DIAMOND SUGAR MILLS LTD., AND ANOTHER versus THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH AND ANOTHER
Supreme Court of India | Decided 13 December 1960 | [1961] 3 S.C.R. 242 | 1960 INSC 265
Key facts
- Decided
- 13 December 1960
- Bench
- SYED JAFFER IMAM*, J.L. KAPUR*, K.C. DAS GUPTA, RAGHUBAR DAYAL, N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR
- Bench size
- 5
- Case number
- CIVIL APPEAL No. 35/1959
- Disposal
- Appeal(s) allowed
- Citation
- [1961] 3 S.C.R. 242
- Neutral citation
- 1960 INSC 265
Text of the judgment
242
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
I
(1961]
Finance Act was not applicable in that pa.se. In the
The Income-ta:¥ second there was no profit in any preceding year and
Officer, Alwaye therefore the fiction failed because it postulates that
v.
there should be undistributed profits of one or more
lte Asok Te:¥tiles years immediately preceding the previous year. In
Ltd., Alwaye the third case also the Finance Act was inapplicable
Kapu, 1 .
because the additional tax was not properly laid upon
the total income and what was actually taxed was
never a part of the total income of the previous
year.
In our opinion the order of the High Court was
erroneous. We therefore allow this appeal and set
aside the judgment and order of the High Court with
costs in this court and in the High Court.
Appeal allowed.
.rg6o
December I3.
DIAMOND SUGAR MILLS LTD., AND
ANOTHER
v.
THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH AND
ANOTHER
(JAFER IMAM, J. L. KAPUR, K. C. DAs GUP'l'A,
RAG~AR DAYAL and N. RAJAGOPALA
AYYANGAR, JJ.)
Sugar Cane-Imposition of cess-Enactmtnt taxing entry of
cane into factory-Constitutionality of-"Local are((', Connotat$011
of-Constitution of India, Sch. VII, Lisl II, Entry 52-U. P.
Sugarcane Cess Acl, I956 (U. P. XXII of I956), s. 3·
Entry 52 of List II of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution empowered State Legislatures to make a Jaw relating to
''taxes on the entry of goods into a local area for consumptiOd,
use or sale therein". The U. P. Legislature passed the U. P.
Sugarcane Cess Act, 1956, which authorised the State Government to impose a cess on the entry of cane into the premises of a
factory for use, consumption or sale therein. The appellant
contended that the premises of a factory was not a 'local area·.
within the meaning of Entry 52 and the Act was beyond the
competence of the legislature.
' .
3 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
243
Held, (per Imam, Kapur, Das Gupta and Raghubar Dayal;
JJ.) that the impugned Act was beyond the competence of the
legislature and was invalid. The premises of a factory was not Diamond Sugar
Mills Ltd.,
a "local area" within the meaning of Entry 52. The proper
meaning to be attached to the words "local area" in Entry 52 · & Another
v.
was an area administered by a local body like a municipality, a
district board, a local board, a union board, a Panchayat or the The State of
Uttar P!'adesh
like.
& Anothe!'
In re: the Central Provinces & Berar Act No. XIV of I938,
[1939] F.C.R. 18, Navinchandra Mafatlal v. The Commissioner of
Income~tax, Bombay City, [1955] I S.C.R. 829, State of Madras v.
Gannon Dunkerley & Co., Ltd., [1959] S.C.R. 379 and South Carolina v. United States, (1905) 199 U.S. 437, referred to.
Emperor v. Munnalal, I.L.R. 1942 All. 302, disapproved.
Per Ayyangar, J.-The Act was invalid only in so far as it
sought to levy a tax on cane entering a factory from within the
same local area in which the {actory was situate and was valid
in other cases. It was permissible to read the Act so as to confine
the tax to the limitations subject to which it could be constitutio~
nally levied an~ to strike down that portion which outstepped
the limitations.
In re Hindu Women's Rights to Property Act, I937, [1941]
F.C.R. 12 and Blackwood v. Queen, (1882) 8 A.C. 82, applied.
CIVIL APPELLATE JuRISDICTION: Civil Appeal No.
35 of 1959.
Appeal from the judgment and decree dated October 29, 1956, ofthe Allahabad High Court in Writ
Petition No. 327 of 1956.
H. N. Sanyal, Additional Solicitor-General of India,
J. B. Dadachanji, 8. N. Andley, Rameshwar Nath and
P. L. Vohra, for the appellants.
G. 0. Mathur and 0. P. Lal, for the respondents.
1960, December 13. The Judgment of Imam,
Kapur, Das Gupta and Dayal, JJ. was delivered by
Das Gupta, J. Ayyangar, J. delivered a separate judgment.
DAs GUPTA, J.-.This appeal is against an order
of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad rejecting the appellants, application under Art. 226 of the
Constitution. The first appellant is the Diamond
Sugar Mills Ltd., a. public limited company owning
and operating a sugar factory at Pipraich in the District Gorakhpur, for the manufacture of sugar from
Das Gupta].
244 -
~ -,_:9 60 :
.". ,'
~SUPREME COURT REPORTS
i
[1961]
sugarcane. ' The second a'pp~lla~t'" is .the Director of
By this application _ the_ appellants ·
Mills Ltd..
challenged the imposition· of cess on the entry of
· c&- Another.
sugarcane into their factory:\ On:Fcbruary :24, 1956,
v.
when the application was. made theU. P. Sugarca'ne
The State of- {Regulation of Supp1y and Purchase} Act, 1953(U. P.':
u~~:;tah::s" XXIV of 1953), was ih force. Section 20 of this Act
gave to the Governor of U. P. the power to impose by _
Das Gupta J· notification "a cess not exceeding 4 arinas per maund
on the· entry- of sugarcane into an area specified in
-- suchnotificati,lm for consumption; use or sale therein''. This Act it may be mentioned bad taken the
place of an earlier Act, the U. P. Sugar Factories Control Act, 1!}38, s. 29 of which authorised the Governor
of U.' P. to impose by a notification after consultation'
with the Sugar Control Board under the Act "a cess
not e·xcceding 10 per cent of the minimum price, if
any, fixed under _s. 21 or 4 annas per maund which- .
ever was higher ori the entry of sugarcane_ into a local
area specified in such notification for consumption,
usc or sale therein'\ Notifications were issued under
this provision for different crushing seasons starting
from 193S-30, the last notification -issued thereunder
being for the crushing season of 1052-53. These notifications set out a number of factories in a schedule
and provided that during 1952-53 crushing season cess
at a rato of three annas per maund shall be levied on,
the entry of all sugarcane into tho local areas , comprised in factories mentioned in the schedule for consumption, useor sale therein. Act No. XXIV of 1953
repealed tho 1038 Act. The first notification under
tho provisions' of s. 20 of tho 1D53 Act was in these·
terms:" In exorcise of the powers conferred by sub-sec-tion (1) of section 20 of , Uttar Pradesh Sugarcane
(Regulation of. Supply and Purchase)- Act~ ·1953;.
(U-P. Act No. XXIV of 1953) the Governor is pleas~ ed to declare that during the 1954-55 crushing sea. son, a cess at a rate of three annas per maund shall·
be levied _on the -entry of, all sugar cane into the
·local-.areD.s comprised in the factories mentioned- in~
the Schedule, foJ; the consumption, use or sale therein". ·.
·
Dia~;:;;; suga~· the company.
'
.
3 S.C.R. SUPREl\ffi COURT REPORTS
l
v
·;
I.
245
Similar notifications were also issued on October 23,
1954, for the crushing season 1954-55 and on Novem6 Th Diamond Sugar
ber 9, 1955, for the crushing season 1955-5 ·
e Mitis Ltd.,
appellants' factory was one of the factories mentioned &- Anotl1dr
in the schedule of all these notifications. On the date
v.
of the application, i.e., February 24:, 1956, a sum of The State of
Rs. 2,59,644-9-0 was due from the first appellant and a. Uttar Pradesh
further sum of Rs. 2,41,416-3-0 as liability on account &- Another
of cess up to the end of January, 1956, also remained Das Gupta J.
unpaid.
The appellant contended on various grounds that
s. 20 of Act XXIV of 1953 was unconstitutional and
invalid and prayed for the issue of appropriate writs
directing the respondents the State of U. P. and the
Collector of Gorakhpur not to levy and collect cess oil
account of the arrears of cess for the crushing season
1954:-55 and in respect of the crushing season 1955-56
and successive crushing seasons and to withdraw the
notifications c:lated October 23, 1954:, and November 9,
1955, which have been mentioned above.
During the pendency of this application under Art.
226 before the Allahabad High Court the U. P. Legislature enacted the U. P. Sugarcane Cess Act, 1956
(U. P. XXII of 1956), repealing the 1953 'Act. Section 3 of this Act as originally enacted was in these
words:"Tho State Government may by notification in
the official gazette impose a. cess not exceeding four
annas per maund on tho entry of tho cane into the
promises of a factory for use, consumption or t...}le
therein:
_I'rovid_ed. that tho ~tate GO\·ernment may like·
wtse rom1t m whole or m part such cess in respect
of cane used or to be used in fa.ctory for any limited
purpose spe_cifietl in the notification.
Expln.natwn:-If the State Government in the
case of any factory si}:uato outside Uttar Pradesh
so declare, any p~a.ce 1~.Uttar Pradesh set apart fo;
the purct~a.se of can~ mtenhded or required for URe,
consump ton or sa e m sue factory shall bo d
otl to be tho premises of the factory.
eem(2) The cess imposed under sub-section (l) shall
1
246
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1961]
be payable by the owner of the factory and shall be
paid
on such date and at such place as may be
Diamond Suga'
prescribed.
Mills Ltd.,
(3) Any arrear of cess not paid on the date pres.S. Another
v.
cribed under sub-section (2) shall carry interest at
The State of
6 per cent. per annum from such date to date of
Uttar Prad~sh
payment.n
· .S. A nother
There is a later amendment' by which the words
''four annas" have been altered to "twenty-five naye
Das Gupta j
paise" and the words "Gur, Rab or Khandsari Sugar
Manufacturing Unit" have been added after the
words "factory" in sub-section (1). These amendments
are however not relevant for the purpose of this
appeal.
Section 9 of this Act repealed s. 20 of the Sugar
Cane (Regulation of Supply and Purchase) Act, 1953.
Sub-sections 2 and 3 of s. 9 are important. They are
in these words:"2. Without\prejudice to the general application
of section 24 of the U.P. General Clauses Act, 1904,
every notification imposing cess issued and every
· assessment made, (including the amount- of cess
collected) under or in pursuance of any such notification, shall be deemed a notification issued, assessment made and cess collected under this Act as if
sections 2, 3 and 5 ·to 8 had been in force at all
materia] dates.
3. Subject as provided in clause (1) of Article 20
of the Constitution every notification issued cess
imposed and act or thing done or omitted between
the 26th January, 1950, and the Appointed date in
exercise or the purported exercise of a power under
section 29 of the U. P. Sugar Factories Control Act,
1938, or of s. 20 of the U. P. Sugarcane (Regulation
of Supply and Purchase) Act, 1953,. which would
have been validly and properly issued, imposed,
done or omitted if the said sections had been as
section 3 of this Act, shall in law be deemed to be
and to have been validly and properly imposed and
done, any judgment, decree or order of any court
not withstanding."
The pos~tion after the enactment of the U. P.
3 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
247
60
Sugarcane Cess Act, 1956, was that the imposition and
r9
assessment of cess that had already been made under Diamond suga,
the 1953 Act would operate as if made under the 1956 Mills Ltd.,
Act. In view of this the first appellant, the Diamond tf>. Anon,,
Sugar Mills Ltd., prayed to the High Court for permisv.
sion to raise the question of constitutionality and vali- ~~:,s~:;d:~
dity of the 1956 Act. It also prayed for the issue of a tf>. Another
writ in the nature of mandamus directing the respondents not to levy cess upon the petitioners-appellants Das Gupta ].
under this new Act, the U. P. Sugarcane Cess Act,
1956.
This application was allowed and the High Court
considered the question whether s. 3 of the U. P.
Sugarcane Cess Act, 1956, empowering the State
Government to impose a cess not exceeding four annas
per maund on the entry of the cane into the premises·
of a factory for the consumption, use or sale therein
was a valid law.
The principal ground urged in support of the appellants' case was that the law as enacted ins. 3 was
invalid and that it was beyond the legislative competence of the State Legislature. Several other
grounds including one that the provisions of the· section went beyond the permissible limits of delegated
legislation were also raised. All the grounds were
negatived by the High Court which. accordingly rejected the appellants' petition. .The High Court however
gave a certificate under Article 132(1) and also under
Art. 133(1)(c) of the Constitution and on the basis of
that certificate the present appeal has been filed.
Of the several grounds urged before the High Court
only two are urged before us in appeal. One is that
the law was invalid, being beyond the legislative competence of the Sta.te legislature; the other is that in any
case the provision giving the Governor power to levy
any cess not exceeding 4 annas without providing for ·
any guidance as to the fixation of the particular rate,
amounted to excessive delegation, and was accordingly invalid. The answer to the question whether the
impugned law was within or beyond the legislative
competence of the State legislature depends on whether the law falls under Entry 52 of the State List-
.
I
I
l
J
248
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1961]
List II of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution.
It is quite clear that there is no other entry in either
Diamond Sugar
tho State List or the Concurrent List under· whioh tho
Mills Ltd.,
legislation could have been made. Entry 52 is in
& Another
v.
these words:-"Tax on the' eritry of goods into a JocaJ
The State of
area for consumption, use or sale therein". Section 3
Uttar Prc1desh
of the impugned Act which has .already been set out
& Anoth~r
provides for imposition of a cess on the entry of suga.rDas Gupta J. cane into the premises of a factory for use, oonsumption or sale therein. Is the "premises of a factory" a
local u.rea within the meu.ning of the words used in
Entry 52? If it is the legislu.tion was clearly within
the competence of the State legislature; if it is not,
the law was beyond the Stu.te legislature's competence
and must be struck down as invalid.
In considering the meaning of the words "local
area" in entry 52 we have, on the one hand to bear in
mind the salutary rule that words .conferring the
right of legislation should be interpreted liberally and
the powers conferred should be given tho widest
amplitude; on the other hand we have to guard oursol vcs agaim;t extending the meaning of the words
beyond their reasonable connotation, in an u.nxiet.y
to preserve the power of tho legislature. · ln Re the
Central Provinces & Berar Act No. XIV of 1938 C) Sir
Maurice Gwycr, C. J., observed:"1 conceive that a broad and liberal spirit should
inspire those whose duty it is to interpret it; but I
do not imply by this that they are free to stretch or
pervert the language of the enactment in the interests of any legal or constitutionnl theory, or even
for the purpose of correcting any supposed errors".
Again, in Navinchandra ]'Jafatlal v. The Comrnis8ione-r
of lncume 'Pax, Bombay City( 2 ) Das, J. (as he then
was) delivering the judgment of this Court observed:" .........The cardinal rule of interpretation however, is that words should be read in their ordinary,
natural and grammatical meaning Sllbject to this
ridor that in construing words in a constitutional
· ermctment conferring legislative power the most
li) [193'JJ F.C.R. 18, 37·
(2) [1955] 1 S.C.R. 829.
-.
3 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
~·
·····~
249
1960
liberal construction should be put upon the -words
so that the same may have effect in their widest Diamond Sugar
amplitude."
Mills Ltd.,
Our task being to ascertain the limits of the & Another
v.
powers granted by the Constitution, we cannot extend
these limits by way of interpretation. But if there is The Slate of
Pradesh
any difficulty in ascertaining the limits, the difficulty Uttar
& Another
must be resolved so far as possible in favour of the
legislative body. The presumption in favour of con- Das Gupta].
stitutionality which was stressed by the learned
counsel for the respondents does not take us beyond
this.
On behalfof the appellants it has been urged that
the word "local area" in its ordinary grammatical
meaning is never used in :oospect of a single house or
a single factory or a single plot of land. It is urged
that in ordinary use the words "local area" always
mean an area covering a specified region of the country as distinguished from the general area. While it
may not be possible- to say that the words "local area."
have acquired a definite {l.nd precise meaning and the
phrase may have different connotations in different
contexts, it seems correct to say that it is seldom, if
ever, used to denote a single house or a single factory.
The phrase appears in several statutes, some passed
by the Central Legislature and some by the Provincial
or ~tate Legislatures; but in many of these the words
have been defined. These definitions being for the
peculiar purpgse of the particular statute cannot be
applied to the interpretation of the words "loeal area."
as used in the Constitution. Nor can we derive any
assistance from the judicial interpretation of the words
"local area" as used in the Code of Criminal Procedure
or other Acts like Bengal Tenancy Act a.s these interpretations were made with reference to the scope of
the legislation in which the phrase occurs. Researches
into dictionaries and law lexicons are also of no avail
a.s none of these give the meaning of the phrase "local
area''. What they say as regards the meaning of the
word "local" offers no guidance except that it is clear
that the word "local" has different meanings iu different contexts.
3a
250
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1961]
The etymological meaning of the word ~'local" is
"relating to" or "pertaining to, a place. It may be
'';:;,~;s L:;,~ar first observed that whether or not the whole of the
&- Anoth~r
State can be a "local area", for the purpose of Entry
v.
52, it is clear that to be a. "local area" for this purpose
The State of
must be an area within the State. On behalf of the
Uttar Pradesh respondents it is argued that "local area" in Entry 52
~ Another
should therefore be taken to mean ''any part of the
Das Gupta f. State in any place therein". So, the argument runs,
a single factory being a part of the State in a place in
the State is a "local area". In other words, "local
area'' mean "any specified area inside the State". The
e1bvious fallacy of this. argument is that it draws no
distinction between the word "area" standing by itself
and the phrase "local area". If the Entry had been
"entry of goods into any area of the State ............ "
some area would be specified for the purpose of the
law levying the cess on entry. If the Constitutionmakers were empowering the State Legislatures to
levy a cess on entry of goods into_ any specified area
inside the state the proper words to use would have
been "entry of goods into any area ............... " It
would be meaningless and indeed incorrect to use the
words they did use ''entry of goods into a local area".
The use of the words "local area" instead of the word
"area" cannot but be due to the intention of the Constitution-makers to make sure that the power to make
laws relating to levy on entry of goods would not
extend to cases of entry of goods into any and every
part of the state from outside that part but only to
entry from outside into such portions of the state as
satisfied the description of "local area". SoJL.ething
definite was sought to be expressed by the use of the
word "local" before the word "area": The question is:
what exactly was sought to be .expressed?
In finding an answer to the question it is legitimate
to turn to the previous history of constitutional legislation in the country on this subject of giving power to
legislature to levy tax on the entry of goods. In the
State of Madras v. Gannon Dunkerley & Go., Ltd. (1 )
z96o
D.
~-
(I) [1959) S.C.R. 379·
3 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
251
1 60
this Court referred with approval to the stateme~t
9
of law in Halsbury's Laws of England, Vol. II, n·
a5
' ' state of E ng1'1sh 1aw 'amon
~gar
para. 157, p. 93, t hat. t he ex1stmg
Mills Ltd
in 1867 is relevant for consideration in determining ~So Anotht;
the meaning of the terms used in the British North
v.
America Act in conferring power and the extent of The State of
that power. This has necessarily to be so as in· the Uttar Pradesh
words of Mr. Justice Brewer in South Carolina v.
& Another
United States (1 ) "to determine the extent of the grants Das Gupta J,
of power, we must, therefore, place ourselves in the
position of the men who framed and adopted the
Constitution, and inquire what they must have understood to be the meaning and scope of those grants."
.Turning now to the previous legislative history we
find that in the Government Of India Act, 1935, Entry
49 of the Legislative List (List II of the 7th Schedule)
was in the same words as Entry 52 of the Constitution
except that instead of the words "taxes" as in Entry
52 of List II of the Constitution, Entry 49 List II of
the Government of India Act, used the word "cess".
In Government of India Act, 1915, the powers of the
provincial legislatures were defined ins. 80A. Under
clause (a.) of the third sub-section of this section the
local legislature of any province has with the previous
sanction of the Governor-General power to make or
take into consideration any law imposing or authorising the imposition of any new tax unless the tax was
a tax scheduled ~s exempted from this provision by
rules made under the Act.
The third of the Rules that were made in this
matter under Notification No. 311/8 dated December
18, 1920, provided that the legislative council of a
province may without the previous sanction of the
Governor-General make and take into consideration
any law imposing or authorising a. local authority to
impose for the purpose of such local authority any tax
included in Schedule II of the Rules. Schedule II
contained 11 items of which items 7 and 8 were in
these words:7. An octroi
8. A terminal tax on goods imported into a local
(l) (1905) 199 u.s. i37·
't
252
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1961]
area in which an octroi was levied on or before 6th
July. 1917.
Diamond Sugar
Mills Lid.,
Item 8 was\ .slightly modified in the year 1924 by
&- Another
another notification as a result of which it stood
v.
thus: 8. A terminal tax on goods imported into
The State of
or
exported from a local area save where such tax
Uttar Pradesh
is
first
imposed in a local area in which an octroi
6- Another
was levied ')nor before July 6, 1917. Octroi is an old
Das Gupta ]. and well known term describing a tax on the entry of
goods into a town or a city or a similar area for consumption, sale or use therein. According to the Encyclopaedia Britannica octroi is an indirect or consumption tax levied by a local political unit, normally
the commune or municipal authority, on certain categories of goods on their entry into its area. The Encyclopaedia Britannica describes the octroi tax system
in France (abolished in 1949) and states that commodities were prescribed by law and were divided into
six classes and for all the separate commodities within
these six groups maximum rates of tariff were promulgated by presidential decree, specific rates being fixed
for the three separate sorts of octroi area, established
on the basis of population, namdy, communes having
(I) less than 10,000 inhabitants, (2) from 10,000 to
50,000 and (3) more than 50,000. While we are not
concerned here with other features of the octroi tax
system, it is important to note that the tax was with
regard to the entry of goods into the areas of the
communes which were local political units. According to the Shorter Oxford English Dictionary "commune" in France is a small territorial division governed by a maire and municipal council and is used to
denote any similar division elsewhere.
The characteristic feature of an octroi tax then was
that it was on the entry of goods into an area administered by a local body. Bearing in mind this characteristic of octroi duty we find on an examination
of items 7 and 8 of the Schedule Rules mentioned
above that under the Government of India Act, 1919,
the local legislature of a Province could without the
previous sanction of the Governor-General impose a
,.
(
3 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
253
tax-octroi-for entry of goods into an area adminis·
tered by a local body, that is, a local government Diamond Sugar
authority and the area in respect of which such tax Mills Ud.,
could be imposed was mentioned in item 8 as local & Anothet·
v.
area.
It is in the background of this history that we have The State of
Pradesh
to examine the use of the word ''local area" in item Uttar
c!). Anoth6r
49 of List II of the Government of India Act, 1935.
Here the word "octroi" has given place to the longer Das Gupta f.
phrase "cesses on the entry of goods into a local area
for conbilrnption, use or sale therein.n
It was with the knowledge of the previous history
of the legislation that the Constitution-makers set
about their task in preparing the lists in .the seventh
schedule. There can be little doubt therefore that in
using the words "tax on the entry uf goods into a
local area for consumption, use or sale therein", they
wanted to express by the words "local area" primarily
area in respect of which an octroi was leviable under
item 7 of the schedule tax rules, 1920-that is, the
area administered by a local authority such as a
municipality, a district Board, a local Board or a
Union Board, a Panchayat or some body constituted
under the law for the governance of the local affairs
of any part of the State. Whether the entire area of
the Stat€~, as an area administered by the State
Government, was also intended to be included in the
phrase "local area", we need not consider in the present case.
The only other part of the Constitution where the
word "local area" appears is in Art. 277. That Article
is in these words:,, Any taxes, duties, cesses or fees which, immediately before the commencement of this Constitution,
were being lawfully levied by the Government of any
State or by any municipality or other local authority
or body for the purposes of the State, municipality.
district, or other local area may, notwithstanding
that these taxes, duties, cesses or fees are mentioned
in the Union List, continue to be levied and to be
applied to the same purposes until provision to the
contrary is made by Parliament by law.,
254
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1961]
There can be little doubt that ''local area" in £his
Article
has been used to indicate an area in respect of
Diamond Sugar
which
there
is an authority administering it.
Mills Ltd.,
While the scope of Article 277 is different from the
~Another
v.
scope of entry 52 so that no direct assistance can be
The State of
obtained in the interpretation· of the words "local_
Uttar Pradesh
area" in entry 52 from this meaning of the words in
& Anolher
Art. 277 it is satisfactory to find that the meaning of
Das Gupta ]. "local area" in entry 52 which appears reasonable on
a consideration of the legislative history of the matter
is also appropriate to this phrase in its only other use
in the Constitution.
Reliance was sought to be placed by the respondents on a decision of the Allahabad High Court in
Empero~· v. M unnalal (1 ) where the word "local area" as
used in s. 29 of the U. P. Sugar Factories Control Act,
1938, fell to be considered. That section, as we have
already m~ntioned, authorised the Governor ofU. P. to
impose by a notification, after consulting the Sugar
Control Board under the Act, a cess on the entry of
sugarcane into a local ar~:;a specified in such notification
for consumption, use or sale therein. The notifications
which were issued under this provision set out a number of factories for the levy of a cess at the rate of
three annas·per maund on entry of all sugarcane into
the loca:I area comprised in the factories mentioned in
the schedule for consumption, use or sale therein.
Section 29 was clearly within the words of entry 49
of List II. The question that arose before the Court
was whether the specification of certain factories as
local areas was valid law. The learned Judge appears
to have proceeded on the basis that the Governor had
notified the area comprised in 74 factories as one
"local area" and held that once this was done the
entire area covered by all these factories should be
considered as one statutory local area. It appears to
us that the learned Judge was not right in thinking
that the area comprised in 74 factories was notified as
one local area. What appears to have been done was
that the area of each factory was being notified as a.
local area for the purpose of the Act. Proceeding on
(I) I.L.R. I9f2 All. 302.
3 S.C.R. STJPREME COURT REPORTS
255
the basis that the area comprised in the 74 factories
was notified as one local area the learned Judge ad- Diamond .Sugar
dressed himself to the question whether this entire Mills Ltd.,
area was a local area within the meaning of the Act.
.S. Anoth~r
v.
He appe:;~.rs to have accepted the contention that the
word local area was used in the sense of an adminis- The State of
Pradesh
trative unit, but, says he, the administration need not Uttar
.S. Another
be political, it may be industrial and educational or it
may take any other form of governmental activity. Das Gupta].
"I cannot see,'' the learned Judge observed, "why it
is not open to -the provincial government or the·provinciallegislature to make an industrial survey of the
province and to divide up the·entire prqvince into
industrial areas or factory areas or mill areas or in
any other k~nd of areas, and each one of these areas
may be notified and be· treated as a local area. And
once such areas come into exitence and remain in
operation they can be regarded as local areas within
the meaning of entry No. 49 of List II in which a cess
may be levied".
Even if this view were correct it would be of no assistance to the respondents. It is no authority for the
proposition that the area of one sing~e factory is a
local area within the meaning of entry 49. We think
however that the view taken by the learned Judge is
riot correct.
It is true that when words and phrases previously
interpreted by the courts are used by the Legislature
in a later enactment replacing the previous statute,
there is a presumption that the Legislature intended
to convey by their use the same meaning which the
courts had already given. to them. This presumption
can 'however only be used as aD- aid to the interpretation of the later statute and should not be considered
to be conclusive. As Mr. Jastice Frankfurter observed
in Federal Com. Comm;ssion v. Columbia B. System (1)
when considering this doctrine, the persuasion that
lies behind the doctrine is merely one factor in the
t9tal effort to giv~ fair meaning to language. The
presumption will he strong where the words of the
previous statute have received a. settled meaning by a.
(1) 311
u.s. 131·
256
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1961]
series of decisions in the difl'erent courts of the country;
Diamond Sugar and particularly strong when such interpretation has
Mills Ltd.,
been made or affirmed by the highest court in the land.
~ Another
We think it reasonable to say however that the prev.
sumption will naturally be much weaker when the
The State of
interpretation was given in one solitary case and was
Uttar Pradesh not tested in appeal. After giving careful considera~ Another
Das Gupt(J. ].
tion to the view taken by the learned tftrdge -Of the
Allahabad High Court in Emperor v. Munnalal (supra)
about the meaning of the words "local area" and proper weight to the rule of interpretation mentioned
above, we are of opinion that the Constitution.makers
did not use the words "local area" in the meaning
which the learned Judge attached to it. We are of
opinion that the proper meaning to be attached to the
words "local area" in Entry 52 of the Constitution,
(when the area is a part of the State imposing the law)
is an area administered by a local body like a municipality, a district board, a local board, a union board, a.
Panchayat or the like. The premises of a factory is
therefore not a "local area".
It must therefore be held that s. 3 of the U. P.
Sugarcane Cess Act, 1956, empowering the Governor
to impose a cess on the entry of sugarcane into the
premises of a factory did not fall within Entry 52 of the
State List. As there is no other Entry in either State
List or Concurrent List in which the impugned law
could fall there is no escape from the conclusion that
this law was beyond the legislative competence of the
State Legislature. The law as enacted ins. 8 of the
U. P. Sugarcane Cess Act, 1956, must therefore be
struck down as invalid.
It may be mentioned that this is not a. case where
the Jaw is in two parts and one part can be severed
from the other and saved a.s valid while striking down
the other portion which is invalid. Indeed, that was
not even suggested by the learned counsel for the respondents. It is unnecessary for us to consider whether
if s. 3 had instead of authorising levy of cess for .entry
of sugarcane into the premises of a factory for use,
consumption or sale therein had authorised the imposition of a. cess on entry of cane into a local area for
-
3 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
257
1 60
consumption, sale or use in a factory that would have
9
been within Entry 52. It is sufficient to say th~t we Diamond sugar
cannot re-write the law for the purpose of savmg a Mills Ltd.,
portion of it. Nor is it for the Court to offer any sug- b Another
gestion as to how the law should be drafted in order
v.
to keep it within the limits of legislative competence. The SJate of
Uttar Pt·adesil
As the law enacted b y the Legislature stand s t h ere
b Another
is no escape from the conclusion that this entire law
.. Das Gupta ).
must be struck down as invalid.
In view of this conclusion on the first ground raised. '
on behalf of the appellant 'it is unnecessary to consider
the other ground raised in the appeal that section 3
has gone beyond the permissible limits of· delegated
·
legislation.
As we have held that the impugned legislation was
beyond the legislative competence of the State Legislature the appdlants are entitled to the relief asked for.
We accordingly allow the appeal, set aside the order
passed by the High Court and order the issue of a
writ directing th~o~.t the respondents do forbear from
levying and collecting cess from the appellants on
account of arrears of cess for the crushing season
1954-55 and in respect of the crushing season 1955-56
and successive crushing seasons under the U. P. Sugarcane Cess Act, 1956.
The appellants will get their costs here and below.
AYY.ANGAR, J.-1 have had the privilege of perusing the judgment just now pronounced, but with the
utmost respect regret my inability to agree with the
order proposed.
The learned Judges of the High Court held that the
i~pugned enactment was within the scope of Entry 52
of the ·State Legislative List in Schedule 7 to the
Constitution, by placing reliance on the following
passage in the Judgment of Da.s, J. in Emperor v.
Munna Lal ( 1) where the learned Judge said:
"Indeed I · cannot see why it is ;not open to Pro~
vincia.l Government or Provincial Legislature to
make an industrial survey of the Province and to
divide up the entire province into industrial areas
(I) I.L.R. [194~] AU. 30:z, 328.
33
Ayyangar J.
258
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1961]
or factory areas or mill areas or in any other kind
of areas, and each one of these areas may be uotifiDiamond S11gar
ed
and be treated as a local area. And once such
Mills Lt4.,
areas come into existence and remain in operation
,£. A 110ther
v.
they can be regarded as local areas within the
'fhe State of
meaning of Entry No. 45 of List II in which a cess
Ullar Pradesh
may be levied."
c$. tl not her
In other words, the view which they favoured was to
AyyaJ~gar ].
read the expression "local area" practically to mean
any "area" entry into which was by the relevant fis- _
cal statute, made the suoject of taxation. In my
opinion that is not a corr~ct interpretation of the
entry and I agree with my learned brethren th~t having regard to the historical material, which~ has been
exhaustively set out and discussed in their · judgment,
the word "local area" can in the entry designate only
a predeter.mined local unit-a unit demarcated by
statutes pertaining to local self government and placed under the control and administration of a local
authority such as a municipality, a cantonment, a
.district or a local board, an union or a panchayat etc.
and not any region, place or building within the State
which might be defined, described or demarcated by
the State's taxing enactment as an : area entry into
which is made taxable.
·
But there my agreement stops and we diverge. In
my opinion, this construction of the expression
·. "local area" in entry 52 does not automatically result
in the invalidity-of the. impugned enactment and of
the levy under it, but the extent to which, if any the
. charging section exceeds the pow~r conferred by the
entry would.depend on ·matters which.have not been
the subject of investigation, and it is this point that
I sha.ll elaborate in .the rest of this judgment.
It_ is unnecessary for the purposes of this case and
possibly eveh irrelevant, to determine the precise
scope, content and incidents of a.n "octroi" dutyexcept that in the context in which it appeared in the
Scheduled Taxes Rules framed under the Government
of India Act, 1919, the expression signified a tax levied
on entry into an area of an unit of local l¥imi.nistration. It is unprofitable to canvass the question
3 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
259
whether a local authority empowe~ed at that date to
196o
levy an 'octroi' might or might not lawfully con- 1. - "
fine the levy to entry for consumption alone, to use D :11.~;d
alone or for sale alone. But when that entry was e,. Asnothe;
refashioned and enacted as item 49 of the Provincial
v.
Legislative List under the Government of India Act, The State of
1935 (in terms practically identical with Entry 52 in Ullar Pradesh
the Sta.te Le-gislative List under the Constitution), &- •.J1Iothcr
the matter was no longer left in doubt. The new A)'JII>tgar ] .
item ran:
"Cesses on the entry of goods into a local area for
consumption, use or sale therein".
In connection with the use of the words "for consumption, use or Rale therein" in the item three
matters deserve notice: (1) Where the entry into the
"local area" was not for one of the purposes set out in
it, viz., for consumption, use or sale therein, but the
entry was, for instance in the course of t,ransit or for
warehousing during transit, the power was not available; in other words, a mere entry could not per se be
made a taxable event. (2) It was sufficient if the entry
- was for any one of the three purposes; the use of the
disjunctive 'or' making this clear. (3) The passage of
goods from one p'Ortion of a local area to another
portion in the same local area, would not enable a. tax
to be levied, but the entry has to be. "into the local
area'', Le., from outside the local area.
It is the second and the third of the above features
that caU for a more detailed examination in the context of the points requiring decision in the present case.
With this background I shall analyse the terms of
s. 3(1) of the Act (United Provinces Act XXII of 1956)
to ~scertain where precisely the provision departs
froni the scope or content of entry 52. I will read
that section which runs:
. "3. (1). The State Government may by notification in the official gazette· impose a cess not exceeding four_annas per maund on "the entry of the cane
into the premises of a factory for use, consumption
or sale therein:
Provided that the State Government may likewise remit in whole or in part such cess in respect
L;;gat
260
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1961]
of cane used or to be used in factory for any limited purpose specified in the notification.
Diamond Sugar
Explanation:-If the State Government, in the
Mills Ltd,.
case of any factory situate outside Uttar Pradesh,
v.
so declare, any place in Uttar Pradesh set apart for
The Statt of
the purchase of cane intended or required for use,
Uttar Pradesh
consumption
or sale in such factory shall be deemed
6- Another
to be the premises ot the factory."
J.Jeaving the Explanat-ion for the present, there a.re
two matters which require advertence: (I) The first
was the point emphasised by Mr. Sanyal for t.he
appellant., that entry into the premises of a factory
"for the purpose of consumption, use or sale therein"
is fastened on as the taxable event treating the
factory premises as if that were itself a "local area".
(2) A part from entry into factory premises for usc,
C011sumption or sale therein, entry of the cane into
other places within the local area, i.e., into "unit for
local administration" is not made the subject of tax
levy.
The second of the above matters cannot invalida.to
the legislation, because a power to tax is merely
enabling, and apart from any question of discrimination under Art. 14-which does not arise for consideration before us-the State is not bound to tax eYery
entry of goods into "a local area". Again, the tax
could undoubtedly be confined to entry of goods into
a "local area" for consumption or usc in particular
modes; in other words, there could be no legal· objection to the tax levy on the ground that it does not
extend to entry of goods into "a local area" for every
type of consumption or use.
In my judgment the real vice of the charging s. 3(1)
lies not in that it confines the levy to eases where the
entry is for purposes of consumption etc. in a factory
but iri equating the premises of a factOI'y with "a
local area" entry of goods into which, occasions the
tax. Another way of expressing this same idr.a would
be to say~ that whereas under Entry 52 the mo\yement
of goods from within the same local area in which the
factory is situated. into the premises of the factory,
could not be the subject of tax liability, because there
..
3 S.C.R. SUPREME ·coURT REPORTS
261
1 960
would in such cases be no entry of the goods ''into a
local arean under s. 3(1) of the Act, not merely is the D.
d ,. gAr
.
f
'd h
taman .,u
movemen~ of goods mto the actory from outsr e t e
Mills Ltd.,
'local area' in which the factory is situate made the
<S- Anot"'"
subject of tax, but the words used are capable of imv.
posing the tax even in those cases where the entry The Stat, of
Uttar Pradesh
into the factory is from within the same local area.
<S· Another
'Vhat I have in mind may be thus illustrated: If
factory A situated in Panchayat area B gets its supply Ayyangar J.
of cane from outside the Panchayat area, the levy of
the tax on the entry of the cane into the Panchayat
area would clearly be covered by ('ntry 52. The State
is not bound to tax every entry of the rane into the
the area but might confine the levy to the entry of
the cane for the purpose of consumption in a factory.
The tax might be levied and collected at the border
of the Panchayat area but there is no legal obligation
to do so, and the place at which the entry of the goods
is checked and the duty realised is a matter of
administrative machinery which cloes not touch on the
validity of the tax imposition. It would thus not
detract from the validity of the tax if by reason of
convenience for effecting collection, the tax was levied
at the stage of entry into the premises of a factory.
So long, therefore, as the ca110 which enters a factory
for the purpose of consumption therein comes from
outside that local unit of administration in y; hiclt the
fact6ry is situated, in my opinion it would be covered
by the words of entry 52 and ·well wit.hin the legislative competence of the State Government. The language of s. 3, as it stands arJpears, however, also to
extend to cases where the supply of cane to a factory
is from within the same local unit of administration;
in other words, where there is no entry of the cane
into the local area as explained earlier. If this were
the true position, the enaptment cannot be invalidated
as a whole. It would be valid to the extent to which
the tax is levied on cane entering a factory for the
purpose of consumption etc. therein from outside the
local area, within which the factory premises are
situated, and only invalid where it outsteps this
limitation.
w
262
96 o
-d-S
1
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
The next question is whether this is a case where
inva,lid portions are so inextricably
. b ut to
to leave t h e Court no optwn
strike down the entire enactment as invalid as beyond
the legislative competence of the State, or whether the
charging provision could be so read down as to leave
the valid portion to operate. In my opinion, what is
involved in t he case before us is not any problem of
severance, but only of reading down. Before taking
up this question for discussion two objections to the
latter course have to be considered. The first is that
this aspect of the matter was not argued before us by
learned Counsel for the State as a ground for sustaining the validity of the legislation. In my judgment
this is not an objection that should st-and in the way
of the Court giving effect to a view of the law if that
should appear to be the correct one. In making this
observation one has necessarily to take bto account
the fact that legislation in nearly this form, has been
in force in the State for ove1· twenty years, and
though its vires was once questioned in 1942, that
challenge was repelled and the tax levy was held valid
and was being collected during all this period. The
sugar-cane cess has been a prime· source of State
ReYenue for this length of time and this Court should
not pronounce such a legislation invalid unless it
could not be sustained on any reasonable ground and
to any extent.
The second ground of object.ion which has appealed
to my learned brethren but with which, I regret, I
cannot concur is that it would require a rewriting of
the Act to sustain it.
Now if the first paragraph of sub-s. (1) .of s. 3 hn.d
read:
''The State Government may by notification in
the official gazette impose a cess not exceeding four
annas per maund on the entry of the cane into the
premises of a factory (from outside the local area in
which the factory premises were situate) for use,
consumption or sale therein:" (The words in brackets added by me)
the valid and
.
D tamon
ugar ,
Mills Ltd.
mterwoven as
& Anolhe;
v.
n~ state of
Uttar Pradesh
<5• Another
Ayyangar J.
[1961]
3 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
263
the levy would be entirely within entry 52 even according to my learned brethren. The question is whether Diamond Sugar
the implication of these words would be a rewriting Mills Ud.,
<f> AnotJru
of the provision or whether it would be merely
v.
reading the existing provision so as to confine it to
the powers conferred upon the State Legislature by The State of
Uliar Pradesh
the relevant legislative entry. In view of the strong
<f>. Another
opinion entertained by my learned brethren, I have
given the matter the utmost consideration, but I feel Ayy~tngar f.
that the words which I have suggested are a permissible mode of construction of a statute by which wide
words of an ene.otment which would cover an event,
contingency or matter withfn legislative power as well
as matters not within it, are read as confined to those
which the -·law making body had authority to enact.
In iny judgment the opinion of the Federal Court in
In re Hindu Women's Rights to Property Act, 1937 e),
affords a useful analogy to the ·present case. The
enactment there impugned provided for the devolution
or succession to "property" in general terms which
would have -included both agricultural as well as nonagricultural property, whereas the Central Legislature
which enacted the law had no power to deal .with
succession to· agricultural property. The contention
urged before the Court was that by the use of the
expression "property", the legislature had evinced an
intention to deal with property of every type and
that it would be rewriting the enactment a.nd not
. carrying out the legislative intent if the reference to
"property" in the statute were read as Hproperty
other than agricultural property". Dealing with this
contention, Sir Maurice Gwyer, delivering the opinion
of the Court said:
"No doubt if the ~ct does affect agricultural land
in the Governors• Provinces, it was beyond. the competence of the Legislature to ~nact it: and whether
or not it does so must depend upon the meaning
which is to be given to the word "property" in the
Act. If that word necessarily and inevitably comprises all forms of property, including agricultural
land, then clearly the Act went beyond the powers
(I) [1941] F.C.R. n.
""264
Diamond S1~gar
Mills Ltd.,
t5- Another
v.
TA~ Stale of
Uttar Pradesh
(!).A 11other
Ayyangar ].
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1961]
of the Legislature; but when a Legislature with
limited and restricted powers makes use of a word
of such wide and general import, .the presumption
must surely be that it is using it with reference to
that kind of property with respect to which it is
competent to legislate and to no other. The question is thus one of construction, and unless the Aet
is- to be regarded as wholly meaningless and ineffective, the Court is bound to construe the word "property" as referring only to those forms of property
with respect to which the Legislature which enacted
the Act was competent to legislate; that is to say,
property other than agricultural land. . ........... The
Court does not seek to divide the Act into two parts,
viz., the part which the Legislature was competent,
and the part it was incompetent, to enact. It holds
that, on t.he true construction of the Act and especially of the word "property" as used in it, no part
of the Act was beyond the Legislature's powers."
The Court accordingly held that the Hindu Women's
Rights to Property Act, 1937, applied to non-agricultural property and so was valid. In this connection
it might be interesting to refer to the decision in
Blackwood v. Queen (1) which Sir Maurice Gwyer, C.J.,
referred to with approval. That case related to the
validity of a duty imposed by the Legislature of Victoria (Australia) on the personal estat,es of deceased
person. The learned Chief Justice observed "The
Judicial Committee construed the expression "personal estate" occurring in the statute to refer only to:
"such personal estate as the colonial grant of probate
conferred jurisdiction on the person'1l representatives
to administer, whatever the domicile of the testator
might be, that is to say, personal estate situate within
the Colony, in respect of which alone the Supreme
Court of Victoria had power to grant probate: Their
Lordships thought that "in imposing a duty of this
nature the Victorian Legislature also was contemplating the property which was under its own hand, and
did not intend to levy a tax in respect of property
(1) [1882] 8 A.C. 82,
3 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
265
beyond its jurisdiction~'. And they held that "the geneml expressions which import the contrary ought to Diamond Sugar
receive the qualification for which the appellant con- Mills Ltd.,
tends, and that the statement of personal property to
<!- Anol~er
be made by the executor under s. 7(2) of the Act
v.
The
State
of
should be confined to that property which the probate
Uliar Pradtsh
enables him to administer" (1).
0 A11other
To confine the tax to the limitations subjec~ to
which it could, under the Constitution, be levied is, Ayyangar ].
in my opinion, not an improper method of construing
the statute. The manner in which the word ':property" was read down by the Federal Court in In re
Hindu Women~s Rights to Property Act, 1937 (1) and
the word "personal property': construed by the Privy
Council in Blackwood v. Queen{~) make iu my opinion
less change in the text of the impugned provision than
the addition of the words I have set out above, which
after all are words implicit in the power conferred on
the State Legislature. I would, therefore, hold that
the charging section would be invalid and beyond the
legislative competence of the State of Uttar Pradesh
only in so far as it seeks to levy a tax on cane entering a factory from within the same local area in
which the factory is situate and that in all other cases
the tax is properly levied; and that the impugned section could and ought to be so read down.
The matter not having been considered from this
aspect at earlier stages, we have necessarily no material before us for adjudicating upon whether tax levied
or demanded from the appellant is due and if so to
what extent. We have nothing befQ._re us to indicate
as to how far the cane, the entry of which into the
factory of the appellant is the subject of the impugned
levy, has moved into the factory from outside the
local unit in which the factory is situated or originated
from within the same local area:. I consider that
without these matters being investigated it would not
be possible to adjudicate upon the validity of the tax
demanded from the appellants.
There is one matter to which it is necessary to
(r) Per Sir Maurice Gwyer, C. J. [194t) F.C.R. tl, 2S.
(2) ·[J88z] 8 A.C. 82.
34
266
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1961]
advert which I have reserved for later consideration,
Diamond Sugar viz., the validity of the Explanation to s. 3(1) of the
Act. It would be apparent that the Explanation was
Mills Ltd,,
<!). Another
necessitated by the terms of sub-s. (1) of s. 3 'vhich
v.
equated "factory premises" with "local areas", or
1'he Stale of
rather
rendering factory premises the sole local areas
Uttar Pt'adesh
entry
into
which occasioned the tax. So far as the
& Another
purchasing centres which are dealt with in the ExplaAyyangar ]. nation are concerned, the cane that moves into them
from outside the "local area" where these centres are
would clearly be covered by Entry 52, since the purpose of the movement into the centre is on the terms
of the provision for effecting a sale therein. In other
words, the same tests which I have discussed earlier
in relation to entry into factory premises, would apply
mutatis mutandis to these purchasing centres and in
so far as a tax is levied on the movement of the cane
from outside the local area the levy would be legal
arid in order. I would read down the Explanation in
the same manner, as I have read down the main
charging provision so as to confine the levy to entry
from outside that ''local area"-local area being
understood in the sense already explained.
I would accordingly allow the appeal, and remand
it to the High Court for investigating the material
facts which I have mentioned earlier with a direction
to pass judgment in accordance with the law as above
explained.
BY COURT. In accordance with the opinion of
the majority the appeal is allowed, the order passed
by the High Court is set aside and a writ be issued
directing that the respondents do forbear from levying and collecting cess from the appellants on account
of arrears of cess for the crushing season 1954-55 and
successive crushing seasons under the Uttar Pradesh
Sugarcane Cess Act., 1956.
·
The appellants will get their costs here and below.
Appeal allowed.
~
•
'(
I
I
/
..
\.
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