JYOTI PERSHAD versus THE ADMINISTRATOR FOR THE UNION TERRITORY OF DELHI (AND CONNECTED PETITIONS)
Supreme Court of India | Decided 21 April 1961 | [1962] 2 S.C.R. 125 | 1961 INSC 167
Key facts
- Decided
- 21 April 1961
- Bench
- BHUVNESHWAR PRASAD SINHA*, S.K. DAS, A.K. SARKAR, N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR, J.R. MUDHOLKAR
- Bench size
- 5
- Case number
- WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) No. 67/1959
- Disposal
- Dismissed
- Citation
- [1962] 2 S.C.R. 125
- Neutral citation
- 1961 INSC 167
Text of the judgment
•
-
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
125
6
out that though Rustica varieties of tobacco are gene'9 '
rally not known to be used for biris, when they are
Jagan•ath
cured in broken leaf grades they cau be used with
v.
admixture with biri tobacco like Pandharpuri tobacco Union of llldia
for imparting strength to biri mixtures, and so accord- . --ing to the Committee no generalisation in this matter Ga;endrngadkar J.
is possible and it cannot be asserted that. all forms of
this variety are incapable of use in biris. Besides, it
would be quite possible for dealers in the said varieties of tobacco to send them to other parts of the
country where they are used for the purpose of manufacturing biris. Therefore, the grievance made by
the petitioners that the tobacco in which they deal
can never be used for biris i8 obviously nut well
founded.
In the result the petition fails and is di,,missed with
costs.
Petition dismissed.
JYOTI PERSHAD
v.
THE ADMINISTRATOR FOR THE UNION
TERH.ITORY OF DELHI
(AND CONNECTED PETITIONS)
(B. P. SINHA, 0 .•J., s. K. DAS, A. K. SARKAR,
N. H.AJAGOPALA AYYANGAR and
J. R. MUDHOLKAR, JJ.)
Slu1n Areas-J.mprovement and clearance of-Validity of enactment-Co,.stit,.tionality-Rent Control-Operation of Rent Control Act in areas governed by Slmn Areas Act-Delhi 6- Ajmer Rent
Control Act, I952 (38 of I952)-Slum Areas (Improvement and
Clearance) Act, Ig56 (96 of Ig56), s. r9-Constitutian of lndid,
Arts. I4, r9(r)(j).
The petitioner after a prolonged litigation and having fu].
filled all the conditions of the Delhi Rent Control Act, obtained
decrees of ejectment against the tenants,
April 2I.
126
z96z
SUPREME l!)QURT REPORTS
[1962)
In the meantime the Slum' Areas (Improvement and Clearance) ~.\\ct, 1956, came into force and the petitioner in accordance
Jyoti Pershad
withs. rg of the said ,Slum1Areas .(I.ct applied to-the competent
authority for per.mission to execute the.decree, \yhich perplissio~
Administrator for \Vas ref Used inter alia on the grounds O[ harrlship tO the tenants 3.nd
The Union Terri- the hurhan aspect ·of th~··ca::;e. 1iTh'e appeals therefrom Were also
tory of Delhi
rejected 1 The' petitioner moved the Supreme Court fOr issue of
a. writ of certiorari to quash the orders on the ground that (I)
v.
s. rg ol the Act was invalid an\! uncons\i~utional as violative, of
the petitioner's rights guaranteed by Arts. 14 and i9(r)(f) of the
Constitution, in as much as s., 19 of the Slum Areas Act' was a
super-imposition on the rights of die petitio!\er who had s~ tisfied
the requirements of the Rent' Control Act bdfore obtaining his
decree, which amounted to unreasonable re~trictions on the right.
to hold:property guaranteed by the Constituti9n, and (2) that
s. 19(3) of the Slum Areas Act vested an unzuided, unfettered, and
uncontrolled Power in arl exedutive officer to \vithhold permis-
sion to execute a decree which the petitioner had obtained alter
satisfying the reasonkble requirem,.ents of the la\v as enacted in
the Rent Control Act, (3) The power conferred on the competent authority bys. 19(3) of the Slum Areas Act was an exces_sive delegation of lt:.gislaiive po\ver and therefore unconstitutional.
Held, thats. rg of the Slum Areas (Improvement and Clearance) Act, 1956 1 -3.yas not obnoxious to the equal protection of
laws guaranteed by''Ai;t. 14 of the Constitution. There was
enough guidance to the competent ·authority in the use of his
<liscretjon under s. 19.(1) of the Act_ The restrictions imposed
by s. I9 of the Act could not' b'e said to be unreasonable.
The guidance could be derived irom the enactment anrl that
it bears a reasonable aQd rational. relationship to the 0bjccnti
be attainen by the A~t and 'in fact would fultll the 'purpose
which lhe law seeks to. achieve, viz., the orderly elimination of
slums, with interim protection for tl;e slum dwellers until they
were moved info better dwellings.
T\le order of ~he. competent authority in the present case
was not open to challenge as it' was ,in line .with the policy and
purpose of the Act.
•
So long as the Legislature indicated in.the operative provisions of the statute with certainty, the. pohcy and purpose of
the enactment, the-mere fact that the legislation
\Vas skeletal
or that every detail of the application of law to a particular
case, was not laid down in- the enactment itself or the fact that
e. discretio~ )Vas left to those en truste~ with adrhinistering the
law, afforded no basis ciiher for the contention that there had
been an excessiv"e delegation of legislative power as to amount
to an abdication of its functions, ·or that the discretion- vested
was uncanalised and unguided so as to amotl.nt to a carte blanche
to discriminate, If tho power or discretion has been conferred
2 S.C.lt. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
127
in a manner which was legal and constitutional the fact that
z96z
the Parliament could possibly have made more detailed provision, could not be a ground for invalidating the law. ·
]voti Pershad
The freedom to 'hold property' was not absolute but was
.. v.
subject. under Art. 19.(5), to "reasonable re~trictions" being Adnunis~rator Jo:
placed upon it "in the interests of the general public". The 1 he Union Tm•criteria for determining the dt·gree of restriction on the right tory 0 ! Del/ii
to hold property which would be considered reasonable, were
by no means fixed or static, but must obviously vary from age
to age and should be related to the adjustments necessary to
solve the problems which communities faced from time to time.
If law failed to take account of unusual situations of pressing
urgency arising in the country and of the social urges generated
by the patterns of thought, evolution and of social consciousness,
it would have to be written down as having failed in the very
purpose of its existence. Where the legislature enacted laws,
which in its wisdom, was considered necessary for the solution
of human problems, the tests of "reasonableness", had to be
viewed in the context of the issues which faced the legislature.
In the construction of such laws and particularly in judging
of their validity the courts had to approach it from the point
of view of furthering the social interest which it was the purpose of the legislation to promote, for the courts were not, in
these matters, functioning as it were in vacuo, but as parts of
a society which was trying, by enacted Jaw, to solve its problems and achieve social concord and peaceful adjustment and
thus furthering the moral and material progress of the community as a whole.
Thot the provisions of the special enactment, the Slums
Areas (Improvement and Clearance) Act. 1956, will in respect
of the buildings in areas declared slun1 areas operate in addi~
tion to the Delhi & Ajmer Rent Control Act, 1952.
Ramakrishna Dalmia v. Justice Tendolkar, (1959] S.C.R. 279,
Harishankar Bagla v. State of Madhya Pradesh. [1955] 1 S.C.R.
380, M/s. Dwarka Prasad Laxmi Narain v. The State of Uttar
Pradesh, [1954] S.C.R. 803, State of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali
Sarkar, [1952] S.C.R. 284, Kathi Raning Rawat v. State of Saurashtra, [1952] S.C.R. 435, Kcdar Nath Bajoria v. State of West
Bengal, (1954] S.C.R. 30 and Pannalal Binjraj v. Union of India,
(1957] S.C.R. 233, discussed.
ORIGINAL JumsmcTroN: Petitions Nos. 67, 87 and
130of1959.
Petitions under Art. 32 of the Constitution of India
for enforcement of Fundamental Rights.
R. S. Narula '1nd S.S. Chadha, for the petitioners.
M. C. Setalvad, Attorney-General of India, B. Sen
and T. 1vl. Sen, for Respondrmts Nos. 1, 2 and 5 (In
128
SUPREME COURT REPOR'fS
[1962)
petition Xo. 83 of 1959) 1, 2 (l.nd 12 (In Petition No. 67
Jyuli Pmhad of 1959) and 1, 2 and 4 (In Petition No. 130 of 1959) .
. . v.
JV. S. Barlingay (l.nd A. G. Ratnaparkhi, for responAd"''"''"010' for dent No. 3 (In Petn. No. 83 of 1959).
TJi, Union Ternlory of /J.tl.i
Sardari Lal Bhatia, for respondents Nos. 3a., 4, 5, 0
(a, b, c,) and 7-10.
J. D. Jain and !{. L. Mehta, for the Intervener in
Petition No. 67 of 1959 (Phool Chanel).
r96i
1961. April 21.
delivered by
Ayy••g•• J.
The Judgment of tho Court was
AYYANOAR, J.-Thesc th~ee petitions have been
filed invoking the jurisdiction of this Court under
Art. 32 of tho Coµstitution challenging the constitutionality of s. 19 and particularly sub-s. 3, of thn Slum
Areas (Improvement and Clea.ranee) Act 1956 (Central
Act 96 of 1956), on the ground t.ha.t it offends the fundamental right of tho petitioners guaranteed to them
by Arts. 14 and 19(1Xf).
To appreciate the grounds on which this contention is sought to be sustained it is necessary to set out
brieily a. fow facts. W c might however mention that
though the constitutional objection, a.<lvcrted to is
common to a.11 the three petitions, it is sufficient to
refer to the fa.ct.a of tho case in \Vrit Petition No. 67
of 1959 which is typical of the cases before us.
The petitioner-Jyoti Pershad-is the owner of a.
house in Delhi in which respondents 3 to 11 wore
tenants. Each of these nine individuals occupied a
single room in this house. As the petitioner <'onside red
the house to be old and required to he demolished and
reconstructed, he submitted a plan to the Connril of the
Delhi ::llunicipal Committee a.nd applied for sanction
for the reconstruction of the house. The plan was
sanctio1l('tl and thereafter the petitioner filed suits
against these nine tenants under s. 13(1)(1() of the
Delhi a.ml Ajmer Rent Control Act 38 of 1952 (which
will hereafter be referred to as tile Hent Control Act).
The suits were rcsibtcd by the tena.nts Two matters
had to be proved under s. 13(1Xgl of the Rent Control
Act by a plaintiff before he could obtain an urder of
2 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
129
eviction: (i) tha;t there was a plan which had been
'9 6'
sanctioned by the municipal authorities which made Jyoti Pershad
provision for the tenants then in occupation of the
v.
house being accommodated in the house as reconstruc- Admini,1.ator for
ted, and (ii) that the plii.intiff had the necessary funds Th• un;m; Territo carry out the reconstruction. The plan which had 10'Y of Delh•
been approved by the Delhi Municipal Committee Ayy;;;.gar 1 .
made provision for the construction of a doublestoreyed building with twelve rooms which was,
therefore, more t)lan ample for the nine tenants for
whom accommodation had to be provided. The plaintiff also established that he had deposited cash in the
State Bank of India sufficient for reconstructing the
house as sanctioned in the plan. On December 8, 1956
the Civil Court in Delhi passed decrees in favour of
the petitioner for the eviction of respondents 3 to 11.
Section 15 of the Rent Control Act enacted:
"15. (1) The Court shall, when passing any
decree or order on the grounds specified in clause (f)
or clause (g) of the proviso to sub-section (1) of section 13, ascertain from the tenant whether he elects
to be placed in occupation of the premises or pn.rt
thereof from which he is to be evicted and if the
tenant so elects, shall record the fact of the election
in the decree or order and specify therein the date
on or before which he shall deliver possession so
as to enable the landlord to commence the work
of repairs or building or re-building as the case
may be.
(2) If the tenant delivers possession on or before
the date specified in the decree or order, the landlord, shall, on the completion of the work of repairs
or building or re-building place the tenant in
occupation of the premises or part thereof.
(3) If, after the tenant has delivered possession
on or before the date specified in the decree or order
the landlord fails to commence the work of repairs
or building or re-building, within one month of the
specified date or fails to complete the work in a
reasonable time or having completed the work, fails
to place the tenant in occupation of the premises in
17
130
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1962]
accordance with sub-section (2), the Court may, on
the application of the tenant made within one year
Jyoti PtTsl1ad
from the specified date, order the landlord to place
v.
the tenant in occupation of the premises or pa.rt
Admi,.istTator for
Tiit Unio,. Territhereof on the original terms and conditions or to
tory of DelAi
pay to such tenant such compensation as may be
fixed by the Court."
The tenants, however, refused to give up possessession within the three months time granted to them
by the decrees to vacate the preml1es but went up in
a.ppea.l against the orders of eviction under s. 34 of the
Rent Control Act to the Senior Sub-Judge, Delhi.
These appeals were finally disposed of against the
tenant-appellants, some on the merits a.nd some by
reason of abatement, by the end of October, 1957.
C nder the rules governing the construction of houses
on plans sanctioned b,v the Delhi Municipal Committee, the sanctioned building had to be completed
within a period of one year from the date of sanction.
As a result of this rule the sanction obtained by the
petitionur la.peed and he ha.d, therefore, to obtain fresh
sanction if in consequence of his success in the appeals
before the Senior Sub-Judge he still desired to demo·
lish and reconstruct the building.
:Meanwhile, two changes ca.me a.bout in the la.w
governing m~tters relevant to the present case: The
first was that the Slum Areas (Improvement a.nd
Clearnnce) Act 96 of 1956, which will be hereafter
referred to a.s the Act, was enacted by Parliament and
ca.me into force in the Delhi area.. Section 19 of that
Act which is impugned in these petitions runs:
"19. (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in
any other law for the time being in force, no person
who has obtained a.ny decree or order for the eviction of a. tenant from a.ny building in a. slum area
shall be entitled to execute such decree or order
except with the previous permission in writing of
the competent authority.
(2) Every person desiring to obtain the permission referred to in sub-section (1) shall make an
application in writing to the competent authority
in such form and containing such particulars as
may he prescribed.
2 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
131
Ig6I
(3) On receipt of such application the competent
authority, after giving an opportunity to the tenant Jyoti Pershad
of being heard and after making such summary
v.
inquiry into the circumstances of the case as it Admini,trator Jo~
thinks fit, shall by order in writing either grant The Un•on T•msuch permission or refuse to grant such permission. 10'Y of Delh•
(4) Where the competent authority refuses to Ayyangar J.
grant the permission it shall record a brief statement of the reasons for such refusal and furnish a
copy thereof to the applicant."
The other change in the law was that due to the
enactment of rules and regulations providing for a
co-ordinated development and planning of buildings in
the Delhi Area the type of constructions that could be
sanctioned by the Delhi Municipal Committee underwent a radical alteration as a result of which in the
area now in question double-storeyed buildings were
not permitted to be constructed and that if the petitioner's house had to be reconstructed it could only
have three living rooms making allowance for the size
of the rooms and the free space that had to be left on
either side of the building in accordance with the
revised municipal regulations.
It would have been noticed that the right of the
tenants to insist on the landlord providing accommodation for them in the reconstructed building
guaranteed to them by s. 15 of the Rent Control Act,
had ceased by reason of their failure to quit and deliver vacant possession of the tenements occupied by
them within 3 months fixed by the order of the Civil
Court (vide s. 15) and hence they had no statutory
right under the Rent Control Act to be provided with
accommodation by the landlord.
Thus freed from obligation to the tenants the petitioner filed on the strength of these decrees for eviction nine applications under s. 19 of the Act before
the competent authority for the eviction of the
tenants from the nine rooms in the building on the
ground that the building had to be reconstructed as it
was in a dilapidated condition. These petitions were
dismissed by the competent authority by his order dated
January 13, 1958 on the ground that the sanction to
132
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1962]
reconstruct the building which the petitioner had
obtained
from the municipality in 1956 had expired.
] yoti Pe, shad
The
order
recited:
••
.Admi11islralvr for
"Since it may take some time for the petitioner
TIJ1 Union Tenito obtain fresh sanction for reconstruction and there
lory of Delhi
is also the possibility of sanction not being given at
all,
it would be no use continuing with these proAyyangar ] .
ceedings until it is definitely known that the landlord has obtained sanction for reconstruction. These
nine applications are accordingly filed with the
option to the petitioner to have them revived without payment of extra fee in case he is able to obtain
sanction."
Therrafter the petitioner applied to the municipal
authorities for sanctioning a building plan. As stated
earlier, tho building plan approved by tho municipality could permit only a building consisting of one
floor in which there were three living rooms and
sanction for the construction of a building with such
accommodation was gra.nt{Cld. With this sanctioned
plan, the petitioner renewed his application under
s. 19 for permission to execute the decree of tho Civil
Court and evict the tenants. By order dated July 30,
1958 a.II these applications were dismissed. The reason
assigned for the order was stated in these terms:
"If the decree is allowed to be executed they will
be thrown out and it will be impossible for them to
get accommodation in the reconstructed building.
They are old tenants and as stated above also very
poor. The execution of the decree will involve very
real hardship to them. They are all occupying
only one Kothri each and paying rent at Rs. 3 per
mensem, and they have no complaint to make
about the condition of their Kothries. The landlord
has four or five other houses which he has let out
on rent. The case has a human aspect and I
disallow the execution of the decree against the
tenants."
The petitioner preferred appeals against this order
to the Administrator of the Union T<lrritory, Delhi to
whom appeals lay under s. 20 of the Act. The
appeals were dismissed, the appellate authority
saying:
,
2 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPOR.TS
133
"I would have allowed the appellant permission
x96r
to evict the tenants, if the property itself was dila- Jyoti Petsha.d
pidated and declared unfit for human habitation by
v.
a competent authority. This is not so. The land- Administrator for
lord naturally desires to get a better return from The Union Tmiland in the congested areas of the city by rebuilding tory of Delhi
on it to better specifications, so that he can get Ayyangar ].
higher rent from it. But if this ten d ency is permitted to have an unrestricted play, then the result
will be the eviction of a large number of poor
people from slum areas.
In the circumstances, the appellant should wait
until either his property is declared dangerous by
the Municipal Corporation, or under a Slum Clearance Scheme he is asked by the competent authority itself to demolish it or rebuild it in a particular
manner."
-i
In these circumstances the petitioner has moved
this Court for the issue of a writ of certiorari to quash
these orders on the ground already adverted to, viz.,
that s. 19 of the Act is invalid and unconstitutional
as violative of the petitioner's rights guaranteed by
Arts. 14 and 19(l)(f) of the Constitution. In passing
we may observe that we are not concerned with the
validity of the particular oi·ders passed in·the case but
only with the general question as to the constitutionality of the impugned s. 19 of the Act.
Before setting out the points urged by Mr. Narula
-learned. Counsel for the petitioners-in support of
his submission that s. 19 of the Act was, in so far as it
enabled the competent authority to withhold permission to those who had obtained decrees for eviction
from executing their decrees, unconstitutional, it
would be necessary to read the material provisions of
the Rent Control Act, 1952, which imposes a restriction
on the right of landlords, inter alia to evict tenants
from the premises occupied by them. Chapter III of
that Act imposes a control over the eviction of
tenants. A tenant is defined (Vide s. 2(j)) as meaning
"any person by whom or on whose account rent is
payable for any premises including such sub-tenants
or others who have derived title under the tenant
134
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1962]
196r
under the provisions of any law before the commencement
of the Act." Section 13(1) enacts:
Jyoti P1rsAod
"Notwithstanding
anything to the contrary con••
tained in any other la.w or any contra.ct, no decree
Ad,,,,iNislralor for
T Alt U #io" Terrior order for the recovery of possB11Bion of any prelory of Delhi
mises sha.11 be passed by any Court in favour of the
landlord a.gs.inst any tenant (including a tenant
Ayya•gar J,
whose tenancy is terminated):".
This blanket protection is, however, subject to the
conditions enumerated in the proviso which reads:
"Provided that nothing in this sub-section shall
apply to any suit or other proceeding for such recovery of possession if the Court is B&tisfied-"
Then follow ten grounds the existence of one or other
of which enables a. landlord to obtain a. decree from
a. Civil Court for the recovery of possession from tenants. Among the grounds thus enumerated it is suffi.
cient to rcfrr to grounds (f), (g) a.nd (1), ground (g)
being the ground upon which the petitioner in the
present ca.se obtained the decrees for eviction and these
run:
"(f) tba.t the premises have become unsafe or
unfit for buma.n habitation and a.re bona. fide required by the hmdlord for carrying out repairs which
cannot be carried out without the premises being
va.ca.ted; or
(g) tha.t the premises a.ro bona. fide required by the
landlord for the purpose of re-building the premises
or for the replacement of the premises by any builing or for the erection of otbrr buildings, and
that surb building or re-building cannot be carried
out without. the premises being vacated; or
(I) that tho landlord requires the premises in
order t-0 carry out a.ny building work a.t the instance
of the GO\·ernment or the Delhi Improvement Trust
in pursuance <>f any improvement scheme or development scheme."
The right of the landlord, however, who obtains a.n
order for eviction under either cl. (f) or (g) above set
out is subject to the provisions of s. 15 whose terms
ha.ve a.lrea.dy hll6n set out. The result, therefore,
2 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
135
1 61
would be that in the cases covered by these two claus9
es the tenants would be entitled, if they conform to Jyoti Pershad
the terms of these provisions, to be reinstated in the
•.
newly constructed premises after the reconstruction. It Administ1a101 for
might be pointed out that under s. 38 of the Rent The Union TmiControl Act the provisions of the Act and the Rules to•y of Delhi
made thereunder are to have effect notwithstanding
.h
. d .
Ayyangar ].
anything inconsistent t herew1t contame m any
other law for the time being in force.
The argument of the learned Counsel was that the
restriction upon the rights of landlords to the enjoyment of the property imposed by s. 13 of the Rent
Control Act could not be open to any objection, legal
or constitutioI:\al because the Legislature has set out
with precision the grounds upon which possession
could be recovered, the defences that might be set up
by the tenants and the conditions subject to which the
rights either of the landlord or of the tenant could be
exercised. It is the super-imposition of the provisions
of s. HJ of the Act on the rights of a landlord-decreeholder who had satisfied the requirements of the Rent
Control Act before obtaining his decree that was
stated as amounting to an unreasonable restriction on
the right to hold property guaranteed by Art. 19(l)(f).
This will be a convenient stage at which we might
set out in brief outline the argument urged by learned Counsel for the petitioner. They were mainly
three: (1) Section 19(3) of the Act vests an unguided,
unfettered and uncontrolled power in an executive
officer to withhold permission to execute a decree
which a landlord has obtained after satisfying the
reasonable requirements of the law as enacted in the
Rent Control Aot. Neither s. 19 of the Act nor any
other provision of the Act indicates the grounds on
which the competent authority might grant or withhold permission to execute decrees and the power
conferred is, therefore, arbitrary and offends Art. 14
of the Constitution. (2) The same point was urged in
a slightly different form by saying that the power
conferred on the "competent authority" bys. 19(3) of
the Act was an excessive delegation of legislative
power and was, therefore, unconstitutional. (3) The
SUPRl!lMl!: COURT REPORTS
1 61
9
[1962]
vesting of a power in an executive authority to ovorJyoti Pershad ride-at his sweet will and plea.sure-rights to prov.
pcrty without any guidance from the Legislature conAdminis1,.1or for stituted an unreasonable restraint on tho petitioner's
n, U•ion Tmi-right to hold property, a right which in the case of the
tory of Delh•
property of the type now in question would includo a
right to obtain possession from the tenant in order
Ayya•gar J.
either to improve it by reconstruction or for the purpose of his own use. Apart from the objection regarding tho vesting of a.n unguided power in a.n executive
authority which is the common ground of objection
urged in regard to points (I) and (2), learned Counsel
submitted that the right vested in a.n e.xccutivo authority to prevent for an indefmite and indeterminate
period of time the right to enjoy his proporty was for
this further reason e.xccssivo and a.n unreasonable restraint which could not be justified under Art. 19(5) of
tho Constitution.
We shall proceed to consider theso points in that
order. The first ground alleged is that s. 19 of the
Act is constitutionally invalid as violative of the
equal protection of the laws conferred under Art. 14
of the Constitution, in that an unguided and arbitrary
discretion is vested in the "competent authority".
Tho import, content and scope of Art.. 14 of tho
Constitution has been elaborately considered and o.xplained in numerous decisions of this Court and it is,
therefore, unnecessary for us to embark on any fresh
investigation of tho topic, but it would be sufficient
to summarise the principles, or rather the rules of
guidance for the interpretation of the Article which
have alread·v been established, and then consider tho
application -of those rules to the provisions of tho
enactment now impugned. It is only necessary to
add that the decisions of this Court lii.ying down the
proper construction of Art. 14 rendered up to 1959
havo been summarised in the form of 5 propositions
by Das C. J. in Ramakrishna Dalmia v. Justice Tendolkar ('), but we a.re making a. summary on slightly
different lines more relevant to the enquiry regarding
the provision with which we are concerned in tho
present ca.so.
\1) [1959] S.C.R. 279, •W• 301 •
.
2 S.C.tt. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
137
(l) If the statute itself or the rule made under it
z961
applies unequally to persons or things similarly situat.
ed, it would be an instance of a direct violation of the Jyoti Pershad
Constitutional guarantee and the provision of the Adminis;;. 10 , for
statute or the rule in queation would have to be The Union Tmistruck down.
tory of Delhi
(2) The enactment or the rule might not in terms
enact a discriminatory rule of law but might enable Ayyangar J.
an unequal or discriminatory treatment to be accorded
to persons or things similarly situated. This would
happen when the legislature vests a discretion in an
authority, be it the Government or an administrative
official acting either as an executive officer or even in
a quasi-judicial capacity by a legislation which does
not lay down any policy or disclose any tangible or
intelligible purpose, thns clothing the authority with
unguided and arbitrary powers enabling it to discriminate.
"The legislature must declare the policy of the
law and the legal principles which are to control
any given cases and must provide a standard to
guide the officials or the body in power to execute
the Jaw. The essential legislative function consists
in the determination or choice of the legislative
policy and of formally enacting that policy into a
binding rule of conduct."
[Harishankar Bagla v. The State of Madhya
Pradesh (1)].
"No rules have been framed and no directions
given on these matters to regulate or guide the discretion of the licensing officer. Practically the
Order commits to the unrestrained will of a single
individual the power to grant, withhold or·cancel
licences in any way he chooses and there is nothing
in the Order which could ensure a proper execution
of the power or operate as a check upon injustice
that might result from improper execution of the
same".
[Messrs. Dwarka Prasad Laxmi Narain v. The ·
State of Uttar Pradesh(')].
(1) [1955] I S.C.R. 380, 388.
18
(2) [195 4] s.c.R. 803, 813.
•
138
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1962]
6
'9 '
In such circumstances the very provision of the
Jyoti Pmhad law which <'nables or permits the authority to discriv.
minate, offrnds the guarantoo of equal protection
Admo"istrntor forafforde<l by Art. 14. Possibly the best instance of this
The u"'"" Tmi- type of casl' is afforded by tho legislation under conj 10'Y 01 Dttho sideration in The State of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali
Sarkar('), the ratio underlying which was thus exAyyangar }.
plained in Kathi Raning Rawat v. The State of Saura-
Bhtra ('):
"If it clepends entirely upon the pleasure of the
l::>tate Government to make any classification it
likes, without any guiding principle at all, it cannot certainly be a proper classification, which requires that a reasonable relation must exist between the classification and the objective that the
legislation has in view. On the other hand, if the
legislature indicates a definite objective and the
<liscrction has been vested in the State Government
as a means of achieving that object, the law itself
cannot be held to be discriminatory, though the
action of the State Government may be condemned
if it offends against the equal protection clause, by
making an arbitrary selection."
(3) It is manifest that the above rule would not
apply to cases where the legislature lays down the
policy and indicat€s the rule or the lino of action
which should serve as a guidance to tho authority.
Where such guidance is expressed in the statutory
provision eonforring the power, no question of violation of Art. 14 could arise, unless it be that the rules
themselves or the policy indicated lay down different
rules to be applied to persons or things similarly
situated. Even where Ruch is not the case, there
might be a t ransgrcssion by the authority of the limits
laid down or an a.buse of power, but the actual order
would bo set a.Hide in appropriat€ proceedings not so
much on the grou11cl of a violation of Art. 14, but as
really heing heyontl its power.
(4) It is not., however, essential for the kgislation
to comply with the rule a.s to equal protection, that
the ruleH for t.he guidance of tho designated authority,
(1) [1952] S.C.R. 2oi.
2 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
'i
139
which is to exercise the power or which is vested with
I96I
the discretion, should. . be ,laid]fdown in express terms yo t.i P ersr1a
, d
1
in the statutory prov1s10n 1tse .
v.
"The Saurashtra case would seem to lay down the Administrator for
principle that if the impugned legislation indicates The Union Tmithe policy which inspired it and the object which it tory 0! Delhi
seeks to attain, the mere fact that the legislation Ayyangar f•
does not itself make a complete and precise classification of the persons or things to which it is to be
applied, but leaves the selective application of the
law to be made by the standard indicated or the
underlying policy and object disclosed is not a sufficient ground for condemning it as arbitrary and,
therefore, obnoxious to article 14."
[Kedar Nath Bajoria v. The State of West
Bengal(')].
"So long as the policy is laid down and a standard
established by a statute, no unconstitutional delegation of legislative power is involved in leaving to
selected instrumentalities the making of subordinate rules within prescribed limits and the determination of facts to which the policy as declared by
the Legislature is to apply."
[Harishankar Bagla and another v. The State of
Madhya Pradesh(')].
Such guidance may thus be obtained from or afforded by (a) the preamble read in the light of the
surrounding circumstances which necessitated the
legislation, taken in conjunction with well-known facts
of which the Court might take judicial notice or of
which it is appraised by evidence before it in the form
of affidavits, Kathi Raning Rawat v. The State of
Saurashtra (') being an instance where the guidance
was gathered in the manner above indicated, (b) or
even from the policy and purpose of the enactment
which may be gathered from other operative provisions applicable to analogous or comparable situations
or generally from the object sought to be achieved by
the enactment.
"The policy underlying the Order is to regulate the
(1) [195") S.C.R. 30, 46.
(2) [1955] I S.C.R. 380, 388.
(3) [1952] S.C.R. 435, 461, 462.
140
Jyoti PersJtad
v.
Ad,ninislralr>r for
'l he u,iion Territory of Dtlhi
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1962)
transport of cotton textile in a. manner that will
ensure an even distribution of the commodity in the
country and make it available a.t a. fair price to all.
The grant or refusal of a. permit is thus to be governed by this policy and the discretion given to the
Textile Commissioner is to be exercised in such a.
way as to effectuate this policy. The conferment of
such a. discretion cannot be ca.lied invalid a.nd if
there is a.n abuse of the power there is amplo power
in the Courts to undo the mischief."
Ilarishankar Bagla v. The State of Madhya Pradesh(').
In Pannalal Binjmj v. Union of India's case(') the
purpose of the provision which was administrative
conveniencu for enabling assessments to be ma.de in
the manner indicated by the Income-tax Act was held
t-0 afford a sufficient guidance so as to render the
provision immune from attack on the ground of violation of Art. 14.
In the circumstancrs indicated under the fourth
head, just as in tho third, the law enacted would be
valid being neither a. case of excessive delegation or
abdication of legisla.tiv-c authority viewed from one
aspect, nor open to objection on the ground of violation of Art. 14 as authorising or permitting discriminatory treatment of persons similarly situated. The
particular executive or quasi-judicial act would, however, be open to challenge a.s already stated on the
ground not so much that it is in viofo.tion of tho equal
protection of the laws guaranteed by Art. 14, because
e.1: concessis that was not permitted by tho statute but
on the ground of the same being ultra vires as not
being sanctioned or authorized by the enactment itself.
The si\uation i1f.:such cases would be parallel to the
tests to be applied for determining the validity of rules
ma.de undor statutes which enable the rule-ma.king
authority to ena.61; subsidiary legislation "to carry out
the purposes of the Act". The criteria to be applied
to determine the validitv of such rules could, in our
opinion, be appropriately applied to determine the
validity of the action under the provisions like the
one <lea.It with under the la.st two hoa.ds.
(1) [1955] J S.C.R. 38o, 388.
(2) [1957] S.C.R. 233.
..
.
I.,
2 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
141
In the light of what we have stated above we
r961
have now to consider the point urged by the learned Jyoti Pershad
Counsel for the petitioner that the Act has vested in
v.
the competent authority the power to withhold evic- Administ.ator for
tion in pursuance of orders or decrees of Courts with- The Union Tmiout affording any guidance or laying down any ta.y of Delhi
principles for his guidance on the basis of which he
could exercise his discretion. In other words, that the ..Jyyangar 1·
Act lays no fetters and has vested in him an arbitrary
and unguided power to pick and choose the decreeholders to whom he would permit execution and those
to whom he would refuse such relief. On the other
hand, the learned Attorney-General submitted that
the discretion vested in the competent authority was
not unguided and that though s. 19 of the Act did not
in terms lay down any rules for his guidance, the same
could be gathered from the policy and purpose of the
Act as set out in the preamble and in the operative
provisions of the Act itself.
We consider that there is considerable force in this
submission of the learned Attorney -General. The
preamble describes the Act as one enacted for two
purposes: (1) the improvement and clearance of slum
areas in certain Union Territories, and (2) for the protection of tenants in such areas from eviction. These
twin objects are sought to be carried out by Chapters II to VI of the enactment. Chapter II which consists of one section-s. 3-provides a definition of
what are "slum areas" and their declaration .as such.
The tests for determining whether the area could be
declared a "slum area" or not briefly are whether the
buildings in the area are (a) unfit for human habitation,
or (b) are by reason of dilapidation, overcrowding etc.
detrimental to safety, health or morals. It is in areas
so declared as "slum areas" that the rest of the enactment is to operate. The provisions, however, make it
clear that in order that an areii may be declared a
"slum area" every building in that area need not be
unfit for human habitation or that human habitation
in every building in such area should be detrimental
to the safety, health or morals of the dwellers. We
are making this observation because of a suggestion
142
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1962]
•
19 61
made, that the declared purpose of protecting the tenants from eviction was inconsistent with the policy
Jyoti Pcrshad
v.
underlying the declaration of an area as a "slum area"
Administrator for and that thus the Act manifested two contrary or conThe Union Terri- flicting ideas or principles which would negative each
tory of Delhi
other and thus leave no fixed policy to guide "the
competent authority" when exercising his powers to
Ayyangar ].
f
grant or re use eviction when an application was made
to him in that behalf under s. 19 o.f the Act.
Chapter III is headed 'Slum Improvement' and
makes provision for two types of orders: (1) to require
the improvement of buildings where repairs-major
or minor-would make them reasonably habitable for
the slum dwellers (vide ss. 4-6), and (2) cases where
mere repairs or adjustments would not suffice but
what is required is the demolition of the entire building. In the latter case certainly the occupants of the
building would have to be evicted and the building
vacated and power is conferred for effectuating this
purpose vide s. 7 (1) and 7 (3). It might be that the
whole area might consist of dwellings of the type
which require demolition and it is Chapter IV that
makes provision for this category of cases which is
headed "Slum Clearance and Re-development". In such
cases the buildings in the entire area are to be ordered to be demolished, and in that event the dwellers
would, of course, have to vacate, but it is presumed
that alternative accommodation would necessarily
have to be provided before any such order is made.
The process would have to be carried out in an orderly fashion if the purpose of the Act is to be fulfilled
and the policy behind it, viz., the establishment of
slum dwellers in healthier and more comfortable tenements so as to improve the health and morals of the
community, is to be achieved. Chapter V makes
provision for the acquisition of land in order to compass the re-development of slum areas into healthy
parts of the city, by providing amenities and more
substantial and better accommodation for the previous inhabitants. It is after this that we have Chapter VI whose terms we have already set out. This
Chapter is headed "Protection of tenants in Slum Areas
..
2 s.c.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
143
from Eviction". Obviously, if the protection that is
afforded is read in the context of the rest of the Act, Jyoti Pershad
it is clear that it is to enable the poor who have no
v.
other place to go to, and who if they were compelled Administrnto' for
to go out, would necessarily create o.thcr slums in the The Union Tmiprocess and live perhaps in less commodious and 1"'Y 01 Delh•
more unhealthy surroundings than those from which Ayyangar } .
they were evicted, to remain in their dwellings until
provision is made for a better life for them elsewhere.
Though therefore the Act fixes no time limit during
which alone the restraint on eviction is to operate, it
is clear from the policy and purpose of the enactment
and the object which it seeks to achieve that this
restriction would only be for a period which would be
determined by the speed with which the authorities
are able to make other provisions for affording the
slum dweller-tenants better living conditions. The
Act, no doubt, looks at the problem not from the
point of view of the landlord, his needs, the money he
has sunk in the house and the possible profit that he
might make if the house were eitlH'r let to other
tenants or was reconstructed and let out, but rather
from the point of view of the tenants who have no
alternative accommodation and who would be stranded in the open if an order for eviction were passed.
The Act itself contemplates eviction in cases where
on the ground of the house being unfit for human
habitation it has to be demolished either singly under
s. 7 or as one of a block of buildings under Ch. IV. So
long therefore us a building can, without great detriment to health or safety, permit accommodation, the
policy of the enactment would seem to suggest that
the slum dweller should not be evicted unless ulternative accommodation could be obtained for him. In
this connection the learned Attorney-Genernl brought
to our attention the prov i.-;ions of the Delhi Development Act, 1957 (LXI of 1957) which makes provision
for the design of a Master Pittll for the city which, if
executed, is likely to greatly reduce, if not to eliminate, slum-; altogcether. It was snggcsted that tuken
in conjunction with this enactment it would be seen
that the power to restrain eviction under s. 19 of the
144
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1962]
Act is one which would not la.st for ever but to a.
.
limited period, though this could not naturally be
Jyoi. Pmhad defined by reference to fixed dates. We see force in
Adminis~;. 10 , Jo' this submission as well. In view of tho foregoing we
11u Union Tmi· consider that there is onough guidance to the compe'"'Y of Delhi tent authorit v in the uso of his discretion under
s. 19(1) of the.Act and we, therefore, reject the conAyy••&"' f.
tention that s. 19 is obnoxious to the equal protection
of laws guaranteed by Art. 14 of the Constitution. We
need only add that it was not, and could not be, disputed that the guidance which we have held could be
derived from the enactment, and that it bears a
reasonable and rational relationship to the object to
be attainecl by the Act and, in fact, would fulfil the
purpose which the law seeks to achieve, viz., the
orderly elimination of slums, with interim protection
for the slum dwellers until they were moved into better dwellings. Wc arc further of the opinion that the
order of the competent authority in the present case
is not opon to challengo either, because it would be
soen that the grounds upon which he has rejected the
petitioner's appliua.tion for oxecution is in lino with
what we have stated to be tho policy and purpose of
the Act.
Before leaving this topic it is necessary to consider
a submission of lea.mod Counsel for the petitioner
which is of immediate relevance to point under examination. He said that, no doubt, tho decisions of this
Court had pointed out that it was not roasonable to
expect the legislature to lay down expressly precise
criteria. for the guide.nee of the authorities who have to
administer tho lR.w because of tho difficulty, if not
impossibility, of contemplating every single circumstance and proscribing rules so as to apply to such
varying si tua.tions, and that was the raison d'etre of
vesting a largo discretion in the hands of the administering authorities after indicating the general principles that ought to guide them. He however urged
that in the present case there was no such insuperable
difficulty, becauMc the restriction pro'?ided for bys. 19
of the Act was superimposed on those which were
1961
2 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
145
enacted by s. 13 of the Rent Control Act, and Parlia.
r96r
ment when enacting the Act, could easily have indi·
.
· h reierence
c
cate d wit
tot h e severa1 groun ds on wh'10 h Jyoti 'vPershad
.
eviction could be had under the Rent Control Act, the Administrato1 fo1
additional restrictions, or further conditions which The Union Tmi·
would be taken into account by "the competent tory of Delhi
authority". If learned Counsel meant by this sub.
mission that it was a possible mode of legislation, Ayyangar }.
there is nothing to be said against it, but if he desired
us to infer therefrom that because of the failure to
adopt that mode, the power conferred by s. 19 of the
Slum Act contravened the guarantee under Art. 14,
we cannot agree.
In regard to this matter we desire to make two
observations. In the context of modern conditions
and the variety and complexity of the situations
which present themselves for solution, it is not possible for the Legislature to envisage in detail every
possibility and make provision for them. The Legis.
lature therefore is forced to leave the authorities
created by it an ample discretion limited, however, by
the guidance afforded by the Act. This is the ratio
of delegated legislation, and is a process which has
come to stay, and which one may be permitted to
observe is not without its advantages. So long therefore as the Legislature indicates, in the operative pro.
visions of the statute with certainty, the policy and
purpose of the enactment, the mere fact that the
legislation is skeletal, or the fact that a discretion is
left to those entrusted with administering the law,
affords no basis either for the contention that there
has been an excessive delegation of legislative power
as to amount to an abdication of its functions, or that
the discretion vested is uncanalised and unguided as
to amount to a carte blanche to discriminate. The
second is that if the power or discretion has been
conferred in a manner which is legal and constitutional, the fact that Parliament could possibly have
made more detailed provisions, could obviously not
be a ground for invalidating the law.
The next point argued by learned Counsel for the
19
146
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1962]
petitioner was. that the· power conferred on the competent authority by s. 19(3) of the Act was an excesJyot• Pmhad sive delegation of legislative power.
As we have
Admini.<;;010 , fa. pointed out earlier, th.is submission is really another
Th• Union Tmi- form, or rather another aspect of the objection based
to'y of n,1,.; on the grnnt of an unfettered discretion or power
which we have just now dealt with. It is needless to
AyJ•anga' f.
repeat, that so long as the legislature indicates its
purpose and lays down the policy it is not necessary
that every detail of the application of the law to particu Jar cases should be laid d'o.wn in the enactment
itself. 1 The reasons assigned-for repelling the attack
based on Art. 14 would suffice to reject this ground of
objection as well. , ,
The last major, objection urged by learned Counsel
was that the power vested in the competent authority
"at its sweet-'l:'..i_ll and pleasure" to refuse permission
to execute a decree .for eviction violated the right to
hold property under Art. 19(l)(f) of the Constitution
and that the same was not saved by Art. l.9(5) of the
Constitution for the reason thaot tfl.e restriction imposed on the exercise of the right was not reasonabJe, IfCounsel were right in his submission that the petitioner's right to obtain possession of his building rested on the "sweet-will and pleasure of the competent
authority" there could be some substance in the
argument. But as we had already had occasion to
point out, it is not at the "sweet-will and.pleasure" of
the competent authority that permission to evict
c9ultl be granted or refused, but on principles gatherable from the enactment, as explained earlier.
Learned Counsel further urged that the right to
hold p,roperty under Art. 19(1)(£) included the right in
the owner of a building to evict a tenant and enter
into actual or physicaf!!occupation of the property.
Counsel is, no dou ht, right in this submission but the
'freedom' t\) 'hold property' is not absolute but .that,
as he himself admitted, is subject, under Art. 19(5), to
"reasonable restrictions" being placed upon it "in the
interests of the .general public". It was not suggested
that slum-dwellers wouJ;d riot constitute "the general
public" and that if a leg1slation was designed to grant
r96r
.
2 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
147
6
them protection, it could not be justified as one in the
'9 '
interests of the "general public'', because obviously ] yo ti Pershad
the interests of such a vast number of the population
v.
in the country, their health, well-being and morals Administrator for
would, apart even from themselves, necessarily im- The Union Tmipinge upon and influence, for good or evil, the health, tory of Delhi
safety, well-being and morality of the rest of the com- Ayyangar ].
munity as well. The only question that is capable of
argument is whether the restriction is reasonable. A
considerable part of learned Counsel's argument on
the reasonableness of the restriction was devoted to
showing that the vesting of an unfettered or unguided
power in the competent authority to permit or not to
permit eviction rendered the restriction unreasonable.
This, as would be seen, is really a different form of
presenting the case of the objection under Art. 14, and
what we have said in dealing with the first point of
the learned Counsel would answer this portion of the
objection.
There are, however, a few more matters which have
relevance about the objection on the score of the
restriction not being reasonable within Art. 19(5) and
the tests to be applied to determining its reasonableness to which we ehould refer. It has already been
pointed out that the restrictions imposed on the right
of the landlord to evict have a reasonable and rational
connection with the object sought to be achieved by
tho Act, viz., the ultimate elimination of slums with
protection to the slum-dwellers from being meanwhile
thrown out on the streets. The question might still
remain whether this restriction on the rights of the
landlords is excessive in the sense that it invades and
trenches on their rights in a manner or to an extent
not really or strictly necessary to afford protection to
the reasonable needs of the slum-dwellers which it is
the aim and object of the legislation to subserve. The
criteria for determining the degree of restriction on
the right to hold property which would be considered
reasonable, are by no means fixed or st,atic, but must
obviously vary from age to age and be related to the
adjustments necessary to solve the problems which
communities face from time to time. The tests, therefore, evolved by communities living in sheltered or
148
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1962]
pla.cid timeR, or la.id down in decisions a.pplic&ble oo
them ca.n hardly serve a.s a. guide for the solution of
Jyoti Pmhod
v.
the problems of post-pa.rtition India. with its stresses
Admi•istrotor for an~ strains a.rising out of movements of popula.tions
H• U•io• Tmi- which have had few parallels in history. If la.w failed to
tory •J Dtlli ta.ke a.ccount of unusual situa.tions of pressing urgency
a.rising in the country, and of the social urges genera.Ayy•"&"' J. ted by the patterns of thought-evolution and of social
consciousness which we witness in the second ha.If of
this century, it would have to be written down as
having failed in the very purpose of its existence.
Where the legislature fulfils its purpose and enacts
laws, which in ita wisdom, is considered necessa.ry for
the solution of what after all is a very human problem
the tests of "reasonableness" have to be viewed in the
context of the issues which faced the legislature. In
the construction of such la.ws and particula.rly in
judging of their validity the Courts have necessarily
to approach it from the point of view of furthering
the social interest which it is the purpose of the legislation to promote, for the Courts a.re not, in these
ma.tt-0rs, functioning as it were in va.cuo, but as pa.rts
of a society which is trying, by ena.cted law, to solve
its problems and a.chieve social concord and peaceful
adjustment and thus furthering the moral and material progress of the community as a whole.
Judged in the light of the above, we consider that
the restrictions imposed cannot be said to be unreasonable. As we have already pointed out, the ban
imposed on evictions is temporary, though learned
Counsel is right in saying that its dura.tion is not
definite. In the very nature of things the period when
slums would have ceased to exist or restrictions placed
upon owners of property could be completely lifted
must, obviously, be indefinite and therefore the indefiniteness ca.nnot be a ground for invalidity-a. ground
upon which the reMtriction could be held to be unrea.sonable. Again, there is an appeal provided
from the orders of .the competent authority to the
Chief Administrator. If lea.med Counsel is right in
his submission that the power of the "competent
authority" is unguided and that he had an unfettered
r96r
2 s.c.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
149
and arbitrary authority to exercise his discretion "at
r96r
his sweet-will and pleasure" the existence of a provi. P k04
sion for appeals might not impart validity to such Jyot• v."'
legislation. The rea;son for this is th~t the appellate Administrator for
power would be subiect to the same vroe as the powAr The Union Tmiof the original authority and the imposition of one tory of Delhi
"sweet-will and pleasure" over another of a lower
authority, would not prevent discrimination or render Ayyongar f.
the restriction reasonable. But if, as we have held
earlier, the Act by its preamble and by its provisions
does afford a guidance to the "competent authority" by
pointing out the manner in which the discretion vested in him should be exercised, the provision as to an
appeal assumes a different significance. In such cases,
if the "competent authority" oversteps the limits of
his powers or ignores the policy behind the Act and
acts contrary to its declared intention, the appellate
authority could be invoked to step in and correct the
error. It would, therefore, be a provision for doubly
safeguarding that the policy of the Act is carried out
and not ignored in each and every case that comes up
before "the competent authority". The procedure
laid down by the Act for the hearing by the "competent authority" and the provisions for enquiry, renders the "competent authority" a quasi- judicial functionary bound to follow fixed rules of procedure and
its orders passed after such an enquiry are to be subject to appeals to the Administrator. We consider
these safeguards very relevant for judging about the
reasonableness of the restriction. In considering these
matters one has to take into account the fact-a fact
of which judicial notice has to be taken-that there
has been an unprecedented influx of population into
the capital, and in such a short interval, that there
has not been time for natural processes of expansion
of the city to adjust itself to the increased needs.
Remedies which in normal times might be considered
an unreasonable restriction on the right to hold property would not bear that aspect or be so considered
when viewed in a situation of emergency brought
about by exceptional and unprecedented circumstances. Just as pulling down a building to prevent the
•
150
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1962]
spread of flames would be reasonable in the event of
a fire, the reasonableness of the restrictions imposed
1yo I v,"'
by the impugned legislation has to be judged in the
Ad,..i•islralor for light of actual facts and not on a priori reasoning
Th Uoio• Tmi· based on the dicta in decisions rendered in situations
tory of Delhi bearing not even the remotest resemblance to that
which presented itself to Pri.riiament when the legislaAyyan1ar ].
tion now impugned was enacted.
Before concluding it is necessary to advert to a few
points which were also urged by learned Counsel for
tho petitioner. First it was said that the impugned s.19
of tho Act imposed a double restriction, a restriction
super.imposed on a restriction already existing by
virtue of the provisions of the llent Control Act, and
that this rendered it unroasonablo. If by this submission learned Counsel meant that different results as to
constitutional validity flowed from whether the impugned section was part of the provisions of the Rent
Control Act, or was a section in an independent
enactment, the argument is clearly untenable. If,
however, that was not meant, but that in tho context
of the restrictions already irnpnsed by the !tent Control Act s. 19 of the Act was really unnecessary
and therefore an unreasonable restraint on the freedom of the landlord, what. we have said earlier ought
to suffice to repel the argument.
Learned Counsel next drew our attention to s. 38 of
the Rent Control Act which reads:
"The provisions of this Act and of the rules
made thereunder shall have effect notwithstanding
anything inconsistent therewith contained in any
other law for the time being in force or in any instrument ha1·ing effect hy virtue of any such law."
If this section stood alone, the argument of learned
Counsel th:tt by re<>son of the width a.nd sweep of its
language, even a. special legislation, such as the Act
was comprehended within the non obsta.nto provi8ion
would have required serious consideration, but tha.t
has been rendered unnecessary, beca.uso even a.part
from s. 19 of the Act which opens with the words:
"Notwithstanding anything contained in any other
law for the time being in force", s. 39 of.the Act also
1
961
,. P hod
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
151
contains a non obstante clause on the same lines as
I96I
s. 38 of the Rent Control Act. The result therefore
would be that the provisions of the special enactment, Jyoti Pershad
as the Act is, will in respect of the buildings in areas Adminis;;ator fo•
declared slum areas operate in addition to the Rent n, Union Terri·
Control Act. The argument therefore that the Act is '°'Y of Delhi
inapplicable to buildings covered by the Rent Control
Act is without substance, particularly when it is seen Ayyangar J.
that it is only when a decree for eviction is obtained
thats. 19 of the Act comes into play.
We therefore consider that none of the points urged
in support of the petition has any substance. The
petitions fail and are dismissed. In the circumstances of the case there will be no order as to costs.
Petitions dismissed.
GORKHA RAM AND OTHERS
v.
THE CUSTODIAN GENERAL OF
INDIA, DELHI
(K. SUBBA RAO, RAGHUBAR DAYAL and
J. R. MUDHOLKAR, JJ.)
Evacuee Property-Moslem non-proprietor migrating to Pakistan-Village dwelling house, if vests in Custodian-· Administration
of Evacuee Property Act, r950 (]I of r950), s. I8(r)-V illage
wajib-u!-arz.
The wajib-ul-arz of village Buland, teshil and district
Rohtak, provided as follows:"No non-proprietor can settle in the village or build a
house without the consent of the owner of the estate. Whenever anybody settles, he obtains land or house from the proprietor of the same and he can live there so long as he pleases.
Whenever he abandons the village, if the house belongs to the
Shamlat of.. .......... lt falls into the possession of the proprietor ......... About the houses of non-proprietors ......... tbere is no
customary righ_t to ~ell or mortgage residential houses, remove
the material or build burnt brick house without the consent of
the proprietor ......... If any person dies heir less his house reverts
April 2z.
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