LT. COL. KHAJOOR SINGH versus THE UNION OF INDIA & ANOTHER.
Supreme Court of India | Decided 1 December 1960 | [1961] 2 S.C.R. 828 | 1960 INSC 234
Key facts
- Decided
- 1 December 1960
- Bench
- BHUVNESHWAR PRASAD SINHA*, J.L. KAPUR*, P.B. GAJENDRAGADKAR*, K. SUBBA RAO, K.N. WANCHOO, K.C. DAS GUPTA, J.C. SHAH
- Bench size
- 7
- Case number
- CIVIL APPEAL No. 37/1995
- Disposal
- Dismissed
- Citation
- [1961] 2 S.C.R. 828
- Neutral citation
- 1960 INSC 234
Text of the judgment
828
r960
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1961]
the question will now be answered in the negative. As
already stated, there is no need to answer the second
The Conirnissioner
.
h' h d
t
·
. of Juconie-tax,
question, W lC
OeS IlO arl~e.
Bambay
v.
Jl.1 /s. Dwarkadas
J(hetan .s- Co.
The appeal is allowed with costs here and in the
High Court.
Appeal allowed.
_Hidayatullah } ,
LT. COL. KHAJOOR SINGH
Dece111ber I.
v.
THE UNION OF JftDIA & ANOTHER.
(B. P. SINHA, c. J., J. L. KAPUR,
P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, K. SUBBA RAO,
K. N. WANCHOO, K. C. DAS GUPTA and
J. c. SHAH, JJ.)
Fundamental Right, Enforcement of-Power of High Court to
issue writs against the Government of India-Constitution of India,
Arts. 3z(2A). 226.
The High Court of Jammu and Kashmir, relying on the
decisions of this Court in Election Commission, India v. Saka
Venkata Subba Rao, [1953] S.C.R. rr44 and K. S. Rashid and Son
v. The Income Tax Investigation Commission etc., [1954] S.C.R.
738, dismissed an applicatbn for a writ made by the appellant
against the Union of India and Anr. under Art. 32(2A), the relevant provisions of which are in the matter of enforcement of
fundamental rights the same as in Art. 226 of the Constitution,
on the preliminary objection that the said application was not
maintainable against the Union of India as it was outside the
territorial jurisdiction of that Court. The appellant's case was
that he was holding the substantive rank of Lieut. Col. in Jammu
and Kashmir and had the right to continue in service until he
attained the age of 53 on November 20, r96r, but was prematurely retired by a Jetter issued by the Government of India on
July 31, 1954, without any allegation or charge and in contravention of Art. 16(r) of the Constitution.
Held, that there can be 'no doubt as to the correctness of
the decisions relied on by the High Court and the appeal must
fail.
2 S.C.R. SUP!tEME COURT REPORTS
829
The jurisdiction of the High Court under Art. 226 of the
Constitution, properly construed, depends not on the residence
or location of the person affected by the order but of the per- Lt. Col. Khnjoor
Singh
son or authority passing the order and the place where the
v.
order has effect cannot enter into the determination of such
jurisdiction. Since ft:inctioning of a Government really means The Union of
giving effect to its order, such functioning cannot determine the India & A not her
meaning of the words "any person or authority within these
territories" occurring in the article .. A natural person, therefore, is within those territories if he resides there permanently
or temporarily, an authority other than the Government is
within those territories if its office is located there and a Government if its seat from which, in fact, it functions is there.
It is not correct to say that the word "authority" in
Art. 220 cannot include a Government. That word has to be
read along with the clause "including in appropriate cases any
Government" immediately following it, which, properly construed, means, that the word may include any Government in an
appropriate case. That clause is not connected with the issuance of a writ or order and is not intended to confer discretion
on the High Courts in the matter of issuing a writ or direction
on any Government, and only means in such cases where the
authority against whom the High Court has jurisdiction to
issue the writ, happens to be a Government or its subordinates,
the High Court may issue a writ against the Government.
Election Commission, India v. Saka Venkata Subba Rao,
[1953] S.C.R. n44 and K. S. Rashid and Son v. The Income-tax
Investigation Commission etc., [1954] S.C.R. 738, approved.
Maqbulunnissa v. Union of India, I.L.R. (1953) 2 All. 289,
overruled.
The Lloyds Bank Limited v. The Lloyds Bank Indian Staff
Association (Calcutta Branches), I.L.R. [1954] 2 Cal. I, referred to.
Proceedings under Art. 226 are not suits covered by Art.
300 of the Constitution. Such proceedings provide for extraordinary remedies by a special procedure and there is no scope
for introducing the concept of cause of action in it in the face
of the express limitation imposed by it, that the person or
authority concerned must be within the territories over which
the High Court exercises jurisdiction.
Ryots of Garabandho v. Zamindar of Parlakimedi, (1943) L.R.
70 I.A. 129, held inapplicable.
The resulting inconvenience of such an interpretation of
Art. 226 to persons residing far away from New Delhi, where
the Government of India is in fact located, and aggrieved by
some order passed by it, may be a reason for suitably amending
the Article but cannot affect its plain language.
This Court should not, except when it is demonstrated beyond all reasonable doubt that the previous ruling, given after
105
830
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1961]
due deliberation and full hearing, was erroneous, go back upon
it, particularly on a constitutional issue.
Lt. Col. Khajoor
Per Subba Rao, J.-The object that the framers of our ConSingh
stitution had before them in declaring the fundamental rights in
v.
Part III of the Constitution and empowering the High Courts by
The Union of
Art. 226 of the Constitution to enforce them would be largely
India 0-- A not her defeated if a person in a remote part of the country had to come
to·New Delhi to seek the protection of the Punjab High Court
whenever the Union Government infringed his funda1nental
right.
The power of the High Courts under Art. 226 of the Constitution is of the widest amplitude and it can issue not merely
writs but also directions and orders.
The words "any Government" in the Article includes the
Union Government which has no constitutional situs in a particular place and exercises its powers throughout India and must,
therefore, be deemed in law to have functional existence
throughout India and thus within the territories of every State.
Consequently, whon the Union Government infringes the legal
right and interest of a person residing within the territorial
jurisdiction of a High Court, the High Court has the power
under the Article to issue a writ to that Government. If its
orders are disobeyed by that Government or any of its officers,
even though physically outside Its territories, it can proceed in
contempt against them under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1952.
Election Commission, fodia v. Saka Venkata Subba Rao, [1953]
S.C.R. rr44, held inapplicable.
K. S. Rashid and Son v. Income Tax Investigation Commission, (1954] S.C.R. 738 and Ryots of Garabandho v. Zamindar of
Parlakimedi, L.R. 70 I.A. 129, considered.
Maqbul-Un-Nissa v. Union of India, I.LR. (1953) 2 All. 289,
approved.
Surajmal v. State of M.P., A.I.R. 1958 M.P. 103 and Radheshyam Makhanlal v. Union of India, A.LR. 1960 Born. 353, held
inapplicable.
In the instant case, therefore, the High Court had the
power to issue the writ to the Union Government under Art.
32(2A) of the Constitution.
Per Das Gupta, J.-It is neither correct nor appropriate to
speak of location of any Government and there is no satisfactory test for ascertaining the location of the Government of
India. Since the Government functions throughout the territory
of India, the conclusion must be that it is within the territories
under the jurisdiction of every High Court. The words "any
Government" in Art. 226 clearly indicate that the High Court
was intended to give relief aguinst th,at Government as well.
Even though the Government of India is within the territories of every High Court, it will not have to face applications
Ig6o
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
831
for relief against the same order in all the High Courts in India.
1960
The words "in appropriate cases" in that Article, properly construed, indicate that there can be only one High Court there- Lt. Col. Khajoor
under that can exercise jurisdiction under the Article for every
Singll
act or omission in respect of which relief is claimed. It is posv.
sible in every case to ascertain the place where the act or omis- The Union of
sion took place and that High Court alone, which exercises India 6- Another
jurisdiction over that place, can have jurisdiction to.grant relief
under the Article.
•
It is not correct ,to say that under
Art. 226 the cause of
action determines the jurisdiction. Neither that Article nor
Art. 32(2A) of the Constitution is based on that principle.
Election Commission, India v. Saka Venkata Subba Rao, [1953]
S.C.R. n44, approved.
CrvIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No.
37of1955.
Appeal from the judgment and order dated December 7, 1954, of the Jammu and Kashmir High Court
in Criminal Misc. No. 76 of 2011.
V ir Sen Sawhney, for the appellant.
0. K. Daphtary, Solicitor-General of India, B. R. L.
Iyengar, R.H. Dhebar and T. M. Sen, for the respondents.
Sardar Bahad,ur, for the intervener.
1960. December 5. The Judgment of Sinha, C. J.,
Kapur, Gajendragadkar, Wanchoo and Shah, JJ., was
delivered by Sinha, C. J. Subba Rao, J. and Das
Gupta, J. delivered separate judgments.
SINHA, C. J.-This appeal on a certificate of fitness
granted by the High Court of Judicature, Jammu and
Kashmir, is directed against the judgment and order
dated December 7, 1954, in an application under Art.
32(2A) of the Constitution for issue of a writ, directions or order against the Union of India, through the
Secretary, Ministry of Defence, New Delhi, as the
first respondent and the State of Jammu and Kashmir
through the Chief Secretary, Jammu and Kashmir
State, as the second respondent.
The petition is based on the following allegations.
The petitioner will be referred to as the appellant in
the course of this judgment. He was aged 45 years
Sinha c. J.
832
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1 60
[1961]
262 days on August 12, 1954. He was holding a reguL1 c
.
Jar commission in the Jammu and Kashmir State
1 Kh 100
• · ~ingh •
' Forces, which were amalgamated with the Defence
v.
Forces. of the Union with effect from September 1,
The Union of 1949.
The appellant holding the substantive rank of
India &- Another Lieut. Col. in the amalgamated forces had the right to
continue in service until he attained the age of 53
~inha c. J.
years, which event will happen on November 20, 1961.
The Government of India issued a letter dated July 31,
1954, retiring the appellant from the service with
effect from August 12, 1954. This decision of the
Government of India is not based on any allegations
or charge of inefficiency, indiscipline or any other
irregularity on the part of the appellant. The aforesaid decision of the Government of India prematurely
retiring the appellant is impugned as illegal, unwarranted and discriminatory and as having been made
in contravention of Art. 16(1) of the Constitution.
The petition was opposed on behalf of the respondents aforesaid on a number of preliminary
grounds of which it is only necessary to mention the
first, namely, that the authority against whom the
writ is sought, that is to say, respondent No. 1, being
outside the territorial limits of the jurisdiction of the
Jammu and Kashmir High Court, the same was not
maintainable. This preliminary objection was heard
by a Division Bench, (Janki Nath Wazir, C. J. and
M.A. Shahmiri, J.) Jammu and Kashmir High Court.
By its judgment dated December 7, 1954, the High
Court upheld the preliminary objection. The High
Court, relying upon the decisions of this Court in Election Commission, India v. Saka Venkata Subba Rao (1)
and K. S. Rashid and Son v. The Income-tax Investigation Commission etc. ('), held that it had no jurisdiction to issue a writ against the first respondent and,
therefore, dismissed the petition, but the High Court
granted the necessary certificate under Art. 132 of the
Constitution; hence this appeal.
The matter was first heard by a Bench of five
judges. In the course of hearing it became clear to
us that the appellant not only sought to distinguish
9
(1) [19531 s.c.R. n4.,
(2) [I9l4] S,C,R. 738.
2 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
833
the two decisions aforesaid of this Court, but questioned the correctness of those decisions. Hence this
Khajoor
larger Bench was constituted in order to examine the Lt. Col.
Singh
correctness of the decisions aforesaid of this Court on
v.
the strength of which the High Court had refused to The Union of
India & A not her
entertain the appellant's petition, on merits.
It has been argued on behalf of the appellant, in the
first instance, that the previous decisions of this Court Sinha C. ].
were distinguishable on the ground that they did not,
in terms, consider the question whether the Government of India was amenable to the jurisdiction of the
High Court under Art. 226 or of the Jammu and
Kashmir High Court under Art. 32(2A) of the Constitution; that those provisions, on a true construction,
would not stand in the way of the appellant, inasmuch
as the Government of India has no location and its
authority is present throughout the Union territory;
that the correct test is whether or not the cause of
action arose within the territorial limits of the High
Court's jurisdiction; that the High Court was in error
in holding that the term "authority" included a
Government.
In answer to these contentions on behalf of the
appellant, the learned Solicitor-General contended
that, on a proper construction of the relevant provisions of the Constitution, it is clear that Sastri C. J.'s
observations relating to "authority" in the case of
Election Commission, India v. Saka Venkata Subba
Rao (1) applied with equal force to Government, m
eluding the Union Government. The Government of
India functions through its officers and, therefore, t4e
locatiori contemplated means the place at which the
orders impugned are ordinarily passed. The considerations in a suit with reference to the cause of action
for the suit do not stand on the same footing in a writ
matter, because the writ has to reach the particular
officers of the Government concerned. The expression
"in appropriate cases" means that there may be cases
where though the Union Government as such is not
located within the territorial limits of a High Court
yet a writ may be issued against it by the High
(1) [1953] S.C.R. 1144.
834
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[196] J
Courts because an officer of the Union Government is
functioning within such limits and it is his order
Lt. Col. Khajoor
which is the subject matter of the controversy. ThereSingh
fore, it is not in every case that a High Court can
v.
The Union of issue a writ against the Union.
A writ of mandamus,
India & Another for example, is directed against a pariticular named
person or authority. Similarly, a writ of certiorari is
Sinha C. ].
directed against a particular record. Therefore, the
writ must issue to someone within the territorial limits
of the High Court's jurisdiction.
The question that we have to determine in this case
is of far-reaching importance and is not a. matter of
first impression. The question was first raised in this
Court in 1952 and was determined by a Constitution
Bench in the case of Election Commission, India v.
Saka Venkata Subba Rao (1 ). In that case a writ was
applied for in the Madras High Court for restraining
the Election Commission from enquiring into the
alleged disqualification of the respondent. A single
Judge of the High Court of Judicature of Madras
issued a writ of prohibition restraining the Election
Commission, a statutory authority constituted by the
President of India, with its office permanently located
at New Delhi, when the matter was heard by the
learned single Judge of the High Court. In the High
Court the Election Commission demurred to the jurisdiction of the Court to issue any writ against it on the
ground that the Commission was not within the territory in relation to which the High Court exercised
jurisdiction, apart from other objections. The learned
Judge of the High Court overruled the preliminary
objection and decided the case on merits, and issued a.
writ prohibiting the Commission from proceeding with
the enquiry. The learned Judge granted the certificate under Art. 132 that the case involved a substantial question of law as to the interpretation of the
Constitution. The Election Commission accordingly
came up in appeal to this Court and challenged the
jurisdiction of the Madras High Court to issue the
writ it had purported to do. This Court overruled the
contention on behalf of the respondent which was
(1) [1953] S.C.R. 1144.
2 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
835
1960
based on the decision of the Privy Council in the
Parlakimedi case (1) that the jurisdiction of the High U. Col. Khajoor
Court to issue a writ is analogous to the jurisdiction
Singh
of a court to grant a decree or order against persons
v.
outside the limits of its local jurisdiction, provided The Union of
that the cause of action arose within those limits. India & A not her
This Court overruled that contention in these Sinha C. ].
words:" The rule that cause of action attracts jurisdiction
in suits is based on statutory enactment and cannot
apply to writs issuable under Art. 226 which makes
no reference to any cause of action or where it arises
but insists on the presence of the person or authority
'within the territories' in relation to which the High
Court exercises jurisdiction".
The Constitution Bench in that case considered that
the language of Art. 226 of the Constitution was "reasonably plain" and that the exercise of the power
conferred by that Article was subject to a two-fold
limitation, namely, (1) that the power is to be exercised "throughout the territories in relation to which
it exercises jurisdiction" and (2) that the person or
authority to whom the High Court is empowered to
issue the writs must be "within those territories". In
other words, the writ of the Court could not run beyond the territories subject to its jurisdiction and that
the person or authority affected by the writ must be
amenable to the Court's jurisdiction, either by residence or location within those territories.
The second case of this Court, which dealt with this
question is K. S. Rashid and Son v. The Income-Tax
Investigation Commission (g). That was a case on
appeal from the judgment and order dated August 10,
1950, of the High Court of Judicature, Punjab, at
Simla, in a number of miscellaneous matters, in which
the High Court had been moved under Arts. 226 and
227 of the Constitution praying for quashing proceedings started against the appellants under the Taxation on Income (Investigation Commission) Act (XXX
of 1947). It was prayed in the High Court that a writ
of prohibition might issue against the Income-Tax
(1) (1943) L.R. 70 I.A. 129.
(2) [1954) S.C.R. 738.
836
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
1960
[i961)
Investigation Commission directing it not to proceed
with the investigation of cases referred to it under the
Lt. 'Col. Khajoor
provisions of the Act. The writ petitions in the High
Singh
Court were opposed on behalf of the Commission on
v.
The Union of a number of grounds, one of them being that the PunIndia & Another
jab High Court had no jurisdiction to issue the writs
prayed
for under Art. 226 of the Constitution, simply
Sinha C. ) 1•
because the Commission was located in Delhi. Reliance was placed on behalf of the Commission on the
decision of the Privy Council in the Parlakimed,i
case(') that the substance of the matter was that the
assessees against whom the investigation had been
started belonged to U. P. and all the assessment proceedings, including reference to the High Court, would
lie in Uttar Pradesh. The High Court gave effect to
this contention and dismissed the application primarily on the ground that the High Court had no jurisdiction to issue the writ to the Commission. The asses.
sees came up in appeal to this Court, and this Court
substantially adopted the reasons given by it in its
previous judgment in the case of Election Commission,
India v. Saka Venkata Subba Rao('). Itis to be noted
that when the High Court of Punjab decided the case,
the decision of this Court referred to above had not
been given. Relying upon its previous decision, this
Court held that the Punjab High Court was in error
in holding that it had no jurisdiction to deal with the
matter under Art. 226 of the Constitution. The appeal
was dismissed by this Court on other grounds, not
material to this case.
Learned counsel for the appellant has contended
that the two decisions of this Court referred to above
are distinguishable from the facts of the present case,
inasmuch as in those cases the Election Commission
and the Income-tax Investigation Commission were
statutory bodies, which had their location in Delhi,
and, therefore, this Court held that the Punjab High
Court was the High Court within whose jurisdiction
those bodies functioned and had their location and
were, therefore, amenable to its jurisdiction. He
further contended that the Union Government functioned throughout the territory of India and could
(I) (1943) L.R. 70 I.A. 129.
(z) [1953] S.C.R. 1144.
2 S.C.R. SUPREME COUR'l' REPORTS
837
1 960
not be said to be located only in Delhi simply because
the capital for the time being was in Delhi. In this connection, strong reliance was placed on the Lt. Col. Khajoor
decision of the Full Bench of the Allahabad High
s;:~h
Court in Maqbulunnissa v. Union of India (1). That The Union of
case does lend a great deal of support to this conten- Jndia & Another
tion on behalf of the appellant. It was held by the
High Court in that case that the words "any Govern- Sinha c. J.
ment" in Art. 226(1) of the Constitution clearly indicated that the Allahabad High Court had jurisdiction
to entertain the fetition under Art. 226, not only
against the State o Uttar Pradesh, but also against the
Union Government for the issue of a writ in the nature
of mandamus, directing the Government to forbear
from giving effect to the order asking the petitioner to
leave India. The ratio of the decision was that, even
though the capital of the Government of India is in
Delhi, its executive power extends throughout the territory of India and that the real test to determine the
jurisdiction would be the residence of the petitioners
a.nd the effect of the impugned order upon them. After
holding that the High Court had the jurisdiction to
entertain the petition, the Court dismissed it on other
grounds, not material to this case. The Allahabad
High Court distinguished the decision of a Division
Bench of the Calcutta High Court dated January 17,
1951, in the case of The Lloyds Bank Limited v. The
Lloyds Bank Indian Staff .Association (Calcutta Branches) (2) which was unreported till then. In that case,
Harries, C. J., speaking for the Court, had held that
though Art. 226 of the Constitution had gone beyond
the English practice by providing that writs in the
nature of prerogative writs could issue even against a
Government, that Government must be located within the territorial limits of the Court which was moved
to exercise its power under that Article. He further
observed that the Government of India could not be
said to be located in the State of West Bengal and,
therefore, writs under Art. 226 could not issue against
that Government by the High Court of Calcutta. That
(1) I.L.R. (1953) 2 All. 289.
1o6
(2) l.L.R. [1954] 2 Cal. I.
838
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1061]
decision of the Calcutta High Court was distinguished
by
the Allahabad High Court on the ....,ground that "the
Lt. Col. Khajoor
effects
of the orders of the Union Government were
Singh
not operative within the jurisdiction of the Court".
v.
The lfnio11 of
It may be added that that decision came up in appeal
India & Another to this Court in Civil Appeal No. 42 of 1952 but the
appeal was dismissed by this Court by its judgment
Sinha C. .f.
dated April 20, 1952, on other grounds. It will be
noticed that when the All11habad decision, so strongly
relied upon by t,he appellant, was given, the two decisions referred to above of this Court were not there.
The Allahab11d High Court may not have given that
judgment if the two decisions of this Court had then
been in existence.
The two main questions which arise, therefore, are:
(i) whether the Government of India as such can be
said to have a location in a particular place, viz., New
Delhi, irrespective of the fact that its authority extends over all the States and its officers function
throughout India, and (ii) whether there is any scope
for introducing the concept of cause of action as the
basis of exercise of jurisdiction under Art. 226. Before,
however,-we deal with these two main questions, we
would like to clear the ground with respect to two subsidiary matters which have been urged on behalf of
the appellant.
The first argument is that the word "authority"
used in Art. 226 cannot and does not include Government. We are not impressed by this argument.
In interpreting the word "authority" we must have
regard to the clause immediately following it. Art.
226 provides for "the issue to any person or authority
including in appropriate cases any Government"
within those territories. It is clear that the clause
"including in appropriate cases any Government" goes
with the preceding word "authority", and on a plain
and reasonable construction it means that the word
"authority" in the context may include any Government in an appropriate case. The suggestion that the
said clause is intended to confer discretion on the
High Courts in the matter of issuing a writ or direction
on any Government seems to us clearly unsustainable.
2 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
839
To connect this clause with the issuance of a writ or
ry6o
order and to suggest that in dealing with cases against Lt c0 1---;., .
· "''a;oor
. h Court h as to dec1"de wheth er ' Singh
Government t he H ig
the case is appropriate for the issue of the order is
v.
plainly not justified by the rules of grammar.· We T~• Union of
have no hesitation in holding that the said clause goes llldia & Another
with the word "authority" and that its effect is that
the authority against whom jurisdiction is conferred Sinha c. 1 ·
on the High Court to issue a writ or appropriate ofder
may in certain cases include a Government. Appropriate cases in the context means cases in which
orders passed by a Government or their subordinates
are challenged, and the clause therefore means that
where such orders are challenged the High Court may
issue a writ against the Government. The position,
therefore, is that under Art. 226 power is conferred on
the High Court to issue to any person or authority or
in a given case to any Government, writs or orders
there specified for enforcement of any of the rights
conferred by Part III and for any other purpose.
Having thus dealt with the two subsidiary points
raised before us, we may now proceed. to consider the
two main contentions which arise for our decision in
the present appeal.
This brings us to the first question, namely, whether
the Government of India. as such can be said to be
located at one place, namely, New Delhi. The main
argument in this connection is that the Governme~t of
India is all-pervasive and is functioning throughout
the territory of India and therefore every High Court
has power to issue a writ against it, as it must be presumed to be located within the territorial jurisdiction
of all State High Courts. This argument in our opinion
confuses the concept of location of a Government with
the concept of its fun<{tioning. A Government may be
functioning all over a State or all over India; but it
certainly is not located all over the Sh1.te or all over
India. It is true that the Constitution has not provided that the seat of the Government of India will be at
New Delhi. That, however, does not mean that the
Government of India as such has no seat where it is
located. It is common knowledge that the seat of the
840
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1961]
Government of India is in New Delhi and the GovernLt c 1 Kh .
ment as such is located in New Delhi. The absence
· ~inch •Joor of a provision in the Constitution can make no differv.
ence to this fact. What we have to see, therefore, is
The Union of whether the words of Art. 226 mean that the person
India &- Another or authority to whom a writ is to be issued has to be
resident in or located within the territories of the
Si11ha C. ].
T
High Court issuing the writ? he relevant words of
Art. 226 are these"Every High Court shall have power ... to issue to
any person or authority ... within those territories ... ".
So far as a natural person is concerned, there can be
no doubt that he can be within those territories only
if he resides therein either permanently or temporarily. So far as an authority is concerned, there can
be no doubt that if its office is located therein it must be
within the territory. But do these words mean with
respect to an authority that even though its office is
not located within those territories it will be within
those territories because its order may affect persons
living in those territories? Now it is clear that the
jurisdiction conferred on the High Court by Art. 226
does not depend upon the residence or location of the
person applying to it for relief; it depends only on the
person or authority against whom a writ is sought
being within those territories. It seems to us therefore
that it is not permissible to read in Art. 226 the
residence or location of the person affected by the
order passed in order to determine the jurisdiction of
the High Court. That jurisdiction depends on the
person or authority passing the order being within
those territories and the residence or location of the
person affected can have no relevance on the question
of the High Court's jurisdiction. Thus if a person
residing or located in Bombay, for example, is aggrieved by an order passed by an authority located, say, in
Calcutta, the forum in which he has to seek relief is
not the Bombay High Court though the order may
affect him in Bombay but the Calcutta High Court
where the authority passing the order is located. It
would, therefore, in our opinion be wrong to introduce
in Art. 226 the concept of the place where the order
1 60
9
•
2 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
841
passed has effect in order to determine the jurisdiction
I9 60
of the High Court which can give relief under ~rt. Lt. Col. J(Jtajoor
226. The introduction of such a concept may give
Singh
rise to confusion and conflict of jurisdictions. Take,
v.
for example, the case of an order passed by an autho- T~e Union of
rity in Calcutta, which affects six brothers living, say, Tnd•a & Another
in Bombav,
Jodhpur
• Madras, Allahabad, Jabalpur,
b
h .
Sinha C. ].
and Chandigarh. The order passed y the aut or1ty
in Calcutta has thus affected persons i~ six States.
Can it be said that Art. 226 contemplates that all the
six High Courts have jurisdiction in the matter of
giving relief under it? The answer must obviously be
'No', if one is to avoid confusion and conflict of jurisdiction. As we read the relevant words of Art. 226
(quoted above) there can be no doubt that the jurisdiction conferred by that Article on a High Court is with
respect to the location or residence of the person or
authority passing the order and there can be no question of introducing the concept of the place where the
order is to have effect in order to determine which
High Court can give relief under it. It is true that
this Court will give such meaning to the words used
in the Constitution as .would help towards its working
smoothly. If we were to introduce in Art. 226 the
concept of the place where the order is to have effect
we would not be advancing the purposes for which
Art. 226 has been enacted. On the other hand, we
would be producing conflict of jurisdiction between
various High Courts as already shown by the illustration given above. Therefore, the effect of an order by
whomsoever it is passed can have no relevance in
determining the jurisdiction of the High .Court which
can take action under Art. 226. Now, functioning of
a Government is really nothing other than giving
effect to the orders passed by it. Therefore it would
not be r!gh.t to introduce in Art. 226 the concept of
the funct10nmg of Government when determining the
meaning of the words "any person or authority within
those territories". By introducting the concept of
functioning in these words we shall be creating the
same conflict which would arise if the concept of the
place where the order is to have effect is introduced in
842
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1961]
Art. 226. There can, therefore, be no escape from the
conclusion
that these words in Art. 226 refer not to
Lt. Col. f\hajoor
the
place
where
the Government may be functioning
Singh
but only to the place where the person or authority is
v.
The Union of
eit.her resident or is located. So far therefore as a.
India &- Anol/u1· natural person is concerned, he is within those territories if he resides there permanently or temporarily.
Sinh2 C. ].
So far as an authority (other than a. Government) is
concerned, it is within the territories if its office is
located there. So far as a Government is concerned it
is within the territories only if its seat is within those
territ-0ries.
The seat of a Government is sometimes mentioned
in the Constitutions of various countries but many a.
time the seat is not so mentioned. But whether the
seat of a Government is mentioned in the Constitution or not, there is undoubtedly a seat from which
the Government as such functions as a fact. What
Art. 226 requires is residence or location as a fact and
if therefore there is a seat from which the Government functions as a fact even though that seat is not
mentioned in the Constitution the High Court within
whose territories tha,t Reat is located will be the High
Court having jurisdiction under Art. 226 so far as the
orders of the Government as such arc concerned.
Therefore, the view taken in Election Commission,
India v. Saka Vcnkata Subba Rao (1) and K.S. Rashid
a.ncl Son v. The Income-ta.-r; Investigation Commission(')
that there i3 two-fold limitation on the power of the
High Court to issue writs etc. under Art. 226, namely,
(i) the power is to be exercised 'throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction',
that is to say, the writs issued by the Court cannot
run beyond the territories subject to its jurisdiction,
rtnd (ii) the person or authority to whom the High
Court is emnowered to issue such writs must be
"within tho;e territories" which clearly implies that
they must be amenable to its jurisdiction either by
residence or location within those territories, is the
correct one.
This brings us to the second point, namely, whether
(x) ['953] S.C.R. n44.
(Z) [1954] S.C,R. 738.
2 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
843
it is possible to introduce the concept of cause of
r96o
action in Art. 226 so that the High Court in whose Lt c 1•· Kh .
jurisdiction the cause of action arose would be the · ~lngh aJoor
proper one to pass an order thereunder. Reliance in
"·
this connection has been ' placed on the judgment of The Union of
the Privy Council in Ryots of Garabandho v. Zarnindar India & Anothar
of Parlakimedi (1). In that case the Privy Council
held that even though the impugned order was passed Sinha c. J.
by the Board of Revenue which was located. in
Madras, the High Court would have no jurisdiction
to issue a writ quashing that order, as it had rio
jurisdiction to issue a ·writ beyond the limits of
the city of Madras except in certain cases, and
that particular matter was not within the exceptions. This decision of the Privy Council does apparently introduce an element of the place where the
cause of action arose in considering the jurisdiction
of the High Court, to issue a writ. The basis of that
decision, however, was the peculiar history_of the
issue of writs by the three Presidency High Courts as
successors of the Suprem~ Courts, though on the literal construction of cl. 8 of the Charber of 1800 conferring jurisdiction on the Supreme Court of Madras, there
could be little doubt that the Supreme Court would
have the same jurisdiction as the Justices of the Court
of King's Bench Division in England for the territories which then were or thereafter might be subject to
or depend upon the Government .of Madras. It will
therefore not be correct to put too much stress on the
decision in that case. The question whether the concept of ca.use of action could be introduced in Art. 226
was also considered in Saka Venkata Subba Rao's
case (2 ) and was repelled in these words:"The rule that cause of action attracts jurisdiction
in suits is based on statutory enactment and cannot
apply to writs issuable under Art. 226 which makes
no reference to any cause of action or where it arises
but insists on the presence of the person or authority
'within the territories' in relation to which the' High
Court exercises jurisdiction."
Article 226 as it stands does not refer anywhere to
. (1) (1943) L.R. 70 I.A. 129.
(2) [1953] S.C.R. n44 .
----------------~----
:1
~
844
SUP.REME COURT REPORTS
.
[1961]
the accrual of cause of action and to· the jurisdiction
of the High Court depending on the place where the
LI. Col. Khajoor cause of action accrues being within its territorial
Sing/,
·
. v.
jurisdiction. Proceedings under Art. 226 are not smts;
TAe Union of · they provide for extraordinary remedies by a special
India<>- Ano11.., procedure and give powers of ·correction to the High
Court over persons and authorities and these special
.Sinha c. J.
powers have to be exercised within the limits set for
them. These two limitations have already been indi- ·
cated by us above and one of them is that the
person or authority concerned must be within: the
· territories over which the High Court exercises Junsdiction. Is it possible then to overlook this constitu- .
tional limitation and say that the High Court can
issue a writ against a person or authority even though
it may not be within its territories simply because the
ca use of action has arisen within those territories?. lt I
seems to us that it would be going in the face of the ·'
express provision in Art. 226 and doing away with an
express limitation contained therein if the concept of
cause of action were to be introduced in.it. Nor do we
think that it is right to say that because Art. 300
specifically provides for suits by and against the Government of India, the proceedings under Art. 226 are
also covered by Art. 300. It seems to us that Art. 300
which is on the same line as s. 176 of the Government
of India Act, 1935, dealt with suits as such and proceedings analogous to or consequent upon suits and
has no reference to the extraordinary remedies provided by Art. 226 of the ,Constitution. The concept of
cause of action cannot in our opinion be introduced in
Art. 226, for by doing so we shall be doing away with
the express provision contained therein which requires
that the person or authority to whom the.writ is to be
issued should be resident in or located within the
. territories over which the High Court hag jurisdiction.
It is true that this may result in some inconvenience
to.persons residing far away from New Delhi who are ~
aggrieved by some order of the Government of India
as such, and that may be a reason for. making a suitable constitutional amendment in Art. 226. But the
argument of inconvenience, in our opinion, _cannoE
~
1960
•
-
II
2 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
84:5
1 60
affect the plain language of Art. 226, nor can the con9
cept of the place of cause of action be introduced into Lt c 1 J(h .
it for that would do away with the two limitations · ~inch a;oor
on the powers of the High Court contained in it.
v.
We have given our earnest consideration to the The Union of
language of Art. 226 and the two decisions of this India &- Another
Court referred to above. We are of opinion that
. -~
unless there are clear and compelling reasons, which S•nha · f.
cannot be denied, we should not depart from the
interpretation given in these two cases and indeed
from any interpretation given in an earlier judgment
of this Court, unless there is a fair amount of unanimity that the earli~r decisions are manifestly wrong.
This Court should not, except when it is demonstrated
beyond all reasonable doubt that its previous ruling,
given after due deliberation and full hearing, was
erroneous, go back upon its previous ruling, particularly on a constitutional issue. In this case our reconsideration of the matter has confirmed the view that
there is no place for the introduction of the concept of
the place where the impugned order has effect or of
the concept of fur.ctioning of a Government, apart
from the location of its office concerned with the case,
or even of the concept of the plac,e where the cause
of action arises in Art. 226 and that the language of
that Article is plain enough to lead to the conclusion
at which the two cases of this Court referred to above
arrived. If any inconvenience is felt on account of
this interpretation of Art. 226 the remedy seems to
be a constitutional amendment. There is no scope
for avoiding the inconvenience by an interpretation
which we cannot reasonably, on the language of the
Article, adopt and which the language of the Article
does not bear.
In this view of the matter the appeal fails and is
hereby dismissed with costs.
SUBBA RAO, J.-I have had the advantage ofperus- Subba Rao J.
ing the judgment prepared by my Lord the Chief
Justice.· I regret my inability to agree. I would not
have ventured to differ from his weighty opinion but
for the fact that the acceptance of the contention of
•
107
...
846
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1961)
the respondents would practically deprive the majority of citizens of our country of the benefit of cheap,
Lt. Col: Kha7oor expeditious and effective remedy given to them under
51
1
:~ •
Art. 226 of the Constitution against illegal acts of the
The Union of Union Government. If the relevant provisions a.re
India·& Anuth" clear and unambiguous, the said contention must prevail however deleterious the effect may be to public
Subba Rau J. interest.
But if the words of the Article a.re capable
of two or more interpretations, one that will carry out
the intention of the Constituent Assembly and the
other that would defeat it, the former interpretation
must necessarily be accepted. We must also bear in
mind that the provisions of the Constitution are not
"mathematical formulae which have their essence in
mere form". It being an organic statute, its provisions
must be construed broadly and not in a pedantic way,
but without doing violence to the language used.
The facts have been fully stated in the judgment of
my Lord the Chief Justice and it would be redundant
to restate them. It would be enough if I formulate
the point of law raised and express my opinion thereon. The question is whether the appellant, who is a
citizen of India and is residing in the State of
Kashmir, can enforce his fundamental right under
Art 32(2A) of the Constitution by filing an appropriate
writ petition in the High Court of Jammu & Kashmir,
if his right is infringed by an order of the Union
Government. The Constitution of India has been
made applicable to the State of J ammu & Kashmir by
the Constitution (Application to Jammu & Kashmir)
Order, 1954 (Order No. 48 dated May 14, 1954) with
certain exceptions and modifications. By the said
Order, cl. (3) of Art. 32 of the Constitution was deleted, and a new clause (2A) was inserted after cl. (2).
The question falls to be decided on a true construction
of the said cl. (2A) which reads:
"Without prejudice to the powers conferred by
clauses (1) and (2), the High Court shall have power
throughout the territories in relation to 'Yhich it
exercises jurisdiction to issue to any person or authority, including in appropriate cases any Government
within these territories, directions or orders or writs,
1960
-
.
2 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
847
including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandaz96o
mus, prohibition, quo wa1·ranto and ~rtiorari, o~ any Lt. c0 "("-;;11 ajoor
of them, for the enforcement of any of the nghts
Singh
conferred by this Part."
v.
The operative part of this clause is in pari materia The Union of
with Art. 226 of the Constitution with the difference India &- Another
that the words "for any other purpose" found in the Subba Rao ].
latter Article are omitted in the former. Though the
power of the High Court of J ammu & Kashmir is
limited to that extent, in other respects it is as extensive as that of the other High Courts under Art. 226.
The object of the amendment is self-evident; it was
enacted to enable the said High Court to protect the
fundamental rights of the citizens of India in that
part of the country.
The learned Solicitor-General broadly contends that
this Court has construed the analogous provisons of
Art. 226 of the Constitution and held that the writs
under that Article do not run beyond the territories in
relation to which a High Court exercises jurisdiction
and that a High Court cannot issue a writ thereunder unless the person or authority against whom
the writ is sought is physically resident or located
within the territorial jurisdiction of that High Court ;
and that, therefore, on the same parity of reasoning,
the High Court of J ammu & Kashmir cannot issue a
writ to run beyond the territories of that State against
the Union Government functioning through its officers
in New Delhi.
Learned counsel for the appellant contends, on the
other hand, that neither Art. 32(2A) nor Art. 226
bears any such limited const;fuction and that on a
liberal and true construction of the said constitutional provisions it must be held that the High Court
can issue a writ against any Government, including
the Union Government, exercising the functions within the territories of a State, if it infringes the right
of a person in that State.
Before I attempt to construe the provisions of cl.
(2A) of Art. 32, I think it would be convenient to trace
briefly the history of Art. 226, for it throws a flood
.. of light on the legislative intention expressed in
848
z960
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1961]
Art. 32(2A). In pre-independence India the High
Courts, other than the High Courts in the presidency
Lt. Col. Khajoor towns of Bombay, Calcutta and Madras, had no
Singh
v.
pow!')r to issue prerogative writs; even in the case of
Th• Union of the said presidency High Courts the power to issue
India & Another writs' was very much circumscribed; their jurisdiction
to issue the said writs was confined only to the limits
Subba Rao ].
of their original jurisdiction and the Governments
were excluded from its scope. But the framers of our
Constitution with the background of centuries of servility, with the awareness of the important role played by the High Court of England in protecting the
rights of its citizens when they were infringed by
executive action, with the knowledge of the effective
and impartial part played by the High Courts in preindependence India within the narrow limits of their
jurisdiction to protect the rights of the citizens of our
country, with a vision to prevent autocracy raising
its ugly head in the future, declared the fundamental
rights in Part III of the Constitution, conferred
powers on the High Courts to issue to any person or
authority, including in appropriate cases any Government, directions, orders or writs for the enforcement
of the fundamental rights or for any other purpose.
In short, any person of India can approach an appropriate High Court to protect his rights against any
person, authority or any Government if his fundamental right or any other right is infringed by the said
person, authority or Government. If the contention
of tlte respondents be accepted, whenever the Union
Government infringes the right of a person in any
remote part of the country, he must come all the way
to New Delhi to enforce his right by filing a writ
petition in the Circuit Bench of the Punjab High
Court. If a common man residing in Kanyakumari,
the southern-most part of India, is illegally detained
in prison, or deprived of his property otherwise than
by law, by an order of the Union Government, it
would be a travesty of fundamental rights to expect
him to come to New Delhi to seek the protection of
the High Court of Punjab. This construction of the
provisions of Art. 226 would attribute to the framers
2 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
849
1 60
of the Constitution an intention to confer the right
9
on a person and to withhold fro~ hin;t fo: all pra:cti- Lt. Col. Khajoor
ca.I purposes the remedy to enforce his right agamst
Singh
the Union Government. Obviously it could not have
v.
been the intenti9n of the Constituent Assembly to The U11ion of
bring a.bout such an anomal~us result in respect of India & Another
what they conceived to be a cherished right conferred 5 bb-;
upon the citizens of this country. In that event, the u a ao 1•
right conferred turns out to be an empty one and the
object of the framers of the Constitution is literally
defeated.
The scope of Art. 226 vis-a-vis the reach of the
High Courts' power has been considered in two decisions of this Court, namely, Election Commission,
India v. Saka Venkata Ra.o (1) and K. S. Rashid
and Son v. The Income-tax Investigation Commission (2).
Ai;i this Bench of seven Judges is constituted to enable this Court to approach the problem with a fresh
mind unhampered by precedents, I propose to scrutinize the provisions of Art. 32(2A) free from the curbs
imposed by the earlier decisions.
The core of the Article is discernible in the following clause and phrases : "throughout the territories in
relation to which it exercises its jurisdiction", "any
Government'', "within those territories", "directions or
orders or writs, including writs in the nature of habeas
corpus, etc." The words "throughout the territories,
etc." delimit the territorial juris{iiction of the High
Courts in the matter of issuing directions or writs. .A
High Court exercises jurisdiction throughout the
State in which it is located. Its writs run only throughout the State and not beyond its territorial limits.
The main object of the power is to keep the authorities or tribunals within their bounds and to prevent
them from infringing the fundamental or other rights
of citizens. At the instance of an aggrieved pers9n
it can issue one or other of the writs or orders or
directions against the offending authority in respect
of an act done or omitted to be done by it. It is
implicit in the limitation that the impugned act must.
affect a person or property ainenable to its territorial
jurisdiction.
(t) [1953] S.C.R. 1144.
(2) (1954] S.C.R. 738.
850
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1961)
This question, in a. different context, has been considered by the Judicial Committee of the Privy
Council in Ryots of Garabandlw v. Zemindar of Parlakiv.
medi (1 ). There the Board of Revenue situated in the
The Union of
India & Another State of Madras under s. 172 of the Madras Estates
Land Act, 1908, enhanced the rents payable by the
Suhba Rao ]. ryots in three villages, including Parla.kimedi village,
in the district of Gan jam in the Northern Circa.rs.
The question was whether the Madras High Court
had power to issue a writ to quash the order of the
Board of Revenue, as the parties to that litigation
were not subject to the original jurisdiction of the
Madras High Court. The Judicial Committee h.eld
that the Madras High Court had no jurisdiction to
issue a writ of certiorari to run beyond the territorial
limits of that High Court. When it was contended
that, as the Revenue Board was in Madras, the High
Court had jurisdiction to quash its order, the Judicial
Committee repelled that contention with the following remarks at p. 164:
"The Boa.rd of Revenue ha.s always had its offices
in the Presidency Town, and in the present case the
Collective Board, which made the order complained
of, issued this order in the town. On the other hand,
the parties are not subject to the original jurisdiction
of the High Court, and the estate of Parlakimedi lies
in the north of the province ............ Their Lordships
think that the question of jurisdiction must be regarded as one of substance, and that it would not have
been within the competence of the Supreme Court
to claim jurisdiction over such a matter as the present
by issuing certiorari to the Board of Revenue on the
strength of its location in the town. Such a view
would give jurisdiction to the Supreme Court, in the
matter of settlement of rents for ryoti-holdings in
Ganjam between parties not otherwise subject to its
jurisdiction, which it would not have had over the
Revenue Officer who dealt with the matter at first
instance."
This decision in clear terms lays emphasis on the substance of the matter and holds that mere physical
Lt. Col. Kha}oor
Singh
(1) (1943) L.R. 70 I.A. 129.
2 S.C.R. SUPR:tl1ME COURT REPORTS
..
851
presence of an authority within the jurisdiction of a
x960
High Court does not enable that Court to issue writs 1 c
against the said authority in respect of an order made • ~inch a100'
in a. dispute between P.ersons residing outside the
v.
territOria.l jurisdiction of the said High Court. There- The Union of
fore, a High Court's jurisdiction to issue an appropriate India .S. Another
writ depends on the co-existence of two conditions,
namely, (i) the cause of action has accrued within the Subba Rao J.
territories in relation to which it has jurisdiction, and
(ii) the said authority is "within" the said territories.
This interpretation may give rise to a criticism; it
may be asked, which High Court could give the relief
if the cause of action accrues within the territorial
jurisdiction of one High Court and the authority concerned is located within that of another High Court?
There may be statutory authorities with all~India
jurisdiction, but for convenience located in a particular State. In exercise of the powers conferred under
statutes, they may make orders affecting th-e rights of
parties residing in different States. I am prirna facie
of the view that the said authorities, in so far as their
orders operate in a particular territory, will be "within" those territories and the High Court, which exercises its jurisdiction throughout that territory, can
issue a suitable writ against the said authorities. This
interpretation a.voids the anomaly of one High Court
issuing a writ against an authority 'located "within"
its territorial jurisdiction in respect of a. ca.use of
action accruing in another State or territory over
which it has no jurisdiction. But this question does
not arise in this case, for we a.re ma.inly concerned
with the Union Government.
Article 226 of the Constitution is expressed in wide
and most comprehensive terms. There is no difficulty
a.bout the words "person or authority'', but the phrase
"including any Government" gives rise to a conflict
of opinion. If the framers of the Constitution intend-·
ed to extend simply the power of the High Court to
issue writs only against the Government of the State,
they could have stated "or the Government of the
State", instead they designedly used the words "any
Government" which a.t first sight appear rather involved but on a. deeper sc:i:utiny reveal that the words
L -;-;h . -
852
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1961]
z96o
"any Government" cannot mean only the Government
c
Kh .
of
the State. The word "any" clearly presupposes
1
1
100
· ~;ngh •
' the existence of more than one Government functionv.
ing in a State. Under the Constitution two GovernTh• Union of ments function ih each State. Under Art. 1, India
India & Anoth" shall be a Union of States and the territory of India
shall comprise, inter alia, the territories of the States.
Subba Rao J. Part II provides for one class of citizens, that is,
citizens of India. In whatever State a person with
the requisite qualifications of a citizen may reside, he
is a citizen of India and not of that particular State.
All the three departments of the Union as well as the
State function in the State; both Parliament and the
Legislature of the State make laws which govern the
State in respect of matters allotted to them respectively. Both the Union and the State executive powers
extend to the State, and the former is exercised in
regard to matters with respect to which Parliament
has power to make laws and the1atter in regard to
matters with respect to which the Legislature of the
State has power to make laws: see Arts. 73 and 162.
The Judiciary consists of an hierarchy of courts
and all the courts from the lowest to the Supreme
Court exercise jurisdiction in respect of a cause of
action arising in that State. The demarcation between
the Union Government and the State Government is,
therefore, not territorial but only subjectwise and
both the Governments function within the State.
With this background it is easy to perceive that "any
Government" must· include the Union Government,
for two State Governments cannot administer the
same State, though for convenience or as a temporary
arrangement, the offices of one State may be located
in another State. Then it is asked why the A~ticle
confers power to issue writs against any Government
only in appropriate cases. There a.re two answers to
this question. Till the Constitution was framed there
was no power in a High Court to issue a writ even
against the Provincial Government. The Constitution conferred for the first time a power on the High
Court to issue a writ not only against the Sta.te
Government but also the Union Government. As the
L
2 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
853
1 60
Union Government has sway over not only the State
9
in question but beyond it, it became necessary to Lt. co-:;_hajoor
administer a caution that a writ can only be issued in
Singh
appropriate cases. The High Court's jurisdiction is
v.
limited in the matter of issuing writs agai~st the The u,,ion of
Union Government, for it cannot issue writs against fodia &- Another
it in respect of a cause of action beyond its territorial subb;;;;,o 1 .
jurisdiction. There may. also be a case where the
secretariat of one of the State Governments is located
in another State temporarily. In such a case also the
High Court of the latter State cannot issue writs
against that State Government as it is not appropriate
to issue such writs, for the cause of action accrues
within the former State.
I have, therefore, no doubt that the words "any
Government" must necessarily take in the Union
Government.
Much of the argument turns upon the words "within those territories". It is said that the Union
Government is not within the territories of the State,
for its headquarters are in Delhi. The Article does
not use the word "headquarters'', "resident" or "location". The dictionary meaning of the word "within"
is "inside of, riot out of or beyond". The connotation
of the words takes colour from the context in which
they are used. A person may be said to be within a
territory if he resides therein. He may also be within
a territory if he temporarily enters the said territory
or is in the cou_rse of passing through the territory.
Any authority may be in a territory if its office is
located therein. It may also be said to be within a
territory if it exercises its powers therein and if it
can make orders to bind persons or properties therein.
So too a Government may be within a State if it has
a legal situs in that State. It may also be said to be
within a State if it administers the State, though for
convenience some of its executive authorities are
residing outside the territory. We must give such
meaning to these words as would help the working
of the Constitution :rather than retard it. To put it
differently, can it be said that the Union Government
1o8
854
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1961]
is within a. pa.rticula.r State? Union Government in
the present context means the executive branch of
Singh
the Government. Where is it located? To answer
TA• u:;.., of this question it is necessary to consider what is
l>•ai• .s. Anoth., "Union Government". The Constitution in Pa.rt V
under"the heading "The Union" deals with separate
subjects, namely, the executive, the Parliament and
the Union judiciary. Under Art. 53, the executive
power of the Union shall be vested in the President
a.nd shall be exercised by him either directly or
through officers subordinate to him in accordance
with the Constitution. Article 74 provides for a. council of Ministers with .the Prime Minister at the head
to a.id a.nd advise the President in the exercise of his
functions. By Art. 77, a.II executive action of the
Government of India sha.ll be expressed to be ta.ken in
the na.me of the President; a.nd cl. (3) thereof authorizes the President to ma.ke rules for the more convenient transaction of the business of the Government of India, and for the allocation among Ministers
of the ea.id business. Article 73 sa.ys tha.t subject to
the provisions of the Constitution, the executive
power of the Union shall extend to the matters
with respect to which Pa.rlia.ment ha.s power to make
la.we a.nd to the exercise of such rights, authority
a.nd jurisdiction a.s a.re exercisea.ble by the Government of India. by virtue of a.ny tfea.ty or agreement. The Constitution nowhere fixes the seat of
the Union Government or even that of the President. Shortly stated, the Union Government is
the President acting on the advise of the Ministers directly or through officers subordinate to him
in a.ccorda.nce with the Constitution and the jurisdiction of the sa.id Government extends, so fa.r a.s is
relevant to the presi;int purpose, to matters in respect
of which Pa.rlia.ment ha.s power to make la.ws. The
question tha.t immediately a.rises is, wha.t is the sitU8
of such a. Government? There is no statutory sitU8.
]'or convenience of administration, the officers of such
Government ma.y sta.y a.t one place, or they ma.y be
distributed in different places; the President may
reside in one place, th_e Primt Minister in another, the
LI. Col. Khajoor
-
J<
2 S.C.R. . SUPREME COURT REPORTS
855
Ministers in a third place and the officers through
I96o
whom the President exercises his powers in a place
different from the· rest. What happens when the Lt. c~: K:ajoor
Secretariat remains in New Delhi and the President
ing
v.
resides for some months in a year in, say, Hyderabad? The Union of
Contrary.wise, what would be the position if the India &- Another
President stays in New Delhi and the entire or
part of the Secretariat or some of the Ministers Subba Rao J.
stay in Hyderabad? It is, therefore, not possible
to apply the test of residence or location in the
absence of any statutory situs. The Union Government has no fixed legal abode; it is present throughout
the territories over which it exercises jurisdiction and
in respect whereof it can make effective and binding
orders in the field allotted to it by the Constitution.
The constitutional situs of the Union Government is
the entire territories of the Union and it is "within"
the territories of India and, therefore, within the
territories of every State.
Let us look at the problem from another standpoint.
Under Art. 300 of the Constitution, the Government
of India may sue or be sued by the name of the Union
of India. The word "sued" is used in a general sense
and cannot be narrowly construed in the Constitution
as to comprehend only action by way of filing a suit
in a civil court. According 'to Webster, it means to
seek justice or right by legal process. Generally
speaking, it includes any action taken in a court. The
practice followed in the various High Courts and the
Supreme Court is also consistent with the wide meaning attributed to it, for writs are filed against the
Government of India only in the name of the Union
of India. Union of India is a juristic person and it is
impossible to predicate its residence in a particular
place in the Union. Its presence synchronizes with
the limits of the Union territories. That is the reason
why that Order XXVII, rule 3, Code of Civil Procedure, says that in suits by or against the Government
instead of inserting in the plaint the name and
description and place of residence of the plaintiff or
defendant, it shall be sufficient to insert the appropriate name as provided in s. 79. Section 79 of the
856
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1961]
Civil Procedure Code is in terms analogous to Art.
Lt Col-;hajoor 300 of the Constitution, and under that section,
· singh
"In a suit by or against the Government, the
v.
authority to be named as plaintiff or defendant, as the
The Union of case may be, shall belnd•a <>-Another
(a) in the case of a suit by or against the Central
J. Government, the Union of India, and
0
(b) in the case of a suit by or against a State
Government, the State."
As the Union of India has no statutory situs, Order
XXVII, rule 3, Code of Civil Procedure, exempts its
place of residence being given in the plaint or the
written statement, as the case may be. The suit by or
against the Union Government shall be filed in a court
which has jurisdiction to entertain such a suit, having
regard to the provisions of ss. 15 to 20 of the said
Code. On the same analogy, it may be held that the
Union of India has no legal situs in-ti. particular place
and a writ petition can be filed against it in a place
within the jurisdiction of the High Court wherein the
cause of action accrues.
It is said that the limits of the power to issue a writ
are implicit in the nature of a particular writ. What
is the nature of the principal writs, namely, habeas
corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and
certiorari? The writ of habeas corpus "is a prerogative
process for securing the liberty of the subject by affording an effective means of immediate release from
unlawful or unjustifiable detention, whether in prison
or in private custody" The writ of mandamus "is, in
form, a command directed to any person, corporation
or inferior tribunal, requiring him or them to do some
particular thing therein specified which appertains to
his or their office and is in the nature of a public
duty." An order of prohibition is an order directed to
an inferior tribunal forbidding it to continue with the
proceedings pending therein. An information in the
nature of a quo warranto lies against a person who
claimed or usurped an office, franchise, or liberty, to
inquire by what authority he supported his claim. A
certiorari is directed to an authority "requiring the
record of the proceedings in some cause or matter to
z96o
5,.bb;:;;,
I
I
\--
2 s.c.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
~
857
60
be transmitted into the High Court to be dealt with
rg
th~r~." (See Halsbury's Laws of England, Vol. II, 3rd Lt. Col. Khajoor
ed1t10n).
Singh
It was asked how could the liberty of a subject be
v.
secured, the command be issued, the proceedings of an The union of
inquiry be prohibited, the credentials of a person to India & Another
hold office be questioned, the records of a proceeding
be directed to be transmitted to the High Court, if the Subba Rao J.
authority concerned was located, or the person directed resided, outside the territorial jurisdiction of the
High Court? It was also asked how, if the said autho- ,
rity, or person, disobeyed the order of the High Court,
it could be enforced against the said authority or
person. On the parity of the same reasoning the argument proceeded that, as the officers acting for the
Government ofJndia reside in Delhi, a writ which
would become brutum fulmen could not be issued by
the High Court.
The questions so posed are based on a misapprehension of the relevant provisions of the Constitution.
They also mix up the nature of the writs with the
procedure in dealing with the writs or enforcing the
orders made therein. As I have already indicated, the
Article confers a power on the High Court to issue
writs against the Union Government. If the said
Government is "within the State", is it an answer to
it that an officer of the Government dealing with a
particular paper or papers is residing outside the
territorial jurisdiction of the High Court? If the Union
Government is bound by the order of the High Court,
the question of service of notice on a particular officer
acting for the Government or to enforce an order
against him is a matter pertaining to the realm of procedure and appropriate rules can be framed by the
High Court or the requisite law made by the Parliament. If the Union Government disobeys the order it
would certainly be liable for contempt of court under
the Contempt of Courts Act, 1952. Even if the contemner happens to be an officer of the said Government residing outside the territorial limits of the High
Court, the High Court has ample power to reach him
under s. 5 of the said Act.
858
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1961)
. The analogy drawn from English law is rather
misleading.
England is comparatively a small country
Lt.. Col. Khajoor
Singh
and it has only one Government functioning throughv.
out the ·State. The problem that has arisen now could
Th• Union of not have arisen in England, for the jurisdiction of the
India & Another Queen's Bench Division of the High Court extends
-throughout England. In England the manner of the
Subba Rao ].
•
exercise of t h e 3urisdiction
was also regulated by a
procedure brimming with technicalities, but later on
simplified by statute. The framers of our Constitution
therefore designedly used the words "in the nature of"
indicating that they were not incorporating in the
Constitution the entire procedure followed in England,
for the procedure will have to be evolved having
regard to the federal structure of our Government.
How can the procedural law of England in the matter
of writs be bodily lifted and implanted in India? This
Court shall have to put a reasonable construction on
the words without being unduly weighed down by the
historical background of these writs and construe the
Article in such a way, if legally permissible, to carry
out the intention of the Constitution-makers. That
apart, Article 226 of the Constitution is not confined
to the prerogative writs in vogue in England. The
Article enables the appropriate High Court to issue
also directions or orders, and there is no reason why
the High Court could not, in an appropriate case, give
a suitable direction to, or make a proper order on, the
Union Government. Such directions or orders are
certainly free from the procedural technicalities of
the said writs.
I shall now notice briefly the decisions cited at the
Bar. The first is the decision of this Court in Election
Commission, India v. Saka Venkata Rao('). There
the Governor of Madras referred to the Election Com.
mission, which had its offices permanently located in
New Delhi, the question wh~ther the respondent was
disqualified and could he allowed to sit and vote in the
Assembly. The respondent thereupon applied to the
High Court of Madras under Art. 226 of the Constitution for a writ restraining the Election Commission
t96o
(t) [1953) S.C.R. 1144.
•
2 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS ·
859
from enquiring into his alleged disqualification for
membership of the Assembly. This Court held that LI. Col. Khajoor
the power of the High Court to issue writs under Art.
Singh
226 of the Constitution was subject to the two-fold
v.
limitation: (i) that such writs cannot run beyond the The Union of
territories subject to its jurisdiction; and (ii) that the India &- _4 nothe•
person or authority to. whom the High Court is Subba Rao ].
empowered to issue writs must be amenable to the
jurisdiction of the High Court either by residence or
location within the territories subject to its jurisdiction. On that basis ·the writ petition was dismissed.
. At the outset it may be noticed that there is one
obvious difference between that case and the present
one. In that case the respondent was not the Union
of India but an authority which could have and had
its location·in a place outside the Madras State. The
present case satisfies both the conditions: the writ
does not run beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the
High Court, as the Union Government must be deemed to be "within'' the said territories; the second condition is also satisfie·d, as the Union Government,
being within the Sta.te, is a.lso amenable to its jurisdiction.
The next case r'elied upon by the learned SolicitorGeneral is a converse one. It is the decision of ·this
Court in K. 8. Raskiil &: Son v. The Income-tax Investigation Oommissfon (1 ). In that case the· Income-tax
Investigation Commission located in Delhi was inves·
tigating the case of the petitioners under section 5 of
the Taxation on Income (Investigation Commission)
Act, 1947, although the petitioners were assessees
belonging to Uttar Pradesh and their original assess~
ments were made by the Income-tax .authorities of
that State. It was.contended that the _Punjab High ·
Court had no jurisdiction to issue a writ under Art.
226 of the Constitution to the said Commission. This
Court, after restating the two limitations on the power
of the High Court to issue a writ, held that the Commission was amenable to the jurisdiction of the Punjab ~ig.h ~oi:rt an~, therefore, ~he Punjab High Court
had JUr1sdwt10n to issue the writ. This decision also ·
(1) [1954) S.C.R. 738.
860
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1961)
60
deals. with a case of statutory authority located in
Delhi and it has no application to the case of the
Union Government. The question whether the prinv.
ciples that apply to the Government of India would
Th< Union °! equally apply to statutory authorities situate in one
India & Another State but exercising jurisdiction in another, does not
Subba Rao 1. arise for consideration in this case; though, as I have
already expressed, I am prima facie of the view that
there is no reason why they should not.
Now coming to the decision of the High Courts,
there is a clear enunciation of the relevant principles
in Maqbul-Un-Nissa v. Union of India (1). The Full
Bench of the Allahabad High Court directly \lecided
the point now raised before us. The importance of
the decision lies in the fact that the learned Judges
approached the problem without being oppressed by
the decision of this Court in Saka Venkata Rao's
case('), which was decided only subsequent to that
decision. After considering the relevant Articles of
the Constitution, Sapru, J., speaking for the Full
Bench, observed at pp. 293-294 thus:
"The analogy between a government and a corporation or a joint stock company which has its domicile in the place where its head office is situate is misleading. To hold that the jurisdiction of this Court
does not extend to the Union Government as it has
its capital at' Delhi and must be deemed to have its
domicile at Delhi would be to place the Union Government not only in respect of the rights conceded in
Part III but for any other purpose also beyond the
jurisdiction of all State High Courts except the Punjab
High Court."
The learned Judge proceeded to state at p. 294-"In our opinion, the jurisdiction of this Court to
intervene under Article 226 depends not upon where
the Headquarters or the Capital of the Government is
situate but upon the fact of the effect_ of the act done
by Government, whether Union or State being within
the territorial limits of this Court."
Adverting to the words "any Government" in Art.
226, the learned Judge observed at p. 292 thus:
'9
Lt. Col. Khajoor
· Singh
(•) I.L. R. [1953] • All. •89·
(0) [1953] s.c.R. no.
2 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
861
"They indicate that the founding fathers knew
x96o
that more than one government would function with-K-h .
· he same t err1't ory. "
Lt. Co1.
a;oor
mt
Singh
I entirely agree with the observations of the learned
v.
Judge, for they not only correctly construe the pro- The Union of
visions of Art. 226 bu~ also give effect to the inten- India & Another
tion of the Constitution-makers.
After the decision of this Court in Saka Venkata Subba Rao f.
Rao's case (1) the High Court of Madhya .Pradesh
considered the question in Surajmal v. State of M. P. (2 ).
There, the Central Government rejected an application for a mining lease and the order rejecting the
application was communicated to the applicant who
was residing in the State of Madhya Pradesh. It was
held by the High Court that the writ asked for could
not be issued so as to bind the Central Government
because, "(a) the Central Government could not be
deemed to be permanently located or normally carrying
on its business within the jurisdiction of the High
Court; (b) the record of the case which the Central
Government decided was not before the High Court
and could not be made available from any legal custody within the State; (c) the order of the State
Government must be deemed to have merged in that
of the Central Government; (d) the order of the State
Government could not be touched unless the order of
the Central Government could be brought before the
High Court and quashed." We are concerned here
with the first and second grounds. The learned Chief
Justice, who delivered the judgment on behalf of the
Full Bench, applied the principle of the decision of this
Court in Saka Venkata Rao's case(1) to the Union
Government; and for the reasons already mentioned
I am of opinion that the decision is not applicable to
the case of the Union Government. The second reason
in effect places the procedure on a higher pedestal
than the substantive law. It is true that in a writ of
certiorari the records would be called for; but, if once
it is held that the Union Government is within the
State within the meaning of Art. 226 of the Constitution, I do not think why the High Court in exercise
(l) [1953] s.c.R. u44.
109
li) A.I.R. 1958 M.P. 103,
862
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1961]
of its constitutional power cannot direct the Union
z96o
L c -;--;;h 100
. Government to bring the records wherever its officers
~ingh a
' might have kept them.
This second ground is really
v.
corollary to the first, viz., that the Union Government
The Union of is not within the territorial jurisdiction of the High
India & Another Court concerned.
•
t.
Subba Rao
f.
The Bombay High Court in Radheshyam Makhanlal
v. The Union of India(') also held that a writ cannot
issue against the Union Government whose office is
located outside the territorial jurisdiction of the High
Court. Shah, J., applying the principle of the decision in Saka V enkata Rao' 8 caBe (') to the Union
Government held that as the office of the Union
Government was not located within the State of Born.
bay, the Bombay High Court could not issue a writ
to the Union Government. But S. T. Desai, J., was
not willing to go so far, and he based his conclusion
on a narrower ground, namely, that even if the writ
was issued it· could not be enforced. I have already
pointed out that both the grounds are not tenable.
The Union Government is within the State of Bombay
in so far as it exercises its powers in that State and
the High Court has got a constitutional power to
issue writs to the Union Government and, therefore,
their enforceability does not depend upon its officers
residing in a particular place.
The foregoing discussion may be summed up in the
following propositions: (1) The power of the High
Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution is of the
widest amplitude and it is not confined only to issuing
of writs in the nature of habeaB corpu8, etc., for it can
also issue directions or orders against any person or
authority, including in appropriate cases any Government. (2) The intention of the framers of the Constitutfon is clear, and they used in the Article words
"any Government" which in their ordinary signifi.
canoe must include the Union Government. (3) The
High Court can issue a writ to run throughout the
territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction
and to the person or authority or Government within
the said territories. (4) The Union Government has
(1) A.I.R. 196o Bom. 353·
(>) [1953] S.C.R. "H·
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
863
no constitutional situs in a particular place, but it
r9 6o
exercises its executive powers in respect of matters to u c 1 Kh .
which Parliament has power to make laws and the · ~ingh a;oor
power in this regard is exercis;tble throughout India;
v.
the Union Government must, therefore, be deemed in The Union of
law to have functional existence throughout India. India & Another
(5) When by exercise of its powers the Union Govern- Subba Rao J.
ment makes an order infringing the legal right or
interest of a person residing within the territories in
relation to which a particular High Court exercises
jurisdiction, that High Court can issue a writ to the
Union Government, for in law it must be deemed to
be "within" that State also .. (6) The High Court by
issuing a writ against the Union Government i1;1 not
travelling beyond its territorial jurisdiction, as the
order is issued against the said Government "within"
the State. (7) The fact that for the sake of convenience a particular officer of the said Government issuing an order stays outside the territorial limits of the
High Court is not of any relevance, for it is the Union
Government that will have to produce the record or
carry out the order, as the case may be. (8) The
orders issued by the High Court can certainly be
enforced against the Union Government, as it is
amenable to its jurisdiction, and if they are disobeyed
it will be liable to contempt. {9) Even if the Officers
physically reside outside its territorial jurisdiction, the
High Court can always reach them under the Contempt of Courts Act, if they choose to disobey the
orders validly passed against the Union Government
which cannot easily by visualized or ordinarily be expected. (10) The· difficulties in communicating the
orders pertain to the rules of procedure and adequate
and appropriate rules can be made for communicating
the same to the Central Government or its officers.
For the aforesaid reasons, I hold that Art. 32(2A)
of the Constitution enables the High Court of Jammu
& Kashmir to issue the writ to the Union Government in respect of the act done by it infringing the
fundamental rights of the parties in that State.
In the result, I allow the appeal, set aside the order
of the High Court and direct it to dispose of the
864
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
matter in accordance with law.
his costs.
have'
Z:t. Col. Khajoor
Singh
v.
[1961]
The appellant will
DAS GUPTA, J.-I have had the advantage of
Th• Union of reading the judgments prepared by my Lord the Chief
India & Another Justice and Mr. Justice Subba Rao. I agree with the
Das G t.ipla ] .
conclusions reached by the Chief Justice that the
appeal should be dismissed. As, however, I have
reached that conclusion by a slightly different process
of reasoning I propose to indica te those reasons
briefly.
The facts have been fully stated in the judgment of
My Lord the Chief Justice and it is not necessary to
repeat them. It is sufficient to state that the appellant filed an application to the High Court of Jammu
& Kashmir under Article 32(2A) of the Constitution
for the issue of an appropriate writ, order or directions restraining the Union of India and the State of
Jammu & Kashmir from enforcing an order conveyed
in the Government of India's letter dated July 31,
1954, whereby the Government of India ordered the
premature compulsory retirement of the appellant
with effect from August 12, 1954. A preliminary
objection was raised on behalf of the respondents that
Government of India is not a Government within the
territorial limits of the jurisdiction of the J ammu
and Kashmir High Court and so the application was
not maintainable. The High Court accepted this
objection as valid and dismissed the application. The
sole question in controversy in appeal is whether the
High Court had jurisdiction, on the facts and circumstances of this case, to issue a writ to the Government
of India under Art. 32(2A) of the Constitution.
Article 32(2A) of the Constitution under which the
appellant asked the High Court for relief is in the
following words :"Without prejudice to the powers conferred by
clauses (1) and (2), the High Court shall have power
throughout the territories in relation to which it
exercises jurisdiction to issue to any person or authority, including in appropriate cases any Government
within those territories, directions or orders or writs,
2 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
865
including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandaI96°
mus,. prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari, or any Lt. Col. Khajoor
of them, for the enforcement of any of the rights conSingh
ferred by this Part."
v.
Except for the fact that "the High Court" in this T~e Union of
Article means only the High Court of the State of India &- Another
J ammu & Kashmir, while Art. 226 of the Constitution Das Gupta 1 .
refers to all other High Courts and the further fact
that power granted by this Article is for the enforcement only of the rights conferred by Part III of
the Constitution while Art. 226 gives power to the
High Courts in the Union for the enforcement not
only of the rights conferred by Part III but for any
other purpose, the provisions of the two articles are
exactly the same. Power is given to the High Court
to give relief in certain matters by issuing appropriate
writs and orders to (1) any person; (2) any authority
other than the Government and (3) any Government.
The exercise of this power is subject to the existence
of the condition precedent that the person or the
Government or the authority other than the Government must be "within the territories in relation to
which the High Court exercises jurisdiction". A special limitation in respect of the issue of writs or orders
to a Government is introduced by the words "in
appropriate cases" before the words "any Government". Leaving for later consideration the effect of
the words "in appropriate cases" we have first to
examine the question : when is a Government within
the territories under the jurisdiction of a particular
High Court ? On behalf of the first respondent, the
Union of India, it is urged that to be within the territories under the jurisdiction of a High Court the
Government must be located within those territories.
It is pointed out that "any person" to be within any
specified territories has to be present within those
territories; an authority other than Government has
also, before it can be said to be within any particular
territories, a physical existence within those territories
by having its office therein. The same requirement
of location within the particular territories, it is argued, should apply to the case of Governments. The
866
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1961)
argument is no doubt attractive and at first sight
even
plausible. On closer examination however it
Lt. Col. Khajoor b
Singh
ecomes evident that this argument oversimplifies the
v.
problem by slurring over the fallacious assumption
The Union of that a Government has a location in the same way as
India & Another any person or any authority other than Government.
-G Has the Government any location in a similar senseD as
upta 1 . m
· th e same way as a person h as a 1ocat10n
·
at any
point of time by being present at a particular place
or an authority other than the Government can be
said to be located at the place where its office is situated? There is no doubt that when we think of a
Government, whether of the States or of the Union
we are thinking of the executive organ of the State.
The executive power of the Union is under Art. 53
vested in the President and is to be exercised by him.
The executive power of the States is vested in the
Governors of the States and has_ to be exercised by
them. Does it follow however that the Government
of India is located at the place where the President
resides and similarly the Government of each State is
located at the ·place where the Governor resides ? It
has to be noticed that while the Constitution contains
specific provisions in Art. 130 as to where the Supreme Court shall sit, no such provision is made as to
where the President of India shall reside or exercise
his executive power vested in him. Art. 231 of the
Constitution speaks of a principal seat for the High
Court of each State. We search in vain however for
any mention·of any principal seat "for the President
of India or the Governors of the States". The fact
that the President of India has a special place of
residence, the Rashtrapati Bhawan in Delhi and the
Governors of States have also special places of residence at some places in the State known as Raj
Bhavan, is apt to make us forget that the Constitution does not provide for any place of residence for the
President or Governors. There is nothing to prevent
the President of India from having more than one
permanent place of residence within the Union. If
this happens and places of residence are provided for
the President of India in, say, Bombay, Calcutta and
x96o
2 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
\
..
867
1 60
Madras in addition to the residence at Delhi, can it be
9
said that the Government of India is located in Delhi Lt c 1 Kh 100
.
when the President of India resides in Delhi, it goes · ~inch a '
to -Calcutta when he resides in Calcutta, it goes to
v.
Bombay when the President resides in Bombay and ne Union of
to Madras when the President goes and resides in India & Another
Madras ? This may seem at first sight a fantastic
illustration; but when we remember that in fact in Das Gupta f.
the days of British rule, the Viceroy had a permanent
place of residence at Simla for part of the year and
another permanent place of residence at Calcutta for
part of the year before 1911 and after 1911 one permanent place of residence in Delhi and another in Simla,
it is easy to see that what has been said above ·by
way of illustration is by no means improbable. If
therefore a Government is to be held to be located at
the place where the head of the State-the President
of India in the case of the Government of India and
the Governor in the case of each State-resides, it
may well become impossible to speak of any particular
place as the place where the Government is located
throughout the year. This may not a.ffect the question
of any State Government being within the territories
of the High Court of the State. For whatever place
the Governor may have for his residence is bound to
be within the territories of the State. The position
will however become wholly uncertain and difficult as
regards the Government of India being within the
territorial jurisdiction of any particular High Court.
For part of the year it may be, if the residence of the
President be the criterion for ascertaining the location
of the Government, that the Government of India.
will be within the territories of one High Court and
for other parts of the year in another High Court. It
will be wholly unreasonable therefore to accept the
test of residence of the President of India for deciding
where the Government of India is located.
Finding the test of the President's residence illusory,
one may try to say that the Government of India or
of a State is situated at the place where the offices of
the Ministry are situated. Under Art. 77 the President
allocates the business of the Government of India.
868
1960
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1961]
among the Ministers while under Art. 166 the Governor of a State allocates the business of the GovernLt. Col. Khajoor
ment ofa State-except business with respect to which
Singh
the
Governor is required to act in his discretionv.
The Union of
among the Ministers of the State. If therefore it was
India &- Another
correct to say that all the Ministers of the Government
of India had to perform their functions in
Das Gupta].
respect of the business allocated to them at one particular place, it might be reasonable to say that the
Government of India is located at that place. Similarly
if all the Ministers of a State had to perform their
functions in respect of the business allocated to them
at one particular place the Government of the State
might well be said to be located at that place. The
Constitution however contains no provision that
all the Ministers of a State shall perform their functions at one particular place in the State nor that the
Ministers of the Union will perform their functions at
one particular place in the State. Situations may
arise not only in an emergency, but even in normal
times, when some Ministers of the Government may
find it necessary and desirable to dispose of the business allocated to them at places different from where
the rest of the Ministers are doing so. The rehabilitation of refugees from Pakistan is part of the business
of the Government of India and for the proper performancfi' of this business there is a Ministry of Rehabilitation for Refugees. It is well-known that the
Minister in this Ministry has to perform a great
portion of his business at Calcutta in West Bengal and
stays there for a considerable part of the year. Many
of the offices of this Ministry are situated in Calcutta.
·What is true of this Ministry, may happen as regards
other Ministries also. Special circumstances may
require that some portion of the business of the Ministry of Commerce be performed at places like Bombay,
Calcutta or Madras in preference to Delhi, and if this
happens the Minister to whom the business of Government of India in respect of commerce has been allocated will be transacting his business at these places
instead of at Delhi. If public interest requires that
the greater portion of the business of the Ministry of
2 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
869
Defence should for reasons of security or other reasons
r96o
be carried on at some place away from Delhi the L c ~h 100
.
Defence Minister will have to transact its business at '· ~lngh " '
that place. It is clear therefore that while at any
v.
particular point of time it may be possible to speak of The Union of
any Ministry of the Government of India being locat- India & Another
ed at a particular place, the Government of India as a DasGupta].
w hl
o e may not necessarily be located at t h at p1ace. I n
my opinion, it is therefore neither correct nor appropriate to speak of location of any Government. Nor
is it possible to find any other satisfactory test for
ascertaining the location of the Government of India.
In Election Commission v. Saka Venkata Subba
Rao (1 ) this Court held that before a writ under Art.
226 could issue to an authority, the authority must be
located within the territories under the jurisdiction of
the High Court. There however the Court was not
concerned with the case of any Government, and had
no occasion to consider whether a Government could
be said to have a location. The decision in that case
and in the later case of K. S. Rashid and Son v. The
Income-tax Investigation Commission, etc.,(~) does not
therefore bind us to hold tl;i.at a Government has a
location. in the same way as an authority like an Election Commission or an Income-tax Investigation Commission. It appears reasonable therefore to hold that
all that is required to satisfy the condition of a
Government being within the territories under the
jurisdiction of a High Court is that the Government
must be functioning within those territories. The
Government of India functions throughout the territory of India. The conclusion cannot therefore be
resisted that the Government of India is within the
territories under the jurisdiction of every High Court
including the High Court of Jammu and Kashmir.
The use of the words "any Government" appears to
me to be an additional reason-- for_ thinking that the
Government of India is within the territories under
the jurisdiction of the J ammu & Kashmir High Court.
"Any Government" in the context cannot but mean
(I) (1953] S.C. R. u44.
no
(2) (1954) S.C.R. 738.
870
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1961]
every Government. If the location test were to be
u. Col. Khajoor applied the only Government within the territories of
Singh
the State of Jammu and Kashmir would be the
v.
Government of Jammu and Kashmir. It would be
The Union °! meaningless then to give the High Court the power to
India<!> Another give
•
•
" any Governmen t" w1"th'm 1"ts
rel"1ef agamst
Das Gupta . territories. These words "any Government" were used
1
because the Constitution-makers intended. that the
High Court.shall have power to give relief against the
Government of India also.
But, contends the respondent, that will produce an
intolerable position which the Constitution-makers
could not have contemplated. The result of the
Government of India being within the territories of
every High Court in India will, it is said, be that the
Government of India would be subjected to writs and
orders 9f every High Court in India. A person seeking
relief against the Government of India will naturally
choose the High Court which is most convenient to
him and so the Government of India may have to face
applications for relief as against the same order affecting a number of persons in all the different High
Courts in India. If a position of such inconvenience
to the Government of India, though of great convenience to the persons seeking relief, did in fact
result from the words used by the Constitution-makers,
I for one, would refuse to shrink from the proper
interpretation of the words merely to help the Government. I do not however think that that result
follows. For, on a proper 1·eading of the words "in
appropriate cases", it seems to me that there will be,
for every act or omission in respect of which relief can
be claimed, only one High Court that can exercise
jurisdiction.
It has first to be noticed that the limitation introduced by the use of these words "in appropriate cases"
has not been placed in respect of issue of writs to persons and to authorities other than government. It has
been suggested that the effect of these words is that in
issuing writs against any Government the High Court
has not got the same freedom as it has when issuing
writs against any person or authority other than
.i:
'
2 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
871
1 60
Government and that when relief is asked against a
9
Government th~ High Cou:t has ~o t~ke. special care Lt. Col. Khaioor
to see that writs are not issued md1scnmmately but
Singh •
only in proper cases. I have no hesitation in rejecting
v.
this suggestion. It cannot be seriously contemplated The Union of
for a moment that the Constitution-makers intended India & Another
to lay down different standards for the courts when Das Gupta ].
the relief is asked for against the Government from
when the relief is asked for against other 'authorities.
In every case where relief under Art. 226 is sought
the High Court has the duty to exercise its discretion
whether relief should be given or not. It is equally
clear that in exercising such discretion the High Court
will give relief only in proper cases and not in cases
where the relief should not be granted.
Why then were these words "in appropriate cases"
used at all? It seems to me that the Constitution.
makers being conscious of the difficulties that would
arise if all the High Courts in the country were given
jurisdiction to issue writs against the Central Government on the ground that the Central Government was
functioning within its territories wanted to give such
jurisdiction only to that High Court where the act or
omission in respect of which relief was sought had
taken place. In every case where relief is sought
under Art. 226 it would be possible to ascertain the
place where the act complained of was performed or
when the relief is sought against an omission, the
place where the act ought to have been performed.
Once this phce is ascertained the High Court which
exercises jurisdiction over that place is the only High
Court which has jurisdiction to give relief under Art.
226. That, in my view, is the necessary result of the
words "in appropriate cases".
On behalf of the appellant it was contended on the
authority of the decision of the Privy Council in
Ryots of Garabandho v. Zemindar of Parlakimedi (1)
that all that is necessary to give jurisdiction to a High
Court to act under Art. 226 is that a part of the cause
of action has arisen within the territories in relation
to which it exercises jurisdiction. The question whether the ca.use of action attracts jurisdiction for relief
(1) (1943) L.R. 70 I.A. 129.
872
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1961]
r96o
under Art. 226 of the Constitution as in the case of
c1
.
suits was considered by this Court in Saka Venkata
100
Lt. ~;n~;a ' Subba Rao's Case (1) and the answer given was in the
v.
negative. Referring to the decision of the Privy
9
The Union of Council in Parlakimedi's Case ( ) this Court pointed
India & Another out that the decision did not turn on the construction
of a statutory provision similar in scope, purpose or
Das Gupta 1
wording to Art. 226 of the Constitution, and is not of
much assistance in the construction of that article.
Delivering the judgment of the Court Patanjali
Sastri C. J. also observed:"The rule that cause of action attracts jurisdiction
in suits is based on statutory enactment and cannot
apply to writs issuable under Art. 226 which makes
no reference to any cause of action or where it arises
but insists on the presence of the person or authority
'within the territories' in relation to. which the High
Court exercises jurisdiction."
This decision is binding on us, and I may respectfully add that I find no reason to doubt its correctness.
It is true that in that case the Court had to consider
the question of jurisdiction in respect of an authority
other than Government. It is difficult to see however
why if cause of action could not attract jurisdiction
against persons and authorities other than Government it would attract jurisdiction as against a
Government. It seems to me clear that the principle
of basing jurisdiction on cause of action has not been
introduced in the Constitution under Art. 226 or Art.
32(2A) of the Constitution.
It may seem at first sight that to hold that the
High Court within whose jurisdiction the action or
omission, complained of took place will have jurisdiction, is in effect to accept the accrual of cause of action
as the basis of jurisdiction. This however is not
correct. The High Court within the jurisdiction
of which the act or omission takes place, has jurisdiction, not because a part of the cause of action
arose there, but in consequence of the use of the
words "in appropriate cases".
(1) [1953] S.C.R. u44.
(1) (1943) L.R. 70 I.A. n9.
2 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
873
The several oases in the High Court in which the
z96o
question now before us has been considered have
c
bee~ referred to in the majority judgment and also in '· ~ingh a,oor
the Judgment of Mr. Justice Subba Rao and no useful
v.
purpose would be served in discussing them over The Union of
a.gain.
·
India<!;· Another
For the reasons discussed above I have reached the
conclusion that while the Government of India is Da~ Gupta J.
within the territories of every High Court in India
the only High Court which has jurisdiction to issue a
writ or order or directions under Art. 226 or Art. 32
(2A) against it is the one within the territories
under which the act or omission against which relief
was sought took place.
In t.b.e present case the act against which the relief
has been sought was clearly performed at Delhi which
is within the territories under the jurisdiction of the
Punjab High Court and the J ammu and Kashmir
High Court cannot therefore exercise its jurisdiction
under Art. 226.
In the result, I agree with my Lord the Chief J ustice that the appeal should be dismissed with costs.
L ;-;;h .
BY COURT. In accordance with the opinion of the
majority of the Court, this appeal is dismissed with
costs.
.A.J>J>eal disniissed.
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