THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH AND OTHERS versus BABU RAM UPADHYA
Supreme Court of India | Decided 25 November 1960 | [1961] 2 S.C.R. 679 | 1960 INSC 221
Key facts
- Decided
- 25 November 1960
- Bench
- P.B. GAJENDRAGADKAR*, A.K. SARKAR, K. SUBBA RAO, K.N. WANCHOO, J.R. MUDHOLKAR
- Bench size
- 5
- Case number
- CIVIL APPEAL No. 119/1959
- Disposal
- Dismissed
- Citation
- [1961] 2 S.C.R. 679
- Neutral citation
- 1960 INSC 221
Text of the judgment
2 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
679
THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH
AND OTHERS
v.
BABU RAM UPADHYA
(P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, A. K. SARKAR,
K. SUBBA RAO, K. N. WANCHOO and
J. R. MuDHOLKAR, JJ.)
Public Servant-Police Officer, dismissal of-Polict; Regulations, i~hether mandatory-Disregard of, if invalidates disciplinary
action--Autlwrities empow,orcd to take action-If exercise powers of
Governor-Police Act, r86r (V of r86r), s. 7-U. P. Police Regulations, 1\ara. 486-Constitution of India, Arts. r54, 309, 3ro, 3rr.
The respondent was a sub-Inspector of Police. A complaint
was received by the Superintendent of Police that the complainant was carrying currency notes of Rs. 650 in a bundle
when he was stopped by the respondent and his person was
searched, that the respondent opened the bundle of notes and
handed over the notes one by one to one Lalji, who was with
him and that Lalji returned the notes to him but on reaching
home he found the notes short by Rs. 2:;0. Proceedings under 1 )
s. 7 of the Police Act were taken against the respondent on the ·
charge of misappropriation of Rs. 250 and he was dismissed from
service by an order of the Deputy Inspector General of Police.
The respondent filed a writ petition before the High Court challenging the order of the dismi,sal on the ground that the authorities had acted in violation of Rule I of Para. 486 of the U. P.
Police Regulation. This rule required that every information
received by the police relating to the commission of a cognizable
offence by a Police Officer shall be dealt with in the first place
under Ch. XIV, Code of Criminal Procedure. The High Court
held that the provisions of para. 486 of the Police Regulations
had not been observed and that the proceedings taken under
s. 7 of the Police Act were invalid and illegal and accordingly
quashed the order of dismissal. The appellant contended (i)
that the complaint <lid not make out any cognizable offence
against the respondent and r. I of Para. 486 was not applicable
in this case, (ii) that r. III of Para. 486 enabled the authorities
to initiate departmental proceedings without complying with the
provisions of r. I, (iii) that the Police Regulations made in exercise of the power conferred on the Government under the Police
Act delegating the power of the Governor to dismiss at pleasure
to a subordinate officer were only administrative directions for
the exercise of the pleasure in a reasonable manner and any
breach oi the regulations did not confer any right or give a cause
of action to the public servant, and (iv) that the regulations we.re
only directory and the non-compliance with the rules did not
invalidate the order of dismissal.
November 25.
I
680
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1961]
Held, (per Sarkar, Subba Rao and Mudholkar, JJ.) that the
order of dismissal was illegal as it was based upon an enquiry
The State of Uttar held in violation of r. I of Para 486 of the Police RegulaPYadesh & Othet's tions.
v.
The facts alleged in the complaint made out a cognizable
Babu llam
offence under s. 405 Indian Penal Code against the respondent,
Upadhya
and the provisions of r. I of Para. 486 were applicable to it. A
1960
Police Officer making a search of a person was 'entrusted' with
the money handed over by the person searched.
Rule III of Para. 486 did not deal with cognizable offences,
it dealt with offences falling only under s. 7 Police Act and to
non-cognizable offences. Rule III did not provide an alternative
procedure to that prescribed under r. I.
The position with regard to the tenure of public servants
and to the taking of disciplinary action against them under the
present Constitution was as follows:
(i) Every person who was a member of a public service
described in Art. 310 of the Constitution held office during the
pleasure of the President or the Governor.
(ii) The power to dismiss a public servant at pleasure was
outside the scope of Art. 154 and, therefore, could not be delegated by the Governor to a subordinate officer, and could be
exercised by him only in the manner prescribed by the Constitution.
(iii) This tenure was subject to the limitations or qualifications mentioned in Art. 311.
(iv) Parliament or the Legislature of States could not
make a law abrogating or modifying this tenure so as to impinge
upon the overriding power conferred upon the President or the
Governor under Art. 310, as qualified by Art. 31I.
(v) Parliament or the Legislatures of States could make a
law regulating the conditions of service of such a member which
included proceedings by way of disciplinary action, without
affecting the powers of the President or the Governor under Art.
310 read with Art. 311.
(vi) Parliament and the Legislatures aho could make a
Jaw laying down and regulating the scope and content of the
doctrine of "reasonable opportunity" e1nbodied in Art. 311 but
the said la\v was subject to judicial review.
(vii) If a statute could be made by Legislatures within
the foregoing permissible limits, the rules made by an authority
in exercise of the po\ver conferred thereunder would likewise be
efficacious within the said limits.
N. W. F. Province v. Suraj Narain, A.LR. r949 P. C. rr2,
Shenton v. Smith, (1895) A.C. 229, Gould v. Stuart, (1896) A.C.
575, Reilly v. The King, (1934) A.C. 176, Terrell v. Secretary of
State, (1953) 2 All E.R. 490, State of Bihar v. Abdul Majid, [1954)
S.C.R. 786, Parshotam Lal Dhingra v. Union of India, [1958]
•·-
2 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
681
S.C.R. 828, R. T. Rangachari v. Secretary of State for India, (1936)
1960
L.l<. 64 I.A. 40 and High Commissioner for India and High Commissi~ner for Pakistan v. I. M. Lall, (1948) L.R. 75 I.A. 225, refer-The State of Uttar
red to.
,
Prndesh & Others
v.
The Police Act and the rules made thereunder constituted a
Babu Ram
self-contained code providing for the appointment of police offiUpadhya
cers and prescribing the procedure for their removal. Any
authority taking action under the Police Act or the rules made
thereunder must conform to the provisions thereof and if there
was any violation ol those provisions the public servant had a
right io challenge the order of the authority if the rules were
mandatory. Paragraph 486 of the Police Regulations was
mandatory and not directory. The rules were made in the
interests of both the department and the police officers. The
word used in para 486 was "shall" and in the context it could
not be read as "may".
Hari Vishnu Kamath v. Syed Ahmed Ishaque, [1958] S.C.R.
no4, State of U. P. v. Manbodhan Lal Srivastava, [1958] S.C.R.
533 and Montreal Street Railway Company v. Normandin, L.R.
(r9r7) A.C. 170, referred to.
Subject to the overriding power of the President or the
Governor under Art. 310, as qualified by Art. 3II, rules governing disciplinary proceeding could not be treated as administrative directions, but had the same effect as the provisions
of the statute whereurider they were made, in so far as they
were not inconsistent with the provisions thereof. The Governor
did not exercise his pleasure through the officers specified in s. 7
of the Police Act, and the Governor's pleasure could not be
equated with the statutory power of the officers specified. An
inquiry under the Act had to be made in accordance with the
provisions of the Act and the rules made thereunder.
R. T. Rangachari v. Secretary of State for India, L.R. 64 I.A.
40, High Commissioner for India and High Commissioner for Pakistan v. I. M. Lall, (1948) L.R. 75 I.A. 225, R. Venkata Rao v.
Secretary of State for India, (1936) L.R. 64 I.A. 55, S. A. Venkataraman v. Union of India, [1954] S.C.R. n50 and Kliem Chand v.
The Union of India, [1958] S.C.R. 1080, referred to.
Per Gajendragadkar and Wanchoo. JJ.-The provisions of
para 486 were merely directory and a non-compliance therewith
did not invalidate the disciplinary action taken against the respondent.
All public servants, other than those excepted expressly by
the Constitution, held office during the pleasure of the President
or the Governor, and no Jaw or rule framed under Art. 309 or
Art. 154(2)(b) could cut down the content of the pleasure tenure
in Art. 310 subject to Art. 3rr: The Police Act could not stand
higher than a law passed under Art. 309 or Art. 154(2)(b) and
could not cut dowu the content of the pleasure tenure in Art. 310.
682
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1961]
The Police officers held office during the pleasure of the Governor· and the only protection they could claim was the two
Tho State of Uttar guarantees contained in Art. 311.
Pradesh <~ Othm
The rules framed under s. 7 Police Act would be of two
v.
kinds, namely (1) those which defined the jurisdiction of the
Bab" Rani
four grade-s of officers specified in s. 7 to inflict particular kind
Upadhya
of punishment on particular police officers of the subordinate
ranks~----such rules would be mandatory but they could not go
against the provisions of Art 3rr, and (2) procedural rules. The
procedural rules could be of two kinds: ,;) those that prescribed
the manner in which the guarantee contained in Art. 3II(2) may
be carried out-such rules would he mandatory, and (ii) other
merely procedural rules-they conk! only be directory.
The power of the Governor to dismiss was executive power
of the State and could be exercised under Art. 154(1) by the
Governor himself directly or indirectly through officers subordinate to him.
The officers specified in s. 7 of the Police Act were exercising the powers of the Governor to dismiss at pleasure and their
powers were subject to the same limitations to which the Governor was subject. Whether it was delegation by the Governor
himself or whether it was delegation by law under Art 154(2)1.b)
or by the existing law, which must be treated as analogous to a
law under Art. l54(2)(b), the officer exercising the power of dismissal was only indirectly exercising the Gove-rnor's power to
dismiss at pleasure. His order also was subject to the two fetters under Art. 311 and could not be subjected to any more fetters
by procedural rules other than those framed for carrying out the
objects of Art. 3rr(2).
R. Ve11kata Rao v. Secretary of State for India in Council,
[1936] 64 I.A. 55, referred to.
Paragraph 406 was not meant for the purpose of carrying
out the object of Art. 311(2) and could not be mandatory and
could not add a further fetter on the exercise of the power to
dismiss at the pleasure of the Governor over and above the fetc960
ters contained in Art. 311. This rule was only meant to gather
materials for the satisfaction of the authority concerned, whether to take action or not. As such para 486 \vas merely directory and a failure to comply therewith strictly or otherwise did
not vitiate the disciplinary action.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal
No. 119 of 1959.
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and
order <lated January 9, 1958, of the Allahabad High
Court (Lucknow Bench), Lucknow, in Civil Misc.
Application No. 115 of 1955.
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
683
1 60
9
C. B. Agarwala and 0. P. Lal, for the appellants.
G. s. Pathak, Achru Ram, s. N. Andley, Rameshwar The State of Ulla•
Nath, J.B. Dadachanji and P. L. Vohra for the res- Pradesh & Others
pondent.
. Babuv.Ram
1960. November, 25. The Judgment of Sarkar,
Upacihya
Subba Rao and Mudholkar, JJ., was delivered by
Subba Rao, J., and that of Gajendragadkar and Wanchoo, JJ., was delivered by Wanchoo, J.
·
SuBBA RAo, J.-This is an appeal by special leave
against the judgment of the High Court of Judicature
at Allahabad, Lucknow Bench, allowing the petition
filed by the respondent under Art. 226 of the Constitution.
The respondent was appointed a Sub-Inspector of
Police in December, 1948, and was posted at Sitapur
in June, 1953. On September 6, 1953, the respondent
went to village l\fadhwapur in connection with an
investigation of a case of theft. On the evening of
the said date when he was returning, accompanied by
one Lalji, an ex-patwari of Mohiuddinpur, he saw one
Tika Ram coming from the side of a canal and going
hurriedly towards a field. As the movements of Tika
Ram appeared to be suspicious and as he was carrying
something in the folds of his dhoti, the respondent
searched him and found a bundle containing currency
notes. The respondent counted the currency notes
and handed them over to Lalji for being returned to
Tika Ram, who subsequently got them and went his
way. Subsequently when Tika Ram counted the
currency notes at his house, he found that they were
short by Rs. 250. Tika Ram's case is that the bundle
when taken by the respondent contained notes of the
value of Rs. 650, but when he counted them in his
house they were only of the value of Rs. 400. On
September 9, 1953 Tika Ram filed a complaint to the
Superintendent of Police, Sitapur, to the effect that the
respondent and one Lalji had misappropriated a sum
of Rs. 250. There is dispute in regard to the interpretation of the complaint. On receipt of the said complaint, the Superintendent of Police made enquiries
S11bba Rao
J.
684
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1961)
and issned a notice to the respondent to show cause
.
-- u why his integrity certificate should not be withheld,
The Stale of liar
h' h th e respond ent su b m1tte
· d h'is exp1anat10n
'
Pradesh e;. Othm upon w IC
v.
on October 3, 1953. Thereafter the Superintendent of
Babu 11am
Police forwarded the file of the case to the Deputy
Upadhya
Inspector General of Police, Central Range, U. P.,
who directed the Superintendent of Police to take
Subba Rdo f. proceedings under s. 7 of the Police Act against the
respondent. The departmental proceedings were started against the respondent; on November 2, 1953, a
charge-sheet was served upon the respondent under
s. 7 of the Police Act stating that there were strong
reasons to suspect that the respondent misappropriated a sum of Rs. 250 from the purse of Tika Ram; the
respondent filed his explanation to the charge made
against him; and ultimately the Superintendent of
Police held an enquiry and found on the evidence that
the respondent was guilty of the offence with which
he was charged. On January 2, 1954, the Superintendent of Police issued another notice to the respondent to show cause why he should not be reduced to
the lowest grade of Sub-Inspector for a period of three
years. In due course the respondent showed cause
against the action proposed to be taken against him
. on a consideration of which the Superintendent of
Police, Sitapur, by his order dated January 16, 1954
reduced the respondent to the lowest grade of SubInspector for a period of three years. When this
order came to the notice of the D. I. G., U. P., on a
consideration of the entire record, he came to the conclusion that the respondent should be dismissed from
service and on October 19, 1954 he made an order to
that effect. On February 28, 1955 the Inspector
General of Police confirmed that order; and the revision filed by the respondent against that order to the
State Government was also dismissed in August 1955.
Thereafter the respondent filed a petition under Art.
226 of the Constitution before the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, Lucknow Bench, for quashing
the said orders and the same was heard by a division
bench consisting of Randhir Singh and Bhargava, JJ.
The learned judges held that the provisions of para.
I96o
2 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
<'
685
486 of the Police Regulations had not been' observed
r96o
and, therefore, the proceedings taken under s. 7 of the Th 51 -,- Utt
Police Act were invalid and illegal. On that finding, Pr:des~ e;.1Othe~:
they quashed the impugned orders; with the result
v.
that the order dismissing the respondent from service
Babu Ram
was set aside. The State Government, the Deputy
Upadhya
Inspector General of Police, Lucknow, and the Ins- Subba Rao J.
pector General of Police, Uttar Pradesh, Lucknow,
have preferred the. present appeal against the said
order of the High Court.
We shall now proceed to consider the various contentions raised by learned counsel in the order they
were raised and argued before us.
At the outset Mr. C. B. Agarwala, learned counsel
for the appellants, contended that there was no breach
of the provisions of para. 486 of the Police Regulations. If this contention be accepted, no other question arises in this case; therefore, we shall deal with
the same.
The material part of para. 486 of the Police Regulations reads thus:
"When the offence alleged against a police officer
amounts to · an offence only under section 7 of the
Police Act, there can be no magisterial inquiry under
the Criminal Procedure Code. In such cases, and in
other cases until and unless a magisterial inquiry is
ordered, inquiry will be made.under the direction of
the Superintendent of Police in accordance with the
following rules:
I. Every information received by the police relating to the commission of a cognizable offence by a
police officer shall be dealt with in the first place
under Chapter XIV, Criminal Procedure Code, according to law, a case under the appropriate section being
registered in the police station concerned ............... "
This provision expressly lays down that every information received b~ the police relating to the commission of a cognizable offence by a police officer shall be
. dealt with in the first place under Ch. XIV of the Criminal Procedure Code. This provision will not apply
if the information received by the police does not
87
686
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1961]
relate to the commission of a cognizable offence.
Learned counsel contends that the information receivThe State of Utlar d ·
h
t
d
t re1a t e to any 011en~e
cc
Pradesh &- Othm e mt e presen case oes no
v.
committed by the respondent, much less to a cogmBabu Ram
zable offence. This is a point raised before us for the
Upadhya
first time. This does not find a place even in the
statement of case filed by the appellants. In the High
Subba Rao f. Court it was not contended that the information did
not disclose any offence committed by the respondent.
Indeed, it was common case that the information disclosed an offence committed by the respondent, but it
had been contended by the appellants that the misappropriation of the part of the money amounted to
an offence under s. 403 of the Indian Penal Code,
which is not a cognizable offence; and_ it was argued
on behalf of the respondent that it amounted to an
offence under s. 409 of the Indian Penal Code. The
learned judges accepted the contention of the respondent. Even so, it is said that whatever might have
been the contentions of the parties, the information
given by Tika Ram to the Superintendent of Police
clearly disclosed that no offence was alleged to have
been committed by the respondent and that this Court
would, therefore, be justified, even at this very late
stage, to accept the contention of the appellants. But
the contents of the said information do not in any
way support the assertion. Paragraph 3 of the application given by Tika Ram to the Superintendent of
Police, Sitapur, reads thus:
"That on Sunday last dated 6th September, 1953
the applicant· had with him the currency notes of
Rs. 650. The opposite party as well as Shri Babu
Ram met the applicant on the west of Rampur
near the Canal. The opposite-party said to the SubInspector "This man appears to be clad in rags but is
possessed of considerable money." After saying this
the person of tho applicant was searched. The SubInspector, having opened the bundle of notes, handed
over the (notes) one by one to the opposite party."
This statement clearly indicates that either the SubInspector or both the Sub-Inspector and Lalji searched
the person of Tika Ram, that the Sub-Inspector took
1960
-
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
687
the bundle of notes and handed the same over, one by
z9 6 o
one, to Lalji for being returned to ;he applicant, and The State of Uttar
that out of Rs. 650 a sum of Rs. 2o0 was not returned Pradesh & Others
to him. The facts alleged make out an offence against
v.
both the Sub-Inspector as well as Lalji. The mere
Bab11 Ram
fact that th~ respondent is not shown as one of the
upadhya
opposite parties in the application does not affect the
• given m
· t h e app1icat10n
•
Subba Rao J.
question, for the information
imputed the commission of an offence to both the respondent and Lalji. The notice issued by the Superintendent of Police on November 2, 1953 to the res~
pondent also charges him wit.h an offence of misappropriation. It is stated that the said notice only
says that the Superintendent of Police had good· reasons to suspect that the respondent misappropriated
the sum of money and that it does not aver that he
committed the offence of misappropriation. But what
matters is that the Superintendent of Police also
understood from the ·information given and the enquiry conducted by him that the respondent had committed the offence. Reliance is placed upon paragraph 3 of the writ petition wherein the respondent
herein stated that Tika Ram filed a complaint against
Lalji and not against the respondent. As a fact that
is correct in the sense that the respondent was not
shown in that application as the opposite-party though
in the body of that application definit"e allegations were
made against the respondent. In the counter-affidavit filed by the Superintendent of Police on behalf of
the State it was clearly averred that on September 9,
1953 Tika Ram appeared before him and filed a petition to the effect that one Lalji and the respondent
had misappropriated a sum of Rs. 250. Whatever
ambiguity there might have been in the information
-we do not find any-this allegation dispels it and it
is not open to the appellants at this stage to contend
t.hat the petition did not disclose any offence against
the respondent. In the circumstances, we must hold
that. the information received by the police related to
the commission of an offence by the respondent.
, Even so, it is contended that the said offence is not
a cognizable offence. It is said that there was no
688
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1961]
entrustment made by Tika Ram to the respondent and
r96o
The Stale of.Ulla• that, th~refore, the offence _did _not fall 1;1nder s. 409 of
Pradesh &- Olhm the Indian Penal Code, w h10h 18 a cogmzable offence,
v.
but only under s. 403 of the Indian Penal Code, which
Babu Rain
is not a cognizable offence. Section 405 of the Indian
upadhy•
Penal Code defines "criminal breach of trust" and s.
Subba Rao
f.
409 thereof prescribes the punishment for the criminal
breach of trust by a public servant. Under s. 405 of
the Indian. Penal Code, "Whoever, being in any
manner entrusted with property, or with any dominion
over property, dishonestly misappropriates or converts
to his own use that property, or dishonestly uses or
disposes of that property in violation of any direction
of law prescribing the mode in which such trust is to
be discharged, or of any legal contract, express or
implied, which he has made touching the discharge of
such trust, or wilfully suffers any person so to do,
commits "criminal breach of trust". To constitute an
offence under this section, there must be an entrustment of property and dishonest misappropriation of
it. The person entrusted may misappropriate it himself, or he may wilfully suffer another person to do so.
In the instant case the respondent, being a police
officer, was legally entitled to search a person found
under suspicious circumstances; and Tika Ram in
handing over the bundle of notes to_ the police officer
must have done so in the confidence that he would get
back the notes from him when the suspicion was
cleared. In these circumstances, there cannot be any
difficulty in holding that the currency notes were
alleged to·have been handed over by Tika Ram to the
respondent for a specific purpose, but were dishonestly
misappropriated by the respondent or at any rate he
wilfully suffered Lalji to misappropriate the same.
We, therefore, hold that if the currency notes were
taken by the respondent in discharge of his duty for
inspection and return, he was certainly entrusted with
the notes within the meaning of s. 405 of the Indian
Penal Code. If so, the information discloses a cognizable offence. We reject the first contention.
The second objection of learned counsel for the
appellants is that sub-para. (3) of para. 486 of the
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
689
Police Regulations enables the appropriate police
r96o
auth!>rity to i~itia~ the depa~t~ental proceeding The State of Uttar
without complymg with the prov1s1onsofsub-para. (!)Pradesh &- Others
of para. 486. The relevant portion of para. 486 of the
v.
Police Regulations reads:
·
Babu Ram
"When the offence alleged against a police officer
upadhya
amounts to an offence only under section 7 of the
Police Act, there can be no magisterial inquiry under Subba Rao f.
the Criminal Procedure Code. . In such cases, and in
other cases until and unless a magisterial inquiry is
ordered, inquiry will be made under the direction of
the Superintendent of Police in accordance with the
following rules: ......... "
Rule I relates to a cognizable offence, r. II to a noncognizable offence, including an offence under s. 29 of
the Police Act, and r. III to an offence under s. 7 of
the Police Act or a non-cognizable offence, including
an offence under s. 29 of the Police Act. Rule III
says:
"When a Superintendent of Police sees reason to
take action on information given to him, or on his
own knowledge or suspicion, that a police officer subordinate to him has committed an offence under section 7 of the Police Act or a non-cognizable offence
(including an offence under section 29 of the Police
Act) of which he considers it unnecessary at that
stage to forward a report in writing to the District
Magistrate under rule II above, he will make or cause
to be made by an officer senior in rank to the officer
charged, a departmental inquiry sufficient to test the
truth of the charge. On the conclusion of this inquiry
he will decide whether further action is necessary, and
if so, whether the officer charged .should be departmentally tried, or whether the District Magistrate
should be moved to take cognizance of the case under
the Criminal Procedure Code ... "
The argument is that the words "an offence under s. 7
of the Police Act" take in a cognizable offence and
that, therefore, this rule provides for a procedure
alternative to that.prescribed under r. I. We do not
think that this contention is sound. Section 7 of the
Police Act empowers certain officers to dismiss, suspend
690
1 60
9
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1961]
or reduce any police officer of the subordinate rank
The State of Uttar whom they.shall think remiss or negligent in the_ disPiadesh .s. Others charge of his duty, or unfit for the same. The grounds
v.
for punishment are comprehensive: they may take in
Babu Ram
offences under the Indian Penal Code or other penal
upadhya
statutes. The commission of such offences may also
Subbn Rao j.
be a ground to hold that an officer is unfit to hold his
offi ce. Action under this section can, therefore, be
taken in respect of, (i) offences only under s. 7 of the
Police Act without involving any cognizable or noncognizable offences, that is, simple remissness or negligence in the discharge of duty, (ii) cognizable offences,
and (iii) non-cognizable offences. Paragraph 486 of the
Police Regulations makes this clear. It says that when
the offence alleged against a police officer amounts to
an offence only under s. 7 of the Police Act, there can
be no magisterial inquiry under th<;l Criminal Procedure
Code. This part of the rule applies to an offence only
under s. 7 of the Police Act i. e., the first category
mentioned above. Rule I refers to a cognizable offence
i. e., the second category, rule II to a non-cognizable
offence i. e., the third category, and rule III applies to
an offence under s. 7 of the Police Act and to a noncognizable offence. Though the word "only" is not
mentioned in rule III, the offence under s. 7 of the
Police Act can, in the context, mean an offence only
under s. 7 of the said Act i.e., an offence falling under
the first category. So understood, the three rules can
be reconciled. We, therefore, hold that, as the offence
complained of in the present case is a cognizable
offence, it falls under rule I and not under rule III.
'Ve, therefore, reject this contention.
The third contention advanced by learned counsel
for tho appellants raises a constitutional point of considerable importance. The gist of the argument may
be stated thus: In England, the service under the
Crown is held at the Crown's pleasure, unless the employment is for good behaviour or for a cause. But
if there is a statute prescribing the terms of service
and the mode 0f dismissal of the servant of the
Crown, the statute would control the pleasure of the
Crown. In India, the Constitution as well as the
2 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
691
60
earlier Constitution Acts of 1915, as amended in 1919,
I9
and 1935 embodied the incidents of "tenure at plea- The Sta-;.-;1 Uttar
sure" of His Majesty, or the President or the Gover- Pradesh .s. Others
nor, as the case may be, but did not empower the
v.
Legislatures under the earlier Acts and the Parliament
Babu Ram
and the Legislatures under the Constitution to make
upadhya
a law abrogating or modifying the said tenure; there- Subba Rao J.
fore, any law made by appropriate authorities conferring a power on any subordinate officer to dismiss a
servant must be construed not to limit the power of
His Majesty, the President or the Governor, as the
case may be, but only to indicate that they would express their pleasure only through the said officers.
The rules made in exercise of a power conferred on a
Government under a statute so delegating the power
to a subordinate officer can only be administrative
directions to enable the exercise of the pleasure by
the concerned authorities in a reasonable manner and
that any breach of those regulations cannot possibly
confer any right on, or give a cause of action to, the
aggrieved Government servant to go to a court of law
and vindicate his rights.
Mr. Pathak, learned counsel for the respondent, in
countering this argument contends that the constitution Acts in India embodied the incidents of the
tenure of the Crown's pleasure in the relevant provisions and what the Parliament can do in England,
the appropriate Legislatures in India also can do,
that is, "the tenure at pleasure" created by the Constitution Acts can be abrogated, limited or modified
by law enacted by the appropriate legislative bodies.
Alternatively he contends that even if the Police Act
does not curtail the tenure at pleasure, the Legislature
validly made that law and the Government validly
made statutory rules in exercise of the powers confered under that Act and that, therefore, the appropriate
authorities can only dismiss the respondent in strict
compliance with the provisions of the Act and the
Rules made thereunder.
To appreciate the problem presented and to afford
a satisfactory answer it would be convenient to consider the relevant provisions. The Act we are concerned with in this case is the Police Act, 1861 (Act V
692
'9 60
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1961]
of 1861). Its constitutional validity at the time it was
The State of Uttar ma.de wa~ no~ 9uestioned. ynder s. ~ of the Police
r.adesh & Others Act, as it origmally stood, the a.ppomtment of a.11
v.
police officers other than those mentioned in s. 4 of
Babu Ram
this Act shall, under such rules as the local Governupadhy•
ment shall from time to time sanction, rest with the
Subba Rao
1
. Inspector-General, Deputy Inspectors-Genera.I, Assis-
tant Inspectors-General and District Superintendents
of Police, who may, under such rules as aforesaid, at
any time, dismiss, suspend or reduce any police-officer." That section was substituted by the present
section in 1937 and later on some appropriate amendments were made to bring it in conformity with the
Constitution. Under the amended section, "Subject
to such rules as the State Government may from time
to time make under this Act, the Inspector-Genera.I,
Deputy Inspectors-Genera.I, Assistant Inspectors-General and District Superintendent of Police may a.t any
time dismiss, suspend or reduce any police officer of
the subordinate ranks whom they shall think remiss
or negligent in the discharge of his duty, or unfit for
the same". In exercise of the powers conferred on
the Government by s. 46 of the Act, the Government
made the U. P. Police Regulations prescribing the
procedure for investigation and inquiry. We shall
deal with the Regulations at a later stage.
In the Government of India. Act, 1915, as amended
by the Act of 1919, for the first time, the doctrine of
"tenure at pleasure" was introduced by s. 96-B. In
exercise of the power conferred under sub-s. (2) certain classification rules were framed by the local
Government. This Act was repealed by the Government of India Act, 1935, and the section corresponding to s. 96-B was s. 240(1) in the latter Act. Section
241(2) empowered, except as expressly provided by
the Act, the Governor-General and the Governor to
prescribe the conditions of service of the servants
they were empowered to appoint.
The main difference between the Act of 1919 and
that of 1935 was that in the former Act there was
only one limitation on the Crown's pleasure, namely,
that no person in the service might be dismissed by
,.
2 S.C.R.
~
693
an authority subordinate to that by which he was
r960
appointed, whereas in the latter Act a second limitation was imposed, namely, that no such person should PTkcdStahte ,,,01 ut1ar
0
· d in
· rank unt"l
. · d or re d uce
b e d ism1sse
i h e h a d b een ta es v."'" lhers
given a reasonable opportunity of showing cause Babu Ram
against the action proposed to be taken in regard to
upadhya
him: see s. 240, sub-ss. (2) and (3). Another difference between the said two Acts was that while under Subba Rao J.
the former Act all the services were placed in the
same position, under the latter Act special provision
was made for the police force prescribing that the
conditions of service of the subordinfl,te ranks of the
various police forces should be such as might be determined by or under the Acts relating to those forces
respectively-vide s. 243. By the Constitution, the
Act of 1935 was repealed, and, with certain changes
in phraseology, els. (1) and (2) of Art. 310 took the
place of sub-ss. (1) and (4) of s. 240 respectively, and
Art. 309 took the place of s. 241(2). Under Art. 313,
"Until other provision is made in this behalf under
thif'I Constitution, all the laws in force immediately
before the commencement of this Constitution and
applicable to any public service or any post which
continues to exist after the commencement of this Constitution, as an all-India service or as service or post
nnder the Union or a State shall continue in force so
far as consistent with the provisions of this Constitution". The result· is that the Police Act and the
Police Regulations, made in exercise of the powers
conferred on the Government under that Act, which
were preserved under s. 243 of the Government of
India Act, 1935, continue to be in force after the Constitution so far as they are consistent with the provisions of the Constitution.
It is common case, as the contentions of learned
counsel disclose, that the Act and the Regulations
framed thereunder were constitutionally valid at the
inception and that they are also consistent with the
provisions of the Constitution. The difference between the two contentions lies in the fact that according to one His Majesty's pleasure cannot be modified
88
'
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
I
694
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1961]
'9 60
by a statute, according to the other it is subject to
The relevant provisions of the
Pradesh & Others Const1tut10n read thus:
v.
Article 309: "Subject to the provisions of this
Bab.u Ram
Constitution, Acts of the appropriate Legislature may
upadhya
regulate the recruitment, and conditions of service of
persons appointed, b public services and posts in
Subba Rao J. connection with the affairs of the Union or of any
State:
Provided that it shall be competent for the President or such person as he may direct in the case of
services and posts in connection with the affairs of
the Union, and for the Governor of a State or such
person as he may direct in the case of services and
posts in connection with the affairs of the State, to
make rules regulating the recruitment, and the conditions of service of persons appointed, to such services
and posts until provision in that behalf is made by or
under an Act of the appropriate Legislature under
this article, and any rules so made shall have effect
subject to the provisions of any such Act."
Article 310: "Except as expressly provided by
this Constitution, every person who is a member of a
defence service or of a civil service or holds any post
connected with defence or any civil post under the
Union holds office during the pleasure of the President, and every person who is a member of a civil
service of a State or holds any civil post under a State
holds office during the pleasure of the Governor of the
State."
Under Art. 309 the appropriate Legislature may regulate the recruitment and conditions of service of persons appointed to public services. Under Art. 310
every person who is a member of a public service described therein holds office during the pleasure of the
President or the Governor, as the case may be. The
words "conditions of service" in Art. 309 in their
comprehensive sense take in the tenure of a civil servant: see N. W. F. Province v. Suraj · Nara·in (').
Therefore, "the tenure at pleasure" is also one of the
conditions of service. But Art. 309 opens out with a
Ihe state of Uttar statut.ory .provisions.
(1) A.I.R. (1949) P.C. " "
•
2 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
695
restrictive clause, namely, "Subject to the provisions
r96o
of this Constitution", and if there is no restrictive Th 51 -,- Utt
clause in Art. 310, there cannot be any difficulty in Pr:des~ 1
holding that Art. 309 is subject to the provisions of
v.
Art 310; with the result that the power of the Legis- Babu Ram
lature to lay down the conditions of service of perupadhya
sons appointed to public services would be subject to
"the tenure at pleasure" under Art. 310. In that event, Subba Ran f.
any law made by the Legislature could not affect the
over-riding power of the President or the Governor,
as the case may be, in putting an end to the tenure at
their pleasure. Would the opening words of the
clause in Art. 310, namely, "Except as expressly provided by this Constitution'', make any difference in
the matter of interpretation? It should be noticed
that the phraseology of the _f'laid clause in Art. 310 is
different from that in Art. 309. If therl') is a specific
provision in some part of the Constitution giving to a
Government servant a tenure different from that provided for in Art. 310, that Government servant is ex.
eluded from the operation of Art. 310. The said words
refer, inter alia, to Arts. 124, 148, 218 and 324 which
provide that the Judges of the Supreme Court, the
Auditor General, the Judges of the High Courts and
the Chief Election Commissioner shall not be removed
from their offices except in the manner laid down in
those Articles. If the provisions of the Constitution
specifically prescribing different tenures were excluded
from Art. 310, the purpose of that clause would be exhausted and thereafter the Article would be free from
any other restrictive operation. In that event, Arts.
309 and 310 should be read together, excluding the
opening words in the latter Article, namely, "Except
as expressly provided by this Constitution". ·Learned
counsel seeks to confine the operation of the opening words in Art. 309 to the provisions of the Constitution which empower other authorities to make rules
relating to the conditions of service of certain classes
of public servants, namely, Arts.-146(2), 148(5) and
229(2). That may be so, but there is no reason why
Art. 310 should be excluded therefrom. It follows
that while Art. 310 provides for a tenure at pleasure
e;. Othe::
696
SUPREME bOURT REPORTS
[1961]
of the President or the Governor, Art. 309 enables the
· Legislature or the executive, as the case may be, to
Th• Stat• of Uttar
k
1
1 ·
rd ' t
l' t o con.d'iP?adesh & Othersll_la e any a~ or ~u e m. rei:ia .' in er a ia,
"·
t10ns of service without impmgmg upon the overndBabu Ram
ing power recognized under Art. 310.
l:Ipadhya
Learned counsel for the respondent contends tha.t
this construction is inconsistent with that prevailing
Subba Rao J. in the English law a.nd that the intention of the framers of the Constitution could not have been to make
a radical departure from the law of England. The
law of England on. the doctrine of "tenure at pleasure" has now become fairly crystallized. In England,
all servants of the Crown hold office during the plea.sure of the Crown; the right to dismiss at pleasure is
an implied term in every contract of employment of
the Crown, this doctrine is not based upon any prerogative of the Crown, but on public policy; if the terms
of appointment definitely prescribe a tenure for good
behaviour or expressly provide for a power, to determine for a ·cause, such an implication of a power to
dismiss a.t pleasure is excluded, and an Act of Parliament can abrogate or amend the said doctrine of public policy in the same way as it can do in respect of
any other part of common law. The said propositions
are illustrated in the following decisions: Shenton v.
Smith (1 ), Gould v. Stuart (2 ), Reilly v. The King ('i,
Terrell v. Secretary of State('). This English doctrine
was not incorporated in its entirety in the Indian
enactments-vide State of Bihar v. Abdul Majid (5 ),
Parshotam Lal Dhingra v. Union of India('). Section 96-B of the Government of India Act, 1915, for
the first time in 1919, by amendment, statutorily
recognized this doctrine, but it was made subject to a
condition or a qualification, namely, that no person in
that service might be dismissed by any authority
subordinate to that by which he was appointed. Section 240 of the Act of 1935 imposed another limitation, namely, that a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the action proposed to be taken in
1960
-
(1) [1895] A.C. 229.
(3) [1934) A.C. 176.
(S) [1954] S.C.R. 786.
(2) [1896] A.C. 575.
(4) (1953) 2 All E R. 490.
(6) [1958] S.C.R. 828.
1-
2 s.c.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
697
1 60
regard to a person must be given to him. But neither
9
of the two Acts empowere? t~e appropria.te Legisl?>- The State of Uttar
ture to make a law abohshmg or amendmg the said Pradesh & Others
doctrine. The Constitution of India practically incorv.
porated the provisions of ss. 240 and 241 of the Act Babu Ram
of 1935 in Arts. 309 and 310. Bat the Comititution
Upadkya
has not made ''the tenure at pleasure" subject to any Subba Rao j.
law made by the appropriate Legislature. On the
other hand, as we have pointed out, Art. 309 is expressly made subject to "the tenure at pleasure" in
Art. 310.
Nor the attempt of learned counsel for the respondent to discover such a power in the Legislature in
the Entries of the appropriate Lists of the Seventh
Schedule to the Constitution can be legally sustained.
He referred, inter alia., to Entry 70 of List I and
Entry 41 of List II. It iis not disputed that Parliament can make law for the organization of the police
and for the prevention and detection of crime. But
under Art. 245 of the Constitution such a power
is subject to the provisions of the Constitution and,
therefore, is subject to the provisions of Art. 310.
Nor can we imply such a power in Parliament or
the Legislatures from Art.154(2)(b} of the Constitution.
Under Art. 154, "the executive power of the State
shall be vested in the Governor and shall be e:rercised
by him either directly or through officers subordinate
to him in accordance with this Constitution'', and
under cl. 2(b) thereof, "nothing in this Article shall
prevent Parliament or the Legislature of the State
from conferring by law functions on any authority
subordinate to the Governor." The argument is that
a power to terminate the service at pleasure under
Art. 310 is a part of the executive power of the State,
that power under Art. 154 can be exercised by the
Governor directly or through officers subordinate to
him, and that under Art. 154(2)(b) the Parliament or
the Legislature of the.State can confer the same power
on any authority subordinate to the Governor or, at
any ra;;e, can make a law prescribing that the Governor shall exercise the said pleasure through a particular officer.
698
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1961)
We cannot agree either with the premises or the
conclusion sought to be based on it. The first quesThe Stale o1 llar •
•
h h
f
P d h ,,. Othm t10n is w et er the power o
the Governor under
ra " v.
Art. 310 to terminate the services of a Government
Babu Ram
servant at pleasure is part of the executive power of
Upadhya
the State under Art. 154 of the Constitution. Article
154 speaks of the executive power of the State vesting
Subba Rao J. in the Governor; it does not deal with the constitutional powers of the Governor which do not form part
of the executive power of the State. Article 162 says
that, subject to the provisions of the Constitution, the
executive power of the State shall extend to matters
with respect to which the Legislature of the State has
power to make laws. If the Legislature of the State
has no power to make a law affecting the tenure at
pleasure of the Governor, the said power must necessarily fall outside the scope of the executive power of
the State. As we will presently show, the Legislature
has no such power and, therefore, it cannot be a part
of the executive power of the State. That apart, if
the said power is part of the executive power in its
general sense, Art. 162 imposes another limitation on
that power, namely, that the said executive power is
subject to the provisions of the Constitution and
therefore, subject to Art. 310 of the Constitution. In
either view, Art. 310 falls outside the scope of Art. 154
of the Constitution. That power may be analogous
to that conferred on the Governor under Arts. 174,
175 and 176. Doubtless the Governor may have to
exercise the said power, whenever an occasion arises,
in the manner prescribed by the Constitution, but that
in itself does not make it a part of the executive
power of the State or enable him to delegate his
power.
Even on the assumption that the power under
Art. 310 is executive power within the meaning of
Art. 154, it does not make any difference in the legal
position so far as the present case is concerned. Article 310 of the Constitution says that unless expresssly
provided by the Constitution to the contrary, every
civil servant holds office during the pleasure of the
Governor subject to the limitations prescribed under
1960
-
u
2 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
699
Art. 311. Can it be said that Airt. 154(2)(b) expressly
z96o
provides for a different tenure?: Can ~t be said that rhe st;~-,, uuar
the said Article confers on t~e Parliament or the Pradesh & 1Others
Legislature a power higher tqan that conferred on
v.
them under Art. 245 of · the Constitution ? It only Babu Ram
preserves the power of the Legi$1ature, which it has
upadhya
under the Constitution, to make ~law conferring func- Subba Rao J.
tions on an authority subordinlata to the Governor.
That power under Art. 245 is hot unlimited, but is
subject to the provisions of the Cpnstitution and therefore subject to Art. 310 thereof. •
It is then said that if the appellants' contention
were not accepted, it would lead ~o conflict of jurisdiction: while the Governor has tP.e power under Art.
310 to dismiss a public servan~ at his pleasure, a
statute may confer a power on a ~ubordinate officer to
dismiss a servant only subject to conditions; a subordinate officer functioning unde~ an Act may not be
able to dismiss a servant, but t~e Governor may be
able to do so under similar circumstances; a subordinate officer may dismiss a servan!t, but the Governor
may order his continuance in offic~.
This argument is based upon the· misapprehension
of the scope of Art. 309 of the Ofnstitution. A law
made by the appropriate Legisratu".'e or the rules
made by the President or the Governor, as the case
may be, under the said Article may confer a power
upon a particular authority to rem6ve a public servant
from service; but the conferment df such a power does
not amount to a delegation of the Governor's pleasure.
Whatever the said authority does . is by virtue of express power conferred on it by a s~atute or rules made
by competent authorities and nI by virtue of any
delegation by the Governor of his ower. There cannot be conflict between the exerci e of the Governor's
pleasure under Art. 310 and tha\t of an authority
under a statute, for the statutor,r power would be
always subject to the overriding pleasure of the
Governor.
I
This conclusion, the argumen~ proceeds, would
throw a public servant in India. to t~e mercy of the executive Government while their c01ppeers in England
1
1
700
1 60
9
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1961]
can be protected by legislation against arbitrary
Th• 5 ,.-;,-;, u 11 ., acti_ons of the. Sta_te. This apprehension has no re~l
1
Pradesh ;;;. ot1urs basis, for, unlike m England, a member of the publw
v.
service in India is constitutionally protected at least
Babu Ram
in two directions: (i) he cannot be dismissed by an
Upadhya
authority subordinate to that by which he was
Subba Rao ].
appointed; (ii) he cannot be dismissed, removed or
reduced in rank until he has been given a reasonable
opportunity of showing cause against the action proposed to be taken in regard to him. A condition
similar to the first condition in Art. 311 found in
s. 96-B of the Government of India Act, 1919, was held
by the Judicial Committee in R. T. Rangachari v.
Secretary of State for India (1) to have a statutory
force, and the second condition, wnich is only a reproduction of that found in sub-section (2) of s. 240 of
the Government of India Act, 1935, was held in High
Commissioner for India and High Commissioner for
Pakistan v. I. M. Lall (2 ) as mandatory qualifying the
right of the employer recognized in sub-section (I)
thereof. These two statutory protections to the
Government servant a.re now incorporated in Art. 311
of the Constitution. This Article imposes two qualifications on the exercise of the pleasure of the President
or the Governor and they quite clearly restrict the
operation of the rule embodied in Art. 310(1)-vide
the observations of Das, C.J., in Dhingra's case('). The
most important of these two limitations is the provi. sion prescribing that a civil servant shall be given a
reasonable opportu11ity of showing cause against the
action proposed to be ta.ken in regard to him. As this
condition is a limitation on the "tenure a.t pleasure",
a law can certainly be made by Parliament defining
the content of "reasonable opportunity" and prescribing the procedure for giving the said opportunity.
The appropria~e High Court and the Supreme Court
can test the validity of such a law on the basis whether the provisions prescribed provide for such an
opportunity, and, if it is valid, to ascertain whether
the reasonable opportunity so prescribed is really
given to a particular officer. It may be that the
(1) (1936) L.R. 64 I.A. 40.
(2) (1948) L.R. 7S I.A. 225.
(3) [1958] S.C.R. 82B, 839.
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
. 701
60
framers of the Constitution, having incorporated in
I9
our Co_nsti~uti?n the "tenure at pleasure" unha~p~re~ The state of Utta•
by legislative mterference, thought that the said hmi- Pradesh &- Others
tations and qualifications would reasonably protect
v.
the interests of the civil servants against arbitrary Babu Ram
actions.
Upadhya
The discussion yields the following results: (1) In Subba Rao J.
India every person who is a memper of a public service described in Art. 310 of the Constitution holds
office during the pleasure of the President or the
Governor, as the case may be, subject to the express
provisions therein. (2) The power to dismiss a public servant at pleasure is outside the scope of Art. 154
and, therefore, cannot be delegated by· the Governor
to a subordinate officer, and can be exercised· by him
only in the manner prescribed by the Constitution. (3)
This tenure is subject to the limitations or qualifications mentioned in Art. 311 of the Constitution. (4)
The Parliament or the Legislatures of States .cannot
make a law abrogating or modifying this tenure so as
to impinge upon the overriding power conferred upon
the President or the Governor under Art. 310, •as
qualified by Art. 311. (5) The Parliament or the
Legislatures of States can make a. law regulating the
conditions of service of such a member which includes
proceedings by way of disciplinary action, without
affecting the powers of the President or the Governor
under Art. 310 of the Constitution read with Art. 311
thereof. (6) The Parliament and the Legislatures also
can make a law laying down and regulating the scope
and content of the doctrine of "reasonable opportunity" embodied in Art. 311 of the Constitution; but
the said'law would be subject to judicial review. (7)
If a statute could be made by Legislatures within the
foregoing permissible limits, the rules made by an.
authority in exercise of the power conferred thereunder would likewise be efficacious within the said
limits.
What then is the effect of the said propositions in
their application to the provisions of the Police Act
and the rules made thereunder? The Police Act. of
89
702
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1961]
186i continues to be good law under the Constitution.
Paragraph 477 of the Police Regulations shows that
1
~:;a:~~ •;.t0~~:;; the rules in Chapter XXJ_CII thereof have been framv.
ed under s. 7 of the Pohce Act. Presumably, they
Babu Ram
were also made by the Government in exercise of its
upadhya
power under s. 46(2) of the Police Act. Under para.
479(a) the Governor's power of punishment with refeSubba Rao .J. rence to all officers is preserved; that is to say, this
provision expressly saves the power of the Governor
under Art. 310 of the Constitution. "Rules made
under a statute must be treated for all purposes of
construction or obligation exactly as if they were in
the Act and are to be of the same effect as if contained in the Act, and are to be judicially noticed for all
purposes of construction or obligation": see Maxwell
"On the Interpretation of Statutes", 10th edn., pp. 5051. The statutory rules cannot be described as, or
equated with, administrative directions. If so, the
Police Act and the rules made thereunder constitute
a self-contained code providing for the appointment
of police officers and prescribing the procedure for
their removal. It follows that where the appropriate
authority takes disciplinary action under the Police
Act or the rules made thereunder, it must conform
to the provisions of the statute or the rules which
have conferred upon it the power to take the said
action. If there is any violation of the said provisions, subject to the question which we will presently
consider whether the rules are directory or mandatory,
the public servant would have a right to challenge the
decision of that authority.
Learned counsel for the appellants relied upon the
following decisions of the Privy Council and this Court
in support of his contention that the said rules are
11odministrative directions: R. T. Rangaehari v. Se.cretary of State/or India('), R. Venkata Rao v. Secretary
of State for India ('), High Commissioner for India and
High Commissioner for Pakistan v. I. M. Lall('), S. A.
Venkataraman v. The Union of India('), and Khem
Chand v. The Union of India('). In Venkata Rao's
196o
(t) (1936) L.R. 64 I.A. 40.
(3) (r948) L.R. 75 I.A. 225.
(2) (1936) L.R. 64 I.A. 55.
(4) [1954] S.C.R. 1150,
1.5) [1958] S.C.R. 1o80.
2 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
703
case (1) a reader of the Government Press was dismissz96o
ed and in the suit filed by him against the Secretary Th 5 u
of State for India he complained, inter alia, that the p,:de~~·;101 !~::
dismissal was contrary to the statute inasmuch as it
v.
was not preceded by any such inquiry as was prescrib- Babu Ram
ed by rule XIV of the Civil Services Classification
upad/Jya
Rules made under s. 96B(2) of the Government of
India Act. Under s. 96B of the said Act, every person Subba Rao J.
in civil service holds office during the pleasure of His
Majesty. Sub-section (2) of that section empowers the
Secretary of State for India to make rules laying down,
among others, the conditions of service, and sub-s. (5)
declares that no rules so made shall be construed to
limit or abridge the power of the Secretary of State in
Council to deal with the case of any. person in the
civil service of the Crown in India in such manner as
may appear to him to be just and equitable. On a construction of these provisions the Judicial Committee
held that His Majesty's pleasure was paramount and
could not legally be controlled or limited by the rules.
Two reasons were given for the conclusion, namely,
(i) s. 96B in express terms stated that the office was
held during the pleasure and there was no room for
the implication of a contractual term that the rules
were to be observed; and (ii) sub-s. (2) of s. 96B and
the rules made careful provisions for redress of grievances by ·administrative process and that sub-s. (5)
reaffirmed the superio:i; authority of the Secretary of
State in Council over the civil service. It may be
noticed that the rules framed in exercise of the power
conferred by the Act was to regulate the exercise of
His Majesty's pleasure. The observations were presumably coloured by the doctrine of "tenure at
pleasure" obtaining in England, namely, that it could
only be modified by statute, influenced by the principle that the rules made under a statute shall be consistent with its provisions and, what is more, based
upon a construction of the express provisions of the
Act. · These observations cannot, in our opinion, be
ta.ken out of their context and applied to the provisions of our Constitution and the Acts of our Legislatures in derogation of the well settled principles of
(1) (1936) L.~. 64 I.A. 55,
l
704
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1961]
'9 60
statutory construction. In Rangachari's case(') a police
The State of uttar officer was. dismissed by an authority subordinate to
P.adesh o;. Others that by whrnh he had been appointed. The appeal
v.
was heard along with that in Venkata Rao's case (') and
Babu Ram
the judgments in both the appeals were delivered on
Upadhya
the same day. The Judicial Committee distinguished
Venkata Rao' s case(') with the following observations
Subba Rao ]I
at p. 53:
"It is manifest that the stipulation or proviso as
to dismissal is itself of statutory force and stands on a
footing quite other than any matters of rule which are
of infinite variety and can be changed from time to
time."
These observations do not carry the matter further and
our remarks made in connection with Venkata Rao's
case(') would equally apply to this case. J.M. Lal,l's
case (8 ) turns upon sub-a. (3) of s. 240 of. the Government. of India Act, 1935. Again the Judicial Committee made a distinction between the rules and the
provisions of the Act and ruled that sub-ss. (2) and (3)
of s. 240 indicated a qualification or exception to the
antecedent provisions in sub-a. (I) of a. 240. This decision only adopted the reasoning in the earlier decision.
The remarks made by us in connection with Venkata
Rao's case (') would equally apply to this decision. This
Court in S. A . . Venkataraman's case(') incidentally
noticed the observations of the Judicial Committee in
Venkata Rao's case(') and observed that the rules, which
were not incorporated in a statute, did not impose any
legal restriction upon the right of the Crown to dismiss
its servants at pleasure. This Court was not laying
down any general proposition, but was only stating
the gist of the reasoning in Venkata Rao's case('). Das,
C.J., if we may say so, correctly stated the scope of the
rule in Venkata Rao's case(') in the decision in Khem
Ohand's case (6), when he stated at p. 1091"The position of the Government servant was,
therefore, rather insecure, for his office being held
during the· pleasure of the· Crown under the Government of India Act, 1915, the rules could not override
(1) (1936) L.R. 64 I.A. 40.
(3) (1948) L.R. 75 I.A. 225.
(2) (1936) L.R. 64 I.A. 55.
(4) [1954] S.C.R. 1150.
(5) [1958] S.C.R. 1080.
2 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
705
1960
or derogate from the statute and the protection of the
rules could not be enforced by action so as to nullify The state of Uttar
the statute itself."
Pradesh & Others
To state it differently, the Government of India Act,
v.
Babt< Ram
1915, as amended in 1919, and that of 1935 express1y
upadhya
and clearly laid down that the tenure was at pleasure
and therefore the rules framed under that Act must Subba Rao J.
be consistent with the Act and not in derogation of it.
These decisions and the observations made therein
could not be understood to mark a radical departure
from the fundamental principle of construction that
rules made under a statute must be treated as exactly
as if they were in the Act and are of the same effect
as if contained in the Act. There is another principle
equally fundamental to the rules of construction,
namely, that the rules shall be consistent with the
provisions of the Act. The decisions of the Judicial
Committee on the provisions of the earlier Constitution Acts can be sustained on the· ground that the
rules made in exercise of power conferred under the
Acts cannot override or modify the tenure at pleasure
provided by s. 96B or s. 240 of the . said Acts, as the
case may be. Therefore, when the paramountcy of
the doctrine was conceded or declared by the statute,
there might have been justification for sustaining the
rules made under that statute in derogation thereof on
the ground that they were only administrative directions, for otherwise the rules would have to be struck
down as inconsistent with the Act. In such a situation, if the statute was valid-it would be valid in so
far as it did not derogate from the provisions of Art.
310, read with Art. 311-·the rules made thereunder
would be as efficacious as the Act itself. So long as
the statute and the rules made thereunder do not
affect the power of the Governor-in the present case
the Governor's pleasure is expressly preserved-they
should be legally enforceable. In this context the
decisions of the different High 'Courts in India are
cited at the Bar. It would not serve any purpose to
consider every one of them in detail. It would suffice
if their general trend be noticed. They express two
divergent views: one line relies upon the observations
706
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1961]
60
'9
of the Privy Council in Venkata Rao's case(') and lays
Th• seaee of Uttar down that all statutory rules vis-a-vis the disciplinary
Pradesh o;. Others proceedings taken against a Government servant are
v.
administrative directions, and the other applies the
Babu Ram
well settled rules of construction and holds that the
upadhya
appropriate authority is bound to comply with the
subba Rao J.
mandatory provisions of the rules in making an inquiry
under a particular statute. A close scrutiny of some
of the decisions discloses a distinction implied, though
not expressed, between statutory rules defining
the scope of reasonable opportunity and those
governing other procedural steps in the disciplinary process. In our view, subject to the overriding
power of the President or the Governor under Art.
:310, as qualified by the provisions of Art. 311, the
rules governing disciplinary proceedings cannot be
treated as administrative directions, but shall have
the same effect as the provisions of the statute whereunder they are ma.de, in so far a.s they a.re not inconsistent with the provisions thereof. We have already
negatived the contention of learned counsel that the
Governor exercises his pleasure through the officers
specified in s. 7 of the Police Act, and therefore, it is
not possible to equate the Governor's pleasure with
that of the specified officers' statutory power. If so,
it follows that the inquiry under the Act shall be
made in accordance with its provisions and the rules
ma.de thereunder.
Then learned counsel contends that even if the said
rules have statutory force, they are only directory and
the non-compliance with the rules will not invalidate
the order of dismissal made by the appropriate authority.
Before we consider the principles governing the
question whether the rules are mandatory or directory, it would be convenient at this stage to notice
broadly the scope and the purpose of the inquiry contemplated by the rules.
Section 2 of the Police Act constitutes the police
establishment; s. 7 empowers specified officers to
(i) (1936) L.R. 64 I.A. SS·
.
2 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
rJ07
60
punish specified subordinate officers who are remiss
I9
or negligent in discharge of their duties or unfit for The state of uttar
the same; s. 46 enables the Government to make rules Pradesh & Others
to regulate the procedure to be followed by the magisv.
trate and police officers in discharge of any duty Babu Rain
imposed on them by or under the Act; under s. 7, read
Upadhya
with s. 46 of the Police Act, the Police Regulations
embodied in chapter XXXII were framed. Paragraph subba Rao f.
477 of the Regulations says that the rules in that
chapter have been made under s. 7 of the Police Act
and apply only to officers appointed under s~ 2 of the
Police Act and that no officer appointed under that
section shall be punished by executive order otherwise
than in the manner provided in that chapter. Paragraph 478 prescribes the nature of the punishment
that can be imposed on the delinquent officers. Paragraph 4 79 empowers specified officers to punish specified subordinate officers. Paragraph 483 gives the
procedure to be followed in the matter of the inquiry
against a police officer. It reads:
"Subject to the special provision contained in
paragraph 500 and to any. special orders which may
be passed by the Governor in particular cases a proceeding against a police officer will consist ofA-A magisterial or police inquiry, followed, if
this inquiry shows the need for further action, by
B-A judicial trial, or
C-A departmental trial, or both, consecutively."
Paragraph 484 declares that the nature of the inquiry
in any particular case will v-ary according to the
nature of the offence. If the offence is cognizable or
non-cognizable, the inquiry will be according to
Schedule II of the Criminal Procedur~ Code. If the
information is received by the District Magistrate, he
may in exercise of his powers under the Criminal Procedure Code either, (1) make or order a magisterial
inquiry; or (2) order an investigation by the Police.
Paragraph 485 reads:
"When a magisterial inquiry is ordered it will be
made in accordance with the Criminal Procedure Code
and the Superintendent of Police will.have no direct
708
60
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1961]
concern with it until the conclusion of judicial proTh• Star. of Uttor ceedings or until and unless the case is referred to him
Pradesh & Others for further disposal, but he must give any assistance
v.
to the inquiring magistrate that he may legally be
Babu Ram
called upon to give and he must suspend the accused
Upadhya
should this become necessary under paragraph 496."
Subba Rao J. Paragraph 486 says that there can be no magisterial
' inquiry under the Criminal Procedure Code when the
offence alleged against a police officer amounts to an
offence only under s. 7 of the Police Act, and it provides further that in such cases, and in other cases until
and unless a magisterial inquiry is ordered, inquiry
will be made under the direction of the Superintendent
of Police in accordance with the rules given thereunder. Under rule I thereof, "Every information
received by the police relating to the commission of a
cognizable offence by a police officer shall be dealt with
in the first place under Chapter XIV, Criminal Procedure Code, according to law, a case under the appropriate section being registered in the police station
concerned". There are six provisos to that rule. Rule
II provides for the inquiry of a non-cogniz11ble offence;
and rule III prescribes the procedure in regard to an
offence only under s. 7 of the Police Act or a noncognizable offence of which the Superintendent of
Police considers unnecessary at that stage to forward
a report in writing to the District Magistrate. Paragraph 488 deals with a judicial trial and para. 489
with a departmental trial. Paragraph 489 says:
"A police officer may be departmentally tried
under section 7 of the Police Act(1) after he has been tried judicially;
(2) after a magisterial inquiry under the Criminal
Procedure Code;
(3) aft.er a police investigation under the Criminal Procedure Code or a departmental enquiry under
paragraph 486 III above."
There are other provisions dealing with the manner
of conducting the inquiries and other connected matters. The rules provide for the magisterial and police
inquiry followed, if the inquiry showed the need for
further action; by a judicial trial or a departmental
'9
2 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
709
trial, or both, consecutively. In the case of cognizable
x960
offences the Superintendent of Police is directed to
. . l p ro- Pradesh
The State of Uttar
.
.
mvest1gate
und er ch ap t.er XIV of th e C. l'lmma
& Others
cedure Code and in the case of non-cogmzable offences
v.
in the manner provided in rule II of para. 486, and Babu Ram
in the case of an offence only under s. 7 of the Police
Upadhya
Act or a non-cognizable offence in the manner provided under rule III of para. 486. After one or other of Subba Rao J.
the relevant procedure is followed, the Superintendent
of Police is empowered to try a police officer departmentally.
The question is whether rule I of para. 486 is directory. The relevant rule says that the police officer
shall be tried in the first place under chapter XIV of
the Criminal Procedure Code. The word "shall" in
its ordinary import is "obligatory"; but there are many
decisions wherein the courts under different situations
construed the word to mean "may". ThiifCourt in
Hari Vishnu Karnath v. Syed Ahmad lshaque( 1 ) dealt
with this problem at p. 1125 thus:
"It is well established that an enactment in form
mandatory might in substance be directory and that
the use of the word "shall" does not conclude the
matter."
It is then observed:
"They (the rules) a.re well-known, and there is no
need to repeat them. But they Ii.re all of them only
aids for ascertaining the kue intention of the legislature which is the determining factor, and that must
ultimately depend on the ,context."
The following quotation from Crawford "On the Construction of Statutes", at p. 516, is also helpful in this
connection:
"The question as to whether a statute is mandatory or directory depends upon the intent of the
legislature and not upon the language in which the
intent is clothed. The mea,ning and intention of the
legislature must govern, and these are to be ascertained, not only from the phraseology . of the provision,
but also by considering its nature, its design, and the
(I) [1955] I S.C.R. no4.
90
710
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1961]
consequences which would follow from construing it
the one way or the other ... ".
The State of Uttar
.
.
.
Prnd"h & oihm This passage was approved by this Court m State of
v.
· U. P. v. Manbodhan Lal Srivastava (1).
In Craies on
Babu Ram
Statute Law, 5th edition, the following passage appears
upadhya
at P· 242:
"No universal rule can be laid down as to whether
Subba Rao J.
mandatory enactments shall be considered directory
only or obligatory with an implied nullification for
disobedience. It is the duty of Courts of Justice to
try to get at the real intention of the Legislature by
carefully attending to the whole scope of the statute
to be construed."
A valuable guide for ascertaining the intention of the
Legislature is found in Maxwell on "The Interpretation of Statutes", 10th edition, at p. 381 and it is:
"On the other hand, where the prescriptions of
a statute relate to the performance of a public duty
and where the invalidation of acts done in neglect of
them would work serious general inconvenience or injustice to persons who have no control over those
entrusted with the duty without promoting the essential aims of the legislature, such prescriptions seem to
be generally understood as mere instructions for the
guidance and government of those on whom the duty
is imposed, or, in other words, as directory only. The
neglect of them may be penal, indeed, but it does not
affect .the validity of the act done in disregard of
them."
This passage was accepted by the Judicial Committee
of the Privy Council in the case of Montreal Street
Railway Company v. Normandin (2) and by this Court
in State of U. P. v. Manbodhan Lal Srivastava (1).
The relevant rules of interpretation may be briefly
stated thus: When a statute uses the word "shall",
prima facie, it is mandatory, but the Court may ascertain the real intention of the legislature by 9arefully
attending to the whole scope of the statute. For ascertaining the real intention of the Legislature the
Court may consider, inter alia, the nature and the
design of the statute, and the consequences which
1960
(1) [1958] S.C.R. 533, 545.
(2) L.R. [1917] A.C. 170.
2 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
711
1
would follow from construing it the one way or the
96o
other, the impact of other provisions whereby the Th 5 u
. of complymg
. wi•th th e provis10ns
. .
. quest•10n Pradesh
e late o1 ttar
necessity
m
& Others
is avoided, the circumstance, namely, that the statute
v.
provides for a contingency of the non-compliance
Babu Ram ·
with the provisions, the fact that the non-compliance
Upadhya
with the provisions is or is not visited by some
.
. l consequences t h at fl ow Subba Rao J.
penalty, t h e serious
or trivia
tlierefrom, and, above all, whether the object of the
legislation will be defeated or furthered.
Now what is tp.e object of rule 1 of para. 486 of the
Police Regulations? In our opinion, it is conceived
not only to enable the Superintendent of Police to
gather information but also to· protect the interests
of subordinate officers against whom departmental
trial is sought to be held. After making the necessary investigation under chapter XIV of the Criminal
Procedure Code, the Superintendent of Police may as
well come to the conclusion that the officer concerned
is innocent, and on that basis drop the entire proceedings. He may also hold that it is a fit case for criminal prosecution, which, under certain circumstances,
an honest officer against whom false charges are framed may prefer to face than to submit himself to a
departmental trial. Therefore, the rules are conceived
in the interest of the department as well as the officer.
From the stand point of the department as well as the
officer against whom departmental inquiry is sought to
be intiated, the preliminary inquiry is very important
and it serves a real purpose. Here the setting aside
of the order of dismissal will not affect the public in
general and the only consequence will be that the
officer will have to be proceeded against in the man.
ner prescribed by the rules. What is more, para. 487
and para. 489 make it abundantly clear that the
police investigation under the Criminal Procedure
Code is a condition precedent for the departmental
trial. Paragraph 477 emphasizes that no officer appointed under s. 2 of the Police Act shall be punished
by executive order otherwise than in the manner provided under chapter XXXII of the Police Regula.
tions. This is an imperative injunction prohibiting
712
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1961]
inquiry in non-compliance with the rules. Paragraph
489 only empowers the holding of a departmental
5
Pr:de~~·;,1Othe:: trial in regard to a police officer only after a police
v.
investigation under the Criminal Procedure Code.
Babu Ram
When a rule says that a departmental trial can be
upadhya
held only after a police investigation, it is not permissible to hold that it can be held without such investiSubba Rao 1 J,
.
T.i'
gat10n.
-"or
a ll t h e ,.ioregoing reasons, we hold that
para. 486 is mandatory and that, as the investigation
has not been held under chapter XIV of the Criminal
Procedure Code, the subsequent inquiry and the order
of dismissal are illegal.
For the foregoing reasons we hold that, as the respondent was dismissed without complying with the
provisions of para. 486(1), the order of dismissal is
illegal and that the High Court is right in setting
aside the order of dismissal.
In the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed with
costs.
r96o
Th
-
Ult
Wanc.hoo_ J.
WANOHOO, J.-We regret we are unable to agree
that the appeal be dismissed.
Babu Ram Upadhya (respondent) was a sub-inspector of police who was appointed in December, 1948.
In 1953, he was posted at Sitapur. On September 6,
1953, he was returning from a village called Madhwapur, when he saw a man who was subsequently found
to be Tika Ram coming from the side of a canal and
going hurriedly into a field. The movements of Tika
Ram roused his suspicion. One Lalji, an ex-patwari,
was also with the sub-inspector. Tika Ram was called and searched, and a bundle containing currencynotes was found on him. The sub-inspector took the
bundle and counted the notes and handed them over
to Lalji. Lalji in his turn handed over the notes to
Tika Ram. Thereafter Tika Ram, who is an old-man,
almost blind, went away. When he reached his house,
he found that there was a shortage of Rs. 250. He
then made a complaint to the Superintendent of
Police on September 9, 1953, in which he gave the
above facts. An inquiry was made by the Superintendent of Police and ultimately, departmental proceedings under s. 7 of the Police Act were taken
,_
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
713
agafost the respondent. These proceedihgs resulted
196o
in his dismissal and thereupon the respondent applied
The State of Uttar
. h Court u?d er Art. 226 of t h e Const•itu t•ion. Pradesh
to t h e H l~
& Others
The mam contention of the respondent was that
v.
r. 486 of the Police Regulations framed under s. 7 of
/Jabu 11am
the Police Act was not observed and therefore the
Upadhya
departmental proceedings taken against him were
illegal. The reply of the appellant was two-fold: in Wanchoo f.
the first plac~, it was urged that r. 486 did not apply
as there was no report of a cognizable offence against
the sub-inspector; and in the next place, it was urged
that the rules contained in the Police Regulations
were only administrative rules and even if there was
non-compliance with any of them, it would not affect
the departmental proceedings taken against the respondent, provided there was no breach of the guarantees contained in Art. 311 of the Constitution.
The High Court held that there was a report of a
cognizable offence under s. 409 of the Indian Penal
Code against the respondent and therefore the procedure provided by r. 486 ought to have been followed.
It further held that r. 486 had been framed under s. 7
of the Police Act and was a statutory provision, which
had the force of law. As such, following the earlier
view taken by the High Court in two other cases · it
held that a dismissal as a result of departmental proceedings which took place without complying with
r. 486 would be illegal. In consequence, the writ petition was allowed. The appellant then applied for a
certificate to enable it to appeal to this Court, which
was refused. Thereupon special leave was prayed for
from this Court, which was granted; and that is how
the matter has come up before us.
Mr. C. B. Aggarwala on behalf of the appellant
urges the same two points before us. So far as the
first point is concerned, we are of opinion that there is
no force in it. There is no doubt that in the complaint made by Tika Ram, the name of the respondent
was not shown in the heading; but from the facts disclosed in the body of the complaint it is clear that the
sub-inspector searched the person of Tika Ram and
recovered a bundle containing currency-notes. He
714
19 60
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1961]
did so obviously under the authority vested in him as
-, ·-,, uii a police officer.
When therefore he was satisfied
that
Th e S la e o;
ar h
.
.
Pradtsh & others t .ere was n~ reason t? take any further act10n agarnst
v.
T1ka Ram, 1t was his duty to see that the entire
Babu Ram
amount taken by him from Tika Ram on search was
Upadhya
returned to him (Tika Ram); The High Court was
Wanchoo f.
right in the view that where property is taken away
with the intention that it will continue to be the property of the person from whose possession it has been
taken away; there will be an entrustment of the property to the person taking it away, and if subsequently the person taking it away converts it to his own use
or suffers some other person to do so, there will be
criminal breach of trust and not merely criminal misappropriation. Thus an offence under s. 409 of the
Indian Penal Code appears to have been committed
prima f acie on the facts of this case. As an offence
under s. 409 is a cognizable offence, r. 486 of the
Police Regulations would apply. This brings us to the
main point in the present appeal.
Sec. 7 of the Police Act under which r. 486 has been
framed is in these terms:"Subject to such rules as the State Government
may fronI time to time make under this Act, the Inspector-General, Deputy Inspectors-General, Assistant
Inspectors-General and District Superintendents of
Police may at any time dismiss, suspend or reduce
any police-officer of the subordinate ranks whom they
shall think remiss or negligent in the discharge of his
duty or unfit for the same;
or may award any one or more of the following
punishments to any police-officer of the subordinate
ranks, who shall discharge his duty in a careless or
negligent manner, or who, by any act of his own shall
render himself unfit for the discharge thereof, namely:(a) fine to any amount not exceeding one month's
pay;
(b) confinement to quarters for a term not exceeding fifteen days, with or without punishment, drill,
extra guard, fatigue or other duty;
(c) deprivation of good-conduct pay;
2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
715
(d) removal from any office of distinction or spei96o
cial emolument;".
TJ
u11 at
1e 5 tate o1
It gives power to four grades of police officers to dis- Pradesh & 01i.m
miss, suspend or reduce any police officer of the suborv.
dinate ranks whom . they think remiss or negliBabu Ram
gent in the discharge of his duty or unfit for the same.
Upadhya
It also provides for infliction of four other kinds of Wanchoo ].
punishment by these four grades of officers on any
police officer of the subordinate ranks who discharges
his duty in a careless or negligent manner or who by
any act of his own renders himself unfit for the discharge thereof. In the present case we are concerned
with dismissal and' what we shall say hereafter should
be taken to be confined to a case of dismissal. Section 7 shows that the power of dismissal conferred by
it on the four grades of police officers is to be exercised subject to such rules as the State Government may
from time to time make under the Police Act. The
contention on behalf of the respondent is that the
power of dismissal has to be exercised subject to rules
and therefore, when r. 486 of the Police Regulations
(framed under s. 7) provided a certain procedure to
be followed with respect to cases in which a cognizable
offence was involved it was not open to the authority
concerned to disregard that procedure. In effect, it is
urged that r. 486 is a mandatory provision and noncompliance with it would invalidate the departmental
proceedings. It is not in dispute in this case that the
procedure provided by r. 486.was not followed. That
procedural provision is that where a report of a cognizable crime is made against a police officer belonging to the subordinate ranks, it has to be registered as
provided in Chapter XIV of the Code of Criminal Procedure and investigated as provided ·thereunder.
Thereafter the authority concerned has to decide
whether to send the case for trial before a court of
law or to take departmental proceedings. In thts case
no report was registered as provided under Chapter
XIV of the Code of Criminal Procedure and no i1?-vestigation was made as provided in that Chapter. All
that happened was that the Superintendent of Police
to whom Tika Ram had complained inquired into the
716
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1961)
complaint of Tika Ram and thereafter decided to hold
a departmental inquiry under s. 7 of the Police Act
The State ,°f Uttar against the respondent.
Pradesh
Others
.
,
.
v.
The mam contention on behalf of the appellant is
Babu Ram
that the Rules framed under s. 7 of the Police Act are
Upadhya
administrative rules and in any case they are only
directory and non-compliance with them would not
Wanchoo J.
vitiate the subsequent proceedings unless there is a
breach of the guarantee contained in Art. 311 of the
Constitution, as all public servants hold their office at
the pleasure of the President or the Governor, as the
case may be, other than those .expressly excepted
under the Constitution. Reliance in this connection
is placed on the case of R. Venkata Rao v. Secretary of
State for India in Council(').
This brings us to a consideration of the tenure on
which public servants hold office. The position in
England is that all public servants hold office at the
pleasure of His Majesty, that is to say, their service
was terminable at any time without amuse: (see Shenton v. Smith(')). By law, however, it is open to Parliament to prescribe a. different tenure and the King
being a party to every Act of Parliament is understood
to have accepted the change in the tenure when he
gives assent to such la.w: (see GouU v. Stuart (9 )). This
principle applied in India also before the Government
of India. Act, 1915, wa.s a.mended by the addition of
s. 96-B therein. SectiOn 96-B for the first time provided by statute that every person in the civil service
of the Crown held office during His .Majesty's plea.sure, subject to the provisions of the Government of
,
India Act and the rules made thereunder and the only
protection to a. public servant against the exercise of
pleasure was that he could not be dismissed by any
authority subordinate to that by which he was appointed. It was this section, which ca.me for consideration before the Privy Council in Venkata Rao's case(')
and the Privy Council held that in spite of the words
"subject to the rules made under the Government of
India Act," Venkata Ra.o's employment was not of a
1960
-
l'>'
(1) (1936) L.R. 64 I.A. SS
(2) [1895) A,C. "9·
(3) [11196) A,C. 575·
I
2 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
717
limited and special kind during pleasure with an
i96o
added contractual term that the procedure prescribed
.
b h
The State of Uttar
by t h e R u1es must b e ob s~rve d; it
was y t e express Pradesh & Others
terms of s. 96-B held "during His Majesty's pleasure"
v.
and no right of action as claimed by Venkata Rao Babu Ram
existed. . The Privy Council further held that the
upadhya
terms of s. 96-B assured that the tenure of office,
though at pleasure, would not be subject to capricious Wanchoo J.
or arbitrary action but would be regulated by the rules
which were manifold _in number, most minute in
particularity and all capable of change; but there was
no right in the public servant enforceable by action trJ
hold his office in accordance with those rules and he
could therefore be dismissed notwithstanding the
failure to observe the procedure prescribed by them.
The main point which was urged in Venkata Rao' s
case (1) was that under r. XIV of the Civil Services
Classification Rules no public servant could be dis.missed, removed or reduced in rank except after a properly recorded departmental inquiry. In Venkata"'Rao's
case (1) the departmental inquiry prescribed by the rules
was found not to have been held. Even so, the Privy
Council held that the words used in s. 96-B could not
and did not cut dow.n the pleasure of His Majesty by
rules, though it was observed that the terms of the section contained a statutory and solemn assurance that
the tenure of office, though at pleasure, would not be
subject to capricious pr arbitrary action, but would be
regulated by rule. It was further added that supreme
care should be taken that this assurance is carried out in
the letter and in the spirit. The Privy Council further
held that in the case before it, there had been a serious
and complete failure to adhere to important 8'nd indeed fundamental rules, and mistakes of a serious
kind had been made and wrongs had been done which
called for redress; even so, they were of the view that
as a matter of law that redress was not obtainable
from courts by action.
This was the position under the Gov.ernment of
India Act 1915. There was however a material change
in the Government of India Act, 1935. So fa.r, there
(I) {1936) L.R. 64 I.A. SS·
gI
718
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1961]
1 60
9
was one protection to a public servant, namely, that
Prad.sh & Others
to that by which he was appointed. In the Govern-
v.
Babu Rani
ment of India Act, 1935, s. 240(1) laid down that"except as expressly provided by this Act, every
person who is a member of a civil service of the
Crown in India ...... holds office during His Mai·esty's
pleasure."
The words of this section are different from those of
s. 96-B and the tenure of all public servnnts other
than those expressly provided for was to be during
His Majesty's pleasure_ There were, however, two
safeguards provided by sub-ss. (2) and (3) of s. 240.
The first was the same (namely, that no public servant
will be dismissed by an officer subordinate to that who
appointed him); but a further exception was added to
the pleasure tenure, namely, no public servant shall
be dismissed until he has been given a reasonable
opportunity of showing cause against the action proposed to be taken in regard to him. This protection
came to be considered by the Privy Council in High
T"' state of uttarhe-could not be dismissed by an authority subordinate
Upadhya
u·anchoo \].
Commissioner for Jnd,ia and, High Commissioner for
Pakistan v. I. M. Lall (1) and it was held that it was a
mandatory provision and qualified the pleasure tenure
and provided a condition precedent to the exercise of
power by His Majesty provided by sub-s. (1) of s. 240.
Thus by the Government of India Act, 1935, there
were two statutory guarantees to public servants
against the exercise of the pleasure of his Majesty;
but it is clear from s. 240 of the Government of India
Act, 1935, that the pleasure of His Majesty to dismiss
was not otherwise subject to rules framed under the
subsequent provisions of the Government of India Act
appearing in Chapter II of Part X dealing with public
services.
This position continued till we come to the Constitution. Article 310(1) of the Constitution provides for
what was contained in s. 240(1) of the Government
of India Act, 1935, and is in these terms:
"(I) Except as expressly provided by this Constitution, every person who is a member of a defence
(I) (1948) L.R, 75 l.A. 225.
2 s.c.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
719
service or of a civil service of the Union or of an allr96o
India service or holds any post connected with defence Th 5 -1 - 0 Utt
· il post und er t h e Umon,
·
h oldsoffi ce d urmg
· Pradesh
e ta e& 1Others
aY
or any c1v
the pleasure of the President, and every person who is a
v.
member of a civil service of a State or holds any civil
Babu Ram
post under a State holds office during the pleasure of
Upadhya
the Governor of the State."
It will be clear therefore that all public servants Wanchoo f.
except as expressly provided by the Constitution hold
their office during the pleasure of the President or the
Governor, as the case may be. Article 311 then provides for two guarantees and is similar in terms to
s. 240(2) and (3) of the Government of India Act, 1935
and the two guarantees are the same, (namely, (i) that
no person shall be dismissed or removed by an authority subordinate to that by which he was appointed,
and (ii) no such person shall be dismissed or removed
or reduced in rank until he has been given a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the action
proposed to be taken in regard to him). In Parshotam
Lal Dhingra v. Union of India (1), this Court held that
Art. 311 was in the nature of a proviso to Art. 310,
that it provides two constitutional guarantees cutting
down the pleasure of the President or the Governor,
as the case may be, and that it was a mandatory provision which had to be complied with before the pleasure provided in Art. 310 can be exercised.
Mr. Pathak for the respondent urges that in view of
the words of Art. 310 statute or statutory rules can
also cut down the nature of the pleasure tenure provided by Art. 310 in the same way as in England an
Act of Parliament cuts down the ambit of His
Majesty's pleasure in the matter of dismissal. He
relies on the words "as expressly provided by this
Constitution" and urges that it is open to the legiSlature to cut down the pleasure tenure by law or to provide for its being affected by statutory rules. In this
connection he relies on Art. 309 as well as Art. 154 of
the Constitution. Now, Art. 309 begins with the
words "subject to the provisions of this Constitution"
and lays down that "Acts of the appropriate Legislature may regulate the recruitment, and conditions of
(1) [1958j S.C.R. 828.
720
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1961]
servfoe of person appointed, to public services and
posts
in connection with the affairs of the Union or of
Th
01
' · ' " ' ., oihers
tlar any State " . Th e proviso
· to A rt. 3091ays d own t h at
Pra<lesh
v.
"it shall be competent for the President or the Gover.
Babu Rom
nor as the case may be to make rules relating to
Upadhy•
recruitment and conditions of service until provision
in that behalf is made by or under an Act of the
Wanchoo j.
· 1ature' ' . It wi11 b e c1ear immediateappropriate L eg1s
ly that Art .. 309 is subject to the provisions of. the
Constitution and therefore subject to Art. 310 and
therefore, any law passed or rules framed under Art.
309 must be subject to Art. 310 and cannot in any way
affect the pleasure-tenure laid down in Art. 310. The
words "except as expressly provided by this Constitution" appearing in Art. 310 clearly show that the only
exceptions to the pleasure tenure are those expressly
contained in the Constitution and no more. These
exceptions, for example, are contained inter alia in
Arts. 124, 148, 280 and 324 and also in Art. 310 (2).
Therefore, unless there is an express provision in the
Constitution cutting down the pleasure tenure, every
public servant holds office during the pleasure of the
President or the Governor, as the case may be. We
cannot accept the argument that a la.w passed under
Art. 309 prescribing conditions of service would become an express provision of the Constitution and
would thus cut down the pleasure tenure contained in
Art. 310. As the Privy Council pointed in Venkata
Rao's case (1), the rules framed under Art. 309 or the
laws passed thereunder amount to a statutory and
solemn assurance that the tenure of office though at
pleasure will not be subject to capricious or arbitrary
action but will be regulated by rule. But if the rules
or the law define the content of the guarantee contained in Art. 311 (2) they may to that extent be mandatory but only because they carry out the guarantee
contained in Art. 311 (2). Excepting this, any law or
rule framed under Art. 309 cannot cut down the pleasure tenure as provided in Art. 310.
The same in our opinion applies to a law passed
under Art. 154 (2)(b) which authorises Parliament or
the legislature of a State to confer functions on any
r96o
0 ,
- ,-
u
(1) (1936) L.R. 61 I.A. 55·
2 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
721
authority subordinate to the Governor. If any law is
r960
passed conferring on any authority the power to dis.
d
.
nk h l
The Stale of Uttay
miss or remove or re uce in ra , t at aw cannot. cut Pradesh &- Others
down the content of the pleasure tenure as contamed
v.
in Art. 310; that law would be passed under Art. 245
Babu Ram
and that article also begins with the words "subject
Upadhya
to the provisions of this Constitution". Therefore, the
law passed under Art. 154 (2) (b) would also in the Wanchoo f.
same way as the law under Art. 309 be subject to the
pleasure tenure contained in Art. 310 and cannot cut
down the content of that tenure or impose any further
fetters on it except those contained in Art. 311. The
position therefore that emerges from the examination
of the relevant Articles of the Constitution is that all
public servants other than those who are excepted
expressly by the provisions of the Constitution hold
office during the pleasure of the President or the
Governor, as the case may be,. and that no la;w or rule
passed or framed under Art. 309 or Art. 154 (2) (b)
can cut down the content .of the pleasure tenure as
contained in Art. 310 subject to Art. 311.
With this basic position in our Constitution, let us
turn to the Police Act with which we are concerned.
Section 7 thereof lays down that four grades of officers
will have power to dismiss, suspend or reduce any
police-officer of the subordinate ranks subject to such
rules as the State Government may from time to time
make under the Police Act. Though the Police Act is
a pre-constitutional law which has continued under
Art. 372 of the Constitution, it cannot in our opinion
stand higher than a law passed under Art. 309 or Art.
154 (2) (b) and cut down the content of the pleasure
tenure as contained in Art. 310. The police officers
of the subordinate ranks are not expressly excluded
from the operation of the pleasure tenure by any provision of the Constitution; they, therefore, hold office
.during the pleasure of the Governor and the only
protection that they can claim are the two guarantees
contained in Art. 3ll. It is true that s. 7 lays down
that the four grades of officers empowered to dismiss
will act according to rules framed by the St.ate Government; but that does not in our opinion mean that
722
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1961]
these rules could introduce any further fetter on the
-,u pleasure tenure under which the police officers of the
Th e SI a e o1 Ila•
· serv10e.
·
It was necessary t o
Pradesh o;. Others su b ord'mat e ran k s are m
v.
provide for the framing of rules because the section
Babu Ram
envisages conferment of powers of punishment of
upadhya
various kinds on four grades of officers relating to
various cadres of police officers in the subordinate
Wanchoo ].
"
rank s. I t was 1e f t tot h e ru1es to provid e which 1our
grades of officers would dismiss police officers of which
subordinate rank or would give which punishment
to a police officer of which subordinate rank. Such
rules would in our opinion be mandatory as they go to
the root of the jurisdiction of the four grades of police
officers empowered to act under s. 7. But further rules
may be framed under s. 7 to guide these police officers
how to act when they proceed to dismiss or inflict any
other punishment on police officers of the subordinate
ranks. These rules of procedure, however, cannot all
be mandatory, for if they were so they would be putting further fetters than those provided in Art. 311 on
the pleasure of the Governor to dismiss a public servant. Of course, if any of the rules framed under s. 7
carry out the purposes of Art. 311(2), to that extent
they will be mandatory and in that sense their contravention would in substance amount to contravention
of Art. 311 itself. If this were not so, it would be
possible to forge further fetters on the pleasure of the
Governor to dismiss a public servant and this in the
light of what we have said above is clearly not possible in view of the provisions of the Constitution. On
the other hand, it will not be possible by means of
rules framed under s. 7 to take away the guarantee
provided by Art. 311(1), which lays down that no
public servant shall be dismissed by an authority
subordinate to that by which he was appointed. If
any rule under s. 7, for example, lays down otherwise
it will clearly be ultra vires in view of Art. 311(1).
The rules therefore that are framed under s. 7 would
thus be of two kinds, namely (1) those which define the
jurisdiction of four grades of officers to inflict a particular kind of punishment on a particular police officer
of the subordinate rank-they will be mandatory
r96o
2 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
723
for they go to the root of the jurisdiction of the
i96o
officer exe~cising the P~"'.er, but even these rules can- The State of Uttar
not go agamst the prov1s10ns of Art. 311(1); and (2) Pradesh e;. Others
procedural rules, which again may be of two kinds.
v.
Some of them may prescribe the manner in which the Babu Ram
guarantee contained in Art. 311 (2) may be carried out
upadhya
and if there are anv such rules they will be mandatory. The rest will <1_be merely procedural and can only Wanohoo ].
be directory as otherwise if they are also mandatory
further fetters on the power of the Governor to dismiss
at his pleasure contained in Art. 310 would be forged
and this is not permissible under the Constitution. It
is from this angle that we shall have to consider
r. 486.
Before, however, we come to r. 486 itself, we may
dispose of another argument, namely, that the four
grades of officers who have the power to dismss under
s. 7 are exercising the statutory authority vested in
them and are not exercising the Governor's plea.sure
of dismissal under Art. 310 and therefore their action
in dismissing an officer is subject to all the rules framed for their guidance. We are of opinion that this
argument is fallacious. Article 310 defines the pleasure tenure and by necessary implication gives power
to the Governor to dismiss at pleasure any public servant subject to the exceptions contained in Art. 310
and also subject to the guarantees contained in Art.
311. This power of the Governor to dismiss is executive power of the State and can be exercised under
Art. 154(1).by the Governor himself directly or indirectly through officers subordinate to him. Thus it
is open to the Governor to delegate his power of dismissal to officers subordinate to him; but even when
those officers exercise the power of dismissal, the Governor is indirectly exercising it through those to whom
he has delegated it and it is still the pleasure of the
Governor to dismiss, which is being exercised by the
subordinate officers to whom it may be delegated.
Further though the Governor may delegate his executive power of dismissal at pleasure to subordinate
officers he still retains in himself the power to dis~iss
at pleasure if he thinks fit in a particular case in spite
724
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1961)
of the delegation. There can be no question that
where a delegation is made, the authority making the
The State of Utlar d 1
t"
t .
. "t lf wh a t h as b een d e1egate d .
Pradesh .;;. Others e ega ion re ams m 1 se
v..
Therefore, even where a subordinate officer is exercisBabu Ram
ing the power to dismiss he is indirectly exercising the
Upadhya
power of the Governor to dismiss at pleasure and so
his power of dismissal can only be subject to the same
Wa»ehoo•J.
limitations to which the power of the Governor would
be subject if he exercised it directly.
But it is said that in the present case the power has
not been delegated by the Governor under Art. 154(1)
and that it had been conferred on those police officers
by law* In our opinion, that makes no difference to
the nature of the power, which is being exercised by
these four grades of officers under the Police Act. As
we have already said Art. 154(2)(b) gives power to
Parliament or the legislature of a State by law to
confer functions on any authority subordinate to the
Governor. When the function of dismissal is conferred
by law on any authority subordinate to the Governor
it is nothing more than delegation of the Governor's
executive power to dismiss at pleasure by means of
law and stands in no better position than a delegation
by the Governor himself under Art. 154( I). Whether
it is delegation by the Governor himself or whether it
is delegation by law under Art. 154(2)(b) or by an
existing law, which must be treated as analogous to a
law under Art. 154(2)(b ), the officer exercising the
power of dismissal is only indirectly exercising the
Governor's power to dismiss at pleasure arid his order
of dismissal has the same effect as the order of the
Governor to dismiss at pleasure. Therefore, his order
also is only subject to the two fetters provided in Art.
311 of the Constitution and cannot be subjected to
any more fetters by procedural rules other than those
framed for carrying out the object of Art. 311(2).
Therefore, when the four grades of officers proceed to
dismiss any police officer of the subordinate rank under
s. 7 of the Police Act, they are merely exercising the
power of the Governor to dismiss at pleasure indirectly; and the only fetters that can be placed on that
power are those contained in the Constitution, namely,
Art. 311.
z960
.
-
2 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
725
We may in this connection refer once again to the
x96o
case of Venkat~ Rao (1) where the dismissal was by an n.e State : Uttar
officer subordmate to the Governor of Madras; but Pradesh & 1Others
that dismissal was also held to be an indirect exercise
v.
of His Majesty's pleasure to dismiss, and that is why Babu Ram
it was held that if r. XIV of the Classification Rules
upadhya
was not complied with, a public servant had no right
of action against an order dismissing him at His Ma- Wanchoo f.
jesty's pleasure. Therefore, whenever a subordinate
officer exercises the power to dismiss, whether that
power is delegated by the Governor, or is delegated
under a law made under Art. 154(2)(b) or under an
existing law analogous to that, he is merely exercising
indirectly the power of the Governor to dismiss at
pleasure and his action is subject only to the two
guarantees contained in Art. 311. The fact therefore
that the police officer in this case made the order of
dismissal by virtue of s. 7 will make no difference and
he will be deemed .to be exercising the power of the
Governor to dismiss at pleasure by delegation to him
by law of that power. We may add that even where
there is delegation by law of the power of the Governor to dismiss at pleasure, the power of the Governor
himself to act directly and dismiss at pleasure cannot
be taken away by that law, for that power he derives
from Art. 310 of the Constitution. The present case
therefore must be judged on the same basis as any
case of dismissal directly by the Governor and would
only be subject to the two limitations contained in
Art. 311.
We now come to r. 486. This rule, as we have
already indicated, provides that if there is any complaint of the commission of any cognizable crime by
a police officer, it must be registered in the relevant
police station, under Chapter XIV of the Code of Criminal Procedure and investigated in the manner provided by that Chapter. After the investigation is
complete, it is open to the authority concerned, be it
the Superintendent of Police or the District Magistrate, to decide whether to proceed in a court of law
(I) (1936) L.R. 64 I.A. SS·
92
726
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1961)
or to hold a departmental inquiry or do both, though
in the last case the departmental inquiry must take
~he}'~',;:/;}.;'"' place only aft.er the judicial trial is over. The first
'" " v.
""question then that arises is whether r. 486 is meant
Babu Ram
to carry out the purpose of Art. 311(2). As we read
upadhya
r. 486, we cannot see that it is meant for that purpose; it only provides for a police investigation under
Wanchoo,J.
Chapter XIV of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The
police officer making an investigation under Chapter
XIV is not bound to examine the person against
whom he i's investigating, though there is nothing to
prevent him from doing so. Nor is the person against
whom an investigation is going on under Chapter XIV
bound to make a statement to the police officer. In
these circumstances, the purpose of an investigation
under Chapter XIV is not relevant under Art. 311(2)
which-11ays that a public servant shall not be dismissed without giving him a reasonable opportunity of
·showing cause against the action proposed to be taken
in regard to him. Therefore, r. 486 not being meant
for the purpose of carrying out the object of Art. 311
(2) cannot be mandatory and cannot add a further
fetter on the exercise of the power to dismiss or remove at the pleasure of the Governor over and above
the guarantees contained in Art. 311.
It appears to us that the object of r. 486 is that the
authority concerned should first make a preliminary
inquiry to find out if there is a case against the officer complained against either to proceed iu a court or
to take departmental action. The investigation prescribed by r. 486 is only for this purpose. Incidentally
it may be that after such an investigation, the authority concerned may come to the conclusion that there
in no case either to send the case to court or to hold
a departmental inquiry. But that in our opinion is
what would happen in any case of complaint against
a public servant in any department of Government.
No authority entitled to take action against a public
servant would straightaway proceed to put the case
in court or to hold a departmental inquiry. It seems
to us axiomatic if a complaint is received against any
public servant of any department, that the authority
r960
2 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
--j;
'
727
concerned would first always make some kind of a
r9 60
preliminary inqu~ry to 8?'tisfy itself whether .th~re is The State : 1 Uttar
any case for taking action at all; but that is m our Pradesh &- Others
opinion for the satisfaction of the authority and has
v.
nothing to do with the protection afforded to a public Babu Ram
servant under Art. 311. Rule 486 of the Police Reguupadhya
lations also in our opinion is meant for• this purpose
. d Wanchoo J.
only and not meant to carry out t h e obJect contame
in Art. 311(2). The opportunity envisaged by Art.
311(2) will be given to the public servant after the
the authority has satisfied itself by preliminary inquiry that there is a case for taking action. Therefore, r. 486 which is only meant to gather materials for
the satisfaction of the authority concerned, whether
to take action or not, even though a statutory rule
cannot be considered to be mandatory as that would
be forging a further fetter than those contILined in
Art. 311 on the power of the Governor to dismiss at
pleasure. We are therefore of opinion that r. 486 is
only directory and failure to comply with it strictly or
otherwise will not vitiate the subsequent proceedings.
We may incidentally indicate two further aspects of
the matter. In the first place, if the argument is that
the Governor must exercise the pleasure himself so
that only the two limitations provided in Art. 311
may come into play ; it appears that the Governor
has exercised his pleasure in this case inasmuch as he
dismissed the revisional application made to him by
the respondent. There appears no reason to hold
that the Governor exercises his pleasure only when
he passes the original order of dismissal but not otherwise. Secondly the fact that r. 486 contains the word
"shall" is not decisive on the point that it is mandatory: (see Crawford on Statutory Construction, p. 519,
para. 262). In view of what we have said already,
the context shows that r. 486 can only be directory.
If so, failure to observe it strictly or otherwise will
not invalidate the subsequent departmental proceedings.
This brings us to the last point which has been
urged in this case; and that is whether there was substantial compliance with r. 486. We have already
728
'9 60
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1961]
pointed out that there was no strict compliance with
Th• Stat• of Uttar r. _486 as no case wa? regi~tcre_d on the complaint of
Pradesh &- Others T1ka Ram and no mvest1gat10n was made under
v.
Babu Ram
upadhy•
Wanchoo ].
Chapter XIV of the Code of Criminal Procedure. But
there is no doubt in this case that before the Superintendent of Police gave the charge-sheet to the respondent in November, 1953, which was the beginning of
·
t h e respond ent,
t h e d epartmenta l procee d"mgs agamst
he made a preliminary inquiry into the complaint of
Tika Ram and was satisfied that there was a case for
proceeding against the respondent departmentally. In
these circumstances it appears to us that the spirit of
r. 486 was substantially complied with and action
was only taken against the respondent when on a preliminary inquiry the Superintendent of Police was
satisfied that departmental action was necessary.
Even if r. 486 had been strictly complied with, this is
all that could have happened. In these circumstances
we are of opinion that r. 486 which in our opinion is
directory was substantially complied with in spirit
and therefore the subsequent departmental proceedings cannot be held to be illegal, simply because there
was no strict compliance with r. 486. The High
Court therefore in our opinion was wrong in holding
that the subsequent departmental inquiry was illegal
and its order quashing the order of dismissal on this
ground alone cannot be sustained. We would therefore allow the appeal.
BY COURT-In accordance with the opinion of
the majority, this appeal is dismissed with costs.
•
Report an error or ask for masking: grievance@lawgrids.org