THE DURGAH COMMITTEE, AJMER AND ANOTHER versus SYED HUSSAIN ALI AND OTHERS
Supreme Court of India | Decided 17 March 1961 | [1962] 1 S.C.R. 383 | 1961 INSC 101
Key facts
- Decided
- 17 March 1961
- Bench
- P.B. GAJENDRAGADKAR*, A.K. SARKAR, K.N. WANCHOO, K.C. DAS GUPTA, N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR
- Bench size
- 5
- Case number
- CIVIL APPEAL No. 272/1960
- Disposal
- Dismissed
- Citation
- [1962] 1 S.C.R. 383
- Neutral citation
- 1961 INSC 101
Text of the judgment
,
1 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
383
THE DURGAH COMMITTEE, AJMER AND
ANOTHER
v.
SYED HUSSAIN ALI AND OTHERS
(P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, A. K. SARKAR,
K. N. W ANCHOO, K. 0. DAS GUPTA and
N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR, JJ.)
Durgah Endowment - Enactment for administration and
management of property-If violative of denominational rights of
Chishtia Soofies-Provisions, if infringe fundamental rights-Durgah Khwaja Saheb Act, r955 (XX XV 1 of r955), ss. 2(d)(v), 4, 5, II(f)
and (h), r3, r4, r6, r8-Constitution of India. Arts. 25, 26, r9(r)(j)
and (g), r4, 32.
_'J
•
'
The respondents, who were the Khadims of the tomb of
Hazrat Khwaja Moin-ud-din Chisbti of Ajmer challenged the
constitutional validity of the Durgah Khwaja Saheb Act, 1955
(XXXV! of 1955) and certain specified sections by a petition
filed under Art. 226 of the Constitution in the Rajasthan High
Court. The High Court substantially found in their favour and
made a declaration that the impugned provisions of the Act
were ultra vires and restrained the appellants from enforcing
them. The respondents claimed to represent the Chishti Soofies
who~ according to them, constituted a religious denomination or
a section thereof to whom the Durgah belonged and their case
was that the impugned Act had interfered with their fundamental right to manage its affairs. Their further case was that the
Nazars (offerings) of the pilgrims constituted their customary
and main source of income and were their property, recognised
by judicial decisions including that of the Privy Council in Syed
Alta] Hussain v. Dewan Syed Ali Rasul Ali Khan, A.LR. 1938
P. C. 71, that the impugned Act and its material provisions
violated their fundamental rights guaranteed by Arts. 14, 19(1)
(f) and (g), 25, 26, 30(1) and (2) and 32 of the Constitution. It
was con tended that ss. 4 and 5 pf the Act, which provided for
the setting up and composition of the Durgah Committee consist ..
ing of Hanafi Muslims none of whom might belong to the Chishtia order, infringed the rights of the denomination guaranteed
by Art. 26(b), (c) and (d) that cl. (v) of s. 2(d) of the Act, by
which all such Nazars as were received on behalf of the Durgah
by the Nazim or any person authorised by him were to be included in the Durgah Endowment, infringed their fundamental
right to property, that ss. rr(f) and (h) which empowered the
committee to determine the privileges of the Khadims and the
functions and powers of the Sajjadanashin and s. 13(1) which
authorised the committee to make provisional interim arrangement in case the office of Sajjadanashin fell vacant, infringed
J.V!arch I].
,
384
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1962]
their fundamental rights under Art. 25(1), that s. 14 by creating
a statutory right in the Nazim or his agent to solicit and receive
The Du,gah
offerings on behalf of the Durgah awl prohibiting the Khadims
Committee, Ajmer and the Sajjadanashin from doing so, violated their right to
& Anoth"
property ands. r8 which provided for the enforcement of the
v.
orders of the committee as orders and decrees of a civil court
Syed Hussain Ali violated Arts. 14 and 32 of the Constitution. The past history
& Others
of the Endowment for centuries showed that its management
was always vested in Mutawallis appointed hy the State, some
of whom were Hindus, and that the pilgrims who visited the
Durgah and made offering were not confined to Moslems alone
but belonged to all communities.
Held, that the contentions of the respondents must be negatived.
Although this Court has laid down what is a religious denomination and what are matters of religion, it must not be overlooked that the protection of Art. 26 of tlie Constitution can
extend only to such religious practices as were essential and
integral parts of the religion and to no others.
Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras v. Sri
Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar of Sri Shirur Mutt, [1954] S.C.R.
1005 and Sri Venkataramana Devaru v. The State of Mysore, (1958]
S.C.R. 895, discussed.
Assuming that the Chishti order of Soofies constituted such
a denomination or section of it whom the respondents represented, it was obvious that els. (c) and (d) of Art. 26 could not
create any rights which the denon1ination or the section never
had; they could merely safeguard and guarantee the continuance
of such rights which the denomination or section had. Where
right to administer properties had never vested in the denomination or had been surrendered by it or had otherwise been
effectively and irretrievably lost to it, Art. 26 could not be successfully invoked.
In the instant case, since Chishti Soofies never had any
rights of management over the Durgah Endowment for centuries
since it was created, the attack on ss. 4 and 5 of the Act must
fail.
Asrar Ahmed v. Durgah Committee, Ajmer, A.I.R. 1947 P.C.
l, referred to.
It was not correct to say that ss. 2(dJ(v) and 14 of the
impugned Act infringed Art. r9(1)(f) and (g) of the Constitution.
Those sections, properly construed, meant that offerings earmarked generally for the Durgah belonged to the Durgah and
could be received only by the Nazim or his agent. These offerings, as found by judicial decisions, never belonged to the respondents and the impugned sections did not affect what was
found to belong to them.
Syed Altaf Httssain v. Dewan Syed Ali Rasul Ali Khan, A.LR.
1938 P.C. 71, referred to.
l S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
385
There could be no doubt as to the competency of the Legisx96x
lature to regulate matters relating to the property of the Durgah
by providing that the said offerings could be solicited by the TM Du,gah
Nazim or his agent. It \Vas, however, not correct to say thatCornmittee, AJmer
the omission of the word 'explicitly' contained in the definition
6' Anolh"
in the earlier Act from the present Act enlarged the scope of the
v. .
definition in any way.
Syed l-lussain Ali
& Others
The powers conferred on the committee by s. II(f) and (h),
which must be read in the light of the mandatory provisions of
s. 15 which made it obligatory on the committee to observe
Muslim Law and the tenets of the Chishti saint and which had
to be exercised within the limits laid down by s. 16, could not be
said to violate Art. 25(1) of the Constitution.
Section 16 in providing for the setting up of a Board of
Arbitration, embodied a healthy and unexceptionable principle,
obviously in the interest of the institution as well as the parties,
and could not be said to infringe Arts. 14 or 32 of the Constitution.
Section 13(1) could not be read apart from the other provisions of s. 13. That section really intended to lay down the
procedure for determining disputes relating to succession to the
Office of Sajjadanashin and it was, therefore, futile to contend
that s. 13(r) offended against Art. 25(r).
Since s. 18 \vas confined only to such final orders as were
within the jurisdiction of the committee and passed against persons who did not object to them but failed to comply with
them, it did not contravene Arts. 14 or ·32 of the Constitution.
'
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No.
272of1960.
Appeal from the judgment and order dated January
28, 1959, of the Rajasthan High Court in D. B. Civil
Writ Petition No. 17 of 1957.
H. N. Sanyal, Additional Solicitor-General of India,
R. Ganapathy Iyer, Y. S. Nasarullah Sheriff, J. L.
Datta and K. L. Hathi, for the appellants.
G. S. Pathak, Syed Anwar Hussain and B. P.
Maheshwari, for respondents Nos. l to 7.
A.G. Ratnaparkhi for Govind Saran, for respondents
Nos. 8 and 9.
H. N. Sanyal, Additional Solicitor-General of India,
R. H. Dhebar and T. M. Sen, for the Intervener.
1961. March 17. The Judgment of the Court was
delivered by
49
386
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1962]
GAJENDRAGADKAR, J.-In:the High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan at J odhpur a writ petition was filed
T"'.,,Du• gAah
under Art. 226 of the
Constitution
by the nine resnon;mer
.
,
t'
Commi ee,
& Anoth"
dents who are Khad1ms of the tomb of Khwaja Moinv,
ud-din Chishti of Ajmer challenging the vires of the
Sytd Hussain Ali Durgah Khwaja Saheb Act XX XVI of 1955 (hereafter
6 ' Othm
called the Act). In this petition the respondents
Gajend;;;;;:,d 110 , . alle~ed t.hat the ~~t i1;1 gener'.11 and the provisions
1
specified m the pet1t10n m particular are ultra vires
and they claimed a direction or an appropriate writ or
order restraining the appellants the Durgah Committee and the Nazim of the said Committee from
enforcing any of its provisions. The writ petition thus
filed by the respondents substantially succeeded and
the High Court has made a declaration that the
impugned provisions of the Act are ultra vires and has
issued· an order restraining the appellants from enforcing them. The appellants then applied for and obtained a certificate from the High Court and it is with the
said certificate that they have come to this Court by
their present appeal.
According to the respondents the shrine of N azrat
Khwaja Moin-ud-din Chishti which is generally known
as the Durgah Khwaja Saheb situated at Ajmer is one
of the most important places of pilgrimage for the
muslims of India. Since persons following other
religions also hold the saint in great veneration a large
number of non-muslims visit the tomb every yeai:.
Khwaja Saheb came to India sometime towards the
end of the 12th Century A. D. and settled down in
Ajmer. His saintly character and his teachings
attracted a large number of devotees during his lifetime and these devotees honoured him as a great
spiritual leader. Khwaja Saheb belonged to the Chishti
Order of Soofies. He died at Ajmer in or about 1236
A. D., and naturally enough after his death his tomb
became a place of pilgrimage.
The respondents' case further is that after his death
the tomb under which the saint was interred was a
kutcha structure and continued to be such for nearly
300 years thereafter. The petition alleged that a
pucca structure was built by the Khilji Sultans of
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387
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Mandu and over the said pucca structure a tomb was
constructed. Thereafter successive Muslim Rulers, Th e D urga h
particularly the Moghul Emperors, ma d e endowments committee Ajm<r
and added to the wealth and splendour of the shrine.
& An~ther
Khwaja Syed Fukhuruddin and Sheikh Mohammad
v. .
.
Yadgar, who originally accompanied the Khwaja Saheb Syed Husoain Ali
to India, were his close and devoted followers. After
& Others
the saint's death both of them looked after the grave Gajcndra:adkar ].
and attended to the spiritual needs of the pilgrims.
The descendants of these two disciples gradually came
to be known as Khadims. For generations past their
occupation has been that of religious service at the
tomb of Khwaja Saheb. The respondents belong to
this sect or section of Khadims. They claim that they
are members of a religious denomination or section
known as Chishtia Soofies. Their petition further avers
that throughout the centuries the Khadims had not
only looked after the premises of the tomb but also
kept the keys of the tomb and attended to the multitude of pilgrims who visited the shrine and acted as
spiritual guides in the performance of religious functions to wit the Fateha (act of prayer) for which they
received Nazars (offerings). These Nazars were the
main source of income for the livelihood of the
Khadims and have in fact always constituted their
property.
According to the respondents the right of the
Khadims to the offerings and Nazars made by pilgrims
before the tomb and at the Dnrgah had been the subject matter of several judicial decisions and the same
had been finally decided by the Privy Council in
Syed Altaf Hussain v. Dewan Syed Ali Rasul Ali
Khan('). The petition is substantially based on what
the respondents regard to be the effect of the said
decision in respect of their rights. According to them~
the rights recognised by the said decision amount to
their fundamental rights to property and their fundamental right to manage the said property, and that in
substance is the basis of the petition.
Thus the respondents challenged the vires of the
Act on the ground that its material provisions take
(1) A.LR. 1938 P.C. 7x.
388
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[1962]
away and/or abridge their fundamental rights as a
class and also the fundamental rights of the muslims
Comm;ttee~rg;jmer belonging to the Soofi Chishtia Order guaranteed by
& Another
Arts. 14, 19 (1) (f) and (g), 25, 26, 31(1) and (2) as well
v.
as 32. According to the case set out in the petition
Syed Hussai11 Ali all Hanafi muslims do not necessarily believe in
& Others
Soofism and do not belong to the Chishtia Order of
Gajend:;.dkar J. Soofies and it is to the latter sect that the shrine solely
belongs; the maintenance of the shrine has also been
the sole concern of the said sect. It is this sect which
has to maintain the institution for religious purposes
and manage its affairs according to custom and trnage.
That is why the respondents alleged that the material
provisions of the Act were violative of their fundamental rights. In regard to s. 5 of the Act under
which the Durgah Committee is constituted the
respondents' objection is that it can consist of Hanafi
muslims who are not members of the Chishtia Order
and that introduces an infirmity which makes the
said provision inconsistent with Art. 26 of the Constitution. On these allegations the respondents claimed
a declaration that certain specified sections of the Act
were void and ultra vires which made the whole of the
Act void and ultra vires and they asked for directions
or orders or writ in the nature of mandamus or any
other appropriate. writ to the appellants restraining
them from enforcing in any manner the said Act
against them.
The claim thus made by the respondents was disputed by the appellants in their detailed written
statement. They averred that the circle of devotees
of, and visitors to, the shrine was not confined to the
Chishtia Order; but it included devotees and pilgrims
of all classes of people following different religions.
According to them the largest number of pilgrims and
visitors were Hindus, Khoja Memons and Parsis. It
was denied that the Durgah was looked after by the
descendants of Syed Fukhuruddin and Mohammad
Yadgar. The allegations made by the respondents
in respect of their occupation, duties and rights were
seriously challenged and the case made out by them
in regard to the receipt of the offerings and Nazars
1 61
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Th
D
h
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was disputed.
389
According to the appellants the reli-
giou~ s.~rvices at. the tomb were and are performed by
>
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n, Durgah
the Saiiadanashm of the Durgah and the respondents Committu, Ajmer
had no right to look after the premises, to keep the
& Another
keys of the tomb, to attend to the pilgrims visiting
v.
the shrine or to receive any offerings or Nazars. Their Syed Hussain Ali
case was that the Khadims were and are no more
& Others
than servants of the holy t.omb and their duties are Gajend;;;;,dkar 1.
similar to those of chowkidars.
The appellants further pleaded that according to
Islamic belief offerings made at the tomb of a dead
saint are meant for the fulfilment of objects which
were dear to the saint in his lifetime and they are
meant for the poor, the indigent, the sick and the suffering so that the benediction may reach the soal of the
departed saint. The averments made by the respondents in regard to their fundamental rights and their
infringement were challenged by the appeilants and
it was urged that the Act in general and the provisiom specified in tho petition in particular were intra
vires and constitutional.
On these pleadings the High Court proceeded to
consider the history of the institution, the nature of
the rights set up by the respondents and the effect of
the impugned legislation on those rights. The High
Court has found that the offerings made before the
tomb for nearly 400 years before the tomb was rebuilt
into a pucca structure must have been used by the
Khadims for themselves. It also held th:it the Khadims
were performing several duties sot out by the respondents and that it was mainly the Khadims who circulated the stories of miracles performed by Khwaja
Saheb during his lifetime and thus helped to spread
the reputation of the tomb. Even after the tomb was
rebuilt and endowments were made to it the Khadims
looked after the tomb, performed the necessary rituals
and spent the surplus income from the offerings for
themselves. In duo course Sajjadanashins came to be
appointed, but, according to the High Court their
emergence on the scone merely enabled them to become sharers in the offerings. It has further been
390
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[1962]
found by the High Court on a review of judicial dccisions
pronounced in several disputes between the parTIM D urga h
,
h
h
.
committee, AJmer ties t at t e offermgs made at the tomb are govern& Another
ed by the customary mode of their utilisation and
v.
the history of the institution proved that the said
Syed Hussain Ali offerings have been used according to a certain cus& Others
tom which had been upheld by the Privy Council in
1
Gajendragadka' J. the case of Syed Altaf Hussain ( ).
This custom
showed that the offerings made before the shrine are
divided between the Sajjadanashin and the Khadims
in the manner indicated in the said decision. It is
in the light of these broad findings that the High
Court proceeded to examine the vires of the impugned provisions of the Act.
Thus considered the High Court came to the conclusion that the several sections challenged by the
respondents in their writ petition are ultra vires. It
has held thats. 2(b)(v) violates Art. 19(l)(f), s. 5 violates Art. 26, s. ll(f) Arts. 19(1)(g) and 25(1), ss. ll(b)
and 13(i) Art. 25, s. 14 Art. 19(l)(f) and ss. 16 and 18
Art. 14 read with Art. 32. Having found that these
sections are ultra vires the High Court has issued an
order restraining the appellants from enforcing the
said sections. In regard to s. 5 in particular the High
Court has found that the said section is ultra vires inasmuch as it lays down that the Committee shall consist of Hanafi muslims without further restricting
that they shall be of the Chishtia Order believing in
the religous practices and ritual in vogue at the shrine.
It may be added that since s. 5 which contains the
key provision of the Act has thus been struck down,
though in a limited way, the whole of the Act has in
substance been rendered inoperative.
Before dealing with the merits of the appeal it
would be relevant and useful to consider briefly the
historical background of the dispute, because, in determining the rights of the respondents and of the sect
which they claim to represent, it would be necessary
to ascertain broadly the genesis of the shrine, its
growth, the nature of the endowments made to it, the
management of the properties thus endowed, the rights
of the Khadims and the Sajjadanashin in regard to
r96r
(1) A.I.R. 1938 P.C. 71.
-
1 S.C.R.
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391
the tomb and the effect of the relevant judicial deciz96r
sions in that behalf. This enquiry would inevitably The Durgah
take us back to the 13th Century because Khwaja Committu, Ajmer
Moln-ud-din died either in 1236 or 1233 A.D. and it
& Another
was then that a kutcha tomb was constructed in his
v.
·
th
H'
h
C
t
th
t'
Syed
Hussain
Ali
our
e par 1es
&
h onour. I t appears t h at m e 1g
011
agreed to collect the relevant material in regard to the
_:_'__"
growth of this institution which has now become Gajendragadkar J.
scarce and obscure owing to lapse of time from the
Imperial Gazetteer dealing with Ajmer, the Report of
the Ghulam Hasan Committee (hereafter called the
Committee) appointed in 1949 to enquire into and
report on the administration of the present Durgah as
well as the decision of the Privy Council in Asra,r
Ahmed v. Durgah Committee, Ajmer ('). The Committee's report shows that the Committee examined a
large number of witnesses belonging to several
communities who were devoted to the shrine, it considered the original Sanads and a volume of other
documents produced before it, took into account all
the relevant judicial decisions to which its attention
was drawn, and passed under review the growth of
this institution and its management before it made its
recommendations as to the measures necessary to secure
the efficient management of the Durgah Endowment,
the conservation of the shrine in the interest of the
devotees as a whole. Presumbly when the parties
agreed to refer to the historical data supplied by the
Committee's report they advisedly refrained from
adopting the course of producing the original documents themselves in the present enquiry. The political history of Aj~er has been stormy, and through the
centuries sovereignty over the State of Ajmer has
changed hands with the inevitable consequence that
the fortunes of the shrine varied from time to time.
It is true that the material which has been thus
placed before the Court is not satisfactory, as it could
not but be so, because we are trying to trace the
history of the institution since the 13th Century for
nearly 600 years thereafter; but the picture which
emerges as a result of a careful consideration of the
(2) A.LR 1947 P.C. I.
392
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
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said material is on the whole clear enough for our
The Dwgah
purpose ~n the_presen~ appeal.
.
. .
.
Committee Ajm"
KhwaJa Morn-ud-dm was born m Persia 1t1 1143.
&
Later he migrated with his fathrr to Nisharpur near
v.
Meshad where Omar Khayyam is buried. Then he
Syed Hussain Ali moved from place to place until he reached Ajmer
& Othm
about the end of the 12th Century. At Ajmer he died
Gajend,agadh., J. at the ripe old age of 9~:
It appe~rn t.hat he retired
into his cell on the .E ust of Ra Jab and was found
dead in the cell on the Sixth Day when it was opened.
That is why his death anniversary is celebrated every
year during the six days of Ra jab. He received formal
theological education at Samarkhand and Bukhara,
and in the pursuit of spiritual knowledge he travelled
far and wide. Ultimately he became a disciple of
Hazrat Khwaja Usman Harooni who was a well
known faqir of the Chish ti sect. During his lifetime
the reputation ofKhwaja Moinuddin travelled far and
wide and attracted devotees following different religions throughout the country.
At his death the saint could not have left any
property and so there was no question of management
of the property belonging to his tomb. No doubt the
tomb itself was constructed immediately after his
death but it was a kutcha structure and apparently
for several years after his death there does not appear
to have been endowment of property to the tomb,
and so its financial position must have been of a very
modest order. Persons belonging to the affiuent classes
were not attracted for many years and so there was
hardly any occasion to manage any property of the
tomb as such. After his death the family of the saint
remained in Ajmer for some time but it appears that
the members of the family were driven out of Ajmer
for some years and they came back only centuries
later. This was the consequence of the change of
rulers who exercised sovereign power over Ajmcr,
The construction of a pucca tomb was commenced
in the reign of one of the Malwa Kings whose dynasty
ruled over Ajmer up to 1531. There is no evidence to
show that any property was dedicated to the tomb
even then. It, however, does appear that one of the
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393
1 6
9 '
Malwa Kings had appointed a Sajjadanashin to look
after the tomb; this Sajjadan~shin was in later times The Durgah
called Dewan. The construct10n of the tomb took a commit1". Ajmer
fairly long time but even after it was completed there
& Another
is no trace of any endowment of property.
v. .
.
In or about 1560 Akbar defeated the Malwa Kings Syed _Hussain Al•
and Ajmer came under Moghul rule· and so the
& Othm
Moghul period began. Akbar took great interest in Gajendragadkar ].
the tomb and that must have added to the popularity
of the tomb and attracted a large number of affluent
pilgrims. It was about 1567 A. D. that the tomb was
rebuilt and re-endowed by Akbar who reigned from
1556 to 1605. A Farman issued by Akbar ascribed to
the year 1567 shows that eighteen villages were granted to the Durgah. According to the report of the
Committee which had access to the original Sanad and
other relevant documents the year of the Sanad was
not 1567 but 1575. The report also shows that the
object of this first endowment was not one for the
general purposes of the Durgah but for a specific purpose, namely, 'langar khana'. It appears that during
this period a descendant of the saint functioned as a
Sajjadanashin and he also performed the duties of a
Mutawalli. There is no reliable evidence in regard to
the position of the Sajjadanashin, his duties and functions before the date of Akbar, but it is not difficult
to imagine that even if a Sajjadanashin was in charge
of the tomb he had really very little to manage
because the tomb had not until 1567 attracted substantial grants or endowments. The Committee's
report clearly brings out that the appointment of a
Sajjadanashin in the time of Akbar was purely on the
basis of an appointment by the State because it is
pointed out that as soon as Akbar was not satisfied with
the work of the Sajjadanashin,appointed by him in
1567 he removed him from office in 1570 and appointed
a new' incumbent in his place. This new incumbent
carried on his duties until 1600. Similarly in 1612
J ehangir appointed a Sajjadanashin to function also
as Mutawalli. During Jehangir's time (1605-1627)
some more villages were endowed to the Durgah.
50
394
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1962J
(
"'-
'9° 1
During Shahjehan's time (1627-1658) some significant
changes took place in the management of the Durgah.
1 he Durgah
Th e offi ce of t h e SaJJa
.. d anas h'Ill was separate d f rom
Connnittee, Ajmer
o;, Auoth"
that of the Mutawalli under the name of Darogah,
v.
the Mutawalli was put in charge of the management
Syed Hussain Ali and administration of the secular affairs of the
.;;. Othm
Durgah. It would also appear that some of the Darogahs
were Hindus. In his turn Shahjehan endowed
. d-dl
Ga1en raga 'ar 1 .
several villages in favour of the Durgah. This endowment, unlike that of Akbar, was for the general purposes of the Durgah. According to the Committee
Shahjehan's endowment was in supersession of the
earlier grants though it is difficult to decide as to
whether it was in supersession of Akbar's grant or
of an earlier grant made by Shahjehan himself. However that may be, it is quite clear that at the very
time when Shahjehan made his endowment he separated the office of the Sajjadanashin from that of the
Mutawalli and left it to the sole charge of the Mutawalli appointed by the Ruler to manage the properties
endowed to the Durgah. The later history of the institution shows that the separate office of the Mutawalli
who was in sole management of the administration of
the properties of the Durgah continued ever since, and
that throughout its history the Mutawallis have been
appointed by the State and were as such answerable
to the State and not to the sect represented by the
respondents. This state of affairs continued during
the reign of Aurangzeb (1659-1707).
After Aurangzeb died there was a change in the
political fortunes of Ajmer because Rathor Rajputs
seized Ajmer in 1719 and ruled over it for two years
thereafter. This change of political sovereignty does
not appear to have affected the administration of the
Durgah which continued as before. In 1721 the
Moghul rule was re-established over Ajmer but that
again made no change to the administration of the
Durgah and the management of its properties. The
M"ghul rule in turn was disturbed in 1743 by the
Rajput Rathors who were in power for nearly 13
years. The Rathor rule came to an end when the
Scindias occupied Ajmer in 1756 and continued in
.
•
._)
•
1 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
395
possession of the city until 1787. In that year the
I96I
Rathors came back again and remained in possession
till 1791 when Scindias overpowered them and conk Con;:,;11~,':'~ajmer
nued to occupy it until 1818. In about 1818, after
&· Anothn
the Pindari War Ajmer passed into the hands of the
v.
East India Company and so its connection with the Syed Hussain Ali
British Government commenced. Whilst political
&· Othm
soverei!inty ov~r Ajmer was th.us .ch~nging ~ands Gajend,ag.•dka> r.
from time to time the state of affa1rs m relat10n to
·
the Durgah remained as it was during the time of
Shahjehan. The Sajjadanashin looked after the performance of the religious observances of the rites
and the Mutawalli looked after the administration and
management of the properties of the Durgah. In this
connection it is relevant and significant to note that
the Mutawalli has always been an officer appointed
by the Government in power. That in brief is the
broad picture which emerges in the light of the mate.
rial placed by the parties before the Court in the
present proceedings.
At this stage it would be material to narrate very
briefly the relevant history of legislation in regard to
the administration of religious endowments which fol.
lowed the assumption of political power by the British
Government. The first Act to which reference must
be made is Act XX of 1863. This Act was passed to
enable the Government to divest itself of the manage.
ment of religious endowments which had till then
vested in the Revenue Boards. Section 3 of the Act
provided, inter alia, that in the case of every mosque
to which the earlier regulations applied Government
shall as soon as possible after the passing of the Act
make special provision for the administration of such
mosques as specified in the Act by subsequent sec.
tions. Under s. 4 the transfer of the administration
of the said mosque and other institutions to trustees
is provided with the consequence that the administration by Revenue Boards had to come to an end.
Section 6 deals with the rights of the trustees to whom
the property is transferred under s. 4; and it also contemplates the appointment of committees which may
exercise powers as therein specified. With the rest of
396
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1962]
the provisions of this Act we are not concerned. The
effect of this Act was, that the management of religiTh e D urga h
CommWee, Ajm,,ous endowments which had been taken over by the
& Anoth"
Government and which vested in the Revenue Boards
v.
was entrusted to the trustees as prescribed by s. 4. In
Syed Hussain Ali accordance with. the provisions of s. 6 a committee
& 1!_'."_"'
was appointed to look after the management of the
Gajendragadkar 1 . Durgah with which we are concerned and that
· committee continued to be in such management until 1936.
In 1936 Act XXIII of 1936 was passed specifically
with the object of making better provision for the
administration of the Durgah and the Endowment of
the Durgah of Khwaja Moin-ud-din Chishti known as
the Durgah Khwaja Saheb, Ajmer. This Act consisted of twenty sections and in a sense it provided a
self-contained code for the administration of the
Durgah and its endowments. Section 2(4) defines a
Durgah Endowment as including (a) the Durgah
Khwaja Saheb, Ajmer, (b) all buildings and movable
property within the boundaries of the Durgah Sharif,
(c) Durgah Jagir including all land, houses and shops
and all landed property wheresoever situated belonging to the Durgah Sharif, (d) all other property and
all income derived from any source whatsoever, dedicated to the Durgah or placed for any religious, pious or
charitable purposes nuder the Durgah Administration,
and (e) only such offerings as are intended explicitly
for the use of the Durgah. It would be noticed that
the material provisions of the Act which dealt with
the management and administration of the Durgah
were intended to operate in regard to the Durgah
Endowment thus comprehensively defined. Under s. 4
the administration and control of this endowment had
to vest in a committee constituted in the manner prescribed. The powers and duties of this committee are
prescribed by s. 11; whereas s. 16 provides for arbitration of disputes that may arise between the committee on the one hand and the Sajjadanashin, the
Mutawalli and the Khadim or any of them on the
other. With the rest of the provisions of the Act we
are not concerned. In pursuance of the material
r96x
T
.
"
1 S.C.R.
__
.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
397
r96r
provisions of this Act a Durgah Committee was
appointed and it has bee_n in management of the The Durgah
Durgah Endowment ever smce.
committee, Ajmer
As we have already indicated the Government of & Another
India appointed the Committee under the Chairmanv. _
_
ship of Mr. Justice Ghulam Hasan in 1949 to enquire Syed Hussain Alr
into and report on the administration of the Durgah
& Othm
Endowment and to make appropriate recommenda- Gajendragadkar J.
tions to secure the conservation of the shrine by efficient management of the said Endowment. The Committee made its report on October 13, 1949, and that
led to the promulgation of Ordinance No. XXIV of
1949 which was followed by Emergency Provisions
Act, 1950, and finally by the Act of 1955 with which
we are concerned in the present appeal. The Committee held an exhaustive enquiry, considered the
voluminous evidence produced before it, reviewed the
conduct of the Sajjadanashins and the Khadims,
examined the manner in which the offerings were
received and appropriated by them, took into account
several judicial decisions dealing with the question of
the rights and obligations of the said parties and came
to the conclusion that "the historical review of the
position leads only to the inference that the Sajjadanashins and the Khadims between themselves came
to an agreement for mutual benefit and to the detriment of the Endowment and adopted a kind of a
practice to realise offerings from visitors to the Durgah
on a show of some charitable object and led the ignorant and the nnwary into the trap" (1). The Committee
has observed thn.t most of the spokesmen before it
candidly admitted the existence of many malpractices
indulged in by Khadims and a majority of them showed a keen desire to introduce radical social reform in
the community provided they are backed by the
authority of law (2 ). The Committee then commented
on the agreement entered into between the Sajjadanashins and the Khadims as amounting to an unholy .
alliauce among unscrupulous persons to trade for their
(I) Report of the Durgah Khwaja Saheb ( Ajmer) Com1nittee of
Enquiry dated October 13, 1949, published by Government of India in
1950, p. 63.
(2) Ibid, P- 56.
•
398
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1962]
personal aggrandisement in the name of the holy
saint, and it noticed with regret that the interest of
Comm:ttee~rg;jmer the community had suffered more from the supersti&· Another
tious, ignorant and the reactionary hierarchy than
v.
from the doings of zealous reformers('). According to
Syed Hussain Ali the Committee "tinkering with the problem will be a
"' Othm
remedy worse than the disease and it had no doubt that
Gajendragadkar J. no narrow and technical considerations should stop us
from marching forward". As a result of the findings
made by the Committee it made specific recommendations as to the manner in which reform should be
introduced in the management and administration of
the Durgah Endowment by legislative process. Speaking generally, the Act has been passed in the light of
the recommendations made by the Committee.
Thus it would be clear that from the middle of the
16th Century to the middle of the 20th Century the
administration and management of the Durgah Endowment has been true to the same pattern. The
said administration has been treated as a matter with
which the State is concerned and it has been left in
charge of the Mutawallis who were appointed from
time to time by the State and even removed when
they were found to be guilty of misconduct or when
it was felt that their work was unsatisfactory. So far
as the material produced in this case goes the Durgah
Endowment which includes movable and immovable
property does not appear to have been treated as
owned by the denomination or section of the devotees
and the followers of the saint, and its administration
has always been left in the hands of the official
appointed by the State.
In this connection it may be relevant to refer to
the decision of the Privy Council in the case of Asrar
Ahmed (2 ). The appeal before the Privy Council in
that case arose from a suit filed by Syed Asrar Ahmed
against the Durgah Committee in which he claimed
a declaration that the office of the Mutawalli of the
Durgah Khwaja Saheb, Ajmer, was hereditary in his
family and that the Durgah Committee was not competent to question his status as a hereditary Mutawalli in succession to the last holder of that office .
r96r
Th
D
h
(5) Ibid, p. 64 .
•
•
(2) A.LR. 1947 P.C. I,
'
1 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
399
Tli.e District Judge who tried the said suit passed a
z96r
deem~ in ~avou~ ~f Asrar Ah.med but on appeal the
1he Durgah
J ud101al Comm1ss10ner set aside the decree and dis- co,,, milt,,, Ajmer
missed Asrar Ahmed's suit. On appeal by Asrar
& Another
Ahmed to the Privy Council the decision of the Judiv.
cial Commissioner was confirmed. In dealing with Sy"l Hussain Ali
this dispute the Privy Council has considered the
& Othm
genesis and growth of the s~rine along with the Gajeudragadkar J.
stormy history of the State of Aimer to which we have
already referred. In the course of his judgment Lord
Simonds observed that it was not disputed that in the
reign of Emperor Shahjehan the post of Mutawalli
was separated from that of Sajjadanashin and had
become a Government appointment, whereas the
Sajjadanashin remained and continued to be the hereditary descendant of the saint. Then he referred to
the firman of Shahjehan issued in 1629 by which the
Emperor ordered that the Mutawalli appointed by the
State was to sit on the left of the Sajjadanashin at
the Mahfils. Similarly the firman issued by Aurangzeb in 1667 directed the order of sitting at the Mahfils
by laying down that Daroga Balgorkhana, i.e., Mutawalli of the Durgah or anyone who is appointed by
the State do sit on Lhe left of the Sajjadanashin. It is
significant to note that Daroga Balgorkhana was a
Hindu in Akbar's time. Having thus held that the
office of the Mutawalli was an office created by the
State and the holder of the office was a State servant
the Privy Council examined the evidence on which
Asrar Ahmed relied in support of his plea that by
custom the office was hereditary and held that the
said evidence did not justify the claim. This decision
supports the conclusion that the Durgah Endowment
and its administration have always been in charge of
the Mutawalli appointed by the State and that on
occasions the post of the Mutawalli was held by a
Hindu as well.
Having thus reviewed broadly the genesis of the
shrine, its growth and the story of its endowments and
their management, it may now be relevant to enquire
what is the nature of the tenets and beliefs to which
Soofism subscribes. Such an enquiry would serve to
400
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1962]
assist us in determining whether the Chishtia sect cran
be regarded as a religious denomination or a section
Committee, Ajmer thereof within Art. 26. According to Murray T.
& Anothn
Titus (1) "Islam, like Christianity, has its monastic
v. .
. orders and saints, the underlying basis of which is
1
Syed / """'" Ali the mystic interpretation of the religious life known
~ _0 lhers
· aut h or, t h e men 1m.
as Sufi"ism " . Accor d'mg to t Ius
Gajendragadkar J. hued with soofi doctrine came very early to India is
not disputed; but who those earliest comers were or
when they arrived cannot be definitely ascertained.
He also expresses the opinion that though Soofism is
found so extensively "it is not the religion of a sect,
it is rather a natural revolt of the human heart
against the cold formalism of a ritualistic religion,
and so while Sufis have never been regarded as a
separate sect" of muslims they have nevertheless tended to gather themselves into religious orders". These
have taken on special forms of organisation, so that
today there is a great number of such orders, which,
curiously enough, belong only to the Sunnis. The
author then enumerates fourteen orders or families
(khandan); amongst them is the Chishtia Order.
According to the report of the Committee, however,
the Soofies are divided into four main silsilas; amongst
them are Chishtias. The report expresses the definite opinion that the Soofi silsilas are not sects (p. 13).
The characteristic feature of a particular silsila is
confined to a few spiritual practices, like Aurad or
Sama; to certain festivals, institutions like veneration
"of shrines and the devotion to certain leading personalities of the order. Soofism really denotes the
attitude of mind, that is to say, a Soofi, while accepting all that orthodox Islam has to offer, finds lacking
in it an emotive principle. According to Soofies a
clear distinction has to be drawn between the real and
the apparent, and they believed that the ultimate
reality could be grasped only intuitively (Ma'arifat or
gnosis). A special feature of Soofi belief is divine love.
An intellect, according to Soofies, performs a restricted function. The centre of spiritual life is the Qalb
or the Rooh (p. 16).
r1i, Durgah
{1) "Indian Islam", a Religious History of Islam in India, by l\furray
T. Titus, published by Oxford University Press in the Series "The Religious
Quest of India". pp. x10, 111.
.
1 S.C.R.
'
-~
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
401
In Piran v. Abdool Karim (1), Ameer Ali, J., had
r96r
occasion to consider the functions of the Sajjadanashin Th 0
h
and the Mutawalli. He observed that the Sajjadana- Comm:ttee~r~jmer
shin has certain spiritual functions to perform. He is
c;. Another
not only a Mutawalli but also a spiritual preceptor.
v.
He is the curator of the Durgah where his ancestor is Syed Hussain Ali
buried and in him he is supposed to continue the
c;. Others
spiritual line (silsila). As is wellknown phese DurgahsGajendr-:;-;dkaY J
are the tombs of celebrated dervishes, who in their
·
lifetime were regarded as saints. Some of these men
had established Khamkahs where they lived and
their disciples congregated. These dervishes professed
esoteric doctrines and followed distinct systems of
initiation. They were either Soofies or the disciples of
Mian Roushan Bayezid who flourished about the time
of Akbar and who had founded an independent
esoteric brotherhood in which the chief occupied a
peculiarly distinct position. The preceptor is called
the pir, the disciple a murid. On the death of the pir
his successor assumes the privilege of initiating the
disciples into the mysteries of dervishism or Soofism.
This privilege of initiation is one of the functions of
the Sajjadanashin (p. 220-221). Thus on theoretical
considerations it may not be easy to hold that the
followers and devotees of the saint who visit the
Durgah and treat it as a place of pilgrimage can be
regarded as constituting a religious denomination or
any section thereof. However, for the purpose of the
present appeal we propose to deal with the dispute
between the parties on the basis that the Chishtia sect
whom the respondents purport to represent and on
whose behalf-(as well as their own)-they seek to
challenge the vires of the Act is a section or a religious
denomination. This position appears to have been
assumed in the High Court and we do not propose to
make any departure in that behalf in dealing with the
present appeal.
The next point which needs to be considered is the
duties of the Khadims and their rights on which their
claim for an appropriate writ is based in the present
(I) (1891) I.L.R. 19 Cal. 204.
51
402
1 6
9 '
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
proceedings.
[1962]
In the High Court t.he question about
The Durgah
the duties of the Khadims was s~t~led by calling upon
Committee, Ajmer the respondents to file an affidavit m that behalf.
In
& Another
accordance with the order passed by the High Court
Syed Mohammed Hanis, who is one of the Khadims,
a detailed affidavit, setting forth the duties of
& Othm
the Khadims and the statements made in this affidavit
Gajeadragadkar J. do not appear to have been traversed at the trial.
According to this affidavit, every day one Khadim in
rotation opens the first gate of the dome containing
the shrine at 4 a. m. after pronouncing the sacred
call named the "Azan''. Accompanied by a few others
he then proceeds to open the second gate pronouncing certain sacred formulae in adulation of Khwaja
Saheb. Then the Khadime remove the old flowers
from the Mazar and put fresh flowers on it. This
ceremony is called "Sej". The dome premises are
then cleaned, 'Loban' is burnt and the withered
flowers are deposited in a sacred depository. This is
followed by general prayer whereupon the Mazar is
thrown open for the pilgrims. One Khadim remains
on duty inside the dome while others guide the
pilgrims. The Khadim who is present inside the
dome helps the pilgrims to kiss the Mazar and prays
for them, after putting the Daman, that is to say, the
cloth covering of the grave over the pilgrims' heads.
At this stage the pilgrims offer Nazar. At 3 p. m.
the dome gates are closed and the flowers are changed
once again. At this time the dome is given a paint
of sandal paste and the Kabr Posh is also changed.
The Khadim offers prayers for all the four silsilas of
the Soofies and all other human beings, and this is
followed by the opening of the Mazar again. At
sunset there is a beat of Nakkara which gathers the
pilgrims at the dome. At this time the Khadims
carry lamps inside the dome, and while so doing they
touch the heads of devotees with their lamps and then
the lamps are placed on lamp posts. Madha (song in
praise of Khwaja Saheb) is recited followed by the
recitation of Dua and all pilgrims join by saying
Amin. The Mazar remains open in this way until 10
p. m. when three Khadims give a ceremonial sweep
v.
Syed Hussain Ali made
J
1 S.C.R.
.•
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
403
thrice inside the dome and lock it for the night. Besi.
r96r
des these daily duties the Khadims perform a special Th D
h
ceremony during Urs and it is called Ousl. On the day comm:u,;'K;jmer
of Basant Panchami Kavvals bring fresh green plants
& An~th"
and flowers as presents to the Mazar and they are
v.
placed on the Mazar by the Khadims on duty. That Syed Hussain Ali
in brief is the nature of the duties performed by the
·'"' Othm
Khadims in the Durgah
Khwaja
Saheb.
G . draga dk iir .
.
.
•
.
1
Let us now consider the rights which accordmg to
the respondents have been held established by judicial
decisions. In this connection the respondents rely
mainly on the judgment of the Judicial Commissioner
in the litigation which went before him in 1931 as well
as the decision on appeal to the Privy Council in the
matter. The contending parties in this litigation were
the Dewan (i.e., Sajjadanashin), the Khadims and the
Durgah Committee. It is not necessary for our present purpose to set out the respective contentions of
the parties. It would be enough if we recite the conclusions reached by the Judicial Commissioner and
mention the final decision of the Privy Council in respect of them. This is how the Judicial Commissioner
recorded his conclusions at the end of his judgment in
paragraph 14:
'
"(a) The rights of the Diwan in respect of offerings made at the Durgah are declared to be as follows:(i) All offerings or presents made to the Diwan at
the Diwan's Khanqah or sitting place within the
precincts of the Durgah are the exclusive property
of the Diwan.
(ii) Offerings or presents of gold or silver vessels
or implements or Qabarposhes for the use of the
Durgah are the property of the Durgah Committee
as trustees for the Durgah irrespective of the payment of Ta wan to the Khadims, and irrespective of
the spot at which they are presented.
(iii) Other offerings if made outside the dome of
the Shrine are the perquisites of the Khadims, with
the exception that offerings of animals or such bulky
articles as cannot conveniently be brought within
the dome shall, if made at the steps of the Shrine
a1~n
'
•
404
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1962]
z96I
be divided between the Diwan and the Khadims
respectively in equal shares.
The Durgah
Committee, Ajmer
(iv) Other offerings if made within the dome of
& Another
the Shrine shall be divisible between the Diwan and
v.
the Khadims respectively in equal shares irrespecSyed Hussain Ali
tive of the spot at which they are deposited within
& Others
tho dome, provided that the following class of offerings shall be the perquisites of the Khadims excluGajendragadkar ].
sively:
(a) Copper coins and cowries and gold or silver
articles (other than coins) of a value less than
8 Annas, and cotton cloth of inferior quality.
(b) All offerings made between the hours of 4 a.m.
and 4 p.m. on 'Qui' day i.e. the last day of the
'Urs'.
(v) Cash or other offerings sent by post shall be
deemed to be offerings made at the Shrine, i.e. within the dome, unless addressed specifically to the
Durgah Committee, the Diwan or the Khadims for
their exclusive use.
(vi) In the case of articles falling within the scope
of clause (ii) the payment ofTawan shall be deemed conclusive proof that an article is presented for
the use of the Durgah and in case in which no
Ta wan is paid in respect of an article falling within
the scope of clause (ii) the Durgah Committee shall
be the authority to decide whether such article is
required or should be retained for the use of the
Durgah.
(b) The defendant Khadims are enjoined to
refrain from any interference with plaintiff's rights
as above declared."
It has been strenuously urged before us by Mr.
Pathak on behalf of the respondents that the only
offerings to which the Durgah Committee can lay a
claim under this judgment are those specified in cl. (a)
(ii), and he contends that these offerings are none
other than the presents of specified articles as therein
indicated; in other words, the argument is that it is
only offerings of certain articles for certain specific
uses of the Durgah that constitute the property of the
Durgah; all other offerings fall to be distributed either
'
.
• •
I S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
405
6
under cl. (a)(iii) or cl. (a)(iv). If the offerings are made
'9 '
outside the dome with the exceptions there specified Th D
h
they go to the Khadims exclusively; if they are made
within the dome they are to be divided between
& Another
the Dewan and the Khadims in equal shares, but even
v. .
.
0
in respect of such offerings those that fall within Syed &H~'~
'"
Ah
1
cl. (a)(iv)(a) or cl. (a)(iv)(b) have to be paid to the Kha"'
dims. Mr. Pathak thus suggests that cl. {a){ii) refers Gajcndrngadka' J.
only to specific presents given for specific purposes and
the opening word "offerings" in the said clause really
refers to the said presents and nothing else. We would
read this clause as confined to specific presents and as
excluding every other offering altogether. In our
opinion, this contention is unsound. In dealing with
the effect of the finding recorded by the Judicial Commissioner we cannot lose sight of the fact that we are
not construing terms of a statute but we are attempting to find out the effect of the findings made in judicial proceedings. The said findings cannot therefore
be divested from the rest for the reasons given in the
judgment, and those reasons do not support the construction suggested by Mr. Pathak. Besides, cl. (v)
specifically refers to cash or other offerings sent by
post, and it provides, inter alia, that if the said cash
or other offerings are addressed specifically to the
Durgah Committee they would belong to the Durgah
just as if they are addressed specifically to the Dewan
or the Khadims they would belong to them respectively to the exclusion of anyone else. Clause (v) thus
clearly postulates that cash or other offerings may be
sent by the devotees to the Durgah Committee specifically for the purposes of the Committee, and that
must inevitably mean that offering may be made in
cash or may take other forms, and if it is earmarked
even generally for the Durgah Committee it would go
to the Durgah Committee, and neither the Sajjadanashin nor the Khadim can claim any share in it. Construing the word "offerings" in cl. (a)(ii) in the light
of cl. (a)(v) we are disposed to take the view that the
word "offerings" includes also an offering besides presents which are specifically referred to in that clause;
and so it follows that even according to the findings
Comm:u,;':;jmer
•
•
·'
)
406
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1962]
1 61
considered as a whole, if any offerings in cash or kind
are
made in favour of the Durgah and in that sense
Th e D urga h
k d f or its
. generaJ purposes they would belong
Committee. Ajmer earmar e
& Anoth"
only to the Durgah and neither the Khadim nor the
v.
Sajjadanashin can make any claim in regard to it.
Syed Hussain Ali
This matter had gone before the Privy Council in
0 · Others
Syed Altaf Hussain v. Diwan Syed Ali Khan (1).
Gajend;;;;;;,dkar]. Dealing with the question of the offerings and the
rights of the respective parties thereto the Privy
Council observed that it was conceded by the parties
before the Court of Appeal that a distinction must be
drawn inter alia between those articles such as Q,aberposhes which are presented for the use of the Durgah
and the other offerings which are made at the Durgah;
and it added that while the offerings belonging to the
latter category may be divisible between the Dewan
and the Khadims those made for the specific use of
the Durgah are the property of the Durgah. In
appreciating the effect of this observation it must be
remembered that the controversy between the parties
at that stage was not as to whether offerings made
otherwise than in the form of specific articles but
earmarked to the Durgah would belong to the Dtirgah
or not. Even in respect of the articles specifically
given to the Durgah for specific purposes the Khadims
made a claim and that was rejected. This background
of the dispute cannot be overlooked in judging the
effect of the decision itself and observations made in
the course of the judgment. Even so, it is significant
that the Privy Council specifically observed that "it
appears that the offerings which are not intended for
the use of the Durgah are made at various places of
the buildings attached to the shrine". In other words,
it would appear that the offerings which were intended
for the use of the Durgah were treated as constituting
a class of offerings apart from the other offerings
which were divisible between the Khadims and the
Sajjadanashins, and that clearly is consistent with
the view which we have taken in regard to the effect
of the findings recorded by the Judicial Commissioner
in appeal. The Privy Council found that Khadims who
9
(') A.I R. r938 P.C. 7r.
y
1 S.C.R.
•
•
•
•
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
407
work as the servants of the Shrine were no doubt
z96z
entitled to the offering~ as .already indicated but ~hat The Durt•h
they can make no claim m regard to the offermgs committee, Ajmer
which are intended for the use of the Durgah.
& Another
At this stage we ought to examine the scheme of
v.
the Act and read its material provisions the vires of Syed Hussain Ali
which is challenged by the respondents. The Act
&· Others
consists of 22 ~ections: and like its p~edecessor Act Gajendragadkar ].
XXIII of 1936 1t provides a self-contamed Code for
the administration of the Durgah and the Endowment
of the Durgah. Section 2(d) defines Durgah Endowment in five clauses. The first three clauses are exactly
in the same terms as the corresponding clauses of
s. 2(4) of the earlier Act XXIII of 1936. Clause (iv)
of s. 2(d) is substantially similar to the corresponding
clause in the earlier section except that it includes the
Jagirdari villages of Hokran and Kishanpur in Ajmer
expressly, whereas cl. (v) is somewhat differently
worded. Under cl. (v) all such nazars or offerings as
are received on behalf of the Durgah by the Nazir or
any person authorised by him are included in the Durgah Endowment. By s. 3 the provisions of the Act are
given overriding effect even though they may be
inconsistent with the provisions contaiued in Act XX
of 1863. Section 4(1) deals with the appointment of
the Committee in which the administration, control
and management of the Durgah Endowment shall be
vested. This Committee shall be called the Durgah
Committee, Ajmer; that is the effect of s. 4(2). Section
5 prescribes the composition of the Committee. It
provides that the Committee shall consist of not less
than five and not more than nine members all of
whom shall be Hanafi Muslims and shall be appointed by the Central Government. Section 6 deals with
the terms of office and resignation and removal of
members and casual vacancies. Section 7 provides for
the election of the President and the Vice-President
of tho Committee. Section 8 prescribes the conditions
under which the Committee may be superseded. Section 9 provides for the power of the Central Government to appoint a Nazim, and s. IO contemplates the
appoint~ent of an Advisory Committee to advise the
408
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1962]
Nazim. Under s. 11 the powers and duties of the
Committee are specified. All of these powers are in
Com;:ttee~rg;jm" regard to the administration, control and manage& Another
ment of the Dutgah Endowment. 'Two of these ought
v.
to be specified because they are the subject-matter of
Syed Hussain Ali challenge.
Section ll(f) refers to the power of the
0
Others
Committee to determine the privileges of the Kha. d -dk
dims and to regulate their. presence
in the Durgah
by
.
•
G a;en raga ar 1 •
the grant to them of "licences m that behalf if the
Committee thinks it necessary so to do", and under
s. ll(h) power is given to the Committee to determine
the functions and powers, if any, which the Sajjadanashin may exercise in relation to the Durgah. Under
s. 12 provision is made for the remuneration of the
Sajjadanashin. Succession to the office of the Sajjadanashin is the subject-matter of s. 13. Section 13(1)
provides that as soon as the office of the Sajjadanashin falls vacant, the Committee shall, :with the previous approval of the Chief Commissioner, make such
interim arrangements for the performance of the
functions of the Sajjadanashin as it may think fit and
immediately thereafter publish a notice in such form
and manner as may be determined by the Committee,
inviting applications for the office of the successor as
therein specified. Four other sub-sections of s. 13
deal with the appointment of the successor but they
are not the subject matter of any controversy and so
it is unnecessary to refer to them. Section 14 is important. It makes it lawful for the Nazim or any
person authorised by him in this behalf to solicit and
receive on behalf of the Durgah any nazars or offer·
ings from any person, and it adds that notwithstanding anything contained in any rule of law or decision
to the contrary no person other than the Nazim or
any person authorised by him in this behalf shall
receive or be entitled to receive nazars or offerings on
behalf of the Durgah. This section prohibits the
Khadims or the Sajjadanashins to solicit offerings on
behalf of the Durgah and is the subject-matter of dispute. Section 15 enjoins upon the Committee to
observe Muslim law and tenets of the Chishti saint in
conducting and regulating the established rites and
I96z
T
D
h
..-H-
•
'
'
1 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
409
ceremonies at the tomb. Section 16 provides for the
'9 6'
appoint?Jent of a Board of Arbit:ation. If any dis- The Durgah
pute arises between the Committee on the one part Committee, Ajm"
and the Sajjadanashin, any Khadim and any person
&- Aiwthcr
claiming to be the servant of the Durgah on the other
v.
part provided such dispute does not, in the opinion of Syed llussain Ali
·
·
& _
Others
the Comm1ttee,
re]a t e t o any re ]'1g10us
usage or custom or to the performance· of any religious office, it Gajendragadkar ;.
has to go before the Board of Arbitration which consists of a nominee of the Committee and a nominee of
the other party to the dispute and a person who holds
or has held the office or is acting or has acted as a
district judge to be appointed by the Central Government. This section provides that an award of the
Board shall be final and shall not be questioned in any
court.
Section 16(2) lays down that no suit shall lie
•
in any court in respect of any matter which is required by sub-s. (1) to be referred to a Board of Arbitration. Section 17 then lays down that any defect in
the constitution of, or vacancy in, the Committee
would not invalidate its acts and proceedings; and
s. 18 provides for the enforcement of the final orders
passed by the Committee in the same manner and by
the same procedure as if the said orders were a decree
or order passed by a civil court in a suit. Section 19
provides for the audit of accounts and annual report,
and s. 20 empowers the Committee to make bye-laws
to carry out the purposes of this Act. Section 21 deals
with transitional provisions, and s. 22 repeals the
earlier Act of 1936. That in brief is the nature and
• scope of the material provisions of the Act.
The challenge to the vires of the Act rests broad!y
on two principal grounds. It is urged that its impugned provisions are inconsistent with Art. 26(b), (c), (d)
of the Constitution and thereby violate the- right to
freedom of religion and to manage denominational
institutions guaranteed by the said Article. It is also
argued that some of its provisions are violative of the
respondents' fundamental right guaranteed under
Art. 19(l)(f) and (g). It would be convenient to deal
• with these two principal grounds ·of attack before
52
410
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1962]
examining the other arguments urged against the
The Du,gah
validity ?f different sections.
. .
Committee, Ajm"
We will first take the argument about the mfrmge& Another
ment of the fundamental right to freedom of religion.
v.
Articles 25 and 26 together safeguard the citizen's
Syed Hussain Ali right to freedom of religion. Under Art. 25(1), sub& ~~rs
ject to public order, morality and health and to the
Gajendragadkar 1 . other provisions of Part III, all persons are equally
entitled to freedom of conscience and their right
freely to profess, practise and propagate religion. This
freedom guarantees to every citizen not only the right
to entertain such religious beliefs as may appeal to his
conscience but also affords him the right to exhibit
his belief in his conduct by such outward acts as may
appear to him proper in order to spread his ideas for
the benefit of others. Article 26 provides that subject
to public order, morality and health every religious
denomination or any section thereof shall have the
right(a) to establish and maintain institutions for
religious and charitable purposes;
(b) to manage its own affairs in matters of relig10n;
(c) to own and acquire movable and immovable
property; and
(d) to administer such property in accordance
with law.
The four clauses of this Article constitute the fundamental freedom guaranteed to every religious denomination or any section thereof to manage its own
affairs. It is entitled to establish institutions for
religious purposes, it is entitled to manage its own
affairs in the matters of religion, it is entitled to own
and acquire movable and immovable property and to
administer such property in accordance with law.
W'hat the expression "religious denomination" means
has been considered by this Court in The Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras v. Sri
Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar of Sri Shirur Mutt (1 ).
Mukherjea, J., as he then was, who spoke for the
Court, has quoted with approval the dictionary meaning of the word "denomination" which says that a
z96z
{I) [r954] S.C.R. 1005, 1023, 1024.
'
•
1 S.C.R.
.
•
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
411
1 961
"denomination" is a collection of individuals classed
together under the same name, a religious sect or Th -D h
" · an d orgamsat10n
· · an d committee.
' "'ga
body having a common 1a1th
Afmer
designated by a distinctive name". The learned Judge
& Anoth"
has added that Art. 26 contemplates not merely a
v.
religious denomination but also a section thereof. Syed Hussain Ali
Dealing with the questions as to what are the matters
& Othm
of religion, the learned Judge observed that the wordGafend,.gadk., r.
"religion" has not been defined in the Constitution,
·
and it is a term which is hardly susceptible of any
rigid definition. Religion, according to him, is a
matter of faith with individuals or communities and
it is not necessarily theistic. It undoubtedly has its
basis in a system of pleas or doctrines which are
regarded by those who profess that religion as conducive to their spiritual well being, but it is not correct to
say that religion is nothing else but a doctrine or belief.
A religion may not only lay down a code of ethical
rules for its followers to accept, it might prescribe
rituals and observances, ceremonies and modes of
worship which are regarded as integral parts of
religion, and these forms and observances might
extend even to matters of food and dress. Dealing
with the same topic, though in another context, in
Sri Venkataramana Devaru v. The State of Mysore (1),
Venkatarama Aiyar, J. spoke for the Court~ in the
same vein and observed that it was settled that
matters ofreligion in Art. 26(b) include even practices
which are regarded by the community as part of its
religion, and in support of this statement the learned
Judge referred to the observations of Mukherjea, J.
which we have already cited. Whilst we are dealing
with this point it may not be out of place incidentally
to strike a note of caution and observe that in order
that the practices in question should be treated as a
part of religion they must be regarded by the said
religion as its essential and integral part; otherwise
even purely secular practices which are not an essential or an integral part of religion are a pt to be
clothed with a religious form and may make a claim
for being treated as religious practices within the
(1) [1958] S.C.R. 895.
412
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1962)
z9 6r
meaning of Art. 26. Similarly, even practices though
religious may have sprung from merely superstitious
co::.::,~eurc;jm" beliefs and may in that sense be extraneous and unes& An~th"
sential accretions to religion itself. Unless such practiv.
cos are found to constitute an essential and integral
Syed Hitssai11 Ali part of a religion their claim for the protection under
& Othm
Art.. 26 may have to be carefully scrutinised; in other
Gajendragadl<ar /. w.ords, the. protection must b~ confined to such reli. g10us practices as are an essential and an integral part
of it and no other.
In the present appeal we are concerned with the
freedoms guaranteed under Art. 26(c) and {d) in particular. The respondents contend that the appointment
of the Committee contemplated by ss. 4 and 5 has
effectively deprived the section of the denomination
represented by them of its right, to own the endowment properties and to administer them. We have
already stated that we propose to deal with this
appeal on the assumption that the respondents have
filed the present writ petition not only for the Khadims but also for and on behalf of the Chishtis and
that the Chishtis constitute a section of a religious
dPnomination. Considered on this basis the contention
of the respondents is directed aga.inst the powers conferred on the Committee for the purpose of administering the property of the Durgah and in substance it
amounts to a challenge to the validity of the whole
Act, because according to them it is for the section of
the denomination to administer this property and the
Legislature cannot interfere with the said right.
In dealing with this argument it is necessary to
recall the fact that the challenge to the vires of s. 5
has been made by the respondents in their petition on
a very narrow ground. They had urged that since the
Committee constituted under the Act was likely to
include Hanafi muslims who may not be Chishti
muslims the provision authorising the appointment of
the Committee was ultra vires, and in fact the decision
of the High Court is also based on this narrow ground.
:K ow, it is clear that the vires of s. 5 cannot be effectively challenged on any such narrow ground. If the
right of the denomination or a section of such denomination is adversely affected by the statute the relevant
h
..
1 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
,,.·
•
413
prov1s10n of the statute must be struck down as a
~~
whole and in its ent~rety or not at 3:11. If respon- The Durgah
dents could properly mvoke Art. 26(d) 1t would not becommitt"· Ajmu
open to the statute to constitute by nomination a
& Anoth"
Committee for the management and administration of
v. .
.
the property of the denomination at all. In other Syed Hussain Ali
. fi rm1ty
. or t h e vice
. m
. t h c sta t u t e canno t
& Olhm
wor d s, t h e m
be cured by confining the members of the proposed Gajendragadkar J.
Committee to the denomination itself. This no doubt
is a serious weakness in the basis on which they levelled their attack against the validity of s. 5 in the
court below.
Besides, it is significant that the property in respect
of which the claim has been made by the respondents
is only the property consisting of offerings made
either in or outside the shrine. We have already
seen that the Durgah Endowment contains several
other items of property and none of these items except.
the offerings has been referred to in the petition, and
that reasonably suggests that the respondents were
conscious that the other items of property though they
formed part of the Durgah Endowment were never in
the management of the denomination as such and so
as to which they could legally make no claim. That
is another infirmity in the claim made by the respondents in challenging the vires of s. 5.
However, we have allowed Mr. Pathak to argue this
part of the respondents' case on the broad and general
ground that the Chishtia Soofies constitute either a
denomination or a section of ·a denomination and as
such they are entitled to administer and manage all
the properties of the Durgah including the offerings to
which specific reference has been made in the petition
by the respondents. The challenge thus presented to
the vires of s. 5 and other subsidiary sections dealing
with the powers of the Committee cannot succeed for
the simple and obvious reason that the denomination
never had the right to administer the said property in
question. We have already seen how the history of
tho administration of the Durgah Endowment from
the time the first endowment was made down to the
date of the Act clearly shows that the endowments
414
·'9 6'
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1962]
have always been made on such terms as did not con.
The Du,gah
fer ~n the denomination the right to manage the p~o
Commillee, A}m" perties endowed. The management of the properties
& Another
endowed was always in the hands of officers appointv.
ed by the State who were answerable to the State and
Syed Hussain Ali who were removable by the State at the State's plea& Others
sure. We have already seen that until Akbar made
Gajendrngadka' ]. his endowment in
favour of the Durgah the position
of the Durgah and its properties was very modest and
there was hardly any property to manage or administer. Ever since the first endowment was made and
subsequent additions by similar endowments followed
the administration and management of the property
has been consistent with the same pattern and the
said pattern excludes any claim that the administration of the property in question was ever in the hands
of the said denomination. It is obvious that Art. 26( c)
and (d) do not create rights in any denomination or
its section which it never had; they merely safeguard
and guarantee the continuance of rights which such
denomination or its section had. In other words, if
the denomination never had the right to manage the
properties endowed in favour of a denominational institution as for instance by reason of the terms on
which the endowment was created it cannot be heard
to say that it has acquired the said rights as a result
of Art. 26(c) and (d), and that the practice and custom
prevailing in that behalf which obviously is consistent
with the terms of the endowment should be ignored or
treated as invalid and the administration and management should now be given to the denomination. Such
a claim is plainly inconsistent with the provisions of
Art. 26. If the right to administer the properties
never vested in the denomination or had been validly
surrendered by it or has otherwise been effectively
and irretrievably lost to it Art. 26 cannot be successfully invoked. The history of the administration of
the property endowed to the tomb in the present case
which is spread over nearly Four Centuries is sufficient to raise a legitimate inference about the origin of
the terms on which the endowments were founded,
,L
''
'
' -
''' \
~
,,
·~
1 S.C.R.
I
-
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
415
an origin which is inconsistent with any rights subz96z
sisti~g in the. donominat!ons. to. administer the proThe Durgah
pert1cs belongmg to the mstitut10n. It was because committee, Ajmer
the respondents were fully conscious of this difficulty
& Another
that they did not adopt this broad basis of challenge
v. .
in their writ petition. In considering this question 5 yed .H ussam Ali
it is essential to remember that the pilgrims to the
L' ~~"
· tomb have at no time been confined to Chishtia Gajmdragadkar ].
Soofies nor to muslims but that in fact a large number
of Hindus, Khoja Memons and Parsis visit the tomb
out of devotion for the memory of the departed saint
and it is this large cosmopolitan circle of pilgrims
which should in law be held to be the circle of beneficiaries of the endowment made to the tomb. This
fact inevitably puts a different complexion on the
whole problem. We must, therefore, hold that the
challenge to the vires of s. 5 and the subsidiary sections which deal with the powers of the Committee on
the ground that the said provisions violate the fundamental right guaranteed to the denomination repre·
sented by the respondents under Art. 26(c) and (d)
fails.
That takes us to the other principal challenge based
on Art. 19( 1)( f) and (g). This challenge is directed
partly against cl. (v) in s. 2(d) which defines a Durgah
Endowment. We have already seen that by this
. clause all such Nazars or offerings as are received on
behalf of the Durgah by the Nazim or any other person authorised by him are included in the Durgah
Endowment. Section 14 may be read along with this
definition. This section confers power on the N azim
or his agent to solicit or receive offerings on behalf of
the Durgah and prohibits any other person from soliciting such offerings. The respondents contend that
these provisions infringe their fundamental right to
property inasmuch as offerings or Nazars which under
the custom judicially recognised would have gone to
them are now sought to be diverted to the Durgah to
their detriment. This argument proceeds on the assumption that it is only particular presents made for
certain specific purpose of the Durgah that would belong to the Durgah and that the rest of the offerings
416
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1962]
would be divisible between the Khadims and the
Sajjadanashins
as directed in the earlier litigation to
Th e D urga h
h"
h
h
1 d
c
.
Committee, Ajm" w IC we ave area y re1erred. If the assumpt1011
& Anotl"'
made by the respondents was well founded that the
v.
effect of the said decision was to limit the right of the
Syed Hussain Ali Durgah only to the receipt of the specific articles for
011
&
"'s
specific purposes then of course there would have been
Gajendrngadkar J. considerable force in the argument that s. 2(d)(v) and·
s. 14 seek to augment that right and to that extent diminish or prejudicially affect the rights of the respondents. But, as we have already indicated, the decision
of the Judicial Commissioner as well as that of the
Privy Council do not support the claim made on behalf
of the respondents. Even under the said decisions, specific articles given for specific purposes as well as offerings made for the general purposes of the Durgah and
earmarked for it always belonged to the Durgah and
it is only these offerings which are included within the
definition of the Durgah Endowment by s. 2(d){v).
Offerings or Nazars which are paid to the Durgah and
as such received on behalf of the Durgah constitute
Durgah Endowment and s. 14 authorises the Nazim
or his agent to receive such offerings and prohibit any
other person from receiving them. In other words,
the effect of the two provisions is that when offerings
are made earmarked generally for the Durgah they
belong to the Durgah and such offerings can be received only by the N azim or his agent and by nobody
else. It is clear that these offerings never belonged
to the respondents and they can therefore have no
grievance against either s. 2(d)(v) or s. 14. That is
a matter concerning the property of the Durgah and
it is open to the Legislature to regulate by providing
that the said offerings can be solicited by the N azim
or his agent and by no one else. The Khadims' right
to receive offerings which has been judicially recognised is in no manner affected or prejudiced by the
impugned provisions. Even after the Act came into
force pilgrims might and would make offerings to the
Khadims and there is no provision in the Act which
prevents them from accepting such offerings when
made. Therefore, in our opinion, the challenge to the
vires of these two provisions must also fail.
r96r
t
ii
-
1 S.C.R.
- --\_ \
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
417
/
,
\
6
Before we part with s. 2(d)(v) it may be pertinent
'9 '
\, to obser".e. that in substance the relevant. portion of n, -;-;:,gah
\ the defimtron of the Durgah Endowment is the same committee. Aimer
'as in the earlier Act. Under the earlier Act only such
& Another
offerings as were intended explicitly for the use of the
v.
Durgah were included in the Durgah Endowment, Syed Hussain Ali
while under s. 2(d)(v) all Mazars and offerings which
& Others
are received on behalf of the Durgah are so included. Gajendragadkar J.
The omission of the word "explicitly" from the present definition is merely intended to make it clear that
if from the nature of the offering or the circumstances
surrounding the making of the offering or from other
relevant facts it appears that the offering was made
' for the purpose of the Durgah and was accepted on
behalf of the Durgah as such it would be an item of
the Durgah Endowment though the offering may not
have been explicitly made for the Durgah as such;
but the broad idea underlying both the definitions is
that where offerings are made apart from the gift of
specific articles intended for specific purposes of the
Durgah and it is found that they ·are earmarked or
intended for the Durgah for the general purposes of
the institution they would constitute a part of the
Durgah Endowment. Therefore the contention that
by enlarging the definition of Durgah Endowment
s. 2(d)(v) has made an encroachment on the fundamental rights of the respondents is not at all well
founded.
That takes us to s. ll(f) and (h). The challenge to
the vires of these two provisions proceeds on the
assumption that they encroach upon the fundamental
right of the respondents undBr Art. 25(1). It is urged
that the Committee has been given power by these
provisions to determine the privileges of the Khadims
as well as the functions and powers, if any, which the
Sajjadanashin may exercise in relation to the Durgah
and that means infringement of the freedom of the
Khadims to practice their religion according to the
custom and according to their concept. We are not
impressed by this argument. What the relevant provisions intend to achieve is the regulation of the discharge of duties by the Khadims and the discharge
53
418
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1962]
of functions and powers by the Sajjadanashin. It is
The Durgah
common ground that the Khadims discharged their
Committee, AJ11m duties by rotation and that itself proves that some
& Another
regulation is necessary, and so the impugned proviv. .
. sions merely provide for the regulation of the dissyed &Hu«arn
.
Othm Ah ch arge of th e d u t'res by 'h
" e Kh a d'ims an d not1ung
_
more, and so the plea that the freedom to practice
Gajendragadkar J. religion guaranteed by Art. 25(1) has been violated
does not appear to be well founded.
In this connection we ought to refer to s. 15 which
makes it obligatory for the Committee in exercise of
. its powers and discharge of its duties to follow the
rules of Muslim law applicable to Hanafi muslims in
India, and so all the ceremonies in the Dnrgah have
necessarily to be conducted and regulated in accordance with the tenets of the Chishti saint. The powers
conferred on the Committee by s. 11 (f) and (h) must
be read in the light of the mandatory provisions of
s. 15. Thus read the apprehension that the fundamental right to freedom of religion is infringed by the
said provisions will clearly appear to be wholly unjustified.
There is yet another section which is relevant in
dealing with the present point, and that is s. 16.
Under s. 16 arbitration is provided for when disputes
arise between the Committee on the one part and the
Khadims and others on the other. This provision
applies to all disputes except those that relate to any
religious usage or custom or to the performance of any
religious office. In other words, disputes in regard to
secular mittters are left for the decision of the arbitrators, and that, in our opinion, is a very sensible provision. The composition of the Board of Arbitration is
based on well recognised principles; the two parties to
the dispute name their respective nominees and an
impartial member is required to be appointed on the
Board with the qualifications specified bys. 16(l)(iii).
The argument that s. 16 offends against the fundamental right guaranteed by Art. 14 read with Art. 32
seems to us to be wholly untenable. The policy underlying s. 16 is in our opinion healthy and unexceptionable and so the provisions of s. 16 can be sustained
..
'
....,\
•
1 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
.
419
6
on the ground that they are obviously in the interest
'9 '
\ of the in.s~itution as well as th.e J?art!es concer~ed. The Durgah
\ The provisions for compulsory ad3ud10at10n by arbrtra- Committee, Ajmer
' tion are not unknown and it would be idle to contend
& Another
that they offend against Art. 14 read with Art. 32.
v.
If a dispute arises between the Committee and the Syed Hussain Ali
Khadims in regard to a religious matter it would
"' Others
necessarily have to be decided in accordance with the Gajend;;;-;;;dkar 1
ordinary law and in ordinary civil courts of competent
·
jurisdiction. Such a dispute is outside the purview of
s. 16; and indeed, in respect of such a dispute the
Committee is not authorised to make any orders or
issue any directions at all. Therefore the conclusion
appears to us to be inescapable that the provisions of
s. ll(f) and (h) are valid and do not suffer from any
constitutional infirmity.
The next section which is challenged is s. 13(1).
The validity of this section has not been specifically
attacked in the petition but even so since the whole of
the Act has in a general way been challenged we have
allowed Mr. Pathak to urge his arguments against the
validity of s. 13(1). Section 13(1) authorises the Committee to make provisional interim arrangement if a
vacancy occurs in the office of the Sajjadanashin.
Now, in considering the scope and effect of this provision it cannot be read apart from the provisions of the
remaining sub.sections of s. 13. Section 13 is really
intended to lay down the procedure for determining disputes as to the succession to the office of the Sajjadanashin. That is the main object of the section, but if
a vacancy occurs suddenly as it al ways will in the case
of death for instance some interim arrangement must
obviously be made; and all that s. 13(1) empowers the
Committee to do is to make an appropriate interim
arrangement in that behalf and to proceed to take the
necessary steps for the appointment of a permanent
successor as prescribed by the other provisions of s. 13.
Therefore it is futile to contend thats. 13(1) offends
against Art. 25(1) of the Constitution.
Section 14 is attacked on the ground that it violates
the respondents' right to property under Art. 19(1)(f).
We have already discussed this question ~in dealing
420
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
•
[1962]
withs. 2 (d)(v). As we have pointed out all thats. 14
does is to create a statutory right in the N azim or his
Com~:uee~r~jmer agent to solicit and receive offering~ on behalf of the
& Another
Durgah. That does not affect the right of the responv.
dents to receive offerings paid to them by the pilgrims
Syed Hussain Ati visiting the Durgah. The respondents cannot possibly
&· _
Others
· a rig
· ht t o sol"101"t or receive
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m
Gajendragadkar J. for the benefit of the Dmgah. In fact no such claim
ha11 been made in the petition and no such claim can
be made at all. Therefore the validity of s. 14 is not
shaken by the challenge made by the respondents
under Art. 19(1 )(f).
That leaves only one section to be considered, and
that is s. 18. It is urged that s. 18 also violates the
fundamental rights guaranteed to the respondents
under Arts. 14 and 32 of the Constitution. It is difficult to appreciate the argument. It may be conceded
that s. 18 is somewhat clumsily worded. The final
orders whose enforcement is provided for by s. 18
would appear to be final orders passed in matters
within the competence of the Committee as to which
no dispute is raised by the persons against whom the
said orders are passed. We have already seen that if
disputes arise in respect of any matters left to the
jurisdiction of the Committee and they are not of a
religious character then they have to be referred to
arbitration provided for by s. 16, and in that case it is
the award passed by the Board of Arbitration that
would be in force. If disputes arise between the
parties on any religious matters they will have to be
decided in accordance with law in the ordinary civil
courts of competent jurisdiction and so decisions in
these disputes are also outside s. 18. Thus considered
the scope of s. 18 would be confined only to such final
orders as are passed by the Committee within its
jurisdiction against persons who do not object to them
but who fail to comply with them. If that is the scope
of s. 18, as we hold it is, it is idle to contend that
either Art. 14 or Art. 32 or the two read together are
contravened.
During the course of his argument Mr. Pathak emphasised the fact that though the provisions of the
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..
•
1 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
'
enactment may be within the four corners of the Cons'9 6'
titutdion band! non~ ofht_he i_mpugned provishions _mayhbe The Durgah
f oun to eu travires isc1ientswereappre ens1vet at committee, Ajmer
in fact and in practice their rights to receive offerings & Another
would be prejudicially affected. That is a matter on
v.
which we propose to express no opinion. All that we Syod H u"ain Ali
are concerned to see is whether the legal rights of the
& ~~rs
respondents or of the section of the denomination they Gajendragadkar ].
seek to represent are prejudicially affected by the impugned legislation contrary to the provisions of the
Constitution; and a careful examination of the relevant
sections in the light of the criticisms made by
Mr. Pathak against them has satisfied us that none of
the impugned sections can be said to be unconstitutional. If as a result of the enforcement of the present Act incidental)y more offerings are paid to the
Durgah and are received on behalf of the Durgah that
is a consequence which the respondents may regard as
unfortunate but which introduces no infirmity in the
validity of the Act.
In the result the appeal is allowed, the order issued
by the High Court is set aside and the petition filed
by the respondents dismissed with costs throughout.
Appeal allowed.
1.
421
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