Act, to allow his
measurements or photographs to be taken resists
or refuses to allow the taking of the measur ~ments
or photographs, it has been declared lawful l;>y s. 6
to use all necessary means to secl,lre the taking of
the required mflasurements or photographs.
Similarly, s.73 of the Evidence Act authorises the
Court to pe~.'mit the taking of finger impression or a
specimen handwriting or signature of a person
present in Court, if necessary for the purpose of
comparison.
The matter may be looked at from another
point of view, The giving of finger impression or
of specimen signature or of handwriting, strictly
speaking, is not "to be a witness". "To be a
witness'' means imparting knowledge in respect of
relevant fact, by means of oral statements or
statements m writing, by a person who has
personal knowledge of the facts to be comm1micated to a court or to a person holding an enquiry or
investig;i,tion. A person is said-'to be a witness' to
a certain state of facts which has to be determined
by a court or authority authorised to come to a
decision, by testifying to what he has seen, or
something he has heard which is capable of being
heard and is not hit by the rule excluding hearsay
or giving his opinion, as· -an expert, in respect of
matters in controversy. Evidence has been classified by text writers into three categories, namely,
(1) oral testimony; (2) evidence furnished by documents; and (3) material evidence. We have already
indicated that we are in agreement with the Full
Court decision in Sharrna's case (1 ) that the prohibition in cI:(3) Of Art.20 covers not only oral testimony
given by a person accused of an offence but also
.'1961
'.Th.-S<ate of
_Bom6ay
(II
[1954] S. C.R. I 077.
1
I
j
"-
I
3 S.C.R.
-"
--
'
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
31
his written statements which may have a bearing
on the controversy with reference to the charge
against him. The accµsed may have doei•mentary
evidence in his possession which may throw some
light on the controversy. If it is a document
which is not his statement conveying his persopa]
knowledge relating to the charge against him, he
may be called upon by the Court to produce that
document in aecordance with the provisions of
s.139 of the Evidence Act, which, in terms,
provides that a person may be summoned to
produce a document in his possession n power and
that he does not become a witness by the mere
fact that he has produced it; a1;d therefore, he
cann')t be cross-examined. Of course, he can be
cross-examined if he is called as a witness who has
made statements conveying his personal knowledge
by reference to the contents of the document or if
he has given his statements in Court otherwise
than by reference to the contents of the documents.
In our opinion, therefore, the observations of this
Court in Sharma's case(') that s.139 of the
Evidence Act has no bearing on the connotation of
the word 'witness' is not entirely well-founded in
law. It is well-established that cl.(3) of Art.20
is directed against self-incrimination by an
accused person. Self-incrimination mUHt mean
conveying information based upon the personal
knowledge of the person giving the information and
cannot include merely the mechanical process of
producing documents in court which may throw a
light on any of the points in controversy, but
which do not contain any statement of the accused
based on his personal kn ow ledge. For example,
the accused person may be in possession of a
document which is in his writing or which contains
his signature or his thumb impression. The
production of such a document, with a view to
comparison of the writing or the signature
or the impression, is not the statement of
(1) [1954] S.C.R. 1077.
. 19~1
The ·s10te tf
Bonibay
v.
Kathi Kalu Oghad
Scinha C. J.
32.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1962]
IJ11
an accused person, which can be said to be of
the nature of a personal testimony. When an
Bombay
accused person is called upon by the Court or any
v.
Kathi Kalu Oghad
other authority holding an investigation to give
his.
finger impression or signature or a specimen
Sinha C.J.
·of his handwriting, he is not giving any testimony
of the nature of a 'personal testimony'. The
giving of a 'personal testimony' must depend upon
his volition: -He can make any kind of statement '
or may· refuse to make any statement. But his
finger impressions or his handwriting, in spite of
efforts at concealing the true nature of it by
dissimulation
cannot change their intrinsic
. character. Thus, the giving. offinger impressions
. or of· specimen ·writing or of signatures by an
accused person, though it may amount to furdshing evidence . in the larger sense, is not ir.clu<lc<l
within the expression 'to be a witness'.
':..le State of
In order that a testimony by an accused
-person may be said to have been self-incriminatory,
the compulsion of which comes within the . prohibition of the constitutional provision, it must be of
_such· a·· character that by itself it .should have the
·tendency of incrimfoatirig the accused, if not also
of actually doing so. Iu other words, it should be
a statement which niakes the case against the
. accused person atleast probable, considered by
itself. A specimen handwriting or signature or
_ finger impressions by themselves are no testimony
at all, being wholly innocuous because they are
unchangeable except in rare cases where the ridges
-of the fingers or the style of writing have been
tampered with. They are only materials for comparison in order to lend assurance to the Court that
its inference based on other pieces of cvid<·nce · i~
reliable. They are neither oral nor documentar.}'
evidence but belong to the third category of material
evidence which is outside the limit of •testimony'.
Similarlr, durin~ the investi~ation of a ~rime
J
r)
~
.1
.,I
I
•
l
I
3 S.C.R.
•
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
33
1961
by the police, if an accused person were to point
out the place where the corpus delicti was lying
Thi State of
BomblJ!!
concealed and in pursuance of Sllch an information
v..
being given by an accused person, discovery is Kathi Kalv Ogluld
made within the meaning of s.27 of the Evidence
Sinha C. J.
Act, such information and the discovery made as
a result of the information may be proved in
even though it may tend to incriminate
• evidence
the person giving the information, while in police
custody. Unless it is held that the provisions of
s. 27 of the Evidence Act, in so far as they make it
admissible evidence which has the tendency to
incriminate the giver of the information, are
unconstitutional as coming within the prohibition
of cl. (3) of Art. 20, such information would
amount to furnishing evidencJ. This Court in
Sharma's case (1) was pot concerned with pronouncing upon the constitutionality of the provisions of
s. 27 of the Evidence Act. It could not, therefore, be
said to have laid it down that such evidence could
not be adduced by the prosecution at the trial of
the giver of the information for an alleged crime.
The question whether s. 27 of the Evidence Act was
unconstitutional because it offended Art. 14 of the
Constitution was considered by this court in the
case of State of U. P. v. Deomen Upadhyoya(').
It was
held
by this Court that s. 27
of the Evidence Act did not offend Art. 14 of
the Constitution and was, therefore, intra vires.
But the question wh Jther it was unconstitutional
because it contravened the provisions of el. (3)
of Art. 20 was not considered in that case. That
question may, therefore, be treated as an open
one. The question has been raised in one of the
cases before us and has, therefore, to be decided.
The information given by an accused person to a
police officer leading to the discovery of a fact.
,l which may or may not prove incriminatory has
been made admissible in evidence by that Section.
If it is not incriminatory of the person giving the
}
(1)
[ 1954] S.C.·R 1077.
(2) [1961] I S. C.R. It.
•
34
1981
Tho Slat. of
Bombay
v.
KaJhi Kalu Oghad
Sinha C. J.
SUPREME OOURT REPORTS
[1962
information, tho question does not arise. It can
arise only when it is of an incriminatory character
so far as tho giver of the information is concerned.
If the self-incriminatory information has b11en
given by an accused person without any threat,
that will be admissible in evidence and that will
not be hit by the provisions of cl. (3) of Art. 20 of
tho Constitution for the reason that there has been
110 corupulsion.
It mnst, therefore, be held that
the provisions of s. 27 of tho E,·idcnce Act are not
within the prohibition aforesaid, unless compulsion
has bP<'n used in obtaining the information.
In this connection the question was raised
before us that in order to bring the case within the
prohibition of cl. (3) of Art. 20, it is not necessary
that the statement ~hould have been made by the
accuse<! person at ti time when he fulfilled that
character ; it is enough that he should have been
an accused person at the time when the statement
was sought to ho proYed in Court, oYen though he
may not ha-ve been an accused person at the
time he had made that statement. The correctness
of the decision of the Constitution Bench of this
Court in the case of Mohamed Dastagir Y. The State
of Madras (1 ) \Vas questioned because it was said
that it ran counter to the observations of the
Full Court in Sharma's ca.~e. (1 ) In the Full Court
decision of this Court this question did not directly
arise ; nor was it decided. On the other hand,
this Court, in Sharma's case('), held that the
prokction under Art. 20 (3) of the Constitution
is available to a person against whom a formal
accusation had been levelled, inasmuch as a
First Information Report had been lodged against
him. Sharrna's case ('}, therefore, did not decide
anything to the contrary of what this Court
said in Mohame.d Dastagir v. The State of Madras(').
(II (1960] ! S.C.R. 116.
(Zl [1954] S.C.R. 1077.
•
.
, ----
J.,
3 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
35
The latter decision in our opinion lays down the
law correctly.
I.
•
In order to bring the evidence within the
inhibitions of cl. (3) of Art. 20 it must be shown
not only that the person making the statement
was an accused at the time he made it and that
it had a material bearing on the criminality of
the maker of the statement, but also that he was
compelled to make that statement. 'Compulsion'
in the context, must mean what in law is called
'duress'. In the Dictionary of English Law by
Earl Jowitt, 'duress' is explained as follows :
"Duress is where a man is compelled
to do an act by injury, beating or unlawful
imprisonment (sometimes called duress in strict
sens'J) or by the threat of being killed, suffering some grievous bodily harm, or being
unlawfully imprisoned (sometimes called
menace, or duress per minas). Duress also
includes threatening, beating or imprisonment of the wife, parent or child of a
person."
>
-
The complusion in this sense is a physical objective
act and not tile state of mind of the person making
the statement, except where the mind h11s been so
conditioned by some extraneous process as to
render the making of the statement involuntary
and, therefore, extorted. Hence, the mere asking
by a police officer investigating a crime against a
certain individual to do a certain thing is not
compulsion within the meaning of Art. 20 (3).
Hence, the mere fact that the accused person, when
he made the statement in question was in police
custody would not, by itself, be the foundation for
an inference of law that the accused was compelled
to make the statement. Of course, it is open to an
accused pexson to show that while he was in police
custody at the relevant time, he was subjected to
treat~ent which~ in the circumstances of the case,
1961
Th. State Pf
Bombay
v.
Kathi Kalu Oghad
Sinha O. J.
3G
SUPRE~fE COURT REPORTS
[1962]
1961
woul~ lend itself t? the inference that compulsion
Statt o,,
Bo..OOy
v.
f\ at hi Kalu Ogharl
was, m fact, exerc1secl. In other words it will be
a question of fact in each case to be determined by
the Court on weighing the facts and circumstances
clisclosPd in the evidence before it.
Th~
Sinha C. J.
-
In vi{'w of these considerations, we have come
to the following conclusions :(I) An accused person cannot be said to have
heen compellec! to be a witneRs against himself
simply because he made a statement while in
police f'nstocly, without anything more. In other
words, the mere fart of being in police custody at
the time when thP statement in question was made
would 11ot, hy itself, as a proposition of law, lend
itself to the inference that the accused was compelled to make the statement, though that fact, in
conj1mc:tion with oth•.,1· circumstances disclosed in
evidence in a particular case, would ho a relevant
consideration in an enquiry whcth{'r or not the
accused person had b~en compelled to make the
impugned statement.
(2) The mere questioning of an accused
person b,Y a police officer, resulting in a volw1tary
statcmPnt, which may ultimately tum out to be
incriminatory, is not 'compulsion'.
(3) 'To be 11 witness' is not equivalent to
'furnishing evidence' in ilk widest significance ; that
is to say, as inclncling not morely making of oral
or written st.atementA but 11180 procluetion of documents or gi\'ing materials which may be relevant
at a trial to determine thP guilt or innocence of
the accused.
(·I) Giving thumb impressions or impressions
of foot or palm or fingers or specimen writings or
showing parts of the body hy way of identification
~r\l not iAcluded in the expression 'to be a witnes~ '
-
3 S.C.R.
SUPREME COl RT BEFOR'rs
1
37
(5) 'To be a witness' means imparting
knowledge in respect of relevant facts by an oral
statement or a statement in writing made or given
'
in Court or otherwise.
(6) 'To be a witness' in its ordinary grammatical sense means giving oral testimony in Court.
Case law has gone beyond this strict literal interpretation of the expression which may now bear a
wider meaning, namely, bearing testimony in
Court or out of Court by a person a~cused of an
offence, orally or in writing.
•
1961
The State of
Bombay
v.
Kath · K alu Oghad
s;nha c. J.
(7) To bring the statement in question within
the prohibition of Art. 20(3), the person accused
must have stood in the character of an accused
person at the time he made tho statement. It is
not enough that he should become an accused, any
time after the statement has been made.
The appeals will now be listed for hearing
on merits in accordance with the above principles.
The Judgment of S. K. Das, Sarkar and
Das Gupta, JJ. was delivered by
>
'
DAS GUPTA, J.-Is a person compelled "to be
a witness" against himself within the meaning of
Art.20(3) of the Constitution when he is compelled
to give his specimen handwriting
signaturP, Or
impressions of his fingers, palm or foot to the
investigating officer? Is he compelled "to be a
witness" against himself within the meaning of
the same constitutional provisions when he is
compelled to give his specimen handwriting and
signature for the purpose of comparison under the
provisions of s. 73 of the Indian Evidence Act?
These are tbe main questions canvassed before us
and they have both been answered in the negative
in the judgment just pronounced by my Lord the
Chi~f Justice. We agree with these answern; but
as we have reached the same conclusion, · by a
or
Da8 G'up'a J.
38
'1951
-Th< state of
· B,mbay
v.
Kathi Kalu Og/iad
Da• Guph J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1962]
somewhat different approach, -and for different
reasons, these have to be briefly indicated.
The question as regards the meaning to - be
"to be a witness" as used
- in _Art.20(3) of the Constitution came up for
consideration iu 1li.P. Sharma's Case (1) It was
heard by all the .eight Judges who constituted the
Court at the time, and they came to a unanimous
decision. The Court in that _case had to decide
whether search and seizure of documents under
ss.9! and 96 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is
a compelled production -of_the_same so as to
infringe the provisions of Art.20(3) of the Constitution. After pointing out that the guarantee in
Art.20(3) was against "testimonial compulsion",
Jagannadhadas J. speaking for the Court said:-- attached to the words
"The phrase used ill Art.20(3) is "to be a
witness". - A person -can "be a witness" not
merely by giving oral evidence but also
by producing documents or making intelligible
gestures as in the case of a dumb witness
(see section 119 of the Evidence Act) or the
like. "To be a witness" is nothing more
than "to furnish evidence" and such evidence
can be -furnished through the lips or by
production of a thing or of a document or in
other modes."
He next observed that s.139 of the Evidence Act
- which says that a person prorlucing a document
on summons is not a witness, is really meant to
regulate the 1ight of cross-examination and cannot be "a guide to the connotation - of the word
"witness" in Art.20(3), which must be understood
in its natural sense, i.e., as rnferring to a person
who furnishes evidence", and then proceeded : .
-
"Indeed, every positive volitional act
which furnishes evidence is testimony
-co !1954J s.c.R. 1011.
gS.C.R.
-
>
+
-
•
SttPREME COURT REPORTS
39
and testimonial comptilsion connotes coercion
which procures the positive volitional
evidentiary acts of the person, as opposed
to the negative attitude of silence or
submission on his part".
lt was further stated that there was no reason to
think that the protection in respect of the evidence
so procured was confined to what transpired at
the trial in the court room.
If the learned Judges had hoped that by their
exhaustive judgment they would end all d1sputes
about the limits of t.he protection granted by
Art. 20 (3), these hopes were soon ~hattered.
Questions were before long raised before the
different High Courts, as to whether on the
interpretation of the words "to be a witness"
given by this Court in Sharma's Case, compelling
an accused person to give his finger prints or
impressions of palm or foot or a specimen handwritiug in the course of investigation, amounted to
an infringement of Art. 20(3). .The conclusions
reached by the different High. Courts, and in one
case at least, by two Benches of the same High
Court were different. That is why it has become
necessary to examine the question again, and see
how far, if at all, the interpretation given in
Sharma's Case(') requires modification.
The complaint against the interpretation
given in Sharma's Case(') is that it does not solve
the problem as to what the words "to be a witness"
mean ; but merely postpones the difficulty, of
solving it by substituting the words "to furnish
evidence" for the words, "to be a witness". It
throws no light, it is said, on what. is "furnishing
evidence", and unless that is clear, little is gained
by saying that "to be a witness" is to "furnish
evidence". Rival iuterpretations were suggested
before us which it was claimed on behalf of the
protagonists will solve the problem once for all.
(IJ [1954) S.C.R. !077.
1961
The State of
Bombay
v.
Kathi Ka!u Oghad
D<:J-a GuptaJ,
,
40
•
SCTPREl\IE COURT REPORTS
[l!J62j
One of the propo~itions put forward was that "to
be a witness" as used in Art. 20(3) cannot refer to
anything said or done at the stage of investigation
Kathi
Oghad
of an offence. We agree with our learned brethren
- - J. --- that this is an unduly narrow construction. As
Das Gupta •
was pointed out in Sltarma's Case(•) thephraseused
in Art. 20(3) is "to be a witness" and not "to
appear as a witness". That by itself justifies
the coriclusion "that the protection afforded to an
accused in so far as it is related to the phrase "to
be a witness" is not merely in respect of testimonial compulsion in the ·court room but may
well extend to compelled testimony . previously
obtained from him". If the protection was
. intended to be confined to being a witn~ss in Court
then really it would have been an idle protection.
.It would be completely defeated by compelling a
person to give all the evidence outside court and
then, having what he was so compelled to do,
proved in court through other witnesses. An
interpretation which so completely defeats the
constitutional guarantee cannot, of course, be
correct. The · contention that the protection
afforded by Art. 20(3) is limited to the stage of
trial must therefore. be rejected.
That brings us to the suggestion that the
expression "to be a witness" must be limited to ~
statement whether oral or in writing by an accused
person imparting knowledge of relevant facts; but
that mere production of some material evidence,
whether documentary or otherwiBe would not come
within the ambit of this expression. This suggestion
has found favour with the majority of the Bench;
we think however that this is an unduly narrow
interpretation.
We have to remind ourselves
that while on the one hand we should bear in
mind that the Constitution-makers could not have
intended to stifle legitimate modes of investigation
we have to remember further that quite clearly
they thought that certain things should not be ·
1961
7·h• s1at• of
Bombay
u:1.
I
(1) [1954) S.C.R. 1077.
+
.!
~ S.d.R.
•
SUPREME COURT REPoRTS
41
a:llowed to be done, during the investigation, or
trial, however helpful they might scPm to be to
the unfolding of truth and an unnecessary
apprehension of disaster to the police system
and the administration of justice, should not deter
us from giving the words their proper meaning.
It appears to us that to limit the meaning of the
words "to be a witness" in Art. 20(3) in the
manner suggested would result in allowing
compulsion to be used in procuri:og the production
from the accused of a large number of documents,
which are of evidentiary value, sometimes even
more so ,.than any oral statement of a witness
might be.
Suppose, for example, an accused
person .~has in his possession, a letter written to
him by an alleged co-conspirator in reference to
their common intention in connection with the
conspiracy for nommitting a particular offence.
Under s. 10 of the Evidence Act this document
is :the relevant!fact as against the accused himself
for the purpose of proving the existence . of the
conspiracy and also for the purpose of showing
that any such person was a party to it. By
producing this, the accused will not be imparting
any personal knowledge of facts ; yet it would
certainly be giving evidence of a relevant fact.
Again, the possession by an accused of the plan of
a house where burglary has taken place would be a
relevant fact-under s.8 of the Evidence Act as
showing preparation for committing theft. By
producing this plan is he not giving evidence
against himself ?
To a person not overburdened with technical
learning, the giving of evidence, would appear to
be the real function of a witness. Indeed English
literature is replete with instances of the use of
the word "wl'tness" as meaning "evidence." To
give one example; Shakespeare's Horatio speaking
to Hamlet says :-
1M1
The Stale af
Boinbay
v.,
Kathi Kalu 6ghad
Dae Gupta J,
42
1H1
Tho S1ai, oj
Bombay
v.
Kail>i .Kalu Oghad
Dai Gup1aJ.
.StJl'Rll:ME COURT REPORTS
[1962]
"Season your admiration for a while
with ru1 attcnt ear, till I may cleliver, Upon
t.hc witness of these gentlemen, This marvel
to you" (Hamlet, Act I, Scene, II).
,
_
There can be no doubt that to the ordinary
user of English words, the word "witness" is
always associated with evidence, so that to .say
that to be a witness is to furnish evidence is really
to keep to the natural meaning of the words.
Hut, what is the purpose of evidence ?
Section :~ of the Indian Evidence Act defines
evidence thus :-
•
"Evidence means and includes (1) all
Htal-0ments which the Court permits or
requires to be made before it by witnesses,
in relation to matters of fact under inquiry;
such statements arc called oral evidence;
(2) all documents produced for tho inspection
of the Court; such documents arc called
documentary evidence."
Section 5 states that evidence may be given
in any suit or proceeding of the existence or
non-existence of every fact in issue and of such
other facts as are "hereinafter declared to bo
relevant and of no others." Then follow several
sections laying down what arc relevant facts.
It is clear from tho scheme of the various
prov1R10ns, dealing with the matt-0r that the
governing idea is that to be evidence, tho oral
st-0,temcnt or a statement contained in a document,
shall have a tcndeney to prove a fact-whether it
be a fact in issue or a relevant fact-which is sought
to be proved. Though this definition of evidence
. is in respect of proceedings in Court it will bo
proper, once we have come to the conclusion, that
the protection of Art. 20(3) is available even at
the stage of investigation, to hold that at that
A
•
-
3 S.d.R.
.IL
SUPREME dOURT REPORTS
43
stage also the purpose of having a witness is to
obtain evidence and the purpose of evidence is
to prove a fact.
.1966
The Slate of
Bombay
v.
Kathi Ka!u Oghad
-
The illustrations we hA,ve given above show
clearly that it is not only by imparting of his
knowledge that an accused person assists the
proving of a fact; he can do so even by ot~er
means, such as the production of documents which
though not containing his own knowledge would
have a tendency to make probable the existence
of a fact in issue or a relevant fact.
Much has been written and discussed in
England and America as regards the historical origin
and development of the rules against "testimonial
compulsion". These matters of history, however,
interesting they be, need not detain us and we must
also resist the temptation of referring to the
numerous cases especially in America where the
concept of "testimonial compulsion'' has been
analysed. It is sufficient to remem her that long
before our Constitution came to be framed the
wisdom of the policy underlying these rules had
been well recognised. Not that there was no view
to the contrary; but for long it has been generally
agreed among those who have devoted serious
thought to these~problems that few things could be
more harmful to the detection of crime or conviction of the real culprit, few things more likely to
hamper the disclosure of truth than to allow
investigators or prosecutors to slide down the easy
path of producing by compulsion, evidence, whether
oral or documentary, from an accused person. It
has been felt that the .ixistcnce of such an easy
way would tend to dissuade persons in charge of
inv-istigation or prosecution from conducting
diligent search for reliable independent evidence
and from sifting of available materials with the
care necessary for ascertainment of truth. If it
is permissible in law to obtain evidence from the
Das Gupta .r.
44
1961
T/i, Sl<Jle of
Bornl>a;y
v.
/\Othi Kalu 9ghad
Da11 Gupta.J.
[1962)
accused person by compulsion, why tread the hard
path of laborious investigation and prolonged
examination of other men, materials ancl document,,? It has been well said that an abolition of
this privilege would be an incentive for those in
charge of enforcement of law "to sit comfortably
in the shade rubbing red pepper into a poor devil's
eyes rather than to go about in the sun hunting
up evidence". (Stephen, History of Criminal Law,
p. 442). No less serious is the dangrr that some
accused persons at least, may be induced to furnish
evidence against thdmselves which is totally falseout of sheer despair and an anxiety to avoid an
unplearnnt present. Of all these dangers the
Constitution-makers were clearlv well aware
and it was to avoid them that i\rt. 20 (3) was
put in the Constitution, It is obvious however
that these dangers remain tho same whether the
evidence which the accused is compelled to
fornish is in the form of statements, oml or
written uliout his own knowledge or in the shape
of documents or things, which though not transmitting knowledge of the accused person directly
helps the Court to come to a conclnsion against
him. If production of such doeument.s, or things
is giving evidPnce, then the person producing it
is being a witness, on what principle or reason
can it be Raid that this docs not amount to "being
a witness" within the meaning of Art. 20 (3) ?
We find none.
We can therefore find no justification for
thinking that "to be a witness" in Art. 20 (3)
means tc> impart p<·rsonal knowledge and find no
reason ior departing frr.m what this Court said iu
Sharmn'.~ Case(') that "to bo a witness" is nothing
more than "to fumish evidence", and such evidence
can be furnished through lips or by production of
a. tl1ing or of a document or in other modes.
The question then is : Is an accused person
furni8hing eVidcnce when he is giving his specimen
(O [J954J s.c.R 1011.
-
3S.C.R.
-
SUPREME COURT REPDRTS
45
handwriting or impressions of his fingers, or palm
or foot ? It appears to us that he is : For, these
are relevent facts, within the meaning of s. 9 and
s. 11 of the Evidence Act. Just as an accused
person is furnishing evidence and by doing so, is
being a witness, when he makes a statement that
he did something, or saw something, so also he
is giving evidence and so is being a "witness",
when he produces a letter the contents of which
are relevant under s.10, or is producLig the plan
of a house where a burglary has been committed
or is giving his specimen handwriting or impressions
of his finger, palm or foot. It has to be noticed
however that Art. 20 (3) does not say that an
accused person shall not be compelled to be a
witness. It says that such a person shall not b o
compelled to be a witness against himself. The
question that arises therefore is : Is an accused
person furnishing evidence ag~.inst himself, when
he gives his specimen handwriting, or impressions
of his fingers, palm or foot ? The answer to this
must, in our opinion, be in the negative.
-
The matter becomes clear, when we contrast
the giving of such handwriting or impressions,
with say, the production of a letter admissible in
evidence under IO, or the production of the plan
. of a burgled house. In either of these two latter
cases, the evidence given tends by itself to
incriminate the accused person. But the evidence
of specimen handwriting or the impressions of the
accused person's fingers, palm or foot, will
incriminate him, only if on comparison of these
with certain other handwritings or certain other
impressions, identity between the two sets fa
established. By themselves, these impressions or
the handwritings do not incriminate thD accused
person, or even tend to do so. That is why it
must be held that by giving these impressions or
specimen handwriting, thD accused person does not
fqrnisb evidence against himself. /30 when, a,,q
s:
>
1961
The State of
Bombay
v.
Cathi Kali! Oghad
Das Gupta J.
'
46
1961
The. ~al• of·
&m!xzy
v
Kuthi KaTu Oghad
Da8 Gupta .T.
,
SUPREilIE COURT REPORTS
[1962)
-
accused person is compelled to give a specimen
handwriting or imprcs8ions of his fingn, palm or
foot, it m11y be said that he has been cempclled
to hr a witnrss ; it cannot however be said that
he has been compelled to be a witness again8t
himself.
.
This view, it mn,y be pointed out, docs not
in any way militate ::.gainst the policy underlying
the rnle against "t~stimonial C"omp11lsion" wt•
have already disc11,scu above. Thf·rc is littlt•
risk, if at all, in the investigator 0r the prosecutor
being irnluced to lethargy or inaction because he
c:11n gd mch handwriting or impressions from an
accusc·cl person. For, by themsclvPs they are of
littk or of no assistanct• to bring honrn the ~uilt
of a11 ar.cuscd. Nor is thPro anv cham·c of tlw
aceus.. rl to mislead the i1westig'.'ltor into wrong
d1anrn•ls by furnishing false cvidPnct'. For, it
is beyond his pown to alt<ir the ridges or other
<characteristics of his hand, palm or finger or to
alter tho charactPristirs of his handwriting.
Wt• a.grce therefor<' with the conclusion
rcadwd by the majority of th<' Bench that thrn' is
110 infringement of Art.20(3) of the Constitution
by compelling an accused perR011 to give )1iR
specimen handwriting or signature; or imprc~sio11s
(1f hiR fingt,rs, palm or foot to tlw investigating
officer or under nr<lNs of 11 court for the purpost·
;if compari~on under the provisio11s of s.'i:~ of the
Inclia11 Evidence Act; though we havP not been
able to agree with the view of our learned brethren
that "to be a witness". i11 Art.20(3) Mhould be
,,q11at{·1l with the imparting of pcrnonal knowledge
or that. an accused does not become a witness when
he produces some rlocmnent not in his own handwriting even tl1011gh it may tend to prov<' facts
in issue or relevant facts against him.
Jn Criminal Appeals Nos.
110 & ll l of 1958
ii- farther question as re~ards tho vali<lit~ of s.27
of
•
-
-
-
-·
3S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPDRTS
47
1961
the Evidence Act was raised. It was said that the
receipt of information from an accused person in · Tho Stale of
Bombay·
the. custody of a police officer which can be proved
v.
under s.27 is an infringement of Art.20(3). Section Kathi Kalu Ogha<l
27 provides that when any fact is deposed to as
Das Gwpta.J.
discovered in consequence of information received
from a person accused of any offence, in the
custody of a police officer, so much of the
information, whether it amounts to a confession
or not, as relates distinctly to the fact thereby
discovered, may be proved. It cannot be disputed
that by giving such information the accused
furnishes evidence and therefore is a "witness"
during the investigation. Unless however he is
"compelled" to give the information he cannot be
said to be "compelled'' to be a witness; and so
Art. 20(3) is not infringed. Compulsion is not
however inherent in the receipt of information from
an accused person in the custody of a police officer.
There may be cases wbere an accused in custody
is compelled to give the information later on
sought to be proved under s.27. There will be
other cases where the accused gives the information
without any compulsion. Where the accused is
compelled to give information it will he an
infringement of Art. 20(3); but there is no such
infringement where he gives the information
without any compulsion. Therefore, compulsion
not being inherent or implicit in the fact of the
information having been received from a person in
custody, the contention that s. 27 necessarily
infringes Art.20(3) cannot be accepted.
A question was raised in the course of the
discussion as to when a person can be said to have
been "compelled" within the meaning of Art.20(3).
One view is that there must be an element of
constraint or coercion in the physical sense before
it can be said that an accused person has been
"compelled''. Th!:l other view is that in addition
to cases where there has been such constraint or
\loercion an accl.Jsed sqol.J~Cl be sajq vo 4av~ b111m
48
1961
Tli•lilW<of
3o"'6ay
v.
Katlai J(alu Oghad
D•a Gtf<plu .!.
SUPREMR OOURT REPORTS
[l9G2]
"compelled" to be a witness whenever thoro has
been inducement or promise which persuttdod the
accused to be a witness, even though there has
been no such coercion or constr1Lint. In Criminal
Appeals Kos. 110 and 111 the information proved
under s.2i of the Evidence Act was that Pokhar
Singh had buried certain fire.arms in village
Badesra under 'l'oori and thos<' were recovered
when he poinkd these out to the investigating
police officer. This information w1ts proved under
s.27. Hut it does not appe1u to have br!en
suggested that the accused was made to give thi~
information by inJ11ccrnc11t or threat or promise.
On the facts therefore there is no question of tho
information having been received by compulsion.
The qtw.~tion whether any inducement or promiso
which lca<ls an accus<'d person to gi\·e information
amounts to compulsion or not, does not therefore
fall to he decided.
It ma~' be pointed out that i11 the other
appeals, viz., Criminal Appoal No. 146 of 19.58
ancl Criminal Appeal No. li4 of 1959, also, this
question does not arise for consideration in view of
our conclusion that in 1tnv c11.sc the accused docs not
become 11 "witness" aga'.inst himself by giving his
specimen signattirP~ or impressions of his fingers
or palms.
It appears to us to be equally unneressar,v
to decide another queRtion which was mooted in
the course of the hearing, viz., whether the
prohihition of Art.20(3) operates 011ly after a person
has been accused of a11 offonre or even before that
stage. Admittedly, in all these cases the person
on whose behalf the protection under Art. 20(3) ie
clii.imed gave the specimen signatures or impressions of fingers or palms after he had been actually
accused of an offence.
We think it right therefore not to
any op.inion on any of these ~ue~tions,
expres~
-~
'
•
•
•
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