THE COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, BOMBAY versus THE SCINDIA STEAM NAVIGATION CO. LTD.
Supreme Court of India | Decided 6 April 1961 | [1962] 1 S.C.R. 788 | 1961 INSC 139
Key facts
- Decided
- 6 April 1961
- Bench
- T.L. VENKATARAMA AIYYAR*, S.K. DAS, J.L. KAPUR, M. HIDAYATULLAH, J.C. SHAH
- Bench size
- 5
- Case number
- CIVIL APPEAL No. 501/1957
- Disposal
- Dismissed
- Citation
- [1962] 1 S.C.R. 788
- Neutral citation
- 1961 INSC 139
Text of the judgment
788
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1962]
The question is whether it could possibly fall with'1n
Subba,.;;;;;;; Naidu ~he second. pa~t of ?I. (c}, that is, whe.ther the award
v.
rs "otherwise mvahd". In order to brmg the objection
Siddamma Naidu within this clause learned counsel contended that the
award was bad on its face. It is difficult for us to
Mudholkar J. appreciate how the award could be said to be bad on
its face. When a dispute is referred to arbitration,
the arbitrator has to decide it to the best of his judgment, of course acting honestly. Here, in his judgment the arbitrator has allotted to t,he appellant
certain lands the total area of which is less than half
that of the entire land in suit. The appellant's contention is that he is entitled to half the entire land.
This contention was before the arbitrator. In spite of
that he has made the award in the terms in which he
has made it. There appears to be no suggestion that
the arbitrator acted dishonestly. How can it then be
said that this award is on its face bad?
Agreeing with the High Court we dismiss this
appeal with costs to the contesting respondent.
z96z
•
Appeal dismissed.
I
THE COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX,
BOMBAY
v.
THE SCINDIA STEAM NAVIGATION CO. LTD.
(S. K. DAS, J. L. KAPUR, M. HIDAYATULLAH,
J.C. SHAH and T. L. VENKATARAMA ArYAR, JJ.)
Income-tax-Reference-Scope-"Any question of law arising
out of such order", Meaning of-Indian Income Tax Act, I922 (II
of I922), as amended by Income-tax (Amendment) Act, I946 (VIII
of I946), ss. 66, rn(2)(vii) proviso.
Bys. 66 (1) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922 "the assessee
or the Commissioner may, by application in the prescribed form
...... require the Appellate Tribunal to refer to the High Court
any question of law arising out of such order and the Appellate
Tribunal shal] ... draw up a statement of the case and refer it to
'
•
I S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
...
I
)
789
r96r
the High Court." The respondents, who received compensation
from the Government as owners of a requisitioned steamship
lost in enemy action, were assessed to tax under the fourth pro- Conunissioner of
I ncoine-tax,
viso to s. ro(2)(vii) of the Indian Income-tax Act, which was
Bombay
inserted into the Act by the Income-tax (Amendment) Act, 1946
v.
(VIII of 1946) that came into force on May 4, r946. Before the
Tax Authorities the respondents sought to resist the liability on Scindia Steam
Navigation
the ground that the income was received not in the year of
Co. Ltd.
account but in the previous year but failed. No question as to
the applicability of the said proviso was either raised before the.
Tribunal or dealt with by it. The question that was referred
to the High Court was as follows:"\Vhether the sum of Rs. 9,26,532 was properly included
in the assessee company's total income computed for the assessment year 1946-47."
In the High Court the respondents contended that the said
proviso had no application. The appellant took a preliminary
objection to this contention being raised on the ground that it
was not raised and argued before the Tribunal but the High
Court overruled the objection and held that the compensation
amount was not liable to charge as the proviso in question was
not in force on the material date. Against this decision the
Commissioner of Income-tax appealed.
The point for determination in the appeal was whether the
High Court in answering a reference under s. 66 could decide a
question not raised or argued before the Tribunal.
Held (per Das, Kapur, Hidayatul!ah and Venkatarama
Aiyar, JJ.), that the jurisdiction of the High Court under s. 66
of the Indian Income-tax Act is purely advisory and therefore
different from its ordinary jurisdiction as a Civil Court. It is of
the essence of such a jurisdiction that the High Court can decide
only such questio:is as are referred to it and that implies that the
questions must necessarily be those that the Tribunal had occasion to consider.
The words "any question of law arising out of such order"
ins. 66(1) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, do not in the context mean any question of law arising out of the findings in
the order of the Tribunal but only such questions as were raised
before, or decided by the Tribunal.
The Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, is not in pari materia with
the British Statute and in view of the difference betweens. 66(1)
and the corresponding provisions of the British Statute no useful
purpose can be served by referring to English decisions for
interpreting s. 66 of the Indian Act.
Commissioner of Income-tax v. Shaw Wallace & Co., (1932)
L.R. 59 I.A. 206, referred to.
Attorney-General v. Avelino Armarn & Co., [r925) r K.B. 86,
considered.
•
790
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1962]
The power the High Court has under s. 66(2) of the Act to
dire.ct a reference can n:a~e n_o difference since such power is
. Contmissioner of sub1ect to the same 111mtat10ns as that of the Tribunal under
I11come·tax,
s. 66( l) of the Act.
Bombay
v.
Scindia Stea1n
Navigation
Co. Ltd.
Commissioner of Income-tax, Madras v. Mtt. Ar. 5. Ar.
Arunachalam Chettiar, [ 1953] S.C.R. 463, New Jehangir Vakil
Mills Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income-tax, [1960] l S.C.R. 249,
K11sumben D. Mahadevia v. Commissioner of Income-tax, [1960]
S.C.R. 417 and Zoraster & Co. v. Commissioner of Income-tax,
'[1961] l S.C.R. 210, referred to.
Madan/al Dharnidharka v. Commissioner of Income-tax, [1948]
16 I.T.R. 227, disapproved.
'
Case-law reviewed.
The jurisdiction of the High Court in deciding a reference
under s. 66(5) is co-extensive with the right of the litigant to
ask for a reference and the power of the court to make one.
Therefore the High Court has jurisdiction in a reference to
decide questions of law arising out of the order of the Tribunal,
that is question of law raised and decided by the Tribunal, or
question of law raised before the Tribunal but not decided by
it or question of law decided by Tribunal, though not raised
before it, but not questions not raised or decided by the Tribunal even though it may arise from its findings.
A question of law may have more than one aspect and
s. 66(1) of the Act does not contemplate that each aspect of a
question is by itself a distinct question. It only requires that
the question of law which is referred to the Court must have
been in issue before the Tribunal. It does not further require
that the reference should be limited to those aspects ot the
question which had been argued before the Tribunal.
The Commissioner of Income-tax, Bombay South v. M/s. Ogale
Glass Works Ltd. [1955] l S.C.R. 185 and Zoraster & Co. v. Commissioner of Income-tax, [1961] l S.C.R. 210, approved.
In the instant case, the question referred to the High Court
was wide enough to cover the contention raised by the respondent and the High Court was right in holding that the fourth
proviso to s. 10(2)(vii) of the Act, not being retrospective in
operation, had no application.
Per Shah, ].-Section 66 of the Indian Income-tax Act
does not contemplate that the question which the Tribunal may
refer, or which the High Court may call upon the Tribunal to
refer, must be one that is raised and argued before the Tribunal
at the hearing under s. 33(4) of the Act. The section does not
specifically impose such a restriction nor is it implied. To
import into the expression "any question of law arising out of
such order" any limitation that the question must either have
been argued before the Tribunal or dealt with by it, would be
not only to impose fetters upon the jurisdiction of the High
....
I S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
I
I96I
Court which were plainly not intended by the statute and in
certain cases might involve gross injustice to the parties.
Commissioner of ·
Madan/al Dharnidharka v. Commissioner of Income-tax, [1948]
Income· tax,
16 I.T.R. 227, approved.
Bombay
Under s. 66(5) of the Act, the court has to record its opinion
v.
on the questions arising out of the order of the Tribunal and Scindia Steam
not on the arguments advanced before it. In the instant case
Navigation
the High Court, on the question arising out of the order of the
Co. Ltd.
Tribunal and referred to it, had jurisdiction to decide that the
proviso which made the amount taxable was not in operation
at the material date.
I
•
I
•
791
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No.
501of1957.
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and
order dated September 13, 1954, of the Bombay High
Court in Income-tax Reference No. 13 of 1954.
K. N. Rajagopala Sastri and D. Gupta, for the appellant.
A. V. Viswanatha Sastri and P. L. Vohra, for the
respondent.
1961. April 6. The Judgment of S. K. Das, J. L.
Kapur, M. Hidayatullah and T. L. Venkatarama
Aiyar, JJ. was delivered by Venkatarama Aiyar, J.
J.C. Shah, J. delivered a separate Judgment.•
VENKATARAMA AIYAR, J.-The respondents were
the owners of a steamship called "El Madina''. That
was requisitioned by the Government during the last
world war, and was lost by enemy action on March
16, 1944. As compensation therefor, the Government
paid the respondents Rs. 20,00,000 on July 17, 1944;
Rs. 23,00,000 on December 22, 1944; and Rs. 33,333
on August 10, 1946. The original cost of the ship was
Rs. 24,95,016 and its written-down value at the commencement of the year of account was Rs. 15,68,484.
The difference between the cost price and the written.
down value viz., Rs. 9,26,532 represents the deductions which had been allowed year after year on
account of depreciation. As the total compensation
received exceeded the cost price, the respondents have
recouped themselves all the amounts deducted for
depreciation.
Venkatarama
Aiyar, J.
;
792
.,
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
I
I
[1962]
On these facts, the point in controversy between the
respondAnts
and the Department is whether the
· C ommtrnon"
· l"1a bl e to b e me
· 1u d ed m
. the
Income-tax, of amount o f R-s. 9,26
. ,5 32· IS
Bombay
total income of the company for tho year of assessv.
ment which is 1946-47. The provision of law under
Scindia Steam which the charge is sought to be imposed is s. 10(2)(vii)
Navigation
of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, hereinafter refer.
Co. Ltd.
red to as the Act, and that is, omitting what is not
Venkatarama
relevant, as fo!lows:Aiyar J.
"(2) Such profits or gains shall be computed after
making the following allowances, namely:I96I
-:--:-
'
\
•
(vii) in respect of any such building, machinery
or plant which has been sold or discarded or demolished or destroyed, the amount by which the writtendown value thereof exceeds the amount for which
the building, machinery or plant, as the case may
be, is actually sold or its scrap value:
•
··································································
•
Provided further that where any insurance, salvage or compensation moneys are reeeived in respect of any such building, machinery or plant as
aforesaid, and the amount of such moneys exceeds
the difference between the written down value and
the scrap value no amount shall be allowable under
this clause and so much of the excess as d..es not
exceed the difference between the original cost and
tho written-down value less the scra.p value shall be
deemed to be profits of the previous year in which
such moneys were received:".
It is not disputed by the respondents that the sum
of Rs. 9,26,532 would be profits liable to be taxed
under this proviso, if it applies. Equally it is not disputed by the appellant that apart from this proviso
the amount in question could only be regarded as
capital receipt, not liable to be taxed. Before the
income-tax authorities, the respondents sought to
avoid the application of this proviso on the ground
that on representations made by them with reference
to this very matter, the Board of Revenue had directed that for the purpose of Rule 4, Schedule II, of the
Excess Profits Tax Act, 1940, the amount payable as
t
1 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
'793
:l
compensation (both the initial advance as well
any
r961
further payment that may be made) should be taken
.-.
into account as though it had actually been received c7misszoner
of
0
within thirty days of the date of the loss of the ship;
"~ ,:'b-!~x,
and that in consequence the amount should be deemed
v.
to have been received on April 16, 1944. If that con- Scindia Steam
tention is correct, the amounts would have been Navigation
received not in the year of account which was July 1,
Co. Lid.
1944, to June 30, 1945, but in the year previous there- Venkatarnma
to, and they could not therefore be included in the
Aiyar J.
income of the company for the year of assessment.
This contention, however, was rejected by all the
income-tax authorities. Dealing with it, the Appellate Tribunal observed in its Order dated July 15,
1953, that the concession which the Board of Revenue
had intended to give was limited to excess profits tax,
and could not in any event be relied on for the purpose of cutting down the operafon o'f the statutory
provision enacted in the.relevant,1 ·oviso ins. 10(2)(vii);
· and that the material date was 'when the compensation was in fact received-and that was in the year of
-j
account
and not when it became due and payable, in
,'
the year previous theretO. In the result, the Tribunal
,f /••. held that the amount was liable to be included in the
total income of the company.
The respondent then filed an application before the
'
,'
Tribunal, under s. 66(1) of the Act, reqniring certain
.questions to be referred to the court, and one of them
was as follows:·~Whether in view of the fact that the 4th proviso
to section 10(2)(vii) of the Indian Income-tax Act
did not apply to the assessment for the Assessment
year 1945-46 and under the law in force as applicable to that assessment year the sum of Rs. 9,26,532
which accrued in the previous year relevant to
.
that Asses~ment year was not taxable at all, and
the fact that having regard to the Assessee's method
of accounting the said sum should not be assessed
\)
in any other year, the Assessment in respect of the
said sum in the subsequent Assessment year 1946-47
was valid in law."
I
,,)'~
100
{
1
I
794
i96i
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1962]
'- '
,_
By its order dated February 9, 1954, the Tribunal
f referred the following question for the opinion of the
Commissioner o
.-.
oourt:"Whether the sum of Rs. 9,26,532 was properly
v.
included in the assessee company's total income
Scindia Steam
computed for the assessment year 1946-4 7."
Navigation
Th e re1erence
c
· beiore
,_.
came up f or h earmg
a Bench of
Co. Ltd.
the ·Bombay High Court consisting of Cha.gla, C.J.,
Venkatarama
and Tendolkar, J., and then the respondents raised
Aiyar J.
the contention that the proviso to s. 10(2}(vii) under
which the charge was made could not be taken into
account in making the present assessment, as the
same had been introduced by the Income-tax (Amendment) Act, 1946 (VIII of 1946), which came into force
on May 4, 1946, whereas the liability of the company
to be taxed fell to be determined as on April 1, 1946,
when the Finance Act, 1946, came into force: The
appellant raised a preliminary objection to this question
being raised for the first time before the court, on the
ground that it did not arise out of the Order of the
Tribunal, having been neither raised before it nor
dealt with by it, and that further it had not been
referred to the court. Overruling this objection, the
learned Judges observed that the form in which the
question was framed was sufficiently wide to take in
the new contention, that even if the particular aspect
of the question had not been argued before the. Tribunal, it was implicit in the question as framed, and
that therefore the assessee could raise it. On the
merits they held that as the proviso was not retrospective in its operation, the amount in question was
not liable to be included in the taxable income and
answered the question in the negative. It is against
this decision that the present appeal by special leave
is directed.
The main contention urged before us by the appellant is that it was not open to the High Court in the
present reference to go into the question as to the
applicability of the proviso to s. 10(2)(vii}, as it was
neither raised before the Tribunal nor considered by it,
and could not therefore be said to be a question arising
out of the order of the Tribunal, which alone could be
Income-tax
Bombay '
•I
t
•
•
1 S.C.R.
,
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
795
referred for the decision of the court under s. 66(1).
r96r
The court had no jurisdiction,
it
is
argued,
to
allow
a
c
-.-.
f
,
•
.
ommissioner o
question to be raised before it, whwh could not be Income-tax.
referred to it under the section. The contention of the
Bombay
respondents is that all questions of law which arise on
v.
the findings given by the Tribunal in its order can Scindia Steam
properly be said to arise out of its order, and that in Navigation
making a reference under s. 66(1), the Tribunal is not
Co. Ltd.
limited to those questions only which were raised venkatarama
before it and dealt with in its order, nor even to those
Aiyar J.
questions which were raised in the application for
reference under s. 66(1). It is further contended that
in the present case, the question as framed and referred was wide enough to take in the contention as to
the applicability of the proviso and that the High
Court was in consequence within its power in enter.
taining it and deciding the reference on it.
We may now refer to the provisions of law bearing
on tho question. Section 66(1) of the Act confers on the
assessee and the Commissioner a right to apply to the
Tribunal in the prescribed form to refer any question
of law arising out of its order for the decision of the
High Court. If the Tribunal is satisfied that a question of law arises, then.it has to draw up a statement
of the case and refer it to the decision of the High
Court. But ifit considers that no question oflaw arises
on its order, and dismisses the application under
s. 66(1), then the assessee or the Commissioner, as the
case may be, has a right to move the court under
s. 66(2), and if the court is not satisfied about the
correctness of the decision of the Tribunal, it can
require it to state the case and refer it to its decision.
Under s. 66(4) the High Court can, for the purpose of
disposing of the reference which comes to it under
,..
s. 66(1) and (2), call for additional statement from the •
Tribunal. Under s. 66(5) the High Court is to decide
the question of law raised in the case and send a copy
of its judgment to the Tribunal and the latter is to
pass appropriate orders for giving effect to it.
Section 59 of the Act confers on the Central Board
of Revenue power to make rules for carrying out the
purpose of the Act and under sub-section (5), the rules
796
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1962]
made thereunder shall on publication in the official
gazette
have effect as if, enacted
under. the Act. Rule
C on1nnssioner o/
.
Income-tax,
22A framed under this sect10n provides that: "An
Bombay.
application under sub-section (1) of section 66 requiring
v.
the Tribunal to refer to the High Court any question
Scind_ia Steam of law shall be in the following form."
The form is
Navigation
R(T) of which paragraphs 3 to 5 are relevant for the
Co. Ltd.
present discussion, and they are as follows:Venkatarama
"3. that the facts which are admitted and/or
Aiyar J.
found by the Tribunal and which are necessary for
drawing up a statement of the case, are stated in
the enclosure for ready reference.
4. that the following questions of law arise out
of the order of the Tribunal:i96 1
~-:-
(1 ).............................................................. .
(2) ....•........................... . : .... ........................ .
(3) ........... ····· .....•.........................................
5. that the applicant, therefore, requires under
sub-section (1) of section 66 of the aforesaid Act
that a statement of the case be drawn up and the
questions of law numbered .................... out of the
questions of law referred to in paragraph 4 above
be referred to the High Court."
On these provisions, the question that arises for
decision is whether in a reference under s. 66, the High
Court can consider a question which had not been
raised before the Tribunal and/or dealt with by it in
its order even though it be one of law. On the answer
to be given to it there has been a difference of opinion _
among the High Courts and that turns on the meaning
to be given to the words, "any question of law arising
out of" the order of the Tribunal. There is no pronouncement of this Court which concludes this question, though there are decisions which afford guidance
in the determination thereof. These decisions will now
be considered.
'
In Commissioner of Income-tax, Madras v. Mtt. Ar.
S. Ar. Arunachalam Chettiar (1 ), an order of assessment
made by the income-tax officer was corrected by the
Appellate Tribunal not in an appeal under s. 33(4) but
in a miscellaneous application presented to it under
(1) [1953] S.C.R. 463, 471,
•
1 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
797
96
s. 35. The Commissioner being dissatisfied with the
r '
order applied for a ~e~erence under s. ~6(1). ~he Com;,,;:-;:.,, of
Tribunal was of the opm10n that the order m quest10n Income-tax,
could be made in the exercise of its inherent jurisdicBombay
tion and referred the question of its legality to the
v.
court under s. 66(1). The Madras High Court declined Scindia Steam
Navigation·
to answer it on the groun d that as t he ord er was no t
Co. Ltd.
one passed in an appeal, the reference under s. 66(1)
was incompetent, as under that provision the power of VenkatMama
the Tribunal to refer was limited to questions of law
Aiyar J.
arising out of an order passed in an appeal. In affirming this decision, this Court observed:
"The jurisdiction of the Tribunal and of the High
Court is conditional on there being an order by the
Appellate Tribunal which may be said to be one
under section 33(4) and a question of law arising
out of such an order."
This is an authority for the position that the jurisdiction of the Tribunal to make, and of the High Court
to hear, a reference must be strictly sought within the
four corners of s. 66.
In The Commissioner of Income-tax, Bombay South
v. Messrs. Ogale Glass Works Ltd.('), the question
referred by the Tribunal under s. 66(1) was whether
certain amounts received by the assessee from the
Government by cheques drawn on the Reserve Bank
at Bombay were income received in British India
withins. 4(l)(a) of tho Act. The High Court had hold
that as the cheques were received in the State of
Aundh, in unconditional discharge of the claim, the
receipt was not in British India. On appeal to this
Court, it was contended that as the cheques were
posted in British India, tho income must be held tu
have been received in British India. An objection was
put forward to this cont,ention being raised, on the
ground that it was not argued before the Tribunal or
decided by it and that therefore it did not arise out of
its order as required bys. 66(1). But this Court hold
that as the question as framed and referred was of
sufficient amplitude to cover the new point urged, and
as no contention was raised that the question had not
(1) [1955] I S.C.R, 185, 197.
798
'96'
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1962]
been properly referred -under s. 66(1), it could be deci-
-.-. ' o ded under s. 66(5), and that in• that view, it was not
commissioner
/ necessary "to express any opimon on the larger quesIncome-tax
Bombay '
v.
Scindia Steam
Navigation
Co. Ltd.
Venkatarama
Aiya' J.
tion as to the scope, meaning and import of the words
'any question of law arising out of' the Tribunal's
order on "the interpretation of which there exists a
wide divergence of judicial opinion". There was accordingly no decision on the point now under consideration.
In New Jehangir Vakil Mills Ltd. v. Commissioner
of Income-tax (1 ) the point under discussion was whether the High Court was competent under s. 66(4) to
call for additional statement with reference to a
question which had not been referred to it under
s. 66(1) ors. 66(2). This Court held that the scope of a
reference under s. 66(2) was coextensive with that of
one under s. 66(1) of the Act, that therefore the court
had no power under s. 66(2) to travel beyond the
ambit of s. 66(1), that under both these provisions it is
only a question of law arising out of the order that
could be referred, that the object of s. 66(4) was to
enable the court to obtain additional statements only
for the purpose of deciding questions referred under
s. 66(1) and (2) and that accordingly no investigation
could be ordered in respect of new questions which
were not and could not be the subject-matter of a
reference under s. 66( 1) and (2). Here again there was
no decision on the meaning of the words, "any question of law arising out of" the order of the Tribunal.
In Kusumben D. Mahadevia v. Commissioner of Income-tax('}, the question actually referred under
s. 66(1) to the court was whether a sum of Rs. 4 7,120
received by the assessee had accrued to her in the
former State of Baroda or whether it had accrued or
should be deemed to have accrued to her in British
India. On this reference the High Court re-settled
the question so as to raise the contention as to whether the assessee was entitled to any concession under
the Merged States (Taxation Concessions) Order, 1949,
as regards the income of R,s. 47,120, and holding that
she was not, answered the reference against her
(2) [1960] 3 S.C.R. 417, 422.
(1) [1960] I s.c.R. 249.
.'
I
I
1 S.C.tt. SUPREME COUR'r REPORTS
799
6
without deciding the question as to where the income
'9 '
accrued. Against this J udgmeut, the assessee appeal- Commissioner of
ed to this Court and contended that the High Court Income-tax,
was in error in not deciding the question which was
Bombay
actually referred. This Court accepted this contenv.
tention and remanded the case to the High. Court for Scindia Steam
]\T avigation
hearing on t h at point. So f ar t h is d ecision d oes not
Co. Ltd.
bear on the present controversy. But a further point
was discussed and considered by this Court, and that Venkatarama
was that it was not open to the court to raise the
Aiyar J.
question about the applicability of the Merged States
(Taxation Concessions) Order, 1949, as that was not a
question which was raised before or considered by the
Tribunal or referred under s. 66(1). In agreeing with
this contention, this Court observed:"Section 66 of the Income-tax Act which confers
jurisdiction upon the High Court only permits a
reference of a question of law arising out of the
order of the Tribunal. It does not confer jurisdiction on the High Court to decide a different ques. tion of law not arising out of such order. It is
possible that the same question of law may involve
different approaches for its solution, and the High
Conrt may amplify the question to take in all the
approaches. But the question must' still be one
which was before the Tribunal and was decided by
it."
These observations bear on the question now under
consideration but the actual decision was one remanding the case with a direction to the High Court to
decide the question that was referred to it.
In Zoraster & Co. v. Commissioner of Income-tax (1 ),
the assessees were manufacturers of certain kinds of
goods in Jaipur. The Government of India purchased
these articles and paid the price by cheques on the
Bombay branch of the Reserve Bank of India. The
Tribunal held that the profits of these sales had been
received in British India, but on the application of the
assessees referred that question to the court. The
High Court remanded the case to the Tribunal under
s. 66(4) for a supplemental statement observing that
(I) [1961) I S.C.R. ZIO,
I
BOO
r96r
SUP:RF;M:E COURT :REPORTS
[1962]
"it would be necessary for the Appellate Tribunal to
f find, inter alia, whether the cheques were sent to the
C ommtssioner o
b
.
Income-ta.r,
a_ssess~e firm y post or by han? and what d1rec-.-.
twns, 1f any, had the assessee firm given to the Department in the matter." The correctness of this order was
Scindia Steam challenged by the assessee on the ground that the
Navigation
court had no power to call for a fresh statement for
Co. Ltd.
the investigation of a new point and reliance was
Venkatarama
pfaced on the decision in New Jehangir Vakil Mills
Aiyar J.
Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income-tax (' ). This Court
held, following that decision, that the jurisdiction to
call for supplemental statement was confined (a) to the
facts on record and/or found by the Tribunal, and (b)
to the question which would arise from the Tribunal's
order; and that further it could be exercised with
· reference to a new question, if it was an integral or
even incidental part of the question which had been
referred. This decision also proceeds on the view that
a question which is unconnected with the question
already referred cannot be agitated for the first time
in the reference~
There being thus no direct decision of this Court on
the precise meaning of the words "any question of law
arising out of" the order of the Tribunal, we must
examine the decision of the High Courts on the question, and as already stated they are in a state of
conflict.
In A. Abbay Chetty and Co. v. Commissioner of
Income-tax, Madras (2 ), the application of the assessee
under s. 66(1) required the Tribunal to refer a question
of res judicata to the court. '!.'he Tribunal declined to
do so on the ground that that question had not been
argued before it. The assessee then moved the court
under s. 66(2) for an order requiring the Tribunal to
refer that question. Dismissing that application, Patanjali Sastri, J ., as he then was, observed as follows:"Mr. Radhakrishnayya for the petitioner contends
that a question, though not raised before the Appellate Tribunal, can well be said to 'arise out of its
order', if, on the facts of the case appearing from
the order, the question fairly arises. I am unable
1
Bombay
I
v.
(•) [1960), s.c.R. 249.
(2) [1947] 15 l.T.R. 442, 444·
i
."
'
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,
.
)
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1 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
801
to agree with that view. 1 am of opinion that a·
z96z
question of law can be said to arise out of an order c
:---:'b
l l 'f
h d ·d' l
ommissioner of
0 f t h e Appel1ate Trr una on y I sue or er IS~ OSIncome-tax,
es that the question was raised before the TnbuBombay
nal."
v.
Adverting to the contention that the Privy Coun. Scindia Steam
oil had in M. E. Moala Sons Limited v. Burjorjee (1 ) Navigation
allowed a question of law arising on the facts found,
Co. Ltd.
j
to' be raised for the first time before it, the learned Venkatarama
Judge observed: "The case furnishes no useful analogy
Aiyar J.
as the scope of the remedy under s. 66 of the Indian
Income-tax Act has to be determined with reference
to the language of the statute". This decision was
. followed by the Madras High Court in Commissioner of
Income-tax v. Modern Theatres Ltd.,(') and in The
Trustees, Nagore Durgah v. Commissioner of Incometax (').
In G,. M. Chenna Basappa v. Commissioner of Income-tax('), the Andhra High Court followed the decision in A. Abboy Chetty and Co. v. Commissioner of
Income-tax, Madras (5 ) and observed that a question
not raised before the Tribunal "cannot be said to
arise out of its order even if it could be sustained on
the facts in the statement of the case by the Tribunal'', and that further the order of the Tribunal
should disclose that the point of law was raised before
' it. The same view was adopted by the Patna High
Court in Maharaj Kumar Kamal Singh v. Commissioner of Income-tax (6 ). There, discussing the question with reference to the language of s. 66(1) and (2)
and Rule 22A, the court observed as follows:"The provisions of Section 66(1) and Section 66(2)
do not confer upon the High Court a general jurisdiction to correct or to decide a question of law that
may possibly arise out of the income-tax assessment. The section, on the contrary, confers a
special and limited jurisdiction upon the High
Court to decide any specific question of law which
(r) [1932] I.L.R. IO Rang. 242.
(3) [1954] 26 I.T.R. 805.
(5) [1947] 15 I.T.R. 442. 4H·
IOI
(2) [1951] 20 I.T.R. 588.
(4) [1958] 34 I.T.R. 576.
(6) [1954] 26 I.T.R. 79, 86.
802
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1962]
has beeri raised between the assessee and the
Department before the Income-tax Tribunal and
Com1nissioner of
upon
which question the parties are at issue."
Inco1ne·tax,
Bombay
It was accordingly held that only a question of law
v.
which had been actually raised before the Tribunal or
Scindia Steam actually dealt with by it could be referred under
Navigation
s. 66(1).
Co. Ltd.
This is also the view consistently held by the Calcutta High Court. In Commissioner of Excess Profits
Venkatara»ia
Aiyar ].
Tax v. Jeewanlal Ltd. (1), it was held, agreeing with
the decision in A. Abbay Chetty and Co. v. Commissioner of Income-tax, .Madras (2 ), that a question of
law not raised before the Tribunal could not be said
to arise out of its order even if on the facts of the
case appearing from the order the question fairly
arises. In C.hainrup Sampatram v. Commissioner of
Income-tax (3 ), the assessee had applied under s. 66(1)
of the Act to refer the question whether a ~um of
Rs. 2,20,887 was on a true construction of s. 14(2)(c)
of the Act assessable to tax. The Tribunal dismissed
the application on the ground that the question
sought to be raised had not been mentioned at the
hearing of the appeal and had not been dealt with by
the Tribunal and was therefore not one which arose
out of its order. The question having been brought up
before the court under s. 66(2), Chakravartti, J. held
that under s. 66(1) it was only a question that arose
out of the Tribunal's order that could be referred, and
that that must be ·some question which was actually
raised before the Tribunal and dealt with by it; and
that under s. 66(2) the words, "no question of law
arises" could only mean that the question of which-reference had been asked for by the applicant did not
arise, and that the High Court could not require the
Tribunal to refer some question which was not proposed before it. The learned Judge then went on to
observe:
"The Indian Income-tax Act has not charged the
High Court with the duty of setting right in all respects all assessments that might come to its notice;
its jurisdiction is not either appellate or revisional;
(1) [1951] 20 LT.R. 39.
(2) [1947] r5 I.T.R. 443, 444•
(3) [r95r] 20 LT.R. 484, 495-
.'
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1 S.C.R.
II
"
,
••
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
803
nor has it a general power of superintendence under
Section 66. Its sole duty is to serve as the appoint- Comtnissioner of
ed machinery for resolving any conflict which may Income.tax,
arise between an assessee or the Commissioner on
Bombay
V,
the one hand and the Tribunal on the other regarding some specific question or questions of law. If, Scindia Steam
on an application under section 66(2), the High iVavigation
Co. Ltd,
Court finds that the question which the applicant
required the Tribunal to refer was not a question Venkatarama
that arose out of the Tribunal's appellate order, it
Aiyar ].
ought, in my view, to refuse to require the Tribunal
to refer any such question."
The same view was taken in Allahabad Bank Ltd. v.
Commissioner of Income-tax (1) and in Oommissione1·
of Income-tax v. State Bank of India (2).
In Mash Trading Go. v. Commissioner of Incometax ('), a Full Bench of the Punjab High Court had
to consider the true character of the jurisdiction under
s. 66. Therein Kapur, J., as he then was, held, on an
examination of the section and on a review of the
authorities that under s. 66(1) it is only questions
which had been raised before and dealt with by the
Tribunal that could be referred to the High Court,
that the power of the High Court under s. 66(2) to
direct a reference is limited to questions which could
be referred under s. 66(1) and which the applicant
required it to refer, that the Tribunal has no power
to raise a question suo motu, and likewise the High
Court cannot raise any question which had not been
referred to it either under s. 66(1) or s. 66(2), but when
once a question is properly raised and referred to the
High Court, the High Court is bound to answer that
question. In this view, it was held that a reference .
to the High Court on a question which was not raised
before or considered by the Tribunal was not competent. Falshaw, J., while generally agreeing with this
view considered that there might be cases in which a
strict adherence to this view might work injustice,
as for example when a point raised before the Tribunal had not been dealt with by it owing ,to mistake or
(1) [r952] ZI LT.R. 169,
(z) [1957] 31 LT.R. 545·
{3) [1956] 30 LT,R. 388,
804
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1962]
inadvertence, or when its jurisdiction itself was questioned. The learned Judge added that in the former
Co~missio;" of case the point might be deemed to have been decided
';;~=:~;" against the assessee iri the order, thereby attracting
v.
s. 66. It should be noted £hat all the Judges agreed
Sci11dia Steam in holding that the reference in question was incomNavigation
petent as the point had not been raised before the
Co. Ltd.
Tribunal.
We must now consider the decisions which have
Venkalarama
·Aiyar ].
taken a somewhat different view. Vadilal Lallubhai
Mehta v. Commissioner of Income-tax(') was a case
under s. 66 of the Act, as it stood prior to the amendment of 1939 and what was held there was that even
though the assessee had not stated in his application
for reference the questions which really arose out of
the order, it was for the Commissioner to formulate
the correct questions and refer them to the court, and
where he had failed to do so, the court could direct
him to do so. This is not a decision on the question
as to whether questions not raised before or decided
by the Commissioner could be held to be questions
arising out of his order.
In New Piecegoods Bazar Co. Ltd. v. Commissioner
of Income-tax ('), the question that was referred
under s. 66(1) was whether taxes paid on urban immovable property by the assessee were an allowable
deduction under s. 9(1)(iv) and s. 9(1)(v) of the
Indian Income-tax Act. An objection was raised before the court that the question as to the application
of s. 9(l)(iv) had not been argued before the Tribunal
and therefore it could not be referred. Repelling this
contention, Kania, J., as he then was, observed that
the specific question had been put forward as a ground
of appeal, and that was "quoted by the Tribunal in
its judgment" but not dealt with by it, and that in the
circumstances the proper order to pass was to refer the
case back to the Tribunal and "invite it to express its
opinion on this aspect of the contention and raise a
proper ques_tion of law on that point also." This
judgment again proceeds on the view that it is only a
question ra~sed before and dealt with by the Tribunal
'96'
(I) [1935] 3 I.T.R. 152.
(2) [1947] 15 I.T.R. 319.
I
.
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l S.C.R.
I
'
.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
805
I96I
tnat could be referred under s. 66(1), and that is clear
from the observations of the learned Judge that the Co111missioner of
decisions of the Privy Council in Commissioner of In- I ncomc-tax,
come-tax v. Kameshwar Singh (1) and National Mutual
Bombay
v.
Life Association v. Commissioner of Income-tax (2 ),
Scindia
Steam
deprecating the practice of raising new questions in
Navigation
the st!tge of argument on the reference in the High
Co. Ltd.
Court did not stand in the way of the case being referred back to the Tribunal.
Venkatarama
In Madanlal Dharnidh~rka v. Commissioner of InAiyar ].
come-tax ('), the Tribunal referred under s. 66(1) the
following question for the decision of the court:"Whether the remittance of Rs. 2,01,000 out of
profits, made by the assessee in the years preceding
the Maru year 1999-2000 as a non-resident, could
be included under section 4(l)(b)(iii) of the Indian
Income-tax Act in his total income of the year of
account in which he was a resident in British
India?"
This question had not been argued before the Tribunal, but the Tribunal itself referred it because it considered that it arose out of its order. The reference
was heard by Chagla, C. J. and Tendolkar, J. Before
them an objection was raised that the Tribunal could
not refer this question under s. 66(1) as the same had
not been raised before it. Chagla, C. J., observed:
"In my opinion it is necessary clearly to re-state
the jurisdiction of this court. This is not a Court
of appeal. This court merely exercises an advisory
jurisdiction. Its judgments are in the nature of
advice given on the questions submitted to it by
the Tribunal. Its advice must be confined to questions referred by the Tribunal to this court and
those questions must be questions of law which
must arise out of the order made by the Tribunal.
Now, looking at the plain language of the section
apart from any authority, I should have stated that
a question of law arose out of the order of the Tri, bunal if such a question was apparent on the order
,itself or it could be raised on the facts found by the
(t)' [t933] I I.T.R. 94.
(2) [1936] 4 I.T.R. 44·
(3) [19-iSJ 16;!.T.R. 227, 233, 234.
806
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1962]
Tribunal and which were stated in the order. ·r
see no reason to confine the jurisdiction of this court
Commissioner of
to such questions of law as have been argued before
Income·tax,
the Tribunal or are dealt with by the Tribunal.
Bombay
v.
The section does not say so and there is no reason
Scindia Steam
why we should construe the expression 'arising out
Navigation
of
such order' in a manner unwarranted by the
Co. Ltd.
ordinary grammatical construction of that expression. This court has no jurisdiction to decide quesVenkatara111a
Aiyar ] .
tions which have not been referred by the Tribunal. If the Tribunal does not refer a question of
law under section 66(1) which arises out of the
order then the only jurisdiction of the court is to
require the Tribunal to refer the same under section 66(2). It is true that the court has jurisdiction to resettle questions of law so as to bring out
the real issue between the parties but it is not open
to the court to raise new questions which have not been
referred to it by. the Tribunal.''
Expressing next his disagreement with the decision
of the Madras High Court in A. Abbay· Chetty and Co.
v. Commissioner of Income-tax, Madras (1), the learned
Judge observed:
"The decision of the Madras High Court would
also result in this extraordinary situation. An
assessee may raise a question and argue it before
the Tribunal, but if the Tribunal thought fit to
ignore that argument and not to refer to that point
of law in its order, then the court would have no
jurisdiction to call upon the Tribunal to refer that
question of law to the High Court. It is true that
the Income-tax Act is a very technical statute, but
I see no reason why when the plain grammatical
construction of the section does not make it necessary to come to that conclusion· it is necessary to do
so and arrive at such an anomalous result."
In Mohanlal Hiral,al v. Commissioner of Incometax (2 ) a Bench of the Nagpur High Court, hearing a
reference under s. 66(1), held that on the statement of
the case by the Tribunal, the question of law .as
framed was not correct. Then observing that in view
z96c
(1) [1947] 15 !.T.R. 442.
(2) [1952] 22 l.T.R. 448, 452-~53.
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1 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
807
I96I
of the decision of the Privy Council in Commissioner
of Income-tax v. Kameshwar Singh (1 ), it could not it- Commissioner of
self resettle it, called for a fresh statement from the Income-tax,
Tribunal •under s. 66(4). Thus far the judgment is on
Bombay
the same lines as New Piecegoods Bazar Go. Ltd. v.
v.
Commissioner of Income-tax(') and an earlier decision Scindia Steam
of the Nagpur High Court in Beohar Singh v. Commis- Navigation1
Co. Lid,
sioner of Income-tax (3 ). When the case came back on
the further statement under s. 66(4), criticising Venkatarama
certain remarks therein, that the court had no power
Aiyar,. ].
to direct the Tribunal to refer a question not argued
before it, the Court observed that they were made
under a misconception, and quoted the observations
of Chagla C.J., in MadanlaJ, Dharnidharka v. Commissioner of Income-tax(') extracted above, with approval. This can hardly be said to be a decision on
the present. point.
It will be seen from the foregoing review of the
decisions that all the High Courts are agreed thats. 66
creates a special jurisdiction, that the power of the
Tribunal to make a reference and the right of the
litigant t.o require it, must be sought within the four
corners of s. 66(1), that the jurisdiction of the High
Court to hear references is limited to questions which
are properly referred to it under s. 66(1), and that
such jurisdiction is purely advisory and extends only
to deciding questions referred to it. The narrow.
ground over which the High Courts differ is as
regards the question whether it is competent to
the Tribunal to refer, or the High Court to decide,
a question of law which was not either raised before
the Tribunal or decided by it, where it arises on the
facts found by it. On this question, two divergent
views have been expressed. One is that the words,
"any question of law arising out of" the order of the
Tribunal signify that the question must have been
raised before the Tribunal and considered by it, and
the other is that all questions of law arising out of
the facts found would be questions of law arising out
of the order of the Tribunal. The latter is the view
(1) [1933] I I.T.R. 94·
(3) [1948] 16 I.T.R. 433.
(2) (1947] 15 I.T.R 319.
(4) [1948] 16 I.T.R. 227, 233. 234.
I
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808
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1962]
taken by the Bombay High Court in Madanlal
1
-.-.
Dharnidharka
C omnnss1oner o/
b v. Commissioner. of Income-tax
. ( ), and
Income-tax
approved y the Nagpur High Court m Mohanlal
Bombay '
Hiralal v. Commissioner of Income-tax('). 'The forv.
mer is the view held by all the other High Courts.
Scindia Steam Now the a.rgument in support of the latter view is
Navigation
that on the plain grammatical construction of s. 66(1),
Co. Ltd.
any question of law that could be raised on the findVenkatarama
ings of fact given by the Tribunal, would be quesAiyar J.
tions that arise ·out of the order, and that, to hold
that they meant that the question must have been
raised before the Tribunal and decided by it, would be
to read into the section words which are not there.
In support of this contention Shri Viswanatha
Sastri, learned Counsel for the respondents, argued
that it was a fundamental principle of jurisprudence
that the duty of the litigants was only to state the
facts and that it was for the court to apply the appropriate law to the facts found, and he relied on the
observations of Atkin, L. J., in Attorney-General v.
Avelino Aramavo & Co.('), that the court was not
limited to particular questions raised by the Commissioners in the form of questions on the case, and that
if the point of law or the erroneous nature of t]\e
determination of the point of law was apparent on
the case as stated and there were no further facts to
be found, the court could give effect to it. He also
maintained that the position under the Indian law
was the same as under the British statute, because
under s. 66( 1) of the Act, the Tribunal has to refer
not only questions of law arising out of its order, but •
also a statement of the case, that under s. 66(2) the
court can likewise require the Tribunal to state the
case and refer it and that under s. 66( 5) the court has
to decide the question of law raised by the case. We
are unable to agree with this contention. Under the
British statute when once a decision is given by the
Commissioners, it is sufficient that the assessee should
express his dissatisfaction with it and ask that the
matter be referred to the decision of the High Court.
'~
(3) [1925] I K.B. 86.
(2) (1952] 22 I.T.R. 448. '
~
~
1 96 1
(1) (1948] 16 I.T.R. 227,
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, 1 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
.,
809
r96I
It is then for the Commissioners to draw up a statement of the case and refer it for the decision of the
court. The British statute does not cast, as does Commission"
of
lnconie-tax,
s. 66(1) of the Act, a duty on the assessee to put in an
Bombay
application stating the questions of law· which he
v.
desires the Commissioners to refer to the court and Sdndia Steam
requiring them to refer the questions which arise out Navigation
of that order. In Commissioner of Income-tax, Madras
Co. Ltd.
v. Mtt. Ar. S. Ar. Arunachalam Chettiar (1), this Court Venkatarama
has decided that the requirements of s. 66( 1) are matters
Aiyar ].
affecting the jurisdiction to make a reference under
that section. The attempt of the respondents to
equate the position under s. 66(1) of the Act with that
under the British statute on the ground that the
Tribunal has to draw up a statement of the case and
refer it, and that the court is to decide questions of
law raised by it, must break down when the real purpose of a statement in a reference is kept in view. A
statement of case is in the nature of a pleading wherein all the facts found are set out. There is nothing in
it which calls for a decision by the court. It is the
/
question of law referred under s. 66(1) that calls for
decision under s. 66(5) and it is that that constitutes
the .<pivotal point on which the jurisdiction of the
court hinges. The statement of the case is material
only as furnishing the facts for the purpose of enabling the court to decide the question referred. It has
been repeatedly laid down by the Privy Council that
the Indian Act is not in pari materia with the BritiR.h
statute and that it will not be safe to construe it in the
light of English decisions, vide Commissioner of Income-tax v. Shaw Wallace & Co.('). In view of the
difference between s. 66(1) and the corresponding provision in the British ~statute, we consider that no
useful purpose will be served by referring to the
English decisions for interpreting s. 66.
·
·But the main contention still remains that the
language of s. 66( 1) is wide enough to admit of questions of law which arise on the facts found by the
Tribunal and that there is no justification for cutting
. (1) [1.953] S.C.R. 463, 471.
10•
(2) (1932) L.R. 59 I.A, 2o6,
SlO
SUPR~M:tt COURT R~PORTS
r9 5r
[1962] ' ' ~-
down its amplitude by importing in effect words into
it .which are not there. There is considerable
force in
Commisstoner o/
•
..c
Incom<-ta•
thrn argument. But then there are certam ieatures,
Bombay '
which distinguish the jurisdiction under s. 66, and
v.
they have to be taken into consideration in ascertainScindia Steam ing the true import of the words, "any question of
Navigation
law arising out of such order." The jurisdiction of a
Co. Ltd.
court in a reference under s. 66 is a special one, diffeVenkatarnma
rent from its ordini..ry jurisdiction as a civil court.
Aiyar J.
The High Court, hearing a reference under that section, does not exercise any appellate or revisional or
supervisory jurisdiction over the Tribunal. It acts
·purely in an advisory capacity, on a reference which
properly comes before it under s. 66(1) and (2). It
gives the Tribunals advice, but ultimately it is for
them to give effect to that advice. It is of the essence
of such a jurisdiction that the court can decide only
questions which are referred to it and not any other
question. That has been decided by this Court in
New Jehangir Vakil Mills Ltd. v. Commissioner of
Income-tax('); Kusumben D. Mahadevia v. Commissioner of Income-tax(') and Zoraster &·Co. v. Commissioner of Income-tax('). If the true scope of the
jurisdiction of the High Court is to give advice when
it is sought by the Tribunal, it stands to reason that
the Tribunal should have had an occasion to consider
the question so that it may decide whether it should
refer it for the decision of the court. How can it be
said that the Tribunal should seek for advice on a
question which it was not called u·pon to consider and
in respect· of which it had no opportunity of deciding
whether the decision of the court should be sought?
It was argued for the respondents, that, in view of
the fact that the court could compel the Tribunal to
refer a question of law under s. 66(2) for its decision,
not much significance could be attached to the advisory character, of its jurisdiction. It is not conceivable, it was said, that any authority should have a
right to ·compel another authority to take its advice.
We see no force in this contention. Section 66(2)
-.-.
(1) [1960] 1 S.C.R. 249.
(2) [1960] 3 S.C.R. 417.
(3) [1961] I S.C.R. 210.
;.
l S.C.R. SUPREME COUR·T REPORTS
811
z96I
confers on the court a power to direct a reference only
where the Tribunal was under a duty to refer ·under Commissioner of
s. 66(1 ), and it is, therefore, subject to the same limita- Income-tax,
tions as s. 66(1). That has been held by this court in
Bombay
New Jehangir Vakil Mills Ltd. v. Commissioner of Sdndi:·Steam
Income-tax(') and in Zoraster & Co. v. Commissioner Navigation
of Income-tax (0 ). Moreover, the power of the court to
co. Ltd.
issue direction to the Tribunal under s. 66(2) is, as has
often been pointed out, in the nature of a mandamus Venkatarama
and it is well settled that no mandamus will be issued
Aiyar J.
unless the applicant had made a distinct demand on
the appropriate authorities for the very reliefs which
he seeks to enforce by mandamus and that had been
refused. Thus, the power of the court to direct a
reference under s. 66(2) is subject to two limitationsthe question must be one which the Tribunal was
bound to refer under s. 66(1) and the applicant must
have required the Tribunal to refer it. R(T) is the
form prescribed under Rule 22A for an application
under s. 66(1), and that shows that the applicant must
set out the questions which he desires the Tribunal to
refer and that.further, those questions must arise out
of the order of the Tribunal. It is, therefore, clear
that under s. 66(2), the court cannot direct the Tribunal to refer a question unless it is one which arises out
of the order of the Tribunal and was specified by the
applicant in his application under s. 66( 1). Now, if
we are to hold that the court can allow a new question to be raised on the reference, that would in effect.
give the applicant a right which is denied to him
under s. 66(1) and (2), and enlarge the jurisdiction of
the court so as to assimilate it to that of an ordinary
civil court of appeal.
It is again to be noted that, whereas s. 66(1), as it
stood prior to the amendment of 1939, conferred on
the Commissioner a power to refer a question of law
to the court suo motu, that power has been taken away
under the present section and it has accordingly been
held that under s. 66(1), as it now stands, there is no
power in the Tribunal to refer a question of law -suo
motu for the decision of the court. If, as contended
(t) [1960] t S.C.R. 249.
(2) {1961] I S.C.R. 210.
812
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1962]
for by the respondents, the court is to be held to have
power to entertain in a reference, any question of law,
C omm15sioner o/
. on t h e iacts
c
c
d b y t h e T n'b unal, its
·
Income-tax
wh.IC h arises
ioun
Bombay '
jurisdiction under s. 66(5) must be held to be wider
v.
than under s. 66(1) and (2). The correct view to take,
Scindia Steam in our opinion, is that the right of the litigant to ask
Navigation
for a reference, the power of the Tribunal to make
Co. Ltd.
one, and the jurisdiction of the court to decide it are
Venkatarama
all co-extensive and, therefore, a question of law
Aiyar J.
which the applicant cannot require the Tribunal to
refer and one which the Tribunal is not competent to
refer to the court, cannot be entertained by the court
under s. 66(5). In view of the above considerations,
we are unable to construe the words, "any question
of law arising out of such order," as meaning any
question of law arising out of the findings in the order
of the Tribunal.
One of the reasons given by Chagla, · C. J., in
Madanlal Dharni.dharka v. Commissioner of Income.
tax (1 ) for differing from the decision in A. Abbay
Chetty and Co. v. Commissioner of Income-tax,
Madras(') that it is only a question which was raised
before the Tribunal that could be said to arise out of
its order was that that view must result in great injustice in a case in which the applicant had raised a
question before the Tribunal but it had failed to deal
with it owing to mistake or inadvertence. In such a
case, it was said, the applicant would be deprived, for
.no fault of his, of a valuable right which the legislature had intended to give him. But we see no diffi.
culty in holding that in those cases the Tribunal must
be deemed to have decided the question against the
appellant, as Falsha.w, J. was disposed to do in Mash
Trading Go. v. Commissioner of Income-tax('). This is
only an application of the principle well-known to
law that a relief asked for and not granted should be
deemed to have been refused. It is on this footing
that Kania, J. held in New Piecegoods Bazar Go. Ltd.
v. Commissioner of Income-tax(') that, in the circumstances stated above, the court could call upon
1
96 1
:--:-
(1) [1948] 16 I.T.R. :;i27, t33. 234.
(3) (1956] 30 I.T.R. 388,
(2) [1947] '5 I.T.R. 442.
(f) (1947] 15 l.T,R. 319,
' . ..
1 S.C.R.
A
)
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
813
the Tribunal to state a supplemental case after giving
its own decision on the contention. That was also
Cornmissioner of
the procedure adopted in Molwnlal Hiralal v. Commis- Income-tax,
sioner of Income-tax (1 ). Such cases must be excepBombay
tional and cannot be founded on for putting a consv.
truction different from what the language of s. 66(1) Scindia Steam
Navigation·
would otherwise warrant.
Co. Ltd.
There was also some argument as to the position
under s. 66(1) when the Tribunal decides an appeal on Venkatarama
a question of law not raised before it. That would
Aiya~ ].
undoubtedly be ·a question arising out of the order,
and not the less so because it was not argued before
it, and this conclusion does not militate against the
construction which we have put on the language of
s. 66(1).
The result of the above discussion may thus be
summed up:
(1) When a question is raised before the Tribunal
and is dealt with by it, it is clearly one arising out of
its order.
(2) When a question of law is raised before the
Tribunal but the Tribunal fails to deal with it, it must
be deemed to have been dealt with by it, and is therefore one arising out of its order.
(3) When a question is not raised before the Tribunal but the Tribunal deals with it, that will also be a
question arising out of its order.
(4) When a question of law is neither raised before
the Tribunal nor considered by it, it will not be a
question arising out of its order notwithstanding that
it may arise on the findings given by it.
Stating the position compendiously, it is qnly a
question that has been raised before or decided by
the Tribunal that could be held to arise out of its
order.
In this view, we have next to consider whether the
question which was raised before the High Court was
one which arose out of the.order of the Tribunal, as
interpreted above. Now the only question on which
the parties were at issue before the income-tax authorities was whether the sum of Rs. 9,26,532 was assessable to tax as income received during the year of
(1) [1952] 22 I.T.R. HS.
•
814
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1962]
6
'9 '
account 1945-46. That having been decided against
Commissioner of the respondents, the Tribunal referred on their appliTncome-tax,
cation under s. 66(1), the question, whether the sum
Bombay
of Rs. 9,26,532 was properly included in the assessee
v.
company's total income for the assessment year 1946Scindia Steam 4 7, and that was the very question which was argued
Navigation
b
and decided by the High Court. Thus it cannot e
Co. ·Ltd.
said that the respondents had raised any new quesVenkatarnma
tion before the court. But the appellant contends
Aiyar J.
that while before the income-tax authorities the respondents disputed their liability on the ground that
the amount in question had been received in the year
previous to the year of account, the contention urged
by them before the court was that even on the footiug that the income had been received in the year of
account, the proviso to s. 10(2)(vii) had no application,
and that it was a new question which they were not
entitled to raise. We do not agree with this contention. Section 66(1) speaks of a question of law that
arises out of the order of the Tribunal. Now a question of law might be a simple one, having its impact
at one point, or it may be a complex one, trenching
over an area with approaches leading to different
points therein. Such a question might involve more
than one aspect, requiring to be tackled from different
standpoints. All that s. 66(1) requires is that the
question of law which is referred to the court for decision and which the court is to decide must be the
question which was in issue before the Tribunal.
Where the question itself was under issue, there is no
further limitation imposed by the section that the
reference should be limited to those aspects of the
question which had been argued before the Tribunal.
It will be an over-refinement of the position to hold
that each aspect of a question is itself a distinct question for the purpose of s. 66(1) of the Act. That was
the view taken by this Court in The Commissioner of
Income-tax, Bombay v. Messrs. Ogale Glass Works
Ltd. (1) and in Zoraster & Go. v. Commissioner of Income-tax ('), and we agree with it. As the question
on which the parties were at issue, which was referred
(1) [1955] I S.C.R. 185.
(2) [1g61] I S.C.R. 210.
.'
'
""'
.
r
••
)
,
1 S.C.:R. SUPREME COURf REPORTS
S15
to the court under s. 66(1), and decided by it under
r96r
s. 66(5)
is
whether
the
sum
of
Rs.
9,26,532
is
liable
to
c
-.
-.
f
,
.
.
f
oniniissioner o
be mcluded m the taxable mcome o the respondents, Income-tax
the ground on which the respondents contested their
Bombay •
liability before the High Court was one which was
v.
within the scope of the question, and the High Court Scindia Steam
rightly entertained it.
Navigation
It is argued for the appellant that this view would
Co. Ltd.
have the effect of doing away with limitations which Venl•ata<ama
the legislature has advisedly imposed on the right
Aiyar J.
of a litigant to require references under s. 66(1),
as the question might be framed in such general
manner as to admit of new questions not argued being
raised. It is no doubt true that sometimes the questions are framed in such general terms that, construed
literally, they might take in questions which were
never in issue. In such cases, the true scope of the
reference will have to be ascertained and limited by
what appears on the statement of the case. In this
connection, it is necessary to emphasize that, in framing questions, the Tribunal should be precise and
indicate the grounds on which the questions oflaw are
raised. Where, however, the question is sufficiently
specific, we are unable to see any ground for holding
that only those contentions can be argued in support
of it which had been raised before the Tribunal. In
our opinion, it is competent to the court in such a case
to allow a new contention to be advanced, provided it
is within the framework of the question as referred.
In the present case, the question actually referred
was whether the assessment in respect of Rs. 9,26,532
was proper. Though the point argued before the
Income-tax authorities was that the income was
received not in the year of account but in the previous
year, the question as framed is sufficient to cover the
question which was actually argued before the court
namely that in fact the assessment is not proper by
reason of the proviso being inapplicable. The new
contention does not involve re-framing of the issues.
On the very terms of the question as referred which
are specific, the question is permissible and was open
to the respondents. Indeed the very order of reference
I
~
816
1 61
9
Commissioner of
Income-tax,
Bombay
v.
Scindia Steam
J.lavigation
Co. Ltd.
VenkataraJna
Aiyar ].
Shah ].
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1962]
shows that the Tribunal was conscious that this point
also might bear on the controversy so that it cannot
be said to be foreign to the scope of the question as
framed. In the result, we are of opinion that the
question of the applicability of the proviso is really
implicit, as was held by Chagla, C.J., in the question
.c
wh"10 h was re f erred , an d , t h ere1ore,
it was one which
the court had to answer.
On the merits, the appellant had very little to say.
He sought to contend that the proviso though it came
into force on May 5, 1946, was really intended to
operate from April 1, 1946, and he referred us to
certain other enactments as supporting that inference.
But we are construing the proviso. In terms, it is
not retrospective, and we cannot import into its construction matters which are ad extra legis, and thereby
alter its true effect. Then it was argued that the
amount of Rs. 9,26,532 having been allowed as deduction in the previous years, may now be treated as
profits received during the year of assessment, and
thereby subjected to tax. But this is a point entirely
new and not covered by the question, and on the view
taken by us as to the scope of a reference under
s. 66(1), it must be disallowed. In the result, this
appeal is dismissed with costs.
SHAH, J.-The Income-tax Appellate Tribunal,
Bombay Bench "A" referred the following question to
the High Court of Judicature at Bombay under
s. 66(1) of the Indian Income-tax Act:
"Whether the sum of Rs. 9,26,532 was properly
included in the assessee company's total income
computed for the assessment year 1946-47."
The question comprehends two component parts,
(1) whether the amount of Rs. 9,26,532 was properly
included in the assessee's income, and (2) •whether the
amount was properly included in the taxable income
of the assessees for the assessment year 1946-47. The
amount sought to be taxed was part of compensation
received by the assessees from the Government of
India for loss in 1944 by enemy action of their ship
"El Madina." The assessees maintained before the
1
•
•
'
•
1 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
...
'
•
••
•
817
'96'
taxing authorities and the Tribunal that the compensation accrued
to
them
on
April
16,
1944.
This
plea
c
. .
.
.
.
ommissioner o1
was rejected, but ·reJect10n of that plea was not Income-tax
sufficient to make the amount taxable. It had still to
Bombay •
be decided whether the amount which was received in
v.
the months of July and December, 1944, was taxable Scindia Steam
as income. It. is common ground that before the Navigation
amendment by Act 8 of 1946 of s. 10, sub-s. (2), cl.
co. Ltd.
(7), by the inclusion of the fourth proviso, compensa- venkatarama
tion received for loss of a capital asset like a ship was
Aiyar J.
not taxable as income under the Indian Income-tax
Act. The tribunal observed that the compensation
accrued when it was ascertained and was received by
the assessees in the year of account and the amount
was therefore rightly brought to tax in the year of
assessment 1946-47. Manifestly, the tribunal directed
its attention to the statutory provision on the application of which the exigibility of the tax depended. But
proviso IV to s. 10, sub-s. (2), cl. (7) came into force
on May 4, 1946. It was not in force on April 1, 1946,
the day on which the liability to pay tax for the year
of assessment 1946-47 crystallized. The tribunal
erroneously assumed that the amending Act was in
force at the date of commencement of the year of
assessment and the assessees did not attempt to
remove that misapprehension. But the question
whether the amount sought to be taxed was properly
included did arise out of the order of the tribunal, the
tribunal having held that the amount of compensation was taxable by virtue of s. 10, sub-s. (2), cl. (7),
prqviso IV. The question whether the statutory provision .relied upon to tax the assessees was applicable
to the amount sought to be assessed as income was
as much a question arising out of the order of.the
tribunal as the question whether the interpretation
placed by the tribunal upon that proviso was correct,
maybe.
The assessees had maintained that they were not
liable to be taxed under s. 10, sub-s. (2), cl. (7), proviso IV because the amount sought to be taxed was
received before the year of account relet>-ant for the
103
818
'9 6'
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1962]
assessment year 1946-47. The tribunal held, negativ.
Commissioner of ing the contention, t_hat it was tax?'ble under s. 10,
Income-tax,
sub-s. (2), cl. (7), proviso IV. A quest10n of law wheBombay
ther the amount was properly included in the taxable
v.
income for the year of assessment clearly arose and
Scindia Steam that question was referred by the tribunal to the High
Navigation
Court. The High Court under s. 66, cl. (5) of the
Co. Ltd.
Income-tax Act,,has to record its opinion on the quesVenkatarama
Aiyar J.
tions arising out of the order of the tribunal and not
on the arguments pro and con advanced before the
tribunal. In my view, the High Court had jurisdiction
on the question arising out of the order of the trib:unal
and referred, in deciding that the Act which made the
amount taxable was not in operation at the material
date.
This would be sufficient to dispose of the appeal:
but counsel for the revenue submits that as it was
never urged•before the tribunal by the assessees that
the amending Act 8 of 1946 which made the compensation received by the assessees, taxable as
income, was brought into operation after the commencement of the year of assessment 1946-4 7, and the
tribunal never directed its attention to that plea, it
had no jurisdiction to refer that question to the High
Court and the High Court was not competent to answer that question even if ou the facts found the question clearly arose out of the order of the tribunal.
Counsel urges that the question arising out of the
order of the tribunal is only that specific question
which has been raised and argued before the tribunal
and on which the tribunal has given its decision.
We have heard elaborate arguments on the true
meaning of the expression "any question of law· arising out of such order" and the nature of the jurisdiction exercised by the High Court under s. 66 of the
Income-tax Act. There is wide divergence of opinion
on the true import of this clause. Before I refer to
the authorities, it would be useful to set out the
scheme of the Income-tax Act relating to reference of
questions to the High Court under s. 66, and the
nature of the jurisdiction which the High Court
exercises.
.
1 S.C.R.
..
!
. ..
t
819
"(l) Within sixty days of the date upon which he is
served with notice of an order under sub-s. (4) of s. 33 Com1nissioner of
the assessee or the Commissioner may, by application I nconie*tax,
in the prescribed form ... require the Appellate TribuBombay
v.
nal to refer to the High Court any question of law
Scindia Steam
arising out of such order and the Appellate Tribunal
Navigation
shall ... draw up a statement of the case and refer. it to
Co. Ltd.
the High Court:
Provided ........ .
Venkatarama
Aiyar ].
(2) If on any application being made under sub-s.
(1) the Appellate Tribunal refuses to state a case on
the ground 'that no question of law arises, the assessee
or the Commissioner as the case may be, may ... apply
to the High Court, and the High Court may, if it is
not satisfied of the correctness of the decision of the
Appellate Tribunal, require the Appellate Tribunal to
state a case and to refer it, and on receipt of any
such requisition the Appellate Tribunal shall state the
case and refer it accordingly.
(3) .................... .
)
-
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(4) If the High Court is not satisfied that the statements in a case referred under this section are sufficient to enable it to determine the question raised
thereby, the court may refer the case back to the
Appellate Tribunal to make such additions thereto
or alterations therein as the court may direct in that
behalf.
(5) The High Court upon the hearing of any such
case shall decide the questions of law raised thereby
and shall deliver its judgment thereon containing the
grounds on which such decision is founded and shall
send a copy of such judgment ... to the Appellate Tribunal which shall pass such orders as are necessary to
dispose of the case conformably to such judgment.
(6)
(7)
(7A)
.................... .
(8)
..................... "
Under the scheme of the Indian Income-tax Act,
the appellate tribunal is the sole judge of facts. The
High Court indisputably exercises a special advisory
,.
820
z96z
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1962]
jurisdiction to record its opinion on questions sub-
. . o mittedl by the. tribunal;
it .does not act as a court of
comniisstoner
.
/ appea or rev1s10n
Income-ta•
on questwns of law or fact. After
Bombay '
v.
Siindia Steam
Navigation
Co. Ltd.
Venkatarnma
Aiyar J.
the disposal of the appeal by the tribunal under
s. 33(4) of the Income-tax Act, the revenue or the taxpayer may call upon the tribunal to state a case on
the questions of law arising out of the order. If the
tribunal refuses to state a case, the party aggrieved
may move the High Court to call upon the tribunal
to state a case and the High Court may so direct if it
is not satisfied as to the correctness of the decision of
the tribunal refusing to state a case. The question
must be one of law and not of fact and not merely
academic; it must be a concrete problem bearing
directly on the rights and obligations of the revenue
or of the assessees. The power of the High Court is
to require the tribunal to state a case only if it is satisfied that the view of the tribunal (not on the merioo
of the order under s. 33, cl. (4)) but on the application
under s. 66(1) is erroneous. If the tribunal is not called upon to refer a question, the High Court cannot
arrogate to itself the power to call upon the tribunal
to refer questions which arise out of the findings recorded by the tribunal but which the tribunal was not
called upon to refer. But there is in my judgment no
warrant for the view that the question which the tribunal may refer or which the High Court on the refusal of the tribunal may call upon the tribunal to
refer, must be a question which was raised and argued
before the tribunal at the hearing under s. 33(4). The
statute does not specifically impose such a restriction
nor is it implied. To import in the meaning of the
expression "any question of law arising out of such
order" the concept that the question must have been
argued before and dealt with by the tribunal in its
judgment deciding the appeal, is to impose a fetter
upon the jurisdiction of the High Court not warranted
by the plain intendment of the statute. The source
of the question must be the order of the tribunal; but
of the question it is not predicated that the tribunal
must have been asked to decide it at the hearing of
the appeal. It may very well happen and frequently
.
'
'
-
•
.,
...J
j).
I S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
821
cases arise in which the question of law arises for the
z96z
first time out of the order of the tribunal. The tri- c
. .
. 'd
omm1ssioner o/
b unal may wrong Iy apply t h e Iaw, may ca II m
a1 a Income-ta•
statutory provision which has no application, may
Bombay '
even misconceive the question to be decided, or ignore
v.
a statutory provision which expressly applies to the Soindia Steam
facts found. These are only illustrative cases: analo- Navigation
gous cases may easily be multiplied. It would indeed
co. Ltd.
·.l
, be perpetrating gross injustice in such cases to res- Venkatarama
trict the assessee or the Commissioner to the questions
Aiyar f.
which have been raised and argued before the tribunal
and to refuse to take cognisance of questions which
• arise out of the order of the tribunal, but which were
not argued, because they could not (in the absence of
' · any indication as to what the tribunal was going to
decide) be argued.
A concrete question of law having a direct bearing
on the rights and obligations of the parties which
may be founded on the decision of the tribunal is one
which in my judgment arises out of the order of the
...,
tribunal even if it is not raised or argued before the
tribunal at the hearing of the appeal. It is the duty
of the tribunal to draw up a statement of the case
and to fr1tme questions; that duty can only be per" formed adequately if specific questions relating directly to the dispute between the parties are raised. If
the import of the question is unduly large, the High
Court has, and is indeed bound in dealing with it to
restrict it to its true' content in the light of the findings recorded by the tribunal. But in dealing with
the question, the High Court may not only entertain
those aspects of the case which were argued before
the tribunal, but all such aspects as have fairly a
direct bearing on the dispute. The jurisdiction of the
High Court is by statute not expressly circumscribed
to recording its opinion on arguments advanced before the tribunal, and the nature of the jurisdiction
exercised by the High Court does not demand that
such a limitation should be implied. The court has
jurisdiction to decide questions which arise out of the
•,
order of the tribunal, not merely those which were
~ raised and argued before the tribunal.
822
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1962] <
'·
1
'-
6
On the meaning of the expression· "question of law
arising
of such order," judicial opinion in the High
C ommisS1oner 0 / c
.outd"1v1
"d ed , and t h"IS court h as not expressed any
Income-ta>,
ourts 1s
Bombay
authoritative opinion thereon. No useful purpose will
v.
be served by entering upon an analysis of the deciScindia Steam sions of the High Courts-and there are many-on
Navigation
this question. The decisions fall into two broad diviCo. Ltd.
sions. On t he one h and it is ruled t h at "a question of
'11
Venkatarama
law can be said to arise out of an order of the Appel- • W
Aiyar J.
late Tribunal within the meaning of s. 66(1) of the
Indian Income-tax Act, only if such order dis'
closes that the question was raised before the tribunal.
A question not raised before the tribunal cannot be
said to arise out of its order even if on the facts of the
case appearing from the order the question fairly · '
arises." The leading cases in support of this view are
A. Abbay Ohetty & Go. v. Commissioner of Income-ta:r,
Madras(') and The Commissioner of Excess Profits
Tax, West Bengal v. J eewan.lal Ltd., Calcutta('). This
view has been adopted with some variations in the
norms of expression in the following' cases: Maharaj
I
Kumar Kamal Singh v. Commissioner of Income-tax('),
•
G. M. Ohenna Basappa v. Commissioner of Income-tax,
1¥
Hyderabad(') and Punjab Distilling Industries Ltd. v.
Commissioner of Income-tax, P·unjab (5 ).
c
On the other hand is the view expressed by Chagla,
C. J. in Madanlal Dharnidharka v. Commissioner of In'"
come-tax(') where the learned Chief Justice recorded
his conclusion as follows:
··
"I should have stated that a question of law aTose
out of the order of the Tribunal if such a question was
apparent on the order itself or it could be raised on the
facts found by the Tribunal and which were stated in
the order. I see no reason to confine the jurisdiction
of this Court to such questions of law as have been
argued before the Tribunal or are dealt with by the
Tribunal. The section does not say so and there is no
reason why we should construe the expres~ion 'arising
out of such order' in a manner unwarr~nted by the
9 '
-.-.
I
(1) [1947] 15 l.T.R. 442.
(J) [1954] 26 l.T.R. 79.
(5) (1952] 22 I.T.R. 232.
(2) [1951] 20 I.T.R. 39.
(4) [1958] J4 LT.R 576.
(6) [1948] 161.T./,{. 227.
I
, , 1 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
823
z96r
ordinary grammatical construction of that expression."
Com.missionilr of
For the reasons already set out, in my view, the I11come-la~.
Bombay
interpretation placed by Chagla, C. J. on the expresv.
sion "arising out of such order" is the correct one.
Scindia Stea·m
Appeal dismissed.
Navigation
Co. Ltd.
Venkatarama
Aiyar, ].
MADAN LAL ARORA
•
•
' •
••
,~
v.
EXCISE &. TAXATION OFFICER, AMRITSAR
(P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, A. K. SARKAR
K. N. WANCHOO, K. C. DAS GUPTA and
N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR, JJ.)
Sales Tax-Return furnished-Assessee called upon to produce
evidence in support of return-Period of limitation for such demand
from when to run-Punjab General Sales Tax Act, I948, (Punj.
46 of r948), s. II, r. 20 .
.Under the Punjab General Sales Tax Act, 1948, a dealer had
to furnish his return every quarter according to the Rules and
was also required to furnish evidence in support of the return if
called for, and if he failed to do so the assessing authority could
proceed to make an assessment to the best of his judgment, but
this power could be exercised "within three years after the expiry of the period".
Held, that three years within which tbe authority could
proceedf to make the best judgment assessment had to be compuled rom the end of such quarter in respect of which return
had been filed.
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Writ Petition No. 120 of
1959.
Writ Petition under Art. 32 of the Constitution
of India for enforcement of Fundamental Rights.
Bhagirath Das and B. P. Maheshwari, for the petitioner.
N. S. Bindra and D. Gupta, for the respondent.
1961. April 7. The Judgment of the Court was
delivered by
'
Apnl. 7.
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