M/S. HARINAGAR SUGAR MILLS LTD. versus SHYAM SUNDAR JHUNJHUNWALA AND OTHERS
Supreme Court of India | Decided 25 April 1961 | [1962] 2 S.C.R. 339 | 1961 INSC 180
Key facts
- Decided
- 25 April 1961
- Bench
- T.L. VENKATARAMA AIYYAR*, S.K. DAS, J.L. KAPUR, M. HIDAYATULLAH, J.C. SHAH
- Bench size
- 5
- Case number
- CIVIL APPEAL No. 33/1959
- Disposal
- Disposed off
- Citation
- [1962] 2 S.C.R. 339
- Neutral citation
- 1961 INSC 180
Text of the judgment
2 s.c.R. SUPREME COUHT HE.PORTS
33\l
M/S. HARINAGAR SUGAR MILLS LTD.
v.
SHYAM SUNDAR JHUNJHUNW ALA
AND OTHERS
r96r
(S. K. DAS, J. L. KAPUR, M. HIDAYATULLAH, J. c.
SHAH and T. L. VENKATARAMA AIYAR, JJ.)
Appeal-Company rufusing to register transfer of sharesAppeal to Central Government-Decision in appeal-Whether judicial-Central Government, if acts as a tribunal-Special leave, if
lies against decision- Powers of Central Government in appealW hether giving of reasons for decision essential--Companies Act,
r956, (r of r956) ss. I I I and r55-Constitution of India, Art. r36.
One B who held a large number of shares in the appellant
company, transferred two blocks of 100 shares each to his son
and daughter-in-law. The transferees applied to the company
to register the transfers. Purporting to act under art. 47B of
the Articles of Association of the company the directors of the
company resolved not to register the transfers. Against this
resolution the transferees preferred appeals to the Central
GoverPment under s. 111(3) of the Companies Act, 1956. The
Central Government, without giving any reasons for its decision, set aside the resolution of the directors and directed the
company to register the transfers. The company obtained
special leave to appeal against the decision of the Central
Government under Art. 136 of the Constitution and appealed to
the Supreme Court on the gro11nd that the Central Government
acted in excess of its jurisdiction or otherwise acted illegally in
directing the company to register the transfers. The respondents
raised a preliminary objection that the Central Government
exercising appellate powers under s. III of the Act (before its
amendment in i960) was not a tribunal exercising judicial functions and was not subject to the appellate jurisdiction oj the
Supreme Court under Art. 136.
Held, that the appeal was competent to the Supreme Court
by special leave against the decision of the Central Government
under s. ru(3) of the Companies Act, 1956. The Central Government, when exercising po\vers under s. 111 was a tribunal v. ithin the meaning of Art. 136 and was required to act judicially.
A person aggrieved by the refusal to register transfer of shares
had two remedies under the Act, viz., (r) to apply to the court
for rectification of the register under s. 155 or (2) to prefer an
appeal under s. rrr. The power of the Court under s. 155,
which has necessarily to be exercised judicially, and the power
of the Central Government under s. I I I have to be exercised
subject to the same restrictions. In both cases it has to be
1
340
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1962]
1 61
9
decided whether the directors have acted oppressively, capriciously, corruptly or malafide. Th.e decision has manifestly to
flannaga> Sugar stand those objective tests and has not merely to be founded on
M•lls Ltd.
the subjective satisfaction of the authority. Jn an appeal under
v.
s. ur(3) there is a lis or dispute between the contesting parties
Shyam Sundar relating to their civil rights, and the Central. Government has
Jhunjhunwala to determine the dispute according to law in the light of the
evidence and not on grounds of policy or expediency. There
was thus a duty imposed on the Central Government to act
judicially. The proviso to sub-s. (8) of s. ru which provided
for the award of reasonable compensation in lieu of the shares
in certain circumstances also fortifies that view.
Shivji Nathubhai v. The Union of India, [1960] 2 S.C.R. 775,
Re Bell Brothers Ltd. Ex Parle Hodgson, (1891) 65 L.T. 245, The
Province of Bombay v. Kusaldas S. Advani, [1950) S.C.R. 621, The
King v. London County Council, [1931) 2 K.B. 215 and The
Bharat Bank Ltd., Delhi v. Employees of the Bharat Bank Ltd.,
Delhi, [1950] S.C.R. 459, referred to.
In an appeal under s. lII(3) of the Act the Central Government has to determine whether the exercise of the discretion by
the directors. refusing to register the transfer is ma/a fide, arbitrary or capricious and whether it is in the interest of the company. The decision of the Central Government is subject to
appeal to the Supreme Court under Art. i36; the Supreme
Court cannot effectively exercise its power if the Central
Government gives no reasons in support of its order. The mere
fact that the proceedings before the Central Government are to
be treated as confidential does not dispense with a judicial
approach, nor does it obviate the disclosure of sufficient grounds
and evidence in support of the order. In tbe present case no
reasons have been given in support of the orders and the
appeals have to be remanded to the Central Government for
rehearing.
·
'
In re Gresham Life Assurance Society, Ex Parle Penney, (1872)
Law Rep. 8 Ch. 446 and In re Smith and Fawcett, Ltd., L. R.
(1942) l Ch. D. 30.\, referred to.
Per HidayatuUah, j.-'--The app:eal to the Supreme.Court
under Art. i36 was competent. The Act and the Rules showed
that the function of the Central Government under s. u(3) was
curial and not executive; there \vas provision for filing a memorandum of appeal setting out the grounds, lorthe company making representations against the' appeal,· for tendering evidence
.
and award of costs>., There \Vas provision for a hearing arid a
decision on evidence. The Central Government acted as a
tribunal within the meaning of Art. 136.
·
Hu.ddart, Parker & Co. Proprietary Ltd. v. Moorehead, (1908)
8 C.L.R. 330, Shell ComP4ny.of Australia v. Federal Commissioner
of Taxation, [1931] A.C. 275, Rex v. Electricity Commissioners,
[1924] r K.B. 171, RoyarAquarium and Summer and Winter Garden
2 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
341
Society v. Parkinson, (1892) r Q.B. 43r, Shivji Nathubai v. The
z96z
Union of India, [1960] 2 S.C.R. 775 and Province of Bombay v.
Kushaldas S. Advani, [r950] S.C.R. 62r, referred to.
Harinagar Sugar
But special leave should not ordinarily be granted in such
Mills Ltd.
cases. The directors were not required to give reasons for their
v.
decision and there was a presumption that they had acted pro- Shyam Sundar
perly and in the interest of the company. In the appeal under Jhunjhunwala
s. III of the Act all allegations and counter allegations were
confidential and the Central Government could not make them
public in its decision. An appeal against such a decision could
rarely be effective. In the present case the appeal under s. rn(3)
was confined to the ground that the refusal to register was without giving any reasons; there was no question of confidential
allegations and there was no evidence to consider. The Articles
of Association gave the directors absolute discretion to refuse to
register the transfers without giving any reasons and there was
a presumption that the directors had acted honestly. There
was thus no reason for the Central Government to reverse the
decision of the directors.
In re Gresham Life Assurance Society; Ex parte Penney,
(r872) Law Rep. 8 Ch. 446, In re Hannan's King (Browning) Gold
Mining Company Limited, (r897) I4 T.L.R. 3r4 and Moses v.
Parkar Ex parte Moses, [1896) A.C. 245, referred to.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeals
Nos. 33 and 34 of 1959.
Appeal by special leave from the order dated
May 29, 1957, of the Central Government Ministry of
Finance, New Delhi in Appeal Cases Nos. 24 and 33
of 1957.
A. V. Viswanatha Sastri and Ganpat Rai, for the
appellants.
B. P. Maheshwari, for the respondents.
M. C. Setalvad, Attorney-General for India, B. R. L.
Iyengar and T. M. Sen, for Union of India.
1961. April 25. The Judgment of S. K. Das, Kapur,
Shah and Venkatarama Ayyar, JJ., was delivered by
Shah, J. Hidayatullah, J. delivered a separate Judgment.
SHAH, J.-M/s. Harinagar Sugar Mills Ltd. is a
public limited company incorporated under the Indian
Companies Act, 1913 (7 of 1913). Article 47B of the
Articles of Association of the company invests the
44
Shah ].
342
'9 6'
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1962)
directors of the company with absolute discretion to
H arinagar Sugar ;e~use to regist~r any. transfer of shares. That Article
Mills Ltd.
1s m the followmg terms:
v.
"The directors may in their absolute discretion
Shyam Sundar
and without giving any reason refuse to register
Jhunjhunwala
any transfer of any shares whether such shares be
Shah 1.
fully paid or not. If the directors refuse to register
the transfer of any shares, they shall within two
months, after the date on which the transfer was
lodged with the company, send to the transferees
and the transferor notice of the refusal."
One Banarasi Prasad Jhunjhunwala is the holder
of a block of 9500 fully paid-up shares of the company. In January, 1953, he executed transfers in
respect of 2500 out of those shares in favour of his
son Shyam Sunder and in respect of 2100 shares in
favour of his daughter-in-law Savitadevi and lodged
the transfers with the company for registration of the
shares in the names of the transferees. The directors
of the company by resolution dated August 1, 1953, in
purported exercise of the powers under Article 47B of
the Articles of Association, declined to register the
shares in the names of the transferees. Petitions were
then filed by Banarasi Prasad and the transferees in
the High Court of Judicature at Bombay for orders
under s. 38 of the Indian Companies Act, 1913 for
rectification of the register of the company maintaining that the refusal by the board of directors to
register the transfer of the shares was "mala fide, arbitrary and capricious" and that the directors had
acted with improper and ulterior motives. The High
Court rejected these petitions holding that in summary
proceedings under s. 38, controversial questions of!aw
and fact could not be tried and that the proper
remedy of the tranferees, if so advised, was to file
suits for relief in the civil court. Request.s were again
made by the transferees to the company by letters
dated February 29, 1956 to register the transfers made
by Banarasi Prasad in 1953. The directors of the
company in their meeting of March 15, 1956 reiterated
their earlier resolution not to register the shares transferred in the names of the transferees. Against this
,,
•
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
343
6
'9 '
action of the company, appeals were preferred to the
Central Government under s. 111 cl. (3) of the Indian Harin;;;;; Sugar
Companies Act, 1956, which had since been brought Mills Ltd.
into operation on April 1, 1956. K. R. P. Ayyangar,
v.
Joint Secretary, Ministry of Finance, who heard the Shyam Sundar
appeals declined to order registration of transfers, Jhunjhunwala
beoause in his view, the questions raised in the appeals
Shah ].
could, as suggested by the High Court of Bombay,
be decided only in a civil suit. Thereafter, Banarasi
Prasad transferred a block of 100 shares to his son
Shyam Sunder and another block of 100 shares to his
daughter-in-law Savitadevi, and the transferees requested the company by letters dated November 21,
1956, to register the transfers. In the meeting dated
January 12, 1957, the directors of the company resolved not to register the transfers and informed the
transferees accordingly. Against this resolution, separate appeals were preferred by Shyam Sunder and
Sa vitadevi under s. 111 cl. (3) of the Indian Companies
Act, 1956 to the Central Government. It was submitted in para 4 of the petitions of appeal that the refusal
to register the transfer of shares was without "any
reason, arbitrary and untenable". The company filed
representations submitting that the refusal was bona
fide and was not "without any reason, arbitrary and
untenable" as alleged. Shyam Sunder and Savitadevi
filed rejoinders to the representations submitting that
they had never alleged that refusal to transfer the
shares "was capricious or ma.la fide" and that all they
had alleged was that the "refusal was without any
reason, arbitrary and untenable". By separate orders
dated May 29, 1957, the Deputy Secretary to the
Government of India, Ministry of Finance set aside
the resolution passed by the board of directors in
exercise of the powers conferred by sub-ss. (5) and (6)
of s. 111 of the Indian Companies Act, 1956, and
directed that the company do register the transfers.
In so directing, the Deputy Secretary gave no reasons.
Against the orders passed by the Deputy Secretary,
with special leave under Art. 136 of the Constitution,
these two appeals are preferred by the company.
if•'.'
t.•
\e-;
344
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1962]
Two questions fall to be determined in these appeals, (1) whether the Central Government exercising
. -H arsnagar 5 ugar
. Act,
Mills Ltd.
appe11 ate powers und er s. 111 of t he Compames
v.
1956 before its amendment by Act 65 of 1960 is a triShyam Su•dar bunal exercising judicial functions and is subject to
Jhunjhunwala the appellate jurisdiction of this court under Art. 136
of the Constitution, and (2) whether the Central
Shah J.
Government acted in excess of its jurisdiction or otherwise acted illegally in directing the company to
register the transfer of shares in favour of Shyam
Sunder and Savitadevi.
Article 136 of the Constitution, by the first clause
provides:
"Notwithstanding anything in this Chapter, the
Supreme Court may, in its discretion, grant special
leave to appeal from any judgment, decree, determination, sentence or order in any cause or matter
passed or made by any court or tribunal in the
territory of India".
The Central Government exercising powers under
s. 111 of the Companies Act is not a court; that is
common ground. The Attorney-General intervening
on behalf of the Union of India submits that the
Central Government merely exercises administrat.ive
authority in dealing with an appeal under s. 111 of
the Indian Companies Act, 1956 and is not required
to act judicially. He submits that the authority of
the directors of the company which is in terms
absolute, and is not required to be exercised judicially,
when exercised by the Cenral Government under
under s. 111 does not become judicial, and subject to
appeal to this court. But the mere fact that the
directors of the company are invested with absolute
discretion to refuse to register the shares will not make
the jurisdiction of the appellate authority administrative.
In a recent case decided by this court Shivji N athubhai v. The Union of India (1 ), it was held that the
Central Government exercising power of review under
r. 54 of the Mineral Concession Rules, 1949 against an
r96r
(I) [1960] 2 S.C.R. 775·
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
345
1
administrative order of the State Government grant~6 1
ing a mining lease was subject to the appellate juris- H . - 5
. · of t h"is cour t , b ecause t h e power to review
.
ugar
was a.inagar
Mills Ltd.
d wtwn
judicial and not administrative. In that case, the
v.
action of the State Government granting the mining Shyam sundar
lease was undoubtedly an administrative act, but r. 54 J hunjhunwala
of the Mineral Concession Rules, 1949 granted a right
Shah J.
of review at the instance of an aggrieved party to the
Central Government, and autliorised it to cancel the
order of the State Government or to revise it in such
manner as it deemed just and proper. The exercise of
this power was held by this court to be quasi-judicial.
Before it was amended by s. 27 of Act 65 of 1960,
s. Ill of the Indian Companies Act, 1956-omitting
parts not material-provided:
(I) Nothing in sections 108, 109 and IIO shall prejudice any power of the company under its articles to
refuse to register the transfer of, or the transmission
by operation of law of the right to, any shares or
interest of a member in, or debentures of, the company.
(2) If, in pursuance of any such power, a company
refuses to register any such transfer or transmission of
right, it shall, within two months from the date on
which the instrument or transfer, or the intimation of
such transmission, as the case may be, was delivered
to the company, send notice of the refusal to the
transferee and . the transferor or to the person giving
intimation of such transmission, as the case may be.
(3) The transferor or transferee, or the person who
gave intimation of the transmission by operation of
law, as the case may be, may, where the company is a
public company or a private company which is a
subsidiary of a public company, appeal to the Central
Government against any refusal of the company to
register the transfer or transmission, or against any
failure on its part within the period referred to in subs. (2) either to register the transfer or transmission or
to send notice of its refusal to register the same.
(4) ................................ ···•··················· .......... .
(5) The Central Government shall, after causing
reasonable notice to be given to the company and
346
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1962]
alsO' to the transferor and the transferee or as the case
may require, to the person giving intimation of the
. H annagar 5 ugar t
. ·
·by operation
·
'
Mills Ltd.
ransm1ssion
of )aw an d t h e previous
v.
owner, if any, and giving them a reasonable opportuShyam Sun<lar nity to make their representations, if any, in writing
Jhunjhunwala by order, direct either that the transfer or transmission shall be registered by the company or that it need
Shah].
not be registered by it: and in the former case, the
company shall give effect to the decision forthwith.
(6) The Central Government may, in its order aforesaid give such incidental and consequential directions
as to the payments of costs or otherwise as it thinks fit.
(7) All proceedings in appeals under sub-s. (3) or in
relation thereto shall be confidential and no suit, prosecution or other legal proceeding shall lie in respect
of any allegation made in such proceedings, whether
orally or otherwise.
(8) In the case of a private company which is not a
subsidiary of a public company, where the right to
any shares or interest of a member in, or debentures
of, the company, is transmitted by a sale thereof held
by a court or other public authority, the provisions of
sub-ss. (3) to (7) shall apply as if the company were a
public company:
Provided that the Central Government may, in lieu
of an order under sub-s. (5) pass an order directing
the company to register the transmission of the right
unless any member or members of the company speci.
lied in the order acquire the right aforesaid within
such time as may be allowed for the purpose by the
order, on payment to the purchaser of the price paid
by him therefor or such other sum as the Central
Government may determine to be a reasonable compensation for the right in all the circumstances of the
case.
Against the refusal by a company to register the
transfer or transmission of a right to the shares, an
appeal lies to the Central Government. The Government, after giving notice of the appeal and hearing
the parties concerned may order that the shares be
registered if it thinks that that course is in the circumstances proper. The Central Government may
r96r
2 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
347
by the proviso to sub-s. (8) in lieu of an order under
1961
sub-s. (5), directing a private company to register H . - 5
. . of sh ares soId by a court or publ'IC auth o- arinagar
ugar
transm1ss10n
Mills Ltd.
rity, order that any member or members of the comv.
pany specified in the order do acquire the right on Shyam Sundar
payment to the purchaser of the price paid by him, or Jhunjhunwala
such other sum as the Central Government determine
Shah ].
to be reasonable compensation. In exercise of the
powers under s. 642, rules called "The Companies
(Appeals to the Central Government) Rules, 1957"
have been framed by the Central Government. By
cl. (3) of the rules, the form of the petition of appeal
is prescribed. Clause (4) provides that the memorandum of appeal shall be accompanied by an affidavit
and documentary evidence if any in support of the
statements made therein including a copy of the
letter written by the appellant to the company for the
purpose of registration of the shares. Clause (5) prescribes the mode of service of notice of appeal to the
company and cl. (6) authorises the Central Government before considering the appeal to require the
appellant or the company to produce within a specified period such further documentary or other evidence
as it considers necessary. Clause (7) enables the parties to make representations if any in writing accompanied by affidavits and documentary evidence.
Clause (8) authorises the Central Government after
considering the representations made and after
making such further enquiries as it considers necessary to pass such orders as it thinks fit under sub-s. (5)
of s. 111 of the Act. By the appendix to the rules,
the form in which notice is to be given to the company is prescribed. Paragraph 2 of the form states
that the company shall be called upon to make its
representations in writing against the appeal and be
informed that if no representation is received, the
appeal will be determined according to law.
There was no provision similar to s. 111 of the
Indian Companies Act, 1956, in the Act of 1913, nor
is our attention invited to any provision in the English Companies Act on which our Act is largely based,
to a similar provision. Prior to 1956, if transfer of
348
r96r
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1962)
shares was not registered by the directors of a com-
Harinaga-; Sugar pany, action under the Companies Act of 1913 could
Mills Ltd.
only be taken under s. 38 of the Indian Companies
v.
Shyam Sundar
Jhunjhunwala
Shah J.
Act, 1913 by petition for rectification of the share
register. As we will presently point out, the power
to refuse to register a transfer granted by the Articles
of Association, if challenged in a petition for rectification of register was to be presumed to have been exercised reasonably, bona fide and for the benefit of the
company, and unless otherwise provided by the
Articles, the directors were not obliged to disclose
reasons on which they acted. The power had to be
exercised for the benefit of the company and bona fide,
but a heavy onus lay upon those challenging the resolution of the directors to displace the presumption of
bona fide exercise of the power. The discretion to
refuse to register transfers was not liable to be controlled unless the directors "acted oppressively, capriciously or corruptly, or in some way mala fide" (Re
Bell Brothers Ltd. ex parte Hodgson)(').
Power to refuse to register transfer of shares, without
assigning any reasons, or in their absolute and uncontrolled discretion, is often found in the Articles of
Association, and exercising jurisdiction under s. 38 of
the Indian Companies Act, 1913, the court may not
draw unfavourable inferences from the refusal to disclose reasons in support of their resolution. The
power given to the court under s. 38 is now confirmed
with slight modification by s. 155 of the Indian Companies Act, 1956. Under that section, the court may
rectify the register of shareholders if the name of any
person is without sufficient cause entered in or omitted
from the register of members of a company, or default
is made, or unnecessary delay has taken place in
entering on the register the fact of any person having
ceased to be a member. The court is in exercising
this jurisdiction competent to decide any question relating to the title of the person claiming to have his
name registered and generally to decide all questions
which may be necessary or expedient to decide for the
rectification. A person aggrieved by the refusal to
(1) (1891) 65 L.T. 245.
2 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
349
register transfer of shares has, since the enactment of
x96x
the Companies Act, 1956, therefore two remedies for ff . s
. Act, (l) to app lY t o arinagar
ugar
. f un d er t h e Compames
see k .mg re1w
Mills Ltd.
the court for rectification of the register under s. 155,
v.
and (2) to appeal against the resolution refusing to Shyam sundar
register the transfers under s. 111. It is common Jhunjhunwala
ground that in the exercise of the power under s. 155,
Shah J.
the court has to act judicially: to adjudicate upon the
right exercised by the directors in the light of the
powers conferred upon them by the Articles of Asso.
uiation. The respondents however submit-and they
are supported by the Union of India-that the
authority of the Central Government under s. 111
is nevertheless purely administrative. But in an
appeal under s. 111 cl. (3) there is a lis or dispute between the contesting parties relating to their civil
rights, and the Central Government is invested with
the power to determine that dispute according to law,
i.e., it has to consider and decide the proposal and the
objections in the light of the evidence, and not on
grounds of policy or expediency. The extent of the
power which may be exercised by the Central Government is not delimited by express enactment, but the
power is not on that account unrestricted. The power
in appeal to order registration of transfers has to be
exercised subject to the limitations similar to those
imposed upon the exercise of the power of the court in
a petition for that relief under s. 155: the restrictions
which inhere the exercise of the power of the court
also apply to the exercise of the appellate power by
the Central Government, i.e., the Central Government
hits to decide whether in exercising their power, the
directors are acting oppressively, capriciously or corruptly, or in some way mala fidl,. The decision has
manifestly to stand those objective tests, and has not
merely to be founded on the subjective satisfaction of
the authority deciding the question. The authority
uannot proceed to decide the question posed for its
determination on grounds of expediency: the statute
empowers the Central Government to decide the disputes arising out of the claims made by the transferor
or transferee which claim is opposed by the company,
45
350
8UPREME COURT REPORTS
[1962]
and by rendering a decision upon the respective contentions, the rights of the contesting part.ies are
Harinag.,, Suga' d"
er
d . p nma
·
f ame,
· t h e exercise
· of sueh
Mills Ltd.
1recti y auecte
v.
·authority would be judicial. It is immaterial that the
Shyam sunda' statute which confers the power upon the Central
Jhunjhunwala Government does not expressly set out the extent of
the power: but the very nature of the jurisdiction
Shah j.
requires that it is to be exf>rcised subject to ihe limita.
tions which apply to the court under s. 155. The
proviso to sub-s. (8) of s. 111 clearly indicates that in
circumstances specified therein reasonable compensation may be awarded in lieu of the shares. This compensation which is to be reasonable has to be ascertained by the Central Government; and reasonable
compensation cannot be ascertained except by the
application of some objective standards of what is
just having regard to all the circumstances of
the case.
In The Province of Bombay v. Kusaldas S. Advani('),
this court considered the distinction between decisions
quasi- judicial and administrative or ministerial for
the purpose of ascertaining whether they are subject
to the jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari. Faz!
Ali, J. at p. 642 observed:
"The word "decision" in common parlance is more
or less a neutral expression and it can be used with
reference to purely executive acts as well as judicial
orders. The mere fact that an executive authority
has to decide something does not make the decision
judicial. It is the manner in which the decision has
to be arrived at which makes the difference, and the
real test is: Is there any duty to decide judicially?"
The court also approved of the following test
suggested in The Kiny v. London County Council(') by
Scrutton L.J .:
"It. is not necessary that it should be a court in the
sense in which this court is a court; it is enough if it
is exercising, after hearing evidence, judicial functions
in the sense that it has to decide on evidence between
a proposal and an opposition; and it is not necessary
to be strictly a court; if it is a tribunal which has to
1 96 1
. -
{I) [I950] s.c R. 621.
{2J [193iJ 2 K.lJ. 215, 233,
_.
2 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
351
decide rights after hearing evidence and opposition, it
is amenable to the writ of certiorari."
.
. E l
Harinagar 5,. •• ,
I n Th e Bharat B an k L td., Delhi v. mp oyees of the
Miils Ltd ,
Bharat Bank Ltd., Delhi (1), the question whether an
v.
·
adjudication by an industrial tribunal functioning Shyam s,.ndar
under the Industrial Disputes Act was subject to the Jh,.njhunwala
jurisdiction of this court under Art. 136 of the ConShah .f.
stitution fell to be determined: Mahajan J. in that
case observed:
"There can be no doubt that varieties of administrative tribunals and domestic tribunals are known
to exist in this country as well as in other countries
of the world but the real question to decide in each
case is as to the extent of judicial power of the State
exercised by them. Tribunals which do not derive
authority from the sovereign power cannot fall within
the ambit of Art. 136. The condition precedent for
bringing a tribunal within the ambit of Art. 136 is
that it should be constituted by the State. Again a_
tribunal would be outside the ambit of Art. 136 if it
is not invested with any part of the judicial functions
of the State but discharges purely administrative or
executive duties. Tribunals however which are found
invested with certain functions of a Court of Justice
and have some of its trappings also would fall within
the ambit of Art. 136 and would be subject to the
appellate control of this Court whenever it is found
necessary to exercise that control in the interests
of justice."
It was also observed by Faz! Ali J. at p. 463 that a
body which is required to act judicially and which
exercises judicial power of the State does not cease to
be one exercising judicial or quasi- judicial functions
merely because it is not expressly required to be guided by any recognised substantive law in deciding the
disputes which come before it.
The authority of the Central Government entertaining an appeal under s. 111(3) being an alternative
remedy to an aggreived party to a petition under
s. 155 the investiture of authority is in the exercise of
the judicial power of the State. Clause (7) of s. 111
(1) (1950) S.C.R. 459.
352
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1962)
r96r
declares the proceedings in appeal to be confidential,
but
that does
not Udispense with a judicial
.
Ha~inagar Sugar
.
. approach
Mills Ltd.
to the evidence.
nder s. 54 of the Indian lncomev.
tax Act, (which is analogous) all particulars contained
Sh,.am Sund"' in any statement made, return furnished or accounts
Jhunjhunwala or documents produced under the provisions of the
Act or in any evidence given, or affidavit or deposiShah ].
tion made, in the course of any proceedings under the
Act are to be treated as confidential; but that does
not make the decision of the taxing authorities merely
executive. As the dispute between the parties relates
to the civil rights and the Act provides for a right of
appeal and makes detailed provisions about hearing
and disposal according to law, it is impossible to
avoid the inference that a duty is imposed upon the
Central Government in deciding the appeal to act
judicially.
The Attornev-General contended that even if the
Central Government was required by the provisions
of the Act and the rules to act judicially, the Central
Government still not being a tribunal, this court has no
power to entertain an appeal against its order or decision. But the proceedings before the Central Government have all the trappings of a judicial tribunal.
Pleadings have to be filed, evidence in support of the
case of each party has to be furnished and the disputes have to be decided according to law after considering the representations made by the parties. If
it be granted that the Cent-ral Government exercises
judicial power of the State to adjudicate upon rights
of the parties in civil matters when there is a !is
between the contesting parties, the conclusion is
inevitable that it acts as a tribunal and not as an
executive body. vVe therefore over-rule the preliminary objection raised on behalf of the Union of India
and by the respondents as to the maintainability of
the appeals.
The Memorandum and Articles of Association of a
company when registered bind the company and the
members of the company to the same extent as if
they respectively had been signed by the company
and each member, and contained covenants on its and
--
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
353
'9 6'
his part to observe all the provisions oft.he Memorandum an~ o~ the A.rtic!es. Clause ~ 7B of tl~e Ar.ti oles Hadnaga' Suga'
of Assoc1at10n which rnvcsts the director with d1screMills Ltd.
tion to refuse to register shares is therefore an inciv.
dent of the contract binding upon the transferor, and Shyam sunda'
registration of transfer or transmission cannot there- J huuJhuuwala
fore be insisted upon as a matter of right. The conShah ].
ditions subject to which a party can maintain a petition for an order for rectification of the register of
shareholders have been settled by a long course of
decisions. Two of those may be noticed.
In In re Gresham Life Assurance Society Ex parte
Penney('), the deed of settlement of a life insurance
company provided that any shareholder shall be at
liberty to transfer his shares to any other person who
was already a shareholder, or who should be approved
by the board of directors, and that no person not
being already a shareholder or the executor of a
shareholder, should be entitled to become the transferee of any share unless approved by the board.
One J. R. De Paiva who was the holder of ten
shares of the company sold them to W. J. Penney
and lodged the transfer. with the shares for registration at the company's office. The directors in
exercise of the powers conferred upon them by
the deed of settlement refused to register the shares.
In a joint summons taken out by Paiva and Penney
under s. 35 of the Companies Act, 1862, the ]\faster of
the Rolls directed the transfer to be registered, the
directors of the company having failed to submit any
reasonable ground or objection to the purchaser. In
the view of the Mast<:r of the Rolls, it was for the
court to judge whether the objection was reasonable
and that objection must be disclosed to the court.
Against this order, the company approached the Court
of Appeal. James L. J. in dealing with the contention raised by the appellant observed that the directors were in a fiduciary position both towards the
company and towards every shareholder and that it
was easy to coneeive of cases in which the court may
interfere with any violation of the fiduciary duty so
(1) (1872) Law Rep. 8 Ch. 446.
354
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1962]
196r
reposed in the directors. It was observ<>d by James
. L.J.:
H arinagar Sugar
.
.
.
Mills Ltd.
"But m order to mterfere upon that ground 1t
v.
must be made out that the directors have been
Shyam Suuda,
J huujhuuwala
Shah ].
acting from some improper motive, or arbitrarily
and capriciously. That must be alleged and proved,
and the person who has a right to allege and prove
it is the shareholder who seeks to be removed from
the list of shareholders and to substitute another
person for himself.. .. this Court would have jurisdiction to deal with it as a corrupt breach of trust;
but if there is no such corrupt or arbitrary conduct
as between the directors and the person who is
seeking to transfer his shares, it does not appear to
me that this court has any jurisdiction whatever to
sit as a Court of Appeal from the deliberate decision
of the board of directors, to whom, by the constitution of the company, the question of determining
(.he eligibility or non-eligibility of new members is
committed. If the directors had been minded, and
the Court was satisfied that they were minded,
whether they expressed it or not, positively to
prevent a shareholder from parting with his shares,
unless upon complying with some condition which
they chose to impose, the Court would probably, in
exercise of its duty as between the cestui que trust
and the trustees, interfere to redress the mischief,
either by compelling the transfer or giving damages,
or in some mode or other to redress the mischief
which the shareholder would have had a just right
to complain of."
It was also observed by James L.J.:
"I am of opinion that we cannot sit as a Court of
Appeal from the conclusion which the directors have
arrived at if we are satisfied that the directors have
done that which alone they could be compelled by
mandamus to do, to take the matter into their
consideration".
Mellish L.J. observed:
"But it is further contended that in order to
secure the existing shareholder against being deprived of the right to sell his shares, the directors are
2 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
355
bound to give their reason why they reject the
196 r
. transferee, and if they reject him without giving a
reason that is a ground from which the Court oughtH•·~~[i"'L 1~ugar
to infer that they were acting arbitrarily. I cannot
' ~. •
agree with that. It appears to me that it is very Shyam Sundar
important that directors should be able to exercise Jhunjhunwala
the power in a perfectly uncontrollable manner for
Shah j.
the benefit of the shareholders; but it is impossible
that they could fairly and properly exercise it if
they were compelled to give the reason why they
rejected a particular individual.. .. ! am therefore of
opinion that in order to preserve to the company
the right which is given by the articles a shareholder is not to be put upon the register if the board
of directors do not assent to him, and it is absolutely necessary that they should not be bound to
give their reasons although I perfectly agree that if
it can be shown affirmatively that they are exercising
their power capriciously and wantonly, that may be
a ground for the Court interfering".
A similar view was also expressed in In re Smith
and Fawcett Ltd. (1 ) where the Court of Appeal held
that where the directors of the company had uncontrolled and absolute discretion to refuse to register any
transfer of shares, while such powers are of a fiduciary
nature and must be exercised in the interest of the
company, the petition for registration of transfer
should be dismissed unless there is something to show
that they had been otherwise exercised.
Rectification of the register under s. 155 can therefore be granted only if the transferor establishes that
the directors had, in refusing to register the shares in
the names of a transferee, acted. oppressively, capriciously or corruptly, or in some way mala fide and not
in the interest of the company. Such a plea has, in a
petition for rectification, to be expressly raised and
affirmatively proved by evidence. Normally, the court
would presume that where the directors have refused
to register the transfer of shares when they have been
invested with absolute discretion to refuse registration,
that the exercise of the power was bona fide. When
(•) L.R. [1942] I Ch. D. 304.
356
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1962]
the new Companies Act was enacted, it was well
settled that the discretionary power conferred by the
Ha.ina•ar S"ga'
• . to re f use. to register
.
Milts Ltd. ar t'JC1es of assomat10n
wou Jd be
v.
presumed to be properly exercised and it was for the
Shyam Sundar aggrieved transferor to show affirmatively that it had
.fhuujhunwala been exercised mala fide and not in the interest of the
company.
Shah ].
Before the Committee appointed by tho Government
of India under the Chairmanship of Mr. C.H. Bhabha
representation was made by several bodies that this
power which was intended to be exercised for the
benefit of the company was being misused and the
Committee with a view to afford some reasonable
safeguards against such misuse of the power recommended that a right of appeal should be provided
against refusal to registe rtransfer of shares. 'J'.he
Legislature, it appears, accepted this suggestion and
provided a right of appeal. But the power to entertain the appeal is not unrestricted: being an alternative to the right to approach the civil court, it must
be subject to the same limitations which are implicit
in the exercise of the power by the civil court under
s. 155. The Central Government may therefore exercise the power to order that the transfer which the
directors have in their discretion refused, be registered if it is satisfied that the exercise of the discretion
is mala fide, arbitrary or capricious and that it is in
the interest of the company that the transfer should
be registered.
Relying upon cl. (7) of s. 111 which provided that
the proceedings in appeals under sub-s. (3) or in relation thereto shall be confidential, it was urged that
the authority hearing the appeal is not obliged to set
out reasons in support of its conclusion and it must be
assumed that in disposing of the appeal, the authority
acted properly and directed registration of shares.
But the provision that the proceedings are to be treated as confidential is made with a view to facilitate a
free disclosure of evidence before the Central Government which disclosure may not, in the light of publicity which attaches to proceedings in the ordinary
courts, be possible in a petition under s. 155 of the
r96r
.2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
357
Companies Act. The mere fact that the proceedings
I96I
are to be treated as confidential does not dispense H . - - 5
with a judicial approach nor does it obviate the dis- "''J:i~fz:'Ltd~gar
closure of sufficient grounds and evidence in support
v.
of the order.
Shyam Sundar
In the present case, the position is somewhat un- Jhunjhunwala
satisfactory. The directors passed a resolution declinShah ],
ing to register the shares and informed the transferor
and the transferees of that resolution. The transferees
in their petition stated that the refusal to register
transfer was without any reason, arbitrary and untenable and in the grounds of appeal they stated that
they did not know of any reasons in support of the
refusal and reserved liberty to reply thereto if any
such reasons were given. The company in reply
merely asserted that the refusal was not without any
reason or arbitrary or untenable. The transferees in
their rejoinder inade a curious statement-of which it
is difficult to appreciate the import-that they had
"nowhere stated in the memoranda of appeals that
the refusal to transfer shares was capricious or mala
fide" and all that they "had stated was that the refusal was without any reason, arbitrary or untenable".
The Deputy Secretary who decided the appeals chose
to give no reasons in support of his orders. There is
nothing on the record to show that he was satisfied
that the action of the directors in refusing to register
the shares "was arbitrary and untenable" as alleged.
If the Central Government acts as a tribunal exercising judicial powers and the exercise of that power is
subject to the jurisdiction of this court under Art. 136
of the Constitution, we fail to see how the power of
this court can be effectively exercised if reasons are
not given by the Central Government in support of its
order. In the petition under s. 38 of the Indian Companies Act, 1913, the Bombay High Court declined
to order rectification on a summary proceeding and
relegated the parties to a suit and a similar order was
passed by the Joint Secretary, Ministry of Finance.
These proceedings were brought to the notice of the
Deputy Secretary who heard the appeals. Whether
358
z96z
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1962)
in spite of the opinion recorded by the High Court
Harinaga> Sugar and by the Joint Secretary, Ministry of Finance in
Mills Ltd.
respect of another block out of shares previously
v.
attempted to be transferred, there were adequate
Shyam Sundar grounds for directing registration, is a matter on
Jhunjhunwala which we are unable to express any opinion.
All the
documents which were produced before the Deputy
Secretary are not printed in the record before us and
we were told at the bar that there were several other
documents which the Deputy Secretary took into consideration. In the absence of anything to show that
the Central Government exercised its restricted power
in hearing an appeal under s. 111 (3) and passed the
orders under appeal in the light of the restrictions
imposed by art. 47B of the articles of association and
in the interest of the company, we are unable to
decide whether the Central Government did not transgress the limits of their power. We are however of
the view that there has been no proper trial of the
appeals, no reasons having been given in support of
the orders by the Depnty Secretary whc• heard the
appeals. In the circumstances, we quash the orders
passed by the Central Government and direct that
the appeals be re-heard and disposed of according to
law. Costs of these appeals will be costs in the
appeals before the Central Government.
Hidayatullah J.
HIDAYATULLAH, J.-I have had the advantage of
reading the judgment just delivered by my brother,
Shah, J. In view of the strong objection to the competence of the appeals under Art. 136 by the respon'
dents, to whom liberty was reserved by the order
granting special leave, I have found it necessary to
express my views.
The facts have been stated in detail by my learned
brother, and I shall not repeat them in full. Very
shortly stated, the facts are that the second respondent, Banarsi Prasad Jhunjhunwala, transferred 2500
shares to his son, and 2100 shares to his daughter-inlaw, in the appellant Company in 1953. The appellant Company declined to register these transfers.
Proceedings for rectification of the Register under
s. 38 of the Indian Companies Act, 1913, followed
Shah j.
2 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
359
iu the High Court of Bombay, but the High Court
r96r
referred the disputants to the Civil Court. In the
. petition before the High Court, the respondents had Hari;:ft;'u~~gar
charged the Directors of the appellant Company with
v.
ba.d faith and arbitrary dealing.
Sh) <1m sunda•
The respondents renewed their requests for regis- Jhunjhunwala
tration, but they were again declined, and appeals
were filed before the Central Government under Hidayatullak J.
s. 111(3) of the Companies Act, 1956, which had come
into force from April 1, 1956. These appeals were
heard by Mr. K. R. P. Aiyengar, Joint Secret.ary,
Ministry of Finance, who dismissed them, holding
that only a suit was the appropriate remedy.
Ba.narsidas Pra~ad then made a fresh transfer of
100 shares ea.ch to his son and daughter-in-law, and
requests for registration of these shares wei·e made.
The appellant Company again declined to register
the shares, but gave no reasons. Under cl. 47-B of
the Articles of Association of the appellant Company, it is provided:
"The Directors may in their absolute discretion
a.nd without giving any reason refuse to register
any transfer of any shares whether such shares be
fully paid or not. If the Directors refuse to register the transfer of any shares, they shall, within
two months after the date on which the transfer
was lodged with the company, send to the transferee and the transferor notice of the refusal."
The appellant Company was prima facie within its
rights when it did not state any reasons for declining
to register the shares in question.
Appeals were again taken to the Central Government under s. 111(3). It was alleged that the refusal
to register the shares without giving any reasons was
"arbitrary and untenable". In accordance with the
provisions of the section, representations were filed
by the appellant Company and rejoinders by the
opposite party. The transferees made it clear that
they did not charge the appellant Company with
"capricious or mala fide conduct" but only with arbitrary refusal, without stating any reasons. The appeals
360
'96'
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1962]
succeeded, and the shares were ordered to be regis-
. tered. The Deputy Secretary, who heard and decided
H atinagar Sugar h
c
h'1s d ems10n.
· ·
Agamst
·
Mills Ltd.
t e appeal s, gave no reasons ;or
v.
his order, the present appeals have been filed with
Shyam Sundar special leave.
Jhunjhunwala
The preliminary objection is that the appeals are
Hidayatullah J.
incompetent, because the Central Government, which
heard thorn, is not a tribunal, much less a Court, and
the action of the Central Government is purely administrative. It is, therefore, submitted that Art. 136
does not apply, because special leave can only be
granted in respect of a determination by a Court or a
tribunal, which the Central Government is not. This
is not the only provision of law, under which the Central or State Governments have been empowered to
hear appeals, revisions or reviews, and it is thus necessary to find out the exact status of the Central Government when it hears and decides appeals, etc., for the
application of Art. 136.
Article 136( 1) reads as follows:
"Notwithstanding anything in this Chapter, the
Supreme Court may in its discretion, grant special
leave to appeal from any judgment, decree, determination, sentence or order in any cause or matter
passed or made by any Court or tribunal in the
territory of India."
The orders which the Central Government passes,
certainly fall within the words "determination" and
"order". The proceeding before the Central Government also falls within the wide words "any cause or
matter". The only question is whether the Central
Government, when it hears and decides an appeal,
can be said to be acting as a Court or tribunal. That
the Central Government is not a Court was assumed
at the hearing. But to ascertain what falls within
the expression "Court or tribunal'', one has to begin
with "Courts". The word "Court" is not defined in
the Companies Act, 1956. It is not defined in the
Civil Procedure Code. The definition in the Indian
Evidence Act is not exhaustive, and is for the purposes of that Act. In the. New English Dictionary
(Vol. II, pp. 1090, 1091), the meaning given is:
\
2 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
361
"an assembly of judges or other persons legally
r96r
appointed and acting as a tribunal to hear and
. .
. .
J . . J 'J't
Harinagar 5 ugar
d etermme
any cause, c1v11, ecc es1ast1ca , m1 1 ary
.wills Ltd.
or naval."
v.
All tribunals are not Courts, though all Courts are Shyam Sundar
tribunals. The word "Courts" is used to designate Jhunjhunwala
those tribunals which are set up in an organised State Hidayatullah J.
for the administration of justice. By administration
of justice is meant the exercise of judicial power of
the State to maintain and uphold rights and to punish
"wrongs". Whenever there is an infringement of a
right or an injury, the Courts are there to restore the
vinculum juris, which is disturbed. Judicial power,
according to Griffith, C. J. in Huddart, Parker & Co.
Proprietary Ltd. v. Moorehead (1 ) means:"the power which every sovereign authority must
of necessity have to decide controversies between
its subjects, or between itself and its subjects, whether the rights relate to life, liberty or property.
The exercise of this power does not begin until some
tribunal which has power to give a binding and
authoritative decision (whether subject to appeal or
not) is called upon to take action."
When rights are infringed or invaded, the aggrieved party can go and commence a querela before
the ordinary Civil Courts. These Courts which are instrumentalities of Government, are invested with the
judicial power of the State, and their authority is
derived from the Constitution or some Act of legislature constituting them. Their number is ordinarily
fixed and they are ordinarily permanent, and can try
any suit or cause within their jurisdiction. Their
numbers may be increased or decreased, but they are
almost always permanent and go under the compendious name of "Courts pf Civil J udicaturc". There
can thus be no doubt that the Central Government
does not come within this class.
With the growth of civilisation and the problems of
modern life, a large number of administrative tribunals have come into existence. These tribunals have
the authority of law to pronounce upon valuable
(I) [I908] 8 C.L.R. 330, 3.17·
I
362
6
'9 '
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1962]
rights; they act in a judicial manner and even on evi-
Harina-;:: Sugar deuce on oath, but they are not part of the ordinary
Mills Ltd.
Courts of Civil Judicature. They share the exercise
v.
of the judicial power of the State, but they are brought
Shyam Sund"' into existence to implement some administrative policy
J hunjhunwala or to determine controversies arising out of some adHidayatullah J.
ministrative law. They are very similar to Courts, but
are not Courts. When the Constitution speaks of
'Courts' in Art. 136, 227 or 228 or in Arts. 233 to 237
or in the Lists, it contemplates Courts of Civil Judicature but not tribunals other than such Courts. This
is the reason for using both the expressions in Arts. 136
and 227. By "Courts" is meant Courts of Civil J udicature and by "tribuna.ls", those bodies of men who are
appointed to decide controversies arising under certain
special laws. Among the powers of the State is included the power to decide such controversies. This
is undoubtedly one of the attributes of the State, and
is aptly called the judicial power of the State. In the
exercise of this power, a clear division is thus noticeable. Broadly speaking, certain special matters go
before tribunals, and the residue goes before the ordinary Courts of Civil Judicature. Their procedures
may differ, but the functions are not essentially different. What distinguishes them has never been successfully established. Lord St.amp said that the real
distinction is that Courts have "an air of detachment".
But this is more a matter of age and tradition and is
not of the essence. Many tribunals, in recent years,
have acquitted themselves so well and with such
detachment as to make this test insufficient. Lord
Sankey, L.C. in Shell Company of Australia v. Federal
Commissioner of Taxation (1) observed:
"The authorities are clear to show that there are
tribunals with many of the trappings of a Court,
which, nevertheless, are not Courts in the strict
sense of exercising judicial power ... In that connection it may be useful to enumerate some negative
propositions on this subject: 1. A tribunal is not
necessarily a Court in this strict sense because it
gives a final decision. 2. Nor because it hears
(I) [1931) A.C. 275, 296.
~!-
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
363
witnesses on oath. 3. Nor because two or more conr96r
tending parties appear before it between whom it . . '
d e01s10ns
· ·
lla•inagar Sugar
h a.s t o d e01'd e. 4 . N or b ecause I"t gives
Mill Ltd
which affect the rights of subjects. 5. Nor because
~- ..
there is an appeal to a Court. 6. Nor because it is Shyam Sundar
a body to which a matter is referred by another Jhunjhunwala
body. See Rex v. Electricity Commissioners (1 )."
In my opinion, a Court in the strict sense is a llidayatullah J.
tribunal which is a part of the ordinary hierarchy of
Courts of Civil Judicature maintained by the State
under its constitution to exercise the judicial power of
the State. These Courts perform all the judicial functions of the State except those that are excluded by
law from their jurisdiction. The word "judicial'', be
it noted, is itself capable of two meanings. They were
admirably stated by Lopes, L«T. in Royal Aquarium
and Sitmmer and Winter Garden Society v. Parkinson('),
in these words:
"The word 'judicial' has two meanings. It may
refer to the discharge of duties exercisable by a
judge or by justices in court, or to administrative
duties which need not be performed in court, but in
respect of which it is necessary to bring to bear a
judicial mind-that is, a mind to determine what is
fair and just in respect of the matters under consideration."
That an officer is required to decide matters before
him "judicially" in the second sense does not make
him a Court or even a tribunal, because that only
establishes that he is following a standard of conduct,
and is free from bias or interest.
Courts and tribunals act "judicially" in both senses,
and in the term "Court" are included the ordinary
and permanent tribunals and in the term "tribunal"
are included all others, which are not so included.
Now, the matter would have been simple, if the Companies Act, 1956 had designated a person or persons
whether by name or by office for the purpose of hearing an appeal under s. 111. It would then have been
clear that though such person or persons were not
"Courts" in the sense explained, they were clearly
(I) [l924) I K.B. I7I.
(2) [I8J2) I Q.B. 431, 452,
364
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
The Act says that an appeal shall lie to
Government.. We are, therefore, faced
.
Mills Ltd.
wit t e quest10n
wh eth er t h e Central Government
'
v.
can be said to be a tribunal. Reliance is placed "upon
Shyam sundar a recent decision of this Court in Shivji Nathubai v.
Jhunjhunwala The Union of India('), where it was held that the
Central Government in exercising power of review
Hida.yatullah J.
J Mineral Concess10n
. R uJes, 1949, was subject
under tie
to the appellate jurisdiction conferred by Art. 136. In
that case which came to this Court on appeal from the
High Court's order under Art. 226, it was held on the
authority of Province of Bomhay v. Kushaldas S. Advani (2 ) and Rex v. Electricity Commissioners (3 ) that
the action of the Central Government was quasijudicial and not administrative. It was then observed:
"It is in the circumstances apparent that as soon
as r. 52 gives a .right to an aggrieved party to apply
for review a lis is created between him and the
party in whose favour the grant has been made.
U uless therefore there is anything in the statute to
the contrary it will be the duty of the authority to
act judicially and its decision would be a quasijudicial act."
This observation only establishes that the decision is
a quasi- judicial one, but it does not say that the Central Government can be regarded as a tribunai. In my
opinion, these are very different matters, and now
that the question has been raised, it should be decided.
The function that the Central Government performs under the Act and the Rules is to hear an
appeal against the action of the Directors. For that
purpose, a memorandum of appeal setting out the
grounds has to be filed, and the Company, on notice, is
required to make representations, if any, and so also
the other side, and both sides are allowed to tender
evidence to support their representations. The Central
Government by its order then directs that the shares
be registered or need not be registered. The Central
Government is also empowered to include in its orders,
directions as to payment of costs or otherwise. The
r96r
"tribunals".
[1962]
. the Central
H arinagar 5 ugar
. h h
(1) [1960] 2 S.C.R. 775
(2) [1950] S.C.R. 6ZI.
(3) [1924] 1 K.B. 171.
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT R.ll;PORTS
365
function of the Central Government is curial and not
'9 61
executive. There is provision for a hearing and a Ii . - 5
. . on ev1.dence, an d th at IS
. rn
. d ub•1ta bly a cuna
. l annaga'
ugar
M, 11 , Ltd.
d ec1s10n
function.
v.
Now, in its functions Government often reaches Shyam Simda,
decisions, but all decisions of Government cannot be Jhunjhunwala
regarded as those of a tribunal.
Resolutions of wa ---; h
Government may affect rights of pa.rties, and yet, they ' ayatu 1a f.
may not be in the exercise of judicial power. Resolutions of Government may be amenable to writs under
Arts. 32 and 226 in appropriate cases, but may not be
subject to a direct appeal under Art. 136 as the decisions of a tribunal. The position, however, changes
when Government embarks upon curial functions, and
proceeds to exercise judicial power and denide disputes. In these circumstances, it is legitimate to
regard the officer who deals with the matter and even
Government itself as a tribunal. The officer who
decides, may even be anonymous; but the decision is
one of a tribunal, whether expressed in his name or
in the name of the Central Government. The word
"tribunal" is a word of wide import, and the words
"Court" and "tribunal" embrace within them the
exercise of judicial power in all its forms. The decision of Government thus falls within the powers of
this Court under Art. 136.
It is next argued by the learned Attorney-General
that there is no law to interpret or to apply in these
cases. He argues that since there are no legal standards for judging the correctness or otherwise of the
order of the Central Government and the decision
being purely discretionary, it is neither judicial nor
quasi-judicial but merely administrative, and that no
appeal can arise from the nature of things.
Such a line was taken before the Committee on
Ministers' Powers by Lord Hewart, and the argument
reminds one of what he then said that such decisions
are purely discretionary ·and the exercise of such
arbitrary power is "neither law nor justice or at all!".
Sir Maurice Gwyer also was of the opinion that an
appeal could not be taken to Court against a Minister's
366
'9°'
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1962]
decision even on the ground of miscarriage of justice,
. -because that, in his opinion, was "putting a duty on
H
5 uga> th C
arinaga'
Mills Ltd
e our t" wh'IC h was ' 'no t th
" e concern of t he Court " .
This argument takes me to the heart of the controversy, and before I give my decision, I wish to say a
few preliminary things. Article 47-B gives to the
Directors a right to refuse to register shares in their
Hidayatullah ].
a bsol ute d iscretion, wit hout giving reasons. In In re
Gresham Life Assurance Society, Ex Parte Penney('),
James, L.J. observed:
"No doubt the directors are in a fiduciary position both towards the company and towards every
shareholder in it. It is very easy to conceive cases
such as those cases to which we have been referred,
in which this Court would interfere with any violation of the fiduciary duty so reposed in the directors. But in order to interfere upon that ground it
must be made out that the directors have been acting from some improper motive, or arbitrarily and
capriciously. That must be alleged and proved, and
the person who has a right to allege and prove it is
the shareholder who seeks to be removed from the
list of shareholders and to substitute another person
for himself.. .... But if it is said that wherever any
shareholder has proposed to transfer his shares to
some new member, the Court has a right to say to
the directors, 'We will presume that your motives
are arbitrary and capricious, or that your conduct
is corrupt, unless you choose to tell us what your
reasons were, and submit those reasons to our decision', it would appear to me entirely altering the
whole constitution of the company as provided by
the articles."
That shows that the Directors are presumed to
have acted honestly in the interests of the company
and a case has to be made out against them. I shall
only quote from another case, which summarises the
position very aptly. In In re Hannan's King (Browning) Gold Mining Company (Limited) (2 ), Lindley, M.R.
is reported to have decided the case thus:
"Their Lordships did not sit there as a Court of
v.
·
Shyam Sunda'
]hunjhunwala
(1) (1872) Law Rep. 8 Ch. 446.
(2) (1897) 14 T.L.R. 31~.
2 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
367
honour; the question was whether the applicants
r96r
had made out that the transferee was being impro- H . .
Th
"d
arinagar Sugar
perly kept off the register.
ere was no ev1 ence
Mills Ltd.
of that ... The Court ought, as a matter of honesty
v.
between man to man, to presume that the directors Shyam Sundar
were acting within their powers unless the contrary J hunf!.unwala
was proved; but that was not proved by casting un"
ded aspersions upon t hem. "
Hidayatullah ].
1oun
Thus, the matter comes to this that the Directors
have a presumption in their favour and the opposite
party must prove that there was want of good faith.
The right of appeal which is given under the Companies Act, 1956, allows the Central Government to
judge this issue. For that purpose, parties are required, if they desire, to make representations and to
put in evidence. But to enable the parties to have a
free say, the proceedings are made confidential by
law, and there is protection against action, both civil
and criminal. The appeal is disposed of on the basis
of the representations and the evidence. A decision
of a tribunal on a dispute inter partes, in the light of
pleadings and evidence, is essentially a judicial one,
and this Court ought to be able, on the same material,
to decide in an appeal whether the decision given was
correct. If no substantive law is applicable, there are
questions of evidence, of burden and adequacy of
proof and of the application of the principles of justice,
equity and good conscience to guide the Court. Once
it is held that the decision is that of a tribunal and
subject to appeal, it is manifest that an appeal may
lie, unless there be some other reason.
The difficulty which arises in these cases is whether
it was not the intention of the law that the decision
of the Central Government was to be final. The law
makes all allegations and counter-allegations confidential. If Courts cannot compel disclosure of these allegations and the veil of secrecy drawn by law is not
rent, then it appears to me that a further appeal can
hardly be efficacious. In this view, in my opinion,
this Court should not grant special leave in such cases.
The situation which arises is not very different from
what arose before the Judicial Committee in Moses v.
368
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1962]
Parker, Ex Parle Moses (1). The headnote adequately
. gives the facts, and may be quoted:
Ha ..Mills
nagMLtd.·
Sngar
"B y T. asmaman
. Act N
r o. 10 of 1858 , s. 5, d'1spu t es
v.
concernmg lands yet ungranted by the Crown are
Shyam Sundar
referred to the Supreme Court, whose decision is to
]hunjhunwalo
be final; and by s. 8 the Court is directed to be
guided by equity and good conscience only, and by
Hidayatullah J.
the best evidence procurable, even if not required
or admissible in ordinary cases, and not to be bound
by strict rules of law or equity or by any legal
forms:Held: that the Crown's prerogative to grant
special leave to appeal is inapplicable to a decision
so authorised."
In dealing with the case, Lord Hobhouse observed at p. 248:
"The Supreme Court has rightly observed that
Her Majesty's prerogative is not taken away by the
Act of 1858, but intimates a doubt whether it ever
came into existence.
Their Lordships think that this doubt is well
founded. They cannot look upon the decision of
the Supreme Court as a judicial decision admitting
of appeal. The Court has been substituted for the
commissioners to report to the governor. The difference is that their report is to be binding on him.
Probably it was thought that the status and training of the judges made them the most proper
depositaries of that power. But that does not make
their action a judicial action in the sense that it can
be tested and altered by appeal. It is no more judicial
than was the action of the commissioners and the
governor. The Court is to be guided by equity and
good conscience and the best evidence. So were the
commissioners. So every public officer ought to be.
But they are expressly exonerated from all rules of
law and equity, and all legal forms. How then can
the propriety of their decision be tested on appeal?
What are the canons by which this Board is to be
guided in advising Her Majesty whether the
Supreme Court is right or wrong? It seems almost
r96r
(r) [r896] A.C, 245.
2 S.C.R
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
369
impossible that decisions can be varied except by
I96I
reference to some rule; whereas the Court making H .
. f
uJ
l
ll
d arinagar 5 ugar
t h em is ree from r es. If appca s were a owe ,
Mills Ltd.
the certain result would be to establish some system
v.
of rules; and that is the very thing from which the Shyam Sundar
Tasmanian Legislature has desired to leave the Jhunjhunwala
Supreme Court free and unfettered in each case. If Ilidayatullak ].
it were clear that appeals ought to b e a 11 owe d , sue h
difficulties would doubtless he met somehow. But
there are strong arguments to show that the matter is
not of an appealable nature."
See also The'berge v. Laudry {1).
The exercise of the powers under Art. 136 is a
counterpart of the royal prerogative to hear appeals
in any cause or matter decided by Court.s or tribunals.
But where the Articles of Association of a company
give absolute discretion to the Directors and empower
them to withhold their reasons, the appeal taken to
the Central Government would involve decision on
such materis.l, which the parties place before it. If
the allegations are made confidential by law and the
Central Government in giving its decision cannot
make them public, it is manifest that the decision, to
borrow Lord Hobhouse's language, "is not of an
appealable nature". Whether the right to hear appeals
generally against decisions of the Central Government
acting as a tribunal be within Art. 136, in my opinion
-and I say it with great respect-special leave to
appeal should not be granted in such cases, unless
this Court is able to rend the veil of secrecy cast by
the law without rending the law itself. The argument
is that the allegations are confidential only so far as
the public are concerned but not confidential where
Courts are concerned. The question is not that but
one of practice of this Court. This Court should
intervene only when practicable, and that can only
arise if the parties agree not to treat the allegations
as confidential.
That, however, does not end the present appeals.
Special leave has been granted, and I have held that
the appeals are competent, even though such oases
(1) (1876) z App. Cas. 1oi.
370
•9°'
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
often may not be fit for appeal.
[1962]
In this case, there is
Harin;;:i-,;; Sugar no claim that any allegation was confidential. In fact,
Mills Ltd.
the appellants before the Central Government made it
clear that they did not charge the Directors with
"capricious or mala fide conduct" but only with arbitrary refusal, without stating any reasons. The appelHidayatullah ;. !ant Company in its representation set out the history
of previous refusals and the decisions of the High Court
of Bombay and the Central Governme11t, and made it
clear that the action was taken in the interest of the
Company. There are indications in the representation
to show that on t.he previous occasion when these
claimants were referred by the High Court and by
Mr. K. R. P. Aiyengar, Joint Secretary, to the Civil
Court, they did not go to Court to establish that the
action was malafide and capricious. Before the Central
Government, they dropped that allegation, and confined the case to one of refusal without giving any
reasons, and that was tbe plain issue before the
Central Government. There was no evidence for the
Central Government to consider, and the Articles of
Association give the Directors an absolute discretion
to refuse to register shares without giving any reasons,
and, on the authorities quoted earlier, the Directors
must be presumed to have acted honestly. There was
thus no reason for the Central Government Lo reverse
the decision of the Directors, and the fact that no
reasons have been given when nothing was confidential,
leads to the only inference that there was none to
give.
In my opinio.n, these appeals must succeed. I
would, therefore, set aside the order of the Central
Government, and allow the appeals with costs here
and before the Central Government, if an order to that
effect was passed by the Central Government.
Before parting with the case, I may say that the
Report of the Companies Act Amendment Committee
had recommended amendment of s. 111, and it has
been amended, inter alia, by the addition of sub-s. (5A),
which reads:
"Before making an order under sub-section (5) on
an appeal against any refusal of the company to
v.
Shyam Sundar
Jhunjhunwata
2 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
371
1 96 1
register any transfer or transmission, the Central
Government may require the company to disclose to H . - - 5
. t h e reasons f or sue h re f usal , an d on t h e f a1'l ure or aruzagar
ugar
1t
Mills Ltd.
refusal of the company to disclose such reasons,
v.
that Government may, notwithstanding anything Shyam Sundar
contained in the articles of the company, presume J hunjhunwala
that the disclosure, if made, wonld be unfavourable
Hidayatullah ].
to the company."
That would stop the blind man's buff under the unamended law!
BY COURT. In view of the majority judgment of the
Court, we quash the orders passed by the Central
Government and direct that the appeals be reheard
and disposed of according to law. Costs of these
appeals will be costs in the appeals before the Central
Government.
DR. MOHAMMAD SAHEB MAHBOOB MEDICO
v.
THE DEPUTY CUSTODIAN-GENERAL AND
ANOTHER
(And Connected Petition)
(P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, A. K. SARKAR,
K. N. WANCHOO, K. C. DAS GUPTA and
N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR, JJ.)
Evacuee Property-Two groups of persons, transferring assets
to Pakistan during two different periods-Equal protection of laws
-Declaration of evacuee property, when to be made-Administration of Evacuee Property Ordinance, 1949• s. 2(d)(iii)-Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950, s. 22(b).
The appellant was held to be an evacuee under s. 2(d)(iii) of
the Administration of Evacuee Property Ordinance, 1949, and
his property was declared to be evacuee property under s. 22 (b)
of the Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950, on the
ground that he had transferred a substantial portion of his
assets to Pakistan. The relevant portion of s. 22(b) runs
thus:-
April 25.
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