GURU DATTA SHARMA versus STATE OF BIHAR
Supreme Court of India | Decided 24 April 1961 | [1962] 2 S.C.R. 292 | 1961 INSC 174
Key facts
- Decided
- 24 April 1961
- Bench
- BHUVNESHWAR PRASAD SINHA*, A.K. SARKAR, K.C. DAS GUPTA, N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR, J.R. MUDHOLKAR
- Bench size
- 5
- Case number
- CIVIL APPEAL No. 41/1960
- Disposal
- Dismissed
- Citation
- [1962] 2 S.C.R. 292
- Neutral citation
- 1961 INSC 174
Text of the judgment
'
292
I96I
April z4.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1962]
GURU DATTA SHARMA
v.
STATE OF BIHAR
(B. P. SINHA, c. J., A. K. SARKAR, K. c. DAS GUPTA,
N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGARand J. R. MuDHOLKAR, JJ.)
Forest-Protection-V olidity of enactment-Constitutional
validity-Legislative competence-Notification by State Government
-Validity-Bihar Private Forests Act, 1946 (Bihar 3 of 1946).
ss. 14, 21-Bihar Private Forests Act, 1947 (Bihar 9 of 1948),
ss. 14, 21-Ch. IIl-Bihar Private Forests (Validating) Act, I949
(Bihar I2 of 1949), s. 2--Government of India Act, I935 (25 & 26
Geo. 5 Ch. 42), s. 299(2)-Constitution of India, Arts. 19(1)(]).
JI (2).
In 1946 the appellant was granted a right to cut and
remove bamboos and certain other timber to· be found in a
specific area of the forest Village of Jun by certain persons
known as Manjhis who held under a mokarari lease granted by
the Raja of Ranka and whose names had been entered in the
revenue records. Meanwhile, the Bihar Private Forests Act,
lg46, was enacted and it came into force on February 25, 1946.
This Act was repealed and re-enacted by Bihar Act 9 of r948.
On October 14, 1946, the Governor of Bihar issued a notification
under ss. 14 and 21 of the Bihar Private Forests Act, 1946,
declaring the forest of Jun as a protected forest. Though in
the Schedule to the said notification, against the column headed
"name of the proprietor" the name of Raja of Ranka was entered, a copy of the notification was however served on the
Manjhis. Immediately on the issue of the notification the officials of the Government of Bihar prevented the appellant from
working the forest any further.
The appellant challenged the validity of the proceedings
under the Act by filing a suit. The trial court held that the
Act was valid but decreed the suit on the. ground that the
notification issued under s. 14 was invalid, primarily for the
reason that tbe name of the Manjhis a.s landlord had not been
mentioned in it. The High Court on appeal reversed the decree
and dismissed the suit, holding that the omission of the name
of the Manjhis in the notification did not render the same invalid and that even otherwise the proceedings under Ch. III of
the Act had been validated bys. 2 of Bihar Act 12 of 1949·
Held, that the Bihar Private Forests Acts of 1946 and 1948
were validly enacted and were within the Legislative competence of the Province under the Government of India Act, lQ35,
and were not otherwise obnoxious to its provisions.
·
Bihar Act 3 of 1946 was an Act supplementary to, or rather
a complement of the Indian Forests Act of r927 and w,1s clearly
2 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
293
covered by the l.i.:ntry 'Forests' in iten1 22 of Provincial I.egislative List under which the Province could enact legislation not
1nerely gener31ly in relation to "Forests" but also to enable the
Government to assu1ne m::inagement and control of forests belonging to private pi"oprietors. Such a legislation involved no violation of the guarantee against "acquisition by the State without
compensation" contained in s. 299(2) of the Government of India
Act, HJ35 Property, as a legal concept, was the sum of a bundle of
rights and the imposition of a compulsory Governmental agency
for the purpose of managing the forest with a liability imposed
to account to the proprietor for the income derived as laid down
by the statute was not an "acquisition" of the property itself
within s. 299(2) of the Government of India Act, 1935· Nor
does s. 299(5) affect the matter. The rights referred to in it are
derivative rights, 1ike interests carved by an owner-a lessee 1
mortgagee etc. and not an incident of a property right.
Held, further, that the correct specification of the name 6f
the landlord was not a legal pre-requisite of a valid notification
under s. 14 of the Bihar Act 3 of 1946 but the emphasis was on
specification of the land and not so much on the owner or the
person interested in it. The proceedings taken under Ch. III
of the Act including the notification issued under s. 14 of the
Act were valid and in accordance with the law and the validity
of the service of notices required by s. 14 or other provisions
of the Act could not be challenged in view of the provisions of
s. 2 of the Bihar Private Forests (Validating) Act, 1949·
Held, also, that the legislation under which the appellant's
rights were extinguished, subject to his claim for compensation,
was a valid law which took effect in 1946, long before the Constitution came into force and the appellant had therefore no
rights which could survive the Constitution so as to enable him
to invoke the protection of Part III thereof.
M.D. Sir Kameshwar Singh v. State of Bihar, [1950] I.L.R.
29 Pat. 790 and Dwarkaaas Shrinivas of Bombay v. Sholapur
Spinning & Weaving Co., Lid. [1954] S.C.R. 674, distinguished.
Sm. Khemi Mahatani v. Cha.ran Napit, A.LR. 1953 Pat. 365,
K.B.N. Singh v. State, (1956) I.L.R. 36 Pat. 69, Administrator,
Lahore Municipality v. Daulat Ram Kapur, [1942] F.C.R. 3r,
State of West Bengal v. Subodh Gopal Bose, [1954] S.C.R. 587,
Bhikaji Narain Dhakras v. State of Madhya Pradesh, [1955] 2
S.C.R. 589, Slattery v. Naylor, (1888) 13 App. Cas. 446 and Shanti
Sarup v. Union of India, A.LR. 1955 S.C. 624, referred to.
Belfast Corporation v. 0. D. Cars Ltd., [1960] A.C. 490,
applied.
CrvIL APPELLATE
No. 41 of 1960.
38
JURISDICTION:
Civil
Appeal
I96I
Guru Datta
Shairna
v.
State of .f/ihar
~:
294
Guru Datta
Sha,ma
v.
State of Bihar
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1962]
Appeal from the judgment and decree dated April
28, 1958, of the Patna High Court in appeal from
Original Decree No. 70 of 1953.
L. K. Jha, A. K. Jha, S.S. Shukla, E. Udayarathnam
and K. K. Sinha, for the appellant.
Lal Narayan Sinha, Bajrang Sahay and S. P.
Varma, for .the respondent No. 1.
1961. April 24. The Judgment of the Court was
delivered by
Ayyangar ].
AYYANGAR, J.-This appeal comes before us on a
certificate granted by High Court of Patna under
Art. 133(1) of the Constitution.
'The appellant had filed a suit against the State of
Bihar before the Subordinate Judge, Daltonganj and
had succeeded in obtaining a decree in his favour the
details of which we shall presently narrate. The State
preferred an appeal to the High Court and by the
judgment now under appeal the learned Judges of the
High Court had allowed the appeal and dismissed the
suit with costs, and the plaintiff has come np on
appeal to this court.
The facts giving rise to the suit and the appeal may
now be briefly stated. The village of Jun in the district
of Palamau in the State of Bihar was within the estate
of the Raja of Ranka. This proprietor had granted
a mokarari lease df the Yillage which consisted mostly
of forest lands, in favour of certain persons who have
been referred to in these proceedings as the Manjhis.
The Manjhis in their turn entered into a registered
agreement on February 23, 1946, with Gurudutt
Sharma-the appellant before us, whereby the latter
was, in consideration of the payment of a sum of
Rs. 6,000, granted the right to cnt and remove bamboos and certain other timber to be found i.n a specified area of this forest-village. This right the appellant was to have for a period of 8 years ending on
March 1, 1954. By a further deed executed on March
15, 1946, which was howeyer unregistercd,the 1\fanjhis
granted to the appellant the right to pluck; or collect
and carry away bidi leaYes in the same for<'st area for
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
295
a period of 9 years ending Ma.rch l, 1955, for a consideration of Rs. 200~ It is the case of the appellant
that immediately after these deeds were executed, he
started cutting the trees and otherwise exercising the
rights granted to him under them.
Meanwhile the Governor of Bihar who had, by
proclamation issued by him under s. 93 of the Government of India Act, 1935, assumed to himself the
powers vested in the Provincial Legislature, enacted
in exercise of the powers so assumed, the Bihar Private Forests Act, 1946. (Bihar 3 of 1946). It is the
validity of this enactment and the interpretation of
its provisions and of the similar provisions in the
Bihar Pri,,ate Forests Act, 1947 (Bihar 9 of 1948), by
which it was repealed and re-enacted, that form the
main subject of controversy in this appeal. It is
therefore necessary to set out certain of the relevant
provisions and also the action taken under them in
order to appreciate the contentions raised by learned
Counsel for the appellant. The Governor's Act of
1946 extended to the whole of the Province of Bihar
and came inl.o force on February 25, 1946, when
having received t.he assent of the Governor-General it
was first published in the Bihar Gazette. There were
certain forests which were excepted from the operation of this Act by its second section, but the forestE
in the village of Jun with which this appeal is concerned were not among them. The Act contained the
definition of a "landlord" as meaning 'the owner of
the estate or tennre in which a forest is comprised who
is entitled to exercise any rights in the forests'. It is
obvious tl;iat the Manjhis would be "landlords" within
this definition. Section 4 of this Act enacted:
"The rights of the landlord and ...... the rights of
any other person to out., collect or rem·ove trees,
timber or other forest produce in or from ...... in any
forest shall not be exercised in contravention of the
provisions made in or under this Act."
There were other restrictions on the rights of landlords or persons claiming through them but these are
not very )llaterial for the point required to be decided
in this appeal. Chapter Ill of this enactment which
Guru Datta
Sha)tn{'
v.
Stale of Bihar
Ayyangar ].
296
z96z
Guru Datta
Sharma
v.
Slate of Biha.Ayyangar J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1962]
comprised ss. 13 to 30 dealt with "private protected
forests" which were defined in s. 3( 10) as 'a forest
specified in a notification issued under sub-s. (1) of
s. 29'. Sectionl3 with which this Chapter opens made
provision for the Provincial Government, "if satisfied
that it was necessary in the public interest to apply
the provisions of this Chapter to any private forest"
to constitute such forest "a private protected forest."
Section 14 required the Government, when proposing
to constitute a private forest as a "private protected
forest" "to issue a notification (a copy of which shall
be served on the landlord in the prescribed manner)
(a) declaring its proposal, (b) specifying the situation
and limits of the forests and stating that landlords
whose interests are likely to be affected by the constitution of the private protected forests to state their
objections in writing against the proposal." Section 15
prescribed the procedure for hearing the objections
which might be presented under s. 14 and after the
diHposal of the objections a notification might issue
declaring "that it has been decided to constitute" a
demarcated area as "a private protected forest" and
for other consequential matters including the determination of the existence a'1d nature of rights other than
those of the landlords in or over such forests. After
the issue of the notification under s. 15, the Forest
Settlement Officer was· required by s. 16 to publish a
proclamation in the village in the neighbourhood of
the forest requiring persons claiming rights other than
those of a landlord, to appear before him and state the
particulars thereof and the compensation which they
claimed for the infringement of their rights. Sections
17 and 18 dealt with the enquiry by the ]'orest Settlement Officer in respect of these objections and his
powers in doing so. Section 19 made provision for
the extfoction of the rights and claims which had not
been preferred in response to a notification under s. 16
unless the officer was satisfied that the same was not
made for sufficient cause. Section 29 enacted:
"29. (1) When the following events have occurred,
namely:(a) the period fixed under section 16 for preferring
t
2 s.c.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
297
claims has elapsed, and all claims, if any, made
under sections 16 and 22 have been disposed of by Guru Datta
the Forest Settlement Officer; and
Sha1n1a
v.
(b) if any such claims have been made, the period
limited by section 26 for appealing from the orders State of Bihar
passed on such claims has elapsed, and all appeals Ayyangar .f.
(if any) presented within such period lrnvc been disposed of by the appellate officer,
the Provincial Government shall publish a notification in the official Gazette, specifying definitely
according to boundary marks erected or othel'wise,
the limits of the forest which is to be constituted a
private protected forest, and declaring the same to
be a private protected forest from a date fixed by
the notification, and from the date so fixed such
foreRt shall be deemed to be a private protected
forest:
Provided that, if in the case of any forest in
respect of which a notification under section 14 lias
issued, the Provincial Government considers tlrnt
the enquiries, procedure and appeals referred to in
this Chapter will occupy such length of time as in
the meantime to endanger the CfJnservaLion <)f the
forest, the Provincial G1Jvemment may, pending the
completion fJf the said enquiries, procedures and
appeals, declare such forest to be a private pl'fJtected forest, but not, except as provided in sectio1rn 20
and 21, so as to abridge or affect any existing
rights.
(2) Any declaration made in respect of any forest
by the .Provincial Government under the proviso to
sub-section (1) shall cease to have effect from Uie
date of any final order passed under secl.ion 15
directing that the proposal to constitute snch forest
a ptivate protected forest shall be dropped, or of
any order passed under wb-section (l)."
But pending this notification by which "a, private protected forest" was constituted there were provisions
for keeping things in status. quo and for the t'Xtii1guishment of rights by payment of compensation of
the interests of persons who were not landlords.
Section 20 imposed a ban on landlords entering into
298
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1962]
contracts with any other person conferring on the
latter
the right to cut, collect or remove trees, timber or
Guru Datta
other forest produce after the issue of a notification
Sha1ma
under s. 14. Having thus dealt with the landlord,
v.
State of Bt'har s. 21 proceeded to enact a similar ban to have effect
between the date of the notification under s. 14 and
Ayyangar ].
the formal constitution of "a private protected forest"
by a notification under s. 29 against the cutting,
collection or removal of trees by every person including the landlord as well as any person claiming rights
under him. Section 22 laid down the procedure for
dealing with claims of persons who had entered into
contracts with landlords whereby they had obtained
the right to cut, collect and remove trees, timber or
other forest produce etc. It also made provision for
the payment of compensation to such contractors.
Sections 23 to 28 made provision for miscellaneous
matters to which it is not necessary to refer.
There are other provisions which are material for
the points raised in this.appeal but to these we shall
advert later.
To resume the narration of facts, there was issued
on October 14, 1946 a notification under ss. 14 and 21
under Bihar Act III of 1946 of which the operative
words were:
"In exercise of the powers conferred by s. 14 of
the said Act the Governor is pleased to declare his
intention of constituting the said forest (described in
the lst Schedule hereto annexed) a private protected forest and direct that any landlord whose interests are likely to be affected by the said declaration
may, within 3 months from the date of this notification, present to the Deputy Collector of Palamau
an application in writing stating his objection to
the said forest being constituted a private protected
forest.."
The notification contained a further paragraph containing a direction purporting to be by virtue of the
power cont11ined in J· 21 "to prohibit every person
from cutting, collectrng or removing any tree or class
of trPes from the forests until the publication of the
notification under s. 29 of the Act." In the Schedule
2 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
299
annexed, village Jun was included with details of its
location. Against the column headed "Name of the
proprietor" was entered the Raja of Ranka though, as
stated already, the rights over the forest had passed
to the Manjhis whose name had been entered in the
revenue records. It is stated that until October 21,
1946 no rules had been framed under the Act prescribing the form and contents of the notification and of
the procedure to be followed in the issue of the
notification as well as for the conduct of the subsequent proceedings.
Immediately on the issue of this notification the
officials of the respondent-State prevented the appellant from working the forest any further.
The appellant at first took proceedings on the basis
of his rights under the Act. Meanwhile as the life- of
the Bihar Act III of 1946 was limited bv the terms of
s. 93 of the Government of India Act, 1935, the Legislature of the Province of Bihar enacted the Bihar
Private Forests Act, 1948 (Act IX of 1948), repealing
and re-enacting the Governor's Act. This enactment
came into force on March 3, 1948 and its terms,
subject to immaterial variations, were identical with
those contained in the Governor's Act which it replaced. The proceedings taken by the appellant continued
even after Act IX of 1948 came into force. But it is
not necessary to refer to the steps taken by the appellant to assert certain rights and prefer certain claims
under this enactment, because they either failed or
were withdrawn at a later stage and nothing turns on
them.
Having failed in these proceedings under the Act,
the appellant filed the suit which has given rise to the
present appeal T. S. 1 of 1952 in the' Court of the
Subordinate Judge of Daltonganj impleading the
State of Bihar and one A. R. Chaudhuri to whom the
right to cut and collect bamboo and timber in a portion of the area covered by the appellant's contract
was granted by the Government, as the ~econd defendant. The plaint set out the various proceedings
which the pbintiff had taken under the Act, but the
gro111Hfo 011 \\'hich he ,c;ought the reliefs claimed were
Gu1v Datta
Shartua
v,
State of Bi.bar
Ayyangar ]·.
300
SUPREME COUHT HEPORTS
[1962]
rested on: (1) The Forest Acts of 1946 and 1948 were
unconstitutional and void as being in contravention
Guru Datta
of
the provisions of the Government of India Act,
Sharma
v.
lil35. (2) That even if valid when originally enacted,
State of Biknr their provisions violated the frndament1tl rights
guaranteed by Part Ill of the Constitution a1"d could
Ayyangar ].
not therefore be operative or be enforced after January
26, 1950, (3) The proceedings by which the suit-forest
was declared "a private protected forest" were illegal
and invalid principally for the reasons that (a) the
notification under s. 14 did not conform to the requirements of the statute, (b) the notices required to be
served on the landlord under the Act were not served,
and (c) the notifications were not properly published
in the village as required by the Act.
Based on these grounds, the reliefs sought in the
plaint were set out in para. 17 and of these the
material ones were: (1) a declaration that the plaintiff
had a right to work the forests by cutting and c~,rry
ing away the trees, timber etc. and the bidi leaves
which he was entitled to do under the deeds dated
February 23, 1946 and March 15, 1946, executed by
the Manjhis in hiB favour unaffected by the Bihar
Private .Forests Act, the validity of the proceedings
un_der which was impugned, (2) a decree for Rs. 55,000
being the estimated damages suffered by the plaintiff
by reason of the wrongful acts of the Government,
(3) restoration to possession of the forest lauds included in the two deeds, and (4) for mesne profits.
The learned Subordinate Judge who tried the suit,
though he held the Act valid, accepted the plaintiff's
contention that the notifications issued under s. 14
and the other provisions of Chapter III of the Act
were invalid, primarily for the reason that the name
of the Manjhis as the landlord had not been mentioned in the notification issued under s. 14 and on this
ground he passed a decree directing the State to restore
.possession of the forest to the plaintiff so as to euable
him to enjoy the same for a substituted period making allowance for the 7! months for which he had
worked the jungle before his enjoyment was interfered in October 1946. In this view the claim for
2 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
301
damages for Rs. 55,000 and for mesne profits was disallowed.
The State filed an appeal to the High Court of
Patna from this judgment and decree. The learned
Judges reversed the decree of the Subordinate Judge
and dismissed the suit with costs, holding that the
omission of the name of the Manjhis in the notification issued on October 14, 1946, did not render the
same invalid and that even otherwise the proceedings
under Ch. III of the Act had been validated by s. 2
of Act XII of 1949 to whose terms we shall refer in
due course. In view of the previous· decisions of the
High Court which upheld the constitutional validity
of the Bihar Private Forests Act, that point was not
pressed in the High Court. The plaintiff thereafter
applied to the High Court for a certificate under Art.
133(l)(a) of the Constitution and having obtained it
has preferred the present appeal. In the petition of
appeal as originally filed, the constitutional points
regarding the validity of the Private Forests Act were
not raised, but subsequently the appellant filed an
application under 0. XVIII, r. 3(2) of the Supreme
Court Rules for permission to urge additional grounds
in support of the appeal which we granted. The principal ground urged in this application was that the main
operative provisi0ns of the Bihar Private Forests Act,
both as originally enacted in 1946 as well as when reenacted in 1948, were unconstitutional as contravening the requirements of s. 299(2) of the Government
of India Act, 1935.
We consider that it will be convenient to deal first
with the point as to whether, assuming that the Bihar
Private Forests Act, 1946 and 1948 were valid, the
proceedings under Chapter III of the Act for declaring the village of Jun as "a private protected forest"
were legal before considering the question as to the
constitutionality of the Act raised by the additional
grounds urged before us. As would have been noticed
even from the narration of the facts, the principal
point urged for impugning the validity of the proceedings undei: Ch. III of the Aot was that the Manjhis,
39
Guru Datta
Shat ma
v.
State of Bihar
Ayyanga1 ].
302
r96I
Guru Datta
Shanna
v.
State of Bihar
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1962]
whose name had been entered in the record of rights
as the land-holders of the suit-village of Jun had not
been set out in the notification published under s. 14
of the Act and this was the ground upon which the
learned Subordinate Judge decided the suit in favour
of the appellant. The provi8ions of s. 14 are in these
terms:
"14. Whenever it is proposed by the Provincial
Government to constitute any private forest a
private protected forest, the Provincial Government
shall issue a notification (a copy of which shall be
served on the landlord in the prescribed manner)(a) declaring that it is proposed to constitute
such forest a private protected forest;
(b) specifying as nearly as possible, the situation
and limits of such forest; and
(c) stating that any landlord whose interests are
likely to be affected if such forest is constituted a
private protected forest may, within such period,
not being less than three months from the date of
the notification, as shall be stated in the notification,
present to the Collector in writing any objection to
such forest being constituted a private protected
forest.
Explanation-For the purpose of clause (b), it
shall be sufficient to describe the limits of the forest
by roads, rivers, ridges or other well-known or
readily intelligible boundaries."
It would be seen that s. 14 contemplates two stages:
(1) the issue of a notification, and (2) the service of
the notification, as issued, on the landlord which has
to be in the prescribed manner. The expression
'Landlord' is defined in s. 3(6) as:
"the owner of the estate or tenure in which a
forest is comprised who is entitled to exercise any
rights in the forest."
So far as the notification itself is concerned, while
provision is made for the specification of the three
matters which are set out in sub-els. (a), (b) and (c),
there is no requirement in terms, that the name of the
landlord should be set out. It will further be observed
that the notification enables any person claiming
2 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
303
interest as a landlord and who considers that his
interests are likely to be affected by the proceedings
taken to prefer his objections to the declaration as a
"private protected forest". In other words, the notification is a general notice and its aim is to specify the
land in respect of which the declaration is proposed to
be made, so that the emphasis is more upon the
identity of the land than about the person who owns
the land or has rights over it. Besides, the section in
terms specifies what the legal and essential requirements as regards the contents of the notification are
and the ordinary rule of construction would point to
those requirements being exhaustive of what the law
demands. If therefore the specification or mention of
the name of the landlord is not an express requirement
of the section, is such a specification or mention a
requirement by any necessary intendment?
We have already set out the text of the impugned
notification dated October 14, 1946, and it would be
seen that it did mention the name of the landlord, but
this was incorrect in the sense that the Raja of Ranka
who was the proprietor of the estate but who had
parted with his rights over the forests by a mokrari
lease in favour of the Manjhis was shown as the landlord instead of the Manjhis. It was never the case of
the appellant that the mention of the proprietor's
name in the notification misled him or anyone as
regards the identity of the land. We might also mention that Mr. Jha, learned Counsel for the appellant
admitted that he could not impugn the validity of the
notification if notwithstanding that the name of the
landlord specified was incorrect, the notification was
served upon the proper landlord. It is also common
ground that the appellants took part in the proceedings under Ch. III, so that he knew the identity of
the property which was intended to be dealt with by
the notification.
The succeeding provisions of the enactment far from
supporting the case that the correct specification of
the name of the landlo,d is a legal pre-requisite of a
valid notification, points to the coriclusion that so far
1961
Guru Datta
Sharma
v.
State of Bihar
Ayyangar ].
304
Guru Datta
Sharma
v.
State of Bthar
Ayyangar ].
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1962]
as the notification is concerned the name of the landlord is not a legal requirement. For instance, reference
may be made to s. 21 where provision is made for the
issue of an order prohibiting, until the date of the
publication of a notification under s. 29, the cutting,
collecting or removal of any trees in any forest. Such
an order might be issued simultaneously with a notification under s. 14 and the order is "to be published in
the neighbourhood of the forest". Provisions of this
sort indicate what we have already mentioned, that
the emphasis in the notification is on specification of
the land and not so much on who the owner or the
person interested i:r; it wa.~. We are therefore clearly
of the opinion that the learned .Judges of the High
Court were right in holding that the notification under
s. 14 did not contravene the statute.
The next question that arises is whether the notification which was legal under s. 14, had been properly
served on the interested persons as required by the
provisions of Ch. III. The principal point that was
urged to call in question the validity of the service of
the notifications was based on the fact that the notices
had to be served under the terms of s. 14 "in the
prescribed manner" and that the rules which prescribed the manner of service were framed and issued
only on October 21, 1946, with the result that any
service of notice effected before that date could not be
deemed to be a proper service or a service in accordance with the rules and therefore of the statute. We
might however state that it was admitted that no
notices were, in fact, served. Any enquiry, however,
of the validity of the service of notices required by
s. 14 or other provisions of the Act or the effect of the
failure to serve them has been rendered superfluous by
the provisions of s. 2 of the Bihar Private Forests
(Validating) Act (Act XII of 1949) which enacted:
"No proceeding or action taken under section 15,
21 and 29 of the Bihar Private Forests Act, 1946 or
under section 15, 21 or 30 of the Bihar Private
Forests Act, 1948, or under any other section of any
of the said Acts from the respective dates of
commencement of the said Acts, to the date of
2 s.c.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
305
commencement of this Act shall be deemed to be invalid or shall be called in question in any Court, or Guru Datta
proceeding whatsoever merely on the ground that a
Sharn1a
copy of the notification under section 14 of any of
v.
the said Acts was not served on the landlord, or State of JJihar
that there was any defect or ir.regularity in the
service of such notification, nor shall any suit, pro- Ayyangar ] .
secution or other legal proceeding whatsoever, lie in
any Court of law against any servant of the crown
for or on account of or in respect of any such
proceeding or action taken by him."
The learned Subordinate Judge, by a process of reasoning which we are unable to follow, held that the
terms of this enactment were insufficient to validate
the non-service of the notice on the landlord as required by s. 14 and the other provisions of Ch. III of the
Bihar Private Forests Act. The learned .Judges of the
High Court, on the other hand, held and, in our
opinion, correctly, that the effect of the failure to
serve notices or any informality in the service of the
notices required bys. 14 anrl succeeding sections of the
Act was rectified and validated by the Act. In agreement. with the learned Judges of the High Court we
hold that the proceedings taken under Ch. III of the
Act, including the notification issued under s. 14 were
valid and in accordance with the law and that if the
Bihar Private Forests Act were valid the plaintiff
could have no legal ground of cpmplaint which he
could agitate in the suit and that the suit was therfore
properly directed to be dismissed.
This leaves the question of the constitutional v:ili·
dity of the Act for consideration. It is necessary to
state at the outset, that under the deeds dated February 23, 1946 and March 15, 1946, the status of the
appellant quod the Manjhis is only that of a licensee
or contractor having the right to cut and remove the
trees etc. and not that of a lessee. This wa.s the conclusion reached by the Subordinate Judge on the relevant terms of the two deeds and this was apparently
not even challenged in the High Court. On this basis
the only provisions of the Act which could be said to
directly invade the rights of the appella,nt are those
306
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1962]
contained in Ch. III the material sections of which
we have already set out. As provision is made in
Guru Datta
Sharma
s. 22 of the Act for the ascertainment and payment of
v.
compensation to forest contractors whose rights were
State of Bihar either modified or extinguished, the plea that there
was a violation of the guarantee against acquisition
Ayyangar ].
by the State without compensation contained in
s. 299(2) of the Government of India Act, 1935, would
be seen to have no factual foundation. But learned
Counsel for the appellant urged that the extinction of
the rights of contractors under the provisions of
Oh. III, was really in the nature of an ancillary provision complementary to and designed to render effective, the taking over of the management of "private
protected forests" under Ch. IV (to which we shall immediately advert) and that if the taking over of the
management was constitutionally impermissible, the
provisions of Oh. III must also be struck down as unconstitutional. We see force in this contention and
will therefore consider the constitutional validity not
so much of Oh. III as of Oh. IV.
"When a private forest is declared a "private protected forest" under the provisions of Ch. III the provisions of Oh. IV come into operation. Section 31 with
which this Chapter opens enacts:
"31. The control and management of every private protected forest shall vest in the Provincial
Government."
The management and control thus vested is to be
exercised through forest officers and s. 32 provides:
"32. The Provincial Government shall, by notification, appoint a Forest-Officer for the purposes of
each private protected forest or of a specified portion of each private protected forest."
His powers are defined by the succeeding sections and
next we haves. 35 which defines the limits subject to
which the landlord is permitted to remove timber and
other produce from private protected forests whose
control vests in the ProvinciaL Government under
s. 31, and s. 36 .enables the Collector to grant permission to the landlord to erect embankments at suitable
places within the forest for the purpose of irrigating
2 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
307
the land beyond the boundaries of the said forest. The
section that follows is important and so we shall set
it out in full:
"37. The Provincial Government shall receive
all revenues accruing from the working and
management of a private protected forest and shall
pay the whole expenditure incurred in the working
and management of such forest, and the landlord
of such forest or any other person shall not be
entitled to make any objection to any expenditure
that the Provincial Government may consider it
necessary to incur on such working and management."
Section 38 requires the Provincial Government to
maintain the revenue and expenditure account with
an obligation to supply an extract of the yearly
account to the landlord of such forests. The disbursement of the revenues which it receives or the income
which it collects under s. 37 is provided for by s. 39
which runs:
"39. (1) The Provincial Government shall,,during
the period of its control and management of any
private protected forest pay, at prescribed intervals,
to the landlord of the forest(a) an allowance calculated on the total area of
the forest as determined by the Conservator of
Forests at the rate of one anna per acre per annum
or such higher rate not exceeding one anna and six
pies per acre per annum as the Provincial Government may, from time to time, by general or special
order, determine; and
(b) the net profits, if any, accruing from the working and management of the forest,
(2) For the purpose of calculating the net profits,
the total expenditure incurred on the working and
management of the forest shall be adjusted against
the total Income from the working and management up to the date of account and the amount of
any deficit shall be carried forward with interest at
the prescribed . rate from year to year till such
amount is made up and surplus is effected.
(3) .............................................................."
I96I
Guru Datta
Sharma
v.
Stale of Bihar
Ayyangar ].
308
1961
Gu1'u Datta
Sharma
v.
State of Bihar
Ayyangar ].
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1962]
ands. 40 which might be termed a residuary provision reads:
"40. The rights of right-holders in a private
protected forest shall be exercised in accordance
with the rules."
It is only necessary to add that the provisions contained in the re-enacted Act IX of 1948 are substantially identical except as to variation in the numbering of the sections and it is therefore unnecessary to
cum her this judgment with a reference to the corresponding provisions of that enactment.
In the main, the argument of Mr. Jha, learned
Counsel for the appellant on this point was based on
the reasoning contained in the judgment of a Special
Bench elf the Patna High Court in M. D. Kameshwar
Singh v. State of Bihar (1) where the learned Judges
held the Bihar Sta~e Management of Estates and
Tenures Act, 1949, to be ultra vires of the powers of
the Provincial Legislature as contained in the Government of India Act, 1935. The Act there impugned
was one which was described as an "Act to provide
for the State Management of estates and tenures in
the Province of Bihar". Provision was made for
Government notifying any estates or tenures in tho
Province and on such notification the management of
the estate or tenure was to vest in an officer designated by the Act. On such management being taken
over, the power of the proprietor or tenure-holder to
manage the estate was to cease and he was rendered
incompetent to deal with or have any right to create
interests in the property by way of mortgage or lease.
The rents and profits accruing from the estate were to
be payable to and to be collected by tho Manager who
alone was, nnrfor the statute competent to grant valid
receipts thernfor. Tlwre \\·ere Rpetfal provisions emp01vering the Manager to orr!cr the removal of mortgagees or lessees-in- posRession by virtue of agreements
with the proprietor or tenure-holder. Special provisions were also mr1de for dealing with the claims of
creditors-both secured and unsecured. Section 20(5)
of the Act made provision for the disposal of the
(1) (1950) I.L.R. 29 Patna 790.
2 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
309
income, rents and profits received by the manager.
They were to be applied first for the payment of revenue to Government,. then to municipal rents, next to
costs of management and supervision, then for an
allowance to the proprietor to be fixed by rules made
by Government, and any surplus remaining thereafter
was to be paid to the proprietor at the end of each
financial year with power, however, to .the manager
to retain such portion of the surplus which he might
consider necessary as a working balance for the ensuing year. The manager was to have power to contract
loans on the security of the estate or tenure. The
jurisdiction of the civil courts was barred in respect
of matters for which provision was made by the Act.
Though there was a direction that the manager should
have his accounts audited with a right to the proprietor or tenure-holder to inspeot these accounts, in cases
however where these accounts were not audited the
right of the proprietor was merely to draw the attention of the Government to the lapse, with however a
bar on enforcing such rights by resort to the courts
even in the event of the Provincial Government not
taking any action.
The validity of the enactment was challenged principally on two grounds: (1) that an Act of this sort
which deprived the proprietors and tenure-holders of
possession of their property for no default on their
part and for no justifiable reason grounded on public
interest was beyond the legislative competence of the
Province, (2) that even if competent, it amounted to
"an acquisition of property without compensation"
and for a purpose which was not a public purpose so
as to be repugnant to the provisions of s. 299(2) of the
Government of India Act, 1935. Justice Shearer and
Justice Sinha, as he "then was, were of the opinion
that the Act in question was beyond the legislative
competence of the Province under item 21 of the Provincial Legislative List. Justice Das, as he then was,
being the other learned Judge constituting the Special
Bench however took the view that the variety of
matters set out in Entry 21 of the Provincial Legislative List was wide enough to include le~islation of
40
r96I
Guru Datta
Sharma
v.
State of Bihar
Ayyangar ],
310
z96 c
Guru Datta
Sharma
v.
Stale of Bi har
Ayyaugar J.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1962]
the type then before the Court. Both Sinha and
Shearer, JJ. were of the opinion that the Act violated
the requirements of s. 299(2). Learned Counsel-Mr.
Jha-submitted that there was, under the Bihar Private Forests Act, 1946 and 1948, the same type of
deprivation of possession and management of the
proprietor or tenure-holder, the same restrictions placed upon enjoyment, and a similar vesting of powers
and duties on the officers of the State Government as
the manager of the estate under the Bihar Act of 1949
and on these premises he contended that on the same
line of reasoning, the Act now impugned should be
held to be both beyond the competence of the Provincial Legislature as well as unconstitutional as
violating the requirements of s. 299(2) of the Government of India Act, 1935. Before entering on a discussion of the points urged we should add that the
constitutional validity of the Acts now impugned has
been the subject of decision of the Patna High Court
on two occasions and these judgments are reported in
Sm. Khemi Mahatani v. Charan Na.pit('), and K.B.N.
Singh v. State('). In both of them the learned Judges
of the High Court have distinguished the decision in
Kameshwar Singh v. State of Bihar (') and have upheld
the validity of the Acts now impugned.
Learned Counsel for the appellant formulated three
points in support of his plea regarding the invalidity
of the impugned enactment and its application to the
petitioner: (1) that the Bihar Private Forests Acts of
1946 and 1948 were beyond the competence of the
Provincial Government-not being within the legislative entrios in the Provincial Legislative List in
Sch. VII of the Government of India Act, 1935, (2)
that even if the legislation was competent in the sense
of being covered by the entries in the List, the same
was unconstitutional as being in contravention of the
constitutional requirements of s. 299(2) of the same
Act, (3) that even if the legislation were competent and
also constitutionally valid under the Government of
India Act, 1935, its provisions could not be enforced
{1) A.I.R. 1953 Patna 365.
(z) (1956} I.L.R. 36 Patna 69.
(3) (1950) I.L.R. 29 Patna 790.
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
311
against the petitioner after the Constitution came into
force on January 26, 1950, as the provisions of the
enactment contravened Arts. 19(l)(f) and 31(2) of the
Constitution.
We shall now proceed to deal with these points in
that order: ( 1) Legislative incompetence under the
Government of India Act, 1935.-The argument of
learned Counsel on this head was half-hearted and
was based on reliance on passages in the judgment of
the Special Bench of the Patna High Court in Kameshwar Singh v. State of Bihar ('). It is not necessary
for the purposes of this case to canvass the question as
to whether the taking over, for better management, of
an estate in the manner as was done by the Bihar Act
of 1949 is or is not within item 21 of the Provincial
Legislative List in Sch. VII to the Government of
India Act, 1935.. The enactments now impugned are
certainly in relation to "forests" and fall within item
22 of the Provincial Legislative List which reads "22.
Forests''. It is not necessary to decide whether entry
21 dealing with "Land etc." would cover legislation on
forests, because of the special provision in Entry 22
in relation to "forests"-an entry which has come
down from the Devolution Rules under the Government of India Act, 1919. In our opinion, the item
"Forests" would permit all and every legislation
which in pith and substance, to use a phrase familiar
in this branch of the law, was on the subject of
"forests". It is not possible to argue that the two
Acts here impugned do not satisfy this test.
Learned Counsel faintly suggested that item 22
'Forests' would not cover legislation regarding "management" of forests. We consider this submission
wholly without substance. The considerations arising
from the width or amplitude to be attached to the
meaning of expressions dealing with the conferment
of legislative power occurring in a constitutional document should suffice to reject this submission. In this
connection we might refer to the decision of the
Federal Court in Administrator, Lahore Municipality
v. Daulat Ram Kapur(') which dealt with the scope
{<) (1950) l.L.R. 29 Patna 790.
(2) [1942] F.C.R. 31.
r961
Guru Datta
Sharma
v.
State of Bihar
Ayyangar ].
312
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1962]
of the entry 'Salt' in the Central Legislative List in
Sch. VII.
Guru Dalla
Besides, reference may be made also to the legislaSharma
practice which preceded the Government of India
tive
v.
Act,
1935, as having relevance to the understanding
State of Bihar
of the scope and ambit of the entry. The Indian
Ayyangar J, Forests Act of 1878 which repealed the .earlier enactments and consolidated the law in relation to the control over forests primarily dealt with forests which
were the property of the Government or in which
Government had proprietary rights. But it had also
a chapter-Ch. VI-dealing with "control on forests
or land not being the property of the Government".
Section 35 of the Act enabled the local Government
by a notification in the local official gazette to regulate
the maintenance of forests for particular purposes and
pass orders in that behalf, and s. 36 enacted that "in
case of neglect of, or wilful disobedience to, such
regulations'', and w1hat is more important, "if the
purposes of any work to be constructed under s. 35 so
require", the local Government m&.y, after notice in
writing to the owner of such forest or land and after
considering his objections, if any, "place the same
under the control of a Forest.officer, and may declare
that all or any of the provisions of the Act relating to
reserved forests shall apply to such forest or fand.
The net profits, if any, arising from the management of such forest or land shall be paid to the said
1961
owner."
Statutes with similar provisions were also enacted
by various local Legislatures (vide, for exam pie, Madras
Forests Act, 1882). This Central enactment of 18 78
was repealed and re-enacted in a consolidated form by
the Indian Forests Act, 1927. Chapter V of the later
statute-as. 35 and 36 thereof-reproduce in practically the same terms the provisions of the Act of 1878
in relation to the taking over the management of
private forests. As we are now dealing with the
legislative power in this regard, we are not so much
concerned with the grounds upon which the Government could take over and manage forests belonging to
2 S.C.R
'
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
313
private proprietors, as with the practice of the Government taking over the management of the forests if
Guru Datta
public interests so require. This interest might vary
Shanna
from time to time but the above legislation would
v.
show that if public interest did require, the Act autho- State of Bihar
rized Government to take over the management of
private forests on terms of making over the income Ayyangar ].
received to the proprietor.
It is unnecessary to dilate upon the role of forests
in a country whose economy is predominantly agricultural and it has been this aspect that has prompted
the legislation to which we have just now ii-dverted.
Apart from being an important source of fuel and of
raw materials necessary for domestic, industrial and
agricultural purposes, their preservation is essential
for the development of cattle- wealth by providing
grazing grounds. Their function in the conservation
of soil-fertility and in the maintenance of waterregime by improving the tilth and the water-holding
capacity of the soil cannot be exaggerated. They
protect the land against excessive soil-erosion caused
either by rainfall or against a desiccation and erosion
by winds. Their beneficial influence on the growth
of crops and on the maintenance of an equitable
climate cannot be over-stressed (vide First Five Year
Plan, p. 285). Thanks to the inroads made on forest.
wealth owing to the necessities created by the war, we
had the spectacle of large forest areas denuded of
their timber, afforestation making either a slow progress or not attempted at all. So long as the war continued the sacrifice of the forests was one of the incidents which the country had to bear as part of the
war-effort but owing to the high prices of fuel and
timber, the practice of denudation of forests, which
started during the wartime, continued and landholders owning private forests sought to make quick gains
by leasing out their forests for large scale cutting. In
these circumstances public interest and national economy required that this process should be stopped and
the ravages caused by wartime destruction should be
made good by scientific management and regulation
of forests and by a process of afforestation. It was
314
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1962]
in these circumstances that in several Provinces of
India during the year 1946 when these Provinces were
Guru lJatla
under the rule of Governors under s. 93 of the GovernShanna
ment of India Act, 1935, enactments were passed
v.
State of Bihar vesting in Government power to take over and manage
for the purposes abovementioned areas of forest-lands
Ayyangar ].
belonging to private persons. The situation, therefore, demanded that there should be a large extension
of the grounds upon which such private forests would
be taken over for better management by the State
officials as compared with Ch. V of the Indian Forests
Act, 1927. The correlation between Bihar Act III of
1946 now impugned and the Indian :Forests Act, 1927,
is brought out in the long title of the former, the
operative words of which are repeated in the preamble:
"An Act to provide for the conservation of forests
which are not vested in the Crown or in respect of
which notifications and orders issued under the
Indian Forests Act, 1927 are not in force."
The impugned Act was therefore an Act supplementary to, or rather a complement of the Indian Forests
Act of 1927 and is clearly covered by the Entry
'Forests' in item 22 of State Legislative List. The
argument, therefore, that Entry 22 enabled a legislation to be passed in relation to "forests" but did not
include thereiu the power to assume management and
control of forests belonging to private proprietors is
entirely without foundation. In view of what we
have just now stated it would follow that the argument concerning the legislative competence to enact
the Bihar Acts of 1946 and 1948 must be rejected.
The next submission to be considered is whether the
impugned enactments violate s. 299(2) of the Government of India Act, 1935. Section 299(2) runs in these
terms:
"299(2). Neither the :Federal nor a provincial
Legislature shall have power to make itny law authorising the compulsory acquisition for public purposes of any land, or any commercial or industrial
undertaking, or any interest in, or in any company
owning, any commercial or industrial undertaking,
2 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
315
unless the law provides for the payment of compensation for the property acquired and either fixes the
amount of compensation, or specifies the principles
on whid1, and the manner in which, it is to be
determined."
The main, if not the entire argument of learned Counsel for the appellant on this point was vested on certain passages found in the decision of this Court in
Dwarkadas Shrinivas of Bornbay v. 'l'he Sholapur Spinning & Weaving Co. Ltd.('). The validity of the law
that was there considered was a post-Constitution
enactment (Act XXVIII of 1950 dated April 10, 1950)
which replaced an Ordinance issued in January, 1950.
The rights of the appellant before this court had to
be considered in the light of the guarantees contained
in Part III of the Constitution. Under the provisions
of the enactment there impugned the management of
the Sholapur Spinning & 'Weaving Co. Ltd., was taken
over by the Government and the question that was
debated was whether this taking over amounted to
"an acquisition" such as is referred to in Art. 31(2) of
the Constitution in these terms:
"31(2). No propert.y shall be compulsorily acquired or requisitioned save for a public purpose and
save by authority of a law which provides for compensation for the property so acquired or requisitioned and either fixes the amount of the compensation or specifies the principles on which, and the
manner in which, the compensation is to be determined and given; and no such law shall be called
in question in any court on the ground that the
compensation provided by that law is not adequate."
Mahajan, J. (as he then was) who delivered the majority decision of the Court in dealing with this point
expressed himself in these terms:
"The next contention of the learned counsel that
the word 'acquisition' in article 31(2) means the
acquisition of title by the State and that unless the
St>ite becomes vested with the property there C'111
be no a.cqnisition within the meaning of the clause
(1) [1934] S.C.R. 674.
I961
r;uru Datta
Shanna
v.
Sta.te of llihar
Ayyangar ].
316
Guru Datta
Shanna
v.
St1ite of Bihar
Ayyangar ].
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1962)
and that the expression 'taking possession' connoted
the idea of requisition cannot be sustained and does
not, to my mind, affect the decision of the case ......
For the proposition that the expression 'acquisition' has the concept of vesting of title in the State
reliance was placed on the opinion of Latham, C:. J.
in Minister of State for the Army v. Dalziel. ....... .
. .. . . .. . . . . .. . . . . .. . .. . .. . .. . .. . .. . .. . .. . . . . . .. .. Latham, C. J.,
m11.de the following observations:
'The Commonwealth cannot be held to have
acquired land unless it has become the owner of
land or of some interest in land. If the Commonwealth becomes only a possessor but does not become an owner of land, then, though the Commonwealth may have rights in respect to land, which
land may be called property, the Commonwealth
has not in such a case acquired property ........... .
.. . . .. . . .. . .. .. . .... .. .. . . .' The majority of the Court
held otherwise and expressed the opinion that the
taking ..................................... by the Commonwealth for an indefinite period of the exclusive possession of property constituted an acquisition of
property within the meaning of section 51 (xxxi) of
the Constitution. This is what Rich, J. said, representing the majority opinion:'It would, in my opinion, be wholly inconsistent
with the language of the placitum to hold that,
whilst preventing the legislature from authorizing
the acquisition of a citizen's full title except upon
just terms, it leaves it open to the legislature to
seize possession and enjoy the foll fruits of possession, indefinitely, on :i.ny terms it chooses, or upon
no terms at all.'
..................... In my judgment, the true concept
of the expression 'acquisition' in our Constitution
as well as in the Government of India Act is the
one enunciated by Rich, J., and the majority of the
Court in Dalziel's case. With great respect I am
unable to accept the narrow view that 'acquisition'
necessarily means acquisition of title in whole or
part of the property."
Learned Counsel naturally relied on the reference to
,,•,"
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
317
1961
the provisions of the Government of India Act contained in the above passage. Before we deal with this Guru Datta
argument, however, we consider it proper to refer to
Sharina
the judgment of this Court in State of West Bengal v
v.
Subodh Gopal Bose (1), which was composed of four of Stale of Bihar
the Judges who formed the bench in the case of
Dwarkadas Shrinivas, etc. (supra) and in which Ayyangar ].
judgment was delivered almost at the same time
(December 17 and December 18). In the West Bengal
case, the leading judgment was delivered by Patanjali
Sastri, C. ,J ., Mahajan, J., merely c•xpressing his concurrence stating that the principles enunciated by the
learned Chief Justice were the same as those which he
ha,d formulated in the Sholapur case. It is because of
this context that the manner in which this point was
dealt with by Patanjali Sastri, C. J., assumes more
importnnce. It was urged before the Court that the
meu,ning of 1he word "acquired" in the phrase 'taken
possession of or acquired' in Art. 31(2) as it then
stood, connoted nothing more th11n and was intendeJ
to confer the identical gu11rantee 11s was contained in
s. 299(2} of the Government of Indi1t Act, 193.'/, which
had used the expression '1tcquired', the words 'taken
possession of' being aclued merely to overcome
the decisions which had held that requisitioning of
property was not within the constitutional protection.
It was therefore urged that the words 'acquired' or
'taken possession of' implied that the legal title in the
property pasqAd to the Sti1te and could not be taken
to signify or include forms of deprivation of private
property which did not involve the element of the
passing•bf title to the State. Repnlling thfr, argument
the learned Chief.Justice said:
"I see no sufficient reason to construe the words
'acquirerl or taken possession' used in clause (2) of
artfole 31 in a narrow technical sense. The Constitution m11rks a definite break with the old order
and' introduces new concepts in regard to many
matters, particularly those relating to fundamental
rights, n,1:-:l it cannot be assume<.! that the ordinary
(I) [1954] S C.R. 587.
41
318
Guru J)afta
Shanna
v.
Stale of Biha1
Ayyangar J,
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1962j
word' acquisition' was used in the ConsLitutiou in
the same narrow sense in which it may have been
used in pre-Constitution legislation' relating to
ac<]uisition of land. Thrse enactments, it Hhould
be noted, related to land, whereas article 31(2) refers
to moveable property as well, as to which no formal
transfer or vcst.ing of title is necessary. Nor is
there any warrant for the assumption that 'taking
possession of property' was intended to mean the
same thing as ' requisitioning property' referred to
in the entries of the Seventh t-lchedule ............... I
am of opinion that the word 'acquisition' trnd its
grammatical variations should, in the context of
article 31 and the entries in the Lists referred to
above, be understood in their ordinary sense, and
the additional words 'taking possession of' or
'requisitioning' are used in article 31(2} nnd in
the cutrius res.;icctively, not in contradict.ion of tho
term 'acquisition', so as to make it clear that the
words taken together cover even those kinds of
deprivation which do not involve the continued
existence of the property after it is acquired ........ .
The expression 'shall be taken po8session of or
acquired' in clause (2) ......... implies such an appropriation of the property or abridgement of the incidents of its ownership as would amount to a deprivation of the owner."
lt would be seen from the extracted passages in the
two judgments, that the reference to the meaning of
"acquired'' in s. 299(2) of the Government of India
Act, 1935 made by Mahajan, J., as he then was, in
Dwarkadas Shrinivas (') was but au incidental' remark
by way of obiter <tnd was not and was not intended to
be, a decision regarding the scope or content of that
section. lf support were needed for this position,
reference may be made to tbe observations of Vns,
Acting C. J. in Bhikaji Narain Dhakraa 1·. T!te Stale
of Madhya Pradesh('). The learned Chief ,1 ustice said:
"Prior to the Constitution when there 1rnre 110
fundamental rights, s. 299(2) of the Government of
India Act, 1935, which corresponds to Art. 31 had
(1) [1954] S.C.R. 674.
(2J (1955] 2 S.C.R. 589.
{
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
319
been construed by the Federal Court in Kunwar
Lal Singh v. The Central Provinces (1944 F.C.R.
284) and in the other cases referred to in Rajah of
Bobbili v. The State of Madras (1952 l M.L.J. 174)
and it was held by the Federal Court that the word
'acquisition' occurring in s. 299 bad the limited
meaning of actual transference of ownership and
not the wide meaning of deprivation of any kind
that has been given by this Court in Subodh Gopal
Bose's case (1954 S.C.R. 587) to that word acquisition appearing in article 31(2) in the light of the
other provisions of the Constitution."
During the years when the Government of India
Act, 1935, was in operation the Privy Council had no
occasion to pronounce upon the meaning of s. 299(2),
but we might, however, usefully refer to the recent
decision of the House of Lords in Belfast Corporation
v. 0. D. Cars Ltd.(') where the House had to consider
the import of the expression 'take any property'
occurring in a similar context in the Government of
Ireland Act, 1920 (X & XI George V, Ch. 67), s. 5(1)
where the relevant words were:
"In the exercise of their power to make laws
neither ............ the Parliament of Northern Irelaml
shall make a law so as to either directly or indirectly ............... take any property without compensation."
The facts in the case before the House of Lords were
that the respondent who carried on business as garage
proprietors and general motor engineers made an
application to the appellant for the grant of permission to erect certain factories and shops on its land.
This was refused on the ground that the height, and
character of the proposed buildings would not be in
accordance with the requirements of the zone in
which the site was situate. The respondent thereupon
claimed compensation for injurious affection on the
ground that its property had been "taken". The
Court of Appeal of Northern Ireland upheld the respondent's claim and the appellant Corporation brought
the matter in appeal to the House of Lords. The
(1) [1960] A.C. 490.
Guru Datta
Shanna
v.
State of Bihar
Avyangar .f.
320
Guru Dalla
Shanna
v
Slate of Hihar
Ayyangar } .
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1962)
argument pressed before the House, and which found
favour with the Court below in Ireland, was based on
the extended meaning of the word 'acquired' attributed to it in the decisions of the Supreme Court of the
United States which have been referred to and adoptby this Court in Dwarkadas Shrinivas etc. (1) and in
Suuodh Gopal Bose's cases('). Viscount Simonds, delivering the leading judgment, observed:
"I come then to the substantial questions: what
is the meaning of the word 'take'? what is the meaning of the word 'property'? what is the scope of the
phrase 'take any property without. compens>ttion'?
............ I hope that I do not over.simplify the problem, if I ask whether anyone ll8ing the English
language in its ordinary signification would say of
a local authority which imposed some restriction
upon the user of property by its owner that that
authority had 'taken' that owner's 'property'. He
would not make any fine distinction between 'take',
'take over' or 'take away'. He would a.gree that
'property' is a word of very wide import, including
intangible and bngible property. But he would
surely deny that any one of those rights which in
the aggregate constituted ownership of property
could itself and by itself aptly be called 'property'
and to come to the instant case, he would deny
that the right to use property in a particular way
wits itself propm·ty, and that the restriction or denial
of that right by a local authority was a 'taking ',
'taking away' or 'taking ovrr' of 'property' ........... .
Fully recognizing the distinction that may exist between measures that arc regulatory and measures
that are confiscatory and that a measure which
is ex facie regulatory may in substance be con fiscat ory ..... ."
Lord Radcliffe followed on the same lines and referred
in this context to Slattery v. Naylor('), where the validity of a municipal bye-law which prevented an owner
from using the property which he had purchasedburial ground-for the only purpose for which it could
(1) (1954) S.C.R. 674.
(2) (1954) S.C.R. 587.
I 3) (1888) 13 App. Cas. 446.
2 S.C.R.
SUPR~ME COURT
REPORTS
321
be used was upheld by the Judicial Committee as not
amounting to depriving an owner of his property Guru Datta
without compensation.
Sharma
We consider the principles laid down in the Belfast
v.
case (supra) apt as an aid to the construction of the Stale of Bihar
content of the expression "acquired" in s. 299(2) of
the Government of India Act, 1935. The contention Ayyangar J,
urged by learned Counsel for the appellant that the
deprivation of the land-holder of the right of management and control over the forest without his legal
title thereto or beneficial enjoyment thereof being
affected amounts to acquisition of land within s. 299(2)
of the Government of India Act, 1935 must be rejected. The extract we have made earlier from the judgment of Viscount Simonds affords a sufficient answer
to a submission that the right of the landholder to
possession was itself a right of property and as this
had been taken over it constituted an acquisition
within the constitutional provision. Property, as a
legal concept, is the sum of a bundle of rights and in
the case of tangible property would include the right
of possession, the right to enjoy, the right to• destroy,
the right to retain, the right to alienate and so on.
All these, of course, would be subject to the relevant
law-procedural or substantive-bearing upon each
of these incidents, but the strands that make np the
total are not individually to be identified as those constituting "property". So nndo.rstood, there is no
scope for the contention that the imposition, so to
speak, of a compulsory Governmental agency for the
purpose of managing the forest with liabilily imposed
to account for the income as laid down by the st;atute
is an "acquisition" of the prope,.ty itself within
s. 299(2) of tho Government of India Act, 1935.
A very minor point J1. as urged bf. the lea.med Counsel b~d 01?9.n the langu~g" of sub-a. (5) of s. 299
.' which ?¢ads: ·
. ... ·
"299 (5). fl1 this secHon 'land' includes immovable property of every kind and any rigl1ts in or
overJl!i.oh property, and 'undertaking' includ0s part
of an undertaking."
322
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1962]
Learned Coonsel suggested that the right to possesmanagement·and control over the estate was "a
sion,
Guru Datta
right in or over such property" and that if it was so
Sha1n1a
v.
construed, the taking over of such a right would be·
State of Bihar tantamount to "acquisition of land" within s. 299(2).
There is no substance in this argument, because the
Ayyangar j.
rights referred to in s: 299(5) are derivative rights,
like interests carved by an owner-a lessee, mortgagee etc.-and not an incident of a property right
regardip.g which we have already expressed ourselves.
We therefore hold that the impugned enactments
were validly enacted and are not obnoxioos to th'e·
prqvisions of the Government of India Act, 1935.
There remains for consideration the third point
urged that even if the Bihar Private Forests Acts,
1946, and 1948 were valid when enacted, the relevant
provisions cannot be enforced against the appellant on
the ground that the enforcement. would violate the
fundamental rtghts granted to the appellant by Arts.
19 and 31 of the Constitution. The argument was
this: The lease in favour of the appellant was for
terms of 8 or 9 years and would have continued, if
nothing else had happened, till certain dates in 1954
and 1955. He has, however, been deprived of the
benefit of the lease by the operation of the impugned
legislation and the appell~nt's rights which he could
have otherwise enjoyed beyond January 26, 1950 have
been denied to him, and this is tantamount tci the
impugned enactments operating beyon<l January 26,
1950. In suppo_rt of this submission learned Counsel
invited our attention to a passage in the judgment of
this Cour~ in Shanti Sarup v. Union of India(').
That case was cnncernPd p; imarily wi!·h tho constitutionality uf 1>11 order dtttcd Octobrr 21, 1952 passed
by the C.-r1.ral !iuv.-rnm<'11t. 1m1h" s. 3(4) of the Essential Supplies (Tempornry Pown»:) Act, 1946, by which
the petitioner-firm "''is dispossessed of a textile-mil!
which they owned and managed. There had been an
earlier order of the State Government dated July 21,
1949, also which was similarly impugned. B. K.
Mnkherjea, J., as he then was, who spoke for the
.....
(1) A.LR. [1955] S.C. 624, 628.
2 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
323
Court, after pointing out that the order of the Central
Government was not supportable under the terms of
the enactment under which it was made and therefore
had deprived the petitioner of his property under Art.
31 of the Constitution proceeded to add:
"But even assuming that the deprivation took
place earlier and at a time when the Constitution
had not come into force, the order effecting the
deprivation which continued from day to day must
be held to have come into conflict with the fundamental rights of the petitioner as soon as the Constitution came into force and become void on and
from that date under Art. 13(1) of the Constitution."
We are unable to construe these observations as
affording any assistance to the appellant. The lease
or licence which the appellant had obtained by con,
tract from the landholder was put an end to, once and
for all by virtue of the provisions contained in s. 22 of
the impugned enactment which made provision for
compensation for the extinguishment of those rights.
That took place long before the Constitution, in 1946.
We have held that the legislation under which the
appellant's rights were extinguished, subject to his
claim for compensation, was a valid law. It would
therefore follow that the appellant could have no
rights which could survive the Constitution so as to
enable him to invoke the protection of Part III thereof. On this point also we must hold against the
appellant.
The result is the appeal fails and is dismissed with
costs.
Appeal dismissed.
Guru Datta
Sharnia
v.
5ltate of Bihar
Ayyangar ].
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