KUNNATHAT THATHUNNI MOOPIL NAIR versus THE STATE OF KERALA AND ANOTHER
Supreme Court of India | Decided 9 December 1960 | [1961] 3 S.C.R. 77 | 1960 INSC 255
Key facts
- Decided
- 9 December 1960
- Bench
- BHUVNESHWAR PRASAD SINHA, SYED JAFFER IMAM, A.K. SARKAR, K. SUBBA RAO, J.C. SHAH
- Bench size
- 5
- Case number
- WRIT TO PETITION (CIVIL)... No. 13/1958
- Disposal
- Appeal(s) allowed
- Citation
- [1961] 3 S.C.R. 77
- Neutral citation
- 1960 INSC 255
Text of the judgment
3 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
77
The Tribunal had come to the conclusion that no pay.
r96o
ment in addition to the salary, annual bonus and rh c
. .
·
1
b
·
"fi
d
d
.
f
'
ommirnoner
specia onus was JUStI e an any express10n 0 of Exms Profits
opinion to the contrary in the supplementary state- Jax, Madras
ment pursuant to the order for statement of case
v.
could not in our judgment affect the conclusion origi- N. M. 11ayaloo
nally recorded.
Iy" & Sons
In our view the answer to the question whether the
Shah].
disa.llowance by the Excess Profits Tax authorities of
the commission paid to branch managers was justified
under r. 12, Sch. 1, of the Excess Profits Tax Act
should have been answered in the affirmative. On the
view taken by us, Appeal No. 494/1958 will be allowed, but there will be no order as to costs.
Appeal No. 495 of 1958 will be allowed with costs.
Appeals allowed.
KUNNATHAT THATHUNNI MOOPIL NAIR
v.
THE STATE O:E' KERALA AND ANOTHER
(with connected petitions)
(B. P. SINHA, c. J., JAFER IMAM, A. K. SARKAR,
K. SUBBA RAO and J.C. SHAH, JJ.)
Land Tax-Constitutional validity of enactment-Uniform
basic tax on all lands-Classification-Tax on forest areas-Legislative competence of State-Govcrnment"s power to exempt-Provisional assessment-Validity-Travancore-Cochin Land Tax Act,
I955 (Travancore-Cochin IS of r955), as amended by Act ro of z957,
ss. 4, 5-A, 7-Constitution of India, Arts. r4, r9(r)(j), 3r, 265.
Schedule 7, List II, Entries z9, 49.
The Travancore-Cochin Land Tax Act, 1955, was passed· by
the legislature of the State of Travancore-Cochin and was
amended by Act IO of 1957, by the State of Kerala. By s. 4 of
the Act all lands in the State of whatever description and held
under whatever tenure were t.o be charged and levied a uniform
rate of tax to be called the basic tax. Section 7 gave power to
tne Government to exempt from.the operation of the Act such
December 9.
78
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1961)
lands or class of lands which the Government may, by notification, decide. Section 5A which was introduced into the Act by the
T<. T. Moopil Amending Act enabled the Government to make a provisional
Nair
assessment of the basic tax in respect of the lands which had
v.
not been surveyed by the Government and provided that the
Stale of Kerala Government after conducting the survey shall make a regular
assessment ·and make the necessary adjustments in respect of the
amounts paid already. There was, however, no time fixed for
the conduct of the survey.
The petitioners who owned forest in the State, challenged
the constitutional validity of the Act on the grounds that the
provisions of the Act contravened Arts. r4, r9(1)(f) and 31(1) of
the Constitution of India inasmuch as (1) the Act did not have
any regard to the quality of the land or its productive capacity
and the levy of a tax at a fiat rate of Rs. 2 per acre imposed
very unreasonable restrictions on the right to hold property,
(3) the Act did not lay down any provision calling lor a return
from the assessee for an enquiry or investigation of facts before
the provisional assessment was made or any right of appeal to
any higher authority and, in fact, did not make any provision for
hearing the assessee at any stage, (3) s. 7 gave arbitrary power to
the Government to pick and choose in the matter of grant of
total or partial exemption from the provisions of the Act, and
(4) the tax proposed to be levied had absolutely no relation to
the production capacity of the land sought to be taxed or to the
income they could derive, and therefore the Act had been conceived with a view to confiscating private property, there being
no question of any .compensation being paid to those who may
be expropriated as a result of the working of the Act.
The petitioners also challenged the legislative competence of
the legislature of the State to levy a tax on lands on which
forests stood. The case on behalf of the State of Kerala, inter
alia, was that the Act had its justification in Art. 265 of the
Constitution of India, which was not subject to the provisions of
Part III of the Constitution and that, therefore, Arts. 14, rg and
31 could not be pressed in aid of the petitioners.
Held, (Sarkar, J., dissenting), that the Travancore-Cochin
Land Tax Act, 1955, infringed the provisions of Art. r4 of the
Constitution of India.
The Act obliged every person who held land to pay the tax
at the fiat rate prescribed, whether or not he made any income
out of the property, or whether or not the property was capable
of yielding any income. Consequently, there was no attempt at
classification in the provisions of the Act-and it was one of those
cases where the Jack of classification created inequality. It was
therefore hit by the prohibition to deny equality before the law
contained in Art. r4.
Section 5A of the Act which enabled the Government to
make a provisional assessmeqt of the basic tax payable by the
r
•
\
l
i
I
\.
3 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
79
holder of unsurveyed land imposed unreasonable restrictions on
1960
the rights to hold property safeguarded by Art. 19(1)(!) of the
Constitution, inasmuch as (1) the Act did not impose an obliga- K. T. Moopil
tion on the Government to undertake survey proceedings within
Vair
any prescribed or ascertainable period, with the result that a
v.
landholder might be subjected to repeated annual provisional State of Kerala
assessments on more or less conjectural basis and liable to pay the
tax assessed, and (2) the Act being silent as to the machinery and
procedure to be followed in making the assessment left it to the
Executive, completely ignoring the legal position that the assessment of a tax on a person or property was at least of a quasijudicial character.
Section 7 of the Act which vested the Government with the
power wholly or partially to exempt any land from the provisions of the Act did not lay down any principle or policy for the
guidance of the exercise of discretion by the Government in
respect of the selection contemplated by the section, and was,
therefore, discriminatory in effect and offended Art. 14. The
section was not severable from the rest of the Act as both the
charging sections, s. 4 and s. 7, authorising the Government to
grant exemptions from the provisions of the Act were the main
provisions of the statute.
Shri Ram Krishna Dalmia v. Sri Justice S. R. Tendolkar,
[1959] S.C.R. 279, relied on.
The Act was also confiscatory in character inasmuch as the
provisions of the Act had the effect of eliminating the private
owners through the machinery of the Act, without proposing to
acquire the privately owned forests in the State after satisfying
the conditions laid down in Art. 31 of the Constitution.
~r Sinha, C.J., :{roam, Subba Rao and Shah, JJ.-Article
265 of the Constitution which provided that the State shall not
levy or collect a tax except by authority of law referred to a
valid law, and in order that the law might be valid, the tax proposed to be levied must be within the legislative competence of
the Legislature imposing a tax and authorising the collection
thereof and, secondly, the tax must be subject to the conditions
laid down in Art. 13, by which all laws inconsistent with or in
derogation of the fundamental rights in Part III shall be void.
Per Sarkar, J.-(1) The object of the Act was to tax land in
the State for raising revenues by prqviding for a low and uniform rate of basic tax replacing all other dues payable to the
Government and the tax payers were classified according to the
area of lands held by them. Such a classification had an intelligible basis and had a rational relation to the object of the Act. As
tax was to be levied not because the land was productive but
because the land was held in the State, the classification did not
offend Art. 14 of the Constitution, even though it might impose
unequal burden of the tax on the owners of land on account of
owners of less productive land being put on a larger burden.
1
r
80
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1961]
(2) Section 5A did not offend Art. r4 and in the absence
of express provisions laying down the procedure accordini; to
J(. T. Moopil
which the provisional assessment was to be made, the Act could
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not be held invalid on the ground that it was against the rules
v.
of natural justice.
State af Kerala
(3) Section 7, even if it were considered invalid on the
ground that it gave arbitrary power to the Government and
offended Art. r4, was severable from the rest of the Act and
would not affect the other provisions of the Act.
(4) The Act did not infringe the fundamental rights in
Art. rg(r)(f) as the rate of tax fixed by the Act was a very low
rate and the restrictions on those rights were reasonable.
(5) The Act was not in its nature expropriatary and did
not offend Art. 3r. As there was no want of legislative competence, the Act could not be assailed as a piece of colourable
legislation on the ground that though in form a taxing statute
it, in effect, was intended to expropriate lands by imposing a tax
too heavy for the land to bear.
(6) The word "land" in Entry 49 of List II, Sch. 7, of the
Constitution, included "land on which a fo1est stands" and, therefore, under that Entry taxation on land on which forests stood
was permissible and legal. The Act, therefore, could not. be
challenged as being beyond the legislative competence of the
State Legislature.
1960
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Petitions Nos. 13 to 24,
42 and 46 to 54 of 1958.
Petitions under Article 32 of the Constitution of
India for enforcement of Fundamental Rights.
M. 0. Setalvad, Attorney-General for India, Syed
Mahmud, J.B. Dadachanji, S. N. Andley, Rameshwar
Nath and P. L. Vohra, for the petitioners in petitions
Nos. 13-18, and 46-54 of 1958.
C.' K. Daphtary, Solicitor-General of India, Syed
Mahmud, J.B. Dadachanji, S. N. Andley, Rameshwar
Nath and P. L. Vohra, for the petitioners in Petitions
Nos. 19-24 of 1958.
S. N. Andley, Rameshwar Nath, J. B. Dadachanji.
and P. L. Vohra, for the petitioner in petition No. 42
of 1958.
K. V. Suryanarayana Iyer, Advocate General, of
KeroJ,a and Sardar Bahadur, for the respondents.
1960. December, 9. The Judgment of Sinha, C.J.,
Jafer Imam, Subba Rao and Shah, JJ., was delivered
3 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
81
by Sinha, C. J. Sarkar, J., delivered a separate Judgment.
_\
\
K. T. A1ovpil
J..Tat'r
SINHA, C. J.-In this batch of 22 petitions under
v.
Art. 32 of the Constitution, the petitioners impugn the
State of J(erala
constitutionality of the Travancore-Cochin Land Tax
Act, XV of 1955, as amended by the Trantncorc- Sinha C. ].
Cochin Land Tax (Amendment) Act, X of 1957, which
hereinafter will be referred to as the Act. The Act
came into force on June 21, 1955, and the Amending
Act on August 6, 1957. The petitioners are owners
of forest areas in certain parts of the State of Kerala,
which, before the reorganisation of States, formed
part of the State of Madras. The respondents to the
petitions are: (1) the State of Kerala and (2) the District Collector, Palghat:
These petitions are based on allegations, ,._, hich are,
more or less, similar, and the following allegations
made in Writ Petition No. 42 of 1958 may be taken
as typical and an extreme case, which was placed
before us in detail to bring into bold relief the foll
significance and effect of the legislation impugned in
these cases. The petitioner in Petition 42of1958 is
a citizen of India, who owns forests in certain parts
of Palghat Taluk in Palghat District, which was part
of the State of Madras before the reorganisation of
States. These forests are now in the State of Kernla.
Up to the time that these forests were in the State of
Madras, as it then was, the Madras Preservation of
Private :Forests Act, Madras Act XXVII of 1949,
governed these forests. Even after these areas were
transferred to the State of Kerala, the said Madras
Act, XXVII of 1949, continued to apply to these
forests. Under the said Madras Act the owaers of
forests, like the petitioner, could not sell, mortgage,
lease or otherwise alienate any portion of their forests
without the previous sanction of the District Collec.
tor; nor could they, without similar permission, cut
trees or do any act likely to denude the forest or
diminish its utility, as such. The District Collector,
in exercise of the powers under the Act, does not
ordinarily permit the cutting of more than a small
11
)
ry6o
82
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1961)
number of trees in the forest. Thus the petitioner has
not
the right fully to exploit the forest wealth in his
K. T. Moopil
forest
area and has to depend upon the previous perNair
mission of the Collector. In exercise of the powers
v.
State of [(erata given to the Collector under the Madras Act aforesaid, the petitioner's lessee was given permission to
Sinha C. j.
cut certain trees in his forest, which brings to the
petitioner by way of income from the forest, a sum of
Rs. 3,100 per year. Under the Act, a tax called land
tax at a flat rate of Rs. 2 per acre has been imposed
on the petitioner. In pursuance of the provisions of
the Act, as amended as aforesaid, the District Collector of Palghat, purporting to act under the provisions
of s. 5A of the Act, issued a notice to ·the petitioner
provisionally assessing the petitioner's forest under
the said Act to a sum of fifty thousand rupees per
annum and informing the petitioner that, if no representation was made within thirty days, the said provisional assessment would be confirmed and a demand
notice would be issued. As there has been no survey
of the area of forest land in the petitioner's possession, the District Collector has conjectured the said
area to be twenty-five thousand acres. The Petitioner
had made, an application to the District Collector
under the Madras Preservation of Private Forests
Act for felling trees in an area of one thousand acres,
but the Collector was pleased to grant permission to
cut trees from 450 acres only in the course of five
years at the rate of 90 acres a year. The petitioner
has leased out that right to another person, who made
the highest bid of Rs. 3,100 per year, as the landlord's
fee for the right to cut and remove the trees, and
other ~in or produce. Besides the demand aforesaid,
the revenue authorities have levied about four thousand rupees as tax on the surveyed portions of the
forest. The petitioner's forest has large areas of arid
rocks, rivulets and gorges. The petitioner, in those
circumstances, questions the constitutional validity of
the Act, the provisions of which will be examined
hereinafter.
These petitions have been opposed on behalf of the
first respondent and the allegations and submisiiions
3 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
83
made in the petitions are sought to be controverted
by a counter affidavit sworn to by an Assistant Secre- /(. T. Moopil
tary of the Kerala Government in t he Revenue
Nafr
Department. It is in similar terms, as a matter of
v.
fact printed in most. of these cases. It is contended State of T<.rala
therein on behalf of the respondent that the petitions
are not maintainable in as much as no fundamental Si11ha C. j,
rights of the petitioners have been infringed; that the
allegations about the income from the forest lands are
not admitted; and by way of submission, it is added,
they are irrelevant for the purposes of these petitions.
It is stated that the Act was passed with a view to
unifying the system of land tax in the whole of the
State of Kerala. It is submitted that the validity of
the Act has to be determined in the light of Art. 265
of the Constitution and that Arts. 19 and 31 were
wholly out of the way. It is denied that the tax imposed was harsh or arbitrary, or has the effect of
violating the petitioner's right of holding property;
and it was asserted that the allegations in respect of
income from the forests are entirely irrelevant, as the
tax was not a tax on income, but was an "impost on
land''. It is equally irrelevant whether the land is
productive or not. It is also contended that, in view
of the provisions of Art. 31(5)(b)(i) of the Constitution,
Art. 31(2) could not be relied upon by the petitioners.
The allegation of the petitioners that the Act is a
device to confiscate private forests is denied. It is
admitted that, except in certain cases, the entire area
is unsurveyed and that steps are being taken for surveying those areas. It is also stated that the areas
shown in the notices served on the petitioners are
based on information available to the Collector of the
District.; and lastly, it is stated that only notice has
been issued calling upon the petitioners to make their
representations, if any, to the proposed provisional
assessments. The assessments have not yet been
made, and, therefore, there is no question of demand
of tax being enforced by coercive processes. Finally,
it is suggested that the Act has been enacted for the
legitimate revenue purposes of the State.
Before entering upon a discussion of the points in
84
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1961)
controversy, it is convenient at this stage to indicate
briefly the relevant provisions of the Act . which is
K. T. Jl,Joopil
impugned
by the petitioners as ultra vires the State
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·
Legislature. Tbe preamble of the Act is in these
v.
State of Kera/a terms:"Whereas it is deeI.IJ.ed necessary to provide for
Sinha C. j.
the levy of a low and uniform rate of ba,sic tax on
all lands in the State of Travancore-Cochin."
Basic tax has been defined as "the tax imposed under
the proviHions of this Act". Section 3 lays down tbat
the arrangement made under the Act for the levy of
the basic tax shall be deemed inter alia to be a gene. ral revenue •ettlement of the State, notwithstanding
anything in any statute, grant, deed or other transaction subject to certain provisos not material for our
present purposes. The charging section is s. 4, which
is in these terms:"Subjcct to the provisions of this Act, there shall
be charged and levied in respect of all lands in the
State, of whatever description and held under whatever tenure, a uniform rate of tax to be called the
basic tax."
Section 5 l1tys down the rate of the tax which, by the
Amendment, has been raised to Rs. 2 per acre (two
pies per cent. of land. per annum) and the basic tax
charged and levied at that rate shall be the tax payable to the Government in lieu of any existing tax in
respect of land. Section 6 lays down that any stipulation in any contract or agreement or lease or other
transaction to pay land revenue assessment of a11y
land shall be construed as stipulation for the payment
of the amount of basic tax, as charged and levied
under the Act. Section 7 is in these terms:"This Ad is not applicable to lands held or leased by the Gon'rnment or any land or class of lands
which the Government may, by notification in the
Gazette, either wholly or partially exempt from the
provisions of this Act."
Sections 8 and 9 provide for the contimrnnce of the
liability to pay certain dues in respect of existing
tenures in addition to the basic tax in respect of iands
covered by those tenures. Section 10 abolishes the
3 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
85
irrigation assessment charged on certain tank beds
and other water reservoirs named and described there- K. T. Moopil
in. Section 11 preserves the right ofthe Government
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to levy certain irrigation and water cesses and lays
v.
down that the Act shall not affect the power of the Stale of T<erala
Government to levy any rate or alter any existing
rate of irrigation or water cess on itny land, as they Sinha C. J.
deem fit. Cesses, other than those mentioned in s. 11,
are also abolished by s. 12. Section 13 authorises the
Government to appoint such officers as they deem
necessary for the purpose of the Act. Section 14 Jays
down the bar of suits against the Government in respect, of anything clone or any order passed under the
Act. Section 15 saves the right of the Government
which accrued to it·before the Act came into force as
also the conditions of any agreement, grant or deed
relating to any land, except to the extent indicated in
the Act. Section 16 vests the Government with the
power to make rules for carrying into effect the provisions of the Act, with parlicu Jar reference to the
power to make rules for the apportionment of the basic
tax charged on certain kindK of holdings, for defining the powers and duties of the officers apjJointed
under the Act and for determining the kist instalments
and the due date for the pa,yment thereof. These in
short are the provisions of tho Act. The Act, as indicated above, was amended by Act X of 1957, which
substituted the words "State of Kerala" for the words
"State of Travancorc-Cochin" and made certain other
consequential changes. The Amending Act introduced section 5A, which Im~ bceu very much assailed in
the course of the argument b<:fore us and it is, therefore, necessary to set it out in full. It is in these
terms:"S. 5A. Provisional assessment of basic tax in the
case of unsurveyed lands.-( I) It shall be competent
for the Government to make a provisional assessme.nt of the basic tax payable by a person in re8pect
of the lands held by him and which have not been
surveyed by the Government, and upon such assessment such person shall be liable to pay the a.mount
covered in the provisional assessment.
86
Ig6o
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1961)
(2) The Government after conducting a survey of
the
lands referred to in sub-section (1) shall make
K. T. Moopil
a
regular
assessment of the basic tax payable in
Nair
respect
of
such
lands. After a regular assessment
v.
Stale of Kera/a
has been made, any amount paid towards the provisional assessment made under sub-section (1) shall
Sinha C. ].
be deemed to have been paid towards the regular
assessment and when the amount paid towards the
provisional assessment exceeds the amount payable
under the regular assessment, the excess shall be
refunded to the person assessed."
By s. 9, s. 3 of the Madras Revenue Recovery Act,
1864, has been substituted in these terms:
"3. Landholder when and to whom to pciy kist.Every landholder shall pay to the Collector or other
officer empowered by him in this behalf the land
tax due from him on or before the day fixed for
payment under the rules framed under s. 16 of the
Land Ta.x Act, 1955."
:From a review of the provisions of the Act, as amended as aforesaid, it will be clear that the provisions of
the Act lay down in barest outline the policy to impose a uniform and, what is asserted to be, a low rate
of land tax on alt lands in the State of Kera la. Unlike
other taxing statutes, it does not make any provision
for is.sue of notice to the assessee, nor is there any
provision for submission of a return by the assessee.
By s. 5A, it authorises the Government to make a
"provisional assessment" in respect of land, which
has not been surveyed, and such provisional assessment is made payable by the person made liable under
the Act. It does not make any provision for any
appeals in cases where the asscssee may feel dissatisfied with the assessment. The Act does contemplate
the making of "a regular assessment of the basic tax".
But it does not indicate as to when the regular assessment would be made, except indicating that it can be
made only after a survey has been made in respect of
the land assessed. The Act could not ha,-c been cast
in more general terms and the proceedings under the
Act could not have been more summary. It has thus
the merit of brevity as also of simplicity, derived
.3 s.c.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
87
from the fact that a tax is levied at a flat rate, irrespective of the quality of the land and consequently of E<. T. Moopil
its productive capacity. Under the Act, the charge
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has to be levied, whether or not any income has been
v.
derived from the land. The Legislature was so much Stute of K"ala
in earnest about levying and realising the tax that
it could not even wait for a regular survey of the Sinha C. ].
lands to be assessed with a view to determining the
extent and character of the land.
Such are the provisions and the effect of the Act,
which has been assailed on a number of grounds on behalf of the petitioners. It is contended, in the first
•
instance, that inequality is writ large in the provisions
of the Act, which is clearly discriminatory in character
and effect and thus infringes Art. 14 of the Constitution. As the Act does not ,have any regard to the
quality of the land or its productive capacity, and a
tax at a fl.at rate of Rs. 2 per acre is proposed to be
levied under the Act, it is further contended, it imposes very unreasonable restrictions on the right to
hold property and is thus an invasion on the rights
guarnnteed to the petitioners under Art. 19(l)(f) of
the Constitution. The Act does not lay down any
provision calling for a return from the assessee, for
any enquiry or investigation of facts before the provisional assessment is made or for any right of appeal
to any higher authority from the order of provisional
assessment; in fact, there is no provision for hearing
the assessee at any stage. The Act is of an arbitrary
character and is thus wholly repugnant to the guaranteed rights of the petitioners. Section 7 quoted above
gives uncanalised, unlimited and arbitrary power to
the Government to pick and choose in the matter of
grant of total or partial exemption from the provisions of the Act. It also suffers from the vice of discrimination. It has also been vehemently argued that
the Act, though it purports to be a tax on land, is
really a law relating to forests in possession of the
petitioners and would not come within the purview
of entry 18 read by itself or in conjunction with entry
45 of List II, but is law relating to forests under
entry 19. If we tear the veil in which the real
88
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1961]
purpose and effect of the Act has be-en shrouded, it will
appear
that the true character and effect of the Act is
J(. T. JY!<Jopil
not
to
levy
a tax on land, but to expropriate the
~Vair
private
owners
of the forests without p:1yment of any
v.
State .of Kerala compensation whatsoever.
Lastly, it has been urged
that the whole Act has been conceived with a view to
Sinha C. J,
confiscating private property, there being no question
of any compe:isation being paid to those who may be
expropriated as a result of the working of the Act.
This last argument is based on the assertion that the
tax proposed to be levied on private property in
the State ofKerala has absolutely no relation to the
paying capilcity of the persons sought to be taxed,
with reference to the income they could derive, or
actually did derive from the property.
On behalf of the State \lf Kera!a, the learned Ad vocate.General has argued that, though in most of the
cases, that is to say, except in seven petitions (Petitions 21, 22, 47, 49, 50, 51 and 5!) the lands have not
been surveyed, the areas mentioned in the notices
proposing provisional assessment have been ascertained through the local agencies of the Government. It
was further contended that the State had only declared the liability to the payment of the tax at a fiat
rate of Hs. 2 per acre in respect of land, inespecti ve
of the income to be derived therefrom. Hence there
was no necessity for making provision for a detailed
enquiry or investigation. The rate of th'-" t:J.x being
known, and the are& of the land to be taxed having
been loeally ascertained, even thongh without any
regular survey, what remained was merely quantifying the tax, which was of a pnrely administrative
character. The local agencies estimated the land in
possession of particular persons. Those persons were
called up0n to pay provisionally at the rate fixed by
the statut.0. The State has, by execut.ivc act.ion,
appointed authoritic.> who are expected to act in
accordance with the principle of natural justice. Th0re
was, therefore, no need for htying down any elaborate
procedure '1.R in other instances of taxing statutes.
There is a presumption t.hat the anthority appointed
by the Government would act bona fide and in a
3 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
j
89
1 60
proper manner. If there was any case of unfair deal.
9
ing9, the matter could be brought to the Court. It was K. T. Moopil
greatly emphasised that as a flat rate of taxation had
Nair
been envisaged by the Act and as ultimately the tax
v.
at that rate would be realised from land found to be Stat~ of K..al•
in possession of particular persons after a regular survey, the regular survey to be ultimately made would Siftha c. J.
automatically determine the a.mount of tax to be pa.id
and the adjustment of the taxes already paid could
be made on that basis. On the legal aspect of the
controversy raised on behalf of the petitioners, it was
argued that the Act has its justification in Art. 265 of
the Constitution, which was not subject to the provisions of Part III of the Constitution and that, therefore, Arts.14, 19, 31 could not be pressed in aid of the
petitioners. It was also contended that even if the
Act is, in effect, confiscatory, it cannot be questioned,
being a taxing statute. Finally, it was urged that
the question of the amount of income derived by the
petitioners from tlie property sought to be taxed is
w)lolly .. irrelevant, because the Act was not a tax on
income but it was a tax on the property itself.
The most important question that arises for consideration in these cases, in view of the stand taken by
the State of Kera.la, is whether Art. 265 of the Consti.
tution is a complete answer to the attack against the
constitutionality of the Act. It is, therefore, necessary to consider the scope and effect of that Article.
Article 265 imposes a limitation on the taxing power
of the State in so far as it provides that the Sta.te
shall not levy or collect a tax, except by authority of
law, that is to say, a tax cannot be levied or collected
by a mere executive fiat. It ha.s to be done by a.utho.
rity of la.w, which must mean valid la.w. In order that
the law may be valid, the tax proposed to be levied
must tie· within the legislative competence of the
Legislature imposing a tax and authorising the collection thereof and, secondly, the ta.x must be subject .to
the conditions la.id down in Art. 13 of the Constitution. One of such conditions envisa.ge<l by Art. 13(2)
is tha.t the Legislature she.II not make any law which
,.
90
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1961)
takes away or a:bridges the equality clause in Art. 14,
which enjoins the State not to deny to any person
I<. T. Moopil
equality
before the law or the equal protection of the
Nair
laws of the country. It cannot be disputed that if the
v.
State of Ke,ala Act infringes the provisions of Art. 14 of the Constitution, it must be struck down as unconstitutional.
Sinha C. ].
For the purpose of these cases, we shall assume that
the State Legislature had the necessary competence
to enact the law, though the petitioners have seriously
challenged such a competence. The guarantee of
equal protection of the laws must extend even to taxing statutes. It has not been con tended otherwise. It
does not mean that every person should be taxed
equally. But it does mean that if property of the
same character has to be taxed, the taxation must be
by the same standard, so that the burden of taxation
may fall equally on all persons holding that kind
and extent of property. If the taxation, generally
speaking, imposes a similar burden on every one
with reference to that particular "kind and extent of
property, on the same basis of taxation, the law shall
not be open to attack on the ground of inequality,
even though the result of the taxation may be that
the total burden on different persons may be unequal.
Hence, if the Legislature has classified persons or
properties into different categories, which are subjected to different rates of taxation with reference to
income or property, such a classification would not be
open to the attack of inequality on the ground that
the total burden resulting from such a classification is
unequal. Similarly, different kinds of property may
be subjected to differeµt rates of taxation, but so long
as there is a rational basis for the classification, Art.
14 will not be in the way of such a classification resulting in unequal burdens on different classes of properties. But if the same class of property similarly situated is subjected to an incidence of taxation, which
results in inequality, the law may be struck down as
creating an inequality amongst holders of the same
kind of property. It must, therefore, be held that a
taxing statute is not wholly immune from attack on
the ground ~hat it infringcR the equality clause in
4
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ll
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1960
Art. 14, though the Courts are not concerned with the
policy underlying a taxing statute or whether a parti- K. T. 11doopil
cular tax could not have been imposed in a different
Nair
way or in a way that the Court might think more
v.
just and equitable.. The Act has, therefore, to be State of Kijralo
examined with reference to the attack based on Art.
Sinha C. ].
14 of the Constitution.
It is common ground that the tax, assuming that
the Act is really a taxing statute and not a confiscatory measure, as contended on behalf of the petitioners, has no . reference to income, either actual or
potential, from the property sought to be taxed.
Hence, it may be rightly reI\larked that the Act obliges every person who holds land to pay the tax at
the flat rate prescribed, whether or not he makes any
income out of the property, or whether or not the pro·perty is capable of yielding any income. The Act, in
terms, claims to be "a general revenue settlement of
the State" (s. 3). Ordinarily, a tax on land or land
revenue is assessed on the actual or the potential productivity of the land sought to be taxed. In other
words, the tax has reference to the income actually
made, or which could have been made, with due diligence, and, therefore, is levied with due regard to the
incidence of the taxation. Under the Act in question
we shall take a hypothetical case of a number of persons owning and possessing the same area of land.
• One makes nothing out of the Janq, because it is arid
desert. The second one does not make any income,
but could raise some crop after a disproportionately
large investment of labour and capital. A third one,
in due course of husbandry, is making the land yield
just enough to pay for the incidental expenses and
labour charges besides land tax or revenue. The
fourth is making large profits, because the land is
very fer~ile and capable of yielding good crops. Under
the Act, it is manifest that the fourth category, in
our illustration, would easily be able to bear the burden of the tax. The third one may be able to bear
the tax. The first and the second one will have to
pay from their own pockets, if they could afford the
tax. If they cannot afford the tax, the property i8
·:-·:--:_r,:_,>--:-·~
.
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~ .\ . . \
:\
92 '-'.'. ' ' SUPREI\IE COURT REPORTS
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.-
•,
. [1961)
\
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liable to be sold, in due process oflaw,-for-realisation
· . K. T:.· •Moopil
· · ·of the·l public. demand. . It is clear, therefore, that
N•ir
inequa ity is writ large on the Act and is inherent in .
.. - v.
. . th·e very provisions of the taxing section. It is also
stall.of K ...1. clear that there is no attempt at classification· in the
· provisions of the Act •. Hence, no more need be said
Sinha _c. J; as to what could have been the basis for a valid classifi-·---- cation. It is one of those cases where the lack of classification creates inequality. It is, therefore, clearly hit
by the p~ohibition.to deny equality before the law con- tained in Art. 14 of the Constitution. Furthermore,
sec. 7 of the Act, quoted above, particularly the latter
part, which vests the Government with the power
wholly or partially to exempt any land from the provisions of the Act, is clearly. discriminatory in its
effect and, therefore, infringes Art. 14 of the Consti. tution. The Act does· not lay down . any· principle or
policy for the guidance of the exercise of discretion. by
•the Government in respect of the selection contemplated bys. 7. This Court has examined the .cases decided by it with reference to the provisions of Art. 14 of
the Constitution, in the case of Shri Ram Krishna
Dalmia v. Shri Justice S. R. Tendolkar and others(').
S. R. Das, C. J., speaking for the Court has deduced a
number of propositions from those decisions. The
present case is within the mischief of the third propo- sition laid down at. pages 299 and 300 of the Report,
the relevant portion of which is in these terms:. · "A statute may not make any classification of the
persons or things for the purpose of applying its
provisions but may leave it to the discretion of the
· . Government to select and classify persons or things
·to whom its provisions are to apply. In determining the question of the yalidity•or otherwise of such
a statute the Court will not strike down the law
out 'Of. hand only because no classification ·appears
on its face or because a discretion is given to the
· Government to make the selection or classification
_ .- _but will· go on ·to examine and ascertain if the
. statute has laid down any principle or policy for the
guidance of th!l exercise of discretion by the Govern• ment in the matter of the selection or classification.
(1) [1959] S.C.R. 279•.
,
3 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
I
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93
After such scrutiny the Court will strike down the
statute if it does not lay down any principle or K. T. Moopil
. policy for guiding the exercise of discretion by the
Nai11
Government in the matter of selection or classificav.
tion, on the ground that the statute provides for State of J(erala
the delegation of arbitrary and uncontrolled power
to the Government so as to enable it to discrimi- Sinha C. ].
nate between persons or ·things similarly situate .
and that, therefore, the discrimination is inherent
in the statute itself." (p. 299 of the Report).
The observations quoted above from the unanimous
judgment of this Court apply with full force to the
provisions of the Act. It has, therefore, to be struck
down as unconstitutional. There is no question of
severability arising in this case, because both the
charging sections, s. 4 and s. 7, authorising the
Government to grant exemptions from the provisions
of the Act, are the main provisions of the Statute,
which has to be declared unconstitutional.
The provisions of the Act are unconstitutional
viewed from the angle of the provisions of Art.
19( I)( f) of the Constitution, also. Apart from the
provisions of ss. 4 and 7 discussed above, with reference to the test under A.rt. 14 of the Constitution,
we find that s. 5(A) is also equally objectionable
because it imposes unreasonable restrictions on the
rights to hold property, safeguarded by Art. 19(1)(f)
of the Constitution. Section 5(A) declares that the
Government is competent to make a provisional
assessment of the basic tax payable by the holder of
unsurveyed land. Ordinarily, a taxing statute lays
down a regular machinery for making assessment of
the tax proposed to be imposed by the statute. It
lays down detailed procedure as to notice to the proposed assessee to make a return in respect of property
proposed to be taxed, prescribes the authority and the
procedure for hearing any objections to the liability
for taxation or as to the extent of the tax proposed
to be levied, and finally, as to the right to challenge
the regularity of assessment made, by recourse to proceedings in a higher Civil Court. The Act merely
declares the competence of the Government to make
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94
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1961]
a provisional assessment, and by virtue of s. 3 of the .
Madras Revenue Recovery Act, 1864, the land-holders
K. T. Moopil
may be liable to pay the tax. The Act being silent as
Nair
to the machinery and procedure to be followed in
v
State oj J(erala making the assessment leaves it to the Executive to
evolve the requisite machinery and procedure. The
Sinha C. ].
whole thing, from beginning to end, is treated as of a
purely administrative character, completely ignoring
the legal position that the assessment of a tax on person or property is at least of a quasi-judicial character. Again, the Act does not impose an obligation on
the Government to undertake survey proceedings
within any prescribed or ascertainable period, with
the result that a land-holder may be subjected to
repeated annual provisional assessments on more or
Jess conjectural basis and liable to pay the tax thus
assessed. Though the Act was passed about five
years ago, we were informed at the Bar that survey proceedings had not even commenced. The Act
thus proposes to impose a liability on land-holders
to pay a tax which is not to be levied on a judicial
basis, because (1) the procedure to be adopted does
not require a notice to be given to the proposed asses.
see; (2) there' is no procedure (or rectification of mistakes ca!nmitted by the Assessing Authority; (3) there
is no procedure prescribed for obtaining the opinion
of a superior Civil Court on questions of law, as is
generally found in all taxing statutes, and (4) no duty
is cast upon the Assessing Authority to act judicially
in the matter of assessment proceedings. Nor is
there any right of appeal provided to such assessees
as may feel aggrieved by the order of assessment.
That the provisions aforesaid of the impugned Act
are in their effect confiscatory is clear on their face.
Taking the extreme case, the facts of which we have
stated in the early part of this judgment, it can be
illustrated that the provisions of the Act, without
proposing to acquire the privately owned forests in
tjie Statll Of Kerala after satisfying the conditions
laid down in Art. 31 of the Constitution, have the
effect of eliminating the private owners through the
machinery of the Act. The petitioner in petition 42
3 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
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95
i:960
of 1958 has been assumed to own 25 thousand acres
of forest land. The liability under the Act would K. 1'. M oopil
thus amount to Rs. 50,000 a year, as already demandv.
ed from the petitioner on the basis of the provisional
assessment under the provisions of s. 5(A). The peti- State of Kerala
tioner is making an income of Rs. 3,100 per year out
of the forests. Besides, the liability of Rs. 50,000 as Sinha C. ].
aforesaid, the petitioner has to pay a levy of Rs. 4,000
on the surveyed portions of the said forest. Hence,
his liability for taxation in respect of his forest land
amounts to Rs. 54,000 whereas his annual income for
the time being is only Rs. 3,100 without making any
deductions for expenses of management. Unless the
petitioner is very enamoured of the property and of
the right to hold it, it may be assumed that he will
not be in a position to pay the deficit of about
Rs. 51,000 every year in respect of the forests in his
possession. The legal consequences of his making a
default in the payment of the aforesaid sum of money
will be that the money will be realised by the coercive processes of law. One can easily imagine
that the property may be sold at auction and may
not fetch even the · amount for the realisation of
which it may be proposed to be sold at public
auction. In the absence of a bidder forthcoming
to bid for the offset amount, the State ordinarily
becomes the auction purchaser for the realisation
of the outstanding taxes. It is clear, therefore, that
apart from being discriminatory and imposing unreasonable restrictions on holding property, the Act
is clearly confiscatory in character and effect. It is
not even necessary to tear the veil, as was suggested
in the course of the argument, to arrive at the conclusion that the Act has that unconstitutional effect. For
these reasons, as also for the reasons for which the
provisions of ss. 4 and 7 have been declared to be
unconstitutional, in view of the provisions of Art. 14
of the Constitution, all these operative sections of the
Act, namely 4, 5A and 7, must be held to offend Art.
19(1Xf) of the Constitution also.
The petitions are accordingly allowed with costs
against the contesting respondent, the State of Kerala.
96
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1961]
SARKAR, J.-These petitions were filed under Art.
32 of the Constitution, challenging the validity of the
K. T. Moopil
Travancore-Cochin Land Tax Act, 1955, as amended
Nair
by Act X ofl957. The principal Act was passed by
v.
Stale of Kerala the legislature of the State of Travancore-Cochin and
the Amending Act, by the legislature of the State of
Sarkar ].
Kerala, in which the State of Travancore-Cochin had
been merged. The petitioners are owners of lands in
the State of Kerala. The Act as amended and hereafter referred to as the Act, levied a certain basic tax
on all lands in the State of Kerala. The petitioners
say that the levy is illegal and violates their fundamental rights.
·
It appears from the preamble that the Act was
passed as it was deemed necessary to provide for the
levy of a low and uniform rate of basic tax on all
lands in the State. The Act provides that the arrangement made by it for the levy of the basic tax is to be
deemed to be a general revenue settlement of the
State. Section 4 of the Act is the charging section
and it lays down that there shall be charged and
levied in respect of all lands in the State, of whatever
description and held under whatever tenure, a uniform
rate of tax to be cal!ed the basic tax. Section 5 fixes
the rate of the tax at 2 n.P. per cent which works out
at Rs. 2 per acre per annum. This section also provides that the basic tax shall be the tax payable to
the Government in lieu of any other existing tax in
respect of land. Section 12 abolishes all cesses on land
except irrigation cess.
The first ground on which the validity of the Act is
challenged is that it offends the provision as to the
equal protection of the ·Jaws contained in Art. 14 of
the Constitution. The Act applies to all lands in the
State and it imposes an uniform rate of tax, namely,
Rs. 2 per acre. It is said that all lands in the State .
have not the same productive quality; that some are ·
waste lands and others, lands of varying degrees of
fertility. The contention is that the tax weighs more
heavily on owners of waste lands than on owners of
fertile lands. It is said tllat it is bound to happen
~t .. some ownera make no income out of their lanQ.
3 s.c.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
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97
or make a small income and they would have to pay
the tax out of their pocket while the owners of better
classes of lands yielding larger income would be able
to.pay the tax out of the income from the lands. It is
contended that the Act therefore discriminates between several classes of owners of lands in the State
and is void as infringing the equality clause in the
Constitution. It may be conceded that all landg in
the State are not of the same degree of fertility. I
am however unable to see that bemmse of that, the
Act can be said to discriminate between the owners
of them.
What is really said appears to be that the Act
makes a classification of the owners of lands according
to areas. Assume that the Act does so. The question
then is, is such a classification illegal? The equal
protection clause in the Constitution does not mean
that there shall be no classification for the purpose of
any law. It has. been said by this Court in Budhan
Olwudhury v. The State of Bihar (1 ): "It is now well
established that while article 14 forbids class legislation, it does not forbid reasonable classification for the
purposes of legislation. Iri order, however, to pass the
test of permissible classification two conditions must
be fulfilled, namely, (i) that the classification must be
founded on an intelligible differentia which distinguishes persons or things that are grouped together
from others left out of the group and (ii) that that
differentia must have a rational relation to the object
sought to be achieved by the statute in question".
On the argument of the petitioners, the Act makes
a classification between owners of lands using as the
differentia, the area of the land held by them. The
question then, is, is that differentia intelligible and
has that differentia a rational relation to the object of
the Act? Now it seems to me that both the tests a.re
satisfied in the present case. The tax payers a.re
classified according to the area of lands held by them.
That is quite an intelligible basis on which to make a
classification; holders of varying areas of land can
(1) [•95'] 1 S.C.R. 1045 1049.
I~
K. T. Moopil
Nair
v.
Sarkar ].
98
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1961]
quite understandably be placed in different classes.
Next, has such a basis of classification, a rational
K. T, Jl1oopil
relation
to the object of the Act? The Act is a taxing
NaiY
It is intended to collect revenue for the
statute.
v.
State' of f(erala governmental business of the State. · It says that one
of its objects is to provide a low and uniform rate of
Sarkar ],
basic tax. Another object mentioned is to replace all
other dues payable to the Government in respect of the
ownership of the land by a uniform basic tax. Why
is it to be said that the use of the area of land held as
the basis of classification has no rational relation to
these objects. I find no reason. The object is to tax
land held in the State for raising revenues. It is the
holding of the land in the State that makes the
owner liable to pay tax. It would follow that the
quantum of the tax can be reasonably linked with the
quantum of the holding.
Why is it said that the classification on the basis of
area is bad? It is only because it imposes unequal
burden of the tax on the owners of land; because
owners of less productive land would have a larger
burden put on them. Now if this argument is right,
then tax on land can be imposed only according to its
productivity. I have not been shown any authority
which goes to this length. I am further unable to see
how productivity as the basis of classification could
be said to have a more rational relation to the object
of a statute collecting revenue by taxing land held in
the State. The tax is not levied because the land is
productive but because the land is held in the State.
Again if the tax which could be imposed on land had
to be correlated to its productivity, then the State
would have no power to tax unproductive land and
the provision in the Constitution that it would have
power to tax land would, to that extent, be futile. It
seems to me that a contention leading to such a result
cannot be accepted.
Reliance was placed for the petitioners on Oumherland Coal Company v. Board of Revision on Tax
Assessments (1) in support of the contention that a tax
on land not based on its productivity, violates Art. 14.
(1) 76 L.Ji:d.
'•6.
3 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
99
I am unable to hold that this case supports the contention. What had happened there was that a cer- K. T. MoopiJ
tain statute had imposed a tax ad valorem on all coal
Nair
situated in a certain area and in assessing the tax, the
v.
coal of the Cumberland Coal Company had been Slat1 of Kcrala
assessed bv the authorities concerned at its full value
Sarkar ].
while the ~oal of the rest of the class liable to the tax
had been assessed at a lower value. Thereupon it
was held that "the intentional systematic undervaluation by State Officials of taxable property of the same
class belonging to other owners contravenes the constitutional right of one taxed on the full value of his
property." On this view of the matter the Supreme
Court of America directed readjustment of the assessments. The statute with which this case was concerned had levied the tax ad valorem which, it
may be, is the same thing as a tax correlated to productivity. The case had therefore nothing to do with
the question that a tax on coal otherwise than ad
valorem would be unconstitutional. In fact this case
did not declare any statute invalid.
Then it seems to me that if the contention of the
petitioners is right, and land could be taxed only on
its productivity, for the same reason, taxes on all
other things would have to be correlated to the income to be derived from them. The result would be
far reaching. I am not prepared to 11ccept a contention producing such a result and no authority has
been cited to lead me to accept it.
It may be that as lands are not of equal productivity, some tax payers may lie able to pay the tax out
of the income of the land taxed while others may
have to find the monev from another source. To this
extent the Act may· be more hard on some than on
others. But I am unable to see that for that reason
it is unconstitutional. All class legislation puts some
in a more disadvantageous position than others. If
the classification made by the law is good, as I think
is the case with the present Act, the resultant hardship alone cannot make it bad. It was said in JY!agonn
v. Illinois Trust and Savings Bank('), "It is hardly
(I) 42 L.Ed. 1037, 1043.
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1961]
necessary to say that hardship, impolicy, or injustice
of state laws is not necessarily an objection to their
K. T. Moopil
constitutional
validity."
Nair
It
is
then
said
that sub-sec.. (l) of s. 5A, which was
v.
SJate of Ketrala introduced into the Act by the Amending Act, offends
Art. 14. The impugned provision is in these terms:
Sarkar ].
S. 5A. (i) It shall be competent for the Government to make a provisional assessment of the bask
tax payable by a person in respect of the lands held
. by him and which have not been surveyed by the
Government, and upon such assessment such person
shall be liable to pay the amount covered in the
provisional assessment .
1960
..
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.................................. ................................
This section was· enacted as at the date of the Act, all
lands had not been surveyed and so the areas of all
holdings were not known. In the absence of such
knowledge the tax which was payable on the basis of
the areas of the holdings could not be assessed on unsurveyed lands, so the section provides that pending
the survey, the Government will have power to make
a provisional assessment on unsurveyed lands. This
provision was necessary as the survey was bound to
take time.
The contention is that s. 5A(l) gives arbitrary
power to the Government to make a provisional assessment on any person it chooses, leaving out others
from the provisional as&essment. I am unable to read
the sub-section in that way. It may be that it leaves
it to the Government to make a provisional assessment if it chooses. This does not result in any illegal
classification. The surveyed lands and unsurveyed
lands are distinct classes of properties and may be
differently treated. Again, all unsurveyed lands would
on survey have to pay tax from the beginning. It
would follow that the holders of both classes of lands
are eventually subjected to the same burden. As to
the contention that under this section the Government has the right to levy the provisional assessment ·
at its choice on some and not on all holders of unsurveyed lands, I am unable to agree that this is a
proper reading of the section. In my view, the
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101
expression "a person" in the section does not lead to
that conclusion. That expression should be read as I<. T. Moopil
"all persons" and it is easily capable of being so read.
Nair
The section says, "It shall be competent for the
v.
Government to make a provisional assessment of the State of I<erala
basic tax payable by a person". Now the basic tax is
Sarkar J.
payable by all persons holding land. So the provisfrmal assessment, if made, has to be on all persons
holding lands whose lands have not been surveyed.
The Government cannot, therefor~, pick and choose.
A statute is intended to be legal and it has therefore
to be read in a manner which makes it legal rather
than in a manner which makes it illegal. If the
Government did not make the provisional assessment
in the case of all liable to such assessment, then .the
Government's action could be legitimately questioned.
It has however not in fact been said in these petitions
that in deciding to make the provisional assessment
the Government has made any discrimination between
the persons liable to such assessment.
Section 5A(l) is also attacked on the ground that
it is against rules of natural justice in that it does not
say that in making the provisional assessment, any
hearing would be given to the person sought to be
assessed or requiring a return. from him or giving him
a right of appeal in respect of the provisional assessment made. It is true that the section does not expressly pr~vide for a hearing being given. It seems
to me however that if according to the rules of natural justice the assessee was entitled to a hearing, an
assessment made without giving him such a hearing
would be bad. The Act must be read s6 as to imply
a provision requiring compliance with the rules of
natural justice. Such a reading is not impossible in
the present case as there is nothing in the Act indicating that the rules of natural justice need not be
observed.
It was said in Spackman v. Plumstead Board o.f
Works (1 ) where a statute requiring an architect to
give a certain certificate which did not provide the
procedure as to how the architect was to conduct himself, came up for consideration that, "No doubt, in the
(1) IO A.C. 229, 240 .
102
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1961}
60
absence of special provisions as to how the person
who is to decide is to proceed, the law will imply no
more than th.i.t tl.ie substantial requirements of justice
v.
shall not be violated." Again in Maxwell on Statutes
State of l<erala (10th ed.) p. 370 it has been said, "In giving judicial
powers to affect prejudicially the rights of pccsOil or
0
5
"'" ' J.
property, a statute is understood as silently implying,
when it does not expressly provide, the coudilion or
qualification that the power is to be exercised in
accordance with the fundamental rules of judicial
procedure, such, for instance, as that which requires
that before its exercise, the person sought to be prejudicially affected shall hrwe an opportunity of defending himself." In so far as this Act confers a power
on the Government to discharge the judicial duty of
making a provisional assessment, which the petitioners say, it does, it must imply that the judicial process has to be observed.
As regards the return, that seems to me not to be
of much consequence. If the assessee is entitled to
be heard, the fact that he is not aoked to make a return, would not constitute a departure from the rules
of natural justice. Likewise, the absence of a right of
appe:tl is not somct.hing on which the petitioners can
rely. Rules of n11tural justice do not require that
there must al ways be a right of appeal. Under the
Act it is the Government which makes the assessment and it ''ould not be unreasonable to hold that
in view of the high authoricy of tho person assessing,
the absence of a right of appeal is not likely to cause
any miscarriage of justice. I am therefore unable to
hold that in the absence of express provi.sions laying
down tho procedure according to which the provisional assessment is to be made, the Act has to be held
invalid.
It may here be st11ted that in those instances where,
in the p~esent cases, provisional assessments had been
made, t.he assC's~e~s had either themselves supplied
the area of the lands held by them or the area had
been determined after giving them a hearing. After
the area has been determined, the amount of the tax
payable is decided by a simple calculation at the rat<"
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103
of Rs. 2 .per acre of land held and with regard to this,
no hearing is required.
I(. T. Moopil
Then again sub-sec. (2) of s. 5A provides that the
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Government after conducting a survey of the lands
v.
mentioned in sub-sec. (1) under which provisional State of Kerala
assessment is to be made, shall make a regular assessSarkar ].
ment and adjustments would have to be made in
regard to tax already paid on the basis of the regular
assessment. A point is made that there is no time
limit fixed within which the regular assessment is to
be made and so the Act leaves it to the arbitrary
decision of the Government when to make the regular
assessment. I do not think that this contention is
correct. Properly read, the section in the absence of
any indication as to time, means that regular assessment would have to be made as soon after the survey,
as is reasonably possible ..
It is also said that s/l of the Act offends Art. 14.
This section gives power to the Government to exempt
from the operation of the Act such lands or class of
lands as the Government may by notification decide.
This section does not indicate on what grounds .the
exemption is to be granted. It therefore seems to me
that it gives arbitrary power to the Government and
offends Art. 14. But the section is clearly severable
from the rest of the Act. If the section is taken out
of the Act, the operation of the rest of the Act will
not in the least be affected. The only effect will then
be that the Government will have no power to exempt
any land from the tax. That will not in any way
affect the other provisions of the Act. The invalidity
of this section is therefore no reason for declaring the
entire Act illegal. It may be pointed out that it is
not alleged in the petitions that the Government has
exempted any lands or class of lands from the operation of the Act.
It is contended that s. 8 of the amending Act also
shows the arbitrary nature of the Act. That section
provides that if any difficulty arises in giving effect to
the provisions of this Act, the Government may by
order do anything not inconsistent with such provisions which appears to it to be necessary or expedient
104
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1961)
for removing the difficulty. This is a common form
of provision now found in many Acts. The power
K. 1'. Moopil
Nafr
given under it cannot be said to be uncontrolled for
v.
it must be exercised consistently with the Act and
State of Kerala to remove difficulties arising in giving effect to the
Act. In any event, this provision is contained in the
Sark., J.
amending Act only. Even if the section be held to be
invalid that would not affect the rest of the amending
Act or any question that arises on these petitions.
The validity of the Act is also challenged on the
ground that it infringes Art.19, cl. (I), sub-c!s. (f)& (g).
This challenge seems to me to be wholly untenable.
Apart from the question whether a taxing statute can
become invalid as offending Art. 19, as to which the
position on the authorities does not seem to be very
clear, it is plain that Art. 19 permits reasonable
restrictions to be put on the rights mentioned in subcls. (f) & (g). Now there is no dispute that the rate
of tax fixed by the Act is a very low rate. It has not
been said that the rate fixed is unreasonable. It
clearly is not so. The restrictions on these rights
under Art. 19(1), (f) & (g) put by the Act, if any, are
clearly reasonable. These rights cannot therefore be
said to have been infringed by the Act.
The lands of the petitioners are lands on which
stand forests. It is said that under the Madras Preser"ation of Private Forests Act, (Act XXVII of 1949),
which applies to the lands with which we are concerned as they are situated in an area which previously
formed part of the State of Madras, the owners of the
forests can work them only with the permission of the
officer mentioned in that Act. It is said that the
control imposed by the officer has been such that the
income received from the forest is much less than the
tax payable under the Act in respect of the land on
which the forest stands. Taking by way of illustration Petition No. 13, it is pointed out that the income
from the forest with which that petition is concerned
was Rs. 8,477 for the year 1956-57 while the tax
payable under the Act for more or less the same
period was Rs. 1,51,000. I am unabl<il to hold that
because of this the Act offends Art. 19(1), (f) and (g).
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It is not stated that the land is not capable of producing any income other than the income from the forest K. T. Moopil
standing on it. There is nothing to show that in all
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v.
times to come the income from the land including the
income from the forest, will be less than the tax State of Kerala
imposed on it by the Act. The area of the land conSarkar ].
cerned in Petition No. 13 is enormous being about
75,500 acres. I am further unable to hold the impugned Act to be invalid because of action that may be
taken under another Act, namely, the Madras Act
XXVII of 1949.
The validity of the Act is challenged also on the
ground that it offends Art. 31 of the Constitution. I
am unable to see any force _in this contention. If the
statute is otherwise valid, as I have found the present ·
Act to be, it cannot, even if it deprives any person of
property, be said to offend Art. 31(1). It has been
held by this Court in Ramjilal v. Income-tax Officer,
lffohindargarh (1) that "clause (1) of Art. 31 must be
regarded as concerned with deprivation of property
otherwise than by the imposition or collection of tax,
for otherwise Art. 265 becomes wholly redundant."
No question of cl. (2) of Art. 31 being violated arises
here for the Act does not deal with any acquisition of
propert.y.
It is also said that the Act is a colourable piece of
legislation, namely, that though in form a taxing
statute it, in eJfect, is intended to expropriate lands,
held by the citizens in the State by imposing a tax too
heavy for the land to bear. As was said in Raja
Bhairebendra Narayan Bhup v. The State of Assam(')
"The doctrine of colourable legislation is relevant only
in connection with the question of legislative competency". In the present case, there being in my view,
no want of legislative competency in the legislature
which passed the Act in question, the Act cannot be
assailed as a piece of colourable legislation. I may
add that I do not accept the argument that the Act is
in its nature expropriatary or that the tax imposed by
it is really excessive.
(1) [1951] s.c.R. 127, 136.
14
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1961)
I come now to 'the last argument advanced by the
petitioners.
It is said that the Act was beyond the
K. T. Moopil
legislative
competence
of the State Legislature. It is
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conceded that the State Legislature has power to
St•t• of Kera/• impoS'e a tax on land under entry 49 of List 2 in the
Seventh Schedule to the Constitution, but it is said
S'Mur ).
that land as mentioned in that entry does not include
lands on which forests stand. It is contended that the
State Legislature has power to legislate about forests
under entry 19 of that List and also as to lands under
entry 18. There is however no power to impose a tax
on forests while there is power under entry 49 of that
list .to tax land. Therefore, it is said, that there is no
power to impose tax on lands on which forests stand
and the Act in so far as it imposes tax on lands covered by forests, which the lands of the petitioners are, is
hence incompetent.
It is not in dispute that a State Legislature has no
power to impose a tax on a matter with regard to
which it has the power to legislate but has been
given no, express power to impose a tax. Therefore, I
agree, that. a. State Legislature cannot impose tax on
forests. I am however not convinced that "land" in
entry 49 is not intended to include land on which a.
forest stands. No doubt, a forest muststand on some
lay.d. In Shorter Oxford Dictionary, one of the meanings of "forest" is given as an extensive tract of land
covered by trees and unfierg~wth, sometimes intermingled with pastures. The concepts .of forest and
land however are entirely different. The principal idea.
conveyed by the word "forest" is the trees and other
growth on the land. Under entry 19 there may no
doubt be legislation with regard to land in so far it is
necessary for the purpose of the forest growing on it.
It is well known that entries in the legislative lists
have to be read as widely as po~sible. It is not necessary to cut down the plain meaning of the word
"land" in entry 49 to give full effect to the word
"forest" in entry 19. In my view, the two entries
namely, entry 49 and entry 18 deal with entirely
different matters. Therefore, under entry 49 taxation
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3 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
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on land on which a forest stands is permissible and
legal.
For these reasons I would dismiss these petitions.
z960
If. T. Jf oopil
Nafr
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v.
the opinion of Sl•I• of Kerala
· BY COURT:-In accordance with
the majority of the Court, these Petitions are allowed
with costs against the contesting Respondent, the
State of Kerala.
Sarkar
J.
Petitions allowed.
THE STATE OF BOMBAY
v.
S. L. APTE & ANOTHER
(B. P. SINHA, c. J., s. K. DAS, A. K. SARKAR,
N. RAJA.GOPALA AYYANGA.R and
J. R. MUDHOLKA.R, JJ.)
I J
Double Jeopardy-Rule-" Same offence" -Test-Constitution
of India, Art. zo(z)-General Clauses Act, I897 (Io of I897), s. a6
-Indian Penal Code, I86o (XLV of I86o), s. 409-Insurance
Act, I9J8 (IV of I938), s. w5.
By Art. 20(2) of the Constitution "No person shall be prosecuted and punished for the same offence more than once."
Section 26 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, provides,"Where an act or omission constitutes an offence under two or
more enactments, then the offender shall be liable to be prosecuted and punished under either or any of those enactments,
but shall not be liable to be punished twice for the same offence."
The respondents were both convicted and sentenced by the
Magistrate under s. 409 of the Indian Penal Code and s. 105 of
the Insurance Act. The Sessions Judge on appeal upheld the
conviction and sentence under s. 409 of the Indian Penal Code,
but set aside the conviction and sentence under s. 105 of the
Insurance Act on the ground that no sanction under s. 107 of
the Insurance Act had been obtained. Sanction was thereafter
obtained and a fresh complaint was filed against the respondents
under s. 105 of the Insurance Act. The trial ended in an acquit•
ta! by the Magistrate who held that Art. 20(2) of the Constitution and also s. 26 of the General Clauses Act were a bar to conviction. The State appealed to the High Court against the
z960
December 9.
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