KISHAN CHAND ARORA versus COMMISSIONER OP POLICE, CALCUTTA
Supreme Court of India | Decided 9 December 1960 | [1961] 3 S.C.R. 135 | 1960 INSC 254
Key facts
- Decided
- 9 December 1960
- Bench
- BHUVNESHWAR PRASAD SINHA*, J.L. KAPUR, P.B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, K. SUBBA RAO, K.N. WANCHOO
- Bench size
- 5
- Case number
- WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) No. 22/1960
- Disposal
- Dismissed
- Citation
- [1961] 3 S.C.R. 135
- Neutral citation
- 1960 INSC 254
Text of the judgment
3 s.c.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
135
Article 136 of the Constitution confers ·a wide disz96o
cretionary power on this Court to entertain appeals·
. prov1'ded ,.ior by t h e Sanwat
Singh
in suitable cases not oth,erw1se
.,. Othe"
Constitution. It is implicit in the reserve power that
v.
it ca.nnot be exhaustively defined, but decided cases state of Rajasthan
do not permit interference unless "by disregard to the
forms of legal process or some violation of the prin- Subba Rao J.
ciples of natural justice or otherwise, substantial and
grave injustice has been done". Though Art. 136 is
couched in widest terms, the practice of this Court is
not to interfere on questions of fact except iu exceptional cases when the finding is such that it shocks
the conscience of the court. In the present case, the
High Court has not contravened any of the principles
laid down in Shea Swarup's case(') and has also
given reasons which led it to hold that the acquittal
was not jilstified. In the circumstances, no case has
?een made out for our not accepting the said findmgs.
In the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed.
Appeal dismissed,.
KISHAN CHAND ARORA
v.
COMMISSIONER OP POLICE, CALCUTT A
(B. P. SINHA, c. J., J. L. KAPUR, P. B. GAJENDRAGAD-
KAR, K. SUBBA RAO and K. N. WANCHoo, JJ.)
Eating House-Power to grant license-Discretion vested in
Police Commissioner - Constitutionality - Calcutta Police Act,
r866 (IV of r866), s. 39-Constitution of India, Arts. r9(r)(g),
r9(6).
By s. 39 of the Calcutta Police Act, 1866, "The Commiss_ioner of Police, may, at his discretion from time t~ time, grant
licenses to the keepers of such houses or places of public resort
and entertainment as aforesaid for which no licence as is specified
in the Bengal Excise Act, 1909, is required upon such conditions,
(1) (1934) L.R. 61 I.A. 398.
December 9.
136
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1961]
to be inserted in every such license, as he, with the sanction of
the said State Government from time to time shall order, for
Kishan Chand securing the good behaviour of the keepers of the said houses or
Aro1a
places of public resort or entertainment, and the prevention of
v.
drunkenness and disorder among the persons frequenting or using
Com111issioner oj the same; and the said licenses may be granted by the said ComPolice, Calcutta missioner, for any time not exceedipg one year".
The petitioner, whose application for a license in respect of
·an eating house was refused by the Commissioner of Police, Calcutta, under the section, challenged its constitutional validity on
the ground that it conferred arbitrary and unguided powers on
the Commissioner to grant or refuse a license without hearing
the applicant and was, therefore, an unreasonable restriction on
his fundamental right to carry on his trade guaranteed by Art.
rg(r)(g) of the Constitution.
Held, (per Kapur, Gajendragadkar and Wanchoo, JJ.), that
in order to decide whether a provision in a pre-Constitution
statute, like the one in question, satisfies the test of constitutionality laid down by Art. rg(r)(g) read with Art. r9(6) of the Constitution, the impugned section has to be read as a whole in a
fair and reasonable manner and it should not be declared void
simply because the considerations relevant to those Articles are
not immediately apparent from its language. It is not correct
to say that the discretion conferred on the Commissioner by the
first part of the section is absolute and that the question of imposing the two conditions mentioned by the second part can arise
only after the grant of the license. The two parts, read together,
can lead only to the conclusion that the discretion vested in the
Commissioner is guided by the two conditions mentioned in the
section, namely, the securing of good behaviour and the prevention of drunkenness and disorder and a third by necessary implication, that the applicant must have actual and effective
control and possession of the place where he keeps the eating
house.
Section 39 of the Calcutta Police Act, 1866, therefore, confers no arbitrary or uncanalised discretion on the Commissioner,
unguided by any criteria, and does not constitute an unreasonable restriction on the fundamental right to carry on trade under
Art. rg(r)(g) of the Constitution.
Rustom ]amshed Irani v. Harley Kennedy, (1901) I.L.R. 26
Born. 386, inapplicable.
Although tjlere can be no <loubt that procedural provi•ions
of a statute also enter into the verdict as to its reasonableness,
it cannot be laid down as a general proposition that if a licensing
statute omits to provide for a hearing or for the giving of reasons
for refusal, such ornission must necessarily constitute an unreason·able restriction on a fundamental right. The Commissioner
in passing an order under the section acts administratively and
although he must act reasonably. there is no duty cast on him
/
.•·
3 S.C.R~ SUPREME COURT·REPORTS
. '.' .-.·.
'\
'
,-
-,
137
to act judicially. Regard being had to the setting in which the
•960
impugned section appears in the Act and the circumstances of
this case, it could not be said thats. 39 of the Act was such a KidH CA.Rd
Ii
I
,
11
restriction.
·
Aro1•
State of• Madtas v. V. G. Row, [1952] S.C.R. 597, Nagendta
. Y'.
Nath B01a v. The Commissioner of Hills Division. and Appeals, C""'.'"""oner of
Assam, [1958] S.C.R. 1240. Nakkuda Ali v. M. F. De S. Jayarat1111, Polie1: Calcu1t4
1951 A.C. 66 and Exptess Nt11Jspapers (P.) Ltd. v. "The Union of
India, (1959] S.C.R. 12, relied on.
If
applicant thinks that he has fulfilled the three con-
an
ditions and the Commissioner has unreasonably rejected his
application, he has his remedy nnder Art. 226 of the Constitution. ·
.
.
.
Per Subba Rao; J.-It is well settled that restrictions on
fundamental rights must not be arbitrary or excessive or beyond
what is required, in the· interest 'Of the general public. Such
restrictions have to be tested both from the substantive and the
procedural aspects. An nncontrolled or uncanalised power constitutes an unreasonable restriction. Even thongh the ·statute
may clearly express the legislative policy that cannot be enough
unless it provides a suitable machinery for implementation of ·
that policy in accordance with the principles of natural justice.
Restriction~ are justiciable and in deciding whether a restriction
is reasonable or not, the Court cannot attach much importance
to the fact that ·the impugned statute vests discretion in the
State Government or a high officer. · Nor can the distinction ·
between an administrative authority and a. judicial one have
· much relevance except that the Court may be more inclined to
uphold the discretion if vested in an impartial judicial authority
rather than in an administrative one.
State of Mail1as v. V. G. Row, [1952] S.C.R. 597, Thakur
Raghubit Singh v. Cou1t of Watds, Ajmer, [1953] S.C.R. 1049 and
M/s. Dwatka Ptasad Laxmi Narain v. The State of Uttar Pradesh,
[1954] S.C.R. 803, relied on.
Babula! Chandta v. Chief Justice and Judges, High Courl of
Patna, Al.R. 1954 S.C. 524, Harishankar Bagla v. The State of
Madhya Pradesh, [1955] l S.C.R. 380, Union of India v. Eliana
Mal Gulzarimal Ltd.,· (1960]2 S.C.R. 627 and Mineral Development Lt.l., State of Bihar, (1960] 2 S.C.R. 609, considered..
Thus viewed, the plain words of the impugned section cannot
be said to Jay down any policy reasonably capable of controlling
the discretion vested in the Commissioner.
The word 'may' coupled with the words 'at his discretion'
in the first part of the section clearly emphasises the intention
of the Legislature to confer absolute power on the Commissioner.
The second part deals with the nature of the conditions to be
inserted in the license.. •.But the scope of the discrotion to issue
. 18
- \
'". 1 9 60
. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1961]
the license and the power to impose conditions in a license are
·
two
different matters.
KisTr.an CTr.iJnd
Arora;·
Even if the two conditions mentioned. in the second part
. v.
could.be read into the first, the discretion conferred by the secCommissioner of tion would still. b<: arbitrary sin<:e the section neither re.quires
Police C•l<~tt• that the Comm1ss1oner should give reasonable opportumty to
'
the applicant to prove that he satisfies both the test> prescribed
by it nor that he should give reasons for refusing the license and
no appeal.is provided for.
Consequently, from the substantive as much as the procedural aspect, s. 39 of the Act infringes the fundamental right of
. the petitioner guaranteed by Art. 19(1)(g) of the Co.nstitution.
.\
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION:
Petition No. 22 of 1960.
Petition under Art. 32 of the Constitution of
India for enforcement of Fundamental Rights.
· . H.J. Umrigar and B. P. !tfah~shwari, for the petitioner.
·
A. C. J,Iitra, B. Das and P. K. Bose, for the respondents Nos. 1and2.
· ·
P. K. Mukherjee, for respondent No. 3.
1960, December 9. The Judgment of Kapur,
Gajendragadkar and \Vanchoo, JJ., was delivered by
Wanchoo, J., and that of Sinha, C.J., and. Subba
Rao, J., was delivered by Subba Rao, J.
·
W•nchoo J.
\VANCHOO, J.-This petition under Art. 32 of the
Constitution challenges the ·constitutionality of s. 39
of the Calcutta Police Act, No. IV of 1866, (hereinafter called the Act). The facts necessary for our
purpose are these. On August 11, 1954, the petitioner
entered into an agreement with one Haripada Bhowmick, who is respondent No. 3 with respect to an
eating house named 'Kalpatoru Cafeteria', situate in
No. 2 Chowranghee Road, Calcutta. The petitioner
was• appointed a contractor by this agreement and
was given the exclusive. use and occupation of the
said eating house upon certain terms and conditions.
A licence has to be taken out with respect to an
· eating house under s. 39 of the Act. It appears
that originally the licence was in the name of .
Bhowmick, and one of the conditions of the licence
was that the eating house should not be sublet
3 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
139
without permission of the Commissioner of Police
i96o
(hereiuafter referred to as the Commissioner). On the
date of the agreement, Bhowmick held a. licence for Kish;:.~••rul
the eating house, which was to expire on March 31,
v.
1955. It is said that under the agreement the licence Commissioft., of
was to remain in the name of Bhowmick while the Police. cai.u11a
petitioner was to carry on the business as a. contractor. The petitioner carried on the business from after Wancloo J.
the date of the agreement and no application for a.
fresh licence was made l?Y him before March 31, 1955,
when the licence in the name of Bhowmick was to
expire. .It was only on August 8, 1955, that an
application for licence was ma.de by the petitioner on
behalf and in the name o0f Bhowmick, though the
business was continued to be run by him a.II the time
after March 31, 1955. It appears that the application
made in the name of Bhowmick was rejected on
December 27, 1956; but in the meantime Bhowmiok
was prosecuted on September 10, 1955, for running
the eating houee without a licence and was fined on
December 12, 1955. Thereafter a. notice was issued
to Bbowmick on September 7, 1956, to show ca.use
why his application for licence should not be refused
inasmuch as be had not applied in time a.nd violated
the condition of the licence by sub-letting the ea.ting
house to the petitioner. Thereafter the petitioner
applied on September 21, 1956, for the issue of a
licence in his own name. It may be mentioned that in
the meantime there had been disputes between Bhowmick and the petitioner and a. suit had been filed by
Bhowmick against the petitioner in October 1956 in
that connection. It may also be mentioned that
though the petitioner applied for the first time on
September 21, 1956, for licence he bad already been
prosecuted in October, 1955, for keeping a.n ea.ting
house without a licence and convicted in November
1955. The application ma.de by the petitioner on
September 21, 1956, was eventually rejected on March
30, 1958, though in the meantime the petitioner was
all along c01~tinuing .the bus~ness of the ea.ting house
without havmg obta.med a. licence. After the rejection
of his application the petitioner applied to the High
140
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1961]
Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution challenging
the constitutionality of s. 39 and also challenging the
Kishan Chand
·
h'is 1icenc6 on
Arora
order of the Commissioner reJecting
v.
various grounds. This application was dismissed on
commissioner of August 7, 1958. Thereupon the petitioner went up in
Police, Calcutta appeal to a Division Bench of the High Court which
was disposed of on March 4, 1959. The Division
Wanchoo f.
Bench held s. 39 to be constitutional. It further held
that as extraneous matters had been taken into account in rejecting the application of the petitioner for
a licence the rejection was not in accordance with law.
However, as the period of one year for which a licence is valid under s. 39 had expired in September
1957, and the judgment was being delivered in March
1959, the appeal was dismissed on the ground that
that application could not be considered in 1959.
Thereupon the petitioner made another application to
the Commissioner on March 30, 1959, for the period
from April I, 1959 to March 31, 1960. During all this
time the petitioner was carrying on his business as a
keeper of the eating house without a licence. This
application was found defective and another application was made on May 14, 1959. In the meantime,
the petitioner again applied to the High Court on or
about May 8, 1959, under Art. 226 of the Constitution
in order to compel the Commissioner to issue him a
licence or in the alternative to compel him not to
prosecute him for keeping an eating house without a
licence and for such other orders as the High Court
might deem fit to pass. It may be mentioned that day
to day prosecution of the petitioner had begun from
February 1956 under s. 40 of the Act for continuing
to keep an eating house without a licence. This writ
application filed in the High Court was withdrawn by
the petitioner on May 13, 1959, as his application to
the Commissioner of March 30, was defective. On
May 30, 1959, the Commissioner rejected the application of the petitioner for a licence on the ground that
his antecedents and his present conduct showed that
he would not keep good behaviour and further that he
would not be able to prevent drunkenness or disorder
among the persons frequenting or using the eating
1960
3 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
141
1 960
house. The petitioner's complaint is that he was not
heard before the order rejecting his application was Ki<han Chand
passed. Then on June 15, 1959, the petitioner again
Aro.a
applied under Art. 226 of the Constitution to the
v.
High Court against the rejection of his application on Commissioner of
May 30. On February 11, 1960, the High Court Police, Calcutta
allowed the petitioner to withdraw the application Wan-;;;;o J.
with liberty to move snch application as he may be
advised before this Court, in case such liberty was
necessary. Thereafter tho petitioner moved this Court
by his present application on February 15, 1960.
His main contention before us is that s. 39 of the
Act confers naked and uncanalised powers on the
Commissioner to grant or refuse a licence and that no
criteria have been laid down anywhere in the Act to
guide the discretion of the Commissioner. Further,
no opportunity is provided to an applicant for a
licence to be heard either orally or in writing before
passing orders on an application for licence; in consequence, the Commissioner has been given completely
arbitrary powers either to grant or to refuse a licence
and this amounts to an unreasonable restriction on
the fundamental right of the petitioner to carry on
the trade of eating house keeper. Besides this attack
on the constitutionality of s. 39 the petitioner also
contends that the order is mala fide and should be
struck down on this ground. There are some other
grounds in the petition but they have not been pressed before us and it will not be necessary to consider
them.
The first question therefore that falls for consideration is whether s. 39 of the Act is a reasonable restriction within the meaning of Art. 19(6) on the fundamental right to practise any profession or to carry on
any occupation, trade or business contained in Art. 19
( 1)(g). Sec. 39 is in these terms:"The Commissioner of Police, may, at his discretion, from time to time, grant licences to the keepers
of such houses or places of public resort and entertainment as aforesaid for which no licence as is
specified in the Bengal Excise Act, 1909, is required
upon such conditions, to be inserted in every such
142
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1961]
licence, as he, with the sanction of the said State
Government from time to time shall order, for
Kishan Chand
securing
the good behaviour of the keepers of the
Arora
v.
said houses or places of public resort or entertainCommissioneY of
ment, and the prevention of drunkenness and disPolice, Calcutta
order among the persons frequenting or using the
same;
and the said licences may be granted by the
Wtinchoo ].
said Commissioner, for any time not exceeding one
year."
Learned counsel for the petitioner contends that the
language of s. 39 shows that an absolute discretion,
untrammelled by any considerations, is conferred on
the Commissioner by this section and there is nothing
either in the section or anywhere in the Act to guide
the discretion of the Commissioner in the matter of
gra.nting such licences. Therefore, according to learned counsel, the power conferred on the Commissioner
is arbitrary and unguided and such power is necessarily to be struck down on the ground that it cannot
be a reasonable restriction on the fundamental right
to carry on trade. There is no doubt that if the section empowers the Commissioner to grant or refuse a
licence without any criteria to guide him, it would be
an unreasonable restriction on the right to carry on
trade. We have therefore to see whether there is any
guidance either in the section or in the Act to regulate
the exercise of discretion of the Commissioner in the
matter of granting such licences. In this connection
it must be remembered that the Act was passed in
1866 when there were no fundamental rights and we
cannot expect that meticulousness of language which
should be found in statutes passed after January 26,
1950. It may also be mentioned that the Act replaced
two earlier Acts, namely, Act XIII of 1856 and
XL VIII of 1860. The Act of 1860 also contained provisions for licences for eating houses in ss. 11 and 12
thereof, though the language of those sections was
somewhat different. Sec. 11 laid down that in the
towns of Calcutta, Madras and Bombay no eating
house shall be kept without licence and provided for a
penalty for the same. Sec. 12 then laid down that the
Commissioner shall from time to time grant licences to
3 S.C.R. S'UPREME COURT REPORTS
143
keepers of such houses upon conditions for securing the
good behaviour of the keepers of the said houses and l(ishan Chanoi
for the prevention of drunkenness and disorder among
Arora
the persons frequenting or using the same. The Ian.v.
guage of s. 39, however, is different inasmuch as it Commissioner 0!
proyides that the Commissioner may at his discretion Police, Calcutl•
from time to time grant licences. The Act of 1860 Wanohoo J.
was interpreted by the Bombay High Court in Rustom
J. Irani v. H. Kennedy (1 ) as giving no discretion to
the Commissioner to refuse a licence if the person
applying for the licence was willing to fulfil the conditions imposed thereunder. In the case of Calcutta,
however, s. 39 made a change in the language contained in the earlier Act giving discretion to the Commissioner in the matter of grant of licences. The
question therefore is whether the word "discretion"
introduced by s. 39 means an absolute and unguided
discretion and would therefore now become an unreasonable restriction on the fundamental fight of a
citizen to carry on the trade of keeping an ea ting
house. There is no doubt, as we have already indicated, that the section does not say as many of the
provisions of laws passed after January 26, 1950, do
that the Commissioner would grant licence on certain
specified considerations. The contention on behalf of
the petitioner is that the first part of s. 39 confers an
absolute discretion on the Commissioner to grant or to
refuse a licence just as he pleases and that the second
part of the section merely provides for certain conditions to be imposed in case the Commissioner pleases
to grant a licence. We are however of opinion that
when we a.re judging a la.w passed in 1866 to decide.
whether it satisfies the test of constitutionality based
on Art. 19(l)(g) and Art. 19(6), we should take the
section as a whole and see whether on a fair reading
of the section it can be said that there is no guidance
for the Commissioner in the matter of granting or
refusing licences and his power is arbitrary. If such
guidance can be found on a fair reading of the section,
there would be no reason for striking it down simply
because it has not been worded in a manner which
(1) (1go1) I.L.R. a6 Bom. 396.
144
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1961]
1 60
9
would show immediately that considerations arising
from the provisions of Art. 19(l)(g) and Art. 19(6) were
in mind-naturally those considerations could not
v.
be in the mind of the legislature in 1866. We have
Commissioner of therefore to see whether an Act passed before the
Police, Calcutta Constitution came into force can be reasonably and
fairly read as containing guidance in the matter of
Wanchoo ].
licensing, as in this case. If it can be fairly and reasonably read to centain guidance it should not be
struck down. If, on the other hand, on a fair and reasonable construction of the section as a whole, we
come to the conclusion that there is no guidance in it
and the discretion vested in the Commissioner is absolute and arbitrary it will have be struck down.
What then does the section provide? It certainly
gives powers to the Commissioner to grant licences at
his discretion. Those words, however, by themselves
do not necessarily mean that the Commissioner has
the power'to a.ct arbitrarily ahd grant licences where
he pleases and refuse where he does not please to do
so. The section provides further that the licence has
to be granted upon certain conditi.ons and those conditions have to satisfy two objects, namely, (i) securing of the good behaviour of the keepers of the said
houses or places of public resort and entertainment
and (ii) the prevention of drunkenness and disorder
among the persons frequenting or using the same. Of
course, it is implicit in the section that a licence will
only be granted to a person who is the keeper of an
eating house. We cannot read the section as laying
down thij.t the discretion is absolute and that the imposing of conditions for the aforesaid two objects only
arises after that absolute discretion has been exercised
in favour of the grant of licences. We see no unfair.
ness or unreasonableness in reading the section to
mean that the Commissioner shall satisfy himself (i)
that the person applying for a licence is the keeper of
an eating house, meaning thereby that he has a place
where he can carry on the business or trade and that
he actually and effectively has control and poasession
of that place, (ii) that the keeper is a person of good
behaviour so that the eating house may not become
Kishan Chand
Arora
·{
II
3 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
145
a resort of criminals and persons of ill-repute, and (iii)
'96°
that the keeper is in a position to prevent drunken- Kishan Chand
ness and d isord er among those who come to the eatAror&
ing house. This section appears in the Police Act,
v.
the purpose of which is to maintain law and order and Commissioner of
that is why we find that the two objects to be secured Police, Calcutta
when granting licences are the good behaviour of the
keeper himself and the prevention of drunkenness and Wanchoo J.
disorder among those who frequent the eating house.
It seems therefore to us that s. 39 clearly provides
that the Commissioner will use his discretion in deciding whether the person applying for a licence is in
actual and effective control and possession of the
place where the ea.ting· house is to be kept and is
thus the keeper thereof. He will also satisfy himself
that the keeper is a person of good behaviour and further that he is able to prevent drunkenness and disorder in the eating house. If he is satisfied on these
three matters, it seems to us that the section contemplates that the discretion will be exercised in favour of
the grant of a licence. We cannot accept that even
though the Commissioner may be satisfied that the
person applying for a licence has actual and effective
control of the place where he is going to keep the
ea.ting house, is a person of good behaviour and can
pre,·ent drunkenness and disorder among the clientele,
he will still go on to refuse the licence. The discretion
that is given to him is to satisfy himself on these
three points and if he is satisfied about them he has
to grant the licence. On the other hand if he is not
satisfied on any one or more of these points he will
exercise the discretion by refusing the licence. As for
the conditions which will be inserted in the licence,
they a.re only for the purpose of carrying on the two
objects specified in the section. They will naturally
be more detailed in order to carry out the two objects
aforesaid. But these two objects in our opinion along
with the obvious implication in the section that the
person applying must have actual and effective con·
trol of the place where he is going to keep the ea.ting
house a.re the criteria which will govern the exercise
19
146
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1 60
[1961]
of discretion by the Commissioner in the matter of
Kishan Chand granting or refusing a licence. We cannot agree with
Arooa
the learned counsel for the petitioner that the two
v.
parts of s. 39 should be read separately, as if one has
Com.missioner •! no effect on the other. Reading them together, it is
Police, Calcutta in our opinion fair and reasonable to come to the con-- ]. clusion that the discretion of the Commissioner in this
Wanchoo
matter is guided by the two objects mentioned in the
section and by the necessary implication contained in
it that the person applying must be in actual and
effective control and possession of the place where he
is going to keep the eating house. The argument
therefore that s. 39 confers an arbitrary and uncanalised power without any criteria for guiding the discretion of the licensing authority must fail and the
section cannot be held to be an unreasonable restriction on the right to carry on trade on this ground.
Then it is urged that even if there is guidance in
the section it provides for no hearing either oral or
written of the person applying for a licence. Further
it provides for no grounds to be given for refusing a
licence. Therefore, though there may be some guiding
principle in the matter of granting licences, the
absence of a provision for hearing and for giving
reasons for refusal would also make the provision
unconstitutional as an unreasonable restriction on a
fundamental right. Reference in this connection was
made to State of Madras v. V. G. Row (1) where it waB
observed that"ln considering the reasonableness of laws imposing restrictions on fundamental right, both the substantive and procedural aspects of the impugned
law should be examined from the point of view of
reasonableness and the test of reasonableness,
wherever prescribed, should be applied to each
individual statute impugned and no abstract stande.rd or general pattern of reasonableness can be laid
down as applicable to all cases."
There is no doubt that procedural provisions of a
statute also enter into the verdict as to its reasonableness; but at the same time there can be no abstract or
9
(1) [1952] S.C.R. 597·
3 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
147
general principles which would govern the matter and
r96o
each statute has to be examined in its own setting. It Kishan Chand .
is undoubtedly correct that no provision has been
ho.a
made for giving a hearing to a person applying for a
v.
licence and the Commissioner has not to give reasons Commissioner of
when refusing the licence; but it cannot be laid down Police. Calcutt•
as a general propositio~ _tha~ where in the. case of Wan~o f.
licensing statute no prov1s10n 1s made for hearmg and
·
there is no provision for giving reasons for refusal the
statute must be struck down as necessarily an
unreasonable restriction on a fundamental right. No
case has been cited before us which lays down such a
general proposition. We have therefore to examine
the section in its setting to decide whether the absence
of a provision for hearing and for requiring the Commissioner to give reasons for refusal would make this
section unconstitutional. The section appears in the
Police Act, which deals generally with matters of law
and order and the two objects specified in the section
are also for the same purpose. The discretion is vested
in a high police officer who, one would expect, would
use it reasonably. There is no provision for appeal
and there is no lis as between the person applying for
a licence and the Commissioner; the exercise of the
discretion depends upon the subjective satisfaction of
the Commissioner as to whether the person applying
for a licence satisfies the three conditions mentioned
above. It is true that the order when made one way
or the other affects the fundamental right of carrying
on trade, but in the circumstances it cannot but be an
administrative order (see, Nagendra Nath Bora v. The
Commissioner of Hills Division and Appeals, Assam (1)),
and though the Commissioner is expected to act
reasonably there is no duty cast on him to act judicially. In Nakkuda Ali v. M. F. De S. Jayaratne('), the
Privy Council pointed out that it was quite possible to
act reasonably without necessarily acting judicially and
that it was a long step in the argument to say that
because a man is expected to act reasonably he cannot
do so without a course of conduct analogous to the
judicial process. The compulsion of hearing before
(1) [1958] s.c.R. ""o, u53.
(2) [1951] A.C. 66.
148
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1961]
passing the order implied in the maxim 'audi alteram
partem'
applies only to judicial or quasi-J"udicial proKishan Chand
Arora
ceedings: (see, Express Newspapers (P.) Ltd. v. The
v.
Union of India (1)). Therefore, the fact that no hearCommission" of ing is required to be given by the Commissioner before
Police, Calcutta he decides to grant or refuse a licence would not make
the provisions as to licensing in the circumstances of
Wanchoo f.
this case unreasonable restrictions on the fundamental
right of carrying on a trade. For the same reaso1:s it
cannot be said that because the reasons for refusal are
not communicated to the person applying that would
make the licensing provision unconstitutional. The
person applying knows that under the law there are
three conditions (already set out above) which the
Commissioner has to consider in granting or refusing
the licence. If he thinks that he fulfills the three conditions and the Commissioner has acted unreasonably
in rejecting his application he is not without a remedy;
he can apply to the High Court under Art. 226 and
compel the Commissioner to disclose the reasons for
refusal before the Court and if those reasons are extraneous or are not germane to the three matters arising
under s. 39, the High Court will compel the Commissioner to act within the scope of s. 39. We are therefore of opinion that in the circumstances of this case
and in the setting in which s. 39 appears the mere
absence of a provision for a hearing or a provision for
communicating the reasons for refusal to the person
applying, does not make s. 39 unconstitutional as an
unreasonable restriction on a fundamental right. The
attack therefore on the constitutionality of s. 39 must
fail.
Then we turn to the question of mala jides. It is
not the case of the petitioner that the Commissioner
bas any personal· animus against him or that ho is
favouring Bbowmick. What he says in ground 41 of
his petition in this connection is that the reasons given
by the Commissioner in his order dated May 30, 1959,
for refusing the licence are not correct and that the
Commissioner is annoyed with him because he went
to the High Court by means of a writ application.
r960
(I) (1959] S.C.R. 12, 106.
3 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
149
These in our opinion are no grounds for holding that
the order of the Commissioner passed in this case on Kishan Chand
May 30, 1959, is mala fide.
Ato'a
The petition therefore fails and is hereby dismissed
v.
Commissioner of
with costs.
Police, Calcutta
SuBBA RAO, J.-We regret our inability to agree
with Wanchoo, J. Our learned brother in his judgment has stated the facts fully and it is not necessary
to restate them here.
The petitioner applied to the Commissioner of
Police, Calcutta, for a licence to enable him to carry on
the business of an eating house known as "Kalpatoru
Cafeteria". The Commissioner by his order dated
May 30, 1959, rejected the application made by the
petitioner for a licence on two grounds, namely, that
he was ·not satisfied that from "the antecedents and
present conduct" of the petitioner it would be reasonable to think that the petitioner would keep good
behaviour and would be able to prevent drunkenness
or disorder among the persons frequenting the eating
house. The application was rejected under s. 39 of
the Calcutta Police Act, No. IV of 1866 (hereinafter
called the Act). The short question raised is whether
s. 39 of the Act is constitutionally valid. Section 39
of the Act reads:
"The Commissioner of Police, may, at his discretion, from time.to time, grant licenses to the keepers
of such houses or places of public resort and entertainment as aforesaid for which no license as is
specified in the Bengal Excise ,Act, 1909, is required
upon such conditions, to be inserted in every such
license, as he, with the sanction of the said State
Government from time to time shall order, for securing the good behaviour of the keepers of the said
houses or places of public resort or entertainment,
and the prevention of drunkenness and disorder
among the persons frequenting or using the same;
and the said licenses may be granted by the said
Commissioner, for any time not exceeding one
year."
Learned counsel for the petitioner contends that
Subba Rao ].
150
SUPREME COUl{T REPORTS
[1961]
the petitioner has under Art. 19(1 )(g) of the ConstituKishan Chand tion a fundamental right to carry on the business of
A•ora
an eating house and that the provisions of s. 39 of
v.
the Act impose unreasonable restrictions on the exerCommissioner of cise of his right and, therefore, the said section is
Police, Calcutta void.
Before scrutinising the provisions of that section it
Subba Rao J. would be convenient at the outset to notice the relevant aspects of the law vis-a-vis the concept of
reasonable restrictions on a fundamental right. The
concept of reasonableness has been clearly defined by
Patanjali Sastri, C. J., in State af Madras v. V. G.
Row(') thus:
"It is important in this context to bear in mind
that the test of reasonableness, wherever prescribed, should be applied to each individual statute
impugned, and no abstract standard, or general
pattern, of reasonableness can be laid down as
applicable to all cases. The nature of the right
alleged to have been infringed, the underlying purpose of the restrictions imposed, the extent and
urgency of the evil sought to be remedied thereby,
the disproportion of the imposition, the prevailing
conditions at the time, should all enter into the
judicial verdict".
There the constitutional validity of s. 15(2)(b) of the
Indian Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1908, was impugned on the ground that it fell outside the scope of
authorized restrictions in Art. 19(4) of the Constitution.
The issue of a notification by the State Government
declaring an association unlawful was made to depend
upon its subjective satisfaction of certain objective
factors. The Act also provided for an enquiry before
an Advisory Board and the subsequent review of the
order by the Government on the basis of the said
enquiry. It was pressed upon this Court to hold that
the said restriction passed the test laid down in
Art. 19(4) of the Constitution. In rejecting the contention, Patanjali Sastri, C. J., observed thus:
"The formula of subjective satisfaction of the
Government or of its officers, with an Advisory
z96o
(I) [1952] S.C.R. 597, 607, 6o8.
3 s.c.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
151
Board thrown in to review the materials on which
r96o
the Government seeks to override a basic freedom Kishan Chand
guaranteed to the citizen, may be viewed as reasonArora
able only in very exceptional circumstances and
v.
within the narrowest limits, and cannot receive Commissioner of
judicial approval as a general pattern of reasonable Police, c.1,uua
restrictions on fundamental rights."
Subba Rao].
The learned Chief Justice adverting to the procedural
aspect of the restriction criticised the absence of a provision in the impugned Act for personal service on
the association and thus depriving its members of the
opportunity to make their representations.
Compared with s. 39 of the Act, the impugned provisions of the Criminal Law Amendment Act impose
more stringent control, on the exercise of the discretionary power by the Government. Yet the Court
struck down the provisions. The attempt made to
distinguish that decision on the ground that it related to the fundamental right of freedom of speech cannot be justified as the freedom to do business is also
one of the important fundamental rights under the
Constitution.
The case of Thakur Raghuhir Singh v. Court of
Wards, Ajmer (1) was concerned with the question of
the reasonableness of the provisions of s. 112 of the
Ajmer Tenancy and Land Records Act (XLII of
1950) which provided that "if a landlord habitually
infringes the rights of a tenant under this Act, he
shall, notwithstanding anything in s. 7 of the Ajmer
Government Wards Regulation, 1888 (I of 1888),
be deemed to be a 'landlord who is disqualified
to manage his own property' within the meaning
of s. 6 of the said Regulation and his property
shall be liable to be taken under the superintendence of the Court of Wards." The determination
of the question whether a landlord habitually infringed the rights of a tenant was left to the Court of
Wards. This Court held that that section was void
as being unreasonable restriction on the right in property as the restriction made the enjoyment of that
right to depend upon the mere discretion of the
l•l [1953] s.c.R. 1~9. 10;5.
152
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1961]
executive. Mahajan, J., as he then was, observed as
under:
Kishan Chand
"When a law deprives a person of his possession
Arora
of his property for an indefinite period of time
v.
Commissioner of
merely on the subjective determination of an execuPoli<;e, Cal<;utta
tive officer, such a law can, on no construction of
the word "reasonable"· be described as coming withSubba Rao ].
in that expression, because it completely negatives
the fundamental right by making its enjoyment
depend on the mere pleasure and discretion of the
executive, the citizen affected having no right to
have recourse for establishing the contrary in a
civil court."
Though s. 112 of the Ajmer Tenancy and Land
Records Act laid down an objective test, namely, "a
landlord habitually infringing the rights of tenants
under that Act", and, therefore, may be said to have
laid down some policy for the exercise of the discretion by the Court of Wards, the section was struck
down as the discretion was uncanalised and no effective procedure was prescribed to remedy the grievance
of an aggrieved party.
It cannot be said that the Commissioner of Police
has a higher status than the Court of Wards or that
the taking over of the management of an estate
affects a larger right than preventing a person from
doing his business.
The decision in Messrs. Dwarka Praso.d Laxmi
Narain v. The State of Uttar Pra.desh ( ') dealt with
cl. 4(3) of the Uttar Pradesh Coal Control Order, 1953,
whereunder the licensing authority was given absolute
power to grant or refuse to grant, renew or refuse
to renew, suspend, revoke, cancel or modify any
licence under the said Order and the only thing
he had to do was to record reasons for the action
he took. Under the clause the State Coal Controller could delegate power to any other officer. This
Court held that the said Order was void as it imposed
unreasonable restrictions on the freedom of trade and
business guaranteed under Art. 19(l)(g) of the Constitution and not coming within the protection afforded
(I) [1954] S.C.R, 803, Sn.
.
•
3 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
l
~
···:t
153
by cl. (6) of the Article. Mukherjea, J., as he then
r96o
was, observed to the following effect:
Kish"" nand
"The power of granting or withholding licences
Ar.or•
or of fixing the prices of the goods would necesiv.
sarily have to be vested in certain public officers or Com.missioner of
bodies and they would certainly have to be left Pol><•. Calcutt•
with some amount of discretion in these matters. Subba- Rao J.
So far no exception can be taken; but the mischief
arises when the power conferred on such officers
is an arbitrary power unregulated by any rule or
principle and it is left· entirely to the discretion of
particular persons to do anything they like without
any check or control by any higher authority."
We shall now notice som.e of the decisions cited at
the Bar on behalf of the Commissioner in support of
the Y:tlidity of the impugned provisions. In Bahul
Chandra v. Ohief Justice and Judges, High Oourt of
Patna (1) it was held that the proviso to sub-s. (1) of
s. 9 of the Indian Bar Councils Act was not void as
being an unreasonable restriction upon the freedom
to practise a profession, or to carry on an occupation,
trade or calling. The proviso to s. 9(1) states expresly that the rules "shall not limit or in any way affect
the power of the High Court to refuse admission to
any person at its discretion". Under s. 8 of the Indian
Bar Councils Act, no person is entitled as of right to
practise in any High Court, unless his name is entered
in the roll of thii Advocates of that Court maintained
under the. Act. Under s. 9 of that Act, the Bar Council can frame rules with the sanction of the High
Court to regulate the admission of persons as Advocates, Tlie proviso saves the overriding power of the
High Court to refuse admission in its discretion. It
was contended that an unfettered and uncontrolled
discretion was given to the High Court and that was
unreasonable. This Court pointed out that there
could not be a better authority than the High Court
in that .State to which the discretion could be entrusted. This decision turned upon three considerations,
namely, (1) no person was entitled as of right to practise; (2) the discretion to refuse was vested in the
(r) A.l.R. 1954 S.C. S•i·
20
•
154
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1961]
60
highest judicial body in the State; and (3) it was
Kishan Chand implicit in the power of discretion that the High Corn~t
Arora
would give notice before rejecting an application. On
v.
that basis this Court held that the restrictions impo1;.
Co"'.missioner of ed by the proviso to s. 9(1) were reasonable.
Police, Calcutta
Nor does the decision in H arishankar Bag la v. The
1
Subb::;ao ;. State of Madhya Pradesh ( ) lay down any differer,,t
principle. There this Court was concerned with cl. 3
of the Cotton Textile (Control of Movement) Order,
1948, promulgated by the Central Government under
s. 3 of the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Acl;,
1946, which required a citizen to take a permit from
the Textile Commissioner to enable him to transport
cotton textiles purchased by him. It was contended
in that case that the requirement of a permit was an
unreasonable restriction on the citizen's right unde.r
sub-els. (f) and (g) of Art. 19(1) of the Constitution.
This Court rejected the contention and affirmed the
validity of the law. Mahajan, C. J., speaking for thi:i
Court gave four reasons in support of his conclusion
and they were: (1) the Legislature passed the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act during a fftiriod
of emergerwy when it was necessary to impose control
on the production, supply and distribution of com ..
modities essential to the life of the community,;
(2) cl. 3 of the Control Order did not deprive a 9itizen
of the right to dispose of or transport cotton textileE;
purchased by him, but only required him to take a.
permit from the Textile Commissioner to enable him
to transport them; (3) if transport of essential commodities by rail or other means of conveyance was
left uncontrolled, it might well have seriously hampered the supply of these commodities to the public;
and (4) the policy underlying the Order was clearly
enunciated by the provisions therein and that policy
governed the exercise of the discretion by the Textile
Commissioner. On these considerations this Court
maintained the validity of that Order. The said
decision has no analogy to the provisions of s. 39 of
the Act in question.
The decision in Union of India v. Bhana Mal Gulzarimal Ltd.(') related to the question of validity of
'9
-
(t) [1955] I S.C.R. 380,
(•) [196o] •$.C.R. 6•7, 641,
3 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
~·
155
cl. llB of the Iron an_d Steel (Control of Production
i96o
and Distribution) Order, 1941. This Court held, hav- Kisha• Chand
ing regard to the provisions of that Order and those
Ar•••
of the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act,
Y.
1946, that the Legislature had clearly enunciated its Commiss;.,.,. of
legislative policy and that cl. llB of the Order laid Polic-, Ca1..111a
down the object which was intended to be achieved.
Gajendragadkar, J., delivering the judgment of the Subba R•o J.
Court, observed thus:
"Therefore reading cl. llB by itself we do not
see how it would be possible to hold that the said
clause is violative of"Art. 19. Io fact, if ss. 3 and 4
are valid and cl. llB does nothing more than prescribe conditions for the exercise of the delegate's
authority which are co!liistent with s. 3 it is only
the actual priee structure fixed by the Controller
which iu a given case can be successfully challenged
as violative of Art. 19."
The learned Judge considered the price structure
fixed by the notification and observed that the respondents therein did not seriously challenge the validity
of the notification in respect of price structure and,
that apart, it was not proved that the notification
adversely affected a large class of dealers taken as a
whole. The judgment, therefore, does not help the
respondents.
Nor is the decision of this Court in Mineral Development Ltd. v. State of Bihar (1) of any help to the res.
pondents. There the constitutional validity of s. 25( 1)
of the Bihar Mica Act (10 of 1948) was impugned as
violating the petitioners' fundamental right under
Art. 19(l)(f) and (g), of the Constitution. Under
s. 25(1 )( c) of that Act discretion was given to cancel a
licence to the State Government, but cl. (c) was hedged in by two important restrictions, namely, (i) the
failure to comply with the provisions of that Act or
the rules made therimnder should be a repeated failure
and not a mere sporadic one, i.e., the defaulter must
be a recalcitrant one; (ii) before cancelling the licence
the State Government should afford reasonable oppor.
tunity to the licensee to show cause why his licence
(I) (196oj 2 S.C.R. 6og, 619o
156
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1961]
should not be cancelled. This Court in upholding the
Kishan Chand validity of the said section observed thus:
"The power given to the State Government is
Arora
v.
only to achieve the object of the Act, i.e., to enforce
Commissioner of
the said provisions, which have been enacted in the
Police, Calcutta
interest of the public; and that power, as we hi~ve
indicated, is exercisable on the basis of objective
Subba Rao ].
tests and in accordance with the principles of
natural justice. We cannot, therefore, hold tl:at
s. 25(l)(c) of the Act imposes an unreasonable
restriction on the petitioner's fundamental rightB
under Art. 19(l)(f) and (g) of the Constitution."
This decision far from helping the respondents is, to
some extent, against their contention.
The result bf the discussion may briefly be summarized in the form of the following propositions: A
fundamental right to do business can be controlled by
the State only by making a law imposing in the
interest of the general public reasonable restrictions
on the exercise of the said right; restrictions on the
exercise of a fundamental right shall not be arbitrary
or excessive or beyond what is required in the interest
of the general public; the reasonableness of a restriction shall be tested both from substantive and procedural aspects; an uncontrolled and uncanalised power
conferred on an officer is an unreasonable restriction
on such right; though a legislative policy may have
been clearly expressed in a statute, it must also provide a suitable machinery for implementing that
policy in accordance with the principles of natural
justice; whether a restriction is reasonable or not is a
justiciable concept and it is for the Court to come to
one conclusion or the other having regard to the considerations laid down by Patanjali Sastri, C.J., in
State of Madras v. V. G. Row(') and similar others; .in
taking an overall picture of the relevant circumstances, the Court may legitimately take into consideration the fact that the discretion is entrusted to a State
Government or a highly placed officer, but that in itself is of minor importance for the simple reason that
the fundamental right itself is guaranteed against the
(x) [1952] S.C.R. 597.
3 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
I
I
157
60
action of the State, which is defined to include not
'9
only the Union or the State Governments but also Kishan Chand
Parliament, Legislatures and all local or other authorihora
ties within the territory of India; the distinction
v.
between an administrative authority and a judicial Commissioner of
authority is not of much relevance in the context of Police, Calcutta
a reasonable restriction, except perhaps a Court may Subba Rao J.
more readily be inclined to uphold a restriction if a
matter is entrusted to an impartial judicial authority
than to an executive authority.
Bearing the aforesaid principles in mind, let us look
at the impugned provisions of the Act. The section
has been extracted supra. The first part of the section confers a free and unqualified discretion on the
Commissioner to grant a licence. A discretionary
powsr to issue a licence necessarily implies a power to
refuse to issue a licence. The word "may" is an
enabling one and in its ordinary sense means "permissible". When coupled with the words "at his discretion" it emphasises the clear intention of the legislature to confer on the Commissioner an unrestrained
freedom to act according to his own judgment and
conscience. If the section stops there, it is common
case that the power of the Commissioner is uncontrolled and uncanalised. The second part of the section
deals with the nature of the conditions to be inserted
in the licence. The conditions to be imposed are for
securing the good behaviour of keepers of public
resNt and for the prevention of drunkenness and disorder among the persons frequenting or using such
places. No doubt the said conditions must have the
sanction of the State Government. This part, therefore, ensures the peaceful and orderly conduct of business. The sect.ion is clear and unambiguous in terms
and it is not disputed that the plain terms of the section will not enable the conditions of a licence to be
projected into the matter of the exercise of the discretion. But what is contended is that the conditions
laid down a precise policy for guiding the discretion of the Commissioner to give or not to give a
licence. There are many objections to this approach
158
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[l91H]
1960
to the problem. Firstly, it is to rewrite the secKiskan Chand tion. If the legislature intended to guide the disArora
cretion by laying down objective criteria it would
v.
have stated so in express terms; it would not have
Commissioner of left the matter to the absolute discretion of the ComPolice. Caloutta missioner. Secondly, if the two conditions only of
subba Rao ;. the licence control the exercise of the discretion, the
Commissioner cannot travel beyond the said two conditions. As a result the amplitude of the discretion
is drastically cut down. The Commissioner would be
able to refuse a licence only if he was satisfied th1~t
the applicant could not be relied upon to comply wit.h
the said conditions; if he was so satisfied, he could
not refuse a licence in spite of the fact that there were
many other good and relevant reasons for doing so.
Thirdly, if the conditions are not exhaustive but only
illustrative, the section would continue to suffer from
the same vice, as it would still be open to the Commissioner to refuse a licence for any other reason.
Fourthly, discretion based upon an anticipatory breach
of conditions will be as arbitrary as in the case of
absolute disrretion, particularly in the case of new
applicants, as more often than not it will have to be
exercised on the basis of surmises, gossip or information, which· may be false or at any rate untested.
Lastly, by this unwarranted search for an undisclosed
policy in the crevices of the statute, this Court will
not only be finding an excuse to resuscitate an invalid
law but also be encouraging the making of laws by
appropriate authorities in derogation of fundamental
rights.
The provisions of ss. 47 and 48(3) of the Motor
Vehicles Act, 1939 (IV of 1939), bring out in bold
relief the distinction between the exercise of a discre.
tion to issue a licence and the imposition of conditions
in a licence. Section 47 enjoins on the Regional
Transport Authority in considering an application for
a stage carriage permit to have regard to the matters
enunciated in that section. Section 48(3) enables
the Regional Transport Authority to attach to the
permit the conditions detailed in that sub-section.
While the former section regulates the exerciile
"
1•11
!l
l
3 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
159
of the discretion of the Regional Transport Authority issuing a permit, the latter describes the nature Kishan Chand
of the conditions to be inserted in the permit. These
Arora
provisions no doubt cannot be invoked to conv.
strue the provisions of s. 39 of the Act, but we Commissioner of
are referring to them only to show the legislative Police, Calcutta
practice in such matters and to emphasize the fact
that the scope of the discretion to issue a licence and Subba Rao ].
that of the power to impose conditions in a licence are
different. Therefore, on a true construction of the
plain words of the statute we cannot hold that any
policy reasonably capable of controlling the discretion
of the Commissioner has been laid down.
Even if the two conditions can be read into the first
part of s. 39, the arbitrariness is writ large in the
manner of exercising the so-called guided discretion.
In this context it is not necessary to come to a definite
conclusion on the question whether the discretion is
judicial or executive, for whatever be the nature of
the discretion it must be tested from the standpoint of
reasonableness of the restrictions imposed on a person's right to do business. A citizen of India, for the
purpose of eking out his livelihood, seeking to do an
extensive business of an eating house, applies to the
Commissioner for a licence, for without that licence he
cannot do business, and if he does he will be liable to
prosecution. The Commissioner can reject the application on two grounds, namely, (1) from his antecedents and present conduct it would be unreasonable to think that the petitioner would keep good
behaviour, and (2) the Commissioner is not satisfied that the petitioner would be able to prevent
drunkenness and disorder among the persons frequenting or using the eating house. Admittedly this order
is made without giving any opportunity to an applicant to prove that he would satisfy both the tests
laid down by s. 39 of the Act. The Commissioner is
not legally bound to give any reasons for his refusal
to give a licence. Even if reasons are given, there is
no machinery for getting such an order revoked or
vacated. The section does not impose a duty on the
Commissioner to give reasonable opportunity to an
160
'9
60
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[196i]
applicant to clear his character or to disprove any un-
Kishan Chand warranted allegations made against him or to prov•3
Arora
that he would satisfy both the tests laid down by s. 3!)
v.
of the Act. Nor does the section provide for an appeal
Com.missioner of against the order of the Commissioner to an appropriPolice, Calcutta ate authority.
The suggestion that the authority iH
Subba Rao ].
a high officer in the police department and that he can
be relied upon to exercise his discretion properly doe;i
not appeal to us for two reasons, namely, (1) as we
have already pointed out, the Constitution gives a.
guarantee for the fundamental right against the State
and other authorities; and (2) the status of an officer
is not an absolute guarantee that the power will never
be abused. Fundamental rights cannot be made to
depend solely upon such presumed fairness and integrity of officers of State, though it may be a minor
element in considering the question of the reasonableness of a restriction. Therefore, it is clear to our
mind that the exercise of the power also suffers from
a statutory defect as it is not channelled through an
appropriate machinery. We have, therefore, no hesitation to hold that s. 39 of the Act infringes the fundamental right of the petitioner under Art. 19(l)(g) of
the Constitution both from substantive and procedural aspects.
The next question is whether a mandamus will
issue against the Commissioner. The Commissioner
admittedly has launched criminal proceedings against
the petitioner under the provisions of the Act for not
taking out a licence under s. 39 of the Act. As we
have held that s. 39 of the Act is constitutionally
void, a writ of mandamus will issue against the Commissioner of Police, Calcutta, directing him not to take
any further proceedings against the petitioner for
not taking out a licence under the provisions of the
Act.
BY COURT. In accordance with the opinion of
the majority, this Petition is dismissed with costs.
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